Interview on Orbit TV with Emad Adeeb

Our first question is, today, especially, while this is the fourth day of the operations. I don’t want to go or to jump into the operations. I can’t imagine that you are a strategist or a military general to talk to you about the war itself; but I would like to talk to you about something humane -- something human. Whenever I go downtown, across downtown by the American Embassy the last week, I found a lot of demonstrations, a lot of police barricades around the Embassy, and I thought of just a simple question from a very human point of view. If I were the United States Ambassador in Cairo, how would I feel now? I don’t want you to answer me with a political answer but as David Welch, the human being, how did you pass this last week?

Ambassador Welch: Because I live at the place you’re talking about (laughs)? Is that why you are asking me, Mr. Adeeb? But first, let me say it is a pleasure to be on your program again. I watch your work very closely and I admire your skill and your insight.

Mr. Adeeb: Thank you sir.

Ambassador Welch: Well, I wish I were here under better circumstances, that is absolutely for sure. It isn’t you or me that brought us to this impasse -- it’s the regime in Baghdad. Of course, public opinion is charged on this issue, including here in Egypt. In fact, there have been demonstrations here, just as there have been in many capitals around the world…

Mr. Adeeb: In Manhattan (laughter).

Ambassador Welch: … and today in London and in other places. I have always said, when I address this question publicly, two things: First, I am not just an American diplomat, I am also a guest in your country here and I feel good about that. My job is to represent my country, but it is also to represent it in the nation of Egypt -- a fine place with good people where my family and I are comfortable and have been comfortable. I, too, wish my guests would not have to come through barricades. I, too, wish that the atmosphere were calmer, but I didn’t choose that -- this situation -- it was enforced upon us. Second,

I believe in the right of people to express themselves and to have a difference of view with our policy or with the Government of Egypt’s policy, or anyone’s policy. But all demonstrations and public manifestations ought to be kept within the law; and provided that they are, and that they are non-violent, I have no objection to hearing the views of others in whatever way they decide to express them. So, when I have spoken to this question in public here, I have always stressed that right of peaceful assembly.

Mr. Adeeb: But the utmost dream for an Ambassador is to cultivate the fruits of what he has been doing for a long time. Since you came in August 2001, you have been trying to push forward the Egyptian-American relations. Now, what took place in Iraq has enforced a terrible climate, a very negative climate, towards the American policy. We are witnessing now what you can call the anti-American sentiment at its worst, not at its best. This is sweeping all around the world. I want to put it very simple. If your country has gone to Iraq to get rid of one Saddam Hussein, isn’t it, on the other hand, creating 1,000 bin Ladens? You get rid of one Saddam, but you are creating a climate for 1,000 bin Ladens.

Ambassador Welch: I don’t believe so.

Mr. Adeeb: Ok. Let’s talk about this. Let’s discuss this.

Ambassador Welch: First of all, Saddam Hussein is a unique individual who has misled his country and his people for a very long period of time, and you’re right. It has affected the interests of Egypt and the interests of the United States. Every ambassador would like to preside over a flourishing bilateral relationship and a friendly atmosphere between peoples. Our bilateral relationship with Egypt is excellent, and we hope to advance it wherever we possibly can, and protect it from the effects of the regime in Baghdad.

The relationship between our peoples is also good. I think in terms of the friendliness of Egyptians toward the United States and the Americans in general, it is there. It’s true that people here and other places object to some of our policies, particularly on this issue at this time. And because we have now come to the situation that we’re in, where there is armed conflict, I think emotions are enormously high. This, too, will pass. This conflict will be resolved successfully by the operations that we have underway to disarm Saddam and remove that regime and in the days …

Mr. Adeeb: Why, Mr. Ambassador, this American overconfidence that it’s "easy"? We’ll pass it. We’ll get rid of this gang in Baghdad. We’ll get rid of this evil man in Baghdad. We’ll overcome this very limited transitional time of anti-Americanism. Everything will be okay. There are a lot of people who are friends to Americans, are asking the big question, "do you know what you are stepping into? Does this Administration really know what they are doing"?

Ambassador Welch: Mr. Adeeb, I think the choice between doing nothing about this problem and creating 1,000 bin Ladens, as you say, is a false choice. The problem with bin Laden and those who want to pursue terrorism to express their political ends, was there before. It is with us today, and unfortunately I wish I could say it won’t be with us tomorrow, but I can’t. You say that we are overconfident in this situation. I don’t think so. I believe that the American people have lots of doubts about war. That’s why our President has always said, "this is a measure that you resort to last, not first." That’s why he went on our airwaves over this weekend just to remind Americans that once we launch this enterprise, once we are seeking to resolve this by military means, it can be difficult. Some days there’s going to be good news, some days there’s going to be bad news. We need to steel ourselves for that. But one way or the other, this conflict will be resolved successfully by disarming this madman and his weapons of mass destruction, and then removing him from the position he now has grabbed onto.

Mr. Adeeb: Yes, but this depends on a scenario that it will be "easy", "swift"…

Ambassador Welch: No, I don’t think it does. No one has ever said it would be "easy" and "swift".

Mr. Adeeb: And short.

Ambassador Welch: Well, it is short so far. Let’s not rule out success. After all, we are only four days into this operation and fully a third of the country is now, or more if you count the northern liberated areas of Iraq which were liberated before, is not in the control of the regime of Baghdad anymore. Each day that passes, one more part of that country will be lost to the control of the regime; and, as our troops move forward, you will see behind them what the Iraqi people think about their situation. And we will hear from them in due course, without the gangs from Baghdad looking over their shoulder monitoring their every word.

Mr. Adeeb: Sir, but let us try to understand and go to the basics. Why have you done what you have done? Why did America go with military power, military invasion, even without a cover from the United Nations, from an approval of the Security Council, to Iraq? Is it to change Saddam? Is it to change the regime also? Is it to change Saddam and the regime, and occupy Iraq? Is it also for oil? Is it not only to change Saddam, but to create a showcase or a model for changing a lot of countries and re-shaping the map in the area?

Ambassador Welch: Well, I probably, sir, will forget one of the things you listed among the objectives here ...

Mr. Adeeb: Let me tell you: Saddam, the regime, oil, occupation, military occupation, and reshaping the area.

Ambassador Welch: Okay. First, the objective was always to disarm this regime of weapons of mass destruction. It is not supposed to have any. It does. And the question was what to do about it. When we saw that disarmament wasn’t occurring, we proposed a course of action to the Security Council. It could not, because of the will of one member, act in unison. We have plenty of legal authority in the existing resolutions to undertake the action that we are undertaking today. And we can discuss that if you wish. Because we didn’t see the regime cooperating with disarmament by peaceful means, you have to ask the question, "well, why is it making that choice?" And it is because of the decision of one man, backed up by his colleagues in the regime there. He is the source of the problem.

So the first two objectives listed by the President, clearly these operations of the coalition, are the disarmament of Iraq and the removal of the regime. The removal of the regime will accomplish the disarmament of Iraq.

Mr. Adeeb: Yes, I want to do something from this. I understand from this that if there is a system on planet Earth which has weapons of mass destruction and which is not cooperating with the international community to be disarmed, America would have the same position against the system?

Ambassador Welch: Not necessarily. It depends on the degree of risk we feel; the precedent in the case of UN resolutions or not; the cooperation of other powers, what they would like to do; the degree of regional interest. All these cases can be different; and you shouldn’t have inaction on one because you want the same action for all of them.

Mr. Adeeb: Concerning the mass destruction. I’m still talking about mass destruction. You have Iraq; you have Korea, the Korean example; and you have Israel. And you have three different attitudes toward the three.

Ambassador Welch: Well, I would list other countries among the proliferation problems in the world, too. But again, my point is simple. You shouldn’t have inaction on one that we see as extremely urgent, in order to have action of the same kind on all of them. It’s not right to mix the cases in this manner.

In your earlier question you also asked about three other things. Are we there to occupy Iraq? Do we want its oil? And do we intend to hold this up as a showcase, and to re-shape the map?

Let me attempt to address each of those. We do not intend to occupy Iraq. Iraq belongs to the people of Iraq and they may now get their first chance to decide for themselves what they want to do with it. The nation of Iraq should be a sovereign entity, united, with all its territory underneath its command, and the command belongs to the people of Iraq -- not to this filthy regime in Baghdad.

Second, do we want its oil? Not really, Mr. Adeeb. If we need the oil of Iraq or the oil of any other place, we do what we normally do -- we go out and buy it. This is not our objective in this conflict. It never has been and it will not be in the future. Now, look at the first steps taken by our military as they enter southern Iraq. It’s to protect the oil fields from the regime so that they can be used by the people of Iraq for their future. And right now in the Security Council, a resolution is being debated which will continue the oil-for-food program. How then is it that the United States wants the oil of Iraq?

Finally, you asked about this being a showcase, and the first of consecutive steps to redraw the map in the region. We don’t redraw maps. That’s not the business of the United States. We are not a colonial government. We don’t shape history in that way. We shape history by our values and our ideas. Others may not have done such a good job with a map before us, but this is the result that everyone inherited. Our objective in this case is to bring a tyrant down, disarm this country so that it is no longer a threat to us and its neighbors, and then we’ll begin the process of rebuilding it and giving it back to the Iraqi people. That will come, I think, as yes, a bit of a "showcase" for others to watch; and would that be so bad if that happens?

Mr. Adeeb: But this looks very utopic as if Mr. Bush is saying it. Bush, he needs a halo over his head and he has two wings and he’s coming from the sky? This is very angelic as if he’s an angel coming from the sky. I want to understand the national interest for America to do this. Some feelings are that it’s mainly directed to your allies in Europe, that controlling the energy, a country like Iraq, which has 33% of the reserves of the oil for the coming future of the coming 100 years, is very important. If you control oil, its reserves, its paths, its cost, at the end of the day you can control the international economy and you can create a slowdown in the European economy. This is one of the fears that is being dealt with.

Ambassador Welch: Well, you know, I’m sorry I find that theory almost hallucinatory. By that standard we should invade Canada and Venezuela and Mexico, from which we import most of our oil. This is not about oil. It never has been, it never will be. We import oil from all over the world. We don’t need to "control" it. After all, security of demand is an issue for the oil producers, and this is a mutual thing. I don’t think that this …

Mr. Adeeb: It’s not about oil. If we went and closed this path -- it’s not about oil. It’s about what?

Ambassador Welch: Well, how about if we open the path to the two reasons that I said in the beginning.

Mr. Adeeb: You talked about the showcase that you …

Ambassador Welch: No, no, remember my first two reasons. My first reason, the most important reason, is the disarmament of Iraq. After the invasion of Kuwait, the international community said, "we will pause this war, we will suspend conflict, and the price for that suspension is that Iraq must disarm itself of all the weapons of mass destruction it possesses. And inspectors should verify that that has occurred. Now, regrettably, that first opportunity, which Iraq was to have accomplished within 45 days, was never taken. Four-thousand five-hundred or so days later, here we are. It has failed to take the opportunity to disarm peacefully. Not even those who oppose action of the type that we are now seeing, and who opposed a decision on these matters within the Security Council, not even those people assert that Iraq is disarmed. It is incredible to assert that Iraq is disarmed, and that’s why no country of any responsibility does it.

Mr. Adeeb: Sir, you talked about why not a showcase as a matter of bringing it as a democratic example in the area. Could you impose democracy by force? Is it the same model like what happened in Germany and in Japan after the Second WW?

Ambassador Welch: Well, I don’t believe so. Personally, I believe that the impulse for freedom is present in this region. I don’t agree with those commentators, including some in the United States, who talk about an inability of people and governments in this area to change themselves. I’m an optimist in this area. And I believe -- I think it’s implied in your question -- that the best of these measures would be homegrown, that is, the peoples and governments themselves would produce them and we would like to support that. American people respond to that. The American Government seeks that. That is not something that is detrimental or harmful to anyone. What are we arguing against here -- the people should have the right of choice? If this is ever given to the Iraqi people as we now propose to do, I think they are going to be the first ones to stand up and say, ‘Hey, this is not a bad thing and we recommend it to others!’ But that isn’t constructing a new map for the Middle East. It is an example that we would like to see standing at the end of the day. Do we have other examples for this? Yes. You mention a couple -- Germany and Japan. Democracy was not imposed in Germany and Japan by force. They lost the war, yes, but what came after the war was their decision. And the vigor of that process is evident in today’s Germany and Japan. Germany, on the one hand, who disagrees with us about this approach, and Japan, on the other hand, who does agree with us.

Mr. Adeeb: Yes, but President Bush, when he came to power, he said after the 11th of September, "we are not in the position of nation building." But he went and started nation building in Afghanistan and now the whole plan is how to do a nation building after the Saddam era. Why are you getting into trying to decide the future of some national systems?

Ambassador Welch: Well again, I don’t believe that’s our object here. Our object is first, liberate the country; second, stabilize it, help to rebuild it and, in that process, to begin turning it back to its people.

Mr. Adeeb: This is something like BOT -- build, operate, transfer. This business mentality can’t work with people.

Ambassador Welch: Why not? Is there something genetically impossible here? But Mr. Adeeb, let me understand what you are saying. Are you saying it’s impossible for the Iraqi people to determine their own future?

Mr. Adeeb: Not this, not this. You can’t change the cycle of history or push it by force. It has to transform and mature on a gradual pace.

Ambassador Welch: We’re not changing the cycle of history. We don’t have those kinds of Olympian objectives. Our objective is simple. It’s to remove this regime. When this regime is gone, we hope to give the Iraqi people their chance for a better future. That will be the measurement of our ambition here, Mr. Adeeb. And I don’t think it is going to take like a month or two. It’s a long process, and we have to be willing as a people and a nation, to sustain that process. But, it is unfair to judge it right now simply because Iraq has been such a difficult country over the last 30 or 40 years. Why has it been that way? Probably because of the people who lead it.

Mr. Adeeb: Mr. Ambassador, before arguing about how Iraq would look or whether it would work or not, we would like to listen more about ideas. What happens if Saddam is not anymore there, American military forces are in control, what is the plan, what are you going to do? How do you imagine that you can shape it, the form you are talking about to help in building a society?

Also, second question has to be attached to this one. Do you know what you are getting into? I mean the complications of Iraq, their ethnic divisions there, the tribal system there, the differences in religion, the split in the society? They have been under 35 years under tyranny, under a system which is holding the power for 35 years. There is a generation, or more than a generation, which is being brainwashed. Do you know the geopolitics of the area? Do you know the social fiber of this country? A lot of Iraq is a "hot potato." It’s not that easy. While you want to build your structure or your showcase, do you understand what you are getting into?

After the commercial break, we are going to discuss it.

Mr. Adeeb: Once again, Mr. Ambassador, we resume our dialog. The question was posed to you about what would happen the morning after, and do you know what you are getting into?

Ambassador Welch: I wish I knew all the answer to all those complications that you identify. I think your question is very smart. It’s important to enter this discussion with some sense of humility about what we are talking about here. After all, Iraq does have a lot of divisions within it. It’s lived under, as you said, a tyranny for some 35 years. The people are worried and confused about their future. The economic and other difficulties are very, very strong as well.

So, let me be clear about one thing. I haven’t got the answer to all those questions. I think those are very valid ones and, if anything, we enter into this with some knowledge that we can’t do this all by ourselves. We are going to need support and advice from others.

Mr. Adeeb: But does your administration has a whole scenario for the future or are they handling it day-by-day?

Ambassador Welch: No, we’re not handling it day-by-day. But nor do we have a plan with minute details that will address each of those areas of risk that you identify.

Mr. Adeeb: But what is first? The first day you are in, what would you do?

Ambassador Welch: I would divide the issue roughly into three phases. There is probably more certainty about the earlier ones. First, there is the issue of stabilizing the country and assuring that there are no humanitarian difficulties. That’s a very substantial undertaking in and of itself, given that Iraq has gone through two major wars before this conflict, through a long period of sanctions because the regime did not comply peaceably with the requirements put upon it, and now this latest conflict. So the first phase will be to stabilize the situation, control its humanitarian consequences, and begin to get the country back on its feet again.

The second phase is that of reconstruction, rebuilding and, as we say, transition. And in that phase, more and more Iraqis should begin then to run their own affairs, and to begin to think about some of the issues for the third phase.

The third phase will be essentially, for lack of a better term, giving this country back to its people for them to decide how they will govern themselves in the future. Of course, there are lots of ideas about how this might be accomplished, ranging from institutional questions to political participation. Again, I can’t answer all those, but one theme in what we will suggest to Iraqis will be that they do it themselves. Another theme would be to do it with the help and cooperation of the international community. And personally, I would like to see an Arab role in that. I think that there are lots of questions that would probably be better to have an answer that comes from the Arabs themselves about what the future of Iraq should be like. That’s a shared enterprise because I think we all have an interest in peace and stability in this area, and a peaceful and stable Iraq would be an interest to all its neighbors.

Mr. Adeeb: Mr. Ambassador, the idea of Saddam having a safe haven: is it still possible or, since you entered, has the map changed?

Ambassador Welch: This regime, we’re seeing it dissolve before our eyes today. That’s a good thing. It could happen faster if they decided to pack up and leave. I think that option still remains open to them; but again, their performance so far does not indicate that they intend to take it. This conflict could be brought to a much more rapid close if that were to happen. And to this day, I think those who are listening to us, if there’s anybody watching this in Iraq who is thinking about how they can stop this madness from being imposed on them by their leaders, all they have to do is not stand in the way.

Mr. Adeeb: Sir, President Bush asked the Iraqis to go into their houses, close their doors, and not to be a part of what’s happening. This can be understood if you don’t have 1,500 missiles and bombs thrown on the capitol, which is 660 square kilometers, and which includes under its roof, a population of 5 million. How would you go if you were an Iraqi, and you believe President Bush, you go into your house, you close your door, and you will trust his promise, then you have 1,500 rockets and missiles thrown at you?

Ambassador Welch: Mr. Adeeb, forgive me sir, but I don’t agree with the premise of that question. We are not aiming at the Iraqi people -- not one rocket, not 1,500 rockets. We’re aiming at the institutions that support the regime of Saddam Hussein -- at him and his henchmen. We haven’t been bombing civilians. I would love it if this could be done so surgically and precisely that not one single, innocent life was affected at all.

Mr. Adeeb: But there is no insurance policy there that you can avoid touching civilians.

Ambassador Welch: That’s right.

Mr. Adeeb: And there are victims…

Ambassador Welch: And there have been victims all along from the wars that this man started -- far more civilians that are going to be affected by this one. Let’s not forget that. It’s very important to look at what is not happening that people were worried about. If you watch the pictures of Baghdad, pictures that alarm all of us when we see military force being used, I’m not comfortable with that; but on the other hand, I see some other things, too. I see that the lights are still on, the bridges are still standing, the people are still walking in the street. The oil wells -- who started the fires at the oil wells? Fortunately, we got there before the regime did, in most of the cases; so only seven wells were burning. Now, most of the wells in the south are secured; the infrastructure and the ability of civilian life to restore itself rapidly to normalcy is not being attacked -- very important to stress that. In any military conflict, you cannot control every consequence, but the direction here is very clear, and the accusation that it is otherwise, is unfair.

Mr. Adeeb: Mr. Ambassador, the picture of Baghdad skies at night burning, it will always be in the memory and in the souls and in the hearts of a whole generation in the Arab world and in the Muslim world. It will have its effects something like the heroic pictures of the 11th of September. You have always to look to the other side-how they look to the picture. Sometimes you look that people who are demonizing what the Americans are doing, that perhaps they are fanatics, they are militants, they don’t understand what’s good for them. But you also have to understand how we think, how we feel, for an Arab looking to the TV and seeing an Arab capital burning.

Ambassador Welch: Well, I am not dismissing your feeling, believe me. In fact, I noticed that quite a number of people who are not Arab, share your concern.

Mr. Adeeb: Yes.

Ambassador Welch: Nor would I dismiss their emotions either. But I think it’s important to focus on the objective here. The regime in Baghdad is not showing you what the military targets were for that bombing. For all the destruction that we supposedly saw on the television, they have not taken the cameras to see what the targets were.

Mr. Adeeb: Why don’t you show it if you have satellite pictures?

Ambassador Welch: Well, if you’re looking at it from overhead, it is not quite the same as when you’re looking at it from on the ground. They have the ability to take their cameras in there, but they’re never going to show their own people that.

Mr. Adeeb: Sir, do you think that the prisoners of war, who were taken and they were announced today by the Iraqis, ought to be dealt with in a human way and a civilized way? Do you think this will be a gambling card or a trump card in the hands of the Iraqi Government?

Ambassador Welch: Well, Mr. Adeeb, this is a difficult question. I know about how the prisoners of war that are held by the coalition forces will be treated.

Mr. Adeeb: How? Could you explain to the …

Ambassador Welch: Sure. You will not see them on TV saying what town in Iraq they came from. You will not see them giving their name, and their unit’s name, to a camera. You’re not going to see them and their comrades looking in the condition that we have seen them on some of the satellite TV stations. The reason is simple. We treat these people with dignity and respect, giving them the rights to which they’re entitled under international law.

I personally hope that the Iraqi Government does the same for my countrymen and any others that they capture in the course of this conflict; but I have very low expectations for the regime in Baghdad. As we have already seen, this is an unfortunate beginning. I question the motives of those who would participate in this action, too, by showing you and all your viewers this kind of stuff on your TV. I think they participate in the crime that you see before you.

Mr. Adeeb: You mean the Al Jezeera television?

Ambassador Welch: They should make a different editorial judgment; after all, the American networks are not showing Iraqi prisoners of war in this situation.

Mr. Adeeb: Sir, I’m not defending the Al Jazeera television but we have seen what the so-called 500 embedded TV correspondents, with the alliance forces -- some of them have shown us the pictures of the Iraqi soldiers while they were surrendering and holding the white flag, and then going down on their knees and being searched. We’ve seen these pictures. Don’t you think it’s a kind of humiliation for this picture? It’s a judgment also.

Ambassador Welch: No sir, I thought they were treated with dignity. I mean, after all, they are soldiers and one has to be concerned for the security of any surrender. Once they’re surrendered, though, they’re in the protective custody of our forces and international law, and I guarantee you, not one of them will walk out of those gates having been abused. This is not our way, it won’t happen.

Mr. Adeeb: Here I move to a second point Mr. Ambassador. There is this understanding that now we are witnessing a change of heart in the administration which is ruling the United States of America. Always America was the super power, but now some people are looking to Mr. Bush as an Emperor, as Caesar, and America is the Roman Empire and Washington is Rome and the other countries should deal with it as their obedient servant. I know it’s a magnification of a picture, but is American policy moving towards an imperial policy that we don’t care about our allies, we don’t care about our friends, we don’t take advice from anyone, we don’t care about the U.N. or the Security Council? Might is Right and not Right is Might, this is what we are going to do, and whoever wouldn’t like it, if you want us you join with us, if you don’t join us you are our enemy and you are preaching for terrorism. Is this is what it is all about? Or we are missing understanding? Is there is a misunderstanding in visualizing what you are doing?

Ambassador Welch: Thank you for saying that that was a magnification. I think under a microscope the argument doesn’t hold. First, if I may say something, because it is a very important preface to my answer. No administration, to use your word, rules the United States. America is the oldest living government by the people, of the people, and for the people. The people of the United States run the United States. We have an administration in power now; it may be a different one four years from now or eight years from now. This is the way we run our affairs. We don’t have emperors in the United States, we have no colonial history, we have no aspirations to be an empire. If anything we’ve had responsibility imposed on us by changes in international circumstances, and just a few years ago the accusation was made that the United States was reluctant to accept this responsibility. I don’t think that you need worry that the American people are going to support many of the things that you say or believe what you imply in your question, or the objectives in the American administration. It is an interesting and provocative one, but not one that need not detain us very long. I just don’t see that in American history, I don’t see the American people desiring that and I don’t see our administration, especially this administration, intent upon establishing that. The point that we’ve been making here is that we have a danger from Iraq, and we intend to deal with that danger. We don’t have ambitions on the scale that you described.

Mr. Adeeb: You said: "we don’t have a colonial history." Perhaps now, under this administration, you are joining the colonial club with a super power controlling 72% of the currency of the world, controlling the energy, controlling the power. It’s a different colonial power. A very advanced one.

Ambassador Welch: I just can’t agree with that. It’s not how we look at it. The issue here is not one of control. If there is anything that motivates us here, it is giving the control and power to the people.

Mr. Adeeb: If you are run by the people, for the people, did you find demonstrations in the streets of New York and California and everywhere, the people asking the President to go and get rid of Saddam Hussein? It was vice versa. It was the demonstrations asking him not to go to war, until today not to go to war.

Ambassador Welch: I think the American public opinion is solidly behind President Bush on this, was before the conflict started and will be afterwards. If I may say, I wasn’t thinking of the American people, when I talked about the empowerment of people, I was thinking about others. That may be somewhat of a novel thought to the people of Iraq, but guess what, they may be shocked to discover that after all this is said and done, we are actually going to live up to our word and give them a free choice. Would that be a stunning thing in this part of the world? Perhaps.

Mr. Adeeb: Ok. Under which circumstances would this project, this Iraq project or this military project or whatever you want to call it, Liberty for Iraq, or Iraq Liberty, or Freedom for Iraq, would succeed and under which circumstances it would fail? What is the measurement of success and failure in this operation?

Ambassador Welch: An important question. I think the first and the most important object is the removal of the regime, then disarmament, then the stabilization of the situation, and then gradually the return of the authority and control over all of Iraq, one country unified to these people.

Mr. Adeeb: There is this fear that one of the targets of this Iraqi operation is to reshape the alliances in the area and reshape the area. Like you have said that, for instance, not you but one of the administration, Mr. Rumsfeld, described Germany and France as "old Europe." You can come and say that Egypt and Saudi Arabia are the old Arab world. They don’t satisfy our needs or ambitions of the shape of what country or what alliances or what friends we need to deal with. For instance, an American Iraq, a friendly Qatar, a friendly Jordan, a friendly Israel, a friendly Turkey, would reshape or become a group of countries that can reshape the area. This is the example of the countries we need to deal with. But Egypt and Saudi Arabia are the old system, they should join the new kind of showcase. This is what you are talking about. You read 100 articles about this kind of fear, this kind of question mark. How do you think about those two systems, Riyadh and Cairo?

Ambassador Welch: I’ve lived in both places, and I have this to say about that. I think in terms of the whole region, if we just look at this region of the world. Our aspiration is not to divide it up into old and new, friendly and unfriendly, but I think it would be a good thing if this region one day looked a little bit more like Europe as a whole, like Latin America. Yes, countries that are mostly friendly with the United States, stable democracies, looking forward in the future and providing for their people. That would not be a bad thing. How to go about it, that is different in every case. The regime in Baghdad is not like any other regime, not only in the Arab world today, but in Arab history. So I don’t think about whether this should be the model for how you do it in the other places. Different tools for different situations. But that doesn’t mean that we wouldn’t support change where change is occurring in a positive way. There is change going on in the Arab world and it’s important to recognize that to support it where it’s happening. But that doesn’t mean you have to do it exactly this way that you described.

Mr. Adeeb: But if they say the queen is not amused. If Washington is not amused at the pace of change in Cairo, in Riyadh, a la American, its not done the American way -- do you understand the national reasons, do you understand the local restrictions, for whoever is running the show in Egypt, or in Riyadh?

Ambassador Welch: Well, actually I’ll stay away from those examples, for a second and use, forgive the term, "old Europe." If we have a disagreement with them about how to do things, we don’t resort to attacking their government. I mean, look at what we are talking about here. We have stable and friendly relationships with many of the governments in this area. That is a good thing, and each one of those countries is different from the other. I don’t think Egypt is actually that much like Saudi Arabia. I think what Saudis want to do within their own country is for them to decide, and I am sure many of them are seeking change in ways appropriate to their society, I see that happening here in Egypt too.

Mr. Adeeb: But is there somebody sitting in the White House and understanding that every law of action and reaction has its equation and the national leaders of each country have their own restrictions and their own equations? Or is it if you are not applying to the American law of conduct, you are a naughty boy?

Ambassador Welch: I am not entirely sure what you mean by all that, but yes of course, the President of the United States, the Vice President and their advisors take all this very seriously. I think actually, Al Ahram asked the question of Vice President Cheney in this regard just the other day, in an interview.

Mr. Adeeb: They said they don’t have a list of changes.

Ambassador Welch: Exactly, he was very careful in his response. Take that as an indication of the seriousness of this matter for us. And again, to support change where changes occur is not an unfriendly thing, it is at its core a friendly thing.

Mr. Adeeb: Ok. Do you understand the difference between being a friend to the United States and between "an agent to the United States?"

Ambassador Welch: Well, yes, I mean, I think our friends help us in time of need and advise us about how to go about it, and you can have disagreements between friends.

Mr. Adeeb: And our agents?

Ambassador Welch: We don’t have any agents.

Mr. Adeeb: It means somebody who has no national look to his interest, he is your obedient servant. There are some examples in the world like this who would do whatever the Americans want.

Ambassador Welch: I am not sure how far down that track I want to go. The United States does not purchase any one’s national interest. Countries decide for themselves. They make a decision based on the merits of the case and how it affects them.

Mr. Adeeb: It means a friend can tell you what he believes, and differ with you.

Ambassador Welch: And believe me, it seems to me that in this crisis we’ve had more than our share of advice from our friends and some advice from some of those who are not so friendly to us also.

Mr. Adeeb: But the question was, tell me what advice, one piece of advice you took from any of your friends? You just neglected everything and you went through your own plan.

Ambassador Welch: Not entirely. I can’t agree with that.

Mr. Adeeb: Ok. Tell me how you accepted some advice from your friends, like what?

Ambassador Welch: For example, pursuing this through the Security Council, until it was completely and totally obvious to us that but for the will of one member, we would not be able to get action on the Security Council. That was a decision that was deliberately taken by the President of the United States because he had advice from his friends. We also by the way found that it was the right thing to do. It’s good when those two things coincide. Regrettably, we were not able to achieve that in the Security Council but that wasn’t our fault, we would hope for a better outcome. And here we are today, and we still rely upon our friends, each and every decision.

Mr. Adeeb: Mr. Ambassador, now we want to talk about how the rules of the relationship between America and its friends. I think there is difference between being a European friend and somebody who belongs to the Third World, because still, in friendship, there are degrees, and the power of each country has its influence and its kind of friendship. I don’t think for instance, Burkina Faso being a friend to the States, is not like for instance the British-American relation. It differs, from one country to another. Does it bother this administration that somebody would come and tell them: believe me this is wrong, believe me if you went to Iraq it’s harmful, believe me it will open the gates of hell, believe me it will have its impact on the area, believe me it will create an anti-American sentiment? How do they receive this message? For instance, President Bush is meeting a leader from the Middle East and in a closed room and he is telling him this kind of advice -- is it acceptable? Do they have open ears, an open heart to listen to this?

Ambassador Welch: I participated in some of those conversations with this administration and of course the administration before it. The answer is yes, it’s especially important when our friends, who are our friends because not only we feel good about them but more often than not our interests coincide. Its important when those friends do speak up if they don’t agree with us. I hope you would agree it’s also important for us to speak up when we don’t agree with the decisions that they are taking. That exchange is the basis of any serious relationship between countries. I think that it’s not fair to divide the world into Europeans and the Third World, in those terms too. For example there are many European countries that agree with us on this but maybe have different advice on how to proceed with the issue of Iraq. There are countries in the Third World who genuinely belong to the Third World and would never agree with us on how to proceed with the issue of Iraq. Cuba and North Korea stand out as examples. There are quite a number of our friends in the developing world who are also standing with us at this time. It is not meaningless to have that support. Some have said well what is this coalition that you say have 45 countries, but only two matter. Well, I think that depreciates the power of decision of each on of the other 43. These voices are very important to us. We would like to have this support, but we respect disagreement where it occurs.

Mr. Adeeb: But tell me how this advice has ever influenced you. You told me going to the Security Council, give it a second or a third chance, was a result for an advice, but I think maybe that was an advice from Mr. Blair, Prime Minister Blair. But for instance, how you perceive the position of the French or the Germans. These people are your friends, your partners in the NATO, they are from the Western alliance, you enjoyed historical relations with these countries. How now, suddenly, we are seeing a different world?

Ambassador Welch: Well, first on any foreign policy issue, every country has to take decisions based upon its appraisal of the risk and the benefits of its proposed course of action. In evaluating those risks and benefits it’s important to listen to all types of advice from your friends and from others too. And to weigh it accordingly. That occurred in the case of France and Germany. Unfortunately we didn’t agree with them. We don’t agree that avoiding war at all cost is the way to approach this problem.

Mr. Adeeb: But they looked to you that you want to go to war at all cost.

Ambassador Welch: And we looked at them saying that peace at any price was the preferable option. Forget it; that was not going to happen. For us, as we weighed the risks and benefits of action we saw that the risk was very important in not acting. Now, those two countries, both sitting now coincidentally on Security Council, France as a permanent member, Germany as an elected one, had preferred courses of action. They were actually a little bit different from one another. I think I can summarize it as follows: while they wanted the Security Council to act, they were determined that it would not act in a certain way. And by that they brought the whole process to a grinding halt. That’s really unfortunate. It would have been better to have the 18th resolution, but for us it was not necessary in the legal sense.

Mr. Adeeb: They weigh the other side of the coin. If you flip the coin to the other side. The new conservatives, what they call them, the new conservatives running the show in Washington, in this administration, would like to go to war at any price. They wanted to put all obstacles, they would never accept anything done by the Iraqis or any time line, or any chances for giving a peace of chance. They wanted war, war with any price, because this serves their ideas, their ideology, their interests.

Ambassador Welch: I’ll come back to my earlier answer. The Government of the United States belongs to the people in the United States. They make the decisions ultimately. Bush, our President, leads us. There is not a clique of people running America unbeknownst to the interest of its voters.

Mr. Adeeb: This clique was theirs. If we return to the papers, to the papers, 26th of January 1998, an open letter was sent to the honorable William Clinton, the President of the United States of America. In this open letter, which was published in the American papers, there was a demand from some people, important dignitaries in the American society, asking him to use force against Iraq. And that the way using this force against Iraq would reshape the new security policy of the United States towards a lot of things in this world. And it went on putting this doctrine which is being practiced today. When we look to who have signed on this letter, number one was Mr. Rumsfeld, Mr. Armitage, you go to 11 personalities who are now in this current administration. I think it’s a clique it’s a group of people. I am not blaming them that they have an idea; perhaps they are one team and it only makes sense if you have a homogeneous team in one administration. But I mean there is a set of mind, there is a theory, there is a concept to do this whatever the price is. This is what we are fearing in the world.

Ambassador Welch: Well, that would not be consistent with the course of action that we have followed. We have never believed that war, whatever the price, was the objective. The disarmament of Iraq, if it could have been accomplished via the Security Council route as it should have been 12 years ago, would have been the preferred option. Always was the preferred option. Unfortunately it didn’t work, and we are where we are today. That was not our decision, and with all due respect it wasn’t the Government of France’s decision either, it wasn’t the Government of Germany’s. It was the decision of the regime in Baghdad, if they had wanted to disarm, they could have started a long time ago to show convincing evidence that they have no weapons of mass destruction. They didn’t do that. Now, you’re right there are a lot of different voices that shape American policy, that are influences in American politics. We happen to think that’s a healthy thing, and I would point out that with respect to that letter, the Clinton administration didn’t agree with it and stuck with that course of action to the Security Council for another almost 2 remaining years of its term. And still, no results. This has been a long bitter and frustrating experience, trying to use the Security Council to achieve the disarmament of Iraq.

Mr. Adeeb: Here, Vice President Cheney, who is a believer of this theory said we have swept the problem, he means Iraq, under the rug for too long. He thinks you have to call it, look eye-to-eye and start doing something about it.

Ambassador Welch: I am not going to interpret my Vice President’s words, but I would say this about how we reach a decision. In any given foreign policy we are going to weigh the risks and benefits. The risk of containment of Iraq was tolerable for a period of time. This was important when there could be benefits, that is disarmament, shown. As there was less benefit, less disarmament, the risks grow, and especially after September 11, the idea that there could be a regime of this character in possession of these weapons, which then might use them against us, is not tolerable to the American people. That’s why today, as we are in this armed conflict, the overwhelming majority of the American people support this decision. It’s just as simple as that.

Mr. Adeeb: Mr. Ambassador. What happens if you controlled all of Iraq, you got rid of the system, you are there, you searched in Iraq, you left no stone unturned, and you discover that there aren’t weapons of mass destruction. Will you say, "oops, we made a mistake"?

Ambassador Welch: If all those things turn out to be true, we’ll have to see what we’ll say. I don’t believe for one heartbeat that that’s going to be the case. Let’s not forget, that in the last presentation made to the Security Council on this issue, the UNMOVIC inspectors put forward a 167-page report that details the number of things that they cannot find. I don’t need to recite the list; it’s there in a UN document. Go have a look. It’s not a small thing. It’s not like there’s one little missile out there; it’s a whole bunch of things.

Mr. Adeeb: General Franks yesterday said, in a very explicit way, that he’s deadly sure there is WMD in Iraq. Is he talking from information, or from an assumption, or from a belief?

Ambassador Welch: He’s speaking from information. Again, whenever I get this question, Mr. Adeeb, I always point to what is publicly available information. I don’t believe in this game of saying it’s so secret I cannot tell you. Look at what the United Nations itself has said. Every single international examination of this topic has come to the same conclusion, starting with the comprehensive review of Iraq policy launched after Operation Desert Fox at the end of 1998. That disarmament panel, under the chairmanship, not of an American, but a Brazilian diplomat, Ambassador Ameram (sic), came to a solid conclusion that Iraq was not disarmed, and then it listed the reasons for that conclusion. There it is, in the international records. Have a look for yourself.

Mr. Adeeb: Mr. Ambassador, the other scenario: what happens if tomorrow, or after tomorrow or after 3 days, the American forces discover a secret hideaway for WMD. Politically, how would this change the image for the American Administration?

Ambassador Welch: First of all, I hope we find it and it isn’t used. That would be the best of all outcomes. If we find it, we will try and control it and establish what it is …

Mr. Adeeb: No, I mean the political gains, if it is found.

Ambassador Welch: Well, you can answer that for yourself. I think they’re very obvious.

Mr. Adeeb: You wouldn’t take the position of "we told you so?"

Ambassador Welch: I don’t think we need to be in that position. This will be found, and it will be dealt with, and hopefully Iraq will never have such weapons again in the future.

Mr. Adeeb: Okay. I’ll ask you a question, and I hope you don’t think it’s insulting, but you know, everywhere you have this conspiratorial analysis. Wouldn’t [it be possible] for [these weapons] to be placed by Americans, or the American security apparatus [to place them] just to give justification for the operation?

Ambassador Welch: Well, thank you for asking in that hypothetical way. You and I know that that’s not going to happen. We’re not going to fake a cause here. We’ve never done that before. Can I dismiss that there’s going to be those out there who say that the Americans planted this? Regrettably, and all too frequently in this part of the world, that conspiracy thinking seems to come out. I can’t say it won’t come out again. But if WMD are found, we will control them, we will then test them to see what they are, and that evidence will be presented to the world, I’m sure.

Mr. Adeeb: Okay, what if an Arab leader came to the Administration, and told the American Administration today, that I have contacted President Saddam, he’s ready to go and leave the country, he and his family and his money, with a guarantee that he’s not going to be prosecuted? We need solid guarantees in this. Would the American Administration give these solid guarantees?

Ambassador Welch: I really can’t answer that question; that’s beyond my competence. What I can say is this: There are plenty of people in the Iraqi leadership right now who are working with us trying to be sure they are not caught in this mess and can get out of the way. It would be pretty good in my mind if others in the leadership, higher up in Baghdad, were to decide to do the same thing. I can’t speak for them, however, and if such a matter came to the attention of me here, I’d refer it back to Washington for them to think about and decide on. I don’t know how they’d come out on it.

Mr. Adeeb: Contacting Iraqi leadership, especially military leadership, through several channels -- is there a kind of bargain or deal or giving guarantees if they joined the American forces or the American plan, that they would be safe?

Ambassador Welch: Again, you’re asking a question that’s beyond my competence. I’m not in charge of truces and surrenders. General Franks said that there were contacts occurring. I believe that to be the case. Let me just speak of an example from my own experience in the past. In Northern Iraq, where Iraqi forces come very close to those of the Kurdish parties, there’s contact and exchange all the time between them. And some of these commanders come up and say "you know, if there’s a problem, I’m going to stay out of it." Most of the regular Iraqi army are people who are forced to serve. They’re not there of their own free will. And I’m sure they want a better life. We’re seeing plenty of that right now. And more is going to happen.

Mr. Adeeb: Sir, do you think at a certain moment, we are going to witness the same concepts or equation of trying to resolve the problem of Iraq in such a flagrant, strong and swift way being applied to the Palestinian-Israeli [issue]? I mean the same attention, the same enthusiasm being given by the American Administration – will it be given also to the Palestinian-Israeli issue?

Ambassador Welch: This issue, I believe, is -- over the long term -- probably the most important priority for peace and stability in the area. The Arab-Israeli conflict started before Saddam Hussein, and it is still with us today. It is our belief that there isn’t going to be a stable and peaceful area without a solution to this problem, without a comprehensive solution. We would like to make progress on that just as rapidly as possible. In fact, regardless of other events, President Bush spoke to this matter just a few days ago when he announced he would like to proceed forward with the Road Map for how to get from where we are now, where there’s violence and terror, to the destination he laid out in the summer of last year, which is a Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace with Israel. There are some hopeful signs right now. A new Israeli Government has been formed and is ready. A Palestinian Government, under a new empowered Prime Minister, is being formed and – we hope – will shortly be ready. And they should begin right away to deal with this question. As they do, they’re going to have our support and encouragement. I believe they’ll also have the support and encouragement of other friends in the region, including Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia as well. That work is incredibly important. This problem has been with us too long, and yes, it needs to have a lot of energy to move it along toward solution.

Mr. Adeeb: Mr. Ambassador, there are some countries who are paying a very expensive bill due to the military operations against Iraq. One of them is Egypt. The loss of tourism revenues, the return of the Egyptians working in Iraq and Kuwait, and the market itself is in a very tense position. There are direct and indirect costs for this. Is the American Administration understanding of this financial problem that Egypt is facing?

Ambassador Welch: Yes. Happily, our bilateral relationship with Egypt is very good. We understand that the risks of conflict are considerable for the countries of the region. Even those who are indirectly affected will have some costs. Egypt’s economy is vulnerable to outside pressures. It’s true for all of us in an increasingly globalized world. There are effects that will be felt in Egypt, and the United States will be one of those trying to help. In fact, we intend to take the lead on this, and I believe you’ll see some news in the coming days about that.

Mr. Adeeb: This will go into the motion of Congress and all of this?

Ambassador Welch: We have been in discussions with the Egyptian Government, prior to the conflict, about some of the economic reforms under way in Egypt and how best the United States could support those. We have a considerable assistance program to Egypt, even in normal circumstances; it’s our second largest aid recipient. We want to deliver this assistance more quickly and effectively to the Egyptian people for things they need. Under the circumstances, we’re looking at ways to accelerate that. In addition, we’re looking at the extraordinary effects this new conflict presents for Egypt, and how best to deal with those. Because we’re a friend of Egypt, we intend to be responsive. We’ve just had a delegation in Washington, we’re continuing our discussions on this matter, and we’ll see in the coming days what’s best to do.

Mr. Adeeb: What do you think would be the next step in the agenda?

Ambassador Welch: Some of the steps Egypt has already taken are really important in moving economic reform forward, and costly too. So I believe the most urgent need is for us to find ways for us to deliver our existing assistance more rapidly and effectively. This we shall do. Then there’s the question of how best to meet the costs of conflict. And while we’re not the only player in that decision, you can count on the United States to take a leading role.

Mr. Adeeb: There’s an idea of a kind of consortium to help Egypt in this, or will it be only an American step?

Ambassador Welch: No, I think there will be other countries offering help, too, and other international institutions. Egypt, for example, has been in discussions with the World Bank, the Arab Development Fund, and others. They’re important sources of financial assistance as well.

Mr. Adeeb: Unfortunately Mr. Ambassador, the time is up for this segment. I would like to thank you very much for your time and patience in receiving these questions.

Ambassador Welch: Thank you, it’s a pleasure to be with you again. Thank you for this opportunity.

Mr. Adeeb: Thank you.