Report to the President by the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba

As you recall, the commission was established by the President last year, headed by Secretary of State Powell. The report was presented to the President, I believe, last Friday. They met with him today to discuss the report at the White House. And Roger will -- is here today to talk to you about some of the background to report, some of its more salient features, and to answer your questions.

So, Roger, thank you for being here.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Thank you very much.

Good afternoon. This morning Secretary of State Colin Powell and other members of the core group within the Executive Branch of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba presented this report, roughly a 500-page report, responding to the President's mandate of October 2003, to elaborate a plan for hastening the democratic transition in Cuba, and to be prepared to response agilely and decisively to a democratic transition once it is underway.

The President noted in receiving the report that we are not merely waiting for a free Cuba , we're working for a free Cuba . The report represents an essential part of this country's commitment to stand with the Cuban people against the tyranny of Fidel Castro.

It's unprecedented. Because for the first time ever, a U.S. Administration has articulated a definitive, decisive and integrated strategy that represents a national commitment to help the Cuban people bring an end to the Cuban dictatorship and to be prepared to support a democratic transition in meaningful, specific, explicit ways once that transition is underway.

The proposed programs and the initiatives that are outline in this report are meant to help the U.S. Government prepare to respond to a transition in Cuba . They are not intended to be a prescription for how a free Cuba organizes itself or what policies it decides ultimately to pursue. Those decisions remain with the Cuban people or will be with the Cuban people as expressed by a free and sovereign Cuban Government.

Our goal is to liberate the Cuban people from the tyranny and from dependency on international charity. We want them to control their own destinies, to be free to make choices on how they want to live their lives.

The report underscores the U.S. commitment to freedom in the Americas. We appeal to our Latin American neighbors to join this effort, which is based on our shared principles of freedom and respect for human dignity.

Those people who continue to do business with or travel to Cuba are prolonging the misery of the Cuban people. There will be a time to do business with and to travel to Cuba, but that should not come at the expense of the well-being of the Cuban people. And we want to work with others to help us reach that day.

Those who wish to help the Cuban people can do so now by supporting the efforts of those people to put an end to the dictatorship and to prepare for a transition to make their own decisions in freedom.

Specifically, if I can go over -- highlight some key elements of the report and recommendations: On hastening the end to the Cuban dictatorship, the President has directed, in accordance with recommendations in this report, that up to $59 million over the next two years be committed to implementing key provisions and recommendations of the commission.

Up to $36 million will be to carry out democracy-building activities, to support for family members of the political opposition and dissidents, and to support efforts to help youth, women, Afro-Cubans, to take their rightful place in a pro-democracy movement.

The President has also directed that up to $18 million be available to provide for regular air-borne broadcast capability of TV and radio motif, and to provide up to $5 million for public democracy efforts to spread the word about the tyranny in Cuba today.

Another area is to encourage a change in Cuba. The President will accept the recommendations to limit the types of recipients who can receive remittances on the island from the United States so that it would not include members of the repressive apparatus of the Cuban regime, that is to say members of the Cuban Community Party, rather than the people, directly involved in human rights violations. And we'll look at stepping up law enforcement operations to prevent people from violating the limits on remittances that do exist that the current regulations impose.

On family travel, in the family travel category, we would limit the number of trips to one every three years to visit eligible immediate family members; also we would, in family travel, reduce the per diem rate to one-third of what it currently is to, again, dry up the currency, hard currency that Castro uses to maintain his repressive security apparatus.

In addition, we will be carrying out efforts to work with the International Commission on Human Rights, with other international human rights organizations, to repress claims of human rights violations by Cubans who are victims of the current dictatorship.

We will also work with the International Labor Movement to ensure that workers on the island have, at least have their complaints heard, about the violations of internationally recognized labor rights. Also, the President has directed the establishment of a transition coordinator to execute all of the many recommendations to help coordinate an interagency effort to pursue the execution of each of the recommendations that the Commission reports -- recommends.

In the area of assisting a free Cuba, it's a very interesting, rich, specific document on how we can move immediately to respond to a change in the island. Again, decisions about the future of Cuba are for Cubans to make, and the tone of the report is very clear that this is a prescription for how we organize ourselves to respond to a transition, not to micromanage the transition on the island. These are decisions that have to be made by the Cuban people themselves.

We want to coordinate with international organizations and with other international donors in responding to a transition once it's underway. The recommendations would include our support for building strong democratic institutions that protect essential liberties of the Cuban people, the respect for human rights and promotion of the rule of law.

We would also recommend support to help a transitional government meet basic needs of the Cuban people -- health, education, housing, or other human services -- while the Cuban people sweep aside the vestiges of the regime and all of the troubles that are left behind by the decrepit regime.

We also provide specific recommendations in the report for how we can help engender a free market economy that will be attractive to investment and private capital and unleashing the entrepreneurial spirit of the Cuban people.

We identify immediate needs for modernizing the infrastructure that would obviously have to be part of the recovery of the Cuban economy. And we recommend specific measures on assessing environmental damage and efforts that would have to be undertaken by Cuba and its friends to restore the environmental conditions in Cuba that would be conducive to the normal development of a free economy.

With that, I'll take any questions.

QUESTION: Two questions. Since this was released by the White House, does that mean the President subscribes to the recommendations contained in it, including the recommendation to undermine the succession strategy established by the Cuban Government?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Well, we're going to be announcing specific -- as the recommendations are rolled out, and implemented, I should say, there will be specific announcements of recommendations being accepted by the President and his directing Executive Branch agencies to execute the recommendations.

But, in general, yes, the President accepts the report, recognizing that it represents a commitment by his government to carry out these policies recommended within this -- within this report.

Yes.

QUESTION: When you say that you appeal to neighbors to join in this effort, do you refer to the effort to curb remittances, discourage tourism, limit travel, distance themselves from the Castro regime, are you? And then, in the specific case of Mexico, how would you rate Mexico 's actions in this regard?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Well, as a matter of fact, I -- we're not prescribing a particular course of action or policy that other countries should adopt.

As it's very well known to you, that many countries in this hemisphere that share our commitment to freedom in Cuba do not have the same restrictions that we have on travel and trade and doing business with them. They have, in many cases, normal diplomatic relations and they carry them out.

So no, I would not limit -- in our appeal that they join us in this process -- would not limit this to taking these specific measures only. They, as a matter of fact, can engage in their own way. Because of their, the normal relations or commerce that they do with Cuba, they can, in their own way, look to effect change and improve the well-being of the Cuban people.

We have differences of opinion on how that can be done, but the fact is if we find common ground and identify that what we're trying to do is help the Cuban people, I think you -- there are remarkable levels of cooperation that we can, that we can do to help the Cuban people.

QUESTION: Would the amount of remittances still be set in $1.2 billion, or do you think that with these limitations it -- the amount will fall?

And my second question is, critics say that strengthening the embargo against Cuba is a failed policy because Castro has been there for more than 40 years. Why do you think that now this is going to be different?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Well we -- on the remittances level, let me say that we did not adjust the cap on how much an individual can send to Cuba . We did narrow the -- a bit -- the types of recipients, that is to say, not members of the communist party, and it has to members in their immediate family. So I would expect that there would be a contraction on the amount of remittances that reach the island.

As we actually enforce the law, also, and ensure that people respect the existing cap and not go around it, then I expect that would also contract the amount of currency available to the regime.

The report lays out in some detail the apparatus that Castro's regime has created, to vacuum hard currency out of the pockets of their people. And so we think it's important that we focus on limiting, to the extent possible, the amount of hard currency that reaches Cuba in the form of remittances. So we think that is a justifiable approach.

On the embargo, let me say, that we think this report represents a positive, constructive, proactive commitment to liberating the Cuban people, and that is to say, helping them liberate themselves, helping them put this regime behind them, and then moving decisively and agilely to help a transition government so that the vestiges of the regime can be washed away and we can have genuine, profound and broad economic and political change.

The question for us today in 2004 is not whether to impose an embargo on Cuba . It is how you go about lifting it. This report puts the embargo and the justification for our policy of isolating Cuba in some considerable context; and it emphasizes that the embargo is a tool of policy, it is not the policy. The policy is a proactive positive policy to help the Cuban people.

The question for us today is not whether to impose the embargo, but how you go about lifting it. And we believe that making unilateral concessions that would resuscitate the regime of the one person of the 11 million Cubans, who is the single biggest obstacle to economic and political reform, absolutely makes no sense. We want to use the economic measures that we have in place in releasing them so that the benefits accrue to a genuinely democratic transitional government.

QUESTION: Can I say -- where is this $59 million coming from?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: The -- it's yet to be determined, but we will find those monies, and they will have to be reprogrammed from existing sources.

QUESTION: All right. Well, can I ask why it is you're going to be reprogram -- you have a definite amount here to reprogram towards Cuba, which is intended to bring down a government, when you can't find any money at all for Haiti so far? While you're --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Do you know something that I don't know about the Haiti thing?

QUESTION: Yeah, I know that yesterday the Secretary said that he was scrounging, scraping the bottom of the barrel, basically, of the State Department to come up with more money.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: That's not -- that's not what the Secretary said.

QUESTION: Yes, that's what he said.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: That is not what he said. I saw what he said. And do you want to --

QUESTION: Yeah.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Are you going to ask the questions and let me answer them? Or how are we going to do this?

QUESTION: You got money for Haiti now?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Okay. We have money for Haiti , and we're still working on Haiti . We need to find additional resources for Haiti . And we'll find additional resources for Cuba , too. We -- but we will do this out of existing resources, and we are able to meet our essential commitments to both of these countries. And we are doing that. I appreciate your concern.

QUESTION: This is a follow-up. You're not asking Congress for this money specifically? You're going to find it within other funds?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Exactly. Thank you.

Yeah.

QUESTION: I kind of have a two-part question. Denying the family visits once every three years, I mean, doesn't that seem like it's a -- it's hurting the Cuban people more than it would be hurting the regime if you're -- if you say you're interested in helping the Cuban people?

And on a kind of a related note, this Administration has been pretty vocal about what it considers to be a brutal regime. So, I mean, I understand about the, you know, post-transition, you know, helping the new government. But how do you really expect the Cuban people who have been under this embargo, and who have so little resources that -- that these additional kind of information and things, I mean, how do you expect them to turn themselves into a democratic government?

I mean are you hoping to spur some revolution or something? Because it seems as if --you've been talking about the brutality of the regime that these people, it's not -- they're not worried about the money, they're worried about their lives.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: They are. And they're worried about a repressive apparatus, which is supported by people who do trade and travel to Cuba, and go and enjoy the beaches in Cuba, and beaches, which, by the way, Cuban can't even -- don't even have access to -- and that money is plowed into a system, or vacuumed up by a regime that pays a policeman four times what it pays a teacher.

What this strategy is intended to do, or hopes to do, is to identify in a meaningful way ways in which the Cuban people can help themselves, give -- making available to them information about the world, about transitional environments so they can prepare themselves for the future, and that what we want to do in an integrative way is to put an end to that regime that holds them down.

And I think this report lays out an important strategy for doing that, an integrative strategy for doing that, a liberated strategy for --

QUESTION: Well, can I follow -- can I follow up?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Yeah. Sure, go ahead.

QUESTION: But how do you -- if you know that there -- if you consider the regime and the police to be so brutal, how do you expect information to be the ones to help these people prepare themselves for the future?

I mean, don't you think it's a question of, kind of, I don't want to say, like, arming them or anything like that, but isn't it more a factor of they're physically repressed by the regime and so they're not -- I mean, how are they going to overthrow the regime, you know, given what they have?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Well, we hope that some people within the regime will get the message that as they turn up on the list of people because they're human rights violators that are increasingly unwelcome in other countries, and certainly would be unwelcome in ours, as they see this international solidarity under -- behind the effort to help the Cuban people and move beyond the dictatorship, as they recognize that the United States, for one, will not accept a succession scenario, but will just keep Castro-ism in place without Castro, that they will begin to start to think about the role they should play, whether it's repressing people or, instead, stepping aside and letting people have access to freedom.

And is it repressing demonstrations or joining them? And this is -- these are the decisions that people in the regime are going to have to make. But there's no future in Castro-ism in Cuba and there will not be a succession and there will not be accommodations with this regime.

QUESTION: Ambassador Noriega, in the context of this report, do you think the recent actions of Mexico in toughening their stance on Cuba , withdrawing their ambassador, as a positive step forward that will help you advance the objectives of the report?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Frankly, I think that the measures by Mexico are totally unrelated to this report. They are measures that are taken to defend the dignity of Mexico , and we accept that explanation and have sympathy for that explanation.

QUESTION: Can you talk a little bit about what your list is that you want people to do?

QUESTION: Sorry. On the funding issue, the 59 million, how does that compare to current funding, and is that above and beyond or --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Sure. The current level for assistance to nongovernmental organizations' democracy-building efforts is 7 million. We'll increase that by 29 million. We'll also add another 5 million for public diplomacy efforts to disseminate the information about our policy toward Cuba , about the regime's harboring of terrorists and repressing of human rights, committing espionage against other countries. These will all be -- these will be additional sums.

QUESTION: And on the transition -- I'm sorry, a second question. On the transition coordinator, is there a name attached to that, if it were to happen tomorrow?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Not yet. And the 18 million, by the way, it would be up to 18 million for the purposes of the Radio and TV Marti broadcasting. That would be -- it would be up to that sum. Some may come from existing Marti resources and others may be additional resources.

QUESTION: Do you believe that the --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Why don't we go to other folks.

QUESTION: Two very, very specific questions. One is a follow-up to a question you had earlier. Just so I understand, you mentioned this is a decisive, unprecedented action by the Administration. Are we to understand that this is now U.S. policy -- each of these items in the report?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Yes, yes.

QUESTION: Secondly, remittances are not to go to members of the Communist Party and others identified in Cuba as not being deserving of the money. How will you identify those people who should not receive the money? What would be the infrastructure of that here? And how many staff will you need to police that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: The way you do it would be to -- a person would have to sign a release of money, probably the way we would organize this, they would sign an affidavit saying who the end user is of the remittances.

There might be the need for additional resources and enforcement of that. It's unclear at this point. Those are some of the decisions on the amendment of regulations and setting up the enforcement mechanisms will be made in the weeks ahead. But in the very near term -- and we'll have to see whether additional resources will be necessary to do that.

QUESTION: Does the Administration have a list of members of the --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: No, and you wouldn't -- as I -- and I mentioned, we would basically rely on the person sending the remittances to assert that the person is not a member of that party, or part of a repressive apparatus.

One of the tragedies about the current system is that Castro fattens up his policemen and starves everybody else and depends on international charity to support them. But if a person wanted to lie on the affidavit, I suppose they would probably be just as likely to find another way to send their money than through one of our licensed remittance transfer places.

Yes.

QUESTION: Thank you, Ambassador, for this very rare opportunity to exchange views with you. It's been a long time since your office has described the policies that we're talking about right now.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: I give a lot of speeches, you know. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Speeches aren't the same thing as interaction.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Go to my website. You'll find that I am -- I have a lot of content on the website.

QUESTION: Anyway, I do have a question for you. The $36 million that will be directed for democracy support, is there a concern that those funds will actually endanger the very people who are likely to receive them. As you know, 75 plus dissidents are currently in jail, some of them for their association with the United States .

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Well, our concern is that people don't help the Cuban people. And our concern is that they're abandoned. And we will not do that. Those of you who know of the reality in Cuba know that when a dissident meets with a U.S. Congressman or with a Western journalist, or goes to the wrong meeting or party, they can be thrown in jail at the arbitrary whim of the regime.

So they have to make a decision for themselves whether -- if taking, you know, 50 or 100 copies of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will land them in prison for 20 years, whether that's a good thing or a bad thing.

There are Cuban dissidents, more and more, who step up to the plate and say, yes, I'm going to think about the future, I'm going to prepare myself for the future, I'm going to spread the word about what our rights should be and how we can defend them. And if the Americans want to help us, or another country wants to help us, and every foreign embassy from Castro's standpoint is an enemy because it might be a source of information about the world.

If they step up to the plate and say they want to receive support or they want to corroborate with us or come to their National Day Celebration at the Embassy of the Czech Republic , then we should be there and welcome them and help them and support them in any way we possibly can. That's a decision that they -- that those courageous people make for themselves. And when they're thrown in jail for doing those simple things, international solidarity has to be with them and support them as well.

And when independent journalists are jailed for writing articles about the reality in Cuba today, we should all, we should all be worried and we should all speak out in solidarity with those independent journalists.

QUESTION: If I could follow up. Do you foresee cash payments to dissidents at this point?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: I -- no, I -- not -- not, I don't think so. No, I don't think so.

These things will be -- details will be worked out, but there -- most of this material assistance and in-kind assistance may be, you know, powdered milk to some dissident's family, may be published material, printed material -- things that they can do to help themselves keep body and soul together and get the word out about the reality on the island and to get to know other people on the island that are interesting in cooperating to plan for the future. So it's that's form of assistance. I'm sorry.

QUESTION: The cut to $50 in the per diem, does that strictly apply to Cuban-Americans visiting family, or would that apply to an executive of a food company doing trade with Cuba or a journalist or a congressman? 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: It's in the family category. And the reason, the reason there's a difference is, if you're going to visit family, the expectation is you're going to spend some time with your family and not go to the beach.

QUESTION: (Inaudible?)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Sure you can if you can --

QUESTION: What do you think the reaction is going to be of the Cuban people? Do you think they're going to welcome this and feel that it's really helping them? Surely they're going to feel the impact of the lack of hard currency, even if most of it does go to the government.

And secondly, do you think the disparaging comments about the Cuba policy that came out yesterday in this article from a top Powell aide is going to affect the perceptions of your presentation at all, of the new policy?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: On the perceptions on the island, I think that they will -- that people on the island, to the extent that the word can get out on this through a more robust Radio and TV Marti, and all that, and the word of mouth will be that, "The United States is thinking about the future, our friends in the United States are thinking about the future, our friends in the United States are working with others in the world to help us. We need to do that. We need to step forward. We need to prepare ourselves. We need to associate with other Cubans who want a free Cuba." And I think that will be the message of solidarity that will reach the island, and that will be very important.

Cubans, there are Cubans that receive remittances. Not everyone does. I don't know that every dissident does. I don't know if all the 75 people in jail will receive remittances.

QUESTION: But even like the service sector will be affected.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: But they can all think about the future and prepare themselves in the future -- for the future. And folks in the service sector tend to be -- as you know, when you're going to do business in Cuba , you're hired by this -- by the regime, and that tends to be the people that are involved in that service sector who benefit from the tourists going there for low-end tourism and sexual tourism and other exploitive forms of tourism.

There will be a time -- look, sunbathers are not going to liberate Cuba . The money they spend on that island is vacuumed up by a repressive apparatus that exists beyond the causeways, beyond the barriers, behind the barbed wire, away from the beach resorts. And it's the other 11 million people that we're worried about, not the people who are mixing cheap drinks for tourists.

QUESTION: Ambassador --

QUESTION: Could you answer my second question -- Elise -- could you answer my second, please?

QUESTION: Two more questions, please.

QUESTION: I already asked this question. The comments about Cuba policy in the GQ article, where a colleague called it a stupid policy.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: I don't think so. I don't think too many people in Cuba are going to hear about that.

QUESTION: I didn't mean people in Cuba. I meant people here.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: That's not for me to decide how people would perceive these things. This -- I don't know of -- the people that were involved in the preparation of this report, the agencies that were involved in the preparation of the report, represent a national commitment to this policy. It was directed by the President; it was received by the President; the recommendations are being implemented by the President. I think that speaks volumes about the national commitment to helping the Cuban people.

One last question.

QUESTION: Ambassador -- (inaudible) in Espa ñ ol, in Cuba, (in Spanish.)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Can I do the Spanish later? Can I do the Spanish later?

QUESTION: You missed the fact that Venezuela is subsidizing all shipments to Cuba as the second most way of their getting dollars. Is the United States prepared to do anything about that, especially due to the fact that all circles say that Castro short -- cutting the United States, is not just sending enough oil here, and that's one of the reasons for the higher prices.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY NORIEGA: Well, I don't accept the premise that that's the case, that they're just not sending enough oil to the United States. I don't accept the premise of that. And I really don't have any more comment beyond that. You understand what our Venezuelan policy is, and then I'll leave it at that.

QUESTION: Thank you very much.

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