Docs 32-49
32. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
No. 20
Washington, December 1, 1952.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 134, Folder 6. Top Secret. A cover memorandum, not printed, indicates that the report is a record of a conference held November 27-December 1; the participants' names and the location of the conference were not declassified.
Also on December 1 Secretary of State Acheson met with Guatemalan Ambassador Guillermo Toriello to discuss U.S.-Guatemalan relations, especially pro-Communist prop-aganda and activities in the Guatemalan Congress. Ambassador Toriello attempted to justify Guatemala's attitude toward Communist influence in the country. "Once or twice during the conversation, Toriello urged us not to be taken in by the denunciations of the Government by the opposition. By innuendo, he seemed to allege that our estimate of the situation had been unduly influenced by wild stories and rumors circulated by the subversive opposition, disguised and cloaked by anti-communism. The anti-communist movement in Guatemala is dangerous, he argued, since it does conveniently serve as a cloak for the irreconcilable opposition." The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pages 1052-1055 (Document 11).
Section I--Current Activities of the Guatemalan Government
1. Military.
a. The Guatemalan government has, during the last few weeks, shifted three or four of its garrison commanders. This of course is one measure taken to prevent anti-government forces from becoming established in the army. In two instances this shifting of commanders has worked against us and we have been obliged to select new leaders within the garrisons concerned. We anticipate further moves of this nature and expect to counteract it by having at least two of the superior officers in our organization.
b. Recently, we learned of the government's plan to make Quetzaltenango its headquarters in the event of revolution. The government expects any invasion to start from across the Salvadoran frontier and believes its best chances for defense are to fall back on Quetzaltenango and establish a defensive line roughly north and south through that city. Terrain favors such a defense and, by so doing, the government will have in its rear, i.e. the area between Quetzaltenango and the Mexican frontier, the wealthiest and most productive section of Guatemala from which to draw support. The government recently transferred one of its best officers to command Quetzaltenango and has re-enforced the area with troops and arms. Fortunately at the same time the government transferred to the garrison as [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in command one of our best officers. Thus, as long as he is there we will be fully informed on all government plans for the area. In this instance shifting of commanders has worked in our favor.
Comment: This information, i.e. that the government is thinking defensively instead of offensively in the event of revolution is of considerable importance and supports Calligeris' plan for heavy initial shock action and rapid concentration around the Capitol.
c. Because the government no longer completely trusts the army it has begun the development of a secret force of non-military personnel. Though full details are not available the force numbers approximately 1500 men all of which are handpicked for their experience and toughness. The total force breaks down into three separate organizations. These are:
(1) Caribbean Legion. About 200 men mostly Central Americans, commanded by General ___/2/ Ramirez, a Santo Domingoan; the second in command is Col. Rivas Montes, a Honduran. General Ramirez at present owns and operates a sawmill on the outskirts of Jalapa where he has the 200 men supposedly working. We believe it is a training area for the Legion. Col. Montes is living in Guatemala City where he heads Aviateca for the Guatemalan government.
/2/The underlining in paragraphs (1) and (3) is in the source text.
(2) Secret Communist Organization. Composed of roughly 500 men scattered throughout Guatemala. Commander of this organization is a closely guarded secret. The function of this group is to act as "shock" troops in the event of trouble and to liquidate any communist leaders who get out of line. President Arbenz and the other top communist leaders are well aware of this latter function.
(3) _?_. No known name for this organization. Its leader is one ___ Fernandez, a Cuban of Spanish origin(?). The group is composed of Cubans and Spanish republicans. Size of organization is unknown. We do know that Fernandez is in close contact with Carlos Prios Socorates, a Cuban. I believe this organization more dangerous than the Legion.
d. The Guatemalan government has been purchasing arms from El Salvador, Czechoslovakia, and probably Mexico. We do not know the extent of these purchases. Interestingly enough we do know that none of the arms purchased are going to Guatemalan army. We have reason to believe the arms are going to labor organizations and communist groups.
Comment: Calligeris reports that Czech arms purchases to date have consisted only of six (6) AA MG .50 Cal.
2. Political. Present political activity of the government centers around the following:
a. Communist infiltration of all legal political parties in Guatemala. For this purpose the government is not using men well known as communists but men known to it, the government, as communists or communist sympathizers. During 16-18 January 1953 deputies to the National Congress are to be elected. Though the communists now control the National Congress they hope to? dominate it completely by placing their men through the other parties.
b. In March 1953 all judgeships in the supreme and lower courts come up for re-appointment. The deputies elected in January take office on 1 March and they will make the appointments to the courts. These appointments will carry down to the city magistrate level. Thus if the communists completely dominate the National Congress through the election of their deputies in January, and I assure you they will, they will in turn appoint their own men to the courts and will, by 15 March, completely dominate the three branches of the government, i.e., Executive, Legislative, and Judicial.
c. The government has embarked on a campaign to sell communism to the people. The usual propaganda outlets are being employed. Recently they have begun the publication of pamphlets, copies of three which I have given you. The booklet on the Agrarian Law is being widely distributed in Honduras and Salvador.
Comment: Copies of the pamphlets referred to are enclosed./3/
/3/Not printed.
d. Honduras. Guatemalan political activity is on the increase.
(1) We have information that in northern Honduras there are more than forty (40) communist cells in existence.
(2) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is on the Guatemalan payroll. As far as we can determine he is receiving $2000.00 a month from the Guatemalan government. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
(3) [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] we believe the man the government really intends to support is Francisco Morazan, a Honduran, at present private secretary to President Arbenz of Guatemala.
e. Costa Rica.
3. Economic. Economic conditions in Guatemala are very grave and are becoming worse every day. Capital is leaving the country. It is going to Mexico and the United States.
a. On 21 November last I was told by [1 line of source text not declassified] that President Arbenz is preparing to invoke the Economic Emergency Law (La Ley de Emergencia Economia). Under this law all capital in the country, local and foreign, will be frozen.
b. The Guatemalan government is preparing to impose a 6% tax on all imports and exports.
Section II--Activities of the Calligeris Organization in Guatemala
I am not fully informed on every phase of our military preparation in Guatemala, that being primarily Calligeris' responsibility, however I can say that we have reached a high degree of organization and have never been in a better state of readiness than we are at this moment.
1. Troop Organization.
a. Jutiapa. The Guatemalan [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] here is with us as are his three (300) hundred soldiers. Our initial striking force in this area consists of three (300) hundred armed civilians. In addition we have fifteen (1500) hundred men ready but without arms. We have sufficient trucks to move this entire force.
b. Jalapa. The officers and one (100) hundred men stationed here are with us. We have eight (800) hundred civilians ready but without arms.
c. Santa Rosa. No army garrison here. We have one (1000) thousand men ready here but without arms.
d. Zacapa. The garrison here has six (600) hundred soldiers well armed. They have four (4) 75 mm canon and four (4) AA MG .50 Cal. We are not sure of this garrison but hope they will join us.
e. Gualan. No garrison here. We have two (200) hundred men here unarmed.
f. Coban. Army garrison here of about fifteen (1500) hundred men. The post has four (4) 75 mm canon (Pack How.). The second and third in command plus a nucleus in the ranks are with us. We have two (2000) thousand men ready here as an initial force. More than an adequate number of trucks.
g. Salama. No garrison here. We have a force of six (600) hundred men ready without arms.
h. Quetzaltenango. There is a garrison of eight (800) hundred men in this area. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in command are with us. In this area we have organized a group of fifty (50) commandos in sub-units of five (5) men each. Their mission will be to kill all political and military leaders in the city. In the general area we have three (3000) thousand men. They need arms. The city has an excellent airport which we plan to capture and use.
i. San Jose (port on the Pacific ocean). No garrison. The city has an excellent military airfield built by the Americans. The field is not used by the military there being no Guatemalan air force units here.
j. Mazatenango. Garrison of three hundred and fifty (350) soldiers. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in command are with us. We have eight hundred (800) men organized here but without arms.
k. Chimaltenango. No garrison. We have one thousand (1000) men here without arms. We have sixty trucks (60) ready. We are building an airfield here.
l. Sanarate. (SW of El Progreso) No garrison. We have five hundred (500) men ready without arms.
m. El Progreso. No garrison. We have five hundred (500) men without arms.
n. Puerto Barrios. Garrison of one hundred and fifty (150) men. The garrison recently received four (4) AA MG .50 Cal. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in command is with us. I do not know the size of our civilian force.
o. Guatemala City. The government here has about five thousand (5000) men including soldiers and police. Within the city we [have] six hundred (600) men organized in commando units each with a specific mission.
"K" Groups. Mission to kill all leading political and military leaders. The list has already been drawn up. I have in my home a city map showing the location of the homes and offices of all targets.
Saboteurs. We have teams ready to sabotage communications, utilities, all headquarters, transportation, military installation and equipment. For these teams we have selected men whose civilian employment is at or near the targets assigned. We do not plan permanent but only disruptive sabotage.
Documents teams. These teams will capture and impound all documents in government offices, party headquarters, and labor unions.
p. Liberation Committees. Independent of our fighting organization we have organized in each town a liberation committee. The function of these committees will be to assume political and police control in each town as it is liberated and thus re-establish and assure public order and welfare until the new government is prepared to assume these functions.
q. Identity Cards. To protect our personnel and prevent enemy personnel from changing sides during and after the action I have prepared and issued 40,000 identity cards.
2. Intelligence Service. We have developed an intelligence organization. It exists in the government, police, and the army. The head of this service is [name not declassified] a man we trust implicitly and a man who has over 20 years intelligence experience. At present he is seeking to penetrate the labor unions.
3. Airfields. We are selecting and developing airfields all over Guatemala, and in particular around the Capital. Our major field in the Capital area is near the town of Dolores (SSE of Guatemala City and ENE of Esquintla) a particularly isolated area. Here we expect to bring in by air arms and equipment and assemble 3000 men which force will comprise one column for the march on the Capital. We already have the necessary trucks earmarked. In selecting our airfield sites we have enlisted the aid of [name not declassified] an American living in Guatemala. He served as a pilot in WW II and has agreed to fly for us. He states that he can buy us four (4) DC-3s and get us three more American pilots.
Comment: Seekford has asked that this man be sent to visit Calligeris.
4. Psychological Warfare. We have prepared a psychological warfare program.
(a) The farmers of Guatemala have collected money to carry out a press and radio campaign. This is being developed.
(b) We are prepared to carry out Calligeris' 30 day campaign.
(c) We have arranged with the Archbishop of Guatemala for a series of special Masses covering an 8 day period in which the clergy will outline the dangers of communism to Guatemala and ask that the people resist and fight these dangers. In most of the churches throughout Guatemala the women have formed committees to aid in this campaign. What we hope to do through this program is to bring the people to a high emotional pitch. What the Archbishop does not know is that we intend to tie this 8 day campaign to our D-day. He is unaware of our military plans.
5. Current Plans of the Organization. Calligeris recently asked me to visit General Trujillo and ask for help. I believe such a trip would be profitless because neither General Trujillo or General Somoza will give us material help without being properly assured by [that] the United States government approves of such help. Without this approval both of these men stand to lose too much.
We have been building our organization before March of this year. We counted heavily upon your help. Unfortunately that help has now been withdrawn. We used that promise of help as a restraint upon our people from impatient action. Now we can restrain them no longer. Secondly, the Guatemalan government is now proceeding on a plan of action which, if successful, will give that government complete domination of every phase of Guatemalan life. If we permit the government to succeed in its present plan then our chances of eventually overthrowing that government will be very considerably reduced. It has therefore been the decision of the group controlling our organization to strike not later than the first of February 1953 with whatever means we have at our disposal.
33. Intelligence Report Prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State/1/
Washington, January 1, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 78, Folder 1. Secret.
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD: CAPABILITIES OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY, GUATEMALA
Foreword
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time.
Communism in Guatemala: Objectives, Tactics, and Capabilities
I. Objectives
The immediate objectives of the Communist Party of Guatemala, now the Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo, PGT), are to extend the party's control over labor, to increase its influence in and infiltration of the leftist-nationalist government, and to dominate the more radical intellectual circles of the country. The Communists push "progressive" Guatemalan political groups toward extreme labor, agrarian, and educational reform, intensify nationalist dissatisfaction with US private interests in Guatemala, and portray US foreign policy as the instrument of "imperialistic warmongers".
Communist objectives during the comparatively short period of three years of open existence have remained constant. Such alterations and diversions as have occurred were essentially related to the will of an administration which, in the final analysis, has the real power to determine the Communist Party's life or death. Thus, with government support, Communists played a key role in whipping up and organizing popular feeling against the United Fruit Company during the Company-labor disputes of 1951. Subsequently, however, Communist labor leaders silently accepted a government rejection of radical labor code revision. And presently, Communist propagandists in key positions have sharply reduced their attacks upon the United States, apparently because the Guatemalan Government does not wish to prejudice negotiations for assistance from the United States.
II. Tactics
Among groups in Guatemalan society to which the Communists especially direct themselves are urban and rural labor. Intellectuals and the "progressive bourgeoisie" are also high on the list of targets, although the appeal to the latter is mixed with distrust and is, in part, inspired by reason of political necessity because of the middle class core of the national revolutionary movement which has inspired Guatemalan political life since 1944. Since they are few in numbers the Communists concentrate upon infiltrating and capturing existing organizational leadership, or, they may bring into existence their own front organization, especially with respect to peace, youth, and women's groups.
The Communists, with the assistance of the government, have successfully directed the unification of labor and have joined the national General Confederation of Workers of Guatemala (Confederacion General de Trabajadores de Guatemala, CGTG) with the regional Communist Confederation of Workers of Latin America (Confederacion de Trabajadores de America Latina, CTAL) and the international Communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The Communists now seek to expand their control over labor by ousting non-Communist leadership from important railway and rural unions, but especially by leading the government-supported agrarian reform program from which they may expect to realize thousands of recruits among the unorganized peasantry. Thus, the Communists can hope to extend their influence among the electorate and, therefore, over the government by control of voters and by their ability to organize mob demonstrations, while at the same time they strengthen Communist international labor organizations and a variety of front groups.
Among the intellectuals the Communists have successfully concentrated their attention upon educators and writers. They and their sympathizers control the principal teachers' union and the most vigorous professional artists' and writers' union, and have strongly penetrated the official and semi-official press and the government propaganda agencies. From these positions they may hope more effectively to accelerate the government's leftist and nationalist programs, while they cover the nation with propaganda in line with Soviet objectives.
The political tactics of the Communists are adjusted to international Communist strategy and the local environment. From the time of its public emergence in mid-1951 until very recently, the Communists, without legal status, have encouraged and supported the dominant leftist government parties and have sought to work through them, as well as through friends in the executive branch of the government. The Communists have consistently taken a proprietary interest in the activities of the government parties, admonishing and criticizing in detail and urging a united "democratic front" against "reaction". Four admitted Communists have won seats in the national legislature as candidates of the government parties. There also are probably several crypto-Communists seated in this body of 58 delegates which, on the whole, is either sympathetic toward or tolerant of Communism. Within the legislature the Communists successfully work for assignment to labor and agrarian committees and will be found in the vanguard of legislative support for nationalistic measures. This is in addition to the promotion of more direct Soviet objectives as represented, for example, by the "Korean solidarity" manifesto signed by 19 members of Congress in June 1952. The recent registration of the Communist Party as the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT) now gives this group legal status for the first time. The maneuver in all probability does not, however, indicate alteration of Communist political tactics.
In the executive they also seek out positions which best enable them to promote their program. Thus, they have heavily infiltrated the Social Security System, the Agrarian Department and the propaganda agencies. It is apparent also that Fortuny, PGT's General Secretary, has access to the inner circle of politicians who surround the President. He is credited with drafting the recently passed Agrarian Reform Law which subsequently was steered through Congress under Communist leadership.
III. Capabilities
Communist success in Guatemala is strongly conditioned by the superficially democratic, leftist, and nationalistic environment brought about by the Revolution of 1944. The social and economic backwardness of the country and the powerful role played by US business interest in the Guatemalan life provide the Communists with obvious ammunition. Nor is there any question about the relatively high efficiency of Communist leadership in Guatemala. So far, it has demonstrated an ability to lead groups heretofore outside of the nation's political life, as well as strongly to influence politicians who either cannot comprehend or who refuse to comprehend the significance of the tie between local and international Communism. Finally, the traditional ruling groups in Guatemala, particularly the landholders, are so demoralized and divided, that they have been unable to offer serious opposition to Communist development.
At the same time, there are serious limitations to the Communist position. Although the Communists have enjoyed considerable success in capturing key positions among important groups in Guatemalan society, they have not yet gained a substantial consistent popular following. They must continually contend with an essentially inarticulate and conservative mass. On higher levels they must face the fact that the economic groups which subscribe to the principles of the Revolution of 1944 are not extremists and that many seeming pro-Communist political allies are, in fact, primarily opportunists.
The real answer to Communist success in Guatemala lies with the attitude of the administrations of Juan Jose Arevalo (1945-1951) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951- ), for, despite democratic overtones, Guatemalan political life is still largely run by the executive. Arbenz, in particular, has favored Communist development because he has found its leadership cooperative and capable. Whether or not he fully appreciates the dangers of Communism, he apparently believes that he controls the Communist organization. He has the power to check or break the Communist organization at will. In the last analysis the Communists are dependent upon the executive's pleasure for their positions and probably the great bulk of their financial support. In themselves they lack the economic resources and popular following to contest determined opposition from the President.
Communism in Guatemala: Assets
I. Numerical Strength
There are probably less than 1,000 members of the Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo, PGT). PGT's petition for registration in December 1952 carried 532 signatures. Cell organization may be found in predominantly rural areas, but Communist strength is centered in the capital, Guatemala City. PGT membership is drawn from the middle class and labor and its leadership has come largely from among intellectuals and bureaucrats. On the whole, while there are opportunists and dilettantes in PGT, its membership is militant and well-disciplined. Leaders such as Jos? Manuel Fortuny and Victor Manuel Gutierrez are judged particularly capable. Short of engaging in violence against heavy odds, considerable personal sacrifice may be expected from members of this small group as long as they have backing within the government.
II. Electoral Strength
Until the registration of PGT (December 1952) Communist Party members gained a limited number of elected positions--primarily in the National Congress--as candidates sponsored by the dominant government parties. In addition, some crypto-Communists have attained office as members of the progovernment parties. The present strategy of the newly registered PGT is continued reliance upon the "democratic front" support of other parties to provide electoral success. There are four acknowledged Communists presently in Congress. PGT can probably poll its largest vote in Guatemala City, but there it also faces the strongest opposition. In the mayoralty contests of 1951, the independent candidate in Guatemala City, with unusually well-unified, anti-Communist support, won over the progovernment and Communist-backed candidate by 5,000 votes (24,000-19,000). In the most recent congressional election (January 1953), Fortuny, Secretary General of PGT, was defeated as the progovernment candidate in the capital, while another coalition-sponsored Communist was winning in an outlying province. Independent Communist electoral strength in rural areas probably is not great.
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action
As an ally of a friendly government, PGT has had little cause to organize and plan for violent insurrection and no such plans are known to exist. PGT has threatened violence against the government's opposition for alleged revolutionary plots, however, and there have been some reports of Communist-controlled unions possessing firearms. Communist resort to force has been confined largely to rural areas where they have had some success in promoting mob intimidation of local landowners. Should the Communists have to face official opposition, it is doubtful that they could rally more than a few hundred willing to risk violence.
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism
Communist freedom of action is essentially geared to the will of the present administration which has the capabilities, but not the inclination, to wipe out the small Communist organization. The Communists, in fact, receive from the government strategic political appointments and benefit from propaganda and indirect financial assistance. PGT operations are favored by a leftist, nationalist, and "democratic" climate, but the Party lacks a popular following and must work with a generally nonpolitical, apathetic mass.
V. Communist Influence in Labor
The rank and file of Guatemalan union members, who are centered in plantations, farms, transport, communications, and small urban industrial enterprises, although susceptible to demagogic leadership, are essentially non-Communist. Exceptions to this may exist in professional unions, as in the case of the left-wing press guild. At the same time, except for a few groups, such as the railway union, the rank-and-file membership cannot be considered anti-Communist. It is largely undisciplined and, especially in the rural areas, is likely to be apathetic or conservative. Communist control of Guatemalan labor is centered in the leadership of the General Confederation of Guatemalan Labor (Confederacion General de Trabajadores de Guatemala, CGTG), a CTAL-WFTU associate, to which the principal labor unions in the country belong. The CGTG's total claimed membership is 50,000. Possibly the largest union in the CGTG, and one of the most consistently pro-Communist, is the teachers' union which has a claimed membership of 10,000. Certain unions in the CGTG, such as the United Fruit Company and the Pan American Airways organizations, have shown clear-cut Communist direction in recent labor disputes. Rural labor, other than United Fruit Company workers and those on the national coffee fincas, which are affiliated with the CGTG, is nominally controlled by the National Farm Workers Confederation (Confederacion Nacional de Campesinos de Guatemala, CNCG), an associate of the CGTG, whose exaggerated claim of 200,000 members represents only a potential at best. CNCG apparently has recently fallen more definitely under pro-Communist leadership. It is currently engaged in exploiting the political advantages to be gained through the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law.
Local union leadership probably is less consistently in Communist hands. One important United Fruit Company union, at least, has sharply vacillated between Communists and opportunists. Anti-Communists or opportunists have offered especially strong resistance to Communist infiltration in the railway union which has a membership of 4,400 and which, by US standards, most closely approximates a trade union.
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations
Communist front groups are represented in the familiar realms of "peace", youth, women's, and intellectual activities. Their activities center primarily in Guatemala City. A tolerant, often sympathetic, government provides not only protection, but also frequent official recognition, favorable propaganda, and indirect financial assistance.
One of the oldest and most consistently prominent of the front groups is Grupo Saker-Ti, an organization formed by militant young intellectuals associated with the leftist-nationalist Revolution of 1944. Communist infiltration of this group has been heavy and its policies have been strongly pro-Communist, including advocacy of the "peace" movement. The organization publishes a locally well-known journal of the same name. Grupo Saker-Ti probably receives Government financial assistance, a factor which, together with its historical national prestige, guarantees its future under present political circumstances.
The National Committee of Peace Partisans (Comite Nacional de Partidarios de la Paz), the local organization of the international Communist peace front, with a reported membership of 88, under excellent leadership, has been an active "peace" organization. It has held local congresses and has strongly supported international meetings. Under present political circumstances, with the support of the administration's propaganda machinery and the dominant progovernment political parties, the "peace" committee is in a favorable position.
The Democratic University Front (Frente Universitaria Democr?tica) is a small organization in the humanities division of the University of San Carlos. Despite the aggressive character of its leadership, this group has not been successful in either capturing or weakening the anti-Communist student organization, the Association of University Students (Asociacion de Estudiantes Universitarios).
The Guatemalan Alliance of Democratic Youth (Alianza de la Juventud Democratica Guatemalteca) is a front group dating from June 1950; it is affiliated with the Communist World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students. It has worked closely with the Communist Party for the promotion of Communism in Central America and has been active in the promotion of international Communist youth meetings and local and international "peace" organizations. It has assisted in the dissemination of strong anti-US propaganda.
The Guatemalan Feminine Alliance (Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca), with probably less than 100 active members, is an affiliate of the Women's International Democratic Federation. It has joined with other front groups in pushing the local Communist "peace" campaign.
The National Conference for the Protection of Children, which first met in December 1951, not only involved a number of Communist front groups, but its laudable aims initially attracted prominent non-Communists. It also received generous Government support; public buildings were donated for use by the Conference and sessions were addressed by the President's wife and a member of the cabinet.
There are several small refugee groups in Guatemala, some of which may be considered front organizations. One of these is the Spanish Republican Center (Centro Republicano Espanol), which has, perhaps, 50 members.
VII. Communist Infiltration Into Government
There are four known Communists, including the second ranking party member, Victor Manuel Gutierrez, in the National Congress which has 58 seats. The majority of the 43 members of the dominant government parties in Congress are either pro-Communist or tolerant of PGT and there are probably a number of crypto-Communists among them. PGT members control three important congressional committees: labor, agrarian reform, and that dealing with revision of public contracts, a factor of particular concern to US companies operating in the country. Communists and their sympathizers heavily infiltrate the executive. At the top, Jose Manuel Fortuny, Secretary General of PGT, is believed to be a member of the President's inner circle of advisers. Communists are strategically located in the Secretariat of Propaganda from which they disseminate the Communist line through official and semiofficial press and radio and through an extensive poster campaign. They occupy key positions from top to bottom in the Social Security System. They not only were instrumental in pushing through the Agrarian Reform program but now dominate much of its present field administration, particularly at the lower levels which afford direct contact with the landless peasantry and where confiscatory cases are initiated. The national coffee fincas, now administered by the Agrarian Department, have been major centers of Communist-dominated labor organization in the rural areas.
There are possibly a few Communists at lower levels of the armed forces and police. If the recent appeal to soldiers in terms of the Agrarian Reform program is successful, the Communists will have improved leverage in this direction. None are believed to be among the higher ranking officers, even though these have been willing to go along with the government's policy of cooperation with the Communists.
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation
Communists strongly influence public educational circles, especially through their leadership in the teachers' union and through their infiltration of traveling cultural missions in the interior. They are, however, strongly resisted in the University. As noted, the Communists have obtained strategic positions from which they disseminate propaganda through press, radio, and posters to large segments of the population. This is countered, to some extent, by the fact that the largest newspaper circulation is in the hands of the anti-Communist press. The Communists are actively resisted by the Catholic Church insofar as its resources permit, but that institution is relatively weak in Guatemala.
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties
Forty-seven of 58 seats in the National Congress, including the four occupied by known Communists, are held by government-backed political parties. Most of these are either tolerant of, or sympathetic toward, PGT and a number are probably crypto-Communists. The largest and most influential of the progovernment parties is the Party of Revolutionary Action (Partido de Accion Revolucionaria, PAR), which is also the most pro-Communist. These parties have invited the numerically weak PGT to participate in national electoral "democratic fronts" and have successfully sponsored admitted Communist candidates. Except in Guatemala City, opposition parties are badly split and are handicapped by the government-controlled electoral machinery. As already noted, of the two coalition-sponsored Communist candidates running in the most recent congressional elections (January 1953), Fortuny was defeated in Guatemala City, while another Communist was winning in an outlying province.
X. Communist Propaganda Machinery
The PGT newspaper is Octubre, a weekly with an estimated circulation of 3,000. A recently established labor paper, which reportedly receives government subsidies, is Unidad, founded by Victor Manuel Gutierrez and directed by Carlos Manuel Pellecer, who are probably the second and third ranking Communists in Guatemala, respectively. Pro-Communist newspapers are the official daily Diario de Centro America with a circulation of 5,000 and the semiofficial daily Nuestro Diario with 3,000. Among the cultural periodicals, the most prominent is probably Revista de Guatemala, edited by Luis Cardoza y Aragon, chairman of the local "peace" committee. The well-known Saker-Ti has been noted. Other front publications with small circulation include: Infancia, organ of the Protection of Children group, the Bolet?n de la Paz, Mujeres, Orientacion, paper of the Dominican exiles, and Nuestra Lucha, organ of the Democratic University Front.
TGW the government-owned radio station in the capital, is the most powerful in Guatemala and reaches an estimated 500,000. It is fed the Communist line from a number of sources, including the Secretariat of Propaganda. Radio Nuestro Mundo in Guatemala City is also pro-Communist in its policy. Communist-controlled and influenced organizations have easy access to time on these two stations.
General Soviet broadcasts beamed to Latin America are poorly received and a wide audience is unlikely. Some Soviet-Satellite propaganda literature and film comes in, principally by way of Mexico and Cuba, and from travellers returning from the Russian orbit.
XI. Financial Condition
The estimated financial condition of PGT is poor. It probably receives little from membership dues, nor are the labor unions or front groups able to contribute substantially. Some assistance to Communist operations has probably come through CTAL, and the expenses of delegates abroad have probably been paid by foreign sources. The principal source of support comes from the Government through patronage, free propaganda, meeting facilities and some subsidies given to front group activities.
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets
There is no official diplomatic representation between Guatemala and Russia. Czech and Polish ministers, resident in Mexico, are accredited to Guatemala, along with other Central American Republics, but their visits to this area are rare.
XIII. Communist International Organizations
The Conference of Land and Air Transport Workers of Latin America, sponsored by the international Communist labor front, WFTU, and by the regional front, CTAL, was held in Guatemala City in May 1951. CTAL-WFTU officials, including Lombardo Toledano and Louis Saillant, attended and prominent Guatemalan Government officials were also present at the meeting.
International meetings in 1951 and 1952 to which Guatemala sent representatives were:
|
Meeting |
Date |
Size of local representation |
|
1. Regional Conference of Latin American Agriculture (Mexico City) |
May 1951 |
1 |
|
2. Third World Youth Festival (Berlin) |
August 1951 |
6 or 7 |
|
3. World Peace Council (Vienna) |
November 1951 |
1 |
|
4. WFTU General Council Meeting (Berlin) |
November 1951 |
1 |
|
5. American Continental Congress of Peace Partisans (Montevideo) |
March 1951 |
6 |
|
6. International Conference on Defense of Children (Vienna) |
April 1952 |
2 |
|
7. Council of International Union of Students (Bucharest) |
September 1952 |
n a |
|
8. CTAL Central Committee Meeting (Mexico) |
September 1952 |
1 |
|
9. Asian and Pacific Regions Peace Conference (Peiping) |
October 1952 |
5 |
|
10. Continental Congress of Democratic Jurists of America (Rio de Janeiro) |
Nov.-Dec 1952 |
1 |
|
11. World Congress of Peoples for Peace (Vienna) |
December 1952 |
10-11 |
Although no definite information is available, it is probable that the Guatemalan labor affiliate of the CTAL and WFTU has received financial assistance from the parent organizations. It is also probable that the expenses of Guatemalan delegates to Communist-sponsored international conferences have been paid from foreign sources.
XIV. Communist Communication Network
Guatemala maintains closest relations with the Middle American area. Ties with Mexico and Cuba have been particularly close and these two countries are among the principal American focal points for international Communist activity. Guatemala has also been a haven for small groups of political exiles, some of whom have strong Communist leanings, from neighboring countries.
Many Guatemalans, Communists and fellow-travellers, have visited the Soviet orbit, usually to attend international meetings. It is certain that the Communists among these have been couriers for Soviet instructions. The best example of this was the visit which Gutierrez made to Moscow in 1951. It probably was no coincidence that his small Communist labor party was merged with the main Communist group shortly after Gutierrez' return to Guatemala. The most recent demonstration of the sensitivity of the Guatemalan party to Moscow came with the alteration of the party's name in December 1952 to the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), a maneuver traceable to the policies expressed at the Nineteenth Soviet Congress of 1952.
34. Letter From the Ambassador to Guatemala (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong)/1/
Guatemala City, February 13, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025, Box 78, Folder 001. Secret. According to a March 4 cover memorandum, the letter was circulated to OIR and military intelligence officials.
Dear Mr. Armstrong:
With respect to the request in your letter of December 18, 1952/2/ for comments on the National Intelligence Estimate "Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting US Security" (NIE-70, December 12, 1952),/3/ I desire to draw attention to and comment on this document's conclusion in Paragraph 53 that "It is improbable that the Communists will gain direct control over the policy of any Latin American state, at least during the next several years", an appreciation which, in my opinion, may somewhat gloss over the Communist potential, at least in Guatemala, for achieving results just as injurious to the security of the United States by clever and effective concentration on influencing events by indirect means as by concentration on achieving direct control of the Government's policy-making apparatus.
/2/Not found.
/3/Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R-01012A, DDI Registry of NIEs and SNIEs)
In Guatemala, our observation has been that the Communists have thus far dedicated rather minor efforts towards obtaining control of the openly established policy-making positions but have rather aimed at installing their people in positions which will give leverage over influential groups in order to achieve their aims. Thus they have achieved control of the Executive Committee of the Confederacion General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG), the national labor federation; a large measure of influence over the Confederacion Nacional Campesina de Guatemala (CNCG), the agricultural federation; leadership of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de Educacion de Guatemala (STEG), the teachers' union; key positions in the Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social (IGSS), the wealthy Government social security agency; close to a policy-making role in the official and pro-Government press and radio; and substantial influence over the actions of the major nationalist "revolutionary" parties on which the Administration bases its organized political support. Additionally, in the current Congress they chose the Special Committees on Agrarian Reform and Labor Code Revision as the committees to dominate and, principally through the CGTG and CNCG, are now attempting to establish their ascendancy over the administrative machinery created to carry out the Agrarian Reform Law of June 17, 1952. On the other hand, so far as can be determined, the Communists have concentrated little or no effort to obtain control of the Armed or Police Forces, the Foreign Office or other such key policy-making bodies which would be along a shorter route to gaining direct control over the policy of Guatemala.
This pattern of penetration, while it does reflect the probable Communist realization that their domestic and foreign support is presently insufficient to hope for the early establishment of a "People's Democracy" in Guatemala, is illuminating of the real Communist objective here. This is clearly to so disrupt the country's internal structure and foreign relations that its integration into the common efforts of the Western world will be at a minimum, particularly with respect to those efforts designed to safeguard this community against eventual domination by the Soviet homeland of Communism. The Communists themselves have said as much, for instance, in defining the end of their local "Peace" campaign as assuring that "imperialism" will not be able to exploit the country for its "war preparations". To achieve this aim, the Communists have used the leverage of the organizations they have penetrated to mobilize a wide front which upsets the tranquility of Guatemala's relationship to the Western community. Thus they have played up such measures as labor and social security legislation and Agrarian Reform both as a means for capturing leadership of the ill-defined desire for progress of liberal groups and, more importantly, as a means of fomenting debilitating internal strife and dislocations. They have also, however, exploited every tendency to nationalism and autarchy which might serve to break down the ties and good relations of Guatemala with the United States and its friends. (For instance, in the recent Congressional campaign, Sr. Jose Manuel Fortuny, Secretary General of the Communist Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo, warmly endorsed the demand for higher tariffs of the General Association of Industrialists, a manufacturers' and businessmen's organization normally considered "reactionary" by the Communists.) The exploitation of these dynamic and potentially anti-American factors is the cardinal reason for the "Patriotic Front" which the Communists announced as their tactic in their Party Congress last December (my despatch No. 586, January 5, 1953)./4/
/4/Not printed.
To view the situation here in perspective, then, it is necessary to consider that the neutralizing of Guatemala as a Western nation is the immediate/5/ Communist objective and that whether this is done by gaining direct control over national policy or by indirect but wider exercise of influence is a question of means to achieve that objective, not the objective itself. Thus if the degree to which Communists have gained direct control of the Government is used as the scale for measuring their success and potential, there is danger of a mistaken estimate for the evidence appears to be that the Communists themselves use the degree to which they can achieve the neutralization of the country as their own scale for measuring success.
/5/The word "immediate" is underlined and a handwritten note in the margin reads: "no doubt in my mind that the Guat reds have a longer range objective, i.e. a truly 'popularly based' overt control of govt--evidenced by the drive to control the Agrarian Reform machinery and its access to the masses. FW"
The most recent developments in Guatemala, concerning the removal of the Supreme Court for opposing the Arbenz administration in an Agrarian Reform decision, provide an excellent example of the degree of success that the Communists already have in stimulating and exploiting events indirectly through its interlocking machinery (my telegram No. 319, February 11/6/ and previous). Here the Communist Party, barely eighteen months after it came into the open and fifteen months after it established control of the CGTG, set itself an immediate goal--the rapid breaking up of large farms and liquidation of the power potential of the landlords by unrelenting application of the Agrarian Reform Law which was guided through Congress by means of Sr. Gutierrez' Special Committee on Agrarian Reform. To carry out this policy it seemed necessary that the Executive Branch Agrarian Reform authorities act without check from the courts lest the landlords slow up or block the Agrarian Reform through protracted legal proceedings, but on February 2 the Supreme Court in the case of Sr. Ernesto Leal Perez in effect ruled that appeals could be made to the courts when the authorities exceeded their legal limits. The Communists then mobilized the CGTG and CNCG in a campaign to have the Supreme Court Justices who made this ruling ousted and, acting in harmony with President Arbenz, the Communist and pro-Communist Administration leaders in the "revolutionary" parties led a successful floor fight in Congress with the galleries packed with CGTG workers to have the Justices removed for "incapacity". In so doing, the Congress swept aside the independence of the judiciary and exposed the flimsiness of Guatemalan democracy, an accomplishment which illuminates what the Communists can already do by manipulation and indirect control and raises a substantial question whether in the next several years they may not be able to perfect and extend their machinery to such an extent that they will be able to achieve their ends without risking an effort to obtain direct control.
/6/Not printed.
The foregoing is, of course, a presentation to draw attention to the possibilities which the Communists have of realizing their objective through indirect, rather than direct, means and does not outline the anti-Communist counterweights which are present and potentially important in the current mixed Guatemalan situation. What the actual result will be during the next several years will depend in part on the outcome of the interplay of pro-Communist and anti-Communist factors in Guatemala and, to a large extent, on the ability of the United States to align its policy to advantage in the shifting scene that those years will doubtlessly present.
Sincerely yours,
Rudolf E. Schoenfeld/7/
/7/Printed from a copy that indicates Schoenfeld signed the original.
35. Intelligence Report Prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State/1/
No. 6001
Washington, March 5, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 7, Folder 1. Confidential. According to a typed note, this report was prepared by the Division of Research for American Republics. A cover sheet and table of contents are not printed.
ABSTRACT
On June 17, 1952, a comprehensive agrarian reform program became law in Guatemala./2/ Its professed objective is the development of a capitalistic agricultural economy through the abolition of semi-feudal owner-worker relationships, the redistribution of land, and the improvement with state assistance of cultivation methods. The implications of the legislation, however, go beyond agrarian reform inasmuch as its provisions furnish a basis for the strengthening of political and Communist control over the rural population.
/2/On February 26 President Arbenz signed an order issued by the Guatemalan National Agrarian Council calling for the expropriation, under provisions of the Agrarian Reform Law of June 17, 1952, of approximately 234,000 acres of United Fruit Company property near Tiquisate on the Pacific side of Guatemala, and offering the company government bonds as compensation. See Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 1056-1057 (Document 13).
Full implementation of the law would free thousands of agrarian workers from a centuries-old dependence upon the privileged landholding class, but would subject the majority, in all probability, to close control by the state. This would be exercised through a virtually autonomous National Agrarian Department. Certain limitations, also, would be incumbent upon those using redistributed land. Since the great bulk of the land expropriated would be incorporated into the imprescriptible public domain, holdings could be acquired only on the basis of a life grant or by rental. Private title, however, would be possible by the direct transfer to the peasant of land expropriated from private estates. Another feature of the law facilitating state control is provision for the concentration of agrarian workers on each private plantation into a single village.
Administration forces undoubtedly envisage political benefits from the legislation. They are presumably anxious to break the control of the conservative anti-administration large landholders over the farm labor force in order to organize it behind the government. Advantages to the Communists are likely to be enhanced by the opportunity to extend the influence in farm areas through infiltration of the National Agrarian Department, through their expanded control over Guatemalan labor organization, and through greater opportunities to attack the United Fruit Company. The deepening cleavage between moderates and left caused by government sponsorship of the agrarian program will benefit the Communists.
Full and rapid implementation of the land distribution program would be likely to produce serious economic repercussions. Already nervousness has depressed business activity. Thus far, however, agricultural production, which provides the basis of Guatemala's economy, apparently has not been affected.
Implementation of the law will be difficult and politically dangerous. Although an abundance of land is made available for redistribution, only a small part of it is desirably located. The extent to which land controlled by foreign agricultural corporations--the greater part of United Fruit Company holdings are possibly subject to expropriation--may be made available for redistribution is largely a matter of speculation. As far as can be ascertained, these enterprises have no special protection under their operating concessions. While they may appeal decisions affecting their interests to the National Agrarian Department, this agency and the civil courts, which probably could not be utilized, are closely subjected to the will of an administration determined to accelerate the agrarian program. Also difficult for the administration to overcome will be the long-standing living habits and prejudices of the largely Indian agrarian population. Most significant of all will be the perfecting of a competent administrative organization. The strong probability exists that too rapid acceleration of the agrarian program coupled with increasing Communist strength and influence may lead to violence difficult for the Arbenz administration to contain.
AGRARIAN REFORM IN GUATEMALA
1. Background. The Agrarian Reform Law which was adopted on June 17, 1952, is rooted in the Guatemalan revolutionary program which since 1944 has been a vital force in the formulation of governmental policy. As groundwork for such legislation, the framers of the Constitution adopted in 1945 provided for state direction of the national economy, for the expropriation of unused private lands with prior compensation, for the incorporation of such lands into the national patrimony, for both the rental and granting of nationalized lands, for the formation of agricultural communities, for collective farming, for the protection of ejido and communal lands, and for state technical and other assistance to agricultural communities. These provisions were the product of several influences. Probably foremost was the socialistic and nationalistic philosophy of Juan Jose Arevalo, spiritual lender of the Revolution, whose ideas paralleled but apparently owed little to Marxist ideology. Also evident was the Mexican experience in land reform, implanted in the Constitution in all probability chiefly by Jorge Garc?a Granados, President of the Constituent Assembly, who for many years prior to the Revolution had been resident in Mexico.
During the seven-year interval between the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law a number of land reform proposals were advanced. Some of these were quite radical and several Communist-sponsored. Almost all advocated the expropriation and division of large privately-owned estates. Except for the passage of compulsory land rental legislation in 1950, no positive action was taken by the Arevalo Administration (1945-51). President Jacobo Arbenz, however, firmly committed himself to agrarian reform and in repeated speeches stressed the inequity of land ownership, the semi-feudal nature of tenancy and laboring arrangements, and the antiquated cultivation methods employed on small holdings. On May 10, 1952, he submitted to the National Congress the draft legislation which became law the following month. In the final preparation and enactment of this program Communists played a prominent role.
2. Redistribution of Land. Under the provisions of the law certain land is specifically designated for redistribution. This includes uncultivated land, land not cultivated directly by or for the owner, land rented in any form, land needed to establish rural farm settlements, state farms and certain other national lands, certain municipal lands, and excesses resulting from new surveys prior to expropriation. Excluded, however, are farms of less than 221 acres whether or not cultivated, farms of from 221 to 664 acres if a least two-thirds of this land is cultivated, land belonging to Indian or farm communities, land of agricultural enterprises producing essential crops except land not directly used by the enterprise or exploited by systems established by this law, lands used for cattle raising, lands in the immediate vicinity of Guatemala City and other municipalities, and all legal forest reserves.
Of the land available for redistribution under the law, only a small part is desirably located. In the most productive and populous sections of the country, principally the highlands, the privately-owned farms are generally small and exempt from expropriation. Those that are larger are situated almost entirely in the undesirable lowland regions or in inaccessible parts of the highlands. Much of the suitably located and available land is that comprised in the state farms. This situation and the reluctance of the largely Indian agrarian population to migrate to the unhealthful lowlands probably influenced the administration during August and September 1952, in accordance with a previously announced policy, to make the first actual distributions of land from a national plantation and other holdings. In November 1952 arrangements were being completed for the breakup of 110 state farms, and several have since been distributed. Effective December 29, 1952, the Department of National Farms was legally dissolved and its affairs and properties transferred to a liquidating commission pending distribution of the land under the Agrarian Reform Law.
The extent to which land controlled by foreign agriculture corporations may be made available for redistribution is largely a matter of speculation. Largest of these enterprises is the United Fruit Company which owns or leases some 450,000 acres possibly subject to expropriation. As far as can be ascertained, special protection to property of the Company appears not to be afforded either by the Agrarian Law or by the clauses of contracts, including land lease arrangements, between the Company and the Guatemalan Government. Article 12 of the Agrarian Reform Law provides that "there will be no difference between natural and juridical persons who own or rent land in this country, even though they may have signed contracts with the state prior to the date of promulgation of this law insofar as the lands affected are concerned." This article indicates clearly that the Communist-guided framers of the Agrarian Law intended to apply its provisions to foreign enterprises such as the United Fruit Company.
The first moves to apply the law to United Fruit Company holdings were made in December 1952 when workers at both the Tiquisate and Bananera subsidiaries filed expropriation applications with the National Agrarian Department. In protesting these proceedings before the Departmental Agrarian Commissions, representatives of the Company pointed out what they regarded as irregularities in the petitions, presented evidence that much of its acreage was exempt from expropriation because it was forested, was pasture, or was producing "technical crops", and contended that uncultivated lands were needed as a reserve for replacing acreage in bananas forced out of production by plant diseases. The Company also argued that such compensation as might be made would be inadequate if it were based as prescribed by this law upon the tax book value, especially in view of the fact that the Company had sought from 1948 to 1951 to have its land revalued. Moreover, payment in agrarian bonds would be unsatisfactory since they were subject to heavy discounting if cashed soon after issue. Both commissions overruled these arguments and approved the expropriation of the Company's uncultivated lands. In the Tiquisate case, the commission based its decision on the Company's inability to show that it was financially able to increase its cultivated acreage, and its failure to sustain with testimony by technical experts the contentions that all uncultivated holdings were required for agricultural purposes. Appeals in both cases were immediately filed by the Company with the National Agrarian Council. This body, in January, reversed the decision of the commission which had handled the Tiquisate case on the grounds that it had failed to specify the right of the Company to contest the commission's ruling within five days. The ruling, however, gave the Company only a temporary respite, for new petitions were immediately filed which have been approved by the National Agrarian Department and President Arbenz. This action, which would expropriate approximately two-thirds of the Company's Tiquisate holdings, has been appealed to the Guatemalan Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, the Company is faced with problem of numerous persons entering its Tiquisate property, staking out claims to unused lands, and making preparations for settling without legal authorization. In that part of the company subsidiary lying in the Department of Suchitepequez, the Governor witnessed the "invasion" and sent soldiers to protect the intruders. On the other hand, the Governor of the Department of Escuintla ordered squatters off the Company's lands.
In view of the proceedings involving the United Fruit Company which have already taken place and the stipulation in the Agrarian Law that no difference exists between "natural and juridical persons", the Company and other foreign enterprises would appear to be entitled to some legal recourse in case of expropriation. The value of this privilege, however, would be limited by two factors. In the first place, the Agrarian Law provides the cases arising as a result of its implementation may be appealed through the various divisions of the National Agrarian Department to the President, but may not be taken to the civil courts. This limitation, therefore, bars full legal recourse. Secondly, were a constitutional or other loophole to be found for using the civil courts, the appeal, if it reached the Supreme Court, would stand little chance at present of being favorably reviewed since that tribunal is packed with pro-administration judges. Moreover, a Supreme Court decision would be subject to congressional review. The packing of the Court took place in February 1953 when four of the five former justices were replaced after ruling against the expropriation of uncultivated lands belonging to a private landowner who had unsuccessfully appealed his case through the National Agrarian Department to the President of the Republic. The Supreme Court had accepted the case under a constitutional provision which grants a person the right to ask protection or aid (amparo) in a case where he believes the "law, regulation or other order by an authority is not applicable."
If the Agrarian Law is fully implemented, the impact upon private landholders would be borne chiefly by a minority group. The Guatemalan General Directorate of Statistics estimates that of 341,191 private agricultural holdings only 1,710 would be affected. These 1,710 holdings, however, comprise more than half of the total private acreage. Their owners would not suffer a drastic loss of cultivated land, but would be prevented from expanding future operations were their uncultivated acreage expropriated. For owners whose property is condemned provision exists for indemnification based upon the generally low tax valuations as of May 9, 1952. Compensation, for which the administration has made initial provision, is to be in bonds bearing 3 percent interest redeemable in 25 years or less. Although the National Agrarian Department planned in late 1952 to begin distributions from private farms, this phase of the agrarian program was not placed in operation until January 1953 when President Arbenz signed a resolution ordering the first expropriation of four farms in various parts of the country. Financial arrangements for such expropriations had been completed the preceding month with the deposit by the National Agrarian Department in the Bank of Guatemala of $2,500,000 in Agrarian bonds to reimburse landowners.
Meanwhile, the failure of the Government to proceed more rapidly with private expropriations led to increasing pressure, part of it Communist-inspired, to bring this about. Petitions were sent to the agrarian authorities and to the President, and after the beginning of 1953 the seizure of private lands by farm workers gained impetus throughout the country. The official press warned that only the state could apply the law, but the Administration showed signs of yielding to the pressure by moving to authorize squatters to stay on the land under the compulsory rental laws, by refusing generally to use the police power to protect the private properties involved, and by accelerating the rate of private expropriations.
3. Social and Political Implications. Envisaged by the law is the far-reaching social change of freeing thousands of agrarian workers from a centuries-old dependence upon the privileged large landholding class. Prohibited are existing forms of servitude such as the lending by one landowner to another of the personal services of farm laborers, the forced distribution of Indians, and the payment of rental for land in labor. A provision for the placing of land rental on an almost exclusively cash basis, and the limiting of payment whether in cash or kind to 5 percent of the value of the crop produced is one designed to free the Indian peasant from his dependent economic status.
Under the agrarian program, however, the rural classes would be subjected to rather close control by the state. This would be exercised through a virtually autonomous National Agrarian Department--headed nominally by the President of the Republic and having national, departmental and local subdivisions--whose influence is enhanced by its responsibility for rendering technical and other assistance. Certain limitations would be incumbent upon those using redistributed land. If the holding were acquired from the imprescriptible public domain, use would be on the basis of a life grant or by rental as long as adequate cultivation were maintained. Private title would be possibly only by the direct transfer to the applicant of land expropriated from private estates. Such holdings would be restricted to 43 acres and would not be transferable to another owner for 25 years. Another feature of the law facilitating state control is provision for the concentration of agrarian workers on each private plantation into a single village and for the nationalization of private roads connecting such communities with other centers of population.
4. Communist Participation. Although the Agrarian Law does not provide for the complete breakup of large privately-owned estates, it otherwise harmonizes generally with the program of the Guatemalan Communist Party, which purports to favor "peasant-middle-class agrarian reforms" bringing "the destruction of feudalism and the opening of the way to capitalism, or rather, industrialization." The Party has accepted the law as "the least that can be done" and with the admission that it is not feasible to go further at the present time. Rapid implementation of the law, however, was urged at a Party Congress held in December 1952.
Under the law the Communists have an excellent opportunity to extend their influence over the rural population. One method of accomplishing this is through the representation in the various subdivisions of the National Agrarian Department to which the two major labor confederations are entitled. The Communist-controlled General Confederation of Workers (Confederacion General de Trabajadores de Guatemala, CGTG) and the Communist-influenced National Confederation of Farm Workers (Confederacion Nacional Campesina de Guatemala, CNCG) have 60 percent of the seats in the local agrarian commissions, 40 percent in the departmental commissions, and one-third in the national commission. Already Communists and their sympathizers have infiltrated the National Agrarian Department so extensively that they exert an important voice in both policy making and in the implementation of the law.
At the same time, the Communists are tightening their grip on the rural classes by using the law in other ways. Working chiefly through the CGTG and the CNCG, they are propagandizing in behalf of the law, are stimulating farm workers to petition for the redistribution of land, and are helping applicants in their negotiations with the National Agrarian Department. Communist leaders also are taking the initiative resisting the efforts of private landowners to appeal their cases from the National Agrarian Department to the civil courts. Virtually no opposition exists to these activities. A basic reason for this is that the Agrarian Law provides severe penalties for interference with its implementation. Other factors redounding to the advantage of the Communists are an expansion of organizational activities in farm areas by both the CGTG and the CNCG, and the deepened cleavage between moderates and left produced by government sponsorship of the law.
5. Implementation. President Arbenz and his leftist administration forces, particularly the Communists, envisage political benefits from the legislation. They are presumably anxious to eliminate all control of the conservative, anti-administration large landholders over the farm labor force. With this accomplished, agrarian workers could be unionized under auspices and with benefits which would virtually assure their support of the administration. Aside from these broad political advantages, administration leaders will find in the agrarian reform program a greatly enlarged field for graft and patronage. Already the President has moved to keep implementation of the law in his hands by appointing as Chief of the National Agrarian Department the unscrupulous, corrupt, and shrewd Major Alfonso Mart?nez Estevez, his confidant and former private secretary. Next to the presidency, direction of the agrarian program is potentially the most important civilian position in the Guatemalan Government. To finance the operations of the National Agrarian Department, a budget of $404,470 for fiscal 1952-53 was approved in November 1952 by the National Congress.
During 1952, implementation of the Agrarian Law proceeded slowly and produced some confusion and controversy. Many misinformed rural workers evidenced keen disappointment when informed that lands exempt from expropriation could not be distributed to them. Under Communist inspiration, pressure mounted for more rapid distribution. The acceleration of the program became the central issue of the 1952-53 congressional electoral campaign and has been officially marked as the primary government objective for 1953. In the course of the accelerated land distribution program, "squatting" and forced seizures by the peasantry have taken place and have been upheld by the government.
6. Economic Repercussions. Thus far, a serious business recession, particularly affecting Guatemala City, has been the major economic repercussion of the implementation of the reform program. The government has been forced to deny reports that private property in general will come under attack. Rapid and immoderate implementation of the law may well affect agricultural production, the basis of Guatemala's economy, but this has not yet taken place. Dangers predicted locally include labor shortages, loss of land, the depreciation of land values, and a decline in credit.
Conclusion
The adoption on June 17, 1952 of a comprehensive agrarian reform program presages significant sociological, economic and political changes in Guatemala. Full implementation of the law would free thousands of agrarian workers from a centuries-old dependence upon the privileged landholding class, but would subject the majority, in all probability, to close control by the state through supervision by a virtually autonomous National Agrarian Department, through limitation upon land usage, through population concentrations, and through the extension of technical and other assistance.
Full and rapid implementation of the land distribution program would be likely to produce serious economic repercussions. Already nervousness has depressed business activity. Thus far, however, agricultural production, which provides the basis of Guatemala's economy, apparently has not been affected.
Administration forces in all probability will use the law to eliminate all control of the conservative, large landholding classes over farm workers. With the assistance of the Communists, who will take advantage of the opportunity to extend their influence over the rural classes, a stronger backing for the government should result. Advantages to the Communists also are likely to be enhanced by greater opportunities to attack the United Fruit Company, and by the deepening cleavage between moderates and left resulting from government sponsorship of the reform program.
Foreign agricultural enterprises, especially the United Fruit Company, will probably have their uncultivated holdings expropriated since they appear to have no special protection under their operating concessions. While they may appeal decisions affecting their interests to the National Agrarian Department, this agency and the civil courts, which probably could not be utilized, are so closely subjected to the will of the administration that such recourse would avail little.
Implementation of the law will be difficult because of the unavailability of suitably located land, because of the long-standing living habits and prejudices of the largely Indian agrarian population, and because of the likelihood that a competent administrative organization cannot be perfected. The strong probability exists that too rapid acceleration of the agrarian program coupled with increasing Communist strength and influence may lead to violence difficult for the Arbenz Administration to contain.
36. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, March 8, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 2. Top Secret. A handwritten note by Allen Dulles at the top of the page reads: "Copy left with W.B.S. on a personal basis--with understanding there would be no circulation."
MEMORANDUM RE P.B. FORTUNE
We now expect to be in a position to proceed with our phase of the project if desired./2/ However, the chances of success would be greatly enhanced if there were a coordinated effort in the political field. The country in question is thoroughly dependent on its trade relations with us and has discounted the fact that we would do nothing. In effect they have flaunted us and consistently got away with it. It is time they were brought to realize that this could not continue.
/2/Presumably reference is to the adoption on March 4 of NSC 144, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Latin America." One of the objectives of the NSC directive was the "reduction and elimination of the menace of internal Communist or other anti-U.S. subversion." For text of NSC 144/1, March 18, 1953, as well as records of discussion in the NSC of the paper and progress reports, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 1-65.
While the exact steps which might be politically feasible are matters beyond our competence here, we have a legitimate interest, it seems to me, in seeing that the climate is right for the types of action in which we may be engaged.
Here are some of the measures which might be considered.
1. Recalling our ambassador for consultation and sending a two-fisted guy to the general area on a trip of inspection and to report to the President.
Our ambassador is timid and never recovered from his treatment at the hands of Anna Pauker. Further the whole Embassy should be given a look over. I just received the visit of two American citizens highly recommended who have large interests in the country. They indicated that they did not feel they could get anything whatever out of the Embassy in the way of protection of American interests and hinted at darker things. They came to me after talking with Herbert Hoover and Lewis Strauss, and the latter urged that I see them. Harman Pfleger knows about them through Herbert Hoover.
Bill Pawley or someone of his type might be considered. I recognize that Pawley is hard to control, but he is fearless and gets things done even though he may break a little crockery in doing it. I would suggest that he might also spend a little time in the countries bordering on the one of our chief concern.
2. In connection with the mission described in 1, the President in a press conference might express his concern at the Soviet Communist penetration and his desire to consult, in the spirit of the Rio Pact, with other Latin American countries affected thereby.
3. Appropriate speeches might be made by a couple of members of Congress. You may recall that this was done a year or so ago and had a substantial effect. Vice-President Nixon has been fully briefed by the two Americans who saw me and undoubtedly he would cooperate.
4. Anything affecting coffee exportations to the U.S. would be nearly a knockout blow. We might consider the possibility of having some legislation introduced authorizing, upon a finding by the President that a country was taking American property without provision for due compensation, the imposition, within prescribed limits, of some countervailing duties on the imports of such country with the view to providing a base for compensation. The mere threat of such legislation might have a profound effect.
I don't know whether any of these measures are feasible, but I merely wish to raise the issue that the type of action we contemplate is likely to be inadequate unless supplemented along some such lines.
Allen W. Dulles/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typewritten signature.
37. Special Paper Prepared in the Division of Research for Latin America, Department of State/1/
No. 21
Washington, May 26, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 4. Secret. An attached Memorandum for the Record, dated June 5 and drafted by J.C. King summarizes a meeting held with officers from the Division of Research; it reads in part: "Attached paper was reviewed, paragraph by paragraph, and serious objections taken by CIA representatives to the estimate that a substantial rise in anti-U.S. feeling in Latin America might be created by supplying of arms to El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. It was pointed out to representatives of the Department of State that only the adverse effects of such an action were mentioned in the paper, and none of the beneficial effects. It was also indicated that an armed action by these three countries against Guatemala would result in a unification of the Guatemalan people behind Arbenz only if there were prolonged fighting, say for a period of months. This would be highly improbable because an attack by the three countries would be launched only if they were convinced that they had the means to bring about rapid military success. Numerous other minor points were objected to in the paper, and the conclusion was, at the end of the meeting, that a new draft would have to be made by the State Department."
EFFECT UPON GUATEMALA OF ARMS PROCUREMENT BY
EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, AND NICARAGUA
Problem
To determine the effect of overt procurement of arms from the US by El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua upon the Guatemalan military, political leaders and public opinion.
1. Assuming an effectively initiated and sustained program of military assistance to El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, together with an equally effective isolation of Guatemala in the hemisphere, it is likely that the opposition to Arbenz will become more critical and militant and that important Army and political leaders now supporting Arbenz will calculate that the present regime is not in the best interests of either the nation or themselves. Under these conditions, Arbenz would probably eventually fall. However, a substantial rise of anti-US feeling in Latin America and some Latin American resistance to US leadership in the OAS and UN are likely consequences of US military assistance to Guatemala's neighbors. Unless successfully countered, such support would provide Arbenz with effective propaganda with which to sustain national patriotism and to prolong indefinitely the life and present course of his government.
2. The Army is the key to the stability of the Arbenz regime and could effect a rapid and decisive change in the Guatemalan political situation if it were to take concerted action./2/ Although a quick change of attitude is always possible, there is no present reason to doubt the continued loyalty of the Army high command and of most of the Army officer corps to Arbenz./3/ The Army would be unlikely to take revolutionary action unless the high command or a substantial body of unit commanders became convinced that their personal security and well-being were threatened by Communist control of the Government, or unless there were widespread social disorder and protracted deterioration of the economy.
/2/NIE-84, "Probable Developments in Guatemala," May 19, 1953, noted: "The Army (6,000 men) is the only organized element in Guatemala capable of rapidly and decisively altering the political situation." The full text is printed in Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. l061-1071 (Document 15).
/3/NIE-84 estimated that the Guatemalan senior officer corps owed their personal advancement, and loyalty to Arbenz. "Any possible disaffection in the Army would be likely to occur at the junior officer level."
3. An agreement for overt procurement of arms from the United States by El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, especially if arrived at in confidence and if followed by rapid and sustained implementation, probably would seriously affect the Guatemalan Army. It would cause concern among the high command and would stimulate conspiratorial activity on the part of small, already disaffected army elements.
4. Although the concern of the Guatemalan Army leaders probably will involve initial resentment against the United States and a preference to go along with Arbenz, the military are eventually likely to recognize that military aid to neighboring countries is an expression of US determination to eliminate Communist leadership and influence in Guatemala. In this circumstance--and barring effective external sympathy and support--the Army high command is likely to calculate in terms of increased disaffection among lower echelon officer personnel, emboldened action by elements of the political opposition, an increase in the number of revolutionary attempts against the government, the loss of military position and political leadership in Central America, and new defensive requirements along Guatemala's borders.
5. It is probable that these calculations would ultimately cause at least a split among top Army leaders, some of whom would be willing to attempt deals with overt and covert oppositionist elements. Groups with which some present army leaders could negotiate successfully include elements of the urban opposition who, although anti-Communistic, are also strongly nationalistic and who would favor continuance of many aspects of the revolutionary program. The present military leaders neither would nor could negotiate with opposition contained in the pre-revolutionary landholder-military elite. Without the united support of the Army, the Arbenz government could not be expected to survive.
6. Arbenz does not at present have a good position in which to maneuver. Under the pressure here envisaged he is not likely to alter his present course but would appeal to the people in patriotic terms while taking strong measures to control the opposition.
7. Arbenz probably could rally considerable initial support at home, not only among Communist-led labor and the radical fringe of professional and intellectual groups, but also among many anti-Communist nationalists in urban areas, especially Guatemala City. Under circumstances of continued internal tension and national isolation, however, blind emotion will tend to give way to a critical estimate of Arbenz' policies and their consequences. Particularly if the Army's loyalty to Arbenz falters, it is likely that substantial groups among the present opposition will be embodied to take action and that the many political opportunities around Arbenz will seek deals with prospective new leadership./4/
/4/Another State Department analysis of the domestic political situation in Guatemala and its implications for U.S. policy is in a May 21 memorandum from Raymond Leddy to John Cabot, printed in Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 1071-1073 (Document 16).
8. The Communists will strongly support Arbenz as long as he controls the situation and will be able to make considerable local and international capital of the "imperialist attack" upon Guatemala. At the outset, their position in government and labor is likely to be strengthened and they will be able to use labor for effective mass demonstration purposes. The Communists have little power of their own, however, and if the military and larger political support around Arbenz weakens, the Communists will become progressively isolated and their leadership impotent. In time of crisis labor's capacity for effective unified support of Arbenz, if deprived of its present leadership, would be very limited./5/
/5/NIE-84 noted: "The Guatemala Labor (Communist) Party is estimated to have no more than 1,000 members, of whom perhaps less than one-half are militants."
9. The course of developments estimated in 3 through 8 are contingent upon what degree of success the United States may have in countering or neutralizing unfavorable Latin American reaction to the supplying of arms to Guatemala's neighbors. Most governments, with the exception of Argentina, Bolivia, and Costa Rica (especially if Figueres wins the July presidential election) will probably seek initially to ignore the issue. Argentina will certainly take advantage of the situation propagandawise and probably will use it to further an ambition to create a Latin American bloc, seeking particularly the cooperation of Chile and Bolivia. In other Latin American nations--Uruguay, Brazil, and especially Mexico, public opinion is very likely to be sharply critical of the United States and will deplore what will appear to them to be a blow against the inter-American system. The respective governments will be under increasing pressure to express officially the national dissatisfaction. While the procurement of arms by Guatemala's neighbors would provide no legal basis for international action against the United States, Latin American cooperation with the United States on other issues in the OAS and the UN would be under an increased strain.
10. Under present circumstances, the procurement of arms from the United States by El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua will increase the possibility of military attack by those countries on Guatemala. Such an attack will enable Guatemala to put a case before the OAS.
11. Such external possibilities may well provide sufficient psychological support and diplomatic assistance to prolong indefinitely the life of the Arbenz government./6/ The effectiveness of the Government-Communist propaganda will be greatly increased; for many elements of the opposition the anti-Communist issue and other opposition grievances are likely to be subordinated to a sustained, intense national feeling; these developments are likely to encourage the Army to continue its support of the government.
/6/The word "indefinitely" was inserted in an unidentified hand.
38. Report Summary Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, June 18, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 77, Folder 15. Secret. An attached cover memorandum from the Department of the Army, dated June 25, describes this paper as a summary of a report received from the U.S. Army Attach? in Honduras together with Department of the Army comments.
Former Guatemalan Officer Reported Planning Revolution
The United States Army Attach? in Honduras reports as of 8 June that Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, former Guatemalan Army Officer who has been implicated in anti-Government activities and is now a resident in Honduras, is planning to oust President Arbenz of Guatemala. The source of the Army Attach?'s information, whose nationality is not known, claims to be one of Castillo's "Lieutenants". The report is summarized as follows: The attempt is to be made within 90 days. The organization has purchased half a million dollars worth of military equipment including arms and ammunition sufficient to equip 3,000 men. The plan is to land 1,000 men at Puerto Barrios to establish a beachhead and then move by rail to Guatemala City. In the meantime Guatemala City will be "softened up" by air. Sympathizers will join the force en route to Guatemala City and a motor column will cross the Guatemala border from El Salvador. All forces will converge on Guatemala City. Army units except those in Guatemala City are expected to back the move.
G-2 Comment: An attempted revolt by Castillo Armas is quite possible but its success is unlikely. There is no information available to corroborate the various details given by the Attach?'s source, and it is quite probable that there is considerable exaggeration and wishful thinking in the report. Castillo is not believed to have much, if any, support within the Guatemalan Army, and support from Army units is unlikely, at least until the movement shows a good chance of success. Movement by rail from Barrios to Guatemala City could be easily blocked. Furthermore, a movement on the scale indicated would require considerably more logistic support than it is believed Colonel Castillo possesses.
39. Telegram From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State/1/
Guatemala City, August 12, 1953, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 65, Folder 8. Restricted Security Information.
35. Greenberg, Acting Manager United Fruit Company, says Guatemalan Agrarian authorities have now turned their attention from company's Pacific coast properties (my telegram 386, March 26)/2/ to those on Atlantic side and National Agrarian Department notified company on August 12 of order for expropriation of 174,000 acres of company's bananera division. Affected area embraces 138,000 acres in forest; 25,000 in abandoned banana lands; 158 leased to independent banana growers; and 10,000 occupied by squatters under nominal leases. According to Greenberg, company is left with 89,000 acres, including 4,000 in bananas, 5,000 abaca, 59,000 forests and 6,000 pastures.
/2/Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 814.20/3-2653)
He adds that forest land left company is too rugged for banana cultivation and in general other acreages left company are too scattered for future large-scale development.
Company plans file appeal to President Arbenz.
Schoenfeld
40. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, August 12, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 147, Folder 5. Top Secret. A cover memorandum from the Deputy Director (Plans) to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, September 30, labeled "Eyes Only," reads: "Will you please arrange for the filing and recording of the attached Minute of the authorizing action taken at the PSB meeting of 12 August as a part of the file on PBSUCCESS? Our internal records should be so prepared as to show that Project [name not declassified] (as shown on the books of PSB) is one and the same as PBSUCCESS--formerly PBFORTUNE."
At its Informal Meeting on August 12,/2/ the Psychological Strategy Board authorized the Director of Central Intelligence to proceed on a basis of high priority with the implementation of project [name not declassified],/3/ calling on the Departments of State and Defense for necessary support.
/2/On September 16 Frank Wisner sent a memorandum to the Director discussing this meeting at which PBSUCCESS was accorded "an extremely high operational priority." Wisner wrote: "It is my understanding that this was the meeting which flashed the 'green light' to us and--pursuant to your suggestion--I have already taken up with George Morgan the matter of having a suitably sterilized entry made in the records of that particular meeting." According to an oral report received by Wisner, the PSB decision covered these principal elements:
"a. CIA is to have the principal responsibility and is to call upon other departments and agencies for such supporting actions as CIA may deem necessary or desirable to the success of the plan.
"b. The operation is to be directed and controlled by CIA [text not declassified].
"c. It was recognized that this is an extremely difficult operation and that it will require a considerable period of build-up during the course of which the atmosphere must be thoroughly prepared and numerous actions must be taken in order to shake, and hopefully dislodge, the very firm grip which the regime now holds upon the situation.
"d. This is to be an unusually closely-held operation within State and the other departments concerned. (For your personal information, General Smith has directed us to have no direct dealings with the State Department area division; but rather to deal either directly with him or with two specific individuals whom he has named.)" (Ibid.)
An initial estimate placed the cost of the operation at $2.735 million, but "General Cabell, with whom I have discussed this aspect of the matter, has suggested that we allow ourselves a little leeway and put in for the round sum of three million."
/3/A draft policy paper for the NSC, drafted in ARA, August 19, argued against covert intervention: "Our secret stimulation and material support of the overthrow of the Arbenz Government would subject us to serious hazards. Experience has shown that no such operation could be carried on secretly without great risk of its leadership and backers being fully known. Were it to become evident that the United States has tried a Czechoslovakia in reverse in Guatemala, the effects on our relations in this hemisphere, and probably in the world at large, could be as disastrous as those produced by open intervention." For full text of the paper, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 1074-1086.
George A. Morgan
Acting Director
41. Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles/1/
Washington, August 17, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent through Wisner.
SUBJECT
Guatemala
1. During the past year the Government of Guatemala and Communist elements within that country have strengthened their position. Army officers have been treated as a privileged class and every effort has been made to insure the assignment of reliable men to key positions. Implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law has further ingratiated the Government with the lower classes. Conversely, the position of opposition elements has deteriorated. Obvious inability to organize an effective program discouraged some previously militant and caused others to avoid risking revolutionary associations. Further, the abortive Salama uprising forces a number of key opposition figures to flee the country and may have reduced their organizations to relative ineffectiveness. Many diverse and potentially powerful elements opposed to the present regime do remain, however, and would welcome the opportunity to act. It is, none the less, improbable that the Arbenz Government can be successfully countered without direct military action in which revolutionary forces must have outside aid.
2. Rufus is considered to be the most effective potential leader for a revolutionary effort. Necessary contacts with him have been made and extensive groundwork laid. Detailed plans, however, require review to determine their soundness in view of conditions altered during the past year and, particularly, to ascertain whether RUFUS still has the personnel essential for a successful operation.
3. Until July of this year it appeared possible that certain anti-Communist governments of the Caribbean would lend sufficient support in arms, planes and money to RUFUS to permit action. Strong interest was expressed, promises actually made, but broken at the last minute. Our clear instructions, since October 1952, have been to avoid any act which could be considered as "sparking" the revolutionary movement, but to be prepared to assist. It is now evident that insufficient help will be forthcoming from the Caribbean for RUFUS to move. We are therefore faced with two alternatives:
a. Accept the present situation, withdraw the financial support so far given to RUFUS and liquidate the mechanisms which have been set up to assist him.
b. Through covert channels, supply RUFUS with all the arms, planes and money required for a successful operation, providing the review of his assets is positive.
4. Experience with reconnaissance runs of our LCI have demonstrated that this craft is not suitable for the purpose intended. Further, resentment engendered in CINCARIB and 15th Naval District by consequences of the most recent trip makes further activity of this nature inadvisable.
5. Governments of anti-Communist Central American countries bordering on Guatemala require reassurance that the United States is prepared to back them effectively in maintaining a friendly attitude toward our interests and in defending themselves against aggression or self-styled retaliation on the part of Guatemala.
6. In view of the above factors, it is recommended:
a. That detailed plans for RUFUS' field operations be reviewed to ascertain their soundness in the light of existing conditions and to determine whether he still has adequate personnel to support the operation.
b. That a decision be reached as to whether the additional arms and aircraft requested by RUFUS are to be purchased and eventually concentrated at Puerto Cabezas for deployment.
c. That, unless additional arms are made available to RUFUS, material now at DTROBALO not be turned over to him. This recommendation is made to avoid sparking an inadequate effort that might well result in disaster.
d. That, if the answer to b above is affirmative, consideration be given to transporting the material now at DTROBALO to the Free Trade Zone, Port of New York, by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] ship. Arms purchased for RUFUS may be delivered from points of origin to the Free Trade Zone there to be picked up by RUFUS shipping for movement to Puerto Cabezas. Material from DTROBALO could be handled in the same manner with operational facility and sound security. Mr. Cummings states that he is prepared to handle the licensing aspects of these transactions.
e. That the LCI be disposed of through existing cover by returning it to the ostensible Panamanian owner for sale at the best terms obtainable.
f. That military assistance agreements be negotiated between this country and El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. Further, that these agreements include aid in the form of arms for the governments mentioned and that they be implemented with expedition.
J.C. King
42. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, August 19, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret. Prepared on August 20.
SUBJECT
PBFORTUNE--Meeting with DD/P at 1300 on 19 August
1. Tom Mann called DD/P subsequent to meeting in my apartment on 17 August to say he had seen General Smith and informed him of our meeting. General Smith was favorably inclined to positive and constructive suggestions made for softening up. Since Mann is leaving for Greece today, he recommended a substitute to General Smith--Ray Leddy, in charge of Central American Republics. Leddy was approved by General Smith. Mann said he had briefed Leddy with the General's approval, including the fact that only General Smith and Leddy will be cut in. No other echelons or personalities of ARA will be informed.
2. DD/P said the Acting Director wanted a quick check with Col. Edwards on Leddy. I called Colonel Edwards, who checked Leddy's file and at 1520 gave full and unqualified clearance. He said that Leddy's record was highly favorable, in fact, outstanding. I informed DD/P's secretary, who in turn called me at 1650 with the following message from DD/P--"Fine. Go ahead."
J.C. King
CWH
43. Letter From Colonel Castillo Armas to the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
August 22, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 73, Folder 3. No classification marking.
Translation of a letter received from RUFUS, 25 August 1953
1. [initials not declassified] will leave Tegucigalpa on Monday, 31 August. He will be in Washington about 15 September. Yesterday he returned from a visit with our friends in El Salvador.
2. I have complete confidence in Somoza and in our plan to put a base there. The reasons for my confidence are:
a. Somoza has shown himself very enthusiastic and desirous of co-operating with us. For example he sent at his own expense ($4000.00) one of his pilots to the U.S.A. to inspect planes for us.
b. He has promised us one of his big bombers (B-24) completely equipped. I offered to pay for it. He said no we could have it for nothing.
c. Somoza has placed at our disposal his military base at Puerto Cabezas.
d. At the proper moment Somoza is prepared to bring about any necessary agreement for joint action between Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. This he has assured me.
e. He knows moreover that he cannot deceive you and your friends.
f. Lastly, it serves his own interest to help us because he realizes that the threat to Nicaragua is greater than ever before. This he told me personally the last time I saw him.
3. Yesterday WT gave me $10,000.00. I need another $10,000 immediately if I am to meet heavy commitments coming up at the end of the month. I am very sorry to have to raise this subject again but, I beg you to please send me some money as soon as possible.
4. A friend in Panama has offered to sell me an LCI/2/ properly equipped for the operation we have in mind. He asks $10,000.00. This ship is more suitable that the Bali Hai as the Bali Hai has been modified for commercial use. (Note: the Bali Hai has not yet been bought by RUFUS.)
/2/The Central Intelligence Agency had already determined that this ship was inappropriate for the operation; see Document 41.
44. Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King) to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)/1/
Washington, August 27, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret; Eyes Only.
SUBJECT
Instructions for DD/P re Guatemala
Meeting of 27 August 1953
PRESENT
Mr. Wisner, Mr. Barnes, Colonel King
1. Mr. Peurifoy will be appointed Ambassador to Guatemala. There will be a briefing for him in Mr. Wisner's office Tuesday, 1 September, at 11 a.m.
2. General Smith has clarified the roles of Ray Leddy and Dick Berry. Leddy will be the lead man in State and will keep General Smith informed as we progress. Berry will be handled with loose harness.
3. At the PSB luncheon of 26 August the following conclusion was reached. Guatemala will have number one priority. It was confirmed at the luncheon that we will handle Guatemala in our chain of command. Others will play a supporting role only, to the extent we see fit.
4. General Smith told General Cabell that Mr. Tom Mann had briefed him on the meeting with us in apartment of J.C. King and made the following points, with which General Smith agreed:
a. There should be reduced outside participation--this referring particularly to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. All should be informed only on a strictly need-to-know basis.
b. Mr. Mann thought the atmosphere of the meeting showed too much concern on our part with the security angle. General Smith expressed the opinion to General Cabell that we should not be so worried and should not show too much concern. Mr. Wisner, however, emphasized to Colonel King that this does not mean any relaxation in measures to be taken to protect the security of the operation and the U.S. role in it.
5. Future papers will not refer to "diplomatic preparation", but will use the expression "other actions in support of CIA action".
6. Mr. Wisner emphasized to Colonel King that Guatemala is now number one priority in the Agency, and that Colonel King is to be responsible for getting the show on the road.
J.C. King/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
45. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, September 1, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret. Prepared on September 8.
SUBJECT
Briefing of Ambassador John E. Peurifoy re Guatemala
1. Ambassador John E. Peurifoy was briefed regarding the present situation in Guatemala by Mr. Frank Wisner on 1 September 1953. Present were Mr. J. Lampton Berry, Colonel J.C. King, and [name not declassified]. Mr. Wisner pointed out that conditions in Guatemala are obviously adverse to U.S. interests in view of the close working alliance between the administration of President Jacobo Arbenz and the Communist Party. It was noted that this alliance, through formation of a Communist affiliated labor confederation, persecution of foreign economic interests, enactment and implementation of a confiscatory agrarian reform law, court packing and conduct of an aggressively anti-American, pro-Communist publicity campaign, has achieved virtual dominance over national political and economic life. Further, it was observed that the four Communist controlled political parties which comprise the administration coalition hold 51 of the 56 seats in congress, while Communists dominate the National Electoral Board, the Agrarian Department, the Institute of Social Security, the Labor Courts, the Ministry of Education, the Secretariat of Propaganda and the official press and radio. Mentioned, among effects of this alliance upon Guatemalan foreign relations, were the active support of leftist elements in other Central American countries through provision of bases, press and communication facilities, cash, transportation, agents and assassins.
2. Mr. Peurifoy was advised that this Agency has now been authorized to take strong action against the government of President Arbenz in the hope of facilitating a change to a more democratically oriented regime. Some of the past preliminary planning and activity toward this end was reviewed and the point clearly established that success might depend, to a great extent, upon support of our activities by the American Ambassador to Guatemala within the limitations of the "need to know" policy. It was particularly noted that excessive security measures on the part of an ambassador which result in hampering agent activity through unusual limitations of communication and the imposition of time consuming burdens of cover activity are plainly not appropriate. It was also stressed that no aspect of this operation is cleared for discussion with any save specifically designated individuals.
3. Mr. Peurifoy stated that he understood the situation in general terms, appreciated the need for positive action and would be prepared to support the program as American Ambassador to Guatemala. For planning purposes he gave 15 October 1953 as a possible date for his arrival in that country./2/ In discussing station personnel he expressed the hope that among the qualifications of the Chief would be complete facility with the Spanish language.
/2/Peurifoy was appointed on October 5 and presented his credentials on November 4.
[name not declassified]
46. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, September 3, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret. Prepared on September 4.
SUBJECT
PBFORTUNE--Meeting with Principal Agent (KS),/2/ 3 September 1953
/2/Not further identified.
1. At noon, 3 September 1953, Col. King, [name not declassified] and the undersigned met the principal Agency field case officer assigned to PBFORTUNE who has spent 15 months with principal indigenous agent (R)./3/
/3/RUFUS, i.e. Castillo Armas.
2. KS gave his personal impressions of the circumstances surrounding PBFORTUNE and commented on a variety of interesting aspects relative to the proposed operation including the military action plan. This was done primarily for the benefit of [name not declassified] and Tofte who have just been assigned to some special work on the project.
3. It was evident that KS's thinking, planning and liaison with the P/A, (R), have so far been based on estimates of relatively limited support primarily on the part of "the Company." Hence his points of view up to now are somewhat restricted. Furthermore, it should be noted for the sake of order that KS's views are somewhat colored by the fact that he has had to identify himself very closely with the P/A and his cause over a period of time.
4. There is no doubt that KS believes strongly in PBFORTUNE, the principal agent (R) and his overt as well as covert organization. KS admits, however, that there is no tangible proof to date as to the scope and potential of the covert setup inside the country. This is partly due to the fact that KS has avoided any kind of pressure on R to "test" internal capabilities or deliver "proof" in the form of names, locations and numbers of covert elements and their leaders.
Considering that the operation now will be Government (U.S.) sponsored rather than supported by "the Company" as heretofore, KS would assist in devising means of evaluating, at least to a degree, the P/A's capabilities particularly inside the target country.
5. It is interesting to note that the entire available striking force of R in the neighboring country (H)/4/ is 250-300 men. Some of these are reportedly good troops including a number of officers with professional military background.
/4/Honduras.
It is further noteworthy that another neighbor country (N)/5/ has promised to place a military installation at the disposal of R for training and staging of his force. KS believes that R should take advantage of this offer without delay for reasons of morale and expediency.
/5/Nicaragua.
6. KS pointed out with some emphasis that he (and his indigenous associates) were considerably worried about the time element!
According to KS, the population of the target country was showing "increasing soft spots"--meaning that the spirit of opposition to the Government as well as possibly available active resistance potential were rapidly dwindling. KS stated, as his personal conviction: . . . "that unless the operation was implemented and completed within 90 to 120 days, it would be too late"!/6/
/6/The following phrase was added by hand: "Sounds like RUFUS himself talking".
(It should again be noted that KS's frame of mind is based on close association abroad with the indigenous P/A and the military plan calling for militant border crossings, a landing from the sea, and a cross-country advance towards the capital.)
7. After a general discussion, Col. King and KS agreed on plans for a visit with Mr. [initials not declassified]/7/ who is due to arrive in New York over Labor Day weekend. [initials not declassified] is the alleged leader of the present underground movement inside the target country from where he was expelled not too long ago.
/7/Regarding this meeting, see Document 48.
The presence of KS and [initials not declassified] here at this particular time is very significant in connection with reviewing and evaluating the current status and possibilities of PBFORTUNE.
Hans V. Tofte/8/
/8/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
47. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, September 4, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret.
SUBJECT
Impressions of PBFORTUNE
1. The following initial observations are made on the basis of:
Two briefings by Col. King and [name not declassified], 27 and 28 August 1953;
One meeting with CWH and CPP in DD/P's office, 2 September 1953;
Study of basic paper of P/A (CCN #73844-a 5/6 1952);
Study of NIE-84, dated 19 May 1953;/2/
Study of sundry papers for "background";
Debriefing of chief field case officer (KS);/3/
Sundry conferences with King and [name not declassified].
/2/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 1061-1071 (Document 15).
/3/Not further identified.
2. The current situation in the target country would have to undergo a considerable change before it would be favorable and suitable for the implementation of PBFORTUNE.
3. Certain changes in the balance of military power in the general central area in question would have to be established prior to the activation of any kind of revolutionary activity in the target country.
A series of support measures planned for the three neighboring countries recognize this./4/ These preparatory moves in themselves are of very considerable interest in the over-all anti-Communist effort of the Agency and could well pave the way for a number of important covert activities even if the presently contemplated revolutionary climax of PBFORTUNE would have to be cancelled or delayed indefinitely due to lack of internal covert support assets.
/4/For the type of measures considered, see Document 37.
4. The position of the indigenous P/A is weak. His available assets outside the target country are negligible. His plan of action is based entirely on expected popular support. There is no evidence that such popular support would be forthcoming. There are no actual proofs of any effective covert mechanism of any consequence inside the target country.
The military plan of action visualized by the P/A is highly questionable in view of the fact that the main forces would consist of untrained irregulars. It appears that the P/A's military plan grossly underestimates the attitude and defensive capabilities of the regular army. According to NIE-84, this army "can defeat any force which the three neighboring countries could deploy against it--so long as it remains united." In this connection, it is noteworthy that there is no evidence to indicate that the regular army is susceptible to defection or revolt.
5. According to the chief field case officer and others at WH headquarters, there is a definite time element involved in the PBFORTUNE operation. Time limits of 60, 90 and 120 days from 1 September 1953 have been indicated as desirable or ultimate. These time limits are mentioned partly for reasons of climate and partly for reasons of expediency relative to the deteriorating situation within the target country where active opposition and resistance against the present regime is fast disappearing.
6. At this stage, it is the personal opinion of the undersigned that:
a. The present concept of PBFORTUNE with an operational climax centered on a revolutionary effort on the part of the P/A as currently planned is impracticable;
b. Preliminary measures involving the three neighboring countries aimed at offsetting the balance of power, especially military strength, in the over-all central area could be of very considerable importance.
Followed by well-timed covert operations of the PP-type and some well-planned PM activities, it is possible that the target country and its Government could be greatly harassed and placed in an untenable position in due course.
In this connection, it is possible that the present P/A and his assets could be brought into play on a proper, limited scale.
7. CWH is meeting with the leader of the alleged underground movement within the target country in New York this weekend./5/ It is possible that up-to-date reports from this leader may change to a degree the thinking outlined in the above.
/5/See Document 48.
Hans V. Tofte
48. Editorial Note
In early September 1953 CIA officers met with the man known to be Castillo Armas' main ally inside of Guatemala City. The information received by the CIA in New York on September 6-7 differed from the assessment of internal support described in Document 47. According to the source, there already were 53,000 anti-Communist Guatemalans organized in cells of 315 men inside the country, approximately 8,000 supporters within 1 hour of the capital, and two functional intelligence nets. Other assets listed by the source included five clandestine radio stations and ample supplies for the manufacture of bombs. He noted, however: "Capture of Guatemala City at the outset of the movement will require the immobilization or assassination of the key civilian members of the Government as well as immobilization of a majority of the officers."
At the conclusion of the meeting, the source agreed that his organization would prepare a detailed plan and timetable while the CIA would provide 8-10 tons of arms for training purposes. (Memorandum for the Record, September 8; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 7)
49. Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King) to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)/1/
Washington, September 10, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-010125A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret; Eyes Only. A memorandum for the record of this discussion is printed as Document 50.
SUBJECT
Statements Critical of the U.S. Attributed to Guatemalan Ambassador
1. Meeting held in office of CWH on 9 September.
Present:
Mr. Lampton Berry
Mr. Ray Leddy
Mr. Hans V. Tofte
Mr. Tracy Barnes
Colonel J.C. King
[name not declassified]
The critical remarks attributed to Guatemalan Ambassador Toriello and the action to be taken re them were discussed. Mr. Leddy reported that:
At a meeting held in ARA on the morning of 9 September, where twenty-three officers were present, he was the only one favoring action. The other twenty-two voted to do nothing for fear of "rocking the boat". They explained their position by saying that nothing should be done to divert attention from the main issue.
2. Both Mr. Leddy and Mr. Berry expressed themselves as strongly in favor of positive action and all present agreed that this was an excellent opportunity to initiate our PW campaign.
3. Mr. Berry will speak to General Smith, but explained that any action taken by the General which might be attributable to Berry could embarrass and adversely affect Berry's relations with the ARA side of State. His position would be more protected if an approach could be made to General Smith by Mr. Dulles or Mr. Wisner. If Mr. Wisner does not approve, then Mr. Berry will handle the matter directly.
4. Action recommended is as follows:
a. A note from the Department of State quoting the remarks attributed to Ambassador Toriello at his press conference in Guatemala City on 3 September/2/ and inquiring if said statements are true.
/2/Toriello's remarks may have been in response to the Department's aide-m?moire of August 27 on the expropriation of United Fruit Company property. See the editorial note in Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 1056-1057 (Document 13). The text of the aide-m?moire is printed in Department of State Bulletin, September 14, 1953, pp. 357-360. Toriello's remarks have not been found.
b. If he denies having made these remarks, wide publicity should be given to his reply. If he confirms them, a strong note of protest should be presented and our action played up prominently in the press, particularly in Central America.
c. There should not be a threat to declare the Ambassador persona non grata because the Guatemalan Government in retaliation might refuse an Agrement for Ambassador Peurifoy.
5. Attached is a factual summary of events prepared by Mr. Leddy./3/
/3/Not attached to the source text.
J.C. King/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
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