Docs 50-72
50. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, September 9, 1953, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret. Prepared on September 10.
SUBJECT
PBFORTUNE
The following points were noted at meeting of Messrs. Berry, Leddy, Barnes, Tofte, and Colonels King and [name not declassified], 9 September 1953 at 1600 hrs.
1. Nicaragua
Mr. Leddy reported that a working group of Defense was to have presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval on 8 September, the agreement with Nicaragua for military assistance. If this were approved, action may be expected by the first week in October.
2. El Salvador
Mr. Leddy stated that both the Pentagon and the Government of El Salvador were delaying re certain specifications of equipment. He believes that a list is in the hands of the Pentagon now and that something might be done at this end to expedite the Salvadoran request. He will find out the exact situation and inform me.
3. Honduras
Both the present Ambassador, Irwin, and the Counselor of Embassy, are rated unreliable by Leddy. The Embassy building is also insecure. Until there is a change, and no new Ambassador has been selected to replace Irwin, Leddy questions the advisability of sending an Agency representative [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The U.S. Army Attach? is considered the best man in the Embassy and his quarters and office, which are separate, much more secure than the Political Section. [3 lines of source text not declassified] When necessary, Berry will go to Park Armstrong to get action. I am to speak to the Director regarding the need of a new Ambassador. Leddy explained that the situation in State at the moment is complex because of an effort being made to save such posts for career officers. There is a battle between career and political appointees.
4. Guatemala/2/
/2/For another account of this discussion, see Document 49.
The critical remarks attributed to Guatemalan Ambassador to the U.S., Toriello, and action to be taken regarding them, was discussed. Leddy reported that at a meeting held on the morning of 9 September in ARA, where twenty-three officers were present, he was the only one favoring action. The other twenty-two voted to do nothing in order not to "rock the boat". Their position was that nothing should be done to divert attention from the main issue, which is the expropriation of Fruit Company property. Leddy feels strongly that action by us is necessary. Berry is willing to speak to General Smith but believes any action taken by General Smith attributable to Berry would embarrass and adversely affect Berry's relations with the ARA side of State. Therefore, his position would be more protected if an approach could be made by Mr. Dulles or Mr. Wisner. Mr. Leddy will prepare and deliver to me a statement of the position which he recommends. All present agreed that positive action was in order, and this was an excellent opportunity to get publicity and begin our PW campaign. I am to deliver to Leddy today a copy of an opinion on the Toriello statement prepared by [name not declassified]. Assistant Secretary of State Cabot is away until Friday, and consequently did not participate in the ARA meeting on the Toriello matter.
J.C. King
CWH
51. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, September 11, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 3. Top Secret. A cover memorandum routed the document through Wisner to DCI Smith and states that the attached plan had been given provisional approval and submitted to the PBSUCCESS working group. A handwritten note by King, dated September 12, attached to a September 2 paper entitled "The Communist Situation in Guatemala," reads: "Underscored parts of attached Intelligence Summary, according to instructions received from Mr. Wisner 11 Sept., are to be included in the next draft of plan." (Ibid., Box 69, Folder 2) For some of the additional text that Wisner wanted to add, see footnotes 2, 3, and 6 below.
SUBJECT
Guatemala
During the past few years Guatemala has become the leading base of operations for Moscow influenced communism in Central America.
Ruled by powerful, anti-US President Arbenz supported by a leftist coalition government, with all key positions below cabinet level thoroughly controlled by a Communist dominated bureaucracy,/2/ Guatemala now represents a serious threat to hemispheric solidarity and to our security in the Caribbean area.
/2/The following text was underscored in the paper attached to King's note: "the Communists have penetrated the local agrarian committees which are now virtual political machines through which they hope to mobilize the mass support they have heretofore been lacking."
Essentially a primitive, rural country the size of Louisiana with a population of 3-1/2 million, Guatemala is currently engaged in an intensely nationalistic program of progress colored by the touchy, anti-foreign inferiority complex of the "Banana Republic".
With labor to a large degree organized according to communistic methods, and a land reform plan benefiting the peasantry,/3/ the present Arbenz government commands substantial popular support in spite of evidence of opposition in the capital, Guatemala City (Population 180,000).
/3/The following text was underscored in the paper attached to King's note: "Anti-Communists are considered enemies of the state."
With an army of 7000, the well-trained, and quite well equipped, hard core of which is stationed in the capital city, Guatemala maintains the balance of military power in Central America. This, coupled with Communist subversive activities extending across the Guatemalan borders, is a matter of increasing concern to nearby States including Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador.
The disturbing and subversive influence of Communist dominated Guatemala within the Pan-American orbit, as well as an aggressively hardening anti-US policy targeted directly against American interests in the country, has recently caused the United States Government to adopt a somewhat firmer attitude towards Guatemala than heretofore. Based on NSC 144/1/4/ and up-to-date PSB policy guidance, CIA has placed top operational priority on an effort to reduce and possibly eliminate Communist power in Guatemala. Appropriate authorization has been issued to permit close and prompt cooperation with the Departments of Defense, State and other Government agencies in order to support CIA in this task.
/4/NSC 144/1, March 18, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 6-10.
A study of available intelligence estimates (most recently NIE-84)/5/ reveals no internal conditions that could be developed into a vital threat to the present Arbenz administration without determined support from the outside.
/5/Printed ibid., pp. 1061-1071.
Though it is pointed out that the main political opposition to the government is located in the capital city, it is also stated that, although the dissatisfaction of important urban elements will probably increase, effective political unity among these elements is not likely to be achieved. The political union of urban and rural interests is even less likely.
Additional information appears to indicate that previously available active resistance to the government is decreasing rapidly due to general discouragement, especially after an abortive uprising earlier this year, which resulted in the imprisonment and/or exile of important opposition leaders.
It is further estimated that the army is the only organized element in Guatemala capable of rapidly and decisively altering the political situation and that there is no reason to doubt the continued loyalty of the army high command and most of the army to the President, who in turn is under the direct and indirect influence of Communist officials in key government posts and firmly entrenched within pro-Administration political parties.
Military units outside the capital are reported to have little potential for effective revolutionary action due to poor equipment, lack of training and the vigilance and security measures of trusted area commanders.
The police force (3500) could neither defeat an army coup nor itself overthrow the government without army support.
Another of the few organized elements of any consequence, the Catholic Church, is reportedly handicapped by the meagerness of its resources, the small number of priests in proportion to population, the fact that most priests are aliens subject to deportation, and the lack of a program capable of competing with the Communist-led labor movement or with agrarian reform.
A study of a recent evaluation of CIA's political and psychological warfare operations indicates that past efforts by the Agency to combat communism in Guatemala have been hampered by a policy of extreme caution adhered to by State Department representatives in the field. As a result of this, existing CIA assets personnelwise and otherwise in respect to psychological warfare and political action within Guatemala are negligible.
The main operational asset immediately available to CIA is a group of revolutionary activists numbering a few hundred, led by an exiled Guatemalan army officer (RUFUS) and located in Honduras. More than a year ago, some planning within the Agency contemplated the implementation of an ambitious militant plan of revolutionary action on the part of RUFUS and his group. For a variety of reasons this operation was indefinitely postponed; meanwhile RUFUS has received financial aid from private American interests. He allegedly controls considerable clandestine elements and contacts within Guatemala; in fact the above-mentioned operation would have depended for its success on immediate popular support of RUFUS and his revolutionaries, backed by active assistance of an extensive underground resistance organization and certain outlying army garrisons, as soon as RUFUS and his men entered the country.
[1 paragraph (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
In light of existing conditions in Guatemala, with the government steadily strengthening its position, and active opposition deteriorating, the original RUFUS plan is now considered substantially obsolete. It is disturbing that reports from the CIA case officer indicate that unless the RUFUS asset is operationally activated within a very short time (maximum 120 days), it will be subjected to a serious morale problem, and RUFUS' alleged clandestine support organization within Guatemala is likely to disintegrate along with other government opposition.
Undoubtedly there are means and ways of maintaining the RUFUS group on a stand-by basis, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. The RUFUS plan would in any case have to be radically readjusted to meet a more adverse situation. Also, any major action on the part of RUFUS and his supporters would have to be preceded by elaborate covert psywar, political action, sabotage and similar operations that would require a time-consuming build-up of Agency assets of various kinds, including the placement of qualified personnel in the field.
In this connection, it would be the primary concern of CIA to ascertain the existence, scope and potential of alleged Guatemalan covert resistance elements, and alleged clandestine contacts suitable for psychological warfare and political action purposes, as well as for possible active support of a para-military effort at a later date.
There is a general feeling of urgency in respect to action against Guatemala on the part of State and Agency officials connected with this priority task, but also a growing realization of the fact that existing operational assets do not permit any optimistic viewpoints relative to speedy success within a relatively short period of time.
It is recognized that the task headed by CIA calls for a general, over-all plan of combined overt and covert action of major proportions. Some steps have already been taken to initiate certain preparatory
measures in regard to supporting overt action and other US Government sponsored pressure aimed at off-setting the leading position of Guatemalan military strength in Central America.
A general outline of a contemplated course of action follows:
(a) Military Aid to other Central American States: In order to isolate the target country (Guatemala), military aid agreements will be concluded with Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. Implementation of such aid programs will be expedited on a priority basis and US military missions will proceed to the countries in question to supervise deliveries of military equipment and offer technical assistance. Negotiations with Nicaragua are progressing (Action: State and Defense), and it is expected that arms shipments will commence shortly (Action: Defense and FOA). Preliminary steps to encourage Honduras to follow suit are in progress (Action: CIA, subsequently State and Defense), and El Salvador is expected to join up without delay (Action: State and Defense)./6/
/6/The following text was underscored in the paper attached to King's note: "The governments of El Salvador and Nicaragua are strongly anti-Communist, recognize that the trend in Guatemala threatens them with Communist subversion and social upheaval, and may attempt through the Organization of American States to set up machinery for controlling the movements of Communists and exchanging intelligence about their activities. These countries were reportedly ready last spring to give active support to any revolutionary movement in Guatemala which appeared to be succeeding."
(b) Cessation of Military Aid to Guatemala: US military missions will be withdrawn from Guatemala at an appropriate time. Deliveries of arms, heavy equipment and other industrial products of military use have been stopped (Action: Defense and State). Efforts should be made to curtail or stop similar deliveries from foreign sources wherever possible (Action: State).
(c) Supporting Official Pressure: The US Government must from here in adopt a strong, critical attitude towards the Guatemalan Arbenz Government. Every opportunity to crack down hard on Guatemala in response to official correspondence or statements must be fully exploited and subsequently followed up by active measures wherever feasible (Action: State).
(d) Official Discrediting of Guatemala: The threat of a conference of OAS or of Foreign Ministers should be made and reiterated in due course. The objective of the conference is to consider evidence that Guatemala constitutes a menace to Hemispheric solidarity and the internal security of friendly nations through aggressive Communist subversion (Action: State). Collection of evidence, or fabrication of same, will be attended to accordingly (Action: CIA and State).
(e) Economic Pressure: Considering that Guatemalan Government economy is susceptible to pressures, covert economic warfare methods targeted against oil supplies, shipping and vital exports and imports, where feasible, will be applied. In this connection, an already cleared group [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] with extensive experience in Latin American banking, shipping, publicity, general investments and oil, will be assigned the task of preparing a plan of covert action. This will be augmented by advice from [name not declassified] aided by three of his most trusted advisers in economic affairs who have just arrived from Guatemala for consultation. These men occupy high positions in Guatemalan business and industrial life.
Real, or when necessary fabricated evidence re. aggression and subversion, will be used at an OAS conference to obtain approval of the American States for multilateral economic action against Guatemala, particularly in respect to coffee. A study is under way to determine what phases of the coffee industry may be attacked which will damage the Arbenz government and its supporters without seriously affecting anti-Communist elements (Action: CIA and State).
(f) Psychological Warfare: Psywar activities based in other Latin American countries, but targeted against Guatemala, will be stepped up forthwith through the exploitation of exile groups and internal anti-Communist organizations presently engaged in active operations (Action: CIA). A complete psychological warfare campaign for internal implementation in Guatemala is in the planning stage. [name not declassified], the Chief organizer of an extensive clandestine resistance movement, recently joined RUFUS in Honduras after being exiled from Guatemala. Contrary to current intelligence reports, [name not declassified] claims control over substantial assets that would be capable of covert Psywar activities and black operations using contacts within the press, radio, church, army and other organized elements susceptible to rumor, pamphleteering, poster campaigns and other subversive action. [name not declassified] is presently in Washington assisting in preparations for Psywar activity and political action. It will be necessary to strengthen the CIA field station in Guatemala forthwith in order to supervise the launching of a sustained Psywar program and verify the capabilities of the [name not declassified]/RUFUS clandestine organization in Guatemala City and elsewhere (Action: CIA).
(g) Political Action: Preparations for subversion and defection of Army leaders as well as government officials and political personalities are in progress. Here again, [name not declassified] is assisting and offering capabilities for operational exploitation (Action: CIA).
(h) Para-Military Action: As described in the foregoing, RUFUS and his small revolutionary group in Honduras (300) is the revolutionary nucleus around which last year's operational plan was formulated. Success depended entirely on immediate popular support inside Guatemala and a month-long military campaign gaining momentum through a series of complicated maneuvers and rendezvous climaxing in an irregular assault on Guatemala City. This plan is now considered obsolete; however, it is still contemplated to make proper use of the RUFUS asset in appropriate coordination with an overt and covert "softening-up" effort described in the foregoing.
Current thinking singles out Guatemala City as the key target upon which all efforts must be concentrated including a swift, climactic military action sparked by a reinforced RUFUS group with essential support from defected elements of the City garrison and active civilian resistance groups backed by a series of well-prepared unconventional warfare operations. This must include the neutralization of key military figures and control of power and communication centers.
Much preparatory work has already been completed to ensure logistical support of RUFUS. He and his group should take early advantage of the offered use of a military base in Nicaragua. President Somoza of Nicaragua made this offer as a result of several conferences with RUFUS and [name not declassified] in which the US was in no way involved. Supplies now available in the Caribbean should be sent forward without delay to support an extensive covert training program. RUFUS and [name not declassified] must at once take steps to strengthen their force by arranging for exfiltration of additional revolutionary personnel from Guatemala; leader and organizer types should be selected initially for intensive training, and some of these should be re-infiltrated to resistance elements within Guatemala. RUFUS' basic nucleus should eventually be built up to match as closely as practicable the numerical strength of the garrison of Guatemala City (approximately 3000).
The proposed expansion of the RUFUS group would in itself provide some measure of evidence as to RUFUS/[name not declassified] estimates and claims of control of resistance elements currently dependable in Guatemala.
Further proof of the existence of organized clandestine resistance should be obtained by the gradual activation of one selected group after another within Guatemala commensurate with the development and increasing momentum of the psychological warfare and political action campaign. Some subversive operations should likewise be carried out to further testify to the existence of the alleged RUFUS/[name not declassified] capabilities inside the target country, and in order to stimulate popular interest and support. (Suitable target for one of these operations: disruption of a 15-man Communist delegation scheduled to leave Guatemala City on 10 October '53 by commercial air carrier for a Communist Labor Congress in Vienna.)
Steps will immediately be taken to review the RUFUS plan according to concepts set forth in the above and progressively geared to take advantage of operational developments resulting from the before-mentioned overt and covert course of action (Action: CIA supported by State and Defense as appropriate).
(i) Strengthening of CIA Station in Guatemala: As previously indicated, CIA assets in the field personnelwise and otherwise are negligible. No time should be lost in order to reinforce the station with a senior FI operator and an experienced senior PP operator. The current PP and FI effort is considered far short of even beginning to tackle the task at hand. Expert leadership is required to supervise the clandestine build-up in Guatemala without which no RUFUS plan involving revolutionary action sparked from the outside can be implemented with a reasonable chance of success. (Action: CIA--Priority.)
It is estimated that the contemplated operation can be mounted and completed over a period of not less than eight months. A provisional estimate of expenditure aggregates $3,000,000/7/ as per attached specification.
/7/The figure "2,735,000" is crossed out on the source text and "3,000,000" written in by hand.
Attachment
BUDGET SUMMARY
(PBFORTUNE)
|
Psychological Warfare and Political Action |
$270,000 |
|
Subversion |
260,000 |
|
Intelligence Operations |
150,000 |
|
Maintenance of present cadre (8 months) |
160,000 |
|
Expansion of cadre to 500 |
60,000 |
|
Arms and Equipment |
400,000 |
|
Operation of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] training center |
100,000 |
|
Support of internal organization (estimate) |
150,000 |
|
Transportation, storage and travel (estimate) |
85,000 |
|
Transport Aircraft and maintenance |
600,000 |
|
Current liabilities |
[illegible] |
|
Contingencies |
300,000 |
|
TOTAL |
$2,735,000 |
52. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, September 15, 1953, 12:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret. Drafted by King.
SUBJECT
PBSUCCESS
A meeting was held in Mr. Wisner's office at 12:15. Present were Messrs. Wisner, Tofte and King.
1. Mr. Wisner stated that both Gen. Cabell and Mr. Dulles had read the Guatemalan plan for action/2/ and had approved. A meeting is scheduled for discussion of details at 3:00 p.m. in the Director's office on Friday 18 September.
/2/Document 51.
2. The Director had two suggestions:
a. [3 lines of source text not declassified]
b. The creation of a real or notional society of international character for freeing Guatemala from Communism. This society would have agents and representatives in various Latin American countries who would write letters, put out bulletins, and issue warnings to diplomatic representatives of the Guatemalan Government, and who would threaten them with a day of reckoning if they did not alter their present position of supporting the Guatemalan Government and join with the forces of liberation. They are to be told that a day of reckoning is coming.
3. Mr. Wisner called the Secretary of the PSB to inquire if any written record existed of their authorization to CIA to undertake action against Guatemala. Apparently no record was made of the meeting at which a decision was arrived at to give CIA the green light and with other Agencies and Departments of the Government giving full support. A brief paragraph will be prepared by PSB for the record./3/ At the next meeting of PSB their approval will be requested of a budget for the operation so that the Bureau of the Budget may be approached to allocate the necessary amount from the CIA reserve fund.
/3/Possibly Document 40.
4. Mr. Wisner said that Col. King could handle directly with Col. Edwards any questions of clearances for special consultants in New York./4/
/4/Possibly a reference to a group of individuals who met with King the previous day in New York City. According to a September 15 memorandum by King, he had approached a group of executives the previous day, and "explained that we were in need of the best business brains of the country for planning purposes and possibly subsequent action against Guatemala in the economic field; that we wished to explore all possible covert means of embarrassing the present Government by economic pressures." Several executives were willing to help, but said that King would need to get the approval of their Boards of Directors. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2)
5. Project for access to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Managua may be discussed with Mr. Helms.
6. Col. King should mention to Mr. Dulles on Friday the need for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] if a decision is reached to delay or to deny oil to Guatemala.
J.C. King
Chief, WHD
53. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles/1/
Washington, September 17, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
SUBJECT
Conversation with General Smith
1. The conversation which Mr. Berry and I had with General Smith this afternoon, and which I discussed with you before going over to see the General, was of only about fifteen minutes duration. I was able to bring up all of your points but did not get satisfactory answers on one or two of them.
2. General Smith indicated his strong agreement with our recommendation that some form of State Department rejoinder or rebuttal be dealt out to the Guatemalans. He held on to my memorandum which he promised not to show to Mr. Cabot, and he said that he was going to instruct Cabot to get cracking and do something about this. Mr. Berry presented a brief memorandum proposing a planted question and an answer for the Secretary to make at his next press conference. General Smith accepted this but said that he wished to do more. He rang for Cabot to come to his office, but Cabot had apparently gone home.
3. I raised the subject of Honduras and said that our point here was that greater strength was needed in the Embassy since there will be an important role for Honduras to play. Mr. Berry spoke up saying that the present Ambassador is "an old fuddyduddy" who has served out his period of usefulness and who should be replaced by a younger and more vigorous man. General Smith appeared to be interested in this, and said that he would ask Mr. Lourie to take the appropriate action. He rang for Mr. Lourie who had apparently gone home. Mr. Berry undertook to remind General Smith to speak with Mr. Lourie tomorrow morning.
4. I asked General Smith what he proposed to do about Mr. Willauer. General Smith said that he had repeatedly stated that Willauer will have to scratch his own gravel and ring his own doorbells; that he (General Smith) did not make diplomatic appointments; and that he did not propose to sponsor or push for the appointment of Willauer to any particular diplomatic post. In line with my previous discussions with you on this subject, I took no position at all concerning Willauer and confined myself to the question above-indicated.
[3 paragraphs not declassified]
Frank G. Wisner/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Wisner signed the original.
54. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, September 18, 1953, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret. Prepared on September 24. The memorandum is unsigned.
SUBJECT
PBSUCCESS
1. At 1500, 18 September 1953, a meeting was held at the office of DCI to discuss the present status of PBSUCCESS and to consider future plans for this operation. Present were DCI, DDCI, DD/P, COP, CPP, CNE, C/OPS/PP, CWH and CWH-III. DCI opened the discussion by stating that he felt the General Plan of Action, submitted on 11 September to be sound./2/ He added that several detailed suggestions of his own regarding implementation had already been discussed with several of those present.
/2/Document 51.
2. General Cabell stated that he concurred in approval of the General Plan but felt that the budget estimate should be increased to $3,000,000 to provide more adequately for contingencies. Mr. Dulles agreed.
3. Colonel King gave a detailed report on progress to date including action to strengthen Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador, joint planning with [name not declassified], planning for economic and psychological warfare, redeployment of Agency personnel, planned changes in State Department personnel, and advisable diplomatic action vis-?-vis the Guatemalan Government. In reply to the Director's query as to money required for immediate needs, he stated that $50,000 was adequate. Mr. Dulles decided that this would be made available at once.
4. In general discussion Messrs. Wisner, Tofte and Roosevelt pointed out that PBSUCCESS is an extremely difficult and sensitive operation requiring the utmost care in preparation and execution. It was agreed that any ultimate military action must be preceded by thorough exploitation of all other capabilities and that a preparatory campaign of eight months' duration, or more, is deemed advisable.
55. Memorandum/1/
Washington, September 25, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 5. Secret. The memorandum appears to be a draft prepared for King's signature; it includes several handwritten revisions. No final copy was found.
SUBJECT
Tasks for Chief of Station, Guatemala
1. Your priorities for development of KUFIRE assets are as follows:
a. Controlled penetration of the Communist Party.
b. Controlled penetrations of the major labor unions.
c. Controlled penetrations in the major anti-Communist organizations.
d. Controlled penetrations in the armed forces, or controlled agents with access to current planning both in senior and junior officer groups.
e. Controlled agents with access to high-level Guatemalan Government political propaganda planning.
2. The Station will transmit any rumors re: Arbenz government officials, actions taken or to be taken by the Army, government-army relationships, revolutionary activities, relationships among the Communists and any bad morale factors among the ruling clique to Headquarters. The rumors will be accompanied by Station comments re plausibility, where rumor was overheard and any suggested restrictions on re-use in other countries throughout the Hemisphere. (Weekly report, unless no rumors are overheard.)
3. 'The Station will clip and send, with appropriate comments, the column, "Boqueras" to Headquarters whenever it contains rumors of value to the anti-Guatemalan campaign.
4. ESCONSON I will write a "psychological barometer" report on local conditions, PW activities./2/ This report will be sent Headquarters each week.
/2/The final phrase "and give ideas on possible PW actions" was deleted by hand.
5. The Station will make a continuing study of morale factors (complaints, desires, etc.) among the following groups:
a. Students
b. Laborers (farm & industrial)/3/
c. Army Officers
d. Enlisted Men
e. Government Officials
f. Farm owners & operators/4/
g. Business and professional men/5/
/4/This item originally read "Farmers" it was revised by hand.
/3/The parenthetical phrase was added by hand.
/5/The last item was added by hand.
As complete a report as possible on each group should be in Headquarters o/a 15 November 1953. Thereafter Morale Factors should be included with the Rumor Report.
6. The Station will prepare a list of the 25 most dangerous Communists and pro-Communists/6/ and attempt to gather data re these targets which could be used for character assassination (either within or outside Guatemala). This study should be as carefully done as possible, but should be in Headquarters possession o/a 1 December 1953.
/6/The phrase "and pro-Communists" was inserted by hand.
7. When Mexican and/or other exile anti-Communist propaganda is found in Guatemala, it should be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible with a covering dispatch describing details of distribution, where found, any reactions, etc.
8. A bi-weekly flow of negatives, with captions, re conditions in Guatemala will be sent to Headquarters. More pictures of comparisons of living conditions of the top Commies and the peons will be of special value.
9. Chief of Station will prepare an operation designed to attack the October Feria, sending copy to [place not declassified] and original dispatch to Headquarters.
10. Headquarters is relying upon Station Guatemala for the checking of propaganda issued by exile groups and will expect all reports to be forthcoming as requested above.
11. Any propaganda to be placed through Hediger will be forwarded to Headquarters to prevent any crossing of objectives within Guatemala./7/
/7/The sentence originally read: "Any propaganda placed through Hediger will be cleared through Headquarters (Excepting that already in the mill) to prevent any crossing of objectives within Guatemala." It was changed by hand to read as printed here.
J.C. King/8/
Chief, WHD
/8/Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.
Seen and Approved by:
[name not declassified]
56. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, October 3, 1953, 5:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 72, Folder 5. No classification marking. Prepared on October 5.
SUBJECT
PBSUCCESS
1. [name not declassified] met with General Cabell at 1730 3 October 1953, at which time General Cabell raised the following points for consideration:
a. Mr. [name not declassified] and Mr. [name not declassified] stated at a meeting with him earlier in the day that the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] could move 10 to 20 tons of hardware from Panama to New York as suggested, but felt that it might be wiser to move the entire 80 tons in one haul. This should be considered.
b. Negotiations with Nicaragua for a military assistance agreement must be expedited with high priority. Could not Somoza be asked to pad his arms request to include the shipment for RUFUS? Ambassador Whelan is now in North Dakota and plans to return to Nicaragua next week. Mr. [name not declassified] knows how to reach him. In the normal course of events Whelan would not first return to Washington. He could, however, carry any necessary messages to Somoza. [name not declassified] pointed out that the plans for negotiation with Nicaragua have bogged down in Defense, as outlined by Mr. Leddy on 2 October. General Cabell stated that he would be glad to do anything desirable to correct this situation and requested that [name not declassified] advise him further in this regard on 5 or 6 October. [name not declassified] then mentioned that despite Somoza's cooperation being essential to the operation, it was desirable to maintain the fiction of RUFUS' having acquired his arms abroad without official U.S. assistance--a story which it would be difficult to sustain were Somoza asked to include RUFUS' arms with a U.S. arms aid shipment. General Cabell agreed that overt U.S. intervention should be eliminated if at all possible. He mentioned that Somoza is now expected back in Nicaragua from his South American trip on approximately 10 November but that an earlier return is desirable to expedite both treaty negotiations and hardware shipment. Senator Capehart's Committee is expected to arrive in Managua on approximately 25 October in connection with Export- Import Bank business. The Committee must first complete its business in Mexico. This might be used as a lever to get Somoza back to Nicaragua at that time. [name not declassified] feels that some arms for training and/or operational use should be in Nicaragua or Honduras now.
c. [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] stated that Guatemala is now attempting to divide the Honduran Conservative Party while Jose Figueres, who has adopted Peronista ideas, is advocating and promoting expropriation as a Latin American policy. In view of these political factors we should be prepared to trigger PBSUCCESS earlier than planned should the course of events so indicate. We must also remember that Barrios Pena may seize the initiative, in which case we may have to ride in with him.
d. After consultation with Mr. Leddy, [name not declassified] called General Cabell on 5 October and told him that contacts with Defense in connection with PBSUCCESS have been handled through Messrs. Kyes and Nash. Both of these gentlemen are expected to be out of town until 7 October. At the request of General Smith, Mr. Berry will contact Mr. Allen Dulles to request that this matter be taken up with Mr. Kyes at the OCB meeting scheduled for 7 October. General Cabell agreed that this would be the most effective manner of handling the problem.
[name not declassified]
57. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 8, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 80, Folder 2. Secret. Drafted by Fisher.
SUBJECT
Alleged Support of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, Guatemalan Oppositionist, by United Fruit Company
PARTICIPANTS
Colonel Roberto Barrios Pena
Lic. Victor Ramiro Flores
MID--Mr. Fisher
Colonel Barrios Pena said that on August 31 a military and political committee met in San Salvador to unify the opposition forces against the Arbenz Government. All leading Guatemalan oppositionists attended except Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who sent a letter declining to affiliate on the ground of having other commitments. In a later meeting between Castillo Armas and General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, a member of the military and political committee, Castillo Armas renewed his refusal to join the group.
Barrios Pena said it was notorious throughout Central America that Castillo Armas received large sums of money from the United Fruit Company. In Tegucigalpa he had several limousines, numerous body guards, 34 exiled Guatemalan students; and he had a large body of spies and agents engaged elsewhere; the total monthly expenditures amounting to about $30,000. Castillo Armas was known to be entirely without resources of his own. Despite the absurd ostentation of Castillo Armas' heavily financed activities in Honduras, the Guatemalan Government has never said a word about him, but when the United States Government merely asked for just compensation for expropriated property, a storm of insults broke out against the U.S. on the theme of "intervention". This raised the suspicion that there was some kind of understanding with Arbenz, but the worst, according to Barrios Pena, was that Castillo Armas was actively spying on and working against honest oppositionists who were using their own sources/2/ and making great personal sacrifices for a patriotic cause. Castillo Armas' refusal to join in a united front divided the opposition to the Arbenz Government and this, coupled with his sabotage of other people's efforts, assured continued success of the Communist cause. Barrios Pe-a said he had come to the United States to tell the heads of the United Fruit Company of the great damage which their support of the deceitful Castillo Armas was doing to the anti-Communist cause, to the company itself, and to the United States Government, which was being linked to the United Fruit Company through effective Communist propaganda. All his group wanted was to be left alone and not stabbed in the back by the United Fruit Company and its man, Castillo Armas. However, he said, Mr. Montgomery and other United Fruit Company officials had foolishly refused even to see him. He had therefore determined to give his information to the Department and to the McCarthy Committee.
/2/A handwritten note in the margin reads "Trujillo?".
Barrios Pena said his organization had prepared an uprising in Guatemala for March 28, 1953, execution of which was dependent on arrival in San Salvador of a coordinating emissary from a secure outside source of assistance. The emissary failed to arrive when expected and Barrios Pena accordingly cancelled the operation. His subordinate, Carlos Simons, nevertheless set off the abortive Salama uprising on his own responsibility and thus needlessly sacrificed lives and brought about complete suppression of oppositionist leadership in Guatemala. Barrios Pena later went to the outside source of assistance and asked why the emissary failed to arrive./3/ He was told that Castillo Armas had sent word that Barrios Pena was a spy for Arbenz, and that the emissary was therefore withheld.
/3/A handwritten marginal note reads "Trujillo."
I questioned the credibility of reports that any American interest was financing revolutionary forces in Central America. Barrios Pena said that although he had no documentary evidence, there was no shadow of doubt in his mind that the United Fruit Company was in fact contributing heavily to Castillo Armas. He thought the company had already invested about $2 million in him. He attributed the company's confidence in Castillo Armas to Juan Cordoba Cerna, who was retained by the United Fruit Company as counsel for several years. Cordoba Cerna had such faith in Castillo Armas that he sent his own 20-year-old son with him in the attempt to seize the Base Militar in Guatemala City in November 1950. The boy was killed in the terrible ambush which resulted. According to Lic. Flores, over 100 men were shot down by Arbenz' forces, only Castillo Armas and two others escaping. Most were mowed down by machine guns inside the Base Militar. Castillo Armas had brought them there in an incredibly stupid attempt to seize the internal arsenal and take over the fort. After the machine gunning, Army officers finished off everyone with pistol shots except, strangely enough, Castillo Armas and the other two. Furthermore, after only six weeks in the penitentiary Castillo Armas recovered from his superficial leg wound and escaped. He was said to have tunneled through a stone court under an enormous stone wall and up through the pavement of the street outside, all with his bare hands.
Barrios Pena reiterated that he was asking for nothing except that the Department use its influence to stop the company from supporting Castillo Armas in his activity against other oppositionists. Lic. Flores added that he and other anti-Communist leaders of long-standing were growing discouraged and resentful over the unnecessary obstacles put in their way, citing the Castillo Armas situation and adding that the United States was still supporting the Arbenz Government through military missions, etc. They also complained of the U.S. Immigration rules, which they thought should be relaxed in favor of Latin American anti-Communists.
Colonel Barrios Pena handed me a sheaf of documents (in Spanish) which he said were copies of those supplied to Senator McCarthy's committee. I said the paper he left with me would be carefully studied.
Comment: The documents left by Colonel Barrios Pena include the following:
1. A memorandum dated Washington, October 8, signed by Colonel Barrios Pena setting forth the complaint against Castillo Armas substantially as given above. The memorandum contains the following statement: "It is public knowledge that for more than two years the financial agent of Colonel Castillo Armas in Honduras has been the United Fruit Company of Boston, Massachusetts, and that thanks to its influence Castillo Armas enjoys every kind of prerogative and consideration in that country".
2. Copies of three letters purportedly sent by Castillo Armas to other opposition leaders on the question of unification.
3. Copies of a unification pact of the "Guatemalan forces of liberation" signed at San Salvador, August 31, by the following: Military Committee, Colonel Jorge Barrios Solares, Colonel Julio Pablo Garcia, General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, Colonel Roberto Barrios Pena; Political Committee, Carlos A. Luna, Manuel Jose Ares y Valladares, Guillermo Putzeys, Raul Enriquez G., and Carlos Samayoa Chinchilla.
4. A purported memorandum of conversation between General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes and Colonel Castillo Armas at the Salvador-Honduran border on September 13. The memorandum supposedly records Castillo Armas' refusal to join the other oppositionist leaders despite energetic representations by Ydigoras Fuentes.
Colonel Barrios Pena has called at the Department on several previous occasions, the latest being on April 28 when we spoke freely of Salama uprising of March 29 as having been carried out by his organization (although without his authorization).
58. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, October 22, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 143, Folder 3. Secret.
SUBJECT
PBSUCCESS
1. Mr. Leddy called [name not declassified] to state that he had been told at the OCB meeting of 21 October,/2/ General Smith raised the question of arms aid to Nicaragua very forcibly, and that word had been passed on to the Joint Chiefs requiring immediate positive action. Mr. Leddy was informed that Mr. Kyes is following this matter up personally.
/2/Minutes of this meeting are in the Eisenhower Library, NSCStaff Files, OCBSecretariat, OCB Minutes 1, Folder 1.
[name not declassified]
59. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, October 23, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 143, Folder 3. Secret.
SUBJECT
PBSUCCESS
1. Mr. Leddy called [name not declassified] this date to advise him that the OCB Directive to the JCS resulting from the meeting of 21 October, included El Salvador and Honduras as well as Nicaragua. It was directed that authorization be given for negotiations to be conducted with all three countries, with the details regarding form and amount of aid to be worked out later in a normal manner.
[name not declassified]
60. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, October 28, 1953.
/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, Jackson Records. Confidential. Prepared on October 29. Previously printed in Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, p. 1087 (Document 18).
SUBJECT
Debriefing of Ambassador Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, October 28, 1953
Of the various comments made by Ambassador Schoenfeld on the communist situation in Guatemala, the following are most relevant to OCB interests:
1. The communist power-drive in Guatemala has reached an advanced state of infiltration, they hold key positions in (a) the agrarian movement, (b) the labor movement, (c) government administration short of cabinet level.
2. President Arbenz, who is half Swiss, has a granite streak of stubbornness in addition to his volatility and is firmly convinced that he can deal with the communists whenever he has to. This optimism is not shared by Ambassador Schoenfeld, who feels that Arbenz has not even begun to appreciate the real purposes and techniques of communism as a power-seeking movement, not a social reform.
3. On the anti-communist side, there are very few positions of strength. The church is extremely weak, all of its property having been confiscated, and a strong anti-clerical attitude exists. The intellectuals are either bemused by the appeals of communism, or are hypersensitive to the U.S. The land-owners are strictly apolitical and will not permit themselves, or their sons, to engage in political activity. They feel that Guatemalan politics has three unattractive destinations: the palace, the jail, or the cemetery. The independent press, however, is very alert to the communist danger.
4. Guatemala represents in miniature all of the social cleavages, tensions, and dilemmas of modern Western society under attack by the communist virus. Conditions will worsen considerably before we can improve them, and we should regard Guatemala as a prototype area for testing means and methods of combatting communism.
5. It will be of primary importance for U.S. labor organizations to encourage the growth of free trade unions in Guatemala, for U.S. corporations to adopt enlightened labor policy in the area, and for the U.S. Government to develop information activities along non-attributable lines.
Richard Hirsch/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
61. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, October 29, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret.
SUBJECT
Status of PBSUCCESS
1. The present status of PBSUCCESS is as noted below:
a. Personnel.
Present planning calls for utilization of the following field personnel:
[less than I line of source text not declassified], Guatemala
Chief of Station [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]--[name not declassified] GS-15 vice [name not declassified] GS-14
Operations Officer [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] PP--[name not declassified] GS-14
Operations Officer [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] FI--[name not declassified] GS-13
Operations Officer [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] FI--[name not declassified] GS-13
Reports Officer [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] PP--[name not declassified] GS-9
Admin. Asst.--[name not declassified] GS-7
Secty. Steno--[name not declassified] GS-5
Secty. Steno--[name not declassified] GS-5
Commo.--[name not declassified] GS-7
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Guatemala
Operations officer, PP [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]--Donald O. Hediger GS-7
Operations Officer PP [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]--Eliot P. Razmara GS-9
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Honduras
Operations Officer FI [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]--[name not declassified] GS-7
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Honduras
Operations officer PP [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]--Jacob R. Seekford GS-12
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]--Vincent C. Pivall
[4 names not declassified], TDY replacement for [name not declassified], Heddiger and Razmara are in place and operating.
Seekford is on operational TDY in the United States now but is expected to return to Honduras shortly.
[name not declassified] is now at Headquarters but has not yet been released.
[name not declassified] is now at Headquarters with WH studying language and background. [1 line of source text not declassified]
[name not declassified] is scheduled to leave Caracas 28 October. [1 line of source text not declassified]
[name not declassified] is on duty in Panama. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
[name not declassified] is at Headquarters on duty with WH. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
[name not declassified] is at Headquarters on duty with WH. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
Slots for [2 names not declassified], Pivall, [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] are all awaiting CIA internal approval of T/O for Project PBSUCCESS.
b. Military Assistance to Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras.
Action to provide assistance as outlined in the Guatemala General Plan of Action was delayed by lack of approval on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Leddy, ARA State, advises, however, that at the OCB meeting of 21 October/2/ action was taken to obtain JCS approval, that the JCS later reported favorably and that official notification from Defense to State is expected very shortly. Upon receipt of notification, State will initiate negotiations with Nicaragua. Negotiations with El Salvador and Honduras are expected to follow.
/2/See Documents 58 and 59.
c. Official U.S. Pressure on Guatemala.
One aspect of the stronger, more critical attitude which the United States Government is taking toward Guatemala was manifested in Assistant Secretary Cabot's speech of 14 October./3/ This has received extensive press and radio publicity in Latin America and will continue to be stressed through PP field outlets.
/3/Cabot spoke before the General Federation of Women's Clubs on "Inter-American Cooperation and Hemisphere Solidarity." While applauding moves toward social reform in the country, he added: "But when we are resisting Communist aggression and subversion all over the world, no regime which is openly playing the Communist game can expect from us the positive cooperation we normally seek to extend to all of our sister Republics. We know indeed that despite its hypocritical appeals on behalf of the underprivileged, communism does not give a snap of the fingers for the welfare of the masses. It will liquidate them or send them to slave labor camps by the millions to advance its tyrannical power." For the full text of his speech, see Department of State Bulletin, October 26, 1953, pp. 554-559.
Newly appointed Ambassador John Peurifoy is expected to arrive in Guatemala on 29 October.
d. Economic Warfare.
As decided by DD/P and CWH, the Director of Security was requested to obtain background information on a group of key figures in business and industry who are judged to be in the most advantageous positions to provide technical guidance and operational support for EW operations directed against Guatemala. Completed reports from I&S are acted on as operational clearances for the purposes of PBSUCCESS. Studies have been completed on [14-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
e. Psychological Warfare.
Operations in the field of psychological warfare have been developed in close coordination with the principal agent in this country, [name not declassified], who has been established in a safe house near Headquarters. Detailed planning has been materially advanced and developmental operations initiated both here and in the field. An initial sum of $30,000. has been provided [name not declassified] for operations during the months of October and November. Of this, $15,000. has been transmitted to RUFUS and the second $15,000. will be forwarded early in November. Expenditures are being based on the following breakdown:
|
Development of Intelligence Nets |
$ 8,000. |
|
Development of Rumor Nets |
4,000. |
|
Subversion |
10,000. |
|
Production of Propaganda |
5,500. |
|
Contingencies |
1,900. |
|
$30,000. |
Intelligence and rumor nets are now being expanded within Guatemala and in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras.
An intensive study of opposition personalities has been initiated to determine their potential value to the RUFUS organization. In addition, key pro-government figures are being investigated with a view toward possible subversion.
The RUFUS controlled student bulletin Ceuage continues to be published in Honduras and distributed clandestinely in Guatemala. Production is 5,000 copies bi-weekly. Guatemalan government reaction has been marked by press denunciation and efforts toward suppression and confiscation.
A RUFUS controlled radio station in El Salvador has initiated broadcasting. Apolitical material is being used for the present while RUFUS agents check reception in various parts of the country.
RUFUS controlled "committees" are being developed in Mexico, El Salvador and Nicaragua to serve the following purposes:
1. Preparation of propaganda and its introduction into Guatemala.
2. Provision of overt, controlled media for purchase of newspaper advertising space and radio time throughout Latin America.
3. Encouragement of Mexican and Central American support for the RUFUS campaign.
4. Diversion of Guatemalan government attention from the RUFUS group.
The RUFUS symbol-slogan, "God, Country, Liberty" is at present being publicized throughout Guatemala through the Ceuage bulletin. In preparation for the more intensive campaigning to come, 600,000 symbol-slogan colored stickers and 1,000,000 smaller stamps have been prepared and are ready for shipment to RUFUS.
A book, "I Accuse", written by RUFUS to present his aims and plans for the future is ready for printing. As advance propaganda, 600,000 colored stickers have been prepared for distribution at the appropriate time.
In Mexico, the non-RUFUS controlled Committee for the Liberation of Guatemala continues to produce its bi-weekly bulletin for distribution within Guatemala and to a selected mailing list in other countries. It has also prepared and distributed 30,000 comic books. Since it appears that distribution of both bulletin and comic books has been faulty and since the material contained therein has been criticized for obvious falsehoods and inaccuracies, [name not declassified] plans to visit Mexico in an effort to arrange improved coordination, distribution and editorial effort. [name not declassified] intends to offer the Mexican group a part in his overall plan and, if proper control can be established, will provide financial support. If not, support will be withheld from this group.
A staff agent in Guatemala under unofficial cover has contacted an officer of the RUFUS affiliated (CEUA-Comite Estudiante Universitario Anticommunista) and through him had distributed 106,000 window displays, handbills and stickers in Guatemala City and in 123 outlying towns. He plans to continue this distribution on a bi-weekly basis.
A staff agent from Mexico has completed a fact finding tour through Guatemala, British Honduras, Honduras and El Salvador and reports that RUFUS is highly regarded as a potential liberator, that various potential support groups exist in Guatemala and in neighboring countries. He reports strong evidence of RUFUS' internal organizations being intact but seriously discouraged and in danger of premature action motivated by desperation. [name not declassified] is aware of this condition.
A field memorandum has gone to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reemphasizing the importance of the anti-Guatemalan campaign and offering supplementary financial support, news articles, photographs, cartoons and themes to encourage through our covert media, hemisphere wide KUGOWN support of the objectives of PBSUCCESS.
As an aid to RUFUS production of propaganda in the field, procurement of three Gestetner machines (simple, rugged, multilith type devices), three mimeographs and three tape recorders has been initiated. One tape recorder has been turned over to [name not declassified].
In order to check on RUFUS' activities and on the activities of other anti-Communists, Station Guatemala has been directed to take the following actions:
1. Transmit all rumors re Arbenz officials, the Guatemalan Army, revolutionary activities and Communist activities.
2. Prepare a weekly "psychological barometer" report on local conditions.
3. Make a continuing study of morale factors among students, laborers, army officers, enlisted men, government officials, farm owners, and business and professional men.
4. Prepare a list of the 25 most dangerous Communists and pro-Communists with information appropriate for use in character assassination.
5. Forward copies of all anti-Communist propaganda to Headquarters with details of distribution and reaction.
6. Provide Headquarters bi-weekly with negatives and captions illustrative of miserable living conditions in Guatemala.
7. Prepare an operation designed to ridicule the October National Fair.
f. Intelligence.
FI activity on the part of Station Guatemala has continued on a normal basis while production on the part of the RUFUS group has increased materially. Significant data has been received regarding Guatemalan Communist and pro-Communist activity both internally and externally. Stress is being laid on obtaining factual material suitable for use as evidence of Kremlin intervention in the internal affairs of Guatemala and of Guatemalan intervention in the affairs of friendly nations.
g. Paramilitary Action.
An initial shipment of approximately 15 tons of arms and ammunition is now ready for shipment from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and subsequent transshipment to RUFUS at [place not declassified] Nicaragua. Requisite arrangements with the Munitions Control Board and Customs have been completed. Necessary maintenance can be performed conveniently and legally [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This material is intended for use by RUFUS in his Nicaraguan training center and to test facilities for clandestine introduction of arms into Guatemala.
2. WH has not yet been advised of the essential appropriation for PBSUCCESS having been obtained from the Bureau of the Budget.
[name not declassified]
62. Stage One Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, October 22, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 145, Folder 3. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Part II, "KUFIRE," Part III, "KUGOWN," Part IV, "KUHOOK," and Part V, "KUCLUB" are not printed.
Annex B
FRIENDLY ASSETS AND POTENTIAL
Part I
Political Leadership
[5-1/2 pages of source text not declassified]
Attachment A
[1-1/2 pages of source text not declassified]
Annex B
Part I
Political Leadership
B. RUFUS
Synopsis of Favorable Factors:
1. Subject's military record reflects he is an above the average officer who has had sufficient ability to inspire confidence of his exile military associates so that they will follow him in an eventual military attack against the current Guatemalan government.
2. Subject is anti-Communist, pro-United States, and apparently has no excessively militaristic or dictatorial ambitions.
3. Subject possesses an inadequately organized and trained FI apparatus, which, however, could be used as a basis for mounting larger FI operations against the current Guatemalan regime.
4. Subject's PP apparatus, although now relatively ineffective, can serve as framework for a larger PP effort against the current Guatemalan regime.
5. Subject has the confidence and support of the Honduran Government, which provides the movement with an FI and PP Headquarters and distribution base.
6. Subject seems prepared to cooperate with PBSUCCESS officials. He indicated readiness to take fullest advantage of future CIA aid and assistance.
Synopsis of Unfavorable Factors:
1. No method is now available to determine effectiveness of Subject's PP organization.
2. No method is now available to determine the exact extent and effectiveness of Subject's FI nets or informants.
3. Because of lack of experience and necessity, security practices of Subject's group need to be tightened up to control any possible Communist infiltration.
4. [2 lines of source text not declassified] His same contacts may resent accounting for funds paid for carrying out future PP or FI assignments.
5. Subject lacks experience to organize, direct, and coordinate an operation of the magnitude now planned.
6. The general popularity of Subject in Guatemala and the actual number of his hard-core supporters is uncertain. In 1950, Subject's attempted coup was foiled by a Communist penetration. According to [name not declassified], on three later efforts in 1952-53, Subject promised success for his movement but was unable to launch a successful coup against the government because of lack of support within the country.
8. Use of Subject must proceed without a CIA operational clearance.
9. Subject has little military field experience and naturally no unconventional warfare experience.
10. No control can be exercised over Subject at the present time.
1. Biography--See Attachment A.
2. Personality--Subject, primarily a military leader, commands respect and discipline from his followers by his sincere and reasonable manner. Subject does not possess a hard, driving, fiery personality, but his orders are obeyed without question, despite his quiet and reserved attitude. His associates in Honduras clearly indicate that Subject is the absolute leader. He, however, is flexible in considering problems and has demonstrated an ability to compromise.
Subject appears to be deliberate in his manner of thinking and speaking. He is not one who would be considered to commit rash acts or launch into a military operation without being fully prepared.
Subject is of average physical appearance, and in contrast to certain Latin American military officials, is meticulous in his dress and personal habits.
3. Ideology--Subject is regarded as being a sincere anti-Communist and pro-United States. He abandoned a promising military career in 1949 to protest against the Communist influence in the Arevalo Government. He constantly has remained active in plotting against the Communist dominated Guatemalan Governments. No information exists regarding his particular feelings as to new social reforms or methods of governing a Guatemalan administration which he might head.
4. Motivation--No information is available to indicate specifically what Subject's primary motivations are. From the record it is believed his dislike of Communism in the Guatemalan Government prompted his activities against Arevalo, but subsequent events which included the payment of large sums to him for his group's activities, undoubtedly must be considered. In conversations, undesirable personal ambition and motives of financial gain were not revealed.
5. Financial--No information is available regarding source of Subject's income, other than amounts which are being paid him by CIA. There is no information to indicate whether he possesses property or securities inside or outside Guatemala. Subject is not a member of a wealthy Guatemalan family.
Subject has only made demands from CIA to sustain his organization and not for his personal reimbursement. A request has been made for the accounting of money paid to him by CIA. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
6. Area Background--Has lived in Central America, with brief exceptions of visits to United States and exile periods in Colombia and Honduras. Subject is currently residing in Honduras.
7. Control--No control now exists over Subject. Possibly in the future, financial control can be exerted, since he is responsible for funding various PP and FI organizations under his control.
8. Security--A covert name check has been initiated on Subject, but no results have been received at current date. According to instructions from the DCI this project is authorized to proceed without compliance with normal operational procedures because of the urgency and sensitivity of the PBSUCCESS operation.
Subject personally is discreet and security conscious. However, lacking formal security training and adequate resources, certain operating practices have not been sufficiently secure. He has indicated willingness to initiate new methods which will tighten up the security of his operations.
His immediate family, who live with him, are cognizant of many of his operational undertakings.
The physical security of his Honduras Headquarters is considered adequate.
9. Contacts--No specific information is available regarding Subject's military or political contacts who could assure him military support in a revolutionary effort.
Subject has stated he has general support in Guatemala, but to date has not supplied the details of this claimed support. He is reputed to be aided by approximately 200 Guatemalan exiles.
The Honduran Government has permitted Subject to organize his group in Honduras. The nature of the personal and political relationship between [name not declassified] and Subject is confused.
10. Political Ability--Subject has held no political offices and has not been active in any Guatemalan political party. No information is available regarding the attitudes of prominent anti-Government political parties toward him. Subject claims general support, particularly among the anti-Communist University students.
No information is available regarding a statement of his political ambitions for the future. His precise political ambitions are not known.
11. PP Ability--There is no information that Subject has had PP experience, although currently his propaganda groups do coordinate their activities with his Headquarters. Subject has indicated, however, he expects to turn this particular activity over to a qualified assistant, who possesses adequate training and background. He has written an anti-Communist book, Yo Acuso, of doubtful PP value.
12. Military Ability--Subject's military record, (see Attachment A), indicates a rapid rise. Although reasons for this advancement are not spelled out, Subject's capacity for command must be considered as a responsible factor. No information exists regarding the opinion which other Guatemalan officers have for Subject. There is no information available regarding U.S. military officials' opinion of Subject's military judgment and command capacity.
13. Intelligence Ability--There is no information that Subject has worked with any intelligence service, except CIA. He is, however, acquainted with FI procedures as a result of his anti-government activities while in exile. He is in contact with numerous sources in Guatemala [and] with Central American Military Attach?s stationed in Honduras.
Subject admits lack of background in conducting well-organized FI activities, but is convinced of their importance and is willing to cooperate with CIA representatives in improving his FI nets.
14. Replacement--Subject appears to be far above the level of his staff assistants, none of whom apparently are being considered as an eventual replacement for RUFUS.
Attachment A
Full Name: RUFUS
Alias: Julio Restrepo--pseudonym
Date and Place of Birth: 1914 in Guatemala
Present Citizenship: Guatemalan
Relatives and friends in the United States: Peter Woolson, San Antonio, Texas
Wife: Odilia
Brother: Julio Federico Paiz, brother-in-law also known as Federico Paiz Herrara, leader of anti-Communist student group.
Political affiliations: An Aranista. Opposed to the moral corruption of the Arbenz regime. At present, anti-Communistic.
Travel outside Guatemala: On 8 November 1951, left Bogota, Colombia for Panama. Reportedly made a trip through the Central American Republics, thence to the U.S. and in January, 1952, reported to be either in Mexico or Salvador.
Education:
Six years of primary school
Two years Industrial Technical School of Guatemala
Three years basic military studies at the Military Academy
Six mos. specialized training in Artillery at the Military Academy
One year basic course in School of Applied Tactics, Guatemala
Three months at General Staff course (Ground), Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas
Four and a half mos., Service Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Military Service:
Entered Military Academy in 1933 and graduated in 1936
Captain in June, 1939
Major in June, 1944
Lt. Colonel in ?
Arrested on 27 August 1949 for failure to send troops to the capital on 18 July
Employment history:
Entered Military Academy in June, 1933 and graduated in June, 1936
Captain in June, 1939
Major in June, 1944
Lt. Colonel in ?
Commander of Artillery Unit, Ft. Matamoros, 1936-1937
Instructor of Artillery, Ft. Matamoros, 1937-1942
Chief of Artillery of the Atlantic Sector, 1942-1944
First Chief of Expeditionary Force of the Defense of the Atlantic Sector, July 1944
Instructor of Artillery, Ft. San Jose, Sept-Oct 1944
Chief, G-4 Section, General Staff, Oct 1944-June 1945
Chief, G-3 Section, General Staff, June-Nov 1945
Sub-Director of Military Academy, Nov 1947-March 1947
Professor of Tactics, Second Course, Military Academy, May 1946-March 1947
Director of Military Academy, March 1947 until early 1949
Transferred to Chief of Garrison at Mazatenango, a secondary post
Detailed to visit USMA in September 1947
Arrested August 1949 by government police
In November 1950 led an armed attack on the Military Base in Guatemala City, wounded and imprisoned
On 11 June 1951 escaped from National Prison and granted safe conduct to El Salvador
Publications: Wrote a book Yo Acuso in 1951
Court Record: Arrested by Guatemalan Government in 1953 for political activities
Description:
Age--39
Height--5 feet, 5 inches
Eyes--Dark brown
Sex--Male
Weight--135 lbs.
Hair--Black
Build--Slender
63. Memorandum From [name not declassified] of the Central Intelligence Agency to [name not declassified] of the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, November 5, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 2. Secret.
SUBJECT
Summary of Directives and Instructions on PBSUCCESS
1. Pursuant to your verbal instructions of 4 November, there are listed below the principal directives, instructions and sources of instructions for Project PBSUCCESS.
2. General (in "Policy" folder)
a. "Guatemala--General Plan of Action" TS #, dated 11 Sept 1953/2/
/2/See Document 51.
b. PBSUCCESS Status Report, dated 29 October 1953/3/
/3/See Document 61.
3. US Military Assistance (in "Policy" folder)
a. Various memos of conversations between Ray Leddy and [name not declassified]. JCS have approved arms assistance negotiations with Nicaragua, and formal Defense Department notification to State is expected momentarily. JCS have not yet approved negotiations with Honduras or El Salvador.
b. The Guatemalan Government has requested several additional US Army personnel on a TDY basis, to be added to the US Military Mission. State (Leddy) has forwarded the request to Defense without comment. If necessary, State is prepared to ask Defense not to make the personnel available.
4. Economic Warfare
a. The Director of Security has been requested to obtain biographical data on proposed EW consultants. ("Policy" Folder).
b. In discussions between [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] in New York on 2 November, it was agreed that there should be an approach to [name not declassified] to decide on EW methods directed toward cutting off petroleum and other supplies of the Guatemalan government. (For further details, see contact report written by [name not declassified], in "EW" folder.)
5. FI
a. Attached Memorandum from C/WHD to Chief of Station, Guatemala, (Attachment No. 1) outlines priorities for development of KUFIRE assets.
6. PP
a. WHD Field Memoranda 50-53 (Attachment No. 2) and 138-53 (Attachment No. 3) instruct all WHD stations on how to support the anti-Guatemala KUGOWN campaign throughout the hemisphere.
b. WHD Field Memorandum 81-53 (available from [name not declassified] also deals with hemisphere-wide support of the above campaign.
c. Attachment No. 1 outlines PP tasks of Guatemala Station.
d. Mr. Frank Wisner has ordered [name not declassified] to use all WHD covert media to disseminate the Cabot speech and an Arthur Krock column which urges the US government to invoke the Monroe Doctrine in fighting Communism in the Western Hemisphere. ([name not declassified] files.)
e. In discussions between C/PP/Ops, DD/P, etc. there has been talk of attempting to base various PP activities in [place not declassified] and of organizing some sort of "International Organization for the Liberation of Guatemala from Communism". (Memos in "Policy" folder.)
f. The $30,000 given to [name not declassified] in late September 1953 must last RUFUS through November. (Contact Report of [name not declassified], dated 6 October 1953, in "Policy" folder.)
7. Instructions from WHD to Guatemala Station during 1953 (material extracted from Guatemala Chrono File).
a. 5 January, instructed Station to have Hediger continue writing articles about Guatemala for planting elsewhere in hemisphere. (According to [name not declassified]. ESCONSIN 1 now writes such articles.)
b. 26 February, Station was requested to furnish PO Box numbers used by Guatemalan Communists.
c. 6 April, Station was requested to furnish information of religious persecution in Guatemala for use elsewhere in hemisphere.
d. 2 April, Station was instructed to mail "mourning cards" for 30 successive days to Arbenz and top Communist leaders. Cards were to mourn the purge or execution of various Communists in the world and to hint forthcoming doom to recipients.
e. 17 June, Station was requested to collect the following material for hemisphere-wide propaganda:
(1) evidence of worsening economic conditions
(2) photos and facts on failure of land reform
(3) evidence that only Communists were profiting
f. 19 June, Station was requested to report:
(1) Its facilities for placing material in press and on radio
(2) Its facilities for preparing material, printing and distributing it
(3) Its capabilities to initiate strikes, etc.
(4) Its access to Communist or official Guatemalan letterheads, signatures, seals and to information useful for character assassination.
(5) Suggestions as to what action taken by the Guatemalan government would make it most unpopular at home; what the best targets for defamation are; which character assassinations could be most readily and profitably performed.
f. [sic] 1 July, implied and direct criticism of Station performance was made by dispatch. Station was told that:
(1) It had perhaps too willingly agreed to limitations imposed by the US Ambassador
(2) It did not seem to be using security techniques
(3) It had objected to the use of propaganda within Guatemala prepared outside the country, and had not made any alternate suggestions
(4) It had been slow in answering dispatches or had not answered at all
(5) Action and reporting on the labor situation were deficient.
[name not declassified]
64. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, November 11, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
PBSUCCESS
1. With reference to my recent memorandum/2/ regarding the PBSUCCESS budget I have now been informed by CPP that the DCI has secured the $3,000,000/3/ in question from the Bureau of the Budget. (I have been given to understand that Mr. Dulles, General Smith, and Mr. Dodge had a conference and that minutes of this meeting were written to serve as authorization for the above.)
/2/Dated October 31. (Ibid., Box 72, Folder 5)
/3/See footnote 2, Document 40, and Document 54.
2. I was further given to understand that DCI had instructed DDA (Mr. White) to handle the necessary details in respect to securing the funds without undue delay.
3. Confirming our yesterday's conversation I would recommend:
a. That a PBSUCCESS working group have a meeting before the end of this week in order to ascertain the current status of the project as well as plans for the immediate future, and
b. That a general briefing on PBSUCCESS be prepared for DCI, DDCI, DDP and COP. This briefing should be scheduled for the week of 16 November 1953.
Hans V. Tofte
Chief, PP/OPS
65. Draft Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, November 12, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
SUBJECT
Program for PBSUCCESS
REFERENCES
A. "Guatemala--General Plan of Action", TS# dated 11 September 1953/2/
B. Project PBSUCCESS Status Report, dated 29 October 1953/3/
/2/Document 51.
/3/Document 61.
A. Objectives
1. To remove covertly, and without bloodshed if possible, the menace of the present Communist-controlled government of Guatemala.
2. To install and sustain, covertly, a pro-US government in Guatemala.
B. Statement of the Problem
1. The Communists have become strongly entrenched in Guatemala and in the Guatemalan government, thus constituting a threat to United States welfare in the Western Hemisphere.
2. The Guatemalan non-Communist opposition has become disillusioned and disunited. However, a latent anti-Communist resistance potential is believed to exist.
3. The resistance potential must be built up to the point where it can contribute materially to the accomplishment of the objectives of PBSUCCESS.
4. In view of growing Communist strength and declining non-Communist cohesion in Guatemala, the implementation and successful completion of the objectives of PBSUCCESS must proceed without delay.
5. It must be recognized that any major effort to dislodge the Communist-controlled government of Guatemala will probably be credited to the United States, and possibly on CIA. Covert accomplishment of the objectives of PBSUCCESS is therefore defined as meaning accomplishment with plausible denial of United States or CIA participation.
C. Plan of Operations
1. Stage One--Staffing and Assessment--
a. Assignment of Project Personnel.
b. Field Survey by Communications Adviser.
c. Briefing and despatch of Project field personnel.
d. Assessment and analysis of friendly assets.
e. Assessment and analysis of enemy assets.
f. Preparation of detailed operational plans for Headquarters approval.
2. Stage Two--Preliminary Conditioning (D-?)
a. Project Headquarters moves to the field.
b. Create dissension and defection within the target.
c. Discredit target at home and abroad.
d. Demonstrate inability of target regime to represent best interests of the people.
e. Create hope and encourage patience among non-Communists.
f. Complete military agreements with Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador.
g. Withdraw US military personnel from target at appropriate time.
h. Begin economic pressure.
i. Begin formation and training of a para-military force in exile.
j. Assess accomplishments.
k. Obtain Headquarters approval before proceeding to next stage.
3. Stage Three--Build-Up (D-75)
a. Create maximum antagonism to target regime.
b. Fan passive will to resist.
c. Apply internal and external economic pressure to create serious difficulties.
d. In concert with majority of OAS members, apply diplomatic pressures.
e. Demonstrate urgency by speeding military build-up of neighboring countries (not including Mexico).
f. Accentuate para-military preparation.
g. Initiate passive sabotage program.
h. Assess accomplishments.
i. Obtain Headquarters approval before proceeding to next stage.
4. Stage Four--Critical Period (D-25)
a. Apply maximum economic pressure.
b. Accentuate divisionist activity within target.
c. Intensive rumor campaign stimulating fear of war for the purpose of drawing enemy forces away from capital.
d. Constitutional revolutionary forces claim support of people.
e. Para-military force in readiness.
f. Passive sabotage evident.
g. Assess accomplishments.
h. Obtain Headquarters approval before proceeding to next stage.
5. Stage Five--Showdown (D-5)
a. Implement aggressive sabotage plan against key targets.
b. Constitutional leader claims capability to seize power by force and issues ultimatum to target regime to capitulate in order to avoid needless bloodshed.
c. Populace is told to await target regime's reply and further instructions from constitutional leader.
d. If ultimatum fails, popular uprising begins; para-military force enters target country, proclaims authority, declares target regime null and void.
e. Secure position and restore order.
6. Stage Six--Consolidation (D-?)
a. Roll-up of Communists and collaborators.
b. Dramatic initial proclamations and edicts.
c. Formation of government.
d. Announcement of long-range domestic and foreign policy.
e. OAS countries announce immediate recognition and support of new regime.
f. United States offers aid.
g. PBSUCCESS terminated.
D. Organization and Authority
1. Priority
a. "Top Operational Priority" given PBSUCCESS.
2. Authority and Responsibility
a. Primary field authority and responsibility is vested in the Officer in Charge, PBSUCCESS.
b. This officer is designated "Special Deputy for PBSUCCESS, WHD."
c. The command channel will be direct from Special Deputy to CWH.
3. Staff Requirements
a. The following staff requirements for PBSUCCESS are believed to be the minimum for adequate implementation and control of the Plan of Operations envisaged herein. Additional personnel may be required for varying periods of TDY.
b. The T/O outlined below is exclusive of WHD's current T/O.
[Omitted here is a proposed Table of Organization with position titles and grades.]
7. Finance
a. Upon arrival of this program, financial accountability will be vested in CWH, under whose direction CWH/Ad will be the accountable disbursing officer for Headquarters expenditures. Under the general direction of the CWH, the Special Deputy for PBSUCCESS will be the accountable disbursing officer for Field expenditures.
b. Procedures for allocation, disbursement, and accounting of funds will be in a manner acceptable to the DD/A, and as shall be arranged between him and the CWH/Ad.
[name not declassified]/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. The approval lines at the end for CC, CWH, and CD/P are all blank.
66. Contact Report/1/
Washington, November 16, 1953, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 8. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on November 17 by [name not declassified].
Place: DCI's Office
Persons Present: DCI, D/DCI, DD/P, DD/P/COps, CWH, [2 names not declassified]
Cover Used: None
Discussion:
1. The conference was opened by the DCI with the statement: "This is a top priority operation for the whole agency and is the most important thing we are doing. I am under pressure by others to get on with this." The DCI then discussed the procedures involved in applying economic pressure through the coffee buyers in the U.S., suggesting that perhaps through the proper agencies in the U.S. a rumor could be circulated that current Guatemalan coffee contained harmful fungi and therefore would have to be barred from the U.S. [name not declassified] commented that although the idea would be excellent, the danger existed that the coffee buyers, already having been approached and cognizant of our interest would "smell a rat," and possibly embarrass us through the press as certain buyers have already evidenced a lack of cooperation. Further, such action as denying shipment of coffee already paid for would constitute heavy financial losses to these buyers who, lacking proper motivation, might set up hue and cry, thus injuring the program. Based upon these latter comments, the DCI telephoned an unidentified person and informed him to "lay off that coffee idea until further notice." [name not declassified] further commented that perhaps more effective economic measures could be brought about through economic sabotage rather than through direct participation by American businessmen and that such action was contemplated within the proposed program.
2. The DCI reiterated the importance of this project and requested that the briefing proceed, at which time [name not declassified] led off by reviewing briefly the situation report prepared on 29 October 1953./2/ Upon conclusion of the latter, [name not declassified] presented his concept of how the program should be conceived, as embodying the economic, psychological, political warfare and para-military aspects within a concerted, well-integrated, operational plan, proceeding to explain the program of 9 November./3/ The DCI stated that no instructions or other information should be sent to the field on this project which would reveal details of the program--this included official stations. He asked whether the FBI should be informed of our plans for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and was told that it should be. Accordingly, the DCI said that he would handle the matter personally with the Director, FBI, at the proper time. Regarding the status of the military negotiations in the three neighboring countries it was explained that the State Dept. could take no further action until a certain letter, requesting such action, had been received from the Dept. of Defense. The DCI then telephoned Mr. Kyes, Under Secretary of Defense, and asked him if he would be kind enough to expedite the dispatch of this letter to the Dept. of State. The question of T/O was discussed and it was explained that more personnel were required than had originally been contemplated in view of the enlargement of the program. DCI said that he did not want any red tape to interfere with this project and he wanted to make certain that we had the best brains, ability and technical assets of the agency employed on this project to ensure its success.
/2/Document 61.
/3/Presumably a reference to the program described in the November 12 draft memorandum for the record, Document 65.
Decisions: The DCI took the draft of the projected program of 9 November 1953 and gave it to the DD/P for his review and consideration with approval to be announced after it has been studied.
Comments: It was the impression of the writer that the DCI, D/DCI DD/P and DDP/COps were favorably impressed with the program and voiced no objection on any phase except one. The DCI questioned whether or not an ultimatum should be issued to the incumbent regime as he thought that might tip our hand to our disadvantage while he was assured that that matter would be given carefully worked out in subsequent plans and that he would be given an opportunity to review same before such action would be taken.
Recommendations: That the foregoing be followed closely for approval of the program of 9 November in order to serve as a basic Letter of Authority for the conduct of this operation and the assignment of personnel requested therein.
67. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles/1/
Washington, November 16, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 83-00739R, Box 5, Folder 8. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Program for PBSUCCESS
1. Following our briefing and conversation of this afternoon, I have read over the attached program which has been prepared by [name not declassified] and the others working on this project,/2/ and I recommend that you approve it for planning purposes and for the further purpose of authorizing Stage One at this time.
/2/Not attached. According to a typed notation at the bottom of the page, the enclosure was the November 12 draft memorandum for the record, Document 65.
2. Actually the plan is stated in such broad terms that it is not possible to know exactly what it contemplates, particularly in the latter phases. However, I do not regard this as a particular drawback since a vastly-detailed plan prepared at this time would have to be modified in any case. Moreover, the approach specified in this paper calls for the preparation of a detailed operational plan for top level approval at the conclusion of Stage One (the assessment phase).
3. Regarding the "ultimatum" specified under Stage Five, it was understood in our discussion that this was not agreed to and would be given further consideration.
4. The proposed T/O does not seem to me to be excessive, given the importance of this project and the degree of priority attached to it. It is my understanding that this T/O does not take into account the Headquarters personnel who will continue to be used to backstop the operation from Washington. It may even develop that some additional personnel will be required as events develop. (For example, I see no provision for the necessary communications personnel and radio technicians, who I am sure will be needed.)
5. I recommend also the concept of assigning to the operational field chief [name not declassified] the central operational responsibility and I further recommend the command channel outlined in Paragraph D on Page 4.
Frank G. Wisner/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Wisner signed the original.
68. Contact Report/1/
Washington, November 17, 1953, 3:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 8. Secret. Drafted by [name not declassified] on November 18.
Place: Mr. Helms Office
Persons Present: Mr. Helms, Cols. King and [name not declassified], later Mr. Shannon
Cover Used: None
Discussion:
1. Mr. Helms opened the conference by asking the whereabouts of the program of 12 November given to Mr. Dulles (16 November)./2/ He was informed that the paper was undoubtedly in the hands of the DD/P. However, an extra copy was available and was given to Mr. Helms to review. This having been done, his comment was that all emphasis should be placed at this time on Stage I, the period of assessment and that only after a very careful objective assessment of all assets would we be able to determine the future course of the project or even if it should be undertaken. This was agreed upon by all present.
/2/
See Document 65.2. With regard to the T/O, Helms stated that in view of the DCI's approval, he felt he could go ahead and sign off on this T/O in order to expedite its establishment and would instruct Shannon to set it up. [name not declassified] presented a paper prepared on the subject of the pros and cons of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in which was included the fact that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should be arranged. This paper was shown to Col. King and then to Mr. Helms. The latter agreed that it should be [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and suggested we use [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and acquire physical space on the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It was his suggestion that this could be accomplished through Gen. Cabell, who would be able to lay it on through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. With this agreed upon, Shannon was called into the conference and informed about the T/O and was told by Helms that it was the DCI's request that all red tape be cut on this project and that he, Shannon, therefore, should give his personal attention to expediting the implementation with maximum security re the question of establishing a contact in CAA for preliminary negotiations regarding Syracuse. Shannon volunteered that he could arrange it through his official and personal friend who is the Chairman of CAB. Thus it was agreed that [name not declassified] would work with him on this matter.
Decisions:
A. Final decision and approval of this project would rest upon the review of the assessment prepared in Stage I.
B. The T/O was approved by Helms and Shannon was told to establish same.
C. [1 line of source text not declassified]
D. Contact with CAA will be established through Shannon.
Comments: It was the writer's impression that Helms agreed in general with the program paper as presented and his comments regarding assessments were provided for within said program. It also appeared evident that hereafter all administrative matters above or outside the division should be handled personally and directly with Mr. Shannon.
69. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Cabell)/1/
Washington, November 19, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret; Eyes Only.
SUBJECT
Status of U.S. Military Mission in Guatemala
1. With reference to the question which mentioned to me after lunch today as having been raised with you by the Secretary of State, I have given further consideration to this matter and have discussed it with Colonel J.C. King and [name not declassified]. The following is a brief statement of our conclusions and recommendations.
2. It would be undesirable for the U.S. military mission presently in Guatemala to be withdrawn from there/2/--and preferable that this mission in either its present or a slightly reconstituted form remain--provided that it should prove possible for this mission to carry out the following assignments:
/2/at this time. [Footnote in the source text.]
a. By the maintenance of daily contact with top-ranking officers of the Guatemalan military forces, and without resorting to any covert activities of a compromising character, to observe and report at regular and frequent intervals on the general morale and attitude of the Guatemalan armed forces toward the present Guatemalan regime. [The channel for such reporting could be determined after further study, but it might be desirable for this information to be reported to the Ambassador, and by him made available for "his own information and guidance," but actually to be forwarded via our channels of communication.]/3/
/3/Brackets in this paragraph and the one below are in the source text.
b. By taking advantage of normal contacts and associations with ranking representatives of the Guatemalan armed forces, to pass on to them selected statements and observations best calculated to weaken the morale and shake the faith of the Guatemalan armed forces in the present Guatemalan regime. [It should be relatively simple to devise the type and kind of statement and observation to be passed on in this manner and for this purpose in such a way as to avoid or at least minimize the risk of charges that the military mission was engaging in improper activities. For example, the U.S. military personnel might strike a sympathetic and regretful note in their conversations--pointing out that while programs of military assistance are being authorized for neighboring states, it has been impossible for them to obtain any Washington support for their requests and suggestions. They could speculate that the explanation for this difficult matter might result from high level Washington resentment over the policies and official declarations of the Guatemalan government which are seemingly hostile to the United States.] One of the most important types of information which we require is information concerning the morale and attitude of the Guatemalan armed forces and this would be the most natural and ready source of such information. If the contacts between the members of the U.S. military mission and their opposite numbers were as close as they could and should be, it should be possible to observe from time to time the results of other activities and efforts contemplated under the project upon the thinking and feeling of the Guatemalan military, including particularly the degree of firmness and loyalty of the armed forces. In no other way would it be as easy to observe and follow this vital aspect of the entire matter.
3. J.C. King has underscored the point that if the U.S. military mission is to be withdrawn, this is the wrong time to do so. Its withdrawal at the present time would be a substantially empty gesture and would create no particular reverberation. (It would be an almost insignificant tap on the wrist if done now.) The impact of the withdrawal would be much greater if this were done at a later time and after the other aspects of the psychological build-up had gained momentum and begun to have effect.
4. In order to gain the benefits above referred to, two or three steps would probably be required, viz:
a. The present personnel of the mission should be carefully assessed with a view to determining their competence and qualifications to engage in the two lines of activity recommended. Our Station Chief is expected here toward the end of the week and we can get a rundown from him on the characteristics and qualifications of the present members of the military mission. It might be desirable to substitute certain more qualified officers for present members of the mission in certain instances.
b. In any case, it would be necessary for the Chief of the mission to be recalled to Washington for a thorough briefing and cut-in to the extent necessary (which would not have to be too much) to enable him to give direction to the efforts of his staff. Presumably this briefing would be given by the appropriate military authorities, possibly by General Erskine or under his aegis.
Frank G. Wisner/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Wisner signed the original.
70. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles/1/
Washington, November 20, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent through the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
SUBJECT
Status of US Military Mission in Guatemala; conversation with Under Secretary of State
REFERENCE
Memo to DDCI dtd 19 Nov 53, fr DD/P; subject: "Status of US Military Mission in Guatemala"/2/
/2/Document 69.
1. Pursuant to my conversations of yesterday afternoon and this morning with the Director and Deputy Director, I talked with General Smith and gave him our recommendations in response to his question concerning the advisability of withdrawing the US Military Mission from Guatemala. After listening to a brief summary of the reasoning contained in the reference memorandum, General Smith stated that he agreed with our recommendation and commented that this also seems to be the point of view of Ambassador Peurifoy.
2. General Smith went on to say that we should move promptly to examine the composition of the present military mission, which he surmises may include individuals who may be neither disposed nor qualified to function in the manner required. He thought that we should take steps with the appropriate authorities in the Pentagon to see to it that the mission is strengthened by the substitution of a limited number of officers having real competence and background, giving as an example Colonel Hank Mueller who was formerly a personal assistant to General Smith during the time the latter was serving as Director of this Agency.
3. General Smith concluded with the statement that if we require any assistance from him in getting this whole matter laid on and straightened out with the Pentagon, he would be only too glad to give a hand.
Frank G. Wisner/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Wisner signed the original.
71. Memorandum for the Record/1/
New York, November 20, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 77, Folder 7. Secret. Prepared on November 23 in Washington.
SUBJECT
PBSUCCESS--[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
1. A meeting was held with Mr. [name not declassified], Special Assistant to Mr. [name not declassified], President of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], in his office at [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], New York City, at 1615 on 20 November 1953. Present were Mr. [name not declassified] and Col. King.
2. The meeting was arranged by Mr. [name not declassified] as the result of information received from Mr. [name not declassified] to the effect that our [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Mr. [name not declassified], although a distinguished member of the company and a loyal American, has been [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and should no longer be relied upon. After Mr. [name not declassified] had promised to disclose to no one except President [name not declassified], without prior authorization, the matters to be discussed, he was asked if it were practical to reduce their oil stocks in Guatemala within a period of a few months from the present level of 30-40 days, to 15 days, and if so, who, in his company, would need to be informed. Also, if for a period of approximately three weeks all shipments could be stopped so as to reduce the Company's Guatamalan stocks to zero.
3. Mr. [name not declassified] replied that the first step was possible providing the other oil companies/2/ doing business in Guatemala also went along, and that it could be done through normal channels without arousing undue suspicion, if two other officers of the Company in addition to himself were informed--the President, Mr. [name not declassified], and the officer in charge of all marketing arrangements, Mr. [name not declassified], of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; with a weekend residence at [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Mr. [name not declassified] said that Mr. [name not declassified] had served with the U.S. Navy in England during World War II and that he was a discreet, thoroughly loyal and absolutely trustworthy individual; and that [name not declassified] would vouch for him in this instance. The operation would have to be laid on through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], under the direction of their local man, [name not declassified], who is in charge of their supply and transportation. However, to [name not declassified], no explanation other than orders as to what to do would have to be given.
/2/A handwritten note in the margin was not declassified.
4. It was agreed that as soon as I had obtained permission to cut in Mr. [name not declassified], a second meeting would be held, this time including Mr. [name not declassified] and Mr. [name not declassified]./3/
/3/A handwritten note in the margin reads: "Memo has gone forward to Col. Edwards." This memorandum has not been found.
5. My impression of Mr. [name not declassified] was most favorable. He impressed me as a man who would be discreet, trustworthy and who thoroughly understood the problem as presented.
J.C. King
Chief, WHD
72. Contact Report/1/
Washington, November 25, 1953, 9:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 8. Secret.
Place: King's office
Persons Present: JCKing, [2 names not declassified]
Cover Used: None
Discussions:
1. A serious impasse was described by JC as having developed within the State Dept. as a result of the Under [Assistant] Secretary of State Cabot having been kept out of the PBSUCCESS picture. Apparently Cabot, desiring to see that something is done in Guatemala, has demanded a briefing from CIA as to what its plans are and what its current activities are, as Cabot wanted to organize a program to attack the problem. In particular, he planned to call a meeting of all coffee buyers to determine what could be done in this direction./2/ As Cabot has not been cut in, he has never been officially informed of CIA's activities but he did evidence knowledge of certain things going on of which he had not been informed. Allen Dulles, in a discussion with JC, agreed to talk to Bedell Smith at noon today regarding the possibility of cutting Cabot in, at least to a limited degree, recognizing that Smith has neither confidence nor personal liking for Cabot. Further, Allen Dulles was to speak to his brother, John Foster Dulles, in an effort to resolve this matter as Cabot insisted upon this briefing taking place on Monday, 30 November, by J.C. King. Accordingly, an effort must be made by Allan Dulles to offset Cabot's intentions or to obtain approval to cut him in on PBSUCCESS to avoid a clash and possible serious compromise of PBSUCCESS to date.
/2/Cabot met with the coffee importers the same day, November 25. For the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 1088-1091 (Document 19).
2. JC stated he wanted to ship 15 tons of arms now in New York to Nicaragua at once in order to test Somoza's alleged agreement to cooperate. [name not declassified] took strong exception to this proposal, pointing out that the entire subject of handling arms was fraught with peril from the security point of view and great danger as to control, owing to the possibility once the arms were in the hands of certain people they might go off on their own, thus aborting the program. It was explained that the new concept does not necessarily involve a very large shipment of arms to Nicaragua but, contrarily, only that those actually required for training of the cadre classes at Pto. Cabezas be shipped. Further, that the arms would be compartmented and would be delivered to various places in order to achieve maximum control and secrecy. The problem of getting arms from Nicaragua to jump-off points in Honduras and Salvador is in itself a serious problem of logistics and sufficiently disadvantageous to warrant holding such arms in Nicaragua to a minimum. [name not declassified] said that there are various ways in which the arms could be distributed to specific teams, both by clandestine entry through Nicaragua overland and by black air-drop. JC weighed these objections and withdrew his decision to ship arms at once to Nicaragua. Another important factor involved in this discussion--it was pointed out by [name not declassified] that the shipment of arms should not proceed in advance of the military negotiations with Nicaragua as we must first be sure that Somoza has a carrot well within reach before we come along with the stick. JC agreed to this.
3. The question of initiating an energetic foreign currency procurement program was discussed with JC and he was informed that further details would be available Monday on the subject. JC seemed to realize that this matter of obtaining necessary large quantities of foreign currencies would not be easily resolved and concurred with [name not declassified] pushing a procurement program utilizing all sources for the acquisition of the necessary funds.
4. Regarding the security clearances for [name not declassified] and RUFUS, JC informed that there was no objection to going directly to Staff C, providing the request was handled in a normal manner without attracting any attention to the possibility that these individuals would be used for operational purposes. This was agreed to. The matter of safehouses, according to JC, should be handled directly with Mr. [name not declassified] who has been alerted to expect [name not declassified] to lay on specific requirements. HC was informed that this would not be done until the subject matter was studied more thoroughly.
5. [name not declassified] was presented to JC for his approval as the candidate to fill the Administrative Assistant slot. Mentioning her qualifications as having been Ray Leddy's secretary, serving a tour of duty in Guatemala, generally professing knowledge of administrative procedures at both Hqs. and in the field and a knowledge of the language. JC said that he preferred to use the girl from [place not declassified] who was expected in 1 December as he had no slot for her and wanted to recommend her very highly for this position although they had no knowledge of her administrative abilities aside from her handling of work requirements [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. [name not declassified] agreed to wait her arrival on 1 December before making his own decision.
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