Docs 73-103
73. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, November 27, 1953, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 8. Secret.
SUBJECT
Guatemala; Conversation at State Department
PARTICIPANTS
Department of State
John M. Cabot, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
[name not declassified]
1. I called on Mr. Cabot at his request at 4:00 p.m. today. He stated that he is going to talk to a group of coffee importers tomorrow,/2/ the assembly being arranged by Mr. Alborn/3/ (phonetics), one of their leaders. Mr. Cabot wants to ask them about the possibilities of stopping imports of coffee from Guatemala. He will not request them to do it, but will only inquire as to the possibilities.
/2/Presumably Cabot is in error; he met with the importers on November 25; see footnote 2, Document 72.
/3/Possibly Harry H. Allen, Vice President of the Otis McAllister Coffee Corporation.
2. Mr. Cabot requested that CIA, in some way, make it known to the highest Guatemalan government officials that he has been carrying on such conversations.
3. Mr. Cabot stated that he had heard that President Arbenz is in a tantrum about the situation into which he has gotten his country. There is even a report that he has offered to turn the government over to General Diaz. Mr. Cabot believes that the President and other high officials of the government may realize that the country can not stand up against the enmity of the United States and may want to change the regime to be more friendly to us.
4. Mr. Cabot thinks that this is the moment to start any operations that would make them worry. In addition to letting them know that he is talking with the coffee importers about cutting off their market for their principal product, he thinks that we might start some "poison pen" letters and other things to disrupt the morale of the higher officials.
[name not declassified]/4/
WH/CPP
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
74. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, November 28, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 8. Top Secret.
ATTENTION
Chief, WH Division and [name not declassified]
SUBJECT
Exploitation of Military Missions
REFERENCE
DD/P's Memos to DDCI and DCI dtd 19 Nov and 20 Nov 53 Respectively/2/
/2/Documents 69 and 70.
1. At a recent meeting in DD/P's office/3/ (a record of which is in your files) General Balmer was asked to make necessary arrangements with Col. Brad Smith in Gen. Erskine's office for a briefing of the chiefs of the Army mission and Air Force mission in Guatemala City for PBSUCCESS purposes.
/3/Not further identified.
2. Gen. Balmer informed me yesterday "that he had run up against opposition on the working level in the Pentagon". This opposition was particularly on the part of Army, whereas Air Force appeared more cooperative. According to Gen. Balmer "there was a marked reluctance on the part of certain Army officers in the Pentagon to have their military missions, or the heads of same, engaged in intelligence activities". Gen. Balmer emphasized that this was strictly a "working level attitude'' on the part of Army and suggested that we think the matter over and discuss the issue with DD/P without undue delay.
3. I told Gen. Balmer that it was my off-hand impression that the Army perhaps was making too much of our intentions for the military missions in Guatemala as outlined in referenced DD/P memos. It is my belief that we are not trying to levy a heavy reporting responsibility on the missions in addition to their routine duties. But rather that we were asking members of the military missions to pay specific attention to information that they would in any case accumulate during their day-to-day liaison within Guatemalan military circles; the only difference being that they would make some relatively minor but perhaps exceedingly interesting contributions to the PBSUCCESS effort through (a) processing their local know-how to a certain degree, and by (b) assisting the American Ambassador in gauging the current attitudes of leading personalities as well as the rank and file within the Guatemalan Army at a time when relations between Guatemala and the United States were particularly sensitive.
4. In any case Gen. Balmer wants PBSUCCESS officers to give some thought to this matter and have another discussion with DD/P before he (Gen. Balmer) did anything further regarding this issue.
5. Gen. Balmer further stated that he had ascertained that both chiefs of Army and Air Force missions were due to be replaced in March, 1954. Their successors were already or would be shortly in preparatory training in Washington, D.C. or nearby military installations.
6. I suggest that we discuss this thoroughly at our Monday morning staff meeting, 30 November 1953, and brief DD/P immediately thereafter./4/
/4/A handwritten notation reads: "Handled with [initial not declassified] " and an arrow points to Tofte's typed signature.
Hans V. Tofte/5/
Chief, PP/OPS
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
75. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to the Deputy Director for Plans (Wisner) and the Acting Deputy Director of Administration of the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, December 9, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 167, Folder 6. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A series of memoranda attached to this memorandum track the PBSUCCESS planning process, including Documents 51, 65, and 67. Also attached is a "Report on Stage One," dated December 15, drafted by [name not declassified] and approved by King. The report noted that the element of surprise had been lost and that the opposition consisted of 100 "top-flight" Communists who had been to the Soviet Union. In comparison the pro-Western forces included only two "more or less" untested leaders with liabilities: "Neither man is effectively controlled by PBSUCCESS to date, and achievement of control may be complicated by past financial largess on the part of CIA." In addition, "Past security practices of both men have been poor." The report also noted that the CIA had only limited capabilities in Guatemala: "The Station has no penetrations of the PGT, government agencies, armed forces, or labor unions." Nevertheless, based on information from the Station in Guatemala, the "possible pool of passive supporters of anti-Communism" might total "perhaps 90%" of the politically active population, and that "there is recent evidence of widespread, if still latent, officer dissatisfaction with President Arbenz and the Communists." The report concluded that it was "normal for revolution" to start with a few men, however, and posited four recommendations: "A. That the concept of proceeding on the basis of potential assets, rather than on the basis of existing assets, be approved; B. That, keeping in mind that the U.S. national interest, as defined by the National Security Council, requires a change of government in Guatemala, the TOP Operational Priority of PBSUCCESS be formally assured for at least six months; C. That definite, high-level accord be maintained that any Guatemalan or other charges of U.S. intervention will be met with positive U.S. denial based on factual or notional plausibility; D. That in view of the urgency and magnitude of the problem, early approval be granted to implement Stage Two, Plan of Operations, including the organizational concept and financial requirements."
SUBJECT
Project PBSUCCESS
1. I have approved Project PBSUCCESS and the allocation of not to exceed $3,000,000 of funds available to the Agency for its support. The Comptroller is directed to make the necessary adjustments to charge any prior or current expenditures for this Project to this allocation and to credit back any withdrawals made from other allocations.
2. In view of the security aspects of this Project, I hereby authorize the Comptroller to make funds, within the above limitations, available to the Chief, WH Division, at his request and with the prior approval in writing of the DD/P or COP, in such amounts and to such persons as he may desire. The Chief, WH Division, will be the accountable officer for all funds so advanced and will be responsible for assuring that all expenditures are reasonable and necessary for the support of the Project and for obtaining such documentation and receipts for expenditures for these operations shall remain with the WH Division, and the Certifying Officers may accept the certification of the Chief, WH Division, that he has evidence to support the propriety and reasonableness of the expenditures and that they have been made for the official purposes of the Project.
3. The Auditor-in-Chief shall provide for periodic audits, not less than semiannually, under arrangements mutually satisfactory to himself and to the Chief, WH Division.
Allen W. Dulles/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Dulles signed the original.
76. Memorandum From Jacob R. Seekford to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King) for Jerome C. Dunbar/1/
Report No. AL-1
Washington, December 15, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 8. No classification marking. A typed notation on the memorandum indicates the date of information was December 9.
SUBJECT
Seekford, Calligeris Visit With General A. Somoza and Gen. Somoza's son, Colonel Somoza
1. General Somoza reaffirmed all previous commitments to support the Calligeris operation.
[4 paragraphs (18 lines of source text) not declassified]
6. General Somoza has delegated his son, Colonel Somoza, as liaison officer to work personally with Seekford.
[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]
77. Contact Report/1/
Washington, December 22, 1953, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 9. Secret.
Place: Col. King's Office
Persons present: Col King, [name not declassified], Mr Leddy, [name not declassified]
Discussion:
1. Mr Leddy brought along Ambassador Peurifoy's cable on his six-hour meeting with President Arbenz./2/
/2/Telegram 154 from Guatemala City, December 17, printed in Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 1091-1093 (Document 20). A memorandum of conversation dated December 17, prepared by Ambassador Peurifoy, provided more detail of the discussion, including names of Guatemalan Communists and suspected Communists. According to this record of the meeting, President Arbenz' wife, Mar?a Vilanova de Arbenz, was an active participant. (Attachment to dispatch HGG-A-532 from the CIA Chief of Station in Guatemala to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, CIA, December 21; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 1)
2. Mr Leddy mentioned that the US Ambassadors to Central America were to be recalled to Washington for a briefing in early January. He mentioned this so that CIA could indicate whether this briefing would seem inopportune, or whether CIA wished any specific points to be covered.
3. Ambassador Toriello has asked to see President Eisenhower and will probably get the appointment. The President will be asked to "really pour it on".
4. Secretary Cabot has already told the Ambassadors of the three countries concerned that military pact negotiations are in the offing. This may compel State to make the matter public much sooner than previously intended.
5. Ambassador Whelan is coming up. It was agreed that he should be allowed to know enough so that, if asked by President Somoza, he could give a quiet nod to Somoza's support of RUFUS.
6. Two Guatemalans, anti-Communist politicians, have been to see Mr Leddy, offering to stage anti-Communist demonstrations at the appropriate time. It was agreed that clearances on the two should be started. Col King is having their written proposal copied for SD/WHD.
7. Mr Leddy was briefed on the three Nicaraguan bases.
8. Mr Leddy reported that State and Defense had agreed not to send to Guatemala the two added non-coms that Guatemala had requested.
9. It was agreed that the US military missions would not be pulled out when the three military pacts were announced, but only when some striking progress was made on the pacts.
78. Telegram From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to the Chiefs of Certain CIA Stations in Central America/1/
Washington, December 23, 1953, 2220Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 7, Folder 2. Secret; Routine; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by [name not declassified], coordinated by Helms, and approved by King. Sent to Guatemala City, [2 places not declassified] and repeated to LINCOLN.
32044. 1. Effective this date all addressee Stations will constitute component elements of PBSUCCESS regional command with project headquarters at LINCOLN under Jerome C. Dunbar, Special Deputy, WHD for this project.
2. Hereafter until further notice subject Stations will devote top operational priority to this project receiving their guidance and instructions direct from LINCOLN.
3. Prior to 1 Jan 1954 all cables will be directed to Dir as heretofore with info LINCOLN (SLINC).
4. Effective 1 Jan all cables will be directed to LINCOLN info Dir.
5. Separate instructions to follow for revised pouching procedures.
79. Letter From the Ambassador to Guatemala (Peurifoy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Cabot)/1/
Guatemala City, December 28, 1953.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 98, Folder 7. Secret. A cover memorandum from the Station Chief in Guatemala to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division reads: "(1) Attached is a copy of a letter which was drafted by Second Secretary John C. Hill and concurred in by Counselor of Embassy William L. Krieg and First Secretary Andrew B. Wardlaw. (2) A copy of this letter fell into the hands of the writer, and I am taking steps to forward it, inasmuch as it is possible that a copy thereof might not be received by Headquarters through other channels. (3) The letter serves to indicate the attitude of the three officers mentioned, and in view of the recommendations made therein, they, of course, will be in a state of expectancy during the coming months as to what is actually being done concerning this situation. Events of the future will be interpreted by them in the light of the recommendations made. (4) Unless Headquarters receives a copy of this letter through Assistant Secretary Cabot, it is considered important from a point of view of our local relationships with Embassy personnel that no one at Headquarters give the slightest indication that Headquarters is knowledgeable of the contents thereof." A handwritten note in the margin reads: "Note from Nutting--Galbond saw letter, but no copy was made at that time, at request of addressee."
Dear Jack:
You will have seen my Secret Telegram No. 163 of December 23/2/ in which I recommended certain policies which we believe would create a climate favorable for a change in the Guatemalan Government. In this supplementary letter I want to round out those recommendations by stressing the need for the U.S. Government to work actively and quickly to assure that the Guatemalan Government is taken over by elements willing and strong enough to eliminate Communist influence from the Guatemalan political scene when the time comes. When the pressures suggested in my telegram become effective here, the Communists as well as the potential opposition to the regime may be expected to seek to exploit the situation and we must then be as sure as possible that elements favorable to our objectives are in the winning position.
/2/Printed in Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 1093-1095 (Document 21).
As a result of my conversation with President Arbenz and general evaluation of the situation since my arrival here two months ago I am fully convinced that continuance of his administration until its term expires in 1957 will result in a further and dangerous advance of Communism in this country, with all the attendant peril to our security and economic interests in this area. It might well then be too late to root it out without an internal clash of the type that occurred in Greece and elsewhere. I believe further that the internal opposition to the Arbenz regime is unlikely to act independently and that the U.S. Government must accept the risks inherent in helping to bring about a change of government here.
The principal problem now is selecting a force, which should if possible be a Guatemalan force, capable of taking control of the government with our aid and of besting the Communists in the troubled times which will almost certainly surround any change-over. If a change is to be achieved in the near future, the most promising organization which meets the requirements for such a force is the Guatemalan Armed Forces, possibly acting in conjunction with such exiled military and political figures and domestic groups as will cooperate. The internal "anti-Communist" opposition now is badly divided and without a workable political program or an organization immediately available. It would, I believe, take many months of effort and failures to get the "anti-Communist" factions together behind a plan with any chance of success; there would be continual high risks of exposure; and in any case it is doubtful whether even in the event that they win they could stick together on a program which would satisfactorily reduce the chances of a Communist-influenced counter-revolution.
I would therefore recommend that the Department select the Guatemalan Armed Forces as the primary area in which any effort to stimulate anti-government action is most likely to be fruitful. Though now loyal to this government they are basically opportunistic. Efforts to win over key military personnel must be done, as I know the Department is fully aware, so as to take the minimum risk of exposing our hand, by using a judicious mixture of our clandestine channels, our influence with neighboring anti-Communist governments and our contacts with Guatemalan exile groups together with such other contacts with the Military as we can maintain locally. It, of course, will mean expenditure and some risk of charges of intervention which could be serious if the matter is clumsily handled. But this risk must be accepted or we must be prepared to abandon this field to Communism.
The approach to subverting the Armed Forces should of course be flexible and we should attempt simultaneously to develop the other groups, such as dissatisfied and opportunistic elements within the Administration and the "anti-Communist" opposition. While our effort should be concentrated for effectiveness on one group, we must be prepared to shift quickly if our first approaches fail, and to work out combinations of forces if opportunity offers. In this connection, military personnel with government connections such as Colonel Elfego Monzon,/3/ as well as the "anti-Communist" movement, should be closely studied for any role they might usefully play.
/3/The name is underlined and a notation in the margin reads "check."
The measures recommended in my telegram are intended to be closely coordinated with the forging of a non-Communist force to take over here, for of themselves they do not guarantee that a change favorable to us would occur. What I expect is that the program outlined in the telegram would (a) prepare hemispheric and Guatemalan opinion for a change and dull the charges of intervention which may be expected to be leveled at us, and (b) to create here a climate in which important segments of the population and especially the Armed Forces and propertied class felt their interests sufficiently threatened to be stirred from their present lethargy into a better disposition to take the risks necessary to cooperate actively in bringing a new government into power.
We must be as certain as possible, however, that a non-Communist force is prepared to step in at the proper moment. The actual application of economic sanctions would probably hit the propertied classes here harder and more quickly than it would the government, and if long-drawn-out it might well damage irreparably the propertied class and prevent it from retarding the advance of Communism. The Communists, of course, could then be expected to exploit the situation with confiscatory taxes and measures, economic sabotage laws, etc., in order to complete the ruin of the conservative segment that they have begun by their application of the Agrarian Reform Law.
What I suggest, in short, has two complementary aspects: the meas-ures to create a climate favorable for a change recommended in my telegram, and coordinated measures to win over and support a non-Communist force capable of controlling the situation as urged in this letter. I see the risks of exposure and recognize that the program would have to be carefully worked out in Washington and here, for a misfired attempt to change the present Guatemalan Government would most probably greatly strengthen the Communists here and damage our standing everywhere if our part in a failure became generally accepted. However, as I see it, Communism is slowly strangling this country, and delay will only face us with a more difficult problem later.
Sincerely yours,
John E. Peurifoy/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
80. Memorandum for the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)/1/
Washington, January 6, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 4. Secret; Eyes Only. There is no indication on the memorandum of a drafting or originating officer.
SUBJECT
PBSUCCESS
1. At the time [name not declassified] was introduced into the PBSUCCESS Operation, WH/PW and [name not declassified] had prepared a basic general paper on the PW aspects of the anticipated RUFUS campaign. In addition, [name not declassified] had prepared a general outline paper on his views as to what he would do after PBSUCCESS became a success. Moreover, more than two million items of propaganda were shipped to RUFUS. Tape recorders and three mimeograph machines were on their way to RUFUS, three other reproduction machines (Gestetners) were up for immediate procurement, CEUAGE was in operation, CEUA (in Guatemala) was putting out over 100,000 pieces of propaganda every two weeks and organizing a newspaper. FAGE was being organized in San Salvador and plans were being made to put [name not declassified] in contact with LIONIZER group in Mexico. Furthermore, financial commitments, approved by the DCI had been made to [name not declassified]. WH/PW had already outlined to all WH Field Stations the general aims re Guatemala, sent them support materials, outlined future possible support and provided them with more than 20 initial themes.
2. [name not declassified] ordered his staff to come up with a new PW program, though this officer tried to impress him with the fact that there was nothing in the plans which had not been coordinated with both RUFUS and [name not declassified], the only two people in the PBSUCCESS Operation who intimately know the psychology of the Guatemalan people, and that through bitter experience WH/PW had more or less of an idea as to what [name not declassified] and RUFUS would or would not buy. This advice was ignored and [name not declassified] proceeded without consulting [name not declassified].
3. In a conversation with Seekford, this officer was told that [name not declassified] had told Seekford that Col. King, [name not declassified] and myself were no longer in the picture, and that he, [name not declassified], was directly responsible to the DCI. This information was passed on to [name not declassified], who then reassured Seekford that such was not the case.
4. When [name not declassified] moved his office into Bldg. T-32, the PW file was broken up into numerous files, making it impossible for the PBSUCCESS PP Case Officer, Mr. [name not declassified], to read the background of PW planning.
5. The three Gestetner machines promised to RUFUS before [name not declassified] arrived, were delayed for two months through confusion or oversight on the part of [name not declassified] and his staff.
6. WH/PW took Mr. [name not declassified], WH/CPP over to T-32 to meet the PBSUCCESS group. He was told of a PW program prepared by [name not declassified] and his staff. I had never seen such a program and queried Mr. [name not declassified] re this after Mr. [name not declassified] had left, stating that I would like to see what they had come up with. Mr. [name not declassified] informed me that such a program was non-existent.
7. [name not declassified] informed this officer that he would be in charge of activities in a regional area surrounding Guatemala, however, when action dispatches from that area were referred to him they were returned without comment or no action was taken. When questioned re this, no answer was forthcoming. WH/PW, Mr. [name not declassified], [name not declassified] and the regular country desk officers generally had to resolve whatever problems arose.
8. Since this officer and [name not declassified] had been planning re control of the Mexican exile group, this officer repeatedly, through Mr. [name not declassified], asked for some sort of decision so that action could be taken. Such a decision has never been transmitted to Mr. [name not declassified] or this officer.
9. This attitude of [name not declassified] toward [name not declassified] was one of, I am going to run this show my way and if it happens to coincide with that of [name not declassified], fine, if it doesn't then . . . I'm running the show and we'll control RUFUS and [name not declassified]. He also felt that [name not declassified] planning was dream material and too general. This officer felt and still feels that [name not declassified] knows what the people of Guatemala will accept in the way of propaganda and what they won't. [name not declassified] is also smart enough to know that propaganda is going to have to be played by ear--to a large extent--during and after the PBSUCCESS Operation--thus has avoided too specific planning, but has evidenced every desire to cooperate with our wishes and has shown nothing but the completest ideological accord. In addition, every present PW mechanism (CEUA, CEUAGE,/2/ FAGE and their newspapers) was build by RUFUS and [name not declassified] (before [name not declassified] arrived) thus evidencing ability to produce smoothly without dictation. We should aid not drive.
/2/The Embassies in Guatemala City and Tegucigalpa reported on the anti-Communist activities of the CEUA and its publication CEUAGE in despatch 516 from Guatemala City and 240 from Tegucigalpa, December 16 and 4, respectively. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 714.00/12-1653 and 714.00/12-453)
10. [name not declassified] has never told WH/PW what support it should try to give him other than that [name not declassified] must approve everything going to any WH station re Guatemala.
81. Memorandum for the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)/1/
Washington, January 6, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 4. Secret; Eyes Only. There is no indication on the memorandum of a drafting or originating officer.
SUBJECT
PBSUCCESS
1. On the afternoon of 27 November 1953 Mr. [name not declassified] and Mr. [name not declassified] of WHD stated to me that they expected to travel to [place not declassified], on the following Monday to confer with [name not declassified] in connection with Project PBSUCCESS, but were seriously confused and concerned regarding their orders for the interview. Mr. [name not declassified] stated that, although definite commitments had been made to [name not declassified] regarding financial support due on 1 December for operations already initiated in Guatemala, Mr. [name not declassified] had told him that no funds were to be provided until he had so decided at an undetermined future date, possibly 1 January. Mr. [name not declassified], on the other hand, stated that he had been instructed that funds would be forthcoming in increments as required for specific operational use. [name not declassified] had rechecked with [name not declassified] and was told that his orders held.
2. In order to avoid confusion as well as a possible breach of faith with [name not declassified] the matter was referred to Col. J.C. King, who decided to discuss the question with [3 names not declassified] and the undersigned. The meeting was held in Mr. [name not declassified] office. Although [name not declassified] appeared reluctant to discuss the problem he eventually agreed to honor the commitments made to [name not declassified].
3. Following the meeting, after Col. King, [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] had departed, [name not declassified] stated to me that he wished to make several points very plain: first, that he strongly resented Col. King's having attended the meeting or having been brought into the discussion; second, that he had no intention of being "pushed into a corner" or confronted with a "power play" involving operational matters which were exclusively subject to his, [name not declassified], jurisdiction.
82. Dispatch From the CIA Chief of Station in Guatemala (Givloch) to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)/1/
HGG-A-634
Guatemala City, January 11, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 98, Folder 7. Secret; Rybat. Sent for information to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida (Lincoln).
SUBJECT
General--PBSUCCESS
Specific--Stephen R. Lugton
1. In accordance with instructions received from Lugton, material received from him for forwarding is being placed in envelopes marked "To Lincoln, for Jerome C. Dunbar only" and included in Station Guatemala pouches for Washington. As per his request, only one copy of such material has been made and therefore station files will contain no record of information submitted by him. This station will therefore not be held responsible for being knowledgeable of information submitted by him.
2. It is assumed that the policy of handling his material and the principle expressed is in accord with the wishes of Lincoln and Headquarters. If not, this station would appreciate being advised.
Kenneth S. Givloch
83. Memorandum by the Counselor of the Embassy in Guatemala (Krieg)/1/
Guatemala City, January 14, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 65, Folder 5. Secret.
SUBJECT
Views of Colonel Elfego Monzon on Current Political Situation
The same American citizen who recently reported to Mr. Wardlaw/2/ that Colonel Elfego Monzon, Minister without Portfolio, had told a group near Brito, Department of Escuintla, that the time was not ripe for a move against the Government, called at my office today and said that his friend, who is also a close friend of Monzon, had had a three-hour talk with him and obtained the impression that Monzon thought conditions had to become worse here before the Army would act against the Arbenz Government and that if a revolt were attempted by opposition elements, the Government would bring thousands of Indians into Guatemala City and that a massacre of white and middle class elements would result.
/2/First Secretary of the Embassy.
According to the friend, he approached Colonel Monzon with an officer of substantial financial backing if Colonel Monzon would lead a movement against the Government. Monzon had replied by reiterating that the time was not ripe but that he believed that in four or five months if things continued their present course, the leaders of the Army would go to Arbenz and tell him he was "out." The friend had pressed Monzon for his view on what combination of circumstances would cause the Army officers to act, and Colonel Monzon had replied, "Let us hope that there is a strong economic pressure on Guatemala." Monzon had repeatedly emphasized that the Army was anti-Communist and that it was deeply concerned over the growth of Communist power.
In the course of the conversation Colonel Monzon had said he understood that Guatemalan exiles and others were planning a revolt and that he feared it would result in a tremendous amount of bloodshed. He had referred in this connection to the fact that during the revolt which followed the assassination of Colonel Arana in 1949, President Arevalo had started to have thousands of Indians from the Patzun-Patzicia area brought into the City; that Monzon, who was directing the Government forces, had been able to stop this attempt, but that he believed the Government would, if faced with a serious situation, resort to the same device with possibly disastrous results which would leave a scar on the Guatemalan body politic for years to come.
My informant's friend was impressed by the circumstance that up to a year ago Colonel Monzon had been a stout defender of the Arbenz administration. Now he received the impression that Monzon would do nothing to save the Government should it be threatened.
The informant went on to say that he had begun to reconsider his earlier opposition to some sort of U.S. embargo on Guatemalan coffee in the light of Colonel Monzon's remark about economic pressure. As he did not think an Act of Congress or a voluntary agreement among coffee importers feasible, he suggested that "red worms" (gusanos rojos) might be found in Guatemalan coffee by the sanitary inspectors. In reply to questions he said title to coffee passes to the U.S. purchaser when coffee is delivered at a railroad station in Guatemala and that the export tax ($8.00 per sack) became due when the coffee passed through the Guatemalan port. Hence the initial impact of finding gusanos in the coffee would fall on the U.S. purchaser rather than on the grower or the Guatemalan Government. Eventually, of course, such measures would discourage importers from buying Guatemalan coffee. If some way could be found to stop buying Guatemalan Government coffee, this would be even more effective, but neither of us could think of a practical way of doing this.
84. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, January 23, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 5. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
General Concept of Discussions With [name not declassified] Preparing Him for Forthcoming Calligeris Meeting
I. This memo is prepared for approval C/P PBSUCCESS prior to subject conference, as being the general basis of planning now being conducted within the project in the KUHOOK field. It is slanted toward setting [name not declassified] in an advantageous position insofar as his forthcoming meeting with Calligeris is concerned and will be followed up in [name not declassified]-Calligeris meeting and Calligeris-Seekford-Cadick discussions to follow.
II. Factors Determining the Considered Plan of Action:
A. Former Calligeris planning has been considered carefully, and with the following exceptions the main context of PBSUCCESS thinking adheres as nearly as possible to Calligeris' prior concept:
1. It is considered that extreme care must be taken to avoid putting all our assets into any situation, the compromise of which would seriously deplete the forces of the movement. For that reason an attempt is being made to make the entry of outside forces nearer to an infiltration type entry than that of regular forces grouped along main communication routes. Compartmentation of units is sought, also.
2. For the same reason, the approach to Puerto Barrios is being considered land-approach to prevent the obvious containment and easy destruction of Calligeris forces in the event recent notification of "leaks" to the opposition are more complete than realized (an entirely possible situation).
3. With a realization that to allow this movement to become a prolonged civil war would present major complications in addition to allowing opposition to strengthen its tactical situation while ours bogged down, it is considered that each possible strongpoint of the opposition should be accounted for simultaneously rather than piecemeal.
4. Utility of bombing tactics to neutralize any strongpoint has been eliminated, even as a psychological factor, in view of the fact that the very concept of the movement is that of release of persons from oppression and all actions must allow this discontented element to participate in the overthrow of oppression or at least aid by sympathy. Our tactics must veer away from terrorism of this faction and veer towards inviting participation.
5. Techniques of partisan warfare will be applied in the tested and proven manner to best support more conventional military tactics. This technique of combining the two types of tactics has proven itself in reducing the number of personnel and the magnitude of support necessary to overwhelm superior forces many times in history.
6. Techniques in logistics are being applied to eliminate the massive logistical problem and its limitations to mobility and actions of normal military tactics.
7. Communications has been brought to a maximum of dependability.
8. Utilization of all potential personnel, some of which though now unknown, will through organization become "the thousand bee-stings which kill the tiger" which Mao Tse Tung so successfully utilized to overthrow superior forces.
B. Realization that there can be no failure, both from [name not declassified]-Calligeris' standpoint and ours, and that aside from known opposition tactics and precautionary measures the third factor of being up against trained Communist tacticians in the field of security, staybehind, subversion, intrigue, etc., all of us involved must overplan, overprepare, and be prepared to "drive the tack with the sledge-hammer" in the event the tack turns out to be a railroad spike.
II. [sic] Framework of General Planning:
A. The key targets under consideration, those felt necessarily to be controlled to completely insure total success are:
Guatemala garrisons, air facilities, commo, (Guatemala City)
Puerto Barrios port, air facilities, commo, and garrison
Jutiapa garrison, commo, and air facilities
Zacapa garrison, commo, and air facilities
Mazatenango, Quezaltenango and Quiche garrisons, commo and air facilities
Coban air facilities, commo and garrison
San Jose garrison and port facilities and commo
B. The ideal would be simultaneous containment and seizure of control of each key target using known and physically directed shock troops with supporting partisans in each instance.
C. In all actuality, once the entire assets of Calligeris are brought to the surface and evaluated and assigned missions, the approach to each target will be different but will follow one of the following patterns:
1. Strike the feasible targets with shock troops and inner organization, while having pre-developed the others to a point of self-seizure and eventual pre-planned assembly with shock troops and resulting recruits from other targets.
2. Strike the feasible targets as above, and develop the feasible targets to a point of self-seizure, and block the remaining targets through spotting of saboteur teams along routes of egress from the remaining targets, and through organization of block areas in which small equipped and directed units harass and retard any desired military movement until effective consolidation can be attained at our strong points.
3. In all eventualities target sab teams at commo at each target, existing military air facilities, and at any possible transportation tie-up situation. In all eventualities utilize all partisan units possible to be formed at any point in Guatemala where a single Calligeris man can be located.
III. Existing Basis of Planning:
A. The key to the country's survival is Guatemala City. The lifeline (so long as Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico remain reluctant to support the present Guatemalan regime) is the port at Puerto Barrios. Jutiapa, Zacapa, and Coban should be controlled before penetration beyond them to prevent reorganization behind our movement and eventual entrapment. San Jose should be controlled as a possible substitute for Puerto Barrios, an encirclement of Guatemala City, and as a port of entry for our movement in eventual employment of prolonged hostilities. Mazatenango, Quezaltenango, and Quiche pose distance and logistical problems plus a personnel drain, plus remoteness which calls for possibilities of the block manner of containment, that causes us to search for self-seizure and block procedures which will control the situation until consolidation of other gains is completed.
C. [sic] Roughly, pending receipt of intelligence expected as a result of Cadick-Seekford-Calligeris meetings (it should be brought out constantly that all planning at this stage is based on rumor and that total KUHOOK known assets, the reliability of which is unknown, consists of eleven trainees for KUHOOK plus four trainees for KUCLUB) it is felt that inner organization of the Guatemala complex will be the main source for immediate, physical seizure of control. It is estimated that sufficient shock troops could not be assembled outside the country to accomplish the job. If discussion with Calligeris proves that the inner assets in the Guatemala City area are sufficient to attempt (with high percentage of success chance) striking at Guatemala City instantaneously and in concurrence with seizure of Puerto Barrios, Zacapa, Jutiapa and San Jose, the major portion of available forces will be directed at Guatemala City, utilizing the organization of inner assets and surrounding areas at the other sites to obtain control (control here means physical control, without assurance of which, Guatemala City should be put on a secondary basis chronologically speaking and men released in our planning to insure this physical control).
D. Preliminary reports on our assets plus distance and element-of- surprise factors may well dictate a course which calls for setting up Guatemala City inner organization to the point where if a move is made by the Guatemala Central Command to move a partial force toward Zacapa, Jutiapa, Puerto Barrios, or Coban or San Jose, the inner organization would make its bid while partisan organization around Guatemala City retarded, harassed and generally set up the partial force for annihilation by the Zacapa, Jutiapa, Puerto Barrios, Coban, and San Jose forces. The idea of being capable of taking over if Guatemala City forces are depleted can be promoted to the point where the Guatemala City Command will be detained, at least partially. Sab action against air facilities and commo will be executed simultaneous with D-day, with possible K-team action at the same time against key figures. All other assets within the inner organization would remain covert, their plan calling for action on depletion of Central Command forces designed to take control or recall the committed troops, or for action once Calligeris' Zacapa, Jutiapa, Coban, and Puerto Barrios and San Jose forces were consolidated.
E. It is contemplated that the terrain and distance situation along with professed Calligeris assets and reported opposition OB, would allow shock troops to be applied against Jutiapa, Zacapa, and Puerto Barrios. These shock troops would travel in small compact units utilizing back trails and prohibitive terrain to maintain non-detection insomuch as possible, and relying on mobility and concealment to disguise location if detection unavoidable. On D-Day these three forces would be in respective positions, the exact nature of which to be determined following more extensive terrain and intelligence studies. Present figures available, unevaluated, report the following situation, personnel-wise, some of which will be cleared up following a discussion with Calligeris:
Zacapa . . . opposition consists of 6 officers, 94 enlisted Guardia; 38 officers, 601 enlisted Military
111 Calligeris assets--200 within Zacapa (no indication Military status), 500 various localities approx
Jutiapa . . . opposition consists of 14 officers, 199 enlisted Guardia
Calligeris assets--300 within Jutiapa; 300 various localities approx
Puerto Barrios opposition--28 Officers, 283 enlisted Military
Calligeris assets--450 overall vicinity
Coban . . . Opposition (not extracting Calligeris assets reportedly strong) 4 Officers, 64 enlisted Guardia; 23 Officers, 295 men Military
Calligeris assets--2000 reported combination Military and surrounding populace
San Jose . . . Opposition--2 Officers, 28 enlisted Guardia; 15 Officers, 208 enlisted Mil.
Calligeris assets--2000 (reported by Seekford in preliminary discussions)
F. While the above does not in any way constitute a reliable estimate of the situation it does give us a basis for planning and confirmation or rejection of portions of the knowledge should be possible following the forthcoming meetings. Tentatively, the basis of thinking allows for Zacapa shock troops to seize control and move out to approx 14?53'long 90?lat. to form assembly with Coban forces moving down parallel to the Coban-Salama-Morazan highway. It is tentatively planned to seize control of Coban through reported Calligeris' assets within the Garrison and augment that force with pledged populace (reported) moving through Salama on the journey to the assembly. On assembly, and in line with the existing situation a movement towards Guatemala by this force could be commenced.
Jutiapa seizure would be affected in the same manner from a compartmented staging base just across the Salvador border. Upon completion of this seizure it would turn parallel to the main highway to a point some five miles east of Laguna de Amatitlan to join with forces from San Jose and turn towards Guatemala City. The seizure of San Jose would be dependent on the facts learned from the coming Calligeris meeting as to the true identity of the 2,000 reported personnel in the area.
G. Due to distance, logistical problems and need to utilize personnel at the foregoing projects the ideal will be to organize Mazatenango, Quezaltenango and Quiche to the pint of self-seizure. A study of personnel of those garrisons may disclose gimmicks with which we can force key military figures to employ a Latin-type retardation, insuring that these forces do not enter into the tactical picture in time to alter it. The probable situation will be a series of retardation events set up by organization of the area between these three sites and Guatemala City designed to delay reinforcement from these three sites until consolidation of the other targets as completed.
H. Contingency plans should account for 1. employment of Guatemala forces to the aid of our initial targets (which contingency has been generally considered in the above paragraphs). 2. Retirement of Guatemalan forces to Quezaltenango as has been reported to be the Guatemalan plan. In this latter event it is now being considered most feasible to complete the capitulation of Guatemala City set up against returned activities from the Quezaltenango area and complete solid reorganization before turning to the Quezaltenango problem. After solid organization it would be considered within our capabilities to take the forces at Quezaltenango by straight attack. 3. Another contingency would be for Guatemala City to prepare for a state of siege in which case reorganization following seizure of the initial targets could be carried out while insuring isolation of Guatemala City from re-supply or reinforcement.
IV. Communication:
A. Communications men now commencing training will produce two types of radio operators. One type is to be called resident R/Os and will be placed in the vicinity of target sites, as yet unselected points, for the purpose of reporting last minute changes in OB. Once the tactical situation opens up, we will revert to tactical R/Os who have previously been married to specific shock troop units. Until the tactical situation opens up Commo will be processed through outside (LINC). It is expected agent-to-Calligeris service will be a 6-hour process. Once the tactical situation opens up arrangements have been made for unit-to-Calligeris-to-unit-info LINC service. The messages will be sent in code due to the dependability of the RS-1 set to be used on this operation. Resident R/Os will have their radios delivered to them once they are in position. Tactical R/Os are expected to be paired and will carry RS-1s in packs.
V. Logistics:
A. The logistical support has been broken down into three categories: 1. Weather-proofed kits of approximately 50 lbs. weight, the contents of which are grouped to service partisans, saboteurs and R/Os. Approximately 12 March the total of these kits will arrive by plane at fields near the staging areas for distribution as needed. The sum total of equipment to be packaged is outlined.
85. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles/1/
[place not declassified], January 25, 1954, 0543Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 75, Folder 7. Secret; Routine; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to Guatemala.
225. Ref: LINC 159; GUAT 015; DIR 222./2/ From Mylkes. [name not declassified] advised report [name not declassified] arrested on charges illegal possession arms. [name not declassified] extremely worried since [name not declassified] is principal link between Calligeris and Wsburnt Army officers who support his group. [name not declassified] according [name not declassified] has considerable information re personalities, plans, and organization Call-[name not declassified] Group, and from personal experience considers [name not declassified] will be tortured and confession his knowledge entirely possible.
/2/GUAT 15, January 24, is ibid., Box 10, Folder 3; LINC 159 and DIR 222 were not found.
86. Memorandum From the First Secretary of the Embassy in Guatemala (Wardlaw) to the Counselor of the Embassy in Guatemala (Krieg)/1/
Guatemala City, January 26, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 98, Folder 8. Secret. This memorandum is marked as a copy and is the first enclosure to a memorandum from the Chief of Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida, February 1.
A finquero who has on previous occasions supplied me certain information recently told me that he had learned from the Czech Kubes who is a next-door neighbor of Colonel Elfego Monzon that the Colonel seems to be prepared psychologically for joining the opposition. Colonel Monzon reportedly stated that he had 300 officers on his side, but my informant did not know whether this meant they were merely well disposed towards Monzon or actually had come to some sort of understanding with him. Colonel Monzon is quoted as having stated that it would be too bad to have the uprising occur just at this time when things were not quite ready.
A few days ago Colonel Monzon was shocked to learn that the Guardia Civil had recently received 500 sub-machine guns from Belgium and he was particularly annoyed that despite his position in the Guatemalan Army this delivery had been effected without his having been informed. He arranged to inspect one of these guns and reported it to be a very fine weapon. The guns fire clips of 30 cartridges. He is reported to have said that the delivery of these guns to the police was an affront to the Army.
My informant was of the opinion that the police are now better equipped for fighting inside the city than is the Army. Supporting his view that the Army's weapons are in a very poor state, he remarked that an individual by the name of Julio Gaitan, whom he knows slightly, told him that he had recently visited the barracks at Guardia de Honor where he observed 150 soldiers working away at rifle cartridges with files. He asked an officer what the soldiers were doing and was informed that they were filing down Czech cartridges which did not quite fit the 7 mm. rifles used by the Guatemalan Army. My informant took this as evidence that the Guatemalan Army is suffering a desperate shortage of ammunition.
My informant also reported that it is said by many people in Guatemala that the opposition has a large store of arms in Ahuachapan, El Salvador, which is not far from the Guatemalan border. He had no further information on this.
I am convinced of the reliability of my informant but I have no opinion about the reliability of Kubes or Gaitan.
87. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Washington, January 27, 1954, 2137Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 7, Folder 2. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.
35910. Ref: DIR 21969./2/ For purposes PBSUCCESS program and to help support ODYOKE position forthcoming OAS Conference Caracas, urge all stations your jurisdiction give top priority obtention solid evidence of Guatemalan support of subversion or interventionist activities neighboring countries as requested ref.
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., Folder 1)
88. Contact Report/1/
No. 16
[place not declassified], January 29-30, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 10. Secret; RYBAT. Drafted on January 31 by Francis T. Mylkes, a pseudonym [text not declassified].
Place: Safe House B, LINCOLN
Persons Present: RUFUS, [name not declassified], Mylkes
Discussion:
1. Following concerns only matters taken up after Galbond's departure. Mylkes began discussion of PP organization as it pertained to LINC and to various organizations in the field. A general picture was developed as to how the PP program fitted into the overall picture and how important it was. At Galbond's advice, particular stress was laid on how the military could be defected or neutralized. The current installations and future capabilities were discussed. Personnel to perform work at LINC were discussed and letters have been prepared by [name not declassified] and introduction to RUFUS to our [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] case officer has been arranged. Matter of financial control brought up difficulties. Neither is in favor of having funds come from [name not declassified]. Previously [name not declassified] was in agreement with this arrangement. Their idea was that they could not justify funds coming from the U.S. I pointed out that our case officers would indicate that they were coming direct from [name not declassified] or RUFUS. No decision was reached.
2. Before any further items of PP, or any of FI and/or PM matters could be discussed, the White Paper hit the press./2/ After Mylkes was furnished with known facts (Guat 046),/3/ he was directed to check with RUFUS as to whom the possible source of this info was. LINC 321/4/ gave briefly that info which was gathered from RUFUS. His attitude toward Mylkes' insistence for facts to back up statements which indicated info leak would be Somozas or Pablo or acceptance of fact that it could be his men Delgado or Capt. Sierra was one of indignation.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 89.
/3/Dated January 29. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 10, Folder 3)
/4/Document 93.
3. This conversation (para 2) brought up subject of security. Mylkes indicated that he was personally certain that the group would want to study all of the security considerations before continuing as scheduled. He advised that on two previous efforts the RUFUS-[name not declassified] group had been compromised at last moment, causing long delay and costly re-financing. For this reason Mylkes stated that it was his Personal opinion that RUFUS be prepared to either explain the fact with the info that his group had been penetrated on a high level from the beginning and/or current method of security and FI practices were not adequate. RUFUS defended his position strongly by saying that his men should not be judged too severely and that he, personally, was responsible since he could not establish such a system of checks and investigations with his sensitive Latin assistants.
4. Later the same day (30 Jan.), Mylkes returned to the house and the matter of security was again brought up. At this point RUFUS, without any prompting, advised that he had learned now that Delgado had betrayed him and that he was willing to accept the ideas of the group re: security and FI Ops. Mylkes pointed out that although RUFUS would lose some authority and responsibility he would receive the benefits of better intelligence and security. He agreed and said that immediately upon his return he would issue a general order which would necessitate compliance with all measures deemed necessary by our FI officer. He said that all of those sensitive people would have to accept a general law which arose as a result of this Delgado betrayal or be removed to less sensitive jobs out of his general Headquarters. RUFUS agreed that all elements of his organization would be advised to adhere strictly to all new security regulations as suggested by our FI rep and issued by RUFUS' command.
Comment:
Let's get our fee while the tears are hot. Remains to be seen to what degree RUFUS will comply with these promises once he is in the field and is in full possession of our aid and equipment.
Mylkes
89. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Stations in Guatemala and [place not declassified]/1/
[place not declassified], January 30, 1954, 0907Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 1, Folder 3. Secret; Routine; PBSUCCESS; RYBAT. Sent for information to the Director of Central Intelligence.
296. Re: LINC 276./2/
/2/Dated January 28. (Ibid.)
1. Following is KUGOWN guidance for immediate use amplifying ref in connection with WSBURNT govt White Paper./3/
/3/According to a January 30 New York Times article found in Central Intelligence Agency files, the Guatemalan Government charged in a "White Paper" that it had learned of a heavily-financed plot involving Nicaraguan President Somoza plus the Governments of El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela to overthrow the Arbenz regime. "In an apparent allusion to the United States, Guatemala listed the 'Government of the North' among those it accused of endorsing the plot. The Government charged further that the United Fruit Company, a United States-owned concern with large banana plantation holdings in Guatemala, had supplied arms to the plotters." According to the article, the claims were backed by "photostatic copies of correspondence," although the Department of State refused to "dignify" the charges. A spokesman said "that the charges were 'in line with the usual Communist charges against the United States.'" (Ibid., Job 79-01025A, Box 82, Folder 2) The text of the Department of State press release on January 30 is printed in Department of State Bulletin, February 15, 1954, pp. 251-252.
2. Ridicule:
A. Link White Paper to WSBURNT October fair fiasco. Now we have January Fair. October, bulls didn't show up. Where is the January bull, this American colonel? He hasn't shown up either. That makes it easy for the govt toreadors. In October, tickets were all fouled up. Could it be the same with photo-stated "tickets" attached to White Paper? Anyway, always some excitement in WSBURNT.
B. WSBURNT people being victimized by too much propaganda. Plot expos? too stereotyped, with familiar U.S. United Fruit Co., Nicaraguan scapegoats. WSBURNT govt cries wolf too often./4/
/4/Dispatch No. [telegram indicator not declassified] 429-29 to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida, February 9, reported: "Prevailing popular WSBURNT view is that John H. Calligeris, himself, furnished the WSBURNT Government data for the white paper . . . . Calligeris has since that time [i.e., the time of his escape in 1951] not been too greatly trusted nor held in high regard by the opposition to the present WSBURNT regime." Yd?goras Fuentes agreed, and explained, "he did not trust Calligeris and it could well be true. Yd?goras further stated to Source he often wondered precisely how Calligeris escaped since he had never been able to ascertain from whom the assistance came." (Ibid., Box 55, Folder 2)
C. Paper just sign same fear, panic in WSBURNT govt and Red ranks that led to recent arrests.
3. De-emphasis:
A. Attempt obtain bigger play for recent stories of WSBURNT refugees than for paper.
B. Paper must be read in light recent WSBURNT razzle dazzle preceding OAS. New Foreign Minister named; PRG party suggests hauling Arevalo out of ashcan to make dramatic stand of OAS; Pravda lends big hand; Toledano drums up followers against "intervention" from hemisphere Reds; WSBURNT makes arrests. Whole orchestra playing and now White Paper supposed to be cymbal crash. Only, cymbal is cracked.
C. If possible, fabricate big human interest story, like flying saucers, birth sextuplets in remote area to take play away.
D. WSBURNT in last minute tried withdraw paper, but it already in press hands.
4. Diversionary:
A. Paper attempts intimidate neighboring countries so WSBURNT can more easily take pressure off recent repressive measures.
B. Paper covers up for domestic terror in WSBURNT. What kind of justice first arrests and exiles innocent people, then publishes charges? What do charges mean since people released? Plans for Red coup.
C. Paper is cover up for aggressive plans. WSBURNT training new Caribbean legion. Leaders Miguel Angel Ramirez, Jorge Rivas Montes. Made heavy arms purchases recent months, financed by Soviets. Now secret Soviet military mission headed by unidentified Soviet partisan warfare expert, in WSBURNT. Is WSBURNT plotting invasion Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, seizure Panama Canal for Soviets? 300 man 5th column already hiding in Salvador. Guat Commies taking over bldgs on Salvador border.
D. Banking circles Berne, Switzerland refute Arbenz denials of forthcoming Soviet loan of 20 million Swiss francs. Swiss and Iron Curtain suppliers already approached to furnish flamethrowers, napalm and other aggressive weapons. To be financed from loan.
E. Big split in WSBURNT army and govt over present course. Arbenz letting army friends down, listening to Pelleger. Pelleger overextending himself.
F. Soviet sub sighted landing arms on WSBURNT Pacific coast. Get WSBURNT spokesman to deny report, or claim denial.
5. Positive Stand:
A. Talk of plot from outside nonsense. Real opposition inside WSBURNT. Some leaders in entourages Arbenz, Fortuny.
B. Govt panic augurs well for future. If govt so panicked by false evidence, wait till it meets real forces of opposition. Paper attempts avert this inevitable development. Futile attempt to get people to oppose inevitable.
C. Paper is fabrication, but one thing true: anti-communism in WSBURNT strong and growing. Will be real plots until defeat of pres-ent govt. Resistance thrives on repression, as did Christianity.
6. Foregoing may or may not be related to fact but is pertinent to situation./5/
/5/Telegram 349 from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the DCI, February 3, reported that the details of the operation had been compromised: "Enemy attacked with 7-page 'White Paper' exposing numerous operational details of PBSUCCESS, including Seekford, Calligeris documentation, Calligeris-KMFLUSH relations, location KUHOOK and KUCLUB TNG sites, old Calligeris military plans etc. Enemy also neutralized and partly rolled up Calligeris military intelligence net controlled by SECANT." (Ibid., Box 1, Folder 4)
90. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Washington, January 30, 1954, 1931Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 2. Secret; Operational Immediate; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by J.D. Esterline.
36511. 1. Persons with ultimate KUBARK authority have agreed that decision re future of PBSUCCESS will be made on Monday 1 February 1954. Between now and Monday forward all available information in detail re status of operation regardless of how unimportant it may seem. Include with information the following:
A. Exact location SCRANTON and SARAMAC.
B. Details of current cover situation Seekford, Lugton, Merton, and Middlecott.
C. Estimate of extent of compromise and disclosure of KUBARK interest from Delgado's intercepts while acting as courier.
D. Any other information of value not covered in A, B, and C.
2. Urge that Calligeris write up an appreciation of the situation to include the extent and details that may be in hands of the Arbenz forces.
3. Recall Iden A to LINC immediately. Imperative he not travel through WSBURNT or even chance flying over country. He should proceed direct from KMFLUSH to Iden B and thence directly to LINCOLN. No exception may be taken to that pattern of travel.
4. Consider seriously the advisability of withdrawing Iden C from WSBURNT if his position appears to be in any danger of compromise.
5. Telecon 30 January 1954 will serve no purpose. Decisions cannot be made. Will advise you 1 February 1954 as to future actions./2/
/2/See Document 94.
91. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
[place not declassified], January 30, 1954, 1023Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Job 79-01025A, Box 1, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.
297. 1. Following views are presented for HQS consideration:
A. White Paper/2/ has effectively exposed certain aspects of PBSUCCESS, probably more to come. Stage One report clearly recognized this possibility (cover page and page 2). Stage Two was implemented to explore and probe potential assets, testing while developing./3/
/2/Handwritten marginal note: "[illegible]--'White paper' only thing to be carded."
/3/Handwritten marginal note: "quite agree." The Stage One report is Document 62.
2. Aside from KUHOOK camps and limited KUFIRE progress, other operations not even implemented to date. Assessment thus far has been favorable to good./4/ Losses sustained by arrests and expos? not believed irreparable providing no lessening in determination develops.
/4/Handwritten marginal note: "Question fair to good aspect of assessment."
C. Believe remaining assets will deteriorate rapidly if any doubts or evidence of abandonment permitted, thus effectively destroying what appears to be only known substance to resistance./5/ Our pressure, once applied, should not be released but intensified. Nothing is more demoralizing than on-again, off-again.
/5/Handwritten marginal note: "fluff."
2. Current situation however requires careful consideration. The enemy has played a strong card which we must be prepared to counter and exploit or withdraw.
3. Exploitable factors:
A. By admitting a plot of sufficient gravity to demand a white paper, the enemy has actually given to the anti-Communist forces a stature and publicity they have never before had.
B. The enemy has confessed to a deep division within the country, thus sharpening the issue in everyone's mind./6/
/6/Handwritten marginal note: "?"
C. The enemy has publicized outside aid to the opposition, thus raising the opposition's hope.
4. Counter-action:
A. Have Calligeris make radio reply confirming his intention to devote himself to the freedom of his people, thus converting him to a public stand on issues and overt status.
B. Endeavor obtain similar statement from Somoza. Of course he is anti-Communist and all refugees from tyranny are welcomed and assisted in his country. His is a free country, unlike WSBURNT.
C. Once Calligeris in overt status, PBSUCCESS would continue build-up, utilizing most covert/clandestine procedures possible./7/
/7/Handwritten marginal note: "?"
D. ODYOKE officials could evidence attitude that history repeats itself in WSBURNT. Oppressed people are struggling for freedom midst wild Communist charges. This will go on as elsewhere until liberty is restored.
E. Other anti-Communist countries in Caribbean area should be encouraged to support Somoza stand.
F. Establish committee for freedom of WSBURNT overtly to counteract Communist blasts and to provide courage to resist, faith and hope. (Present time, enemy has both initiative and advantage.)
5. Steps in furtherance of para 4 above:
A. LINCOLN has requested Calligeris and [name not declassified] to prepare radio address for Calligeris. Being [Bring] cable for HQS approval.
B. LINCOLN ready prepare suggested Somoza stand for transmittal via Calligeris after HQS approval.
C. LINCOLN would proceed securely, using full clandestine techniques,/8/ insisting upon controls throughout. No departure from present plans./9/
/8/Handwritten marginal note: "Do they have that capability."
/9/Handwritten marginal note: "good if poss."
D. This is HQS action and in keeping present ODYOKE stand from which retirement would be difficult.
E. HQS action with LINC through Calligeris/[name not declassified].
F. LINCOLN would submit proposal to HQS for approval before implementation.
6. Advise soonest. Meanwhile Calligeris and Seekford being kept separated and in safe lodging for cooling off period or re-direction.
92. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
[place not declassified], January 31, 1954, 0357Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 1, Folder 4. Secret; Operational Immediate; PBSUCCESS; RYBAT.
311. Re: DIR 36511./2/
/2/Document 90.
1. In full discussion with Mylkes re possible sources White Paper info, Calligeris named in order: Somoza, Somoza's son, Delgado, Captain Raul Sierra, and Seekford. He devoted considerable time to speculation that Somozas could be witting or unwitting sources, but could give no motives for such action on their part. When directly questioned why he had named Seekford, C replied Somoza Jr. had once told him Seekford security risk. C then added he himself had fullest confidence in Seekford. C extremely reluctant to consider Delgado or Sierra as sources, despite his own admission that both knew virtually all his plans, including most sensitive items of White Paper.
2. Calligeris obliquely declined to divulge Sierra's true name to Mylkes. (Note Sierra action re KUCLUB TNG site reported SCRANTON 002 (IN 14032). Note also Seekford request POC on Sierra in alias per [telegram indicator not declassified] 0858.
3. Calligeris indicated to Mylkes his dislike of Lugton's requests for bio data on personnel in his intelligence nets.
4. When Mylkes pointed out that Delgado and Sierra were also on staff for two previous attempts which were compromised at crucial junctures, Calligeris failed to respond directly. He replied that group must also consider both Somozas and Seekford as definitely possible sources of White Paper.
5. Above would perhaps not ordinarily raise doubts Calligeris loyalty or motivation and might be interpreted as pride or reticence. However, in present situation, fullest objectivity, candor and straight talk are required of all concerned. Above Calligeris replies either fail to meet such standards or suggest inability of Calligeris to face situation realistically.
6. In addition, there are the objective considerations that:
A. Calligeris himself has not been engaged in three compromised attempts.
B. KUBARK has invested heavily, financially and otherwise, in Calligeris.
C. KUBARK needs fullest information on events leading to present situation.
7. In the light of all the foregoing, LINCOLN considers it imperative that HQS give most serious consideration to LCFLUTTER for Calligeris and [name not declassified] soonest. LINCOLN believes it virtually unfeasible to take the basic decisions scheduled for 1 Feb 54 without the evidence obtainable though LCFLUTTER on the integrity of [name not declassified] and Calligeris.
8. LINCOLN is well aware of significance of LCFLUTTER at this point. [name not declassified] and Calligeris may refuse, thus terminating their participation in operation, since to keep them on after such refusal would eliminate any chance of control. LINCOLN considers this risk much less weighty than the danger of making KUBARK decisions on less than maximum available evidence.
9. In order minimize possibility affronting [name not declassified] and Calligeris pride, LINCOLN recommends following approach:
A. Discuss with [name not declassified] first, as individual less involved operational details.
B. Explain to [name not declassified] need to apply every precaution prior to new start, precautions beginning at top.
C. Explain to [name not declassified] that many PBPRIME commercial firms use LCFLUTTER.
D. Explain to [name not declassified] LCFLUTTER had been used on all key American personnel and it therefore consistent for him and Calligeris to do so.
E. If [name not declassified] persuaded, have him persuade Calligeris.
10. If LCFLUTTER approved, Mylkes will attempt obtain acquiescence [name not declassified] and Calligeris.
11. Recommend LCFLUTTER team be dispatched LINCOLN immediately. Operator should be most competent, and, if possible, speak Spanish. Upon receipt ETA, LINCOLN will provide contact instructions.
12. FYI: Although request in early December, no security clearances have been received on either [initial not declassified] or C to date.
93. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
[place not declassified], January 31, 1954, 1928Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 1, Folder 4. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.
321. Re: DIR 36511, para 1C; GUAT 022, 043, 046./2/
/2/DIR 36511 is Document 90; telegrams 22, 43, and 46 are dated January 27, 30, and 29, respectively. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 10, Folder 3)
1. KUFIRE estimates compromise from Delgado's intercepts while acting as courier may be considerable judging from foll items which appeared in White Paper.
2. Delgado and others as indicated fully aware of foll items according to debriefing of Seekford and Calligeris:
A. Shipment of arms known by Delgado, Col Somoza, Pres Somoza and Capt Sierra.
B. Letter from Calligeris to Pres Somoza known by Delgado, Capt Sierra. Seekford did not have knowledge letter.
C. Calligeris' Nicaraguan passport in name of Carlos Centeno know by Delgado, Pres Somoza, Capt Sierra.
D. Calligeris military plan known by Delgado, Sierra, Secant: Plan same as 1949, 1951 plan. Seekford claims this is not Calligeris' plan but is plan belonging to Ydigoras Fuentes. This plan probably given to WSBURNT police by SECANT as cover story per previous agreement with Calligeris.
E. KUHOOK TRG on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], code name El Diablo; [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], code name Taptap; airfield near Puerto Cabezas known by Delgado, Pres Somoza, Col Somoza, Sierra, and Penny Rogers who flew Seekford in plane for recon of sites.
F. Seekford photo and passport known by many, surely known by Delgado, according to Calligeris.
G. Location of established ham, semi-clandestine radio stations, frequencies, call letters known by Delgado, Sierra, commo commission Honduras and a certain Fernando Conterras, according to Calligeris.
H. Archie Baldocchi allegedly offered "sea fire" planes $20,000 each. Known only by Delgado. This info from both Calligeris and Seekford [(telegram indicator not declassified] 0852 (IN 45599)).
I. SEQUIN known by Delgado, SECANT, most of group in WSBURNT. Calligeris knows nothing of $2,000 paid Ticas by Rubion.
J. Calligeris knew nothing about 15 radio operators whom an identified Salvadoran requested Sinicaldi to obtain.
3. Other info that may be in hands Arbenz forces but has not yet appeared in press:
A. Black flight known by Delgado, Col Somoza, Pres Somoza, Sierra, people who unloaded plane and army personnel at airfield.
B. With SECANT's capture it very possible that through torture WSBURNT possesses info on military net directly under SECANT.
C. American group financially supporting movement known to most of Calligeris' immediate staff; undoubtedly known by Delgado.
D. Whereabouts of Calligeris can be easily ascertained by anyone checking airlines.
4. Because of GUAT 022, GUAT 043, Delgado's extensive knowledge of all that appeared in White Paper and oral report from Seekford that source in WSBURNT G-2 reported on 27 Jan that he had seen photostats of two documents carried by Delgado in WSBURNT G-2 office. LINCOLN must presently consider Delgado as double agent.
94. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Stations in Guatemala and [2 places not declassified]/1/
[place not declassified], February 2, 1954, 1845Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 1, Folder 4. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence and [place not declassified].
340. From Dunbar.
1. Desire to assure all concerned that recent expos? of alleged activities pertaining PBSUCCESS although unfortunate some respects fortunate in others. Further this incident has not affected PBSUCCESS objective any way aside from importance recognizing need for employment appropriate techniques throughout. Keynote must be positive thinking, determination, demonstration professionalism, balancing security with effectiveness, in order meet challenge which confronted.
2. I have just returned from HQS where above fully evidenced by all concerned. Ascham and Galbond particularly expressed confidence in ability all concerned to fulfill requirements PBSUCCESS.
95. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Communications, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified]) to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)/1/
Washington, February 9, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 77, Folder 2. Secret. The date of the memorandum most probably is February 4, 1954.
SUBJECT
Establishment of Radio Station to Handle Tactical Communications for PBSUCCESS
1. At such time as operation PBSUCCESS enters the para-military phase, or begins the utilization of agent type communications to service intelligence nets, there will be a requirement for a small semi-clandestine radio station to handle these communications.
2. There are two major reasons why KUBARK should establish and operate such a radio station rather than support a station to be handled by Calligeris. By controlling and operating the base radio station, KUBARK has control of PBSUCCESS tactical communications and thus maintains control over the operation itself. The second major reason is that the operation of such a semi-clandestine radio base is a specialized skill not available except through KUCLUB. There is not sufficient time available to train Calligeris' men to handle base station communications.
3. Technically the existing KUCLUB radio station in [place not declassified] could be utilized for this operation. However, communications originating in WSBURNT during the para-military phase and traceable as working into a U.S. Government radio station prohibits the use of this station.
4. The Sherwood installation and the base radio station could be combined into one installation thus making the most economical use of communications personnel available. The strong possibility that Sherwood could be compromised and lost before the para-military is entered into must be considered, thus making it unwise to combine the two installations.
5. Therefore, it is recommended that the Chief, WHD approve the establishment of the radio base station in KMFLUSH. The equipment necessary for the installation is not great and could be installed in an isolated safehouse anywhere in KMFLUSH, preferably north of the capitol city. The installation would be made by KUCLUB radio operators who would remain with the equipment until the station was activated.
6. The station could be operated on a limited basis handling PBSUCCESS communications with the Calligeris group without attracting any attention or being in any danger of location through DFing.
7. The station would become fully operational only for a few days during the para-military phase of the operation. At that time it would probably be necessary to assign two additional KUCLUB radio operators to handle the rapidly expanding communications. If desirable this station could also serve as an advanced operations base for the PBSUCCESS case officer during this phase.
8. At the completion of PBSUCCESS, the radio station would be deactivated at the earliest possible date, thus making the risks of operating the station relatively small.
9. If the establishment of the radio station is approved, implementation will proceed as follows:
a. Request Somoza approval for establishment, stressing that station to handle Calligeris tactical communications and that danger of disclosure through DFing, etc., negligible.
b. Obtain necessary site through Somoza.
c. Ship equipment KFLUSH next black flight.
d. Send two KUCLUB radio operators to KMFLUSH to set up station and to handle necessary communications until para-military phase.
e. Assign additional radio operators as necessary.
10. If at all possible, KUCLUB radio operators should be processed using passports under alias.
[name not declassified]
96. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala/1/
[place not declassified], February 9, 1954, 1853Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 1, Folder 5. Secret; Priority; PBSUCCESS; RYBAT. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
451. Re: LINC 399./2/
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., Box 1001, Folder 4)
1. In accordance with ref, request ETA Givloch soonest.
2. Prior to trip, request Givloch confer with FMBLUG to obtain JMBLUG's personal views on following:
A. What political platform should an anti-Commie group, seeking to overthrow WSBURNT Govt, espouse? What should be announced position of such group on agrarian reform, foreign capital, role of army, labor unions, nationalism, etc.?
B. What political actions must an anti-Commie group, once it has seized power, carry out to remain in power? What should it actually do on the planks contained in its pre-coup platform?
3. Above is for LINCOLN guidance prior to shaping up [name not declassified]/Calligeris positive political program.
4. Dir FYI: Believe foregoing guidance helpful and easily obtainable but not to be construed as any effort to bypass ODACID.
97. Contact Report/1/
No. 23
[place not declassified], February 10, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 147, Folder 1. No classification marking. Drafted by [name not declassified] on February 13.
PLACE: Safehouse "A"
PERSONS PRESENT: [2 names not declassified]
COVER USED: Roberto Ford
SUBJECT: Discussion of Political Matters with [name not declassified]
Discussion:
1. On 9 February 1954 I advised [name not declassified] that within a very short time the Group would need a very concise report on his political platform; we would need this, I explained, to help summarize our future propaganda activities (which I restated for him). I advised [name not declassified] to put himself in the position of an individual facing a group of newspapermen who could within 10 or 15 minutes briefly outline his political program. He said that he would be very happy to do so and immediately started to prepare this report; after working on this matter for one day, he said that he was almost finished. In addition to writing the general points, [name not declassified] said that he was attempting when possible to put on a separate paper the specific steps of his program which would fall under each general heading; this, he said, would be extremely necessary in order to make our propaganda campaign more effective.
2. We developed the discussion of how [name not declassified] would implement this political program, discussing the great difficulties of re-orienting certain political trends in his country. At this point [name not declassified] made the following observation: "If the Group gives me freedom of administration--" I immediately assured him that there would be no interference by the Group in Guatemalan administrative affairs once his Junta in power. He continued, "Well, if that is true, and if Rufus provides me with the sufficient military security which he has indicated, then I will provide him with a sufficient strong administration." He added, "You will see that we will make this work."
3. He indicated very forcibly that he himself would take the responsibility for administering the political and economic program. He implied RUFUS would be relegated to the more or less secondary position of holding a military club in the background in order that [name not declassified] could achieve the administrative and political aims with which he has stated he will comply.
4. I asked [name not declassified] if he had thought about the matter of resolving the need to obtain military security while at the same time maintaining a certain balance within the army to enable him to secure liberty of action. He said, "Ah yes, I have not forgotten that. I hope that if plans progress it will be possible to have the army neutralized in a certain form so that certain elements will not be powerful enough to wreck the program which I expect will be necessary to carry out." He indicated again that his complete dependence on full cooperation with RUFUS and the maintenance of a balance among the various army elements would evolve into a successful dual military-political operation for his new government.
5. In this discussion [name not declassified] further indicated clearly that with circumstances as they are today, government of and by the people of Guatemala would be virtually impossible, that as he saw it his new government had certain long range targets and certain short range targets. He implied that absolutely free elections and other such lofty principles as greatly expanded educational facilities and certain technical advances would certainly be the long range type of planning. Specifically, the agrarian reform issue would fall into this category.
6. Speaking on the agrarian reform issue, [name not declassified] indicated that he hoped to achieve an equitable set-up where ever possible. I asked him at this point what would be his position with regard to the demands of United Fruit and how he would handle their obvious claims for repayment of the land which had been taken from them. While there was no direct statement on this point by [name not declassified], the inference was that that which had already been taken from United Fruit would be almost impossible to return and his solution would be the possibility of opening up to them new tracks of land and making available other land enterprises which had heretofore been denied them. The possibility of offering United Fruit other undeveloped lands for their technical exploitation would constitute [name not declassified] reply to the demands of United Fruit for retribution or repayment for lands taken from them.
7. [name not declassified] was advised that immediately upon his return from his home in [place not declassified], I would have prepared for him a group of ideas of a propaganda nature which could be very closely dovetailed in with some of the political ideas which he has espoused. However I stated that while the ideas which he would give me would be carefully considered, they would not necessarily be incorporated immediately into any propaganda programs. I also mentioned to [name not declassified] that he could use some of these propaganda ideas in radio broadcast programs which he could cut here in [place not declassified] and which he would do on an anonymous basis. He agreed wholeheartedly that such programs, based on the specific points of propaganda upon which both the Junta and the Group were in agreement, could be done upon his return from his home in [place not declassified].
[name not declassified]
98. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Guatemala City, February 10, 1954, 1109Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 126, Folder 4. Secret; Routine; PBSUCCESS; RYBAT. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
079. Re: GUAT 015./2/
/2/Dated January 24. (Ibid., Box 10, Folder 3)
1. Major Enrique Trinidad Oliva released 6 Feb due lack of evidence supporting charge ([illegible] 9 Feb).
2. Lic Manuel Oreliano Cardona expressed belief Oliva may have been forced to reveal details local opposition movement (source: JMBLUG 7). Station has no evidence supporting this belief.
99. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to CIA Stations in [2 places not declassified]/1/
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 7, Folder 2. Secret; Routine. Approved by King. Repeated to [2 places not declassified].
Washington, February 12, 1954, 2054Z.
38175. 1. Major Alfonso Martinez (Estevez), Director Guatemalan National Agrarian Dept, believed now in Switzerland. Subj was scheduled arrive Amsterdam from Montreal 20 Jan 54 on KLM flight 650. Travelled alone.
2. Subj aged 30 formerly private secretary to Guat President Jacobo Arbenz. Purpose subject's trip variously reported for:
A. Deposit funds for leading Guat officials
B. Purchase arms for Guat Govt.
3. For [place not declassified]: Request confirmation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Amsterdam arrival and check on further planned itinerary. For [place not declassified]: Request check on subject's movements, contacts, etc., which would substantiate or disprove either 2A or 2B para 2./2/
/2/Telegram DIR 38178, sent less than 1 hour later, transmitted instructions to plant a story that Mart?nez had not fled the country but was in Switzerland depositing money in the name of Guatemalan Government leaders, in case Switzerland had to become a safehaven in the event that Arbenz and other leaders had to flee. In addition, Mart?nez was to be portrayed as an arms buyer, purchasing aircraft and arms for Arbenz. (DIR 38178 [place not declassified], February 12, 2150Z; ibid.)
4. For [2 places not declassified]: If para 3 checks negative, please institute similar checks your areas, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] if necessary.
5. Request priority handling.
100. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
[place not declassified], February 18, 1954, 0032Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 1, Folder 6. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to Guatemala City.
579. 1. Suggest one shot KUGOWN operation to effect rapid distribution propaganda WSBURNT Church circles, continuing during PBSUCCESS.
2. Assuming [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] still available [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], suggest he be sent two week visit WSBURNT bearing letter introduction to MSGR Rossell Arellano.
3. At Guat's discretion [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would reveal intentions to Rossell, or would work directly through persons like [2 names not declassified] ([document indicator not declassified]-1438) and [name not declassified] ([document indicator not declassified]-649).
4. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would carry to WSBURNT basic material for producing several series pamphlets and posters; also funds paying local creative, production, distribution services.
5. Estimate that above program would be effective despite lack usual controls, owing Church motivation and rapport within clergy. Proposal has additional merit if carried out immediately; vis, that of assessing PBSUCCESS assets within clergy.
101. Dispatch From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)/1/
HUL-A-75
[place not declassified], February 19, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 147, Folder 1. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. A typed note indicates that the dispatch was hand carried by Cowden.
SUBJECT
Security Matters
Compromise Cable Traffic, PBSUCCESS
REFERENCES
[telegram indicator not declassified] 846, 847
LINC 611, 612/2/
/2/Attached but not printed.
1. Foregoing references and statement from Pivall clearly establishes that:
A. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], failed to properly paraphrase and/or substitute official cryptonyms and pseudonyms for field counterparts on messages involved, which had been passed to Seekford.
B. Case Officer, Seekford, failed to properly safeguard above messages received from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
C. Messages in question, according to intermediary, had been brought to personal attention of President Somoza.
2. Pending Headquarters' action as per LINC 612, LINCOLN's initial reaction aside from the compromise of communications security, was more or less to the effect that President Somoza is simply more witting of PBSUCCESS than heretofore known. In this regard a verbal comment was made to one of LINCOLN's officers in November 1953 to the effect that shortly after President Somoza's visit to President Truman, and while en route back to Managua, the escorting U.S. officer had spoken quite openly to Somoza regarding his cooperation against Guatemala. Upon making the assessment of PBSUCCESS no record of the latter was found in the files of WHD. LINCOLN is only slightly informed as to the true extent of Seekford's personal negotiations with Somoza. As an indication of the extent of this relationship, a reference is made to [telegram indicator not declassified] 775. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was queried as to the identity of this American on the occasion of the Regional Conference of 12-13 February and admitted that, unquestionably, the person referred to was Seekford. However, he was reluctant to so state it in a cable until he could quote some reliable source.
3. From the security aspect, LINCOLN urges fullest Headquarters investigation and the change of all pertinent cryptonyms. From the overall operational standpoint, LINCOLN assumes that, as in the case of the White Paper incident, all concerned are fully agreed to press PBSUCCESS to a successful conclusion, with complete attainment of the objectives set for the Project.
Jerome C. Dunbar
102. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
[place not declassified], February 19, 1954,1857Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 52, Folder 3. Confidential; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.
616. Suggest KUGOWN black diversionary operation:
1. DIR 38984/2/ indicates Martinez going Czechoslovakia.
/2/Not found.
2. Miami Herald 19 Feb reprints La Prensa 18 Feb Mexico U.P. stating WSBURNT getting Soviet arms thru medium Czech Finca owner and that arms to be landed from Soviet submarines.
3. Suggest HQs arrange with RQM search graphics register for photo Soviet sub (or what could pass for Soviet sub) lying close inshore: photo should be poor lacking detail and credibly taken by amateur with box camera from KMFLUSH Pacific coast.
4. Pivall would give photo to [name not declassified] suggesting following course:
A. Pivall and one trusted aid take truckload blackflight arms and cache on Pacific coast;
B. [name not declassified] "discover" submarine photo and public press;
C. [name not declassified] order investigation coastal areas thus leading to discovery Soviet arms cache and further press publicity.
5. After photo in hands [name not declassified] and arms cached, operation could be frozen for utmost use. One use would be to complete operation in advance of enemy strategem to embarrass PBPRIME. Another use would be to complete operation within few hours after enemy propaganda victory. Further value is that once completed, operation would give pretext for [name not declassified] possession satellite arms delivered by black-flight.
103. Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King) to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)/1/
Washington, February 20, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 70, Folder 2. Secret.
SUBJECT
Compromise of Cable Traffic--PBSUCCESS
1. The Lincoln station advised headquarters on 19 February 1954 that a major compromise of Commo and project security was discovered on or about 17 February 1954 by [2 names not declassified] replacement with the Castillo Armas group. The following is a chronological report of the compromise as received by WHD from Lincoln:
a. During the week of 15 February 1954, Mr. [name not declassified] met [name not declassified], owner of an apartment in [place not declassified] formerly occupied by [name not declassified], and settled his account. During this meeting, Mr. [name not declassified] handed to [name not declassified] the original copies of all messages which have been passed by the Chief of Station, [place not declassified], to [name not declassified]. [name not declassified] advised that [name not declassified] left these messages in the apartment when he left the country. [name not declassified] further stated that because of the apparent importance of the information contained in the messages, he had made said messages immediately available to his good friend, President Somoza. When [name not declassified] examined the messages in question, he immediately realized that a serious exposure of Agency cryptonyms and PBSUCCESS organizational methods and procedures had been revealed to at least two known unauthorized persons and probably an indeterminable number of others. He immediately cabled Station Lincoln advising them of the compromise in general terms and indicated that he was departing for Lincoln immediately with the documents in question.
b. Station Lincoln alerted headquarters at 1300 hours, 19 February 1954, by telephone and advised that a courier would arrive at headquarters at 2200 hours, 19 February 1954, with the compromised documents. Lincoln followed the telephone call with cable 612 which indicated that fact that the compromise consisted of 5 pages of slightly paraphrased text containing all basic cryptonyms and pseudonyms applying not only to PBSUCCESS but to the Agency at large. The PBSUCCESS desk made a preliminary examination upon receipt of cable 612/2/ and determined that the compromise involved roughly six cables. It was not possible at that time, however, to determine exactly which cryptonyms had been exposed. When the courier arrived with the compromised messages, Mr. [name not declassified] of Commo was called and he and Mr. Esterline, desk officer PBSUCCESS, examined the documents together and compiled an accurate list of exposed indicators. Mr. [name not declassified] of the Security Office was advised of this list the morning of 20 February and a copy of the list was hand-carried to his office at 1020 hours that date.
/2/Not found.
c. The following is a list of those cryptonyms and pseudonyms which were exposed to President Somoza, [name not declassified] and an indeterminable number of others:
|
LINCOLN (LINC) |
[not declassified] |
|
[not declassified] |
KUGOWN |
|
Seekford |
KUFIRE |
|
PBSUCCESS |
Cadick |
|
LUGTON |
GUAT |
|
KUHOOK |
[not declassified] |
|
Calligeris |
[not declassified] |
|
WSHOOFS |
ODYOKE |
|
SARAMAC |
SROBA |
|
SCRANTON |
LINCOLN Security Officer (Compromising phrases) |
|
KMFLUSH |
Customs at New Orleans (Compromising phrases) |
|
MT/1 |
Pivall |
|
MT/3 |
[not declassified] |
2. A preliminary analysis of the exposed messages has been performed, and based on that analysis and assessment, the following assumptions have been made:
a. That President Somoza, [name not declassified], and an indeterminable number of others now know that a powerful, well organized, official United States organization is backing the Castillo Armas group.
b. That a definite possibility exists that the information contained in subject messages may have gotten into the hands of Raul Saqueda, chief of personnel for the Castillo Armas group, and [name not declassified], pilot, soldier of fortune and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. If this happened, it could well be that any or all of the information may have gotten into the hands of the Guatemalan government through agents in the Castillo Armas organization.
c. If [name not declassified] is less than he purports to be, the information may have been passed to any one of a number of other intelligence services. As regards [name not declassified], however, a preliminary investigation gives indication that he is pro-American and that he probably has handled the messages in the manner he indicated.
3. A preliminary analysis of the report by [name not declassified] (attached hereto), otherwise known as Pivall, re the circumstances under which he procured Mr. [name not declassified]'s messages in [place not declassified] clearly indicates the following about Mr. [name not declassified]:
a. Specifically as regards the copies of paraphrased cables, he apparently intentionally withheld from the Agency information of what was known to him to constitute a major breach of security directly affecting the security of the project and the security of the Agency. The fact that this was known to him is clearly indicated by his having arranged, while in Washington, without notifying the Agency, the mailing of a letter to [name not declassified], who is not yet cleared, in [place not declassified], the expressed aim of which was the recovery of the papers.
b. [name not declassified] is completely unreliable, professionally and personally.
4. Mr. [name not declassified] has been recalled to headquarters from his home in [place not declassified]. He will be given a very thorough and detailed interrogation. The situation cited in paragraph 3a above clearly and painfully indicates that PBSUCCESS may be compromised to a degree heretofore considered beyond the realm of possibility, and further, a large amount of information yet unrevealed may be in the hands of the Arbenz government.
5. It must be kept in mind that the foregoing report is at best a cursory examination of the situation and that a more detailed analysis cannot be presented formally until Lincoln and headquarters have had time to collect and collate all information re this specific incident and Mr. [name not declassified]'s general pattern of action since October 1953.
J.C. King/3/
CWH
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
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