Docs 255-287
255. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Guatemala City, June 28, 1954, 2254Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 5. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
992. Re: GUAT 990./2/
/2/Dated June 28. (Ibid.)
1. We have been double-crossed.
2. [3 names not declassified] formed junta and announced it over TGW at 1145. [name not declassified] renounced presidency, kept chief armed forces. [name not declassified] Min Defense. [name not declassified] Minister of Gobernacion. [name not declassified] asked [name not declassified] remain. This complete violation agreement 7 hours earlier.
3. With [name not declassified] failure, issue became readiness of junta negotiate with Calligeris. JMBLUG, JMBLUG 1, ESQUIRE, Bannister, Nutting spent from 1200 to 1415 with junta. [name not declassified] spoke for junta. They refused give yes or no to JMBLUG question whether they would meet Calligeris. Evaded all issues, praised their own anti-communism, slandered Calligeris, cried have beaten army retain power in nation.
4. Urgently recommend bombing Adam this afternoon.
5. Next mtg 1730, same participants. Bombs would persuade them fast.
256. Telegram From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State/1/
Guatemala City, June 28, 1954, 9:42 p.m.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 175, Folder 1. Unclassified; Priority.
1133. Pass Defense. Diaz at 11:45 this morning June 28 issued following Decree establishing Junta consisting of himself and Colonels Jose Angel Sanchez and Elfego Monzon.
"Considering that it is desirable for stability of situation brought about by resignation of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzman from position of constitutional president of republic/2/ to give to new government broader composition which will lead to representation of other forces and that for these reasons it is convenient to bring into executive Colonels Jose Angel Sanchez and Elfego Monzon. Therefore, decrees:
/2/Arbenz relinquished the presidency to Army Chief of Staff Colonel D?az June 27.
1. A governmental Junta be constituted for conducting administration of nation.
2. Governmental Junta be constituted as follows: Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz, who will serve as chief of armed forces; Colonel Jose Angel Sanchez, who will serve as delegate of Junta in Ministry of National Defense; and Colonel Elfego Monzon who will be delegate of Junta in Ministry of Interior.
3. This decree enters into effect day of its publication in Official Gazette."/3/
/3/The first act of the new junta was to declare the Communist Party illegal. (Telegram 1134 from Guatemala City, June 28; 9:40 p.m.; ibid.)
Peurifoy
257. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Holland) and the Ambassador to Guatemala (Peurifoy)/1/
June 29, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 2. Confidential. Drafted by Holland, who was in Washington; Peurifoy was in Guatemala City.
Early in the morning of Tuesday, June 29, Ambassador Peurifoy called me from Guatemala to say that he was talking on a clear line from which censorship had been removed for the purpose of that call. He said that at about three o'clock in the morning the Junta composed of Diaz, Monzon and Sanchez had been overthrown by a Junta composed of Monzon and two young colonels, Jose Luis Cruz and Mauricio Dubois.
Monzon is favorable to Castillo Armas, and the Junta wants to arrange an immediate cease-fire order and a conference with Castillo Armas on June 29 in El Salvador.
Ambassador Peurifoy says that he is very favorably impressed with the two additions to the Junta and feels that we should do everything possible to strengthen it. He asks that we use our good offices to try get word to Castillo Armas to set an hour today on which all ground fighting will cease and to ground all his airplanes immediately. If we will advise Peurifoy of the hour so fixed, the Junta will suspend activities of their ground forces simultaneously.
If the conference is arranged in El Salvador, the Junta will go in an Embassy plane. Ambassador Peurifoy and the Papal Nuncio will accompany them, but will stay in the background and not participate in the conferences.
258. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Mission Broadcasting Station/1/
[place not declassified], June 29, 1954, 1359Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 7. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence and Station Chiefs in Guatemala and [place not declassified].
4510. Command msg for Cadick.
1. Junta taken over by Col. Monzon, believed friendly, who desires Calligeris to indicate soonest his cease-fire hour and Monzon will issue official cease-fire same time.
2. Also Calligeris to indicate what hour he willing to meet Monzon in DTFROGS to discuss terms.
3. Advise soonest of above meanwhile use your best efforts to hold position, suspend attack and specifically order all A/C keep away from Adam until authorized. Use A/C only for recon over Zacapa complex.
4. Comply soonest. Avoid needless bloodshed.
259. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Mission Broadcasting Station/1/
[place not declassified], June 29, 1954, 1631Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 7. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Station Chiefs in Guatemala and [place not declassified].
4515. Re: LINC 4510./2/ For Cadick.
/2/Document 258.
1. Do not be influenced by cry of hoax as we shall retain power of retaliation until Calligeris position is secure. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Regret we unable to fully inform you of every detail therefore you must keep confidence throughout this difficult period.
2. Your complete compliance to ref msg is mandatory.
3. Modification of use of A/C: You may re-supply field forces to extent necessary to maintain effectiveness while awaiting final decision. Use armed fighter A/C for recon for defensive purposes. Instruct air and ground to be particularly alert for withdrawal enemy units to Adam as such action would violate cease-fire principle of troops in place. Important that enemy not take advantage of cease-fire in any way. Report violations before taking action.
4. Clear all plans and significant actions with LINC until further notice.
5. Report your compliance ref msg soonest.
260. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Guatemala City, June 29, 1954, 2025Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 5. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
999. 1. [1 line of source text not declassified]
2. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] his only ambition is obtain cease fire and end of "useless" slaughter.
3. He sending plane to Zacapa in attempt land there [1 line of source text not declassified]. I warned him that plane might be shot down and it would be advisable to waggle wings etc if approached.
4. He preparing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] asking for cease fire and immediate start discussions with Calligeris.
5. My impression is that govt here so completely shaken they will make only half hearted attempt to establish any conditions.
6. ESSENCE has many men ready though they without arms at moment. However irregulars from Via Canales area may start moving in immediately.
7. Saw some of Salama prisoners. They horribly beaten. Several were assassinated by guards.
8. [name not declassified] stated that STANDEL 1 had forced him into deal with help certain army officers which had obliged him play cagey game and arrange for inside coup. [1 line of source text not declassified] Believe nobody desirous of occupying hot seat at this moment.
261. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]/1/
Washington, June 30, 1954, 0023Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 146, Folder 6. Top Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters, the Mission Broadcasting Station, and the CIA Station in Guatemala. Drafted by Allen Dulles.
07063. Here is present situation and headquarters' instructions:
1. Since objective of throwing top Communists out of Guatemalan Government accomplished and Monzon whom we believe reliable and friendly to Calligeris now in charge of situation in Guatemala City our prime objective must be to prevent fratricidal civil war.
2. PBPRIME and Salvador have been asked by Monzon group to use good offices to bring about immediate cease fire and to arrange El Salvador meeting between Monzon group and Calligeris group. We are anxious to bring this about as promptly as possible./2/
/2/Arrangements were set in motion later that morning, Allen Dulles told the Secretary of State during a phone call: "we must decide this morning whether Jack [Peurifoy] should go down to the meeting. It is important that some dynamic wise fellow be there." The Dulles brothers then agreed that "we cannot let Armas down." (Memorandum of telephone conversation, June 30, 8:44 a.m.; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations, Box 7, A67-28)
3. Council of American States met today and was advised of good offices invitation and of its acceptance by both PBPRIME and Salvador and that latter is endeavoring to bring about immediate San Salvador meeting.
4. SKILLET has been asked by ODACID to send his attach? and member of his staff to Calligeris to urge his acceptance of El Salvador invitation and to facilitate cease fire proposal made by Monzon who has asked Calligeris to fix time for such cease fire.
5. Whelan is being asked to request Somoza to help persuade Calligeris to accept El Salvador invitation.
6. We are anxious that air operations should be stopped at earliest possible moment consistent with vital security Calligeris forces and hope that Calligeris can take some action in the field to bring about a cease fire. We understand Monzon may attempt to approach him through emissary to effect this.
7. Desire [place not declassified] should immediately send Ontrich to Calligeris Hdqrs on behalf of the group which has been extending support to Calligeris. Ontrich should report as promptly as possible regarding attitude Calligeris and present military situation. He should tell Calligeris that consistent with the vital security of his forces he should not undertake offensive action and should permit Guat forces to disengage if they show willingness to do so and should not call for or expect air support inconsistent with above policy. Also he should propose Calligeris accept Monzon proposal for cease fire and fix time if he able do so in advance Salvador meeting.
8. Calligeris should be advised that his supporting group will exert its influence to see that at El Salvador meeting legitimate claims and interest of Calligeris group are protected unless he insists upon prolonging hostilities if other side is willing to accept honorable conditions and carries out cease fire.
9. Calligeris has just sent message reading as follows: "I accept interview with the categorical understanding that the fact of attending it does not forcibly bind me to come to an agreement. If it be that the conditions do not satisfy the ideals and plans of the liberation movement for broad and definitive national reform." We consider his expressed attitude to be reasonable. [place not declassified] should facilitate trip to Salvador if Calligeris requests. Desirable that his pilot [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] and preferably one of his own people. Since Monzon being flown by official U.S. plane same facility might be accorded Calligeris if available [place not declassified] and Embassy approves. Possibly preferable Calligeris should use his own light plane directly from Hdqrs in field. Suggest Calligeris advise estimated ETA Salvador.
10. Since dictating above message GUAT 001 IN 23524/3/ received indicating situation Guat City strongly favorable Calligeris, that population overjoyed and want their hero now. Cable recommends that Calligeris simply announce coming Guat City by plane with fighter escort.
/3/Dated June 29. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 6)
We are endeavoring check this recommendation by phone through ODACID with JMBLUG. This daring program appeals to us provided adequate security at airfield can be arranged in opinion JMBLUG and Guat Station. Will send further advice on this subject as soon as JMBLUG's views obtained.
11. [place not declassified] please pass entire message to SKILLET.
262. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Guatemala City, June 30, 1954, 0031Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 6. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
003. 1. TGW at 1545 announced junta taking all steps to effect cessation of hostilities.
2. Believe we must have in mind [name not declassified] will try consolidate his power by delay in talks. Fundamentally [name not declassified] is hostile to Calligeris as he stated [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Do not believe him above taking advantage cessation air activities to delay cease-fire orders to army and thus wipe out Calligeris ground forces.
3. Therefore repeat our recommendation Calligeris arrive here tomorrow with fighter escort. Suggest SHERWOOD announce this and request great public demonstration at airport. Also have plane at same time drop "Nuestro Libertador" post D-day leaflets.
4. Repeat Calligeris has massive public support and bloodshed will occur in city if he does not arrive soonest.
263. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Guatemala City, June 30, 1954, 0036Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 6. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
002. 1. This is to fill you in on nights developments.
2. Holland called JMBLUG approx 2230 about DTFROGS mtg.
3. JMBLUG met at Jefatura Fuerzas Armadas with STANDEL-1 and SUMAC-2 approx 0100 June 29 to pass Holland's message.
4. Approx 0400, ODUNIT attach? called JMBLUG out of meeting. Jose Luis Cruz had been to see him, said pro-Calligeris officers had taken Base Militar 2000 June 29. Said new junta formed, would march on Jefatura building shortly to seize STANDEL-1, SUMAC-2.
5. JMBLUG decided stay so as not tip hand.
6. [name not declassified] phoned, asked JMBLUG come to palace. JMBLUG declined. [name not declassified] said he would be at Jefatura right away.
7. STANDEL-1, SUMAC-2 excused themselves, conferred briefly. Came back, said they planned resign.
8. New junta arrived, surrounded Jefatura, marched into conference room armed. Took over.
264. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala/1/
Washington, June 30, 1954, 1933Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 4. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by [name not declassified]. Repeated to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters.
07147. Re: DIR 07144./2/
/2/Dated June 30. (Ibid.)
1. For a number of obvious reasons we must not lose opportunity collect for later study and exploitation the mass of documentation which undoubtedly exists in Guatemala attesting to activities and workings international communism there.
2. Communist Party hqs, private offices Communist leaders, labor and other Communist-controlled organizations, FonOff, Caracas Conference Staff, G-2, G-4 are some of the places and sources which will yield such info but only if made clear this absolute and immediate necessity and that "protection" will not be tolerated.
3. Need for this should be transmitted [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Calligeris and effected [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] immediately. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] work with Cruz or whoever can give you authority and support. Not a minute should be lost. Suggest you assess desirability use of CLOWER who although remaining in background would control indigenous team armed with appropriate authority of requisition. When above operational hqs prepared assign TDY Embassy KUBARK Sgranger CP expert with small clerical staff respectively to give guidance and collate material for processing hqs.
4. Determined move this direction will yield additional advantage placing us in position affect [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
265. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Washington, June 30, 1954, 2352Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 4. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.
07298. From Ascham, Ordway and Whiting. Refs: A. DIR 07299;/2/ B. DIR 07300./3/
/2/Document 266.
/3/Dated June 30. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 4)
1. To Playdon, Dunbar, and all hands at LINC as well as all elements of PBSUCCESS complex: Heartiest congratulations upon outcome developments past forty-eight hours./4/ A great victory has been won. This victory is the more notable by virtue of the extreme difficulties of the operation and the odds which were recognized to be against our chances of success from the outset. The energy and devotion of the personnel at LINC and the field Stations has been truly exceptional and has served as an inspiration and a challenge to all of us at hqs.
/4/The following sentence was deleted from the original text: "(Although matter obviously not finally resolved.)"
2. It is requested that LINC pass on the foregoing to all appropriate elements of PBSUCCESS field complex and at full strength. Hqs assumes LINC will have its own special messages to send to the field but desires to have hqs congratulations expressed as well.
3. Not necessary to repeat hqs congratulations to Guat and [place not declassified] because this done directly by refs. These messages were thus sent by hqs for special reason that JMBLUG and SKILLET key members team effort WSBURNT and WSHOOFS parts of operation and had their initial briefings and indoctrination from hqs. Accordingly it seemed appropriate hqs extend congratulations to them both as members of the true team effort and individually.
266. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala/1/
Washington, June 30, 1954, 2352Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 4. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner and approved by DCI Dulles. Repeated to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.
07299. For JMBLUG and Bannister from Ascham, Ordway and Whiting.
1. To JMBLUG and all hands at Station heartiest congratulations upon outcome developments past forty-eight hours. Great victory has been won and what is now required is consolidation of achievements and shoring up of gains.
2. Accomplishments of KUBARK station have been outstanding and all hands should know that all at hqs realize what they have achieved under extraordinarily difficult circumstances.
3. Concerning role played by JMBLUG although no surprise to those of us familiar with his record, we would like him to know we feel he has surpassed even our greatest expectations. He can take great comfort and satisfaction from fact that his accomplishments are already well known and fully appreciated in all important quarters of govt. His inspiring and steadfast leadership and his wholehearted support and cooperation with our efforts and our personnel are deeply appreciated and we trust he not disappointed that we embarked upon this operation together.
267. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Mission Broadcasting Station/1/
[place not declassified], July 1, 1954, 1618Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 7. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Station in Guatemala and the Director of Central Intelligence.
4575. For Cadick.
1. Word received mtg broken off due unacceptable demands both sides. Calligeris apparently insists on right entering Adam leading his army liberation. Monzon demanding remain number one for 30 days.
2. Both demands are unreasonable. Calligeris insistence on triumphal march would antagonize army upon which he must lean for support. Monzon's position strengthens with each hour that passes.
3. Hqs expects Calligeris might return soon to somerset or Tegu and desires Cadick or Ontrich (with SKILLET) make immediate effort to turn him around and go back to DTFROGS soonest for resumption of discussions. Further Calligeris must be told unless he becomes reasonable he will lose his friends quickly.
4. Although everyone PBSUCCESS very anxious have Calligeris succeed in final step same time cannot support hostilities between anti-Communists. Request you impress upon him high moral principles involved which must not become sacrificed for vanity or personal interests.
268. Memorandum From [name not declassified] of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)/1/
Washington, July 1, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 154, Folder 1. Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Mr. Bissell Recd 7/5/54."
RE
Control in Guatemala
It became increasingly evident to those members of PBSUCCESS who were in close contact with Calligeris during the period leading up to D-Day that he was not an intelligent individual, lacked administrative ability and was easily penetrated and influenced. In conversations with LINCOLN Senior officers this was a subject of much concern and discussion and it was recognized that some control would have to be maintained over him so that his future government would not fall flat on its face. After discussing the aforementioned with the WH Division they recommended that Wellbank, presently residing in San Salvador, be considered as the person to attach to Calligeris to furnish the necessary control and guidance.
Your attention also is being called to the fact that one of the conditions for [name not declassified] to return to the group in May, was that the group take a more realistic look at the limitations of Calligeris and adopt a stronger position in controlling him.
I feel that our endeavoring to control [name not declassified] thru Page may cause us to alienate Calligeris who undoubtedly will be following all of [name not declassified] actions and contacts on a constant basis. Furthermore [name not declassified] has not indicated any ability to wield influence; on the contrary, he has reached his present position through the process of elimination. We never have had any control over his actions nor has he any reason to be obligated to us at the present time. I recommend strongly that we make up our minds what phase of the govt we are planning to back and follow this course inasmuch as the Latin mind is so suspicious and with such a talent for intrigue that they will perceive immediately our two-pronged device which to them will be very apparent and we will find ourselves in the position where we will be playing both ends against the middle when actually there is nothing in the middle, and so will really be playing against our own interests. In Latin America you always have two powers: The party that is IN power and the one intriguing to GET IN. We are IN power and I believe that we should take all steps possible to remain in that position and you won't accomplish this by trying to back two horses.
[name not declassified]
269. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
[place not declassified], July 1, 1954, 1624Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 7. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.
4577. 1. Desire to state for your consideration that failure to back Calligeris strongly at this time resulting in loss of his position and assets would seriously jeopardize ultimate success in effectively eliminating Communists from WSBURNT.
2. [name not declassified] has no claim to authority for popular support. Calligeris has become symbol of anti communism and has demonstrated support from people. For all we know this could still be a maneuver to trap and dispose of Calligeris and must remember Communist regime leaders are all waiting in asylum. For what? We note none were arrested.
3. Urge we use every influence to support Calligeris to fullest at this moment, not only to avoid further bloodshed which would inevitably result but to ensure final success of our undertaking./2/
/2/Pending word from Washington, staffers at PBSUCCESS Headquarters had to temper their support for Castillo Armas in a telegram to the Mission Broadcasting Station: "basic agreement contained no mention of commitment to support any one person for top position only to attain objectives of freeing country. While we may desire and do all possible to place Calligeris on top this is a policy matter above and apart from PBSUCCESS jurisdiction." (Telegram 4598 from PBSUCCESS Headquarters to the Mission Broadcasting Station, July 2; ibid.)
270. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Washington, July 1, 1954, 2002Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 5. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.
07377. Ref LINC 4579./2/
/2/Dated July 1, not printed. (Ibid., Box 6, Folder 7) A handwritten note on the telegram reads: "This is canceled as per LINC 4582."
1. Hqs agrees with your concern on score that situation has deteriorated somewhat and may deteriorate further, particularly if agreement cannot be achieved soonest [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. However as we have discussed with you on telephone this morning we must concentrate our energies at this time on supporting ODACID efforts achieve such agreement and this will require pressure to be brought to bear on both parties. JMBLUG is under instructions to do this and it is our purpose have Ontrich available for additional arm twisting Calligeris if deemed necessary by JMBLUG.
2. For your further background info and guidance, it is present policy position that Calligeris should be urged by all who have influence on him to accept either one of two positions; viz., command of military forces or presidency of junta, but not both, and that it is deemed preferable he accept command military forces. We understand it is being pointed out to him that in this position he will really hold the power and will be able to enforce appropriate Communist cleanups and bring his trusted men into high army positions.
3. In any event it is crystal clear to us and you should understand that for us to take different line than JMBLUG would be highly confusing and very dangerous. Best way to avoid this is let JMBLUG call the signals and we act solely in supporting role. Hence LINC should not issue any instructions or advice to Calligeris or PBSUCCESS personnel re this aspect of [matter?] without prior and distinct instructions from hqs. ODACID is carrying the ball now having been brought officially into picture as result request use good offices effectuate cessation hostilities and arrival at agreement.
4. Since dictating above your cancellation message (LINC 4582)/3/ arrived indicating you intend resubmit./4/ However we dispatching this message in order inform you ODACID policy position.
/3/See footnote 2 above.
/4/In telegram LINC 4579 (see footnote 2 above), PBSUCCESS Headquarters had taken a very tough line: "Believe situation deteriorating rapidly and only above positive action will save our position. LINC does not have confidence in [name not declassified] or his followers to clean out and control Communists who are deeply entrenched throughout social structure. Only leaders or front persons have been removed thus far and we must assume Soviet will use maximum effort to regain its hold."
5. Recommend you send substance of above policy line to SHERWOOD.
271. Telegram From the Mission Broadcasting Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
[place not declassified], July 2, 1954, 0832Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 12, Folder 6. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
519. 1. Entire [name not declassified] strain was cover up for real motive, i.e. if ODYOKE does not back Calligeris, [name not declassified] will. Holding planes and gear was to prevent flying gear anywhere out for Calligeris. Impasse now broken on promise. If ever ordered fly gear away prior settlement to any point other than Calligeris support, will inform [name not declassified]. On receipt alert, [name not declassified] will undoubtedly impound.
2. F 47 recon Zacapa area 0800 July 2. C 47 may resupply. [name not declassified] leery of flights during talks.
272. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]/1/
Washington, July 2, 1954, 2337Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 4. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Dulles. Repeated to the CIA Station in Guatemala.
07707. Please deliver following to JMBLUG from Ascham: I have seen Holland's cable to you/2/ and wish strongly to reinforce views expressed regarding treatment of Calligeris. I need not stress responsibilities and loyalties resulting from operational background with which you are familiar. Naturally I cannot judge relative merits of the two individuals as I know neither of them personally. I do know that Calligeris was the chosen instrument to effect a high objective and that his actions have contributed mightily to that end. He has borne the risks and if he were now to feel that he had been double crossed not only would our moral position suffer but we would be incurring the gravest of security risks. My great admiration for you personally and for the skill with which you have handled this matter makes me feel that this message is probably unnecessary nevertheless I wish you to know how I feel particularly as I see from Holland's message that this view is not inconsistent with that of ODACID and because the security of our ops may be involved.
/2/Not further identified.
273. Editorial Note
The CIA Station in Guatemala strongly favored absolute U.S. support for Castillo Armas in opposition to the junta that he replaced. PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida generally agreed with those sentiments, but cabled the Station in Guatemala on July 6, 1954: "Entire political situation now in hands of ODACID." The cable authorized the Station Chief to confer with Ambassador Peurifoy "to follow his instruction in event you are needed, otherwise leave entire matter in his hands." (Telegram 4700 from PBSUCCESS Headquarters to the Station in Guatemala, July 6; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 9)
In a discussion with White House Press Secretary James Hagerty on July 7, Secretary of State Dulles "recommended that the President say that this country was 'taking normal steps to satisfy ourselves that the new Guatemalan Government was stable and was willing to carry out its international obligations.'" Hagerty concluded: "That is as far as Dulles recommended we go at this time." (Hagerty Diary Entry for July 7, 1954; Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers, Box 1, A-71-79)
Telegram 049 from the Station in Guatemala, July 8, emphasized the political uncertainty within the country, lack of support for the junta, and Communist activities: "Five man junta has not enjoyed popular support but to contrary has provoked disquiet since anti-Commies fear situation unfavorable to them while Commies not being arrested began to swagger and talk of revenge. Some indications of plotting within army. . . . Party records still not found. Known Commies wandering streets, starting undercover activities, endangering stability of government which not proceeding with necessary vigor." (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 146, Folder 1)
Telegram 08056 to the CIA Stations in [place not declassified] and [place not declassified], July 7, provided additional details about the continuing activities of the Communist Party in Guatemala. (Ibid., Box 9, Folder 5)
274. Memorandum From William Robertson of Operation PBSUCCESS to the Chief of the Project/1/
Washington, July 8, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 146, Folder 4. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.
SUBJECT
PM OPERATION
I. General:
A. This report is to serve three purposes: to record the operation from its outset to its finish; to summarize the factors adding to and detracting from the success of the operation; and to list those errors made, avoidable in future operations.
B. The outline to be followed will be informal and in chronological order as follows:
1. Staging and Pre-Operation Preparations
2. The Operation
3. Comments.
II. Staging and Pre-Operation Preparations:
A. The Background of the Situation Prior to the Staging
1. Approximately 85 Calligeris personnel had received training in Nicaragua, 75 of these under the guidance of Pivall. Pivall graduated 30 sabotage leaders, 6 shock troop leaders, 16 organizers, 4 staff personnel and 19 incompetents. Exactly 13 radio operators graduated under the guidance of Dunavant and Middlecott.
2. Eighty-nine tons of equipment were prepared in three forms at FJHOPEFUL. Forty-three tons were waterproofed for burial. Fifteen tons were packed for drop. Thirty-one tons were prepared for shock troop use. Prior to the staging period the entire burial and shock troop equipment had been moved to Honduras.
3. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was reluctant to provide support for this operation. The Honduran Government allowed all staging to occur inside its borders. The Nicaraguan Government permitted training and support in the form of air operations to occur within its borders.
4. The personnel situation: We were operating under the belief that we had 267 men in Honduras and Salvador for use as shock troops and specialists, outside of the training personnel that had been sent to Nicaragua.
5. Plans:
a. Our plans were based on the belief and strong proof that a large percentage of the people inside Guatemala were opposed to Communism and were willing to fight against Communists, and the belief that the Calligeris organization was a good one and that Calligeris had strong organizations in each of the 9 target areas. Each of these target areas was to be organized by a trained organizer to the point that each target area could be conquered by its own inner organization, with the realization that the amount of organization within the Army unit would be the key to the amount of bloodshed necessary.
b. In addition, shock troops were prepared in the following manner:
Puerto Barrios--116 men under the leadership of [name not declassified], to move from Macuelizo to Tenedores to Entre Rios, in order to seal off the Puerto Barrios area.
Jutiapa--46 men under [name not declassified] to move from a point 15 miles west of Metapan through Asuncion Mita to Jutiapa and subsequently to the capital city.
A force of 70 men under [name not declassified] was to move from Florido to Carta Blanca and be in position in Zacapa at H-Hour.
A force of 96 men under [name not declassified] was to move from Copan Ruinas to Camotan to Jocotan to Vado Hondo to seize Chiquimula. These were to hold at Chiquimula until it could be seen whether Zacapa or Jutiapa forces needed aid.
A force of 106 men under [name not declassified] was to move from Nuevo Ocotepeque to Esquipulas to Quezaltepeque. They were to hold at Quezaltepeque and if no aid was needed at Zacapa or Jutiapa, they were to move to San Luis Jilotepeque to Jalapa to Palencia to Guatemala City.
[name not declassified] with 16 men was to break away from [name not declassified] group and take Morales in order to back up the block of Puerto Barrios.
B. Staging and Preparation for the Operation
1. Just prior to D-Day the Communists made a concerted drive against our inner organization. Thousands of people, including key leaders of the Army and civilians were jailed or otherwise incapacitated.
2. Based on the fact that we believed the inner organizations were much more extensive than the portion jailed, we decided to launch the organizers and sabotage leaders to the undamaged portion of the inner organization.
3. All organizers and sabotage leaders were launched by 10 July [June?]. It is not known the percentage of these men that reached their destination but there are many reasons to believe that a large percentage were intercepted at the border.
4. Twenty-two pre-D-Day drops were attempted. No definite light patterns were received on these drops. Portions of the arms were used later at Canales, Palencia and Quezaltenango.
5. Resident radio operators were launched, and later contact was made with Zacapa, Puerto Barrios, Guat City and Quezaltenango. One Quezaltenango radio operator and one Guat City radio operator did not come up. A radio operator formerly scheduled for Jutiapa was converted to a tactical radio operator.
6. Approximately 100 men crossed into Honduras from Jutiapa just prior to D-Day. In light of the recent roll-up of our inner organization, it was decided to use these men as harassment teams to agitate the rear of the enemy in order to determine if such agitation would ignite the inner organization to the point of a premature D-Day, at the same time hoping that an organized D-Day could be launched when practicable.
7. On assembling the shock troops, however, it was found that Calligeris' total available men was approximately 165. We used the 100 men scheduled for harassment teams in order to fill out our shock troops and depended on pre-D-Day air drops to provide the agitation desired to stir up the inner forces. In addition Nicaraguans, Costa Ricans, Hondurans and any other injected parties that wanted to join our shock troops were recruited.
8. A pre-D-Day movement of arms into Guatemala was not as successful as desired due to the Alfhem alert, delay in movement to Honduras and other troubles too numerous to mention.
9. Two days before D-Day, the decision to request permission to go was made. The facts bearing on the case were weighed and the field decision to request go was made in spite of the fact that in many cases we could not follow the original plan. One of the most weighing factors was the belief that the history of failing organizations is based more on failures to act than on failures from acting. A report on the factual condition of the situation was withheld with the realization that if the full situation were reported, pressure from above LINCOLN might have caused a delay in operations. A firm belief was shared by all that further delay would only call for a deteriorating situation.
III. The Operation:
On the evening of the 18th all shock troops crossed the line at first darkness as scheduled. Throughout the 19th reporting was sketchy. On the 20th [name not declassified] passed Tenedores. [name not declassified] captured Camotan after a short fight with only one casualty. [name not declassified] took Esquipulas with no fight. At this point we picked up 400 recruits for the [name not declassified] group. [name not declassified] was reported at Carta Blanca. [name not declassified] departed the [name not declassified] group. The Gualan sabotage team cut the rail bridge between Zacapa and Puerto Barrios. Indications are that communications cuts Jutiapa to Guatemala City, San Jose to Guatemala City, Puerto Barrios to Guatemala City and Zacapa to Guatemala City were successful at this time. [name not declassified] bombed tanks at San Jose and Retalhuleu.
On the 21st [name not declassified] was resupplied four miles out of Gualan, indicating that he was not where he was supposed to be. He was resupplied during the daylight hours. [name not declassified] joined [name not declassified] and his instructions were to break away when Quezaltepeque was taken and go to Jutiapa. [name not declassified] was moving toward Vado Hondo. [name not declassified] captured Jocotan after a small fight with the local garrison. [name not declassified] captured one half of Puerto Barrios and controlled the communications from Puerto Barrios to Guatemala City. [name not declassified] captured Morales, Bananera and Los Amates. [name not declassified] bombed the tanks at Puerto Barrios.
On the 22nd [name not declassified] sent an advance party into Gualan, which party became engaged with the opposition. He took the remainder of his forces to support the engagement and after winning, he remained in Gualan. The same day the La Ceiba boat, apparently off course, as they were scheduled to land to a reception party near Santo Tomas, landed above Puerto Barrios and immediately became involved in a fire fight. The exact efficiency of this group can only be determined by the fact that every Puerto Barrios military communiqu? from this day on mentioned this group of 27 men and grossly exaggerated their size. The last 9 men were captured on the night of the 28th. [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] joined at Vado Hondo. Calligeris joined them there, and the FCP moved to Managua. The fighter aircraft ran their first tactical mission, hitting the Guatemala City tanks on this date. [name not declassified] was still containing the Puerto Barrios group. [name not declassified] occupied Morales. Reports from TGW indicated Canales and Quezaltenango uprisings among the populace, and the two chiefs of the Chiquimula Garrison were captured by surprise at Vado Hondo.
On the 23rd [name not declassified] met a superior force at Gualan consisting of the majority of the reinforced Zacapa Command. His radio operator was incapacitated and the radio destroyed, [name not declassified] retreating to a point near La Union. [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] attacked Chiquimula without air support. The attack was successful except for remnants of the garrison which held out at the Cuartel. Thirty-two men and 2 officers were captured. The men reported that the Army did not desire to fight Calligeris. One of the officers joined our forces. [name not declassified] fled from Puerto Barrios under duress. [name not declassified] was still holding Morales on the 23rd. The fighter support on that day hit the Zacapa Garrison, exploding an ammo storage dump, and bombed a bridge between Chiquimula and Jutiapa.
On the 24th air support was launched against the garrison that was holding out in the Cuartel at Chiquimula and against artillery installations within range of the town. An unsuccessful try was made to resupply a reported 500 men organized at Jutiapa. [name not declassified] was run out into the mountains near Morales and the Puerto Barrios commander dispatched a large group toward the Zacapa area. Air search along the Puerto Barrios-Zacapa corridor was made a daily secondary mission for fighter aircraft from this point forward.
On the 25th the Zacapa Garrison counter-attacked Chiquimula. This counter-attack was withstood by a junior officer, [name not declassified], with 200 men. [name not declassified] was brought into the fight as support and was reported as having left in the face of the enemy. [name not declassified] reports 500 dead, probably an exaggerated report. [name not declassified]'s weapons placement and leadership won the day. The Guardia de Honor was reported moving from Ipala toward Quezaltepeque. Air search and opportune flights were run on a continuous basis from this point forward. A small drop was made to a group at Jalapa. Immediately thereafter the recipients attacked the Jalapa Garrison. The air hit four trains full of re-enforcements, destroying 3 of them. Matamoros was hit. El Jicaro bridge was destroyed and the Zacapa to Chiquimula road was strafed and bombed to prevent re-enforcement from Zacapa. Two hundred fifty enemy troops were reported at La Union. Recruits continued to flock to the Liberation Army. The reported strength was 1100 at Chiquimula.
On the 26th the Zacapa Garrison again counter-attacked Chiquimula. On the same day our air support surprised them assembling at the line of departure and they were easily routed. The Jalapa group was resupplied and immediately the enemy commander reported that he was under attack by 1500 rebels. It is believed that the appearance and equipping of this group caused the immediate holding up of the Guardia de Honor in its advance into our rear from Ipala to Quezaltepeque and caused the enemy commander to delay throwing his reserves in at Zacapa-Chiquimula. The air hit the Zacapa marshalling yards, hitting one passenger train carrying troops, hit the Jutiapa bridge and strafed TGW. Somoza's intelligence reports that TGW went off the air at that time and that Quezaltenango radio shifted frequency to TGW frequency, Quezaltenango radio ostensibly becoming TGW. Through Somoza, Ydigoras Fuentes offered 300 men to cross against Jutiapa from Salvador. He was lined up with an air drop which was to occur on the night of the 30th. He was given operation money and dispatched to Salvador to make the arrangements. (Eventually, when the final Junta was formed, Ydigoras was informed that he was not to cross the border under any circumstance.)
All radios were ordered to concentrate on communications cuts, as evidence was on hand to substantiate the fact that PT/16 was causing confusion, which was counteractable only by phone and telegraph. Proof that the teams must have acted on orders comes from a Guatemalan Army emergency order the following day to protect the lines against the rebels at all costs.
On the 27th Calligeris attacked Zacapa and on receipt of enemy fire and without air support due to weather fell back to Chiquimula. The fighter support assigned to hit the tanks at San Jose struck a ship of unknown origin reported by Somoza to be carrying arms to Guatemala.
On the 28th a 200-man feint was launched at Ipala for the purpose of deception, and at total darkness all forces were pulled down to the road for the final attack on Zacapa. The air that day hit the Zacapa fort, getting secondary explosions, making us believe an ammo dump was hit. Matamoros was bombed again. TGW was strafed and bombed. The Jalapa group was launched toward Zacapa and [name not declassified] was resupplied and instructed to move to Zacapa the following morning.
On the 29th all ground forces and air support commenced the attack on Zacapa. The advance party entered Zacapa. Zacapa officers were conferred with and arrangements for the Zacapa truce were made by [name not declassified]. The Monzon agreement was completed, and our forces were ordered to hold up. The final disposition of troops was 1500 Calligeris men surrounding 700 Zacapa soldiers at Zacapa, with a reported 4500 men of the Guatemalan Army below Quezaltepeque and 1500 Liberation Army above and to the left of Quezaltepeque at Jalapa.
IV. Comments:
Certain lessons, some newly learned and some paramilitary axioms ignored for the sake of expediency, should be recorded for KUBARK/KUHOOK study and prevention or inclusion in future operations.
A. Planning
As can happen in any military or paramilitary operation, PBSUCCESS Headquarters was massive, while the implementing staff was necessarily restricted to a very few. Twenty men can easily think up more things to be done than three men can put into practice. The end result is either a necessary discarding of ideas or a valiant but imperfect implementation of the plans handed down. In this case, because of the loyalty and untiring devotion of KUHOOK field personnel to the proj-ect at hand, the latter case proved true. In the event the above is unavoidable in the future, care should be taken to arrange the planning/implementation time ratio giving the implementation phase its proper precedence. Again, since the KUHOOK field personnel did devote itself to the job, the defect was not seriously detrimental but could have been one more possible asset to the opposition.
B. Headquarters Direction
It is believed that one of the keys to the success of the operation was LINCOLN's willingness to delegate command to the field at the crucial operational moment. LINCOLN direction was completely constructive and avoided hand-tying, operation-crippling restrictions sometimes found in this type of project.
LINCOLN laid down the rules of conduct of the operation before the operation, confining its direction to those new situations which developed as the operation progressed. This should serve as a model for the future.
C. Timing Errors
Unfortunately, three incidents completely removed the element of surprise.
1. The propaganda program, one of the most effective arms of the project's paramilitary machine, was exposed prematurely in this writer's opinion. The first leaflet drop caused the opposition to spring into action right at the moment when the inner organization was necessarily the most active--organizing, equipping, recruiting, etc. To quote [name not declassified]: "In my country I have much opposition, mostly underground. I cannot afford to continually oppress that opposition, but at the first sign that it is ready to act, for instance with the type of forewarning that your leaflet drop gave to Arbenz, I would do exactly what he did--incapacitate the entire organization if possible."
In fairness to the PP Section, any criticism of this leaflet drop is "Monday Morning Quarterbacking." All field personnel, including the principal agent and his staff, were elated at the first news of the successful drop, and it was only when the serious consequences occurred that the act was criticized.
It is believed that the most effective leaflet drops during the operation were those following a successful paramilitary blow.
2. The premature paramilitary actions in connection with the attempt to stop the Alfhem arms movement aided the enemy in preparing counteraction to the movement. By not accomplishing the destruction of the arms and yet exposing routes of ingress and launching points, we practically negated proposed arms and specialists' movements due to occur within the following three weeks.
3. A request for a June 16 crossing and a June 18 H-Hour was delayed on June 16 to a June 18 crossing, again giving the opposition extra days of preparation after certain exposing preparatory moves had been made.
The result of the above errors was a dearth of coordination of underground support to the operation.
D. Value of Training
One major factor in the success of shock troop movement and combat was the caliber of unit and sub-unit leaders. Our leaders proved more effective than those of the opposition in the ground skirmishes and in the two major battles engaged in. It is believed that this effectiveness was gained in paramilitary training received under PBPRIME direction.
In addition to lifting the morale and confidence of the troops, the military efficiency of the unit leaders was shown when the first counterattack against our forces was withstood solely because of a junior officer's wise weapons' placement and command presence under fire. Although very seldom in the future will we be able to train hosts of troops when working behind the Iron Curtain, it should be a prerequisite of our KUHOOK programs that we withdraw unit and sub-unit leaders for at least a month's leadership training. By this means we regain the edge lost through lack of capability to organize in the open.
E. Air Support
Air Support provided the clincher to the operation. Air was used strategically to substitute for the vacancy left by the roll-up and subsequent disorganization of the majority of the inner organization. By this method, bridges were cut, reinforcements harassed, resupply by shipping stopped, troop movements interrupted, gasoline supply virtually destroyed, and arms and ammo supplies destroyed.
The psychological effect of fighter air support was tremendous and added to the myth that Calligeris' Army was an organized, unbeatable force.
Air support was confined to strategical, semi-tactical and supply support. Close-air support was not feasible for several reasons:
1. No trained air-ground liaison teams.
2. Inefficient tactical communications system.
3. The nature of the fighting was such that unstable positions, undefinable lines and the fast aircraft being used prevented orientation by the pilots.
It should be noted here that the sole close air support employed was by a Cessna 180 and by a C-47 circling the combat area with 30 lb. fragmentation bombs and home-made TNT--nail and scrap iron bombs.
F. Communications
We were not prepared for a tactical communications net. Six tactical radios and the FCP radio occupied a full schedule for the base setup we employed. Team to FCP to team communications at times took 24 hours because of staff traffic and blanks in communications due to atmospheric conditions. At times, the round trip traffic was only two hours, but this was not dependable.
Use of code is impractical in a tactical net, due to the time involved and also due to the garble factor. In this operation certain immediate action messages, FCP to Air Support, were garbled. The most damaging were those in which an error or a garble occurred in coordinates. An intelligent guess by a commo officer or an air operations officer's surmise as to what was meant does not suffice. Resupply runs were made under just such circumstances when time did not permit cable clarification. In at least one such instance, it is known that the team was on the ground and that the drop occurred 9 miles North of the team area. Usually, garbles were more prevalent when the operator or commander was under fire.
Having the agent pads and Chief of Operations separated by radio from air support was a serious error rectified early in the operation. Until rectified, air requests were sometimes received after the ground action had occurred. Allowances had been made for this possibility by placing special air request pads in agent hands with the base pad at air operations, but this left air operations working in the dark as to the ground situation. When rectified, we were able to support the operation more properly.
Before rectified, however, we were forced to use voice code using [name not declassified]'s personal communications to [name not declassified]. In these cases, at times, 6-8 hours could be cut from the time necessary for an air request to be honored.
V. Special Subject:
In every business there is a special group of persons who comprise the "scoffers," the disbelievers"--men content to bury their complete lack of usefulness under the guise of lack of faith in success.
Our organization has its share. Some have drifted from project to project and from division to division--confusing assumed "professionalism" with plain lack of energy or ability to do more than point out weakness in other people's thinking.
In most cases these people are only dead wood. Usually, their most damage to an operation is confusion of the issue for a short period. However, on this project I can point out four specific instances in which support functions were warned by such characters not to offer requested support as "this project is doomed to failure."
The possible effects of tolerating such persons in an operational organization are too obvious to list here.
It is hoped that this situation can be pointed out to KUBARK heads as an existing condition, true not only in this project but also in others with which the writer has had experience.
VI.
Recommendations for all field personnel considered as having performed in an efficient manner are being presented in separate reports. I wish at this time, however, to place in the body of this report my personal opinion that the key man to the success of this project is Vincent C. Pivall.
Pivall's firm adherence to orders enabled LINCOLN to rely on the fact that plans were being carried out within the realm of possibility and that Principal Agent attempts to alter those plans were minimized. The preservation of KUBARK interests was considered a solemn duty by Pivall and it showed up in the results of his work.
His professional knowledge and direct manner of dealing with the indigenous personnel gained him, and KUBARK, their respect and spirit of camarade necessary to good guidance on operations of this type.
In addition, Pivall's analytical and objective thinking and reporting spotted for LINCOLN many defects in the old Calligeris organization, useful in planning the operation.
It is recommended that his services would be valuable in a KUHOOK staff position within WHD if he is to remain in WHD. If released from WHD, it is recommended that KUHOOK staff consider him for training assignments or a field project assignment after completing a KUHOOK training course at [place not declassified].
It would be a serious KUBARK/KUHOOK loss to lose this man through disinterest on the part of KUBARK or through allowing him to become de-motivated.
William Robertson/2/
CPM/PBSUCCESS
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
275. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
[place not declassified], July 9, 1954, 1946Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 9. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Stations in Guatemala and [place not declassified].
4728. Re: [telegram indicator not declassified] 746;/2/ GUAT 049./3/
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., Box 13, Folder 8)
/3/See Document 273.
1. LINC declines to suggest any candidates aside from those already proposed by Ontrich as it now appears to be the prerogative of the field and particularly JMBLUG.
2. It is now apparent that the present govt of WSBURNT is entirely KUBARK PBSUCCESS character and that a period of vigorous consolidation must now be undertaken to ensure ultimate success this operation. Although this phase is primarily ODACID's responsibility it is urged that KUBARK through WHD consider this area a matter of primary interest until completely stabilized.
276. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
[place not declassified], July 9, 1954, 2100Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 9. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS; PBCABOOSE.
4731. Re: A. [telegram indicator not declassified] 1090;/2/ B. [telegram indicator not declassified] 744./3/
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., Box 92, Folder 19)
/3/Not found.
1. LINC strongly concurs with [name not declassified] desires for P-51's and subsequent sale F-47's to Calligeris and urges all possible KUBARK effort to insure favorable decision on KMFLUSH request to ODACID and expeditious delivery of aircraft.
2. As expansion of above views and to insure fullest utilization of experience and knowledge gained through PBSUCCESS the following points are submitted for your consideration.
A. Personal [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] support PBSUCCESS both have emphatically pointed up [name not declassified] opposition to communism, his clear insight Latin American affairs and his realization of need for and desire to establish and continue ODYOKE support and collaboration.
B. SKIMMER as authorized by Hqs has made definite commitments to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Calligeris re help on air support which while not officially ODOYOKE commitments must be morally recognized as such and fulfilled if any future ODYOKE-Latin American dealings are to have proper foundation.
277. Memorandum From Jerome Dunbar, Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Chief of Station in [place not declassified]
[place not declassified], July 9, 1954.
[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 104, Folder 3. Secret; RYBAT. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]
278. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Stations in Guatemala and [place not declassified]1
[place not declassified], July 13, 1954, 0047Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 9. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
4757. 1. LINCOLN closing Station 2400 hours 12 July. Thereafter PBSUCCESS stations revert WHD command.
2. Please continue PBSUCCESS slug for those matters relating to project or matters that would reveal existence of same.
3. Hope you enjoyed association as much as LINC has. The book is now closed but the story was a good one. Thanks.
279. Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King), to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)/1/
Washington, July 22, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 154, Folder 2. Secret. Drafted by King on July 22.
SUBJECT
Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Joe Montgomery and Mr. Thomas Corcoran of The United Fruit Company
Present at meeting on 22 July were Mr. Montgomery, Mr. Corcoran and Col. King
1. Mr. Corcoran opened the conversation by saying that Mr. Montgomery had just arrived from Central America and would like to report on recent events and his observations.
2. Mr. Montgomery said:
A. He had reached a satisfactory settlement with the United Fruit Co. workers in Honduras, and that this would remain in effect until the new government, which will take office in January 1955, passes certain proposed social legislation. The period of tranquillity is estimated at approximately one year.
B. President Galvez showed himself to be a man of courage with considerable iron in his backbone during the critical period after the uprising began in Guatemala. While the outcome was in doubt he strongly resisted all pressure to turn against Castillo. Galvez is now feeling very happy and much relieved. Valenzuela, the Foreign Minister, was weak and of no help at all.
C. Somoza had planned to move against Figueres immediately after Castillo's success in Guatemala and was only prevented from doing so by Washington. He still intends to move at a more opportune moment.
D. Montgomery saw [name not declassified] in Guatemala City on the 13th and found him much disturbed about the future because of:
(1) In his opinion Castillo was not acting promptly enough in the appointment of his people to key positions. In particular he was delaying too long in selecting the head of the Security Police. It was only after Montgomery went to Peurifoy at the request of [name not declassified], and Peurifoy in turn spoke to Castillo, that Col. Mendoza was made the head of the police. Col. Mendoza is considered an excellent selection.
(2) The fact that almost all the leading Commies were successful in taking asylum in the Mexican and other embassies instead of being caught and thrown in jail, is considered a threat to future stability. There is talk of a clandestine radio in the Mexican Embassy being used for their purposes.
(3) There is no criticism however, of the speed with which the minor Commies were rounded up nor with the number who are in jail.
E. Mr. Montgomery said he had heard that Col. Monzon was considered a good man although [name not declassified] had some doubts about him.
3. Mr. Corcoran then got to what I am sure was the main reason for today's visit. He said he had never seen anything more ill timed than the announcement of the anti-trust suit against the United Fruit Co. as it weakened their bargaining position with the Hondurans since it was announced prior to the settlement of the strike, and would undoubtedly make things more difficult in Guatemala. He compared the suit against the Fruit Co. at this time with the breaking up of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire when there was nothing good to replace it at the end of World War I. He indicated that the breaking up of the Fruit Co. would leave a chaotic situation. He wanted to know what guidance could be given to Mr. Montgomery because of the political importance of all this in Central America, and Mr. Montgomery added that he would like to know if the Fruit Co. were considered expendable. They had heard on the Hill, prior to the uprising in Guatemala, that CIA would bring about the fall of Arbenz and then see that the blame fell on the Fruit Co. I replied that the first I heard of the anti-trust suit was when I read about it on the front page of the Washington Post, that nothing had come to me since, that I was sure CIA had nothing to do about it, and I did not believe the Fruit Co. was considered expendable. I asked Mr. Montgomery whether he still planned to carry out various of the steps he had promised to make in Guatemala if a democratic government came into power. He replied that such was still his intention, and among other things he had in mind turning over the railroad. However, he did not wish to do this in such a way that everyone would say the Fruit Co. was responsible for the revolution, and that he was awaiting an invitation initiated by Castillo to discuss arrangements. Another step would be to give Guatemala an increased share of the profits. I stated that since he was in a frame of mind to be on the giving rather than the collecting end I did not see why he was too concerned about any charges of complicity in the revolution because it would appear more natural, if that were so, for them to be receiving rather than turning over the railroad. I said that there was a recent cartoon (and described the one of 10 days ago) about second chances, and that this seemed the opportunity they had long been waiting for to do things with a reasonable government which we all hoped that of Castillo's would be. Mr. Montgomery agreed and said he felt that the outcome could build up a much more favorable impression of the Fruit Co. in the Caribbean. Mr. Corcoran then said he had not been able to find out who was responsible for the suit, that Henry Holland said he had nothing to do with it, the Secretary of State said he was not responsible, that others with whom he talked all declined to accept responsibility. I said that I had no idea who was behind it except that I wished to repeat I was quite certain the Agency had nothing to do with it because this was not our business, and that if he wished to discuss the political implications in other countries I felt the proper place to make his facts known was with the Department of State.
J.C. King
280. Report Prepared in the U.S. Information Agency/1/
Washington, July 27, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-R01731R, Box 30, Folder 1011. Secret. The report was submitted to the Operations Coordinating Board on August 2 at the request of USIA's Acting Director, according to an attached cover memorandum.
REPORT ON ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
IN THE GUATEMALAN SITUATION
In concert with other departments and agencies and for the purpose of supporting specified foreign policy objectives, the Agency began last November-December 1953 to regroup its limited resources in an effort to meet the growing crisis conditions in Guatemala and neighboring countries. Unfortunately, the sharp cutback in Agency funds and personnel during the summer and fall of 1953 had forced reduction of the already small operations in the area, especially in various smaller countries where the programs amounted to one-man holding operations. Actions taken by the Agency to remedy these deficiencies and to carry out an effective operation may be grouped under three time-periods: the six months prior to the communist arms shipment; the crisis period of May-June; and the current post-crisis period.
I. Pre-Crisis Period
A. Policy--Up to the 10th Inter-American Conference at Caracas in March much Latin American opinion refused to concern itself with the communist issue in Guatemala, either regarding the Arbenz regime as a "home-grown" revolutionary movement dedicated to improving the lot of the exploited Guatemalans, or preferring to dwell on the United Fruit issue and speculate as to United States motives of economic imperialism.
In this context our principal information effort was directed toward creating greater awareness throughout the Hemisphere of the real threat to peace and security posed by the verifiable communist penetration of the Guatemalan government. In accordance with established policy at that time, this effort stopped short of accusations, directly attributed to the Agency, against the Arbenz regime as communist-dominated but did include the preparation and placement of unattributed articles labeling certain Guatemalan officials as communists, and also labeling certain actions of the Guatemalan government as communist-inspired.
Even though Guatemala alone voted against the anti-communist resolution at Caracas, public attention in Latin America did not begin to focus on the issue of communist penetration and resultant threat to peace and security. With this in mind, the Agency intensified its efforts to get irrefutable evidence publicized throughout the Hemisphere, again short of directly labeling the Arbenz regime as communist but using its actions as self-evident proof.
B. Operations--In November and December, 1953, the information program in Guatemala was reviewed with Ambassador Peurifoy, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency. A new Public Affairs Officer was appointed and provisions were made for such internal strengthening of personnel and funds as events might require. In order to give direct support to the Guatemalan program, long seriously handicapped in operations through Guatemalan government restrictions, and to help meet the problem of communist penetration in the Central American area, a regional servicing operation was developed whereby USIS Mexico could give program support to Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. This serv-icing concentrates on anti-communist materials produced by USIS Mexico in direct collaboration with the other posts and tailored to meet specific needs in individual countries. A third phase of organizational build-up was a considerably expanded 1955 budget projection, parts of which were to be initiated with 1954 funds, especially the strengthening of the one-man holding operations in the smaller countries.
Elsewhere in the Caribbean, and related to the Central American plan, a new office was established in Port-of-Spain for the Trinidad-British Guiana-Barbados area. The existing small operation for the French West Indies, based in Martinique, was re-examined and provision made for selected expansion.
Media and field operations were directed to intensify their efforts in the collection, preparation, and placement of materials demonstrating communist design on, and penetration of, the Hemisphere. A successful project in January, for example, was the preparation here of a series of articles exposing Guatemalan communists Fortuny and Gutierrez; these were planted in a Chilean newspaper and later reprinted in selected other countries with Chilean attribution.
Throughout this period and on through the crisis itself emphasis was placed on cross-reporting Latin American opinion which opposed the Arbenz regime and supported the U.S. stand as taken at Caracas.
The Agency's special coverage team at the Caracas Conference fed out a continuous flow of news, backgrounders, photos, and tape recordings, concentrating on the anti-communist resolution and Guatemala's lone opposition. Through direct Wireless File to all missions and fast pouch these materials were disseminated by all field offices throughout the conference with good placement, backed up by frequent background briefings and conversations with editors, commentators, and public opinion leaders. Film coverage was arranged for newsreel and TV outlets and, for future continuing use, full film documentation was developed on the anti-communist resolution, including speeches by Secretary Dulles and Assistant Secretary Holland.
II. Crisis Period
A. Policy--The communist arms shipment to Guatemala in mid-May marked a definite turning point: first, among the small neighboring countries fearing intervention or aggression; second, elsewhere in the Hemisphere a mixture of surprise, concern and even alarm at this unexpected development; third, elsewhere in the world as the issue became headline news and the communist propaganda network openly took up Guatemala's cause. Especially significant was the attention given to the problem in Moscow radio broadcasts which from the beginning had been high and became a continuous clamor, so that by June 23 one Pravda article was broadcast thirty separate times.
As part of the basic U.S. decision to see the issue through to an emergency OAS meeting of consultation, the Agency immediately embarked upon an aggressive information effort, utilizing all available resources, to expose and discredit the Arbenz regime as communist-dominated, to dramatize the threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere, and to encourage positive action by other American Republics. This effort included use of direct attribution but continued to emphasize cross-reporting of desirable Latin American opinion. Strong advantage was taken of key developments which helped swing Latin American opinion to our side, such as the Soviet arms delivery and the Guatemalan-Soviet maneuver in the U.N.
Output was directed not only to the hemisphere but also to other parts of the world where, because of public unfamiliarity with the Latin American scene, communist propaganda found ready acceptance. Content was aimed at such attitudes as: skepticism or outright disbelief regarding the U.S. position, ranging to public acceptance of allegations that the U.S. engineered the revolution and that U.S. officials had strong financial interests in the United Fruit Company; public rejection of the premise that international communism had in fact subverted the Guatemalan government; reaction in principle to the U.S. stand on searching vessels in American waters and to the U.S. opposition to U.N. Security Council consideration of the Guatemalan request.
Information treatment was complicated by censorship within Guatemala which, for a period, gave the communist side a distinct advantage in getting out its story first; also by the marked tendency of certain foreign news agencies to cross-report reactions adverse to the U.S. and to select comment out of context.
B. Operations--Benefiting from the previous organizational build-up, an emergency working party under the leadership of the Assistant Director for American Republics was established in the Agency, with special liaison officer assigned to Assistant Secretary Holland in the Department of State. Specialists were reassigned within the Agency to the Policy and Programs Staff for Latin America, the intelligence-research staff, and the press, radio, and films media. A series of directives was issued formulating the various tasks to be undertaken by media and field operations.
Despite the lack of lead time in the policy decision to change from a largely unattributed effort to an aggressive labeling campaign, more than 200 articles, backgrounders, and scripts were prepared and transmitted by Wireless File, cable, and fast pouch during four weeks beginning the end of May for press and radio placement abroad. These were developed partly from public sources and partly from declassified intelligence from State and CIA. Content ranged from coverage of daily developments in Guatemala, Washington, the UN, and elsewhere in the area, to original verified expos?s of communist penetration. Illustrative of numerous pamphlets prepared, a "Chronology of Communism in Guatemala", written here and printed in Habana in 100,000 copies, was distributed to all posts in Latin America. In addition some 27,000 pieces of anti-communist cartoons and posters were expedited to the field for selective placement. Based on Agency materials WRUL broadcasts were stepped up throughout the crisis period. Newsreel coverage of Guatemala's action in the U.N. and the emergency OAS meeting were released worldwide. Three special film subjects, including the film "Caracas: Resolution and Reality," were sent to all posts in the area.
Not only posts in this area but selected posts around the world regularly filed back useful stories for cross-reporting together with analyses of local opinion trends. When it became clear from these reports and other sources that censorship inside Guatemala was preventing foreign correspondents from reporting the story, while at the same time Guatemalan and allied sources were pushing their own version of the revolt, the Agency detailed an experienced press officer to Tegucigalpa in Operation Berry. This consisted of assembling daily, from intelligence sources, a succinct account of events within Guatemala and forwarding by cable to Embassy Tegucigalpa. The press liaison officer informally passed this information along to selected correspondents. Coverage immediately began to improve, helping also to offset cross-reporting by foreign news agencies of anti-U.S. comment.
Field reports now coming in show effective use of materials produced here and by the field posts themselves. Wireless File materials were well received by both metropolitan and provincial papers as timely and effective and were widely printed, frequently without attribution to USIS. This was also true of the anti-communist cartoon prints and plastic plates. Through well-organized mailing lists the various pamphlets and posters were put into the hands of selected individuals and groups. Local radio outlets likewise were successfully brought into play. For example, the important CMQ network in Cuba early in June agreed to use all hard-hitting commentaries on Guatemala at peak listening hours, without USIS attribution. Selected films were redirected to key groups throughout the area, including films exposing communist activities in other countries clearly paralleling the Guatemalan situation.
III. Post-Crisis Period
At the present time, the information treatment of the Guatemalan problem has entered the phase of disseminating the documentation only now becoming available from within Guatemala, which confirms the communist nature of the Arbenz government and demonstrates the truth of the representations previously made by the United States. In this task, the Castillo Armas government can be expected to help by exposing the atrocities and the tactics of the previous administration. Since this is the first time a communist government has been overthrown, a full case history of "rise and fall" is available, pointedly useful on a sustained basis in arousing Latin America to the methods and dangers of communist penetration. This line is also being carried worldwide to offset the large measure of skepticism which characterizes public reaction to the Guatemalan situation.
As part of the basic job of getting verified facts on communist penetration in Guatemala, the Agency detailed two cameramen to Guatemala as soon as it was possible to enter the country. A considerable quantity of sound film documenting communist atrocities is already on hand. Together with other film materials this footage will be developed into two permanent film records on communism in Guatemala, one short subject for immediate theatrical release worldwide and one longer subject for continuing use. A similar effort is being made with regard to still photos and recorded interviews. These and other efforts are in addition to publicizing official statements or reports as they become available for public use.
The Agency will continue to give high priority to Guatemala during what undoubtedly will be a long period of rehabilitation. A long-range effort of re-orientation seems indicated, at government levels and particularly in the interior areas where land has been distributed and doubts about the future persist. The Agency desires to play its part in a coordinated multi-Agency effort and has informally exchanged views with the Department of State on the type and size of resources that might be employed.
In addition to efforts within Guatemala, there is urgent need for a marked step-up in the information program for the hemisphere, for the two-fold purpose of aggressively exposing communist penetration and bolstering democratic forces. As in efforts directed toward Guatemala, this should be part of a multi-Agency plan of action, bringing to bear on the hemisphere greater attention and larger resources than the U.S. government has given it in the years since the war.
281. Briefing Paper/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 2. No classification marking. A covering memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence from Tracy Barnes listed the participants scheduled to attend the White House briefing on July 29.
GUATEMALA BRIEFING
(1) Entire briefing top secret and more. Danger in relaxing security after operation completed, particularly if successful. Fortunate so far in keeping CIA out of publicity. [Times & Luce (Time)]/2/
/2/Brackets in the source text in sections 1, 3, and 6.
(2) Last August pursuant OCB action, initiated program to eliminate pro-Communist government in Guat. Action program approved December. Team assembled from Korea, Germany, Egypt, Chile.
(3) Plan contemplated:
(a) Internal revolution, spark-plugged by Colonel Castillo Armas from Honduras--most available Guat exile long subsidized by CIA. In several revolutions.
(b) Defection of Guat Military at highest level.
(c) Defection of individual Army garrisons at strong points.
(d) Radio campaign from clandestine transmitters.
(e) Subversion of individual Guat leaders, military and civilian.
[Changes during Ops--importance of air]
Also parallel State Dept. Ops through O.A.S. to hold conference to take steps vs "Communist Guat."
U.S.A. diplomatic pressures--Navy & Air reconnaissance, etc. Program budgeted at approximately 3 million dollars. Total spent slightly in excess.
(4) U.S. government hand undisclosable. Established theory of fictional group of Anti Commie American businessmen interested in South America and desirous of eliminating Communism (not United Fruit). CIA dealt with Armas as representative this group. Somoza, Galvez, etc., might have made good guess--but implicated.
(5) Operation presented problems over and above those of usual Banana Republic revolution.
(6) Background:
Following fall of Dictator Ubico in 1944, pendulum swung far to left and Guatemala under left-wing leader Arevalo 1944 to 1951 when Arbenz took over. Arbenz able army officer but slowly came under complete influence of hard-core Communists, particularly Fortuny, Pellecer, Gutierrez, and others who trained in Communist school, frequent visitors to Moscow and satellites. [Prague School]
Arbenz controlled army; hard-core Communists took over labor unions, radio, major press organs, and dominated Indian peasantry who had little interest in Marx, et cetera. Foreign properties taken over, land divided up and Communist type state fast being organized. Some thirty abortive revolutions.
Time running against us and faced early probability of purge in Army, arming of the laborers, and further liquidation of the intelligentsia. Also critical situation Honduras (elections).
(7) Via intelligence channels information obtained regarding Arbenz negotiation to purchase 5 million dollars worth of arms from Czechoslovakia. (Refer attempt trace these arms--ran down wrong vessel (German flag)--arrival of Alfhem at Puerto Barrios May 15.) This arrival really blessing in disguise since publicity brought entire situation Guat to a head. However, resulted severe reprisals and due indiscretions one of our main chains within Guatemala completely liquidated (May 30) and danger that our entire network would be rolled up unless we moved rapidly.
Summer rains impending which would impede ground and air operations. Castillo forces augmented by defections following Alfhem incident but still the total of his forces on D-Day represented 80 bodies trained in guerrilla operations by CIA and approximately 400 men in all went over line on D-Day. Necessary move immediately or lose psychological opportunity and control of assets. Reports from Guat and outlying regions indicated popular expectation built up by our radio and by events forced decision to move or lose entire initiative.
(8) Operation run--
Policy control: HQ Wash--
Wisner-Bissell
WH Division--Col. King; [name not declassified]; Esterline, etc.
Ops Control and Field Coordination:
Lincoln HQ [place not declassified]
Field Control:
[place not declassified]
[place not declassified]--SOMERSET--SHERWOOD
Guat City
Support:
[place not declassified]/3/
[place not declassified]
/3/The following handwritten notations appear at the end of the paper: "1. Chance clear out commies in S.A.; shown weakness; 2. Air power--dangers to them; 3. Coordinated action--State, Defense, CIA; 4. Do something for Central America."
282. Editorial Note
A revolt of Guatemalan military cadets disturbed the tentative peace in Guatemala City on August 2, 1954. Castillo Armas viewed the uprising as the precursor of a large-scale army revolt by "unknown forces." He told Ambassador Peurifoy that he planned to "escape" the city in the evening to regroup his liberation forces. (Telegram 116 to the CIA, August 3; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 7)
The revolt faltered the same day and order was restored by nightfall. On August 5 Allen Dulles reported to the National Security Council: "The revolt of the cadets was a natural development from the possibility that the liberation army would secure all the military positions which the cadets had hoped for. Everything was quiet now that both the cadets and the liberation army had been disarmed." (Memorandum of discussion at the 209th meeting of the NSC; Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File)
Documentation on the revolt is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central File 714.00. For a discussion of the incident, see Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pages 357-360.
283. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala/1/
Washington, August 9, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 168, Folder 6. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBHISTORY. No time of transmission is on the telegram.
12215. GUAT 130./2/ 1. Appreciate advice contained in para 1 of ref however desire further clarification including answers to following questions. Although your team "discovered" believed understood, please confirm upon completion discovery of documents 2 to 9 any others in brochure, and also please advise of terms and conditions any understanding or agreement on part of regime covering our use, including overt exploitation this material. Also what can we cite as the source of these documents and method our obtainment thereof for purposes of public exploitation of documents. This "sourcing" should of course be in form acceptable to regime./3/
/2/
Dated August 8. (Ibid., Box 173, Folder 4)/3/
A handwritten note beside this paragraph reads, "Done."2. We again call to your attention and that of entire PBHISTORY team the extreme importance of any and all documentary evidence tending to establish contacts, connections and courses of dealing as between Arbenz regime and/or Guat Communist Party and leaders on the one hand, and Moscow-Prague and international Communist organization on the other hand. ODACID particularly keen obtain any such documentary evidence soonest possible to assist in tying down allegations still made in some quarters that Guat Communist apparatus was purely indigenous affair, not directed, controlled or guided by world Communist hqs.
284. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Guatemala City, August 24, 1954, 0337Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 7. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.
185. 1. Since returning to Station, have held conversations with ESQUIRE, Calligeris, ESCOBILLA, [name not declassified], ZPSEMANTIC, [name not declassified], ZPSECANT and other contacts this Station. Following conclusions have been reached which believe represents true picture although some details lacking.
A. Political situation tends worsen because Calligeris shows little political sense.
B. Calligeris apparently putting to one side tried collaborators of previous days and now surrounded by highly suspicious opportunistic elements including Jorge Garcia Granados, former secretary of Vicente Lombardo Toledano, former Ambassador to Washington, well known for Communist tendencies. Calligeris denies he has anything do with Garcia Granados, blamed latter's presence in palace and closeness to govt on [name not declassified]. However known that Calligeris has dined with him and consulted him on important matters.
C. Though Calligeris told Bannister that [name not declassified] was responsible for 2 August uprising, ZPSECANT stated [name not declassified] was loyal and acted correctly.
D. [name not declassified] told ESQUIRE that he leaving on long tour including Zrmetal trip around 20 September. Stated he realized this effort Calligeris to dispose him but professed willingness leave quietly. Professed hope be able get govt on sound footing prior his departure. Stated, believe correctly, that he alone of junta has done real work in setting up govt administration. It true that [name not declassified] is hard worker and knows way around govt departments.
E. Meanwhile [name not declassified], ZPSEMANTIC, others consider [name not declassified] as menace who trying cut ground out from under anti Communists and weaken Calligeris. [name not declassified] has no popularity but does have some army support. Cannot see how tranquillity achievable with [name not declassified] remaining in junta. Problem is how get him out without trouble if he refuses to leave as [name not declassified], ZPSEMANTIC, Calligeris and others desire.
F. All anti Communist groups with sole exception Putzeys and a few others have eagerly awaited return [name not declassified] with view he only one capable solving situation and giving needed political guidance.
G. Meanwhile Calligeris has made some military moves with political ends which merit consideration. On 16 August, 500 CEUA picked soldiers from Canales region were incorporated into Base Militar while 500 soldiers who could not be trusted were released. This move gives Colonel Neiderheitman, Calligeris picked but [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], strong control potentially over this key military installation. At same time 350 picked men under Eduardo Taracena, CEUA leader, have been posted as palace guard. A further group of 300 picked men will be placed in the Guardia de Honor on 23 August.
H. Calligeris told Bannister evening 20 August that he needs aid in immediately obtaining two armored scout cars for palace guard. Bannister referred him to JMBLUG.
I. ZPSEMANTIC told Clower noon 20 August that he has 900 armed men concentrating in city which will act in whatever way necessary to ensure that anti Communist cause is not defrauded by palace or by incompetence. Obvious that ZPSEMANTIC is [name not declassified] man. Have checked and ZPSEMANTIC story is true. More being armed daily.
J. [name not declassified] told Bannister 18 August morning that he hopes reach working agreement with Calligeris but when asked what reaction would be if this proved impossible and it became necessary overthrow Calligeris Bannister replied that it most desirable he and Calligeris reach working agreement. Believed essential that Hqs consider possibility that [name not declassified] followers may rise against Calligeris as last resort if they find it impossible continue collaborate with him.
K. ZPSEMANTIC, Coronado Lira, Mario Sandoval, ESSENCE, and other key anti Communists and govt figures facing dilemma concerning their future actions. One hand do not wish jettison Calligeris who still popular hero. They consider supporting him desirable but only up to point where they can continue doing so without sacrificing anti Communist cause and their reputations. On other hand, break with Calligeris would play into army and possibly Communist hands unless this accompanied by successful movement which would control country.
L. Available info indicates that [name not declassified] has strong support in western part of country while ZPSEMANTIC, [name not declassified] and CEUA believe they control eastern part including bases of Zacapa, Jutiapa, Puerto Barrios, and Jalapa.
M. Meanwhile Calligeris promised Bannister that he intends divide air force between Puerto San Jose and Puerto Barrios, strengthen Quetzaltenango, Quiche, Zacapa garrisons to point where these will have two companies 80 mm mortars, two companies 60 mm mortars, and two companies heavy weapons each plus one observation plane. Each will make daily flights over surrounding countryside. At same time these key bases will become centers of intensive training of anti Communist army reserve for future eventualities.
N. Have delayed advising this data while checking and attempting fit into overall picture.
O. Crucial meeting between Calligeris and [name not declassified] to be held 23 August and consider future peace WSBURNT depends outcome this meeting.
P. As suggestion believe following should be done: [name not declassified] should be removed from junta and sent abroad on diplomatic mission. Calligeris and ZPSECANT should invite [name not declassified] to join them on junta while agreeing to follow [name not declassified] political plan which has support key anti Communist figures now occupying important positions in government.
Q. [name not declassified] addition to junta would offer tremendous advantages including built in check and balances plus propaganda value of having [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as member of government. Idea of having [name not declassified] (portion garbled; being svcd) eminence but without any real power would probably be unworkable since Calligeris could always refuse follow advice or drag feet in carrying out plans. If [name not declassified] member of junta he could see that program carried out. Moreover wise that [name not declassified] have responsibility as well as authority.
R. These matters have been discussed with JMBLUG who is in general agreement.
S. Recognize this policy matter but [name not declassified] and Calligeris have asked Bannister for advice. Calligeris urgently asked for instructions.
285. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Guatemala City, August 29, 1954, 0040Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 7. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.
208. Re: Guat 185;/2/ DIR 14411./3/
/2/Document 284.
/3/Not found.
Have held further series conversations with contacts this situation and following is resume info obtained.
1. Political situation continues to worsen with probability that groups regular army will soon attempt coup or when and if cadets participating in Aug 2 and 3 uprising are sentenced by court martial.
2. [name not declassified] has refused to depart on scheduled trip outside WSBURNT prior to 20 Sept and strong indications he conspiring with disaffected army elements against Calligeris. If so probable this movement would be launched prior [name not declassified] departure.
3. [2 names not declassified] meeting held night 23 Aug but no satisfactory working agreement reached. According to [name not declassified] and ESGAIN, Calligeris does not consider [name not declassified] collaboration essential but to contrary is closely working with Jorge Garcia Granados in plans for oil development Peten region.
4. [name not declassified] stated morning 27 Aug he believes impossible reach serious working agreement with Calligeris since latter always promises carry out [name not declassified] suggestions but never does so.
5. [name not declassified] sure Calligeris would balk at [name not declassified] membership in junta.
6. Calligeris through ESGAIN advised Bannister he desirous removing [name not declassified] from junta but desires remain as sole head of govt./4/
/4/A bracket drawn in the margin encloses paragraphs 6-10 along with the word "out."
7. Insistent rumors that dishonesty appearing in govt handling of funds.
8. ESCOBILLA, [name not declassified], ESGAIN, and ZPSEMANTIC advised that Calligeris had collected more than $200,000 for aid to army of liberation but these funds have been spent on other "confidential" matters. Funds embarked by Arbenz govt for Congressional expenditure have also been spent for intelligence activities by Calligeris!
9. [name not declassified] and ESGAIN report Calligeris keeps large sums in his possession which he uses in effort buy support.
10. On 25 Aug Calligeris through ESGAIN requested $100,000 from Bannister for liberation army necessary expenditures. Bannister replied he understood WSBURNT govt has considerable funds in PBPRIME banks. On 26 Aug Calligeris repeated his request through ESGAIN. Bannister advised that he had no funds but would forward Calligeris request.
11. Meanwhile it known that army of liberation members have received as little as $18 in two months and are fed through charity. Liberation army leaders contrary to Calligeris orders refuse to disband because they fear such will play into hands of army which would immediately launch coup and seize power. Widespread belief that Calligeris is either blind or possibly sold out to regular army./5/
/5/Handwritten notations in the margin next to both paragraphs 11 and 12 read "OK."
12. [name not declassified] and ZPSEMANTIC advised that following individuals are ready to resign from govt in mass protest against Calligeris political activities: Hector and Domingo Goicolea, Carlos Salazar, Carlos Sosa, Carlos Cifuentes, Gabriel Martinez del Rosal, Enrique Salazar Liquens, Mario Sandoval, Oscar Cobar, Adan Manrique Rios, Manuel Orellana, Adan Serrano and Luis Coronada Lira.
13. [name not declassified] has consistently prevented these resignations but bluntly stated today that continuance irresponsible activities by Calligeris will force him to permit the resignations of these individuals and the opening of a strong political campaign against Calligeris. Said campaign to be marked by mass demonstrations of protest against Calligeris and junta political activities.
14. [name not declassified] stated that army of liberation has withdrawn its support of Calligeris and has pledged its support to him.
15. On 25 Aug Col Manuel de Jesus Perez, commander of the liberation units in Jutiapa, was ordered by Calligeris to disarm his men. Perez refused, sent his 300 well armed men to Jalapa and himself came to capital where he defied Calligeris and pledged his support to [name not declassified]. [name not declassified] sent Perez to Puerto Barrios to take command of two companies of liberation army which allegedly control that port. Perez stated he would remain maximum of one month unless an anti-Calligeris movement was launched.
16. Col Jorge Barrios Solares, Commander liberation forces in Chiquimula, is estimated have approx 800 men still under arms. Barrios Solares refuses obey orders from Calligeris and junta and has also pledged loyalty to [name not declassified]. Chiquimula forces now better armed than before and have light and heavy artillery as well as machine guns.
17. Col Ernesto Niederheitman, commander of Base Militar, has promised full support to [name not declassified] and has drawn up plans to neutralize Aurora Air Base if the air force does not side with [name not declassified] when and if emergency arises. [name not declassified] stated he may be able to take over air force through Lt Guillermo Mendoza and Col Luis Urrutia de Leon. Niederheitman having difficulties with the Base Militar because Calligeris has permitted unfriendly, pro-regular army officers to be put in subordinate positions in base. Niederheitman advised he intends to remove these officers as soon as possible.
18. Guardia de Honor under command of Col Francisco Oliva, [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] it doubtful that Colonel Oliva could control Guardia de Honor since majority officers are regular army.
19. Ceua picked soldiers have been infiltrated into both Guardia de Honor and Base Militar as reported by GUAT 185. These soldiers are expected oppose any efforts on part regular army against govt or against liberation army.
20. Colonel Antonio Estrada, Commander Zacapa zone, has promised full collaboration.
21. Garrisons of Coban and Quetzaltenango considered as [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He making efforts gain control Quiche and Jutiapa garrisons.
22. Said ESODIC 1 was his man.
23. Inferred he will send representative discuss matters with [name not declassified] who displeased with Calligeris.
24. Advised that Trujillo has offered arms but only if ODYOKE approves.
25. [name not declassified] requested Bannister forward this info without delay and, knowing of Calligeris request for funds ostensibly for liberation army and confidential expenses, asked that 100,000 be given him and not Calligeris. [name not declassified] stated that continued existence for next six weeks of liberation army is only guarantee that anti Commies and cause will not be eliminated through army coup followed by massive retaliation on part of army and Commie elements./6/
/6/Handwritten notations in the margin next to this paragraph read "out."
26. Meanwhile have picked up statements allegedly made by Calligeris in confidence indicating he trying win over regular army by inferences he will rebuff Americans. Obvious that he cutting ground out from under National Committee of Defense Against Communism. Comment: Feel serious trouble inevitable unless Calligeris gets together with [name not declassified] on loyal (rcvd unloyal) basis, eliminates highly suspicious, opportunistic elements from positions as advisers, and adopts more realistic political line. Request advice soonest concerning Calligeris and [name not declassified] request for funds. Though funds could be delivered to [name not declassified] without difficulty believe that, if decided give to him, better this should be done through bank in PBPRIME rather than through Station./7/ Believe necessary that liberation army be maintained during this critical period when political tension rapidly reaching explosive point./8/
/7/The previous two sentences are enclosed in a hand-drawn box and "out" is written in the margin.
/8/A handwritten note in the margin next to this sentence reads: "comment."
286. Editorial Note
By the beginning of September 1954 all the major documentary sources in Guatemala, including the Foreign Ministry and the Communist Party, had been explored, but few incriminating documents were found. The Station in Guatemala concluded: "All sources agreed Commies and govt. implicated officials either destroyed or personally took out damaging documents. For example, Calligeris advised all Army G-2 files burned, which included Alfhem correspondence." (Telegram 290 to the CIA, September 5, 1954; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 168, Folder 7. See also memorandum dated September 3; ibid., Folder 10)
According to a Summary Progress Report dated September 28: "The PBHistory team reviewed more than 500,000 documents, not including several hundred thousand duplicate copies and illegible or semi-destroyed papers and masses of Communist propaganda, books, leaflets, and magazines." But of that number, only 2,095 were duplicated and a further 50,000 microfilmed. While considering the overall mission a success, the report admitted that "very few" "Communist damaging" documents had been found. (Report attached to dispatch HGG-A-1375 from the Chief of Station in Guatemala to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, October 1; ibid.)
Exploitation of the documents included their release to the press. The documents offered were printed by an "unusually cooperative" Guatemalan press, but "the editors made little embellishment of even the most provocative documents, unless suggestions, captions or stories written by the KUGOWN officer went with the photostatic copy." (Ibid.) Attempts to publicize the findings throughout Latin America, however, were unsatisfactory. The report noted that only one news service had even carried the initial press release by the Minister of Propaganda. The others "felt the story was not 'spot' news, and consequently did not value it to the point of cable traffic." (Ibid.) The conclusion reached was that the bulk of the documents "may be of value for research study." (Memorandum, September 3; ibid.)
287. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, May 12, 1975.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 153, Folder 3. Secret.
SUBJECT
CIA's Role in the Overthrow of Arbenz
In August 1953, the Operations Coordinating Board directed CIA to assume responsibility for operations against the Arbenz regime. Appropriate authorization was issued to permit close and prompt cooperation with the Departments of Defense, State and other Government agencies in order to support the Agency in this task. The plan of operations called for cutting off military aid to Guatemala, increasing aid to its neighbors, exerting diplomatic and economic pressure against Arbenz and attempts to subvert and or defect Army and political leaders, broad scale psychological warfare and paramilitary actions. During the period August through December 1953 a CIA staff was assembled and operational plans were prepared.
Following are the specific operational mechanisms utilized by the Agency in the overall missions against the Arbenz government:
a. Paramilitary Operations. Approximately 85 members of the Castillo Armas group received training in Nicaragua. Thirty were trained in sabotage, six as shock troop leaders and 20 others as support-type personnel. Eighty-nine tons of equipment were prepared. The support of this operation was staged inside the borders of Honduras and Nicaragua. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] There were an estimated 250 men in Honduras and El Salvador for use as shock troops and specialists, outside of the training personnel that had been sent to Nicaragua.
b. Air Operations. The planning for providing air operational support was broken down into three phases; i.e. the initial stockpiling of equipment; the delivering of equipment to advance bases by black flight; and the aerial resupply of troops in the field. Thirty days prior to D-day, a fourth phase, fighter support, was initiated. There were approximately 80 missions flown during the 14-29 June 1954 period, by various type aircraft such as C-47's, F-47's and Cessnas which were used to discharge cargo, distribute propaganda and for strafing and bombing missions.
c. Clandestine Communications. A clandestine radio broadcasting station was established in Nicaragua. The purpose of these broadcasts was to intimidate members of the Communist Party and public officials who were sympathetic to the Communist cause. The radio station, prior to D-day, broadcasted programs on why they were on the air; dramatized examples of Communist tyranny; the ideologies and aims of the Liberation Movement and what effect was intended vis-?-vis each individual who was listening; an aggressive program outlining the activities which would ultimately bring down the Communist threat, etc.
d. Q Program. The objective was spreading responsibility for the operation throughout as many Latin American countries as possible in order to lessen the impact of United States participation.
e. Indigenous agent radio operator training program. This included 13 radio operators, including seven residents and six tactical, and one cryptographer who were trained in Nicaragua from 6 March-9 June 1954.
One of the propaganda ploys was to fabricate reports of Soviet arms deliveries to Guatemala by submarine, and then arranging to have a CIA planted cache of Soviet arms discovered and publicized. The mythical arms deliveries were superseded by the real thing when a ship carrying 2,000 tons of Czech weapons and ammunition arrived. This shipment created an international furor and provided clinching proof of what had been the main CIA propaganda theme, that Guatemala under Arbenz had become a Soviet satellite.
The results of the operational efforts described above were positive, however key Guatemalan Army officers wanted either official assurance of U.S. Government support or an overt military incident which would demonstrate Castillo's power and determination. On 1 June the Arbenz regime began a wave of arrests which obliterated Castillo's intelligence nets and action assets inside the country and on 8 June a 30-day suspension of all constitutional liberties was announced.
On 17-18 June five shock teams trained by the Agency crossed into Guatemala. The turning point came on 25 June when Castillo's forces repulsed a counterattack and later bombed a fortress in Guatemala City.
On 27 June Arbenz resigned and turned the government over to another Communist, Carlos Enrique Diaz, chief of the armed forces. Following the resignation the Chief of Station and another agency officer held a negotiating session with Guatemalan Army officers. The Agency representatives argued that Diaz was unacceptable [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Following assurances from the U.S. Ambassador that Monzon was indeed the U.S. choice, those present agreed that Monzon would be the head of a junta. The agreement soon broke down when Diaz doublecrossed Monzon by appointing him as Minister of Government while Diaz retained his position. Diaz caved in following bombings by F-47's.
Negotiations took place between Castillo and Monzon, President of the Junta, who agreed to accept Castillo as a member. In early July Castillo became President of the Junta with Major Enrique Oliva and Monzon as the other two members.
The budget allocation for this activity was $3,000,000 and the actual cost, less recoverable assets, was just under the original allocation.
Background
It was considered that Guatemala represented a serious threat to hemispheric solidarity and to U.S. security in the Caribbean area. Guatemala was ruled by anti-U.S. President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman who was elected to office as a result of fraudulent elections in November 1950. Arbenz was supported by a leftist coalition government, with all key positions below the cabinet level thoroughly controlled by a Communist-dominated bureaucracy. The country also maintained the balance of military power in Central America through the army of 7,000 men, the well-trained, hard-core element of which was stationed in Guatemala City. Because of this Communist influence and a hardening anti-U.S. policy, on the part of Guatemala, which was targeted directly against American interests in the country, the U.S. Government was forced to adopt a somewhat firmer attitude toward Guatemala. Based on NSC 144/1 and PSB policy guidance, the Agency placed top operational priority in an effort to reduce and possibly eliminate Communist power in Guatemala.
BUDGET SUMMARY
|
Psychological Warfare and Political Action |
$270,000 |
|
Subversion |
250,000 |
|
Intelligence Operations |
150,000 |
|
Maintenance of present cadre (8 months) |
160,000 |
|
Expansion of cadre to 500 |
60,000 |
|
Arms and Equipment |
400,000 |
|
Operation of Nicaraguan training center |
100,000 |
|
Support of internal organization (estimate) |
150,000 |
|
Transportation, storage and travel (estimate) |
85,000 |
|
Transport Aircraft and maintenance |
800,000 |
|
Current liabilities |
10,000 |
|
Contingencies |
565,000 |
|
$3,000,000 |
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