Docs 206-254
[place not declassified], June 19, 1954, 0934Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 2. Secret. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence and to SHERWOOD. 4062. Ref: [telegram indicator not declassified] 650./2/ /2/Not printed. (Ibid., Box 13, Folder 7) 1. No authority to bomb at present, also army may swing our side soon.2. Avoid attack and bypass Hank while having air show by fighters for benefit garrison.
3. If fear or dislike regime does not bring army over in day more forceful air support will have to be provided.
4. Try one day guerrilla tactics with air show. Meanwhile we are requesting authority for real air support to be ready if necessary. In meantime can assure you have realistic hope that army may turn against regime. Cannot afford risk this opportunity by bomb or other attack until make effort find out.
5. SHERWOOD: Order supply bombs moved to SOMERSET to be ready by dawn 20 June.
207. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
/3/Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 2)
1. Regret that we cannot at this time authorize the forms of air to ground action requested by ref A and recommended by ref B. This matter has been reconsidered in detail as of this morning with Ascham and Ordway full participation, and following is gist of reasoning as well as statement of certain conditions under which this decision might be relaxed or modified.2. The use of air to ground action against WSBURNT military personnel and/or military vehicles would in our judgment have effect of engaging their honor and prestige and causing them to consolidate in opposition to Calligeris forces. We recognize possibility that through use of bombing against one or more garrisons, assaults with respect to these could be successful but call your attention to fact that these victories could be pyrrhic and illusory if they were to result in "loss of war" due to utter alienation and antagonizing of WSBURNT military. This is entirely apart from the extremely damaging effect which such action would have upon world including US domestic public opinion and the confirmation which it would give to main Toriello lines, viz "bombing" and "invasion".
3. Hence unless and until it becomes considerably more apparent than it now is as to what the position of WSBURNT army will be and whether or not there is any likelihood of its shifting over to Calligeris
' side, these measures of attack must be avoided.4. We are particularly anxious to make it clear to LINC that this is not an arbitrary or final judgment on the part of Hqs nor is it any evidence of cautious or negative attitude here. We are and will continue to be open minded with regard to this matter and will be receptive to renewals of recommendations from the field and LINC after enough time has passed to enable all of us to judge better the true situation with respect to the armed forces. It seems to us that it should be possible to determine with fair or approximate accuracy what move they will make, if any, within period of next 24 to 36 hours.
5. We repeat that neither you nor field should gain impression that Hqs is otherwise than in full and complete support of this operation and entirely prepared to take and/or authorize any actions necessary to the success of the venture and which appear to be reasonably calculated to achieve that end.
6. Recommend that in your instruction to the field you reflect the sense and flavor of the foregoing.
/4/ /4/A Department of State statement on June 19 indicated, among other things, that Ambassador Peurifoy had reported serious uprisings in Guatemalan cities and three overflights (one each on June 17, 18, and 19) but no bombings or strafings in the Guatemala City area. The Guatemalan Foreign Minister told Peurifoy, however, that two planes had bombed a house in Guatemala City and also strafed the National Palace. (Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1954, pp. 981-982)
1. There is no further use moralizing about or with [name not declassified]. We have gone as far as we can with talk. [name not declassified] is what he is. He has said what he needs. We may regret or dislike or disagree with his request but if we refuse it, we are abandoning what ever potential [name not declassified] may have and we can not afford that since Calligeris assets are too small.
2. [name not declassified] knows what effect bombs will have on the Latin temperament including his own. Aerial acrobatics are not the same thing.
3. Meanwhile the govt and Commies are arresting and killing. Martinez del Rosal got a bullet in the center of his forehead. They shot Perfecto Villegas and then ran a truck over him. Kaufman had his feet carbonized before he died.
4. While this goes on, we fail to bomb. This is what William James called "atrocious harmlessness".
5. If we bomb, that does not guarantee [name not declassified] will act but then we will have done our utmost. And there is no danger of a boomerang. At this stage, both friend and foe respect force alone.
6. We have already missed the moment to bomb, mainly last night. We still have a chance today and tomorrow.
7. Many people have been to see me saying one bomb on palace would do the job.
8. Bomb repeat Bomb.
209. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency
2. Is it not more serious to fail to win having already gone so far than it is to win even though our enemies may try to tar US with intervention? Is not our intervention now under these circumstances far more palatable than by Marines? This is the same enemy we fought in Korea and may fight tomorrow in Indo-China. He knows no quarters and gives none. He is hiding behind Guats on his side and we on ours. He sent the Alfhem arms we sent token gear.
3. Our plans called for internal strength, the enemy ruthlessly eliminated or suppressed this hope. We tried forcing defection by propaganda and token force of armed irregulars. Unless we revert now to real determination to win, our clandestine propaganda effort of pretended strength will if not already become known for what it is. We have 300 men, some already deserting, the enemy
's strength remains unimpaired.4. Our basic plan although altered still remains feasible providing we use our one asset over the enemy
--air power. Unless we show real strength within 24 hours we run great risk of Galvez turning against SYNCARP or WSBURNT attacking WSHOOFS. Osorio is still fence sitting because he has not received assurance ODYOKE is determined to see Calligeris succeed. [name not declassified] is facing the enemy's charges alone and offers his air force to bomb WSBURNT. He is willing go all the way to victory.5. View above and ref msg LINCOLN respectfully requests Hqs move soonest to authorize following specific course of action:
A. Authority to conduct flak suppression attacks on AA in Adam or elsewhere where obstructing ground progress.
B. Authority to bomb Hank and other garrisons later if necessary as example of strength and determination of anti-Communists.
C. Authority to tell army that all who oppose anti-Communists and shoot at them to defend communism will be shot or bombed.
6. Must emphasize again decision must come soon before our mythical strength becomes known to enemy and air remains our only power.
210. Telegram From the CIA Chief Station in Guatemala to the Central Intelligence Agency
3. I have on repeated occasions reported that this resolution will be won or lost in WSBURNT city and that the one determinant factor is the attitude of the Army High Command. If the Army High Command can be won over to our side ultimate success is a foregone conclusion. If it decides to back Arbenz, PBSUCCESS will not prevail. This is the principal consideration underlying K Program.
4. Our sole key to the Army High Command is [name not declassified]. I have the very greatest respect for him as a human being, an officer and a patriotic servant of his country. It is on his authority mainly that I originally proposed an air strike against military targets in the WSBURNT city area. I refuse to believe that [name not declassified] would be so swayed by self-seeking motives as to ignore counter productive effects with respect to the attitude of people WSBURNT. Although I specifically and repeatedly questioned him on that score he could not conceive of "adequate other forms of exhibiting strengths". Nor could SWALLOW with whom I raised that point.5. It would be presumptuous to stake my judgment against yours in matters as portentous as those involved here. You of course know what is at stake for the U.S. if this endeavor fails. I can not assay the prospects of collecting backing for future unilateral intervention in WSBURNT. I am deeply perturbed by what failure will do not only to the many brave people who have staked their lives on American good faith and strength but also how it will affect our prestige in other Latin American countries.
6. I am convinced that the Guat Station in strict compliance with your directions will do its utmost to wrest success from a situation that to me looks serious. I am deeply impressed their utter dedication to that task.
211. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
2. Ref B suggests you now inclined place main reliance not on inducing defection WSBURNT army but upon its intimidation or actual defeat through air to ground action supported by shock forces. If so you presumably have in mind attacks on number of military installations. This still seems to us more likely to consolidate army
's loyalty to regime and we still believe defection of army is best chance.3. In ref E, JMBLUG clearly has in mind different kind of target selected with view to intimidation and creation sense of crisis, but we are unclear as stated ref D what specific targets would meet this specification and avoid other objections.
4. In view of widely differing views on appropriate and effective targets request your recommendations this point after receipt reply to ref D.
5. Apologize direct dispatch refs C and D to field. Believe necessary in view extreme urgency final decision.
212. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency
2. Ref para 1: As to targets, LINCOLN does not contemplate employment of tactics requiring instrument controlled or guided bombing, on contrary, from outset of air support plan only low level skip or dive bombing with attendant pinpoint accuracy considered feasible to fulfill all foreseeable requirements. LINCOLN has at no time supported or even considered favorably field (including JMBLUG) requests for bombing national palace, racetrack or other non military targets. Only military garrisons and storage tanks are presently considered primary essential targets and of these only Hank is desired for immediate action in event ultimatum to commander is ineffective.
3. Ref para 2:
A. When air support plan drawn up every emphasis was placed upon selection of combat experienced ODYOKE service trained pilots. In other words, only best and most combat proven pilots were to be selected of the 32 or more candidates interviewed by Brodfrost.
B. Lead pilot, [name not declassified], CMDR, USNR; flew with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], became an ace during [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; joined us, became an ace with 12 kills in Pacific, wing CMDR on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; considered one of the finest tactical naval air planners. All verified from naval records.
C. [name not declassified] selected [name not declassified] as his wingman. His qualifications are: LT (SG) USN active reserve, combat experience with navy in Pacific WW 2; completed advanced naval pilots course on night target pinpointing day before reporting to SYNCARP. Highly recommended by [name not declassified].
D. [name not declassified] USAF, flew 50 missions over Japan from Iwo Jima. Has over 1560 hours in F 47 and over 5,000 hrs in total. Checked out by Brodfrost who rated him tops.
E. Re bombsights, ODUNIT provided combat ready A/C.
F. Flak only reported light to accurate over Adam 20 and possibly 40 mm. Minor damage sustained one A/C. See following SHERWOOD cables for specific details: 286 (IN 19798), 291 (IN 19939), and 295 (IN 20028).
/3/ Sufficient flak encountered over Adam to warrant consideration as hazardous to dangerous but not serious thus far. /3/None printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 93, Folder 17; Box 12, Folder 3; and Box 93, Folder 14, respectively)
/3/Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 5)
1. We are ready authorize use of bombs moment we are convinced would substantially increase likelihood of success without disastrous damage interests of PBPRIME.2. You already familiar our views concerning damage likely to be done our cause by ill directed or premature attacks. We fear bombing of military installations more likely to solidify army against the rebellion than to induce defection and we are convinced attacks against civilian targets, which would shed blood of innocent people, would fit perfectly into Communist propaganda line and tend to alienate all elements of population.
3. As to effect of bombing on [name not declassified] decision, we will not repeat argument that his plea for bombing is irrational now that capability to deliver has been convincingly demonstrated. Agree question is not whether his request is rational or moral but whether granting it will actually induce him to move. Must rely heavily your judgment on this point but disturbed report ref B that you have had no contact [name not declassified] since 1500 hours 18 June.
4. Ref A does not recommend any specific target. Implies palace might be decisive target but this seems to us open to second objection para 2 above. Earlier suggestion of racetrack might avoid both objections para 2 above but by same token bombing would not directly affect capabilities of regime. Would facilitate our further consideration final decision this issue if you would recommend specific targets.
5. Pending receipt your recommendations and further assessment capabilities for accurate bombing must withhold authorization.
214. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
2. The position of the top-ranking officers is constantly shifting with daily rises and falls in their attitudes. This group has long proclaimed its strong anti-Communist feelings and its ultimate intention of doing anything to rid the government of Communist influences. Various officers have declared themselves as willing to take action against the regime given just a little more time or just a little more encouragement.
/2/ It is probable that the rising pressure of events will compel this group to declare its position, one way or the other, at any time from now on--although the possible result could be split in the ranks. There are unconfirmed reports/3/ as of Saturday night/4/ to the effect that Colonel Diaz, the Chief of Staff, and some 40 officers had applied for asylum in various foreign embassies in Guatemala City, but these embassies have not yet confirmed this report. /2/A hand-drawn box surrounds the word "encouragement" and "justification" is written in the margin. /3/A line drawn from the word "reports" points to the word "rumors" written in the margin./4/June 19.
3. There were new defections on Saturday from the Guatemalan Airforce, one pilot flying out with his plane and several others obtaining asylum in the Salvadorian Embassy. The Guatemalan Airforce has thus far failed to produce any interception effort against the overflights against the Armas planes. However very heavy anti-aircraft fire is reported.4. There is thus far no evidence to confirm the charges and propaganda of the Guatemalan regime of bombing attacks upon Guatemala. On the contrary there are eyewitness accounts of clumsy efforts to fabricate evidence of aerial bombardment (the home of Colonel Mendoza
--one of the defecting airforce officers, was set on fire by the police). It is probable that some of the damage to oil storage facilities and other installations, attributed by the Guatemalan Government as well as by Castillo Armas, to bombing attacks is in fact the result of sabotage efforts on the part of Armas agents or other resistance elements.5. There is considerable evidence of a determination on the part of the Guatemalan Government to mobilize and arm Communist-controlled student youth and labor (agriculture) organizations. At the same time there is evidence of a hasty attempt to mobilize additional strength for the army.
6. There are strong indications of mounting tension between the army and the Guardia Civil
--the Communist-influenced police organization.7. We cannot confirm that either Puerto Barrios or San Jose has fallen to the Armas forces, but it is clear that there have been uprisings in these and other cities. A bridge on the key railroad line between Guatemala City and Puerto Barrios is reliably reported to have been damaged near Gualan.
Description of the Armas Movement
8. The action of Colonel Castillo Armas is not in any sense a conventional military operation. He is dependent for his success not upon the size and strength of the military forces at his disposal but rather upon the possibility that his entry into action will touch off a general uprising against the Guatemalan regime. The forces of Armas entering Guatemala from Honduras are estimated to number about 300 men. These have now been joined by others from inside the country to make a total in excess of 600 armed men. (The majority of this number is equipped with rifles, sub-machine guns and 50 mm mortars. These weapons are non-U.S. manufacture.) Armas himself is expected to leave his command post in Honduras today and join one element of his forces near Jutiapa by plane, but thus far there is no word that an airfield has become available. From the command post which he proposes to establish at this location, he will endeavor to coordinate the activities of his other scattered groups throughout the country.
9. The entire effort is thus more dependent upon psychological impact rather than actual military strength, although it is upon the ability of the Armas effort to create and maintain for a short time the impression of very substantial military strength that the success of this particular effort primarily depends. The use of a small number of airplanes and the massive use of radio broadcasting are designed to build up and give main support to the impression of Armas
' strength as well as to spread the impression of the regime's weakness.10. From the foregoing description of the effort it will be seen how important are the aspects of deception and timing. If the effort does not succeed in arousing the other latent forces of resistance within the next period of approximately twenty-four hours, it will probably begin to lose strength.
215. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
A. Authority to conduct flak suppression attacks on AA in Adam. It is understood in this connection that the positions to be attacked will be those most removed from barracks, buildings and any large concentrations of personnel.
B. Authority to bomb Hank. It is understood that this will not be done until after fullest warnings possible have been given, and adequate opportunity provided for garrison to evacuate.
A and B above constitute the full extent of authorization granted and you must be explicitly specific in your instructions to SHERWOOD in order that there is no opportunity for misunderstanding and no chance that your instructions will be given any broader interpretation. Essential to be avoided that your authorization will be construed by either command personnel or pilots as permitting any air-ground action against other types of targets or other localities.
2. DIR 05706 (OUT 55618),
/2/ para 5: we understand that you will comply and that you consider this can be done with minimum delay and distraction. /2/See footnote 2, Document 211.
A. Conflict still in two parts, first, strict military Calligeris phase, second, hope of army defection prompted by high level take over from regime.
B. First phase as yet wholly untested. Regime has chosen to permit initial movement unopposed. Small towns therefore have been taken without shot. Some volunteers have joined Calligeris but he has also suffered some defections so his forces are pitifully small.
C. Regime planning soon to start active opposition with Hank probably representing a significant moment in this phase. Calligeris victory which can only occur with authorized air action plus poor opposition or failure to defend prove great incentive both to Calligeris forces and for defection and internal resistance support. Chances of success are however slight considering small attacking forces plus prepared defenses.
D. Meanwhile no evidence of army take over in capital has appeared though there is still circumstantial evidence that army is split and not solidly behind regime.
E. Assuming either victory or defeat at Hank without substantial army defection or take over we will be faced with the necessity of providing Calligeris with all possible support.
2. In light above we believe:
A. Must be in position give all possible support military action not only to aid its success but to prove to army that a foe of some power is involved. This includes the authority to give such air support as the military requirements demand.
B. Make air strikes against important targets such as POL storage at Adam and Bond as well as such possibilities as rail bridges, ammo dumps, etc. These have dual purpose of weakening opposition as well as possibly providing the proof allegedly required by [name not declassified] and army.
3. To extent that WSBURNT territory is taken by Calligeris possibility of controlling air strips increases and landing arms or taking off for missions though something of a formality due lack fuel, mat?riel, etc, can occur.
A. Conclusion. A strictly military type situation has materialized and it must be treated as such or complete defeat accepted. We urge former and request authority on a broad rather than piecemeal basis to take actions set forth in paras 2 A and B above as situation requires. Such authority may not achieve success but lack of same in our opinion will probably mean total defeat in about 48 hours. This conclusion has been forced on us by refusal to date of army to act against regime.
5. Above request not based on feeling that LINC views differ from those of Hqs but on inevitable time lags resulting from communications. Reversals once they begin will only be prevented if at all by quickest possible counter action.
217. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala
2. We have just finished further extensive review of matter following receipt your ref A and after discussion with LINC which agrees completely with our conclusions, we have decided authorize strafing attack against major petroleum storage facilities Adam but no bombs for Adam area. Also you should know our decision authorizing bombing of Hank matter scheduled for tomorrow afternoon still stands and Station should be fully prepared to make best possible exploitation with [name not declassified] of flak suppression at Adam air field, strafing attack on Adam oil tanks, and bombing of Hank. Surely combination of these three items should provide sufficient persuasion to anyone who says that he must have show of aerial force (bomb) to make him move.
3. We trust you will not think we have taken lightly or acted in disregard of your most serious injunctions to us. We have given this our very best thought and have of course been forced to take into account broader considerations as seen from ZRMETAL including the terrible press our side is getting, plus the intensive interest focused on WSBURNT situation, culminating in proceedings of this afternoon. (For one thing we have been partially but only partially influenced by desirability of avoiding making honest man out of your pal Willie before eyes of so many correspondents and foreign diplomats. With respect to latter would any of these be willing support your true version of facts on bombings with their respective home press and UN representatives?)
4. For Station: Have you yet seen or heard tell of [name not declassified] since Friday?/3/ If not do you have any prospects of another meeting?
/3/June 18.
A. The international explosion touched off by WSBURNT can be of tremendous value in crystallizing Commie/noncommie issue particularly if noncommie elements hold firm.
B. As record now stands noncommies are in good shape whether before UN or OAS. WSBURNT has made probable false charges
(1) U.S. pilots shot down in Mexico. This issue in addition to being false when made is irrelevant since granting Calligeris the weapons his use of them should be debated with him.
C. Despite noncommie strength on above issues there are others which in our opinion need strengthening or might weaken or even destroy fabric noncommie position.
(1) Probable aspects of support extraterritorial to WSBURNT. Obviously WSHOOFS and KMFLUSH are the major issues. Sooner or later the Commie attack will begin fixing on known details.
(2) President WSHOOFS appears weak man beset by turbulent political situation in which untrustworthy friends and hungry foes are present. Should he fail to stand firm he is in a position to do serious damage.
(3) KMFLUSH also presents problems. President is involved to eyeballs but we believe for perfectly practical reasons. Being called names is of no moment to him. To be in a position to negotiate benefits from PBPRIME is of great moment to him.
(4) Being aircraft base [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] we think can and will refuse entry investigating group without better supported charges than now exist and will aggressively support all other delaying actions. In return he will however expect what he considers reasonable PBPRIME backing and aid. Failing that he might turn on PBPRIME which would be serious.
2. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Believe preliminary steps could and should start now on an official basis maintaining fiction of no PBPRIME connection PBSUCCESS. Ambassadorial approaches could be made to Presidents in KMFLUSH and WSHOOFS to discuss UN/OAS issues. At same time KMFLUSH/WSHOOFS Ambassadors PBPRIME could be called for high level interview to discuss same issues.
3. This treatment we believe would be recognized as evidence of backing and what is necessary to obtain joint positions should be discoverable without any need for discussing relations to PBSUCCESS. Joint positions must be achieved both for UN/OAS as well as basis continued support PBSUCCESS.
4. In addition to above essential that for diplomatic battle the hole created by non-participation DTFROGS should be filled. Do not know what can be done with present ODACID team but every effort to gain support would be justified. If considered useful Reelfoot can be sent to Hqs to be available for any action this connection.
5. Finally should fight WSBURNT in UN exclusively and solely on issues now drawn without permitting other problems to be introduced.
A. Preference WSBURNT for UN over OAS jurisdictionally improper and clear proof of own weakness and need for aid outside hemisphere from Soviet.
B. Soviet position direct confirmation of A.
6. Die is cast and events may move fast. Thus feel lining up team essential and real chance to win victory over WSBURNT regardless failure Calligeris. While a failure to stay united with present allies in diplomatic battle can effectively destroy Calligeris victory.
2. We agree as argued ref A para 2A and ref B para 8 that it is necessary demonstrate reality of airpower controlled by Calligeris but capabilities wholly inadequate actually to defeat WSBURNT army all over the country. Accordingly purpose must be to demonstrate power in manner best calculated to impress army and impair its morale. Since impossible inflict crippling damage, little point trying cause large number casualties which might only foreclose defection. With this purpose in mind we do not agree with ref A para 3A that "a strictly military type situation has materialized."
3. In accordance foregoing strategic concept we have now authorized following air-ground action:
A. Flak suppression in Adam (ref C para 1A) and wherever required for defense of aircraft operating in support of ground forces.
B. Strafing of oil tanks in Adam.
C. (In response to ref D) fullest air support of attack on Hank including bombing.
4. Assume operation against Hank given highest priority today. Believe successful outcome here could be decisive importance and convinced news of effective air-ground action will quickly become known [name not declassified] and other WSBURNT military leaders in Adam and will serve as demonstration to them of power and determination.
5. With bulk of WSBURNT forces apparently moved out of capital we inclined to believe most effective targets from standpoint morale of army will also be away from Adam. Moreover UN cease-fire resolution, proposal for OAS or UN peace observation commission, and presence of press and diplomatic corps all lead us to conclude heavy political price would be paid for any bombing of Adam. According unwilling authorize at present despite ref E.
6. In order enable us give you broad enough authorization to permit forward planning and avoid delays request you supply list of possible targets (which need not be in great detail) with indication types of air-ground action contemplated, within strategic concept para 2 above. We will endeavor give you maximum authority.
1. Whiting and I have given most careful attention to your messages, particularly GUAT 906 (IN 19969) and GUAT 919 (IN 20161). 3. We cannot put the foreign posture of the country at the mercy of the demand of one army officer who refuses to accept other evidence which should be far more persuasive than one bomb for which follow-up potential did not exist. Here our judgment may or may not have been correct but circumstances of situation left us little alternative.
4. The developing situation, however, may create future opportunities where bombing of oil storage tanks or some clear military objective at Adam could be considered, although have some doubts as to over-all wisdom of this step. We will be glad to get your views.
5. Unless substantial elements of the army show signs of coming over the Calligeris effort may well be crushed although we do not propose to discount this effort as yet or fail to give him all practical aid within our power. For some time we have been apprehensive that high army leaders did not look upon Calligeris with great favor as a potential future leader and may prefer someone within their own ranks now in the country. If so, our next move should be to exert all possible influence to persuade the army that their next target must be Arbenz himself if they are themselves to survive and not be reduced to the status of an organization controlled by Communist commissars while more "trustworthy" Communist elements obtain the arms and favors of the Arbenz government: and that if the army acts it, not Calligeris, will rule the country. Please give us your thoughts on this.
6. For Chief of Station: Please pass your comments along with those of JMBLUG.
1. US press which for first three days was upside down and giving unbelievable support to the two Toriello principal themes, viz. "bombing" and "invasion", has begun to report more objectively and factually. World press, including certain very influential British papers, still giving out very damaging and inaccurate lines. Situation not helped by reporting of British Charg? Guat, one of whose telegrams to Foreign Office I saw yesterday quoting Toriello at length and then giving his own independent confirmation of bombing Guat City. He did not indicate your presence at meeting or any part your challenge to Toriello re bombing evidence. I remonstrated with Embassy about this and perhaps something will result.
2. In view of new Toriello appeal for UN action today,
2. Reports from ESCONSON 2 and 7 indicated Commies and Commie dominated workers claim they intend attack embassies of unfriendly govts and especially PBPRIME embassy where expect seize documentation proving ODYOKE 3. Strafing attack morning 22 June described by competent PBPRIME observer as pathetic. One small oil tank on outskirts of city hit but fire out in 20 minutes. Flak not suppressed. Plane apparently did not come lower than thousand feet at anytime. ESAGE, ESPERANCE.
4. Public impression is that attacks show incredible weakness, lack of decision, and fainthearted effort. Calligeris efforts widely described as farce. Anti Commie anti govt morale near vanishing point. ESPERANCE, ESQUIRE, ESTIMATOR, ESCONSON.
5. One lone plane attacking half heartedly at this stage of game gives impression weakness. If Adam targets to be attacked, suggest some show real strength. Display this morning far more damaging our cause than to govt and Commies. Govt widely accusing ODYOKE of being involved in this insurrection and the people believe this to be so. Weakness and lack of decision is attributed to ODYOKE and will be reflected in attitude of people and especially of Commies and pro govt irregulars toward lives and property of PBPRIME residents in WSBURNT. Only force and decision will be respected. Words are useless.
[place not declassified], June 22, 1954.
1. The text below represents a memorandum dated 18 June 1954 from the local ODACID Chief:
"The Honduran Ambassador told me President Osorio is somewhat cold to General Ydigoras Fuentes. He said that nevertheless, he and the Foreign Minister, Robert Canessa, are working on the President to obtain his backing for Ydigoras as they believe the latter to have sufficient popular support within Guatemala to head a possible government and to be the legal successor to the Presidency because Ydigoras polled a large number of votes despite the fact that he had to make a presidential campaign while in hiding.
"The Chief of Protocol, Ambassador Alvarez Vidaurre, said he personally believed Ydigoras to be intelligent and enterprising but that there were many people here who felt that he was more of a talker than a doer."
Franklin D. Mallek
A. Guillermo Toriello, Guat Forn Min, has lied repeatedly in claims of aerial bombardment of Guat. It is positively established that no bombs have fallen upon Guatemala City nor have any bombs fallen elsewhere in Guat according to all our info through 21 June. Hence in his announcements 18 B. Toriello also lied about invasion. Guat struggle no invasion. Liberation forces are made up of small group Guat patriots who have resisted communism and who organized themselves and have entered the nation to participate in and aid nation-wide revolt against Soviet foreign aggression personified by Commie take over in Guat. Official Guat Radio (TGW) itself stated, 19 June, "We call foreigners those who up to yesterday called themselves Guats." Radio, "Voice of Liberation" stated, "We are ones who carry true banner national sovereignty. As on 15 September 1821, we freed ourselves from Spanish throne, today we consummating independence C. Guat Govt continues reign terror as indicated DIR 05067 (OUT 54341) 2. Is suggested that attribution above can be based on wire service stories or "overheard on shortwave."
2. Do not use above figures on SHERWOOD.
2. Sergeant said he and men were terrified at possibility air bombardment and added that his commander, whose name he could not give though saying he a jefe rather than an officer, had stated army might have to turn against Arbenz. (Jefe is applied to officers of major up in rank).
3. Sergeant stated communications from Base Militar to palace now cut, that many soldiers were injured in strafing attack and that he "can not take more of that". He refused to give his name, unit, or other information except that he from Base Militar.
4. Also stated troops stationed along Barranca around cemetery and along Barranca to north of Matamoros.
5. Impression given by sergeant and two soldiers that they scared to death and would welcome opportunity to fold up.
2. Events over the weekend have left two alternatives:
B. Defeat.
3. I fear that concern for saving face in the UN, press and elsewhere may lead to the infinitely graver loss of face attendant on defeat. The "foreign posture of the country" in Latin America will be irreparably damaged by defeat in WSBURNT. If we win, nobody will listen to the Communist orders.
4. The issue now is how to wage the protracted struggle:
A. Give all support to Calligeris. We cannot afford destruction of his forces; better that they evade the enemy than be beaten. Calligeris still has three possibilities: at a maximum, he will win; or, he may trigger the army to revolt; at a minimum, he will simply keep tension alive. SUMAC has stated to me that the govt cannot stand prolonged tension. He repeated this one hour ago.
B. Step up the air offensive against the army, to induce defection or else crush it.
C. Step up the air offensive against the capital, to stir [name not declassified] remaining troops, encourage friends, frighten foes.
D. Replace the lost F E. If neither Calligeris nor the army win, continue air attack on the capital until STANDEL cracks.
5. The question between STANDEL and us is only this: who will capitulate last?
Would you please discuss with Holland and advise through your channels or instruct through Department, depending on decision reached, the following problem:
1. I cannot conscientiously order the evacuation of Americans from this post at the present time since, while I feel the situation is dangerous, it has not reached the point of chaos or disorder in the city.
2. However, it is generally agreed here that if Americans were evacuated it would be the greatest blow which the government could receive in the psychological field. At my last two meetings with Toreillo, he has become greatly upset each time I have mentioned evacuation.
2. Govt not telling people anything. Army communiqu?s mostly propaganda, contain few facts, political not military in style.
3. Feel it significant govt has not tried stage mass rallies. STANDEL, Commies apparently fear take any action precisely among the masses whose support they claim. Also no real evidence workers being armed.
4. Have searched without result for signs Commies might be planning desperate, last-ditch stand. Possibility remains, but at present appears more likely alleged die hards will claim they never red when tide has turned.
5. General impression is one of spongy, shapeless, gutless govt people. Among these blind, myopic one-eyed man can be boss.
6. Where as dramatic strike against capital would have been less useful in last few days, believe time for it, in view forgoing, rapidly coming again. With wounded returning, rumors about front will thrive. If favorable to us, we should reinforce them with air strikes; if unfavorable, we should counter them. Suggest 24 or 25 June.
7. Know this hard to believe, but people sitting here like kids watching for 4th July firecrackers to go off. The popular imagination is fascinated by the idea of bombs. To people, bombs will signify force majeure, turn of tide they do not understand PBPRIME sophistication, humane concern. Recommend we speak to these kids in kids language
A. Does not trust ERRATIC and has never seen him although ERRATIC has claimed Osorio support.
B. ERRATIC attempted on several occasions to arrange interview with him.
C. Osorio not supporting Calligeris.
D. Calligeris and ERRATIC individually too ambitious and ERRATIC should throw in his support with Calligeris.
/3/Dated June 13. (Ibid., Box 140, Folder 13)
3. Such policy statement to be followed quickly by State Dept release summarizing past, current U.S. support granted agrarian reforms many foreign countries, including Marshall Plan, Point Four Program, FAO, training foreign farm specialists in U.S., etc.
4. Simultaneously U.S. delegate U.N. Security Council, or other well placed govt spokesman, possibly with reference to documents suggested paras 2 and 3 above, but without delay, to present criticism of Arbenz reforms, drawing parallel to Chinese "agrarian reformers", emphasizing reform itself internal affair Guat people, we exclusively concerned with safeguarding Western Hemisphere against Communist conspiracy.
5. Criticism of Guat reforms considered essential to alienate liberal sympathies for Arbenz reform regime abroad, experts should be able furnish supporting facts. Off hand suggestions (true, not black):
A. Campaign against illiteracy bogged down since "cultural missions" sent countryside made Commie propaganda instead,
B. Penniless recipients of land must become indebted govt-controlled agrarian bank to buy farm implements, have to join Commie organizations (CNCG) to become eligible,
C. Roadbuilding essential to utilize land: building program slow since govt spends money propaganda, armaments (Atlantic highway workers recently eight weeks without pay, had to strike to be paid).
6. State Dept might consider above recommendations, consulting area experts countries enumerated para 1 above, for more precise evaluation impact Guat agrarian reform story there and appropriate adjustment U.S. counteraction.
2. Reply Oper Immediate.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 232.
(2) Airlifted MDAP arms used.
(3) Foreign invasion.
(4) Numerous bombings and strafings.
219. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
220. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala
221. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala
223. Dispatch From the CIA Chief of Station in [place not declassified] to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
General--Operational
Specific--Memo by ODACID Chief in re: General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes
224. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to CIA Stations in [3 places not declassified]
225. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
226. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
227. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to the Central Intelligence Agency
228. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to the Central Intelligence Agency
229. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
230. Telegram From the CIA Station in [place not declassified] to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
231. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency
232. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala
233. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
/4/Targets had already been bombed in other parts of the country earlier on June 24; this authorization was specifically for Guatemala City. (Telegram 951 from Guatemala City to PBSUCCESS Headquarters, June 24; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 91, Folder 6)
/5/At the same time the CIA authorized the use of fighters with non-Guatemalan fighter pilots for tactical support missions: "We give this approval reluctantly in view grave security risks inevitably involved and attach greatest importance to phasing out these pilots just as soon as others can be recruited." (Telegram 06394 to PBSUCCESS Headquarters, June 24; ibid.)
A. Recognized as legitimate military objectives;
B. So located and of such a character that attack would involve absolute minimum risk numerous civilian casualties, and minimum risk large scale casualties to troops not currently engaged in active operation against rebels;
C. Clearly identifiable.
3. Your proposed target Fortress Matamoros would seem to meet these conditions if [name not declassified] information is correct and reliable that this structure now used for storage arms and ammo and if large number of troops not quartered there.
4. Other appropriate target for your consideration: Petroleum storage in Adam. Judging from air photo, tanks are fairly remote from residential areas. Direct hit would produce spectacular results. Destruction petroleum reserves in Adam combined with subsequent attacks storage at Bond and Ike would have paralyzing effect on economic and military activities in WSBURNT.
5. As between the two targets, our preference is for Matamoros if sure about its use as arsenal since this is clearly military target and destruction would have minimum effect on civilians. If information about utilization doubtful, recommend petroleum storage.
6. You are hereby granted authority attack either target or both. Whichever selected, vitally important avoid wide miss resulting in heavy civilian casualties. Accordingly, pilot should be ordered take no chances if visibility poor.
7. Believe will be desirable, if attacks successful and effective, to follow up with leaflet drop emphasizing:
A. That only military targets were attacked;
B. Targets chosen to minimize even military casualties;
C. Usual line that liberation forces opposing regime, not army and that army can prevent regrettable damage to military installations by helping to liberate the country.
/3/Document 220.
2. As to immediate decisions, generally concur your instructions ref A on question desirability establishment new regime and announcement names of government members, believe must weigh two opposing considerations:
A. Early action desirable in order increase air of legitimacy of rebellion and make semi-official support possible sooner if movement successful.
B. Main danger this action that it will alienate army officers who either dislike Calligeris or simply prefer themselves control new regime.
3. On balance we conclude unwise announce provisional government now for reason given ref A par 1A and because effect of such action on army unevaluated. Meanwhile if traffic can stand it suggest message to Bannister, Page, and JMBLUG inquiring if they believe establishment provisional government now would reduce chances of action against Arbenz by army officers.
4. Regardless action by Calligeris believe desirable if contact re-established [name not declassified] by Page or Bannister to point out that if army moves decisively against Arbenz it rather than Calligeris will rule the country and to state that SKIMMER would support regime established by army even if it excluded Calligeris entirely. Well aware danger playing both groups simultaneously and naturally would greatly prefer outcome in which [name not declassified] and Calligeris combined forces. Nevertheless if sizable part of the army will really move it will be a stronger force than anything Calligeris has, except air power which we could control in a pinch. Line here proposed was suggested last sentence par 5 ref C.
5. If you agree para 4 above you may wish send appropriate instructions WSBURNT.
ERRATIC himself should be encouraged publicly to offer his services to Calligeris putting aside all past grievances, chips are down. Now is the moment for all anti-Communists to fight shoulder to shoulder. If he willing fine. If only half hearted or still personally ambitious tell him to keep to his hamburger stand.
Title: Kremlin Coordination of Guatemalan Moves
Evidence that the Guatemalan incident is a carefully considered and precisely coordinated Communist thrust at the Americas continues to mount.
The evidence that top-flight agents of the Kremlin are guiding all acts both in the field and on the diplomatic front can be found in the fact that events have a way of waiting on other events before they occur, plus the fact that this interlocking of a grand design is not local, but coordinated in all the Republics. This kind of an operation is beyond the scope of any national Communist group.
Here are some examples:
Not only do the Communists form and finance the Societies of the Friends of Guatemala, they work them like the pawns on a chess board. The entire lecture circuit from Santiago to Mexico City is coordinated; a vote in one society is instantly echoed in another; the wording of resolutions, although seemingly sponsored by men and people thousands of miles away from each other, is often absolutely identical. All these things are the mark of the experienced agent, rather than the political amateur.
The same skilled hand can be found on still a higher level, the diplomatic level. Guatemala Yesterday, Americans were treated to a view of the apparatus at work from top to bottom:
Guatemala bypassed the OAS.
The Soviet Union approved her bypassing.
The Security Council wanted the OAS.
The Soviet Union cast a veto to see that OAS did not get the problem.
That Guatemala presses for still another meeting of the Security Council.
Even as she presses, pickets are marching in front of the UN headquarters, carrying placards for Guatemala. The pickets organized by the American Peace Crusade, a Communist-front organization.
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge agrees that Guatemala should have another meeting of the Security Council.
Then comes the one slip of the day After Just a few minutes time and there would have been no need of the Tsarapkin demand; just a few minutes time and the world would not have got this first-hand picture of how closely-knit the overall plan is.
The hand within the glove had peeped out for just a second, and for a second time Streibert
Fast developing events on Guatemalan problem provide opportunity seize psychological offensive which urgent in view Commie massive propaganda campaign this issue world-wide. Posts urged promote fullest exploitation OAS actions reflecting insistence action within OAS Charter and Rio Treaty to settle Western Hemisphere disputes, in accordance Art 52 of UN Charter which specifically recognizes authority regional organizations. Show this action as countering recent Russian tactics designed to weaken both OAS and UN and maintain Commie foothold in Western Hemisphere. Appeal by Guatemala to UNSC members and Molotov Refer to USIA CA
1. From defector WSBURNT Embassy here we are advised that govt appears very shaky and that there is great confusion. He strongly recommends early announcement of evacuation US citizens from Guatemala as measure having profound adverse effect on regime stability.
2. In light of this information which supports your original views, we feel you should make statement re evacuation plans soonest advising us when this done and also text your statement so can be released to press here. We doubt censorship will let pass text of statement you make. We do not know precise terms your instructions or guidance from ODACID this subject but understand initiative left with you. However, it remains our view this should be done on basis you stating that govt is arranging facilities and will assist those depart who wish go now. The actual working out of details of departures and arrangements less important than shock effect of announcement so no reason delay announcement to this effect. And if ODACID wants order general evacuation later let that come on in due course.
3. Because of operational difficulties and extra load on communications which it would create, we recommend against massive airlift evacuation operation.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by [name not declassified] and released by [name not declassified] at Wisner's direction.
06737. Recommend one more adverse reference to UFCO by SHERWOOD. Reports arriving here that since UFCO not attacked by RUFUS he must be UFCO man. Believe you have proper line for this already; viz. new regime will not put up with UFCO if it persists reactionary outmoded tactics and unsatisfactory labor relations.
2. Army capacity to act vs STANDEL much diminished by move to field.
3. STANDEL apparently planning hold out at least till army defeated, possibly longer. But indications are good part of army would quit fighting if no longer bound by STANDEL authority.
4. If foregoing true, would appear leave us two alternatives:
A. Destroy army in field and march on capital.
B. [1 line of source text not declassified] possibly follow up with airborne invasion of capital while army away.
5. Do not know front situation or Calligeris capabilities, [2 lines of source text not declassified].
"ERRATIC refuses join Calligeris as he states invasion plan being followed contrary his recommendations and convictions. Further, does not see how he could help at Esquipulas at present.
Is recommending to followers in DTFROGS they proceed via WSHOOFS to aid Calligeris.
Is sending [name not declassified] to WSHOOFS soon to contact Calligeris organization. [name not declassified] just arrived from WSBURNT with intel info. [1 line of source text not declassified]"
GUAT 973 3. The above recommendation is made in ignorance of possible station capabilities in this regard, and of course, other possibilities would probably suggest themselves to Guat Station.
4. The result should be beneficial to PBS by clarifying whether [name not declassified] is on our side or not by seeing who he goes to. If he is unconcerned by the threat, he is not really our man. If he is made desperate he may act where previously he has waited for someone else. He may make a bold bid to move the army to his control, assassinate Arbenz, or take asylum. Any of these courses would be good, because in the last case he would not be in a position to complicate things when the Callegeris forces are successful.
[name not declassified]
234. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
235. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]
236. Circular Telegram From the United States Information Agency to Certain Posts
237. Telegram From the United States Information Agency to Certain Posts
238. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
239. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala
240. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
241. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
242. Telegram From PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]
243. Memorandum From [name not declassified] of the Central Intelligence Agency to J.C. Esterline of the Central Intelligence Agency
Proposal to Burn [name not declassified]
244. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
2. Since army has shown no guts in past do not believe they can be expected to show courage now.
3. Believe govt on point of surrendering.
4. Have briefed JMBLUG that govt must agree to following points act or deny statements issued by Calligeris:
A. Arrest Communist and other leaders responsible for situation.
"1. Very distressed on return here to note serious distortion of Guatemalan developments in US and foreign press. This distortion made worse by apparent inability or unwillingness grasp true significance these developments plus effects of iron clad press (both foreign and domestic) censorship by Guat Gov "2. Among distressing reports was an Agence France Presse cable which completely missed the boat and was heavily picked up in Europe chiefly Scandinavia.
"3. Because of former association and continued unofficial access to facts and great personal concern over how this whole thing looked in the newspapers, I have done some checking.
"4. If you consider advisable would appreciate your conveying following as message from me to Fernand Moulier which he can feel free to use in AFP provided no personal or official attribution.
"5. The Guatemalan situation is not a banana republic fracas. It is an actual Guatemalan uprising against a Communist regime and Communist apparatus which is definitely linked to Moscow. That link is not a casual ideological or intellectual link "6. The fact that the revolt apparently started outside Guatemala proper and thereby handed the Communists the word "7. The "8. Arbenz regime statement that churches have been bombed is completely false. Falsity established by actual eyewitness testimony.
"9. Also false is Arbenz statement that Guatemala City has been bombed. A barracks on outskirts used as an arsenal was bombed but destruction of Mendoza House within Guatemala City, which was used by Arbenz as evidence bombing, was according to several eyewitnesses and neighbors arsoned by regime police in order provide an exhibit.
"10. The United Fruit Co. simply does not figure in this thing at all. In fact expect Armas to make public soon his private determination not to allow Fruit Company get away with traditional reactionary policies labor and otherwise.
"11. The 2000 ton shipment of Czechoslovak arms shipped via Swedish freighter out of Stettin, with false documents, was no invention. This ten million dollar consignment of arms actually landed in Guatemala and was taken over by Arbenz and represents, in relation to the size of the regime military forces, a colossal shipment completely unbalancing the armament equilibrium of that area. This by no means only such procurement of arms by Guatemala.
"12. Arbenz is using part of these weapons to arm Communist-led civilian terror commandos who have received secret instructions to prepare for wholesale civilian massacres when the signal is given. In the meantime Arbenz has publicly announced that he will execute ten hostages for every bomb dropped.
"13. Finally, and to repeat, this is a very serious business. The stakes are not the dividends of the United Fruit Company. The stakes are whether or not imperial Communism shall have a tactical command post in Central America within a few miles of the Panama Canal and in position undermine neighboring states. Instead of yelling about Yankee imperialism and invasion the free world should be grateful that a handful of brave but maybe pathetically comical exiles got the pitch and decided to do something about it."
2. FYI. There remains no choice but fight unless STANDEL
1. Arbenz is out but Diaz 4. Tell Diaz bombings to start noon 28 June and will not stop until liberation army occupies palace or Diaz agrees to terms announced.
5. Target but don 6. SHERWOOD to keep steady strong appeal that anti-Communists are victorious and Diaz must agree cease fire before hundreds of innocent army men die in lost cause. Only way to stop bloodshed is to drive communism out. No other solution acceptable.
1. Dir urgently recommends Calligeris [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] emphatically declare independence from UFCO and allay labor fears liberation regime might return to Ubico A. Present labor union leadershiphall usurped by Commies, tied in with Moscow-led WFTU, CTAL. These Commie leaders must go.
B. Future labor unions will be protected against Commie infiltration and against intimidation or other restrictions by either domestic or foreign employers. Free union elections, collective bargaining, other basic labor rights guaranteed.
C. Liberation govt will protect interests entire people against any predatory financial powers, whether domestic or foreign. Unlike Commies who used UFCO only as propaganda stick, not finding any solution, new govt will reduce role foreign capital in line with country 3. Advise immediately LINC, Dir, result your talk with [name not declassified], report further action taken by him.
/3/Document 250.
2. LINC also believes every effort should be made to follow up this maneuver as rapidly as possible with show of strength and does not concur with JMBLUG 3. Conditions of cease-fire established in LINC 4362 (IN 22435) 5. Needless to say Lincoln fully concurs with JMBLUG
1. As result all day meeting with STANDEL 1 and General Staff, it has been determined that STANDEL 1 will assume presidency tonight. Then have agreed to move immediately on seizing Commie leaders and sending them out of country. They have refused to deal with Calligeris and sought good offices of PBPRIME to bring about cease fire on both sides.
2. It is my opinion that once STANDEL is out tonight, they should be forced to deal with Calligeris. I personally do not wish to become part of another Mihailovich 3. I do not trust the army leaders either on anti-communism or on keeping faith with PBPRIME. They are collaborators with communism and must pay penalty in form Calligeris assumption of presidency.
4. Our first victory has been won but not the battle. Please consult Holland on this matter in conjunction with my formal reports to him. In other words, force negotiations. If necessary, have Holland send me such instructions.
/3/Apparently wrong ref. See DIR 06759 (OUT 57820)." [Footnote in the source text. Telegram 6759 is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 3.]
/4/Document 252.
2. Ref C was sent before receiving STANDEL 4. On theory full advantage should be taken of first enemy weakness LINC has directed air strikes for Adam afternoon 28 June on TGW transmitter bldg, Matamoros and flak suppression. Anticipate this show of strength will provide substance to any consideration of Calligeris
B. Declaration martial law.
C. Cessation of hostilities.
245. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]
246. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala
248. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala
249. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency
250. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to the Central Intelligence Agency
251. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala
252. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles
The Sec. asked if there is anything new, and AWD said there are a lot of messages--with several very good ones from Peurifoy. AWD doesn't like Diaz--he was put in by Arbenz./2/ They are maneuvering to get him out and get a better army officer in. They are trying to keep our own forces intact and not get too deeply engaged. They are sending out propaganda to the effect that officers in the field better go home quick or they will be taken. They have superior forces--the other side--and our side must use more air power. There may be a bombing attack on the radio. The bombing has been excellent and effective. AWD said he is looking into the British ship matter./3/ No authority was given for this. However, we can't say it. AWD said he will try to make it appear that Arbenz' boys thought this might get us involved. /2/Among other reasons, the CIA was critical of D?az for allowing Arbenz to make a farewell broadcast in which he blamed the United States for the crisis and said "US aviators and other mercenaries had unleashed fire and death on civilians." (Telegram 1125 from Guatemala City, June 28, 1954; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 175, Folder 1)
/3/On June 27 the rebel air force mistakenly sank a British freighter carrying coffee and cotton. See Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p. 340.
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