Docs 1-31
January 1-29: The Continuing Search for Peace and Preparations for the Enemy's Winter-Spring Offensive
1. Editorial Note
On January 1, 1968, Radio Hanoi broadcast an official North Vietnamese statement made by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh during a reception for a visiting delegation from Mongolia on December 29, 1967, in Hanoi. Trinh's remarks seemed to refine earlier official remarks and categorically affirmed the single condition under which his government would enter into discussions on peace in Vietnam. The key part of Trinh's statement reads:
"If the American government really wants conversations, as clearly stated in our declaration of January 28, 1967, it must first unconditionally cease bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. After the cessation of bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the DRV will start conversations with the United States on relevant problems."
For the full text of the statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pages 1055-1057. The operative term used in Trinh's statement was that talks "will" follow a halt rather than "could," as mentioned in previous proclamations. On January 3 Mai Van Bo, the North Vietnamese representative in Paris, told French Foreign Minister Etienne Manac'h that the statement was the "direct answer to President Johnson." In addition, he elaborated that "we will guarantee that the conversations will be explicit (claires) and serious." (Telegram 8741 from Paris, January 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/RAMS)
The statement was perceived by the United States, however, as neither innovative nor radically different from past intransigence on Hanoi's part. In a news conference on January 4, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that the "use of the word 'will' instead of 'could' or 'would' seems to be a new formulation of that particular point, but that leaves a great many questions still open." He suspected the sincerity of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in light of the fact that the North Vietnamese ordered an offensive for the winter season and already violated the holiday truces. For Rusk's remarks, see Department of State Bulletin, January 22, 1968, pages 116-124.
South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu stated that he "saw no real change" in the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister's formulation for peace. (Telegram 14927 from Saigon, January 3; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-VIET S) The Consulate in Hong Kong, the primary U.S. post for "China-watching," described the Trinh statement as "a flat contradiction" of China's position on Vietnam and thus a reflection of the policy differences between the North Vietnamese and the Chinese. (Telegram 3774 from Hong Kong, January 3; ibid., POL 27 VIET S) According to an Intelligence Note from Thomas Hughes, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Secretary of State Rusk, January 12, Hanoi responded harshly to the tepid U.S. response; the North Vietnamese accused the United States of distorting Trinh's statement, putting forward "arrogant" and "insolent" conditions for a halt, and continuing the escalation of the war. (Ibid.)
2. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 3, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Goldberg and approved in S/S on January 6.
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam and the Security Council--Part 6 of 7
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Goldberg and Ambassador Dobrynin
In mid-December Ambassador Dobrynin approached me at a large social function and indicated a strong desire for a private meeting with me at an early date. After checking with the Secretary and with his concurrence, I arranged a luncheon in the Secretary's private dining room for the Ambassador and myself on January 3, 1968. My talk with Ambassador Dobrynin covered a wide variety of topics, and our discussion of two and one-half hours is briefly summarized as follows:
We then talked briefly about Viet Nam and the Security Council./2/ I told him that our final decision had not been made but then asked whether in light of the recent statements out of Hanoi the Soviet position about UN involvement had changed in any way. Dobrynin replied that insofar as he was aware their position remained the same against UN involvement and then frankly in response to a question from me stated that their position would, as in the past, be determined by Hanoi's attitude. He added that it had been their view for some time that the NLF position was not necessarily the same as Hanoi's and expressed the private opinion that it would be highly useful to explore possibilities through the NLF. I then asked for his reaction to the recent statement of Foreign Minister Trinh of North Vietnam./3/ He disclaimed any official information about the statement but added that it was not surprising since Hanoi had stated the same position to Kosygin last February. He added that Kosygin had communicated this to us at the time./4/ I inquired whether in light of Trinh's statement, the Soviets as a co-chairman of the Geneva Conference would feel at great liberty to join with the British in reconvening the conference. He replied that the bombing still stood in the way. He then asked as to the meaning of the President's San Antonio statement/5/ and I replied that I thought the statement spoke for itself and that I had tried at the UN to express the same concept when I said that negotiations or discussions could only take place under circumstances which would not disadvantage either side. He then asked whether the words meaningful or fruitful negotiations were not conditions and I said rather than being conditions they were a simple statement that negotiations would have to be good faith negotiations.
/2/For the debate over whether to introduce the issue of Vietnam in the UN Security Council, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Documents 421 ff.
/3/See Document 1.
/4/Reference is to talks Kosygin held with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson in February 1967; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Documents 39 ff.
/5/The President's San Antonio address of September 26, 1967, established a formula for a bombing halt, provided the halt was followed by "prompt and productive" discussions with the North Vietnamese who would not take advantage militarily of the cessation. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 995-999. See also Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 340.
3. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, January 3, 1968, 2:55 p.m..
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and McNamara, January 3, 1968, 2:55 p.m., Tape F68.01, Side A, PNO 2. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. Johnson called McNamara from his ranch in Texas, where he remained until January 13. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
President: Bob?
McNamara: Yes, Mr. President?
President: Dean just called me and says that he thinks there's some re-strikes scheduled that could be misinterpreted because of Sihanouk and because of the Romanians./2/ It looks like every time we get to where we can get in with the weather, why something happens, and I guess the weather is not too good anyway, but--
/2/See Document 5 and footnote 4, Document 14.
McNamara: Mr. President, I can't quite hear you.
President: I say, Dean just called me and said that there were some re-strikes scheduled in the Hanoi area and because of the Sihanouk thing and because of the Romanian thing that he questioned the wisdom of our going in. I asked Buzz [Wheeler] what was scheduled. He said that there was nothing important except the two bridges and they didn't need to be hit for the next day or two. I wanted to get your judgment on what you thought about it. Dean Rusk suggested I call you./3/
/3/Rusk called the President at 2:38 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of this conversation has been found. Johnson then called Wheeler at 2:47 p.m. He informed Wheeler that Rusk told him that strikes, including the re-strikes, which he believed did not involve any especially significant targets, should be prohibited in the area around Hanoi for a few days due to the situation in Cambodia and the involvement of the Romanians in the peace process. Wheeler replied that the re-strikes on two bridges in Hanoi were important and that McNamara had told him that he was not keen on Rusk's proposal. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Wheeler, Tape F68.01, Side A, PNO 1)
McNamara: There are a total of 11 targets authorized for re-strike in the 5-mile area, and 3 other targets that have not yet been struck but are authorized for strike, and therefore 14 targets authorized on which action would be deferred by Dean's proposal. I talked to Buzz about it. It was my view, and I think he shared it as he evidently expressed to you, that deferral of strikes in that 5-mile circle for a period of days would not be serious. The weather's been bad, we haven't been hitting them regularly anyhow, so I would support Dean's view, although I must also say that I don't think the political gain of these deferrals is very great either.
President: I don't think we get any gain but we might get some damage just from propaganda-wise, and they always like to use this as a standard operating excuse.
McNamara: Well, you probably know that two Los Angeles Times reporters are writing a book on this theme and that sways my judgment as much as anything, the exact point that you just made. And their book could be very damaging and it would be worse if we went in there in a slam-bang strike when the weather was good and gave any basis for Hanoi or Cambodia or the Romanians for criticizing us. So I supported Dean's view and I told him to tell that to you.
President: Well, then, let's just tell them, and you tell him that I've talked to you, I wanted to get all the information before I did, and you tell him and tell Buzz for me, let's hold it off for 2 or 3 days and we'll talk about it a couple of days from now.
McNamara: It might be helpful, in the orders that go out to the field, if we could put a date on it, subject of course to later change.
President: I'd tell them 2 or 3 days.
McNamara: Just 2 or 3--it would probably be better if I gave them a date, such as today, the 3d. Would the 6th be appropriate?
President: Yeah, that's all right.
McNamara: Tentatively the 3d through the 6th.
President: That's all right. Of course, if Sihanouk told us to go to hell in the morning, and the Romanians, whatever came of that, but I guess that's all right.
McNamara: All right, we'll bring it up to you again.
President: Why don't you just--yeah. That's all right. Or why don't you just tell them not to strike until further notice and that you expect that there will be at least a 72-hour deferral.
McNamara: That's better.
President: We anticipate a 72-hour deferral. Do not strike within 5 miles of Hanoi until further word.
McNamara: That's good.
President: And then we can give them notice and do it and it doesn't look too bad for the record with other folks.
McNamara: Yes, very good. I'll do that, Mr. President.
President: Any other news?
McNamara: No, sir. I talked to Charlie Schultze/4/ today about the problem of a no tax bill and the expenditure reductions, and you had talked to him after you had talked to me, and he and I discussed how we'd go about it on the Defense and non-Defense side and he and I are in accord that we're going to try to get $3 billion of expenditure reduction out of Defense and $3 billion out of non-Defense. I've being working with my comptroller here, I haven't told anyone else in the Department, but I would hope by Saturday to have a list of the kinds of actions we'd have to take to get that $3 billion expenditure reduction.
/4/Director of the Office of Management and Budget Charles L. Schultze.
President: Good. Well, let me know when you're done. I'll be seeing you. You call me now.
McNamara: I'll do it right away.
4. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, January 4, 1968, 0510Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 3J-Bombing Mistakes. Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only. This telegram was received at the LBJ Ranch Communications Center at 1:05 a.m. on January 4. The notation "ps" on the telegram indicates that the President saw it. The President stayed at the Ranch from December 26, 1967, through January 13, 1968.
CAP 80092. 1. Jim Jones has asked me for comment on the Westinghouse interview with Bo in Paris./2/ It must, of course, be combined with the Trinh formula presented at the Outer Mongolian banquet/3/ and combined with other evidence as well.
/2/In a January 3 interview with Bernard Redmont, a correspondent for the Westinghouse Broadcasting Corporation, Bo reportedly had "confirmed more clearly than ever that Hanoi is willing to open peace talks at once if the bombing and all other acts of war against North Vietnam are halted." See The New York Times, January 4, 1968.
/3/See Document 1.
2. I shall, therefore, divide this report into three parts:
--analysis of Bo and Trinh statements;
--other evidence and analysis of it;
--conclusions and recommendations.
I. Trinh and Bo
3. On the face of it the Trinh and Bo statements meet all but one of the criteria--more or less--built into the San Antonio formula:
--"prompt". The Westinghouse broadcast, for the first time, says "Hanoi is willing to open peace talks at once if the bombing etc., are halted."
--"productive". In both the Westinghouse and the Trinh statements Hanoi paraphrases productive as "conversations on problems interesting the two parties." In line with the Buttercup formula,/4/ the Westinghouse interview sharply distinguishes those problems between the U.S. and the North (U.S. operations against North Vietnam plus anything reciprocal they would do with the South) from those matters appropriate to the NLF and Saigon in the South.
/4/See Document 6.
--"assuming". There is no word in public at all, in either the Trinh or the Westinghouse statements, responding to your "assumption" that Hanoi would not "take advantage" of a bombing pause.
4. This is clearly the greatest gap between Hanoi's apparent present position and San Antonio formula; that is they do not address themselves at all to the DMZ problem.
5. Now look at these formulae from Hanoi's previous point of view:
--They have dropped "could" for "will"; they have dropped "permanently," leaving only "unconditionally" which could be as much to our advantage as theirs, because it leaves us freedom of action to resume bombing if in our judgement they do not meet our "assumption."
6. In short, Hanoi, so far as the public record is concerned, has left us in the position of having some kind of response to all the elements in the San Antonio formula except reciprocal restraint at the DMZ; since we can continue to bomb in Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail even during a pause.
II. Other Evidence
7. It is certain that these moves by Hanoi are, at least part--and perhaps wholly--an effort to exert increased political and psychological pressure on you to stop bombing the North. I say this for two reasons:
--We know for certain that various Eastern European friends of Hanoi have been urging them for some time to present a better face to the world by being "more flexible."
--If they were one hundred percent serious about ending the war they would have used a secret channel to us, not the public prints, to shift their position and find accommodation with the San Antonio formula.
8. Having said this, I must also say that I think we must keep our minds open to the possibility that they have decided it is more in their interest to end the war before the November 1968 election than after the election.
9. For at least a year we have known the object of their military operations was not victory in the field in Vietnam but political victory in the United States. We have generally believed they're holding out until November 1968 in the hope that American political life would produce a Mendes-France who would accept defeat as the French did in 1954. But they may have decided now that a pre-election Johnson will give them a better deal than a post-election Johnson or a Nixon-Rockefeller-Reagan with four years to go.
10. Whether this transition in their thoughts has--or has not--taken place, the following are facts with which we must reckon:
--They have told the Viet Cong cadres all over South Vietnam that the purpose of the winter-spring offensive is to yield as soon as a coalition government which the NLF will dominate: they are now promising their long suffering cadres peace; and this is an important hostage to fortune.
--The new NLF program shifts the NLF from being "the sole legitimate representative of the South Vietnamese people" to being a participant in a coalition government.
--There is Buttercup, the most persuasive of all the approaches we have thus far had.
--In at least one South Vietnamese province (Long An) the Viet Cong province leader is promising peace by Tet to his people.
--The Russians have been denouncing Mao as having turned Asia over to the United States to organize by frightening the peoples of Southeast Asia with "Hitlerite" domination (Soviet speeches on this theme sound very much like our own speeches about the emergence of the new Asia).
--Hanoi has begun to spread the concept of a neutralized Southeast Asia--not dominated by any other major power; and Hanoi is also beginning to establish ties to France, Singapore, and elsewhere looking, apparently, to its postwar development.
--A Rumanian envoy is coming here on January 5th with a message from Hanoi;/5/ and we are returning Buttercup/2 to meet Buttercup/1 the same day.
/5/See Document 5.
III. Conclusions and Recommendations
11. Keep our powder dry: unless proved to the contrary we must plow ahead with our present plans in both South Vietnam and with respect to the bombing of the North. We are engaged in a test of nerve and will in which we are being measured every day. We should not draw back from our present dispositions and operations unless we have reasons of substance to do so.
12. We must accept that we are being subjected, at the minimum, to a major Hanoi psychological warfare offensive to get us to stop bombing in order to permit them more cheaply to prolong the war in the South.
13. We should make no move on the Trinh-Westinghouse formula until we hear out the Rumanian envoy on January 5th-6th. Then we must make clear to the envoy and to Hanoi that the San Antonio formula is rock-bottom. You meant every word that you said about the San Antonio formula in your TV interview.
14. But if the Rumanian message is reasonably forthcoming, we will face a very tough problem:
--should you have a bombing pause and talks "at once" even if you do not have prior assurance on the "assumption" of "no taking advantage";
--or, should you first negotiate and insist on the assumption of reciprocal action from either side.
15. This is a matter of which, of course, you must judge in the light of all the evidence at the time. We have not heard the Rumanian yet. I would, however, make this observation: if there is any chance for peace, it is because they want it before 1968. Therefore, we should, if we get a reasonably forthcoming response from the Rumanians, take it slowly and carefully despite the pressures that are already building at home and abroad. To make it precise, I think we should send the Rumanians back to check out the "assumption" before we actually stop bombing--assuming that they confirm at a formal diplomatic level the Trinh and Westinghouse statements.
16. Finally, we must watch sensitively the Buttercup channel and other indicators of the possibility of a Southern negotiation. Both the Westinghouse broadcast and Buttercup have, as I noted initially, made the same sharp distinction:
--between a Southern negotiation to settle the political shape of South Vietnam;
--and a U.S.-Hanoi negotiation to stop the bombing (with NVN reciprocal action) and thus set the stage for the reinstallation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962--to which the Westinghouse interview refers explicitly.
17. In short, Mr. President, I am beginning to believe my judgement at the time of Ho's letter to you a year ago/6/ could be wrong. I then said that peace was beyond our grasp until after the November 1968 election. I am now beginning to open my mind to the possibility that Hanoi may have decided that time is no longer its friend--either on the battle fields of Vietnam or the battle fields of U.S. politics. But, I repeat, a part of what we see is certainly not diplomacy but political pressure against us.
/6/For Ho Chi Minh's February 1967 letter to President Johnson, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 82.
18. On both counts, therefore, we must be prepared to respond actively to what we hear from the Rumanians on January 5-6 and to what emerges from Buttercup. At a certain point you may wish to cease the initiative. Instead of counterpunching you may wish to hold their feet to the fire on both the San Antonio formula and your five points on TV. If you wish this scenario pursued I can continue; but that's enough for tonight.
5. Record of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 5, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject Files, M-Man. Secret; Nodis; Packers. Typed at the top of the page is the notation: "Dean--At Walt's request I prepared this memo to go to the Ranch. It's inadequate but best I could do briefly on four hours talk. Ben has sent it over to Walt. Averell." In telegram CAP 80115 to the President, January 5, Rostow suggested Vance, Clifford, Bundy, Taylor, or Lodge as the negotiator if Packers was successful in producing a halt and subsequent talks. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, PACKERS (II) continued)
Following are the highlights of this morning's meeting between Governor Harriman and the Romanian First Deputy Foreign Minister, Macovescu, lasting over two hours followed by lunch:
1. As a result of their conversations with Governor Harriman in Bucharest,/2/ President Ceausescu and Prime Minister Maurer sent Macovescu to Hanoi. Macovescu was in Hanoi for four days in mid-December and had a number of meetings with Vietnamese officials, including one long one with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and two with Foreign Minister Trinh.
/2/For an account of the meetings of November 28-29, 1967, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 411. In a January 2, 1968, meeting, Bogdan told Bundy and Davidson that Macovescu and his staff would arrive on January 5 and would be prepared to stay "as many days as necessary to have all contacts and to fulfill his mission." Bogdan added that he thought Macovescu "had something" of importance as a result of his meetings in Hanoi. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PACKERS)
2. After extended discussion, Macovescu was told in writing with verbal explanations that:
(a) Hanoi will undertake talks with U.S. at any mutually agreeable place, after bombardment of North Vietnam has unconditionally ceased. However, no interval of time before the meeting was specified. Demand for permanent cessation of bombardment was definitely dropped.
(b) At the talks Hanoi would put forward its four points and the NLF program as basis for settlement. However, Hanoi understands the United States to have a different position and is prepared to engage in serious discussions.
(c) There was no mention of the NLF being present at the talks, nor limitation of subjects to be covered.
In addition, Macovescu explained in detail to North Vietnamese the meaning of the assumption of "no advantage" to be taken of the cessation of bombardment--namely, no increase in the flow of men and supplies to the South or attack across the DMZ. However, Hanoi characterized the "no advantage" formula as a condition and maintained an unwillingness to indicate its position. Macovescu clearly understands the adverse effect of a breakdown in negotiations if Hanoi were to take advantage of the cessation of bombardment and is certain he explained it fully to North Vietnamese.
Macovescu stopped in Peking on his return and reported to Chinese Foreign Office official Romanian and U.S. positions but not Hanoi's. At first, Chinese appeared to oppose negotiations but at end stated it was a question for Hanoi to decide.
Macovescu is under instructions for Ceausescu and Maurer to see the President before his return.
Harriman was impressed by Macovescu's meticulous care in clarity of his statements and answers to his questions in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding on our part of Hanoi's position. It seems clear that Trinh's statement of December 28 resulted from Macovescu's visit.
A fuller memcon/3/ is being prepared which the Secretary of State will bring with him on Sunday./4/ In the meantime, he is seeing Macovescu at 11:00 Saturday morning./5/
/3/Dated January 5. (Ibid.)
/4/January 7.
/5/In the meeting the next day, Macovescu told Rusk and Harriman: "The leaders of my government, President Ceausescu and Prime Minister Maurer, believe that at present there is a minimal set of conditions required to start conversations with the government in Hanoi. We believe that it is in your interest (and here I emphasize that we have no intention of interfering in your internal affairs), the interest of Hanoi and the interest of world peace that a gesture be made towards peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam." (Memorandum of conversation, January 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PACKERS)
6. Editorial Note
The contacts between the United States and the National Liberation Front (NLF) known as Buttercup began in the fall of 1967 and continued through early 1968. The immediate objective of the Buttercup operation was to secure the exchange of prisoners; both parties also viewed it as a possible means for generating a dialogue on political issues. For documentation on the operation in 1967, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume V, Documents 341 ff. On January 5, 1968, the intermediary Truong Binh Tong and Mai Thi Vang, the wife of NLF Central Committee member Tran Bach Dang, were released from South Vietnamese custody in order to return to the headquarters of the NLF, the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). Arriving at COSVN on January 10, Tong met with Dang's secretary, Anh Ba, who, in addition to questioning him about the American reaction to the original letter Tong had transmitted, which called for an exchange of political views in addition to a prisoner release, directed him to return with a new offer. (Telegram CAS 6841 from Saigon, January 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-7 VIET S/BUTTERCUP)
Ten days later, Tong arrived in Saigon with a message proposing that the GVN release four prisoners named on a list passed to the United States the previous October in exchange for the release of two American and two South Vietnamese prisoners. (Telegram CAS 7321 from Saigon, January 23; ibid.) This proposal followed a January 8 release by the NLF in Binh Thuan of 14 South Vietnamese officers, 2 of whom were on the exchange list, a move that Secretary of State Rusk termed "somewhat implausible in terms of the promptness of the action and the belatedness of the word to us establishing the connection." (CAS telegram from Rusk to Bunker, February 3; Central Intelligence Agency, DO/EA Files: Job 78-00058R, C/VNO File, BUTTERCUP, Vol. III-1 February 1968) On January 23 the NLF did release the two American enlisted men in Quang Tin Province and two additional South Vietnamese soldiers in Can Tho Province.
Carrying a reply from the United States, on January 26 Tong left for Viet Cong headquarters in the NLF Military Region IV in order to make contact with COSVN by radio. The points listed in the reply sent with Tong included: "(a) clarification of proposed prisoner release by NLF; (b) more formalized and efficient prisoner exchange arrangements in the future; (c) NLF agreement to using the radio channel or alternatively face to face meetings by representatives from both sides designated to discuss prisoner exchange matters; and (d) selection of different, more efficient and less dangerous routes for travel" by Tong on future trips. (Telegrams CAS 297 and 298 from Saigon, January 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-7 VIET S/BUTTERCUP)
On January 27 North Vietnam announced that it would release three American pilots; they returned to the United States on February 17. In light of this development, the administration became very eager to move forward on Buttercup, and suggested that the Embassy engineer a reciprocal release of GVN-held Viet Cong prisoners even without waiting for Tong's return. (Telegram CAS 70173 to Saigon, January 27; ibid.)
Tong arrived back in Saigon on January 29. The message he carried from Dang was disappointing, since it did not address the points made by the United States in its message sent through Tong and instead called for a continuation of the same procedures for the second part of the exchange. (Telegram CAS 353 from Saigon, January 29; ibid.) Difficulties were encountered in persuading the GVN to agree to the release of NLF prisoners, two of whom were killed during Tet. Working through Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, however, the Embassy convinced the GVN to agree to the release of three of the VC prisoners, only one of whom had been on Tong's January list. (Telegram CAS 591 from Saigon, February 12; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Buttercup Vol. II, and telegrams from Bunker to Rostow, Rusk, Helms, and McNamara; CAS 730, February 20; and CAS 768, February 22; Central Intelligence Agency, DO/EA Files: Job 78-00058R, C/VNO File, Buttercup, Vol. III-1 February 1968)
On February 22 Tong returned to COSVN with the Viet Cong prisoners released by the GVN as well as with instructions to inform Dang that political discussions were still under consideration by the United States. Despite initial U.S. optimism relating to this channel, no further response was received from Tong, and both sides began to back away from this contact. (Telegram CAS 896 from Bunker to Rostow, Rusk, McNamara, and Helms, February 27; telegrams from Bunker to Rostow, Rusk, Clifford, and Helms; CAS 148, April 24; and CAS 654, September 11; ibid.) In a memorandum to Deputy Executive Secretary John Walsh, May 26, Fred Greene, Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, observed: "It does not seem likely, therefore, that the Front was prepared, had covert political contacts eventuated, to give very much on its own position; rather such contacts might have seemed worthwhile in and of themselves as advancing the Front's claim to formal status as the negotiating partner with the U.S. with regard to ending the war in the South." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-7 VIET S/BUTTERCUP)
The channel remained moribund until January 16, 1969, when an NLF operative identifying herself as "Madame Jeanne" telephoned the Embassy in Saigon on the same extension given to Tong and identified herself as his associate. The GVN, however, immediately raised considerable resistance to pursuing this channel. (Memorandum from Helms to Secretary of State William P. Rogers, January 27, 1969; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (Helms) Chrono, Jan.-Jun. 1969)
7. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Leonhart) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, January 6, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6G(1)a 12/67-1/68, Talks with Hanoi. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Rostow saw it.
1. Herewith rough cuts at:
Stabilizing GVN/RVNAF
Political/Psychological Actions Against the VC
2. My main search has been for measures which will (a) increase GVN willingness to move in phase with us and (b) minimize our dependence on their assumption of new administrative burdens. Locke's talk with Thieu yesterday abundantly illustrates the point./2/
/2/As reported in telegram 15140 from Saigon, January 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-VIET S) A follow-up conversation with Thieu was reported by Locke in telegram 15269 from Saigon, January 7. (Ibid.)
3. On scenario reflections, the problem of the number of governments with which we may wish to be in early touch will deserve very careful treatment. "Effective international guarantors", a revised supervisory commission, or new international inspection force may all be involved. And in addition to whatever claims the 1954 Geneva Nine or the 1962 Geneva Fourteen may have--there are at least the special situations of Japan and Indonesia.
Bill
Attachment 1
STABILIZING THE GVN AND RVNAF FOR AND
DURING NEGOTIATIONS
1. Political. The prime question is agreement on the nature and composition of the political system we seek in Vietnam. This issue cuts across the negotiations process, SVN cooperation, the requirements of US public opinion. We must be clear about the design we have in mind and get it right. From it, we can work back to initial negotiating positions--fallbacks--irreducibles--troop dispositions--interim security arrangements--aid strategy--regional development plans.
a. The non-negotiable negatives: No coalition in advance of elections; no partition of SVN; no freeze-in-place during negotiations.
b. The basics: constitutional order; one-man/one-vote elections; GVN freedom of movement in SVN; "open skies" over NVN; undiminished GVN control of the armed forces and security establishment.
c. Maneuver areas: (1) present GVN Constitution with representatives in an expanded Assembly elected from where balloting has not yet taken place--(2) new National Elections under the present Constitution and a revised election law (primaries and a runoff)--(3) revised Constitution by a new Constituent Assembly followed by new national elections. Each has advantages--the third would provide the longest stretch out for strengthening the GVN and deferring US troop withdrawals.
2. Bilateral Arrangements. Once agreement is reached with the GVN "inner group" on the political framework, we will need general understandings on post-settlement bilateral arrangements. These should include:
--post-settlement MAP and military support costs
--US adviser forces (engineers, technical service elements, instructors, etc.)
--transfer and stand-by maintenance of military installations
--national and regional economic development plans.
3. "Effective International Guarantees"--as stipulated at Manila./3/ We will need to define at an early stage with the GVN who will be the guarantors and what the case of intervention.
/3/Regarding the discussion of Vietnam at the Manila conference of October 1966, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. IV, Document 284.
4. Negotiating Process. Invite and assure GVN participation from the beginning. Consider Military Advisers Group (in Saigon) from Troop Contributor Countries.
5. Specific Actions
a. Intensify Pacification--deploying a substantial share of US forces against provincial guerrillas; expanding combined operations; moving at least one US division to the Delta; increasing air reconnaissance and Market Time operations.
b. Accelerate Anti-Infrastructure Campaign--expanding detention programs and facilities, and emphasizing PRU operations (increased pressure against the infrastructure is probably indispensable to greater effectiveness of Chieu Hoi and National Reconciliation appeals).
c. Shift AID Program Emphasis to support of elected village institutions--accelerating movement of civilian supplies to the countryside, expediting indemnity payments for war damage, energizing land reform, improved rice cultivation, local education and health programs.
d. Grant Wage and Pay Increases--for GVN and RVNAF, justified in any event (real wages having declined in the government sector 50 percent since 1964).
e. Organize Civil Constabulary--activate program for combining elements of RF/PF/CIDG/PRU/PFF into a single rural constabulary under civil auspices and not subject to demobilization arrangements.
f. Assist GVN Information Services--expanding radio and TV operations and rural programs.
g. Increase Support to National Political Building Blocks--labor unions, veterans, farmers associations, sectarian groups.
h. Accelerate and Publicize Post-war Economic Plans--based on Lilienthal-Thuc reports,/4/ and including regional cooperation programs.
/4/See ibid., vol. V, Document 430.
6. Contingency Plans
a. (US/GVN) Reach general understanding on military consequences of a failure of negotiations.
b. (US Only) Develop a series of leverage actions and contingency measures for any GVN attempt to thwart or sabotage negotiations--once they appear reasonably productive. These measures should be scaled from reduced US support through coup frustration to regime succession.
Attachment 2
POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS AGAINST THE NLF
1. High-level Defector Program could have the greatest pay-off. It should be re-examined at highest levels and pressed to the maximum.
2. Chieu Hoi--Seek further program improvements in security of camps, living conditions, employment opportunities, exploitation of individual returnees in VC areas, and information on good treatment by GVN.
3. National Reconciliation--try to persuade GVN to reactivate, offering full amnesties, job opportunities, and political rights.
4. Designate "No Fire" Areas in each district in SVN where individuals can turn in--with bounties for arms--and supervised by US civil affairs teams.
5. Establish Substantial Reward System for province or district chiefs who arrange unit defections.
6. Expand Use of Hoi Chanh in Military Operations--increase use of Kit Carson scouts; experiment with Chieu Hoi Battalions; publicize in VC areas their successes against the VC.
7. Psy Ops Appeals--Convene psyops working groups in Washington and Saigon to review both procedures and content. Possible new themes:
"Join Winning Side--While You Can"
"Hanoi is Sacrificing the South for Immunity in the North"
"Hanoi is Conspiring with the Chinese to Weaken the VC for an NVN Takeover"
"New GVN Constitution Guarantees Free Elections--It's Better to Vote than to Die"
8. Telegram From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, January 11, 1968, 0227Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, PACKERS (II) Continued. Top Secret; Nodis; Packers. Received at 0408Z at the LBJ Ranch.
CAP 80264. Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara recommend that you now arrange to see the Romanian representative in order to deliver to him the written and oral messages below. These messages have the full concurrence of Walt Rostow, Nick Katzenbach, and myself, and were drafted in extensive consultation with Governor Harriman.
If you approve these texts, the Secretaries recommend that you select a member of your staff to work out with Walt or me an absolutely secure means of flying the representative to the Ranch and return, for an appointment at a time designated by you. The representative must have his interpreter and his personal aide and note-taker as well; these two persons are important to enable him to give us and Hanoi what have seemed to us all extremely clear, full, and accurate accounts of what is said. It is also recommended that Governor Harriman act as escort with his aide, Daniel Davidson, who has taken all the notes on our side. We believe it essential that a full record of the conversation be made.
Governor Harriman and Davidson could see you before the actual meeting to give you any further background you may desire. However, we believe the proposed texts speak for themselves.
In our meeting tonight, it was the feeling that Bunker should be given a summary of the Romanian messages and these texts, for his own personal information and not for revealing to Thieu./2/ We expect to send another message to Bunker on what he can say to Thieu to ease the tense atmosphere in Saigon, and also a very short statement to the Manila allies--to the effect that, as Secretary Rusk said in his press conference, we are exploring the meaning of the Trinh statement and how it relates to your San Antonio formula, we have no information as yet, but will be in touch with them when and if there is any useful light.
/2/Bunker was authorized to do so in telegram 98130 to Saigon, January 12. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PACKERS)
The Romanians should communicate the following written message (in English and French texts) to the DRV:
1. The DRV has communicated to the USG this statement of DRV position:
"If the USG really wants discussions with the Government of the DRV it should first unconditionally cease bombing and any other acts of war against the DRV. After the unconditional cessation of all bombing and of any other US act of war against the DRV and at the end of an appropriate period of time the Government of the DRV will enter into serious discussions with the USG."
The USG welcomes this statement.
2. We understand that Foreign Minister Trinh has stated that "as soon as" all bombing ceases, the DRV "shall be prepared to receive" a U.S. representative. The USG will be prepared to have its representative have contacts with a representative of the DRV as soon as all bombing ceases. (The USG believes that the first contacts should take place almost immediately, perhaps one or two days after the cessation of bombing.) The purpose of these "contacts," which might be in Vientiane, Rangoon, Bucharest, or some other suitable third-country location, would be to fix the time and place of serious discussions referred to by the DRV. Arrangement of the necessary modalities for the serious discussions should take no more than a few days./3/
/3/
In a January 8 memorandum to Rusk, Harriman described a meeting that day among himself, Bundy, Davidson, and the Romanians exploring what they had been told on the issue of talks following a halt: "Macovescu explained that it was his impression there could be preliminary contacts through diplomatic representatives to exchange points of view and then after an appropriate period of time official meetings to prepare for negotiations. In other words, he visualized the possibility of three stages: contacts, official talks and then negotiations." (Ibid.) A full report on this conversation is in a memorandum of conversation, January 8. (Ibid.) In a January 9 memorandum to Katzenbach, Harriman wrote: "I've been surprised that a number of people have assumed that Hanoi would insist on having the talks Secret. For my part, I don't see how it would be possible to keep any talks 'secret' after bombing has stopped. It seems to me the sensible thing to do is to pick a place such as Rangoon or Bucharest, where the presence of international press is limited. Should there be contacts prior to the talks, the possibility of which was suggested by Mr. M.[acovescu], I assume these would be secret." (Ibid.)3. The USG takes note of the fact that a cessation of aerial and naval bombardment is easily verifiable. In fact, the act of cessation would be observed immediately internationally and become a matter of public knowledge and speculation. In these circumstances, the USG believes that the "serious discussions" referred to by the DRV should commence immediately on the conclusion of the arrangements through the contacts.
4. Obviously it will be important at an appropriate time, in connection with the serious discussions, to accommodate the interests of all parties directly concerned with the peace of Southeast Asia. One such means is that the DRV and the USG might suggest to the two co-chairmen, and possibly to the three ICC members, that they be available at the site chosen for the serious discussions in order to talk to all parties interested in the peace of Southeast Asia. This procedure could avoid the problems of a formal conference.
5. The USG understands through representatives of the Romanian Government that the serious discussions contemplated by the DRV would be without limitation as to the matters to be raised by either side. The attitude of the USG toward peace in Southeast Asia continues to be reflected in the 14 Points and in the Manila Communiqu?.
6. The USG draws attention to the statement of President Johnson in San Antonio on September 29 in which he said:
"The United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Viet-Nam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Viet-Nam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation."
The Aide-M?moire handed to the Romanian Government in November, 1967, which we understand was communicated to the DRV in mid-December, explained this statement in the following language:
"The President, in making his assumption that the North Vietnamese would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation while discussions proceed, was not assuming North Viet-Nam would cut off entirely its support of its forces in the South while the armed struggle was continuing; at the same time the USG would feel if NVN sought to take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation to increase its support of its forces in the South, to attack our forces from North of the DMZ or to mount large-scale visible resupply efforts, now impossible, it would not be acting in good faith."
The USG wishes to confirm to the DRV that this statement remains the position of the USG.
7. The USG would inform the DRV in advance of the exact date of the cessation of aerial and naval bombardment in order to enable the DRV to have its representative prepared to meet the representative of the USG.
End of Written Message
ORAL POINTS
The following points would be made orally to the Romanian representative:
(A) The Romanian representative should be thanked for his efforts and told that we are confident that he has fully and faithfully reported the positions of both sides in these matters. We are grateful for this action and have confidence that he will continue to do so.
(B) He should understand that the first sentence of paragraph 4 in the written message is intended to refer to the importance of the South Vietnamese Government and other interested parties being present at the site of the discussions in order to play an appropriate role.
(C) The USG wishes to avoid any misunderstanding also with respect to any allegations which may be made concerning specific military actions by the USG against the DRV prior to cessation. In deference to the serious intent and sincere objectives of the mission of the Romanian Government, the USG will refrain for a limited period of time from bombing within 5 miles of the center of Hanoi or of Haiphong. This information is for the Romanian Government only. The USG states this as a fact and not as a commitment as to the future, but the USG would not wish the DRV to be informed of this fact for fear that, as in the past, it could be misinterpreted by them.
(D) The USG awaits with interest the report of the Romanians, after consulting Hanoi, on the foregoing written and oral points.
9. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 11, 1968, 12:45 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PACKERS. Secret; Nodis; Packers. Drafted by Davidson and initialed by Harriman. The meeting was held in Rusk's office.
SUBJECT
Vietnam Peace Talks
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large
Daniel I. Davidson, Special Assistant to Gov. Harriman
Romania
First Deputy Foreign Minister George Macovescu
Corneliu Bogdan, Ambassador
Marin Iliescu, First Secretary of Embassy
Sergiu Celac, Third Secretary of Embassy
Rusk: I talked to the President. He regretted that it is not feasible for you to come to the ranch. He had hoped to come to Washington but there have been problems of scheduling discussions and of other types.
He did ask me to thank you for your visits to Hanoi and Peking.
He asked me to give you a communication. It is in two parts--one oral and one written, and we ask you to convey the written to Hanoi.
Maybe you want to read it over with your colleagues to see if there is any inaccuracy in our understanding of what you told us.
Our President will be writing to your President to thank him and to give our views. The President told me this morning that he would be in immediate touch with your President on this matter.
(The Secretary distributed the written message.)/2/
/2/See Document 8.
This, of course, is a highly confidential communication.
Macovescu: Oh yes.
Rusk: We might go over it paragraph by paragraph to check the accuracy of our understanding of what was said. Paragraph one is from the public statement, so we assume there is no problem.
Harriman: No, it is not the public statement, but the statement conveyed through the Romanians.
Rusk: I understand.
(About five minutes passed while the group reads the document.)
I don't want to press you. I will be leaving in a few minutes for California. You might discuss further with Ambassador Harriman the accuracy. The policy matters are between us and Hanoi, but you may wish to talk with the Governor about detail and accuracy.
Harriman: I would like to bring in Assistant Secretary Bundy.
Rusk: There are also certain oral points I am to make but perhaps the simplest thing is to give them to you in writing with the understanding that it is to be considered oral.
Macovescu: Understood.
Harriman: You'll note that the first paragraph is our thanks to you.
Rusk: Yes, perhaps I should read that paragraph aloud.
You notice we are telling you that we won't bomb you if you return to Hanoi.
Harriman: Perhaps they won't feel that we were welcoming them as we did last time.
Rusk: In terms of talks, we are making suggestions. If there are other suggestions, they can be considered.
There are two problems. First is the contacts to make arrangements which we refer to as "contacts". Then there are the more serious discussions. It is difficult to conduct them in secrecy. The bombing will have stopped and the world will have noted it. If the discussions are in public there are a good many governments and parties who will suggest that they are entitled to participate. We could lose months, so we proposed--let's see how we put it. In paragraph four, the second sentence, we say, "one such means". In other words, this suggests that the two Co-chairmen and the three ICC members send representatives to the location. Anyone else could be in the city available to discuss this with the two or the five or with each other.
Rusk (cont.): I do not know Peking' s attitude. They may not want to come to a conference but might want to have a man present at the location. On our side some will want to be present. This is one suggestion that could avoid the problem of a formal conference. We are willing to hear your suggestions or Hanoi's. It's a problem of modalities--to avoid a formal conference, but to make all views available. I don't anticipate a big meeting with eight or twelve or fifteen present, but the two Co-chairmen or the three ICC members might be a communications center talking to the parties and putting their two or five heads together on the possibilities of agreement.
Macovescu: I have a first question Mr. Secretary. Suppose that after the first contacts the two parties desired to meet according to certain formulae--one of which you have just presented. This is just for me to see what is the issue and not a final suggestion on my part. Would you accept to have further negotiations with the Vietnamese alone, without the presence of any other party there? I repeat, this is not a formal suggestion, but to make me clear in my mind, and if you don't wish me to discuss this aspect with the Vietnamese, I will not.
Rusk: If the fact of talks becomes public, and I think it will, both sides will have serious problems. In our reply to Secretary General U Thant in March, we made it clear that other parties must be associated with talks./3/ This does not mean that there cannot still be bilaterals, but we cannot have a situation where everyone else is excluded. The Government of Saigon and others present problems. I wouldn't make that suggestion to Hanoi. If they come back with it, we will look at it but it will be difficult.
/3/On March 15, 1967, the United States delivered a reply of support for U Thant's March 14 call for a standstill cease-fire in Vietnam. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Documents 107 and 108.
Macovescu: It is not my suggestion and I won't raise it. I just meant to bring more clarity so that we might better know your position. If the Vietnamese side raises this problem we shall communicate with you on it.
Rusk: You have a mission in Hanoi?
Macovescu: We just sent a new Ambassador.
Rusk: You have private communications.
Macovescu: Yes.
Rusk: While you are in Hanoi, you may have problems you wish to discuss with us. Ambassador Davis/4/ is a good friend and very discreet. You may wish to communicate through him.
/4/Richard H. Davis, Ambassador to Romania.
The President did tell me that he probably will be in Washington and that he wishes to see you if you come back.
I was in Texas and could land but not take off. I had to travel over miles of icy roads. The President's schedule has been completely disrupted.
Harriman: And the security problem is impossible.
Rusk: And we didn't want to delay.
Harriman: I'd like to ask a frank question. I have told the Secretary that the President should address his letter to Ceausescu and not to Maurer, which is his natural instinct since he met him.
Macovescu: Ceausescu.
Rusk: I'll be leaving for California in a few moments. But Mr. Harriman, our youngest elder statesman, will be available this afternoon.
Harriman: Any time.
Macovescu: I thank you. Of course I will be needing certain clarifications but as you told me that I may have these through Governor Harriman--for that reason I won't detain you. I know you are very busy.
I hope that I am not going home empty handed and that we shall be in a position to continue this dialogue between Hanoi and Washington.
Rusk: Mr. Minister, Governor Harriman and I have been involved in many crises. Don't be discouraged too soon with your difficulties. We are interested in peace, not in something less. The two sides are still divided by very difficult and complex problems. The question is peace but on what basis so a certain amount of persistence on your side is required.
Macovescu: We understand the situation as well as you do. We also understand that it is not only complex but also complicated. We can assure you that we do not discourage easily.
Harriman: They have negotiated with the Russians.
Rusk: If you succeed, you will get the Nobel and Lenin Peace Prizes. If you fail, you will have the satisfaction of having tried.
Bogdan: Perhaps a Pulitzer Prize for writing a book?
Harriman: We can't give you a Lenin Prize, or recommend you for it, but we can recommend you for a Nobel Prize.
Macovescu: We don't desire a prize, but peace, which will satisfy us sufficiently.
Harriman: I'll see you anytime you wish./5/
/5/Harriman, Bundy, and Davidson met with the Romanian delegation later that evening to clarify the message for the North Vietnamese. Harriman underscored that the primary concern was to have clarified fully the U.S. position and to obtain the North Vietnamese reaction to it. "The maximum you can get is that they will meet us in two days or in five days for serious talks after cessation in Rangoon or Vientiane or elsewhere--the more you can get of this the better but we are not asking for those precise answers," he told Macovescu. (Memorandum of conversation, January 11, 5:15 p.m.; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PACKERS)
Rusk: I am going off to make a speech in California tonight. After the speech I will be asked questions. Do not pay too much attention to what I say. The document that I have given you is the important thing.
10. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 12, 1968, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Toon and approved in U on January 15.
SUBJECT
Soviet Note on "Pereyaslavl-Zalesskiy" Incident
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Yuri N. Chernyakov, Soviet Charg?, a.i.
Mr. Nicholas deB Katzenbach, Acting Secretary
Mr. Malcolm Toon, Country Director, Soviet Union Affairs
Chernyakov requested and was given an appointment with the Acting Secretary in order to deliver a note from his Government in reply to the United States Government note of January 5 with regard to the bombing of the Soviet ship "Pereyaslavl-Zalesskiy" in the harbor of Haiphong on January 4./2/ A translation of the note is attached./3/
/2/In its January 5 note, the United States apologized for the incident but "neither substantiated nor ruled out" the claim that the damage was caused by U.S. aircraft. (Ibid.)
/3/Not printed. In its January 12 note, the Soviet Government replied that it could not "acknowledge the reply of the USA Government to be convincing, since it not only does not contain a clear recognition of the guilt of the American armed forces in the perpetration of the marauding attack upon a Soviet merchant vessel in violation of all norms of international law and freedom of navigation, but actually admits the possibility of the repetition of such aggressive acts by the American air forces." Since Rusk had informed Dobrynin on January 9 of the accidental dropping of 17 undetonated bombs near Haiphong, the Department was surprised that the Soviet reaction was so muted. (Telegram 96905 to Moscow, January 10, and telegram 98440 to Moscow, January 13; both ibid.)
Mr. Katzenbach pointed out that the Soviet Government must recognize that ships operating in an area of active hostilities run certain risks and it was impossible to guarantee that accidents would not happen. As had been made clear in the United States Government note of January 5, all that could be done was to offer assurances that careful precautions would be taken to avoid damage to non-hostile shipping in and around North Vietnam. The United States Government regretted the damage caused to the Soviet ship in the port of Haiphong and hoped that such incidents could be avoided in the future. It was for this reason that additional information, of which the Charg? was undoubtedly aware, had been passed to Ambassador Dobrynin by the Secretary of State earlier this week. Mr. Katzenbach pointed out that there could be no real guarantee against damage to Soviet shipping so long as Soviet ships operated in the North Vietnamese waters.
Chernyakov said his instructions did not go beyond the delivery of the note itself, but he would point out on a personal basis that attacks on Soviet shipping were in contravention of international law and violation of the principle of freedom of navigation. In Chernyakov's view the best way to avoid further incidents would be to stop the bombing.
Mr. Katzenbach replied that the bombing could stop tomorrow if the North Vietnamese would comply with the Geneva accords and withdraw their forces from South Vietnam. If this should be done, then difficulties stemming from such developments as the January 4 incident involving the "Pereyaslavl-Zalesskiy" would not arise between our two countries.
Chernyakov referred to Trinh's statement of December 30/4/ and said that it was clear that talks would take place if the bombing were stopped.
/4/See Document 1.
Mr. Katzenbach said that the United States Government's position on cessation of bombing was clearly set forth by the President in his San Antonio speech in which the President said that he would be prepared to stop the bombing if it was clear that such action would lead to productive talks. Was it Chernyakov's view that Trinh's offer was a serious one?
Chernyakov said that his Government certainly regarded Trinh's offer as a serious one and the only way to ascertain if talks could be productive would be to stop the bombing in order to permit them to take place. He did not wish to criticize the statements by President Johnson, but he would point out that whereas in the past the President had said that the United States Government attached no preconditions to talks, the San Antonio formula seemed to impose the condition that talks must be productive.
Mr. Katzenbach felt that it was wrong to regard the San Antonio formula as imposing conditions on talks. Obviously, if the North Vietnamese should insist that the agenda for talks be limited to Hanoi's four points, then there would be no purpose in talks since obviously they could not be productive. This was the meaning of the San Antonio formula in Mr. Katzenbach's view.
Chernyakov said that he would only point out that in his December 30 statement Trinh made no mention of the four points.
Chernyakov was asked if his Government planned to publicize the note which he had handed Mr. Katzenbach. Chernyakov had said his instructions did not refer to publicity and he would point out on a personal basis that his Government's note of January 4/5/ was made public.
/5/The January 4 Soviet note demanded punishment of those responsible for the incident and called for U.S. assurances that it would not happen again. (Telegram 94518 to Moscow, January 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
11. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 13, 1968, 1055Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. This telegram is printed in full in Douglas Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers: Reports to the President from Vietnam, 1967-1973, Vol. 1 (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies), pp. 284-294.
15899. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my thirty-fourth weekly message.
A. General
1. In the present message, I am attempting to give an objective evaluation of the efforts and achievements which, in common with our Vietnamese and other Free World allies, we have recorded during 1967. This represents not only my own views but also those of the major elements of the Mission so that in effect it represents a Mission consensus. In the next message, I hope to outline the major problem areas we foresee and to summarize the actions we plan to take to deal with them in the year ahead.
2. The past year has been one of sustained and unremitting effort and I believe has seen enough achievements to give us every encouragement to continue along the present lines. We can have confidence that the successful defense of the Republic of Viet-Nam against Communist aggression and subversion is assured. Our efforts have been magnificently supported by you and by the American people, who have contributed in men and money to a degree unparalleled in our own history, to the defense of a people far from our shores. But as you have often said, the cost in men and money, heavy as it has been, cannot be compared to what the cost would ultimately be if we allowed Communist aggression and subversion to succeed in Viet-Nam. All of us working in the Mission here are convinced that what we do will affect not only the future of Viet-Nam but all of the countries in this part of the world who wish to be free and so has a direct bearing on our own vital national interests.
3. The achievements of the past year, I believe, fall into three main categories. In the field of military operations the bringing into proper balance of the ratio of combat to support troops in the U.S. forces and the steady improvement of the Vietnamese armed forces, together with the contributions of our Free World allies, resulted in increasingly effective actions against the enemy. He has been thwarted in his attempts at penetration south of the DMZ, his bases increasingly neutralized, and he has been steadily pushed back toward the Laotian and Cambodian borders. Viet Cong recruitment and morale have declined. Lines of communication have been steadily opened up, commerce and trade thus permitted to develop.
4. Slow but steady progress in pacification combined with military successes have brought a steadily increasing proportion of the population under government control, now about 67 percent, with a corresponding decrease under Viet Cong control, approximately 17 percent, the balance being in contested areas.
5. Progress in these two categories were essential elements in the progress achieved in the third, that of constitutional development. Perhaps the major achievement of the year has been stabilization of the government and the opening and democratization of the political system. People have been able to vote for local, village, and hamlet officials thus marking the beginning of the reinstitution of local self-government. The promulgation of the Constitution opened the way for the election of a President, Vice President, and a National Assembly. The inauguration of the new government marked a beginning of fully constitutional processes and the change-over to civilian rule. The immediate problem now facing us is to encourage, prod, persuade, and draw our Vietnamese allies to use their new political and governmental structure to face up to and resolve more effectively the problems of defense and growth that have beset them for many years.
6. I think these achievements reflect favorably on the Vietnamese people. For them the struggle against the Communists has been going on for more than twenty years, and their losses have been heavy. But we can now see growth of a conviction among them that they can and will see the struggle through to a successful conclusion. Their concerns now turn more directly on the nature and form of a final settlement and the position it would leave them in, located immediately next to an unremittingly hostile neighbor. Their concern is with the consequences of success rather than with the results of failure.
7. Our defects in the field of public affairs, both here as well as in Washington, have required imagination and energy. We have sought to present the true dimensions of the conflict in Viet-Nam to American and world public opinion as objectively and fairly as we can, but we have had to do this through a press which, it seems to me, has been unusually skeptical and cynical. One experienced journalist gave an explanation for this which may have validity, i.e., that there is a generation gap here in that many of the young reporters have never seen nor experienced war before and consequently suffer from an emotional trauma which results in subjective reporting. However that may be, the result of all this is that there tend to be two separate and only partially connected realities: the view of Viet-Nam as we see it here in Viet-Nam and the view that is being presented to American and world public opinion. This problem has engaged major attention during the past year and will continue to have our attention in the future. I think we have made some, though limited, progress in dealing with it.
[Omitted here is discussion of progress during 1967 on political, military, pacification, and economic matters.]
Bunker
12. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
CM-2908-68
Washington, January 13, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Files, VIET 385. Top Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that McNamara saw it on January 15. According to a January 8 memorandum from Carver to Helms, entitled "The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh, A Speculative Appraisal," intelligence reports indicated that elements from four NVA divisions had been moved into the area around Khe Sanh in preparation for an attack. The memorandum concluded that the enemy's objectives were, at a minimum, to force abandonment of the base and, at a maximum, "to draw substantial U.S. reinforcements from other areas in South Vietnam and tie them down in the Khe Sanh area." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01284A, DCI/ER Files, ER Files-Special Material 01 Jan-28 Feb 1968)
SUBJECT
Khe Sanh (U)
Recently, two differing views of the situation in the Khe Sanh area came to my attention. Briefly, these are: (1) preempting an enemy assault in the Khe Sanh area by an offensive into Laos; (2) a complete withdrawal from Khe Sanh. I do not personally subscribe to either of these views, both of which overlook important factors. However, since these two propositions have reportedly been given prominent attention at high non-military levels, I considered that it would be useful to have General Westmoreland's comments on them and on the Khe Sanh situation in general./2/ I have now received his comments and I provide them to you, in the succeeding paragraphs, for your information.
/2/In telegram JCS 343, January 11, Wheeler requested Westmoreland's views on each option. The first was phrased as "the possibility of turning an attack against the Khe Sanh to our advantage, that is, Dien Bien Phu in reverse. This view argues the possibility of capitalizing on an attack against Khe Sanh by striking the enemy from the rear in Laos and proceeding to attack enemy bases in the area, perhaps as far west as Tchepone, in a relatively short campaign." The second was phrased as "withdrawal from Khe Sanh because the enemy is building toward a Dien Bien Phu. This argument is based upon the following premises: A. The Road to Khe Sanh has been cut. B. We do not control the commanding hills. C. The enemy is bringing up artillery which will be able to control the airfield. D. A withdrawal now could be done without much public notice. E. There is an awkward relationship between COMUSMACV and the Marine commander which makes the Marines reluctant to withdraw and COMUSMACV reluctant to direct them to do so." (Johnson Library, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message File, 1 Jan.-31 Jan. 1968)
"1. I have just returned from a visit with General Cushman during which we discussed contingency plans for reinforcing Khe Sanh and the I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). General Cushman has two USMC battalions in Khe Sanh now and contingency plans for augmenting this force with an additional USMC battalion on eight hour notice, followed by a second battalion on twelve hour notice, and by SLF forces. Additionally, and as a result of the above discussion, I have directed him as a matter of first priority to alert a brigade of the Americal Division to move into the Hue/Phu Bai area. This can be done quickly with fixed wing or rotary wing aircraft.
"2. As a second priority we are prepared to reinforce I CTZ in the Hue/Phu Bai, Danang, or Chu Lai areas in that priority with another brigade, either from the 101st Airborne Division or from the 1st Cavalry Division.
"3. Additional actions underway include the following:
"a. As the ROK Marine Brigade moves into the Danang tactical area of responsibility (TAOR), elements of the 1st Marine Division are being released for deployment north of Ai-Van pass. This in turn is releasing elements of the 3d Marine Division for movement into Quang Tri province. Two battalions of the ROK Marine Brigade have completed their movement and four battalions of the 1st Marine Division are now north of Ai-Van pass. This move will be completed by 31 January with four ROK battalions in the Danang TAOR and five 1st Marine Division battalions north of the pass.
"b. The JGS has agreed to deploy a task force of two airborne battalions to I CTZ on or about 15 January 1968, bringing to four the number of ARVN airborne battalions in I CTZ.
"c. We are developing priority targets in Operation Niagara/3/ for a sustained Arc Light campaign, augmented by tactical air, beginning not later than 18 January. We plan to concentrate on targets in RVN prior to Tet with approximately 75 percent or more of our total effort. During and following the Tet cease fire, we will strike targets in Laos. This operation also includes a slam type operation in the Khe Sanh area by 7th Air Force. In conjunction with our sustained Arc Light campaign, I am requesting (by separate communication) a further step up in the B-52 accelerated program now scheduled to begin 20 January.
/3/A clearing operation involving bombing and artillery shelling of enemy positions around Khe Sanh.
"d. We are also requesting that a carrier be alerted to be brought in to augment tactical air, and the prompt return of the SLF for commitment to either the 3d or 1st Marine Division areas.
"e. Maximum number of NGF support ships will be concentrated in the I CTZ.
"4. Regarding view (1), above, my concept for operations in Laos is outlined in Operation El Paso, proposed for October 1968. Preempting a Khe Sanh area assault by an offensive into Laos is neither logistically nor tactically feasible at this time. Significant considerations include the following:
"a. To be effective, a Laotian assault should be launched in the near future.
"b. With the NE monsoon upon us, launching and supporting the magnitude of force envisioned is not within our current capability. An air LOC is essential and flying weather is marginal. Additionally, our airlift capabilities are inadequate to support both this concept and an acceptable tactical posture in other RVN threat areas at this time.
"c. We estimate sizable enemy forces to be in the Tchepone area and to the north thereof; thus a brief successful campaign there may not be possible.
"5. Regarding a withdrawal from Khe Sanh, I consider this area critical to us from a tactical standpoint as a launch base for Special Operations Group (SOG) teams and as flank security for the strong point obstacle system; it is even more critical from a psychological viewpoint. To relinquish this area would be a major propaganda victory for the enemy. Its loss would seriously affect Vietnamese and US morale. In short, withdrawal would be a tremendous step backwards.
"6. Although there are some in non-military circles who favor the concept of retreating into enclaves, I must reiterate that such a strategy merely returns the center of violence to the midst of the RVN people in the populated centers. On the other hand, a massive assault into Laos is not feasible in the near time frame.
"7. In view of the enemy capability to initiate a major offensive in Quang Tri province before Tet, I would prefer to defend with force deployment and combat support as indicated above. I will submit additional support requirements separately for Arc Light, Carrier and NGF support."
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
On January 17, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson delivered his annual message to Congress on the State of the Union. In the speech, the President discussed the prospects for peace in Vietnam:
"Right now we are exploring the meaning of Hanoi's recent statement. There is no mystery about the questions which must be answered before the bombing is stopped. We believe that any talks should follow the San Antonio formula that I stated last September, which said:
"--The bombing would stop immediately if talks would take place promptly and with reasonable hopes that they would be productive.
"--And the other side must not take advantage of our restraint as they have in the past.
"This Nation simply cannot accept anything less without jeopardizing the lives of our men and of our allies. If a basis for peace talks can be established on the San Antonio foundations--and it is my hope and my prayer that they can--we would consult with our allies and with the other side to see if a complete cessation of hostilities--a really true cease-fire--could be made the first order of business. I will report at the earliest possible moment the results of these explorations to the American people."
For full text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pages 25-33.
14. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 17, 1968, 1115Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 8:01 a.m. and passed to the White House. This telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 295-301.
16225. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my thirty-fifth weekly message:
A. General
1. I indicated in my last weekly message/2/ that I would be sending my assessment of problems and prospects for 1968 in my next message. I have now deferred this for a week in order to assure that a more careful and comprehensive analysis can be prepared. The following report therefore covers normal developments of the past ten days.
/2/Document 11.
2. Viet-Nam is now entering its annual pre-Tet lull when most activities are either slowed or halted altogether in favor of preparations for the great annual Tet holiday, which is a celebration which resembles our Christmas, New Years, and Thanksgiving all rolled into one.
3. Indeed approaching Tet season is the official explanation of the reason given for calling a halt to the conflict between the government and the CVT labor union which arose because of the demands of the employees of the former French owned power company for pay increases. The strike had already spread to other segments of the work force. Although there were other compelling reasons for calling a halt to the conflict between the government and the CVT labor union, following a meeting of labor leaders and government officials which lasted until 3 in the morning, the CVT yesterday issued a communiqu? stopping all strikes in the interest of not inconveniencing the people before the Tet holiday.
4. If the Tet spirit helped to smooth over the clash between the CVT and the government, it has not yet allayed the widespread concern about the possibility that the U.S. will make a deal with Hanoi or the NLF which will ultimately result in a Communist takeover of South Viet-Nam. The Trinh statement on negotiations set off a wave of speculation that continues to touch all facets of Vietnamese political life. The Senate discussed the question of the GVN position with regard to the NLF on January 3, and most speakers stressed their belief that coalition government is a Communist tactic aimed at accomplishing by political means what they have failed to do by military action. The chairman of the Senate as well as a number of other Senators and lower house Deputies have expressed their deep concern to us privately. Some military leaders have gone so far as to talk privately of a coup if a coalition government seems imminent. Even militant Buddhist leaders and "Struggle" elements have expressed such fears and counseled against any dealings with the NLF which will give the Front any status other than that of Hanoi's instrument. These fears have been echoed and agitated by the press. For six weeks editorial comment has been dominated by such things as the possibility of U.S. recognition of the NLF and the bogey of coalition government.
5. President Thieu has responded to these anxieties by a series of statements designed to show that he is determined to oppose and prevent any policy moves from any quarter which will result in a Communist takeover here. On January 5 he told journalists that he will crush all peace moves which favor the formation of coalition government. He made several similar statements in the following days, and on January 15 he made a major speech in which he set out the government position on the peace issue. He warned against a bombing pause without any reciprocal action by the Communists, and he said that the Communists are trying to get the allies to negotiate with the NLF in order to "obtain acceptance of a 'coalition government' in which the Communist elements, as Trojan horses, will gradually take over the whole of South Viet-Nam."
6. I think that Thieu's remarks reflect his own general thinking, though he is personally more flexible than the uncompromising tone of his speech might seem to indicate. For example, he repeated to me recently what he had said as long ago as last August that he could and was not unwilling to probe the NLF but that this must be done secretly and that he could do nothing unless and until public speculation and talk subsided. But whatever his personal view of these matters, the speech certainly reflects his reading of Vietnamese political realities. Thieu clearly does not think that he can take any other position publicly without risking loss of support from both military and civilian leaders.
7. I expect that the Secretary's very good statement of January 15/3/ will help to reduce the fears that we are going to sell out South Viet-Nam, and in turn that should make such reactions as Thieu's January speech less necessary. In fact, Thieu yesterday told me that the agitation and the fears which had been sweeping the country were like a wave. The crest had been reached and it was not subsiding. The problem of handling Vietnamese opinion will continue to be with us, however, all the more so if Hanoi in fact proves to have any sincere intention of seeking an acceptable solution to this conflict.
/3/Rusk assured the GVN that "it goes without saying that the future of South Vietnam could not be decided without full participation of the legal and constitutional government of South Vietnam." See The New York Times, January 16, 1968.
8. Concentrating as they are on the possibilities of negotiations with Hanoi and the NLF, most Vietnamese leaders have had little to say about the Bowles mission to Cambodia and the resulting communiqu?./4/ Comment has been mildly favorable for the most part, though I think no one really expects much in the way of concrete results. In his January 15 speech, Thieu restated the government's position on the Cambodian border question in rather harsh terms. The tone of his remarks unfortunately reflects the continuing [garble--antipathy?] which most Vietnamese leaders feel for Sihanouk personally as well as Thieu's understandable anger over the great assistance which Cambodian policies have given to the enemies of a free South Viet-Nam. I tried to get Thieu to eliminate one paragraph referring to Sihanouk personally but he reacted rather strongly and said that while obviously Sihanouk did not have to talk to the Vietnamese, the least he could do was to be correct. Thieu and Ky, however, in private conversations with Phil Habib and me have agreed that the Bowles mission was a useful exercise and that Sihanouk's intentions should now be tested more concretely.
/4/In a January 4 press conference, Rusk announced that Ambassador to India Chester Bowles would travel to Cambodia to discuss with Sihanouk measures to restrict the presence of NVA/VC forces in Cambodia. See Department of State Bulletin, January 22, 1968, pp. 116-124. In a January 12 joint communiqu? resulting from Bowles' trip, Sihanouk renewed his pledge to strengthen the ICC's role in ensuring Cambodian territorial integrity, especially through the policing of border areas. They did not, however, reach accord on "hot pursuit" of Communist forces into Cambodian territory. See ibid., January 29, 1968, pp. 133-134. See also Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXVII, Documents 105 ff.
[Omitted here are sections on Priority Programs, Other Reports on Efforts to Improve Civil Administration, and sections on Political, Pacification, Economic Issues, Chieu Hoi, and Americans and Vietnamese Killed.]
Bunker
15. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Henry Kissinger and the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/
Washington, January 17, 1968, 7:30 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PENNSYLVANIA. Secret; Nodis; Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania peace effort involved the efforts of Kissinger to conduct direct talks with Bo through two French intermediaries, Raymond Aubrac and Herbert Marcovich. For additional documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Documents 306 ff.
1. At 9:00 p.m. Paris time January 16, Bo called Marcovich and asked him if he could stop by to see Bo at an early time. M went over to see him immediately and had a two hour conversation, which he reported to Kissinger at 5:30 a.m. EST this morning.
2. Bo opened by saying that the breakoff in conversations with M & A last October was occasioned by general conditions and the DRV still held both of them in high personal esteem.
3. Bo called attention to the interview he had given to the French radio and television network earlier in the evening (see page 1 NYT story today by Henry Tanner),/2/ and read him the Q and A about Hanoi's commitment to talk an appropriate time after cessation of the bombing.
/2/In the interview conducted on January 16, Bo confirmed that the Trinh formula was "perfectly clear," stating notably that "all political observers have underlined the changes for the conditional to the future in the remarks of December 29." See The New York Times, January 17, 1968.
4. M asked what the DRV meant by "an appropriate time", and Bo replied that conversations would begin "just as soon as it will be established that the cessation is effective."
5. M asked whether it would now be possible for Bo to receive Kissinger, and Bo replied that under existing circumstances any such request would be taken into consideration./3/
/3/Later that day, Kissinger informed Read that he had given the following message to Marcovich for Bo: "a. Thanks for your message. b. If you (B) wish to see me directly, I will make an effort to come although my schedule is full." (Memorandum of telephone conversation between Kissinger and Read, January 17, 6 p.m.; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PENNSYLVANIA) According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation, January 18, 9 a.m., in which Kissinger reported to Read that Marcovich had delivered the message to Bo, Kissinger told Read that "Bo thanked M and opened the envelope in his presence but did not discuss it with M. Bo said that he hoped 'things were going somewhere this time'. M reports the atmosphere was cordial." (Ibid.)
16. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, January 17, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, VIET 092. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached note from Wheeler to Nitze, January 18, reads: "Paul--Herewith a copy of a Memo for Record by Bill DePuy concerning situation in SVN. I propose to give a copy to each member of the No-Name Committee at our meeting this afternoon. You will note he reports Komer et al. at some variance with the CIA report on the same subject & Amb. Bunker's 35th Weekly Report. Bus."
SUBJECT
Conversations with Ambassador Komer and Major General Forsythe--COORDS, MACV
1. Both Ambassador Komer and General Forsythe are extremely disquieted by the situation in the GVN at this time. The basis for their unhappiness and concern goes something like this:
a. The GVN is simply not functioning at this time. The various ministries have not organized themselves nor have they launched into the new programs mentioned by Thieu in his inaugural statement.
b. The reorganization of the RVNAF which was worked out on a combined basis with MACV and which would reduce the power of the Corp Commanders and the Division Commanders in respect to their relationship with the provinces as well as the regional and popular forces has been frustrated by a series of crippling stipulations. For example, it is not to go into effect until:
(1) The military situation is propitious.
(2) The provincial staffs are beefed up.
(3) The provincial staffs have reached an unstated higher level of training and quality.
c. Corrupt Province Chiefs have not been removed.
d. Province Chief designees have not been sent to the Vung Tau School and now will receive a watered down course in Saigon instead, but this has not yet started.
e. The Vice Chief of the JGS (until recently General Thang) has not been given authority for Provincial affairs. This simply means that the Corps Commanders continue to exercise their "war lord" authorities without regard to Saigon and the particularly unresponsive Corps Commanders in the 2nd and 4th Corps have not been removed./2/
/2/According to a January 20 discussion with Forsythe reported in telegram 16712 from Saigon, January 23, Thieu noted that the reorganization of the RVNAF that began on January 2 ultimately would result in the termination of all but a supporting role in pacification by the division and corps commanders, thereby removing them from the "political arena" in order to concentrate on the "military arena." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-VIET S)
2. At the moment the Thang case is center of stage. Thang demanded increased authority along the lines of the reorganization plan and demanded the relief of Vinh Loc and Manh in 2nd and 4th Corps respectively. He stated that there was no point in going through the pacification planning cycle while these two Corps Commanders continued to ignore Saigon authority. Thieu refused to let Thang resign but said he could not move that rapidly. Thang is cooling his heels at home./3/ Thieu continues to refer to the post Tet period when he claims all these problems will be solved. There is only a little confidence in Saigon that this will be the case. What worries Bunker, Westmoreland and Komer and Company at the moment is that the press which had called a moratorium of four months on criticism of the Government is now on to the fact that Thang has been sidetracked. General Sidle is of the opinion that this will blow the thing wide open and the press will take off after the inactivity--in fact the back sliding--of the Government. The Thang case, of course, is only symptomatic and the last thing he wants is a lot of American help at this time. He believes that if he is reinstated under American pressure that Thieu will only go through the motions and give him no real authority./4/
/3/In a January 17 memorandum to Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, and Rostow, Helms noted the Saigon CIA Station's opinion that Thang's resignation was "a serious threat to the GVN pacification effort" because he had "provided a quality of leadership and courage in his relationships with other senior military leaders that, one can safely predict, will not be replaced." The Station suggested that the situation be kept "in a state of suspense" so that Thang's role in pacification might somehow be saved. (Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 970/305 (29 Sep 67), IR 2554, Sea Cabin)
/4/Forsythe and Komer met with Thang and his designated replacement, General Nguyen Van La, on January 24. Thang listed the most important objectives of the GVN pacification effort, especially focusing on means to improve the RF/PF in terms of morale, manpower, and its contribution to RD. In addition, means for more effectively training province and district level officials had to be ensured. (Memorandum for the Record, January 24; U.S. Army Center of Military History, DepCORDS/MACV Papers, 103. RD Liaison: 1968)
3. Thieu thinks he is faced with conflicts between three major constituencies:
a. The electorate and the new lower and upper houses.
b. The senior generals who placed him at the head of the ticket in lieu of Ky.
c. The Americans.
4. Thieu, in long conversations with General Forsythe, who has a special relationship with him, seems to understand the problem only too well--in fact exaggerates the danger of a coup. His approach apparently is to move toward reorganization very slowly and thus gradually to diminish the powers of his military constituency. Whether he will do this is by no means certain. That he will proceed with great caution and slow speed is highly likely. In the meantime, the RD Cadre and the Province RD Chiefs are having a morale crisis. The Junior Officers of the Army are increasingly restive in that nothing has been done about corruption in the Armed Forces. The Government ministers and ministries feel that they have no authority to move out on new programs nor are they getting any support from Thieu. The Prime Minister, Loc, is involved in some kind of a balancing act between Thieu and Ky.
5. This all adds up to an absence of forward motion and an apparent inability to make the basic organizational and personality decisions which would put the Government on the road. Komer considers this to be intolerable, given the weight of U.S. investment in blood, dollars and effort. He feels the crunch is coming and that we are very close to the time when the U.S. must somehow force the GVN to make decisions and move out. All this of course, is a perfect example of the so-called theory of leverage. There is simply no possibility of applying effective leverage anywhere below the top level in Saigon with any success unless and until the Bunker/Westmoreland/Komer level has applied adequate leverage at their level. This view, by the way, is very wide-spread amongst the successively lower echelons in the American military and civil structure.
6. Given the GVN sensitivity to U.S. activities related to possible negotiations, this may well be as difficult a time as any to put the heat on the GVN. This does not change the fact that we are close to a time when this nettle must be grasped. It would be far better to do it now before the press mounts an attack against the GVN for inactivity. There is a current preoccupation with the likelihood of a major NVA effort in the Northern provinces (probably Khe Sanh) which can probably be handled from a military standpoint after a number of bloody fights. But in the long run, the immobility of the GVN is the more serious and most difficult problem. It may be necessary for the U.S. high command in Saigon, not only to make certain demands to the GVN for specific actions, such as reorganization, but also to involve itself in whatever scenarios may be necessary to remove the power of the Corps Commanders. Of all the things regarding SVN that should be worrying Washington now, it is my opinion that this subject should be number one./5/
/5/In a memorandum to the Senior Advisers for each CTZ, January 18, Komer outlined final COMUSMACV-approved guidelines for the 1968 pacification effort. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 472, MACV Headquarters, CORDS Office Files, 1966-1969, 1601-04--CORDS Correspondence and Unidentified Files (Folder 2 of 2))
W.E. DePuy
Major General, USA
17. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Roche) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 18, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6 G (1)a, 12/67-1/68, Talks with Hanoi. Eyes Only. Received at 3:55 p.m. An attached note from Johnson to Rostow, January 18, 6 p.m., reads: "Raise the question with the proper people." A handwritten notation reads: "done 1/19/68."
I recognize (and respect up to a point) the attitude that Secretary Rusk, Bill Bundy and others have about "gimmicks" or "grandstand plays."/2/
/2/On January 4 Roche sent a memorandum to Rostow which reads: "Why not try a little dirty pool and see what happens? 1. We announce that our negotiating team will be in Geneva tomorrow. 2. We announce that there will be an 'unconditional' bombing pause. 3. We announce that if there is a DRV negotiating team there and that 'productive discussions' are initiated, and no military advantage is taken of the pause, the 'unconditional' pause will be extended. I don't have much use for gimmicks, by and large, but this puts the ball in their court." (Ibid., 6 G (1)b, 12/67-1/68, Talks with Hanoi)
Of course, there is a difference between your position and theirs: nobody to my knowledge has ever been elected Secretary of State.
We are getting butchered in the press for "over-caution" vis-?-vis negotiations. I have never doubted that the Communists would throw negotiations into the pot this year as a technique of political warfare (see my attached memo of last March 27)./3/
/3/In the memorandum to the President, March 26, 1967, Roche wrote: "On the basis of various statements that have been emerging from Hanoi over the past six months, as well as articles in Hoc Tap and other Communist organs in Hanoi, I am convinced that Ho knows that the road to victory in South Vietnam by overt aggression is closed. He is therefore willing to shift from overt war to negotiations, with the latter in no way compromising his determination to some day 'unify' Vietnam. Negotiations are a weapons system at which Ho is an expert (see his performance between the French and the Chinats from 1946-49 or his 1949-53 moves with the French)." Roche concluded that Ho would initiate negotiations "at the worst possible time in terms of American internal unity--say on September 1, 1968." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 273--Vietnam Task Force)
But why can't we play too? Why can't you announce that on January 30 our representatives will be in Djakarta, Rangoon, Geneva or wherever, that the bombing of North Vietnam will stop (it's Tet anyhow), and that if productive discussions occur it will not be resumed, etc.
This would put the ball in Hanoi's court--and we could still bomb hell out of the Laotian trails without violating the pledge.
Let "world opinion" focus on Hanoi for a while.
John
18. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 18, 1968, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PACKERS. Secret; Nodis; Packers. The meeting was held in Harriman's office.
SUBJECT
Vietnam Peace Talks
PARTICIPANTS
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large
Daniel I. Davidson, Special Assistant, S/AH
Corneliu Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador
Ambassador Bogdan told the Governor that Mr. Macovescu today left for Hanoi and that weather permitting he will arrive in Hanoi on January 22. Bogdan presumed this was Hanoi time. On Tuesday January 23, the Soviet government will be informed by an authorized representative of the Washington talks and of Macovescu's new mission to Hanoi. Ambassador Bogdan did not know who the authorized representative would be but thought it would be "probably at the highest level". When asked what the Russians would be told Bogdan said that he had not been informed exactly but he recalled Macovescu saying they would be given the gist or a summary of the talks.
Governor Harriman asked if the Ambassador had seen the State of the Union address/2/ which the Governor characterized as confirming the San Antonio formula. Bogdan replied that he had and saw nothing new in it. The Governor said that he mentioned the speech because some newspaper commentators said that the U.S. had hardened its stand and that he wanted the Romanians to know that the U.S. government had not changed its position. Ambassador Bogdan recalled that Secretary Rusk had said that what he told the Romanians is what counts and not what was said publicly. Bogdan said the Romanians understand that no advantage is not a condition but a warning.
/2/See Document 13.
The Governor stated that he was authorized to inform the Romanians that there had been no change in the San Antonio formula. As the Romanians had been frankly told a bombing pause could not continue if Hanoi took advantage of it but the U.S. was not requiring Hanoi to agree to any conditions in advance.
The Governor referred to the statements by Bo in Paris./3/ Bogdan said that they did not contain anything new and if anything confirmed what the Romanians had told us. Governor Harriman said that we did not want to get it confused with the Romanian message.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 4.
Ambassador Bogdan said that yesterday evening after the State of the Union address Murrey Marder of the Washington Post had called him at home and asked if a high Romanian official was in Washington. Bogdan had said that no such high official was now here but that the First Deputy Foreign Minister had inspected the Embassy at the beginning of the year. The Ambassador had asked Marder what made him inquire and Marder had replied that there was an item on this in a Washington news letter./4/
/4/Telegram 98490 to Bucharest, January 14, instructed DCM Neubert to deliver a message to Ceausescu from Johnson thanking him for his government's efforts "to bring about an honorable and peaceful solution." (Ibid.) On January 15 Neuber gave the note to Macovescu and informed him that information on the latter's visit to Hanoi the previous December apparently had leaked out. In response, Macovescu replied that such an occurrence was "understandable" since both the Soviet and Chinese Governments had been informed of his visit to the DRV. He hoped that the secrecy of his visit to Washington would be maintained until after his planned trip to Hanoi later in January. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PACKERS) Despite Macovescu's hopes, the Romanian Government itself did not maintain secrecy. A January 26 note given to the Department of State by the Apostolic Delegate Luis Raimondi, reads: "In a special audience with His Holiness, Pope Paul VI, on January 24, 1968, the Prime Minister of Rumania repeatedly stated that he has reason to believe that if the United States stops bombing North Vietnam, the Hanoi Government will not take advantage of the situation to reinforce its military power. This information, received by the Cardinal Secretary of State, is conveyed for whatever interest it may have." (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
19. Memorandum From the Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/
Washington, January 18, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, Peace Talks. Secret. An attached note from Helms to Rostow, January 22, reads: "Here are three copies of an effort on our part to fulfill your request for an examination of certain hypotheses in connection with Hanoi's intentions. I have sent copies to no one else. If you want further distribution, please advise me." A second attached note from Smith to Helms, January 18, reads: "This has been revised after consultation with George Carver, Dean Moor, and DD/I. I believe they are now satisfied with it."
SUBJECT
Alternative Interpretations of Hanoi's Intentions
Introduction
1. There are several hypotheses concerning the progress of the war in coming months and the intentions of the Communists. Most of them can be argued plausibly, for and against, and can be supported by some evidence. None is capable of conclusive proof or disproof, mainly because the evidence is either insufficient or can be interpreted in various and often diametrically opposed ways.
2. For example, there is the question of whether the North Vietnamese are willing to "negotiate." Hanoi has declared that it "will" talk if the bombing of North Vietnam is stopped. It is idle to say that this represents no change of attitude whatsoever; it is equally idle to assume that of itself it indicates an early end to the fighting. One may argue, quite plausibly, that Hanoi has finally comprehended that war against the power of the US can have but one ultimate conclusion, and is now probing to find out what US terms are. But one may also regard this latest statement simply as another political and psychological move to encourage dissent in the US and inflame world opinion against Washington.
3. In present circumstances it is true that any of a multitude of things could happen, at almost any time. Hanoi could quit tomorrow, or at any time thereafter; the Chinese could enter the conflict with their own armed forces in great number; China could collapse in total chaos; the Soviets could take a far more active role, either in support of Hanoi to continue the war or in withdrawing such support; the South Vietnamese government and polity could disintegrate; the Sino-Soviet controversy could become far more or far less acute than it is, and thus change the context of the Vietnam struggle; the policy of the US government could change in any of a number of ways, and so on.
4. A balanced estimate of the situation cannot rule these and other possibilities wholly out of consideration. The best it can do is to decide, on the basis of evidence and careful argument, that many of them are so unlikely as to be irrelevant, at least until more evidence appears, and that others should be held as possible qualifications and correctives in a net judgment. In the paragraphs that follow we attempt to show how the evidence and arguments may fit or not fit into alternative estimates of the prospects in Vietnam.
5. There are three hypotheses under which the situation in Vietnam may be considered and to which most of the evidence may be related: (1) Hanoi has decided that it must terminate the fighting in the course of this year; (2) Hanoi still feels a good measure of confidence in its prospects and firmly intends to fight on until it perceives a break in its favor in US policy; (3) Hanoi is less certain of its prospects and is keeping several options open. It intends to continue hard fighting in the months ahead, but recognizes it may be advisable to seek a compromise solution within the next year, according to the way things develop.
I. Pessimism in Hanoi
6. The more solid evidence supporting the proposition that Hanoi intends to quit at an early date comes from an analysis of Communist prospects in South Vietnam. According to our view of the data, the leaders in Hanoi could conclude that their prospects in South Vietnam are steadily and surely diminishing. The toll on their forces is increasingly heavy; their losses cannot be reduced without undermining the effectiveness of their military and political operations; recruitment in South Vietnam is becoming more and more difficult, control over the population is diminishing, and morale is becoming more of a problem as the war continues without conclusive results. Even though such problems may not yet be critical, the overall effect is that the Communist position will be weaker at the end of 1968 than it is now. Military action can arrest the decline but cannot change it fundamentally.
7. Proceeding from this analysis, Hanoi's current efforts on the military and political fronts can be seen as one last push to gain the best possible terms in an early settlement. For example, it can be argued that Hanoi would not intentionally seek the bloody and costly battles that it has, unless it knew that the fighting would end fairly soon and replacements would not be a problem. Hanoi would not, under this hypothesis, commit part of its strategic reserve, unless it believed there would be no real threat of an invasion from the US. Nor would the North Vietnamese claim that 1968 would be "decisive" and lead to the formation of a "coalition" government unless they actually anticipated an early political settlement.
8. There are, of course, various other considerations or factors which could cause Hanoi to seek an early end to the fighting; some of these have some evidential base. Perhaps the burden of the war on North Vietnam is in itself a decisive factor. The leadership may find that the annual loss of young men, added to the sum of economic and material damage, is unacceptable in its implications for the future vigor and productivity of the nation. Our own view, however, based on a variety of sources and buttressed by the recent testimony of the Spanish repatriates, is that the strains of the war on North Vietnam are still well within manageable limits.
9. There are other possibilities which are no better than sheer conjecture, but which cannot be entirely excluded. For example, it could be that Moscow, concerned over a decline in Communist strength in Vietnam, a possible US invasion of the north, and greater Chinese involvement and influence in North Vietnam, is exerting pressure on Hanoi to end the war. Such pressure could have taken the form of a threat to terminate major military aid after the completion of the deliveries negotiated this past fall along with a promise to provide substantial aid for economic development once the fighting stops.
10. Pressures from Peking could also be responsible for a decision to end the fighting. The Chinese, for example, might have made their continued aid conditional on Hanoi's acceptance of Chinese advice on both military and political strategy.
11. Neither of these conjectures can be supported by any available evidence. Indeed, Peking and especially Moscow have appeared reluctant in the past to apply direct and heavy pressures on Hanoi; neither wants to force Hanoi into the embrace of the other. While Moscow, unlike Peking, is not committed to prolongation of the war, it has always seen some advantages in the fighting and has demonstrated no willingness to intervene with Hanoi in favor of early negotiations.
12. Alternatively, Hanoi may have concluded that the Sino-Soviet dispute will undermine effective aid. The USSR may be refusing to ship certain weapons through China, or to risk delivery by sea. Hanoi may anticipate that one of the Communist giants will insist that it take a clear cut stand in the dispute; this would place Hanoi in the position of alienating at least one side.
13. Another possibility is that the North Vietnamese leaders may have concluded that turmoil and disruption in China make it a poor prospect as a "reliable rear area." Hanoi may fear that China's antics are encouraging the US to escalate the war without fear of Chinese reactions. And Hanoi might even fear that the time will come when the Chinese will insist that North Vietnam begin its own "cultural revolution."
14. There is, of course, evidence of Hanoi's concern over the Sino-Soviet dispute and over China's internal policy. Last year the North Vietnamese Politburo and Central Committee apparently passed a resolution affirming Hanoi's neutrality in the dispute. Missions were sent to both Moscow and Peking to explain this position, which has been continually re-emphasized. At one point last year, Hanoi apparently had to become directly involved in ensuring that Soviet supplies transited more expeditiously through China. Hanoi also reacted to Mao's cultural revolution by issuing a fairly pointed criticism of Chinese behavior and the cult of Mao. Added to these concerns is the fairly open record of Chinese opposition to any hint of talks between Hanoi and the United States.
15. What is lacking, however, is any evidence that the tensions with China or the concern over Soviet support have reached the level where Hanoi would fear Soviet or Chinese disengagement. The physical evidence suggests that both Peking and Moscow are in fact increasing their aid.
16. If for any of the reasons discussed under this hypothesis Hanoi should decide to end the fighting, it would have at least two alternatives. It could simply decide to allow the conflict to die down, without seeking a political resolution. Or it could attempt to obtain the best possible terms for a settlement under the existing circumstances. In this latter case, the recent Trinh statement on talks with the US could be read as the first step in the gradual development of a negotiating position. The North Vietnamese, of course, would still bargain for favorable terms, but they would also recognize the need to be more forthcoming and to reduce their demands for a settlement. It would also make sense under this interpretation for Hanoi to get negotiations underway before rather than after the American elections, reasoning that during an election campaign it would have more room for maneuvering against the US. Hanoi's handling of the follow up to the Trinh interview will be a test for this hypothesis; if it is correct confirmatory evidence should become available before long.
II. Confidence in Hanoi
17. The North Vietnamese may be more impressed with their achievements in the past two years than with the problems they have encountered. They have withstood the massive American intervention in the South and the heavy bombing of the North. Despite the bombing, they now fight with more and better arms and ammunition, and their supply lines are more elaborately developed. The political infrastructure in the South has been maintained, even if in somewhat weakened condition. Their military effort, based on the increasing threat from the border areas, not only presents a new challenge to the US on the ground but also introduces new political complications for the Americans. Finally, of course, because of their experience with the ebb and flow of the French war, the natural inclination of the political leaders would be to exaggerate their own strength and expect the US to concede defeat rather than face the prospect of a protracted war.
18. Hanoi's determination to keep fighting could also be explained by what it believes are fundamental weaknesses in the American and South Vietnamese position. The Communists may be convinced that the Saigon regime has little chance of becoming an effective government, generally accepted by the people. Moreover, Hanoi may be persuaded that the South Vietnamese army will never develop into a fighting force which is effective enough to assume part of the US burden. Thus, even if the US military effort is highly successful, in the end the US will find it has no political base in South Vietnam and will be forced to conclude a political settlement with the Front.
19. Even if Hanoi does not read the situation in South Vietnam in this way, it may be relying on assurances of substantial external support which will enable the Communists to fight on effectively. The Chinese may have promised more logistical and air defense troops and even some combat units in order to meet any manpower needs in North Vietnam. The Soviets may have promised new weapons to cope with superior American fire power and the air and naval attacks on the North.
20. Perhaps the best evidence in support of this general interpretation of Hanoi's outlook is the record of the past two years. At each phase of the US buildup Hanoi has been willing to respond by committing additional resources to the struggle in the South. A high level of infiltration has been maintained; the most recent deployments near the western end of the DMZ may express a determination not only to persist in the war, but to try for a decisive defeat of the US in some local battle. Hanoi's leaders have not taken advantage of several opportunities for negotiations; this could mean that they believe nothing can be gained at the bargaining table unless it has already been won on the battlefield. Finally, a commitment to fight a protracted war was the main decision of the North Vietnamese Central Committee resolution of late 1965, was reaffirmed by the Central Committee in early 1967, and continues to be cited as basic policy.
21. As to evidence of external support, Hanoi has recently concluded a series of new agreements with its Communist allies. Moscow has openly promised a variety of weapons; Soviet coastal defense missiles could be the first of several new items on the list. New Chinese weapons have shown up in the Delta for the first time in the war. We know of no increases in Chinese troop strength in North Vietnam in recent months. Recent high level reaffirmations of pledges to support Hanoi, however, could be read as a willingness to increase Chinese commitments. And air defense cooperation between Hanoi and Peking has grown markedly in recent months.
22. We know of no evidence that is totally inconsistent with an intention to continue the war for some considerable period of time. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Hanoi would never draw down its home army and weaken the defense of North Vietnam if it looked forward to a long war, particularly in light of continuing concern over an American invasion. And it could be further argued that Hanoi would not tell the troops in the South that this would be a "decisive" year, if in fact it believed the war was likely to continue well beyond 1968. Finally, why Hanoi would want to keep alive hopes for negotiations, aggravating the Chinese in the process, if it had no intention of reaching a political settlement in the near future?
23. If Hanoi's mood and outlook is roughly as assumed under this hypothesis then its attitude toward peace talks is likely to be intransigent. Upon exploration, moves like the recent Trinh statement will come to nothing. Hanoi, of course, would welcome an end to the bombing, but will adamantly refuse to pay any price for it. Negotiations would be mainly to register the defeat of the US and the end of the Saigon regime.
24. Finally, one may conjecture that Hanoi's postulated confidence rests on some factor or event which is not yet apparent to the US, such as a major escalation by the Communists. This might take the form of a military offensive in Laos which would threaten to expand the area of conflict and further strain US resources in Southeast Asia. Or escalation might take the form of Chinese moves in Vietnam or elsewhere around its periphery. Or again, the North Vietnamese could be relying on the USSR to create a diversionary crisis, say in Berlin.
25. Such possibilities have been carefully considered almost since the beginning of the US intervention in Vietnam. Thus far, there is no persuasive evidence that Hanoi, Peking or Moscow intends to enlarge the war beyond Vietnam or take major action elsewhere against the US.
III. Suspended Judgment in Hanoi
26. The third hypothesis assumes that Hanoi's estimate of the situation is based on a mixture of increased pessimism and continuing confidence, which are compounded by other factors, particularly the American elections. Under this hypothesis Hanoi is keeping several options open and will continue to do so at least until late spring or summer, when it should be in a better position to judge the effect of the American primaries and conventions and the results of its own military offensive. At that time Hanoi will also be better able to judge the effectiveness and durability of the Saigon government.
27. If this is so, Hanoi's winter-spring offensive is designed not only for its immediate military objectives but for its overall impact on the US. Hanoi would recognize that its chances for a military victory have evaporated, but it would still hope, by sustaining high levels of combat in the months ahead, to create the impression of a stalemate. It would not expect the US to capitulate, but it would see increased chances for a compromise on terms that would protect the Viet Cong infrastructure and provide the basis for a new political phase in the revolutionary struggle. Hanoi could not be confident of what the outcome of its own efforts will be. But it would recognize that the next twelve months provide an unusual opportunity because of the American elections.
28. Even if political overtures combined with military pressures do not bear fruit, Hanoi could reason that by agitating the question of a coalition government and contacts with the Front, the strains between Washington and Saigon will grow and the US will come under increasing international pressures to modify its own terms. In short, Hanoi would do what it could to maintain its military pressures, but would at the same time become more flexible in its diplomacy, waiting for some months more to decide whether to make the best deal possible, continue the war more or less along present lines, or even to adopt a radically different way of fighting, i.e., guerrilla warfare.
29. This hypothesis rests on a different reading of much of the same evidence already cited. Hanoi has made military decisions which strike some observers as inexplicable given the nature of their problems. Hanoi cannot possibly hope to drive the US into the sea and probably cannot expect another Dien Bien Phu. Thus, it would seem better advised to conserve its forces for a protracted war in which it would hope to sap the will of the US. Instead, the North Vietnamese commit more troops and seek costly battles. Moreover, since last July they do seem to have indicated more interest in maintaining private contacts with the US and, in some cases, actually inviting US negotiating probes--moves which their rather rigid public position would not justify.
30. This hypothesis is supported by some negative evidence. For example, why should China be so cool to the new program of the NLF unless Peking senses that the revision of the program was a step toward a negotiating situation? Why did the Front try to send representatives to New York, if as Hanoi claims the UN has absolutely no business in the Vietnam question? And, above all, why do the captured documents contain intriguing tidbits suggesting that the war may not go beyond 1968? These contradictions or inconsistencies could be reconciled within the framework of this third hypothesis.
31. Uncertainty could also grow out of the state of relations with China and the USSR. In actual fact we know little of Hanoi's relations with its allies. What we do know is based on glimmerings from captured documents, deductions from overt statements and an occasional hint from Soviet sources. In any case, Hanoi cannot be very confident that Moscow and Peking will not fall into an even more bitter conflict, or that the situation inside China will not deteriorate further. Indeed, Hanoi could conclude that it would be better to explore US terms for a political settlement while China is still in some disarray rather than later, when the Chinese leadership might be reunified and tempted to interfere more directly in Hanoi's affairs.
32. Indications of uncertainty could also be reconciled with an even more extreme variant of this hypothesis, namely, that the North Vietnamese Politburo is badly divided and is pursuing an indecisive and at times contradictory policy. Perhaps, as Ho Chi Minh's health has declined, factionalism has reared its ugly head and led to a fairly even split between hawks and doves. Both factions could seek comfort and support from abroad, the hawks from Peking and the doves from Moscow. The hawks may insist on the need for further intensive military effort while the doves could be arguing for a shift to political tactics.
33. Though there is some evidence that the North Vietnamese leaders have engaged in debates over policy, mainly on the proper military tactics, there has never been sufficient evidence to conclude that the leadership is divided on basic policies of whether to fight or quit. A power struggle in Hanoi, of course, is a possibility after Ho and could be developing now. But the evidence is lacking, and this explanation of Hanoi's behavior seems highly unlikely.
34. Even less likely but still within the reach of the imaginable is a split between the Viet Cong and Hanoi. As Hanoi has assumed more of the burden and direction of the war, it may have alienated a faction within COSVN. The Viet Cong could argue, with support from certain figures in the Hanoi leadership, that all talk of negotiations is defeatism. Hanoi may suspect a Chinese bent in the Viet Cong., etc., etc. There may be actual divergencies between Hanoi and some of the Viet Cong leaders, but a real split should be excluded as unlikely.
35. As noted at the outset of this discussion we cannot rule out any of these three hypothetical explanations for Hanoi's behavior. It would certainly not be surprising if the North Vietnamese continued the war through next year and for some time afterward. It would be more surprising if they decided to end it soon. We believe there is much to recommend the third case: in the months ahead Hanoi will continue its military effort but will probe more intently to discover what the shape of a political settlement might be.
For the Board of National Estimates:
Abbot Smith
Chairman
20. Memorandum for Record/1/
Palm Desert, California, January 18, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, President Eisenhower [1965-1968] [1 of 2]. Secret. Prepared by General Goodpaster on January 22.
SUBJECT
Meeting with General Eisenhower, Palm Desert, 18 January
I met with General Eisenhower for two hours at his office and his home at Palm Desert on 18 January.
I began with a report on the progress of the war. In recent weeks, the VC and NVA have been making an unusual military effort, and taking very heavy losses--3,000 and 2,200 in the last two weeks. Documents have been captured which call for an immediate or "final" effort by all units. The general pattern continues to show Communist losses more than 5 times as great as the losses to U.S., Allied and ARVN forces combined.
Next I gave a r?sum? in some detail of the principal US/ARVN operational efforts now going on and envisaged for the near future, including ground/air operations in SVN (by Corps area), ground activities relating to Laos and Cambodia, naval operations in the Vietnam area, B-52 operations, Air operations against NVN, Air operations in Laos, the anti-infiltration system, and revolutionary development operations in SVN.
Next I covered a few points of special note. There is an enemy concentration which may total 3 NVA divisions in the Khe Sanh area which is being closely watched. Also there is enemy preparation for possible renewed action in the Dak To area. Next, I reported recently obtained VC reports that in Quang Tri and Quang Nam, the Communist organization is being "stunted" by US/SVN military operations, and that in areas of Phu Yen, cadre and infrastructure are disintegrating; also an NVN report indicates that North Vietnam is hurting from the bombing attacks and suffering losses, some of which are irreplaceable.
I then passed on a report that the NVN had conducted a remarkably well coordinated supply operation during Christmas week. Trucks observed in Route Package 1, other than Christmas Day, ranged from 3 to 95 (averaging 44) and waterborne logistic craft from 0 to 43 (averaging 17); on Christmas Day 547 trucks and 325 waterborne logistic craft were sighted. On the same day between Thanh Hoa and Dong Hoi 900 trucks were sighted, 888 moving south (carrying an estimated 4,000 tons). General Eisenhower thought these were significant figures and asked why these figures are not better known. I told him that figures like these had been made public, and there had been some press coverage, although not with the emphasis he had in mind. (I indicated that I could not speak about TV coverage.) He said he thought that photographs should be taken and publicized in case of any future suspension. I told him this has been done in the past, and that in the discussions I have heard concerning possible future bombing halts there was strong insistence on the need to provide photo reconnaissance.
I next reported on Chieu Hoi returnees in 1967. The number--some 27,000--was less than had been estimated when the year began, but was 34% over 1966. Of the 27,000, some 17,000 were military, the equivalent of 2 Communist divisions or about one-fifth of the total VC/NVA killed or captured in 1967 (91,000). Political returnees numbered nearly 8,000 of whom 4,700 were infrastructure or party organizers. General Eisenhower asked whether some of these may be VC agents. I told him that they are screened, and that in fact some of the returnees are used with patrols that seek out, propagandize, and call in air and artillery strikes on the units from which they came.
General Eisenhower commented that the TV coverage of our bases that are hit by mortar fire is damaging to our people's understanding of the war. The presentations are highly dramatic and shocking in their effect. I told him that a great deal of patrolling, which is often successful, goes into protecting our bases against mortar fire, and that some attacking groups have been detected and attacked by air and artillery. This, of course, cannot be shown as graphically on TV and in the press as the attacks on our bases.
I next reported upon the widespread SVN concern over "coalition", as the background for General Thieu's recent statement. Ambassador Bunker had reported rising concern in SVN that the U.S. might be shifting to favor coalition, and had suggested that this should be scotched. Also, Mr. Rostow told me that there was a great deal of talk and worry about this in SVN, much of which seemed to be starting with the VC. The latter, according to captured documents, is pushing the coalition issue in its propaganda (and linking the U.S. to the idea) while calling for a special round of combat effort. I said Mr. Rostow had told me that our government does not favor coalition; this is simply VC propaganda. General Eisenhower said that a coalition would be undesirable and dangerous and we should oppose it. I also mentioned that Mr. Rostow believes there is some evidence of a shift in the view the Communists have held that time is on their side. General Eisenhower thought such a shift would be highly significant.
Next I took up the status of the possible NVN "peace feeler" involved in the shift from "could" to "will", covering points provided to me by General Wheeler. We do not know what the NVN objective may be--whether they are serious, want a respite, seek a psychological coup, etc., or whether their shift on "permanent" cessation is somehow an indirect assurance they will not take advantage of a bombing halt.
During discussion, General Eisenhower cited his experience first with the Italian surrender and later with the German surrender. He advised not to rely on "iffy" favorable interpretations, but to insist upon more frank and clear-cut statements (which may, of course, be made privately). Even then, he said, we must not put ourselves in the position of depending upon belief in what a Communist says. Whatever is worked out must be self-enforcing. I told him that these questions, and others like them, are being very carefully studied within the government, and that a great deal of thought is being given to them. There seems to be considerable recognition that the key issue is whether the NVN is ready, or can be led, to give up its efforts at take-over of SVN by force. Also, that if bombing is stopped, it could prove very difficult to start up again. This underlies the cautious and careful approach that is being made.
Next he said that if the NVN is in fact weakening its position, now is the time to hit them harder. He mentioned B-52 attacks on enemy forces and bases in SVN, and I told him that an expansion of effort is envisaged currently. Also, he thought we should hit the enemy with our ground forces, and should encourage the SVN to go after him with special aggressiveness at this time. The enemy might, as suggested, be making a great military effort in order to impose losses on us, and advance his advantages in going into negotiations. We should do much the same.
He said he hoped that we could get an effective armistice. To that end, now may be the time to increase our combat effort. He commented that this will be a partisan and political year, but that there is nothing partisan in his views when the lives of U.S. military men are involved. He said he wants to see the President win the war.
G.
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
21. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
CM-2927-68
Washington, January 20, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, VIET 092.2. Top Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "Sec Def has seen."
SUBJECT
Tet Stand down
1. This responds to a request from Mr. Walt W. Rostow for General Westmoreland's rationale behind his recommendation for a 36-hour Tet stand down. In requesting General Westmoreland's views, I provided to him a summary of the rationale which the Joint Staff prepared for me on this question./2/ This was provided to Mr. Steadman, OSD (ISA) and Department of State on 18 January. General Westmoreland agreed with that rationale and the logistical data therein. His comments are reflected below:
/2/Attached to a January 18 memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense William Lang to McNamara was a draft Presidential memorandum recommending only a 36-hour Tet holiday truce, a paper arguing the military advantages of reducing the stand-down, and an undated estimate from the DIA which suggested that the North Vietnamese could infiltrate as much as an additional 10,000 tons of material southward during the 12-hour difference. (Ibid., OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 1499, Vietnam 381, Jan-April 1968) In a memorandum for the record, January 16, Westmoreland discussed a conversation he had with Thieu the previous day in which they decided upon a 36-hour truce for the RVNAF (from 1800 on January 29 to 0600 on January 31). However, all U.S. troops would be on alert, as would 50 percent of the ARVN. (Johnson Library, William C. Westmoreland Papers, #28 History File) The truce was shortened the next day; 8 days later, the truce was canceled for CTZ I.
a. Holiday ceasefires have been unilaterally established, together with rules of conduct, by both the enemy and ourselves. However, our respective objectives are unrelated. The record is replete with documented evidence that the enemy's intent and actions have been consistently contrary to any peaceful objectives. Hanoi has directed the truce periods be fully exploited for improving the communist military posture.
b. Free World casualties sustained during truce periods are but slightly less than during non-truce conflict. Hence, there can be no sense of security or safety for the people of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) for the enjoyment of holidays, whether ceasefire periods are established or not. On the other hand, the aggressor in this conflict and his people suffer no similar limitations while pursuing their mockery of our concessions.
c. For so long as Hanoi persists in its direction and support of the war in RVN, our air interdiction efforts in North Vietnam (NVN) are indispensable to both the defense of RVN and the achievement of an early and acceptable negotiations posture. The expense in men and planes has fallen very heavily on the United States. Bombing pauses, however brief, are capitalized on fully to rebuild the essential elements of the NVN logistics system which we have so painstakingly disrupted. It would be unfortunate if our costly, necessary, and yet restrained air interdiction program were nullified by the concession of unilateral privileges which can be accurately forecast as being unproductive.
d. The enemy is presently developing a threatening posture in several areas in order to seek victories essential to achieving prestige and bargaining power. He may exercise his initiatives prior to, during or after Tet. It is altogether possible that he has planned to complete his offensive preparations during the Free World ceasefire. He has used past truce periods for this purpose and can be expected to do so again. We shall do all possible to restrict the movement of men and materials by the enemy in RVN during the ceasefire through advance positioning of our forces.
e. President Thieu and General Vien do not question the advisability of keeping ceasefires to the shortest possible time periods, and they recognize the wholly unilateral aspect of the holiday truces. They do, nevertheless, feel bound to at least a token observance of this most important of Vietnam holidays. However, they do not propose standing down the war for the full run of the traditional Tet celebration; this out of frank recognition of the severe penalties of imposing unwarranted trust in an enemy whose duplicity in such actions is so well established.
f. In summary, the longer the truce the greater the cost to us and to our Allies in lives, material and probably the duration of the war. It has been conclusively demonstrated that holiday truces of whatever length will not have any mollifying effect upon the enemy. The additional 12 hours (to 48 hours) will offer the Vietnamese people nothing in the form of safety or respite from the communists. It would seem that the additional 12 hours will serve only the purpose of the enemy, with no reciprocal benefits to us.
2. Admiral Sharp, in response to my request for his views on this matter, strongly recommended that the Tet ceasefire period be of the shortest possible duration, no more than 36 hours, to permit the enemy the shortest possible period to refurbish and reposition his forces. The additional 12 hours permitted by a 48 hour stand down would allow a very considerable increase in supply movement south and can only result in additional casualties to friendly forces.
3. Copies of this memorandum are being provided to Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Mr. Walt W. Rostow, and OSD (ISA).
Earle G. Wheeler
22. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 23, 1968, 8:30-9:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Confidential. The meeting was held in the White House. Those present at the meeting were the President; Vice President Humphrey; Senators Mansfield, Russell Long, Robert Byrd, McCormack, and Albert; Representative Hale Boggs; and several White House officials. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH
THE DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP
The President said U.S. forces are moving in reinforcements to prepare for a major concentrated attack around Khesanh. The President said that the Communists are making a major build up in this area./2/
/2/The NVA siege of Khe Sanh began on January 22. In a telephone conversation with the President at 8:27 a.m. that morning, McNamara reported: "You undoubtedly know that we think the long-expected attack on Khe Sanh in South Vietnam has been initiated. Substantial artillery and mortar fire and ground action is taking place there. General Westmoreland believes he is fully prepared to meet it." (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and McNamara, January 22, 8:27 a.m., Tape F68.01, Side A, PNO 5)
The President described the capture this morning of a U.S. communication ship off the coast of North Korea. He said confidentially that early reports indicated that several U.S. Navy personnel had been wounded as a result of the incident. There may have been shots fired. The ship was surrounded by North Korean boats and forced to port. He said this could develop into a major international problem./3/
/3/Reference is to the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo.
The President said the U.S. Government and the South Vietnamese government are doing all they can to get Hanoi to discuss peace. "Hanoi changed from would and could to will talk, but they will not say when. They will not discuss anything but North Vietnam. They will not talk unless we cease all military activities. We must know what ceasing all military activities really means."
The President said the U.S. Government thinks it has caught the Soviets paying off some of the anti-war people in this country.
The President said U.S. troops crossed into Cambodia yesterday trying to protect themselves. There was no way to avoid this in effort to save their own lives. The Vice President said he was sorry that Secretary Rusk had to apologize for the incident. The President said it is really a question that we cannot violate even one inch of territorial integrity./4/
/4/In a February 1 memorandum to Calhoun, General Phillip Davidson, head of MACV intelligence, submitted the final report of his investigation on the border episode. The report was transmitted to the Department in airgram A-406 from Saigon, February 8. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S) On January 22 Rusk expressed regret over the crossing into Cambodian territory by allied forces during a clash with the enemy. See The New York Times, January 23, 1968. For background, see footnote 4, Document 14.
The President said there could be a major upsurge in infiltration in the next quarter. The increased intensity of enemy activity indicates a major effort. Intelligence reports show a great similarity between what is happening at Khesanh and what happened at Dien Bien Phu. The President said there is no firm indication that North Vietnam will back down on any of its conditions.
The President said that there is a rapid deterioration of the strength of the Viet Cong. They are having to replace their manpower with North Vietnamese. The current campaign is a short-term surge effort designed to gain political advantages.
The President reviewed the last 48 hours. Reports show that a full scale attack on Khesanh is imminent. There also is a strong possibility of attack on Camp Carroll and multi-battalion attacks on Danang. In addition, country-wide terrorism is expected with attack on Pleiku and enemy violence in and around Saigon.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]
23. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 23, 1968, 12:58-2:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. Those attending the meeting were the President, Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Rostow, Helms, Wheeler, Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S TUESDAY
NATIONAL SECURITY LUNCH
[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo crisis, printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXIX, Part 1, Document 213.]
The President said he thinks that this incident is related to the whole picture. He said he would not be surprised if something happened in Berlin to coincide with what is going on in Vietnam and in Korea.
The President asked if we were confident of our situation around Khesanh.
The President asked General Wheeler if we had given General Westmoreland everything he needed.
General Westmoreland said, yes, sir.
General Wheeler said Westmoreland is confident of being able to handle the problem in Khesanh. He said that re-enforcements have been sent into the area and the weather is not continuously bad. Even in the event of bad weather there is sufficient artillery. In addition, the ARVN have sent a Ranger Battalion to the area to make this a joint effort.
The President pointed out that we have had a very good press from Saigon in the last two or three weeks.
Rostow said General Sidle is an excellent man who is moving the ARVN out front in the press. General Wheeler said Sidle has a good program and also is making Westmoreland more prominent in the news.
The President asked if anybody had heard from Senator Ted Kennedy on the refugee study./2/ Walt Rostow said he had not.
/2/Kennedy visited Vietnam to investigate refugee and medical care programs. Johnson saw Kennedy at a meeting for Democratic members of the Congressional labor committees on the morning of January 23, and asked to meet him the next day. In an off-the-record session on January 24, 11:35 a.m.-12:35 p.m., the President met with Kennedy, his administrative assistant David Burke, and Leonhart to discuss the Vietnam visit. (Ibid.) Notes of the meeting have not been found. Kennedy discussed his visit in a January 25 speech delivered at the World Affairs Council in Boston. In the speech, Kennedy suggested that many leaders in the U.S. military in Vietnam would support the enactment of a defensive enclave-like strategy that emphasized holding onto the heavily populated areas. See The New York Times, January 26, 1968.
Secretary McNamara said he saw a preliminary report from the field. Based on the questions asked, it appears the report will emphasize excessive fire from allied weapons is resulting in civilian casualties and refugees.
Walt Rostow asked should the incident be referred to the United Nations, involving the ship.
The President said this would be protective and would show a lack of malice on our part.
Secretary Rusk said we might like to take this to the Security Council. First, we should see what comes from the Mixed Armistice Commission./3/
/3/Reference is to the armistice commission deliberating on the Pueblo.
Director Helms said the Soviets have their own ships of this kind including two ships off the Korean coast to keep an eye on the Red Chinese. In addition, they have one ship off Guam.
With reference to the expected enemy offensive near Khesanh, General Wheeler said General Momyer is coordinating all air support.
Secretary McNamara said that the anti-personnel barrier has been defended for use around Khesanh.
General Wheeler said that "gravel" (ammunition used to blow up personnel) will be placed in the area tomorrow.
The President read portions of General Westmoreland's cable outlining developments in the area and the potential terrorism which is expected in Saigon./4/
/4/Reference is to telegram MAC 01049 to Wheeler, January 22, in which Westmoreland concluded: "The bulk of our evidence suggests that the enemy is conducting a short-term surge effort, possibly designed to improve his chances of gaining his ends through political means, perhaps through negotiations leading to some form of coalition government." (U.S. Army Center for Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, #29 History File)
[Omitted here is discussion of the Military Assistance Program and the provision of arms to Jordan.]
24. Telegram From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson/1/
Washington, January 24, 1968, 0530Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, United Kingdom, Vol. 7. Secret.
CAP 80370. We have given a careful reading to your record of the current discussion and much appreciate your letting us see it./2/
/2/In telegram T.33/68, January 24, Wilson described his efforts to devise a communiqu? with Kosygin, part of which related to Vietnam. Despite having been briefed by Bundy about the existence of a "channel of communication" with Hanoi (although the fact that it was through the Romanians was not disclosed), the Prime Minister complained that his being in the dark had made his task more difficult. In addition, Wilson noted Kosygin's desire for him to make contact with the DRV Embassy in Moscow. (Ibid.) Bundy's report on his briefing of Wilson is in telegrams 5726 and 5728 from London, both January 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) A backgrounder on Bundy's mission is in telegram 101274 to Saigon, January 19. (Ibid.)
We are a bit puzzled about just what Kosygin has in mind. Over a year ago Secretary Rusk asked Gromyko for advice about which of the capitals in reasonably friendly relations with Moscow would be the most appropriate and reliable contact with Hanoi. Gromyko quite categorically stated "Moscow. The others are of no value." In the most recent period, however, it has been our very strong impression that Moscow was not interested in working seriously in Hanoi for a peaceful settlement. If that was their view, we thought we ought to accommodate them.
One can never be sure about contacts involving third parties. In this instance, however, we have every reason to believe that we are in such contact with Pham Van Dong and Trinh, the Foreign Minister. This derives both from internal evidence in what has allegedly been said and from external evidence in the consistency between what has been said privately, what has been said publicly by Hanoi and by reasonable interpretations of a great deal of diplomatic gossip in a number of capitals involving Hanoi's representatives.
It is probable that Moscow knows the channel and does not particularly like it. After all, Moscow's own prestige could be involved. It may be that Hanoi is somewhat evasive with Moscow because of Hanoi's problem with Peking. There is always the possibility, whatever the intermediary might be, that we are being hoodwinked. But we are protecting ourselves against being hoodwinked. For example, the bombing has not been stopped.
It is curious that Kosygin seems to feel strongly about the channel but has nothing to say on the substance. We have had nothing from your talks with him or with Brezhnev indicating what Moscow is prepared to do on the assumption that we are prepared to stop the bombing within the framework of the San Antonio formula.
We have followed our own contact closely, know where he is and when he will get back. We expect to see him or hear from him again before the end of the month. We have even done one or two little things as a contribution to his safety and comfort while on his mission.
If Kosygin, unexpectedly, wishes to talk about the issues in substance we would be glad to know what he has in mind. He knows our own view, he knows our address and we have had nothing from him.
We concur in your judgment that perhaps you yourself should not see the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow but we have no particular problem about your Ambassador, or indeed our Ambassador, seeing this individual to listen although we would not ourselves wish to direct any message through that channel at the present time. We say this because we have tried on other occasions and have gotten nothing but bruises for our efforts.
Trying to answer your specific questions, we don't know who is taking whom for a ride except that we don't intend to be the victim. It is possible that Hanoi is dealing somewhat at arm's length with Moscow because of the Peking problem. It is entirely possible that Kosygin is trying to sell you something and it would be habitual for him to try to persuade you that we are trying to sell you something. In this case, I have no doubt that he would like to get a tender morsel on Viet-Nam in the communiqu?. What is perhaps more ominous is that Moscow may be playing a spoiling game in Hanoi because of their irritations with the present procedure.
Our inclination would be to play our hand out on the present line to see where we get. If that gets nowhere and Moscow is ready to play the next chapter, we won't object if they smirk a bit and say "we told you so." I do hope that you can keep your position as co-chairman intact when it comes to the communiqu? because there will be a lot of people engaged in defending South Viet-Nam who need to have confidence that at least one of the co-chairmen is playing it straight./3/
/3/In an unnumbered personal telegram for the President, January 24, Wilson expressed thanks for Johnson's message, which "arrived just in time to arm me for what proved a classic Kremlin battle over the passage on Vietnam in the communiqu?." He reported that the Soviets had unsuccessfully "fought with total intransigence for a formula which would have had us denounce outside (i.e. American) interference and declare that any settlement should be based on the right of local peoples to solve their internal affairs without it." In addition, while Wilson could not get the communiqu? tied to the San Antonio and Trinh formulas, he did manage to have the Geneva agreements referenced. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, United Kingdom, Vol. 7) In a further report on his discussions in Moscow, in an unnumbered personal telegram to the President, January 29, Wilson elaborated on his impressions of the Soviet mood: "I cannot help feeling that their real dilemma is how to strike a satisfactory balance in their own minds between, on the one hand, the requirements of their global relationship with yourselves and their determination not to get involved in a conflict with you; and, on the other hand, a blend of gut-reaction against (as they would see it) any attempt by the capitalist world to eliminate a socialist state and of plain fear that any open let up on their part will weaken their effort to retain leadership of the world communist movement." (Ibid.) For the official British record of Wilson's meetings at the Kremlin, see Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Vol. I: Britain and the Soviet Union, 1968-72, pp. 14-22.
25. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 24, 1968, 1215Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 9:10 a.m. The telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 302-315.
16850. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my thirty-sixth weekly message.
A. General
1. In this message, I should like to give a general assessment of some of the problems we shall be facing in 1968 and how we propose to cope with them. We will, of course, be dealing with them and reporting on them in a more specific manner as time goes on, but I thought it would be useful to give a rather general view of the situation ahead as we see it now.
2. I think one general observation is in order. As a result of a number of elections held since September 1966, and with our encouragement, the Vietnamese have adopted a democratic, constitutional form of government with the institutions which normally pertain to it, executive, legislative, and judicial. It marks the transition from a recent military form, and historically an authoritarian form of government to democratic institutions. It is a form of government with which the Vietnamese have had virtually no experience. A senator said to me last week: "We must make our new government work, but it will be difficult because while we have a history of 4,000 years, we have no tradition of democracy." The fact that the basic structures have been built and representative institutions constructed out of near chaos and are beginning to function is in itself quite a remarkable achievement. But the question we have to look to in the coming year is how well and how rapidly they can be made to operate.
3. I believe we shall have to face the fact that in many instances action will be less rapid than under the previous government which could rule by decree. The views of the Assembly, which is beginning to assert its prerogatives, will have to be considered by the executive. Even in cases where regulations might be promulgated by the executive as, for example, in the raising of certain taxes, it may be reluctant to take the political risks involved without consulting the Assembly. The decree law on partial mobilization and the Assembly reaction to it is an example of what may occur. Consequently unless the Assembly is willing to relinquish some of its authority and grant to the executive fairly broad wartime powers, I believe we shall have to expect some disappointment in the rapidity with which actions are taken.
4. Another factor which will make for caution is the necessary process of the transformation of the character of the government from an essentially military one to a civilian regime. This will require some deft handling, especially on Thieu's part. Some resistance by the military to give up prerogatives which they have long enjoyed can be expected. At the same time, the civilian elements of the government have to gain experience and get accustomed to their jobs. Thieu recognizes this problem and, being essentially cautious, will move, I believe progressively step by step rather than abruptly to bring about the change. I believe he is wise in this, for too precipitate actions might cause strains which would be difficult for the present governmental structure to sustain. A corollary to this is the Thieu-Ky relationship, which needs to be nurtured and cultivated on both sides. I think there are encouraging signs that this is developing satisfactorily and that their present relationships are now better than they have been for some time in the past. Both have very recently expressed a desire to work closely together.
5. Another thing we shall have to live with is sensitivity to US pressures, at least with a more articulate expression of it. A massive American presence is apt to stimulate a latent xenophobia and with a free press and open debate in the Assembly, I believe we can expect a certain amount of criticism of our actions here. If kept within reasonable bounds, I do not think we need to be apprehensive about this, for it represents a healthy spirit of developing nationalism and independence.
6. Another general problem is that of political organization, the creation of broadly representative national political parties. This is something which will take time. As both Thieu and Ky have said, the process must develop from a sound base. The effort to force the development too rapidly will result in artificiality and instability. On the other hand, it is something which we must steadily and progressively encourage and help to push, for the development of political organization on national lines is, I believe, the ultimate defense against the Viet Cong and perhaps the only permanent defense. The formation of groupings, or blocs as they call them, in the Assembly and the institution of local government at the village and hamlet level, which is proceeding steadily, may form the nuclei for the development which we seek. This is something which we shall want to keep steadily pushing./2/
/2/Preliminary discussion of Vietnamese plans to form a political party are reviewed in telegram 17282 from Saigon, January 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 12 VIET S)
7. The question of peace, a political settlement and negotiations are matters which will be constantly before us here as well as at home. It is my view, shared by members of the Mission Council, that were we to enter into negotiations now, we would be faced with a most difficult situation. I do not believe that the present government has acquired sufficient strength, either militarily or politically, to be assured of survival on its own. Six months from now it should be in a somewhat stronger position, but Hanoi may be aware of this and consequently press for negotiations. It seems to me that if I were in their place, this is what I would be doing. I realize their estimate of the situation may be quite different, but I believe that we should be prepared for such an eventuality; and that therefore we ought to try to spell out in as precise terms as possible what would be acceptable terms of settlement to us. Since what may be acceptable to us may not be fully so to the GVN or some of our other allies, we may need to engage in some educational effort and I believe we ought to be in a position to begin this before too long.
[Omitted here is discussion of politics, pacification and development, economics, military actions, and public affairs.]
Bunker
26. Notes of Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, January 24, 1968, 1-2:06 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. In addition to those who spoke, those present at the meeting included Humphrey, Rusk, Battle, Sisco, Nitze, Helms, Marks, Vance, Katzenbach, Rostow, Christian, Saunders, Davis, Smith, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo and Cyprus crises. The discussion relating to the Pueblo is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXIX, Part 1, Document 218.]
The President: I spent some of this morning with Senator Ted Kennedy discussing his trip to Vietnam and the report he plans to submit./2/ There are two points he made:
/2/See footnote 2, Document 23.
1. He is distressed about the degree of corruption in the South Vietnamese government. He thinks this may be ascending rather than descending.
2. He said there is substantial division among our generals about tactics and strategy we are following. He said many of them think we are investing more than we are getting in return.
I would suggest Secretary McNamara call the Senator and tell him I am very concerned about his report and that we are taking steps to head this off.
Secretary McNamara: We looked into the harassment and interdiction fire tactics. General Wheeler asked General Westmoreland to make very clear the rules of engagement and make sure they are well understood.
The President: General Wheeler, are you as confident today as you were yesterday that we can handle the situation at Khesanh?
General Wheeler: I do not think the enemy is capable of doing what they have set out to do. General Westmoreland has strengthened his position. He has contingency plans and can meet any contingency. There is nothing he has asked for that he has not been given. Khesanh is important to us militarily and psychologically. It is the anchor of our defensive situation along the DMZ.
The President: General Wheeler, are you sure that you have everything that is needed to take care of the situation in Khesanh?
General Wheeler: Yes, we are. General Westmoreland has been given everything he has requested.
The President: Have you done all we can back here?
General Wheeler: Yes Sir.
The President: We have been getting unusually good press from South Vietnam recently and I think that Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler should pass that along to the people who are handling our press relations out there.
Secretary McNamara: We have a good new military press man and I will be happy to pass along the President's views.
The President: I will now ask Secretary Fowler to give us a summary of his situation concerning the budget and the possible deficit.
Secretary Fowler: It is no longer a question of debate on whether or not a tax increase is a good thing. I think our case has been presented quite clearly. We may get $6 billion, 2.9 from excise taxes and 3.0 from corporate taxes. So it becomes a question of getting 6 this way or 12 if we get the surtax.
Looking back over the last six months, the economy has risen $32 billion in this half versus $13 billion increase in the first half. We have a 4% price increase. Last year we said the balance of payments problem was becoming serious. It did. The committee said they wanted budget expenditures reduced by $5 billion. We reduced them by $4-1/2 billion.
The committee asked us not to request a rate of increase to exceed that of last year. We did that. We restricted new programs. We cut back on old programs.
I reminded the committee that time is running out if we are to do anything meaningful about this deficit.
27. Editorial Note
In confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee during January 1968, Secretary of Defense-designate Clark M. Clifford answered questions on the Vietnam war. In testimony on January 25, Clifford opposed a halt to the bombing under the current circumstances, citing the need for reciprocal actions on the part of the North Vietnamese. In response to a question on whether the North Vietnamese had to end all military activity as a condition of a cessation, Clifford responded that under the San Antonio formula, postulated by President Johnson the previous September, the only conditions were that the North Vietnamese engage in negotiations promptly following a halt and not take advantage of it militarily. "Their military activity will continue in South Vietnam, I assume, until there is a cease-fire agreed upon. I assume that they will continue to transport the normal amount of goods, munitions, and men to South Vietnam. I assume that we will continue to maintain our forces and support our forces during that period. So what I am suggesting is, in the language of the President, that he would insist that they not take advantage of the suspension of the bombing." Clifford's testimony was reported in The New York Times, January 26, 1968. The Senate unanimously confirmed Clifford's nomination on January 30.
28. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 25, 1968, 1228Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
16919. During a talk with President Thieu morning January 25 I told him about the latest information we had had from General Westmoreland on developments in the Khe Sanh area and asked him how he felt about this offensive. Thieu said he thought that the result might give us some real estimate of the will of the North Vietnamese, as they were clearly embarked on an all-out effort along the DMZ. He was also inclined to think that General Giap was actually leading the attack. Thieu said that we would also soon see if this was an NVN effort to support proposals for talks, on the theory that the U.S. was under pressure to talk. Thieu said that he was going to visit the area tomorrow and noted that Generals Westmoreland and Vien were up there today. He observed in conclusion that at least two divisions were needed for a dynamic defense, or possibly a dynamic offensive, if it developed that way.
Bunker
29. Editorial Note
From 1:25 to 3:45 p.m. on January 27, 1968, President Johnson met with a group of leaders representing the National Alliance of Businessmen. The principal subjects of discussion were the Pueblo crisis, economic indicators, and the budget. According to Tom Johnson's notes of the meeting, the President also spoke to the group about Vietnam as follows: "This has been an involved week. We have a very great concentration of power against us. There has been a great deal of political pressure placed on us in this country concerning Vietnam. We have 700,000 people tied down by our bombing in Vietnam. We believe the Hanoi government and the Viet Cong are hurting." The President also read a quote from John Stuart Mills on war: "War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest thing: the decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which he thinks nothing worth a war is worse. A man who has nothing which he cares about more than his personal safety is a miserable creature who has no chance of being free, unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men than himself."
In concluding remarks, the President noted: "We know what would happen if we did not stand firm in Vietnam. We have told Hanoi we will stop the bombing immediately if they will talk promptly and will not take advantage of the talks. In Korea, they killed more of our men after the talks started than before. I do not want that to happen again. We are seeking any way we can for an honorable peace. So, this has been a bad week. We had an intrusion into Cambodia. We had a bomber go down with nuclear weapons aboard. We had a major offensive planned against us in Vietnam. The North Koreans tried to assassinate President Pak and then the North Koreans took the Pueblo." (Notes of the President's Meeting with the National Alliance of Businessmen, January 27; Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings)
30. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President Johnson/1/
JCSM-63-68
Washington, January 29, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 911/301 (29 Jan 68), IR 4542. Top Secret. An attached note reads: "At the special meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 1100 hours Monday, 29 January 1968, the Chairman tabled the subject paper as a proposed CM. After making one minor amendment the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the memorandum should be a JCSM and approved it for signature by the Chairman and transmittal to the President."
SUBJECT
The Situation at Khe Sanh
1. You will recall that on 12 January 1968 General Westmoreland informed me that the Khe Sanh position is important to us for the following reasons: (a) it is the western anchor of our defense of the DMZ area against enemy incursions into the northern portion of South Vietnam; (b) its abandonment would bring enemy forces into areas contiguous to the heavily populated and important coastal area; and (c) its abandonment would constitute a major propaganda victory for the enemy which would seriously affect Vietnamese and US morale. In summary, General Westmoreland declared that withdrawal from Khe Sanh would be a tremendous step backwards./2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 12.
2. At 0910 hours this morning I discussed the Khe Sanh situation by telephone with General Westmoreland. He had just returned from a visit to northern I Corps Area during which he conferred with senior commanders, personally surveyed the situation, and finalized contingency plans. General Westmoreland made the following points:
a. The Khe Sanh garrison now consists of 5,000 US and ARVN troops. They have more than a battalion of US artillery supporting them, and 16 175 MM guns which can fire from easterly positions in support of the Khe Sanh force.
b. Among other reinforcing actions, he has moved a full US Army Division into northern I Corps. Within a few days the equivalent of an ARVN airborne division will also reinforce this area.
c. He has established a Field Army Headquarters in the Hue/Phu Bai area to control all forces, both US and ARVN, in northern I Corps. This headquarters is commanded by General Abrams.
d. General Momyer, Commander 7th Air Force, is coordinating all supporting air strikes in the Niagra area which constitutes the locale of enemy buildup around Khe Sanh.
e. Air action since 17 January has been remunerative. About 40 B-52 sorties per day and some 500 tactical air sorties per day are being conducted in the Niagra area There have been numerous secondary explosions. It appears that air strikes and our artillery fire have disrupted the enemy's logistic buildup and troop concentration.
3. General Westmoreland stated to me that, in his judgment, we can hold Khe Sanh and we should hold Khe Sanh. He reports that everyone is confident. He believes that this is an opportunity to inflict a severe defeat upon the enemy. Further, General Westmoreland considers that all preparatory and precautionary measures have been taken, both in South Vietnam and here, to conduct a successful defense in the Khe Sanh area.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the situation at Khe Sanh and concur with General Westmoreland's assessment of the situation. They recommend that we maintain our position at Khe Sanh.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
31. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 29, 1968, 1:04-1:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. Those in attendance were the President, McNamara, Wheeler, Nitze, Moorer and his assistant, Commander Daniel K. Pope, Harold Johnson, Chapman, McConnell, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S
MEETING WITH
THE
CHIEFS OF STAFF
The President asked the Joint Chiefs if they were completely in agreement that everything has been done to assure that General Westmoreland can take care of the expected enemy offensive against Khesanh.
General Wheeler and all the Joint Chiefs agreed that everything which had been asked for had been granted and that they were confident that General Westmoreland and the troops there were prepared to cope with any contingency./2/
/2/See Document 30.
General Chapman told Walt Rostow that the special ammunition was in the hands of the troops and fully ready to be used if necessary.
General Wheeler: There have been enemy casualties in the Khesanh area.
The President: Are these figures reasonably accurate?
General Wheeler: We count only the ones we find on the battlefield. There is only a 10 percent margin of error in this count. You must remember that a lot of bodies are lost in swamps and waterways and many of them are hauled off by the enemy.
The President: What are you doing with the other aircraft which are not hitting Hanoi and Haiphong?
General Wheeler: They are striking at the Khesanh area, in Laos and in the other parts of South Vietnam.
The President: If you had your way would you also hit Hanoi and Haiphong?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir.
General Johnson: Yes, we would also like to hit Hanoi and Haiphong, Mr. President. We have the capability of doing that.
General Wheeler: In Vietnam we have the capability of flying 1,000 sorties a day. We're using only 500.
[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo crisis; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXIX, Part 1, Document 243.]
The President: A senator (Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts) told me he was very worried about our situation in Vietnam. He said that some of our top generals have serious questions about our military strategy in Vietnam. I thought the Westmoreland-Bunker reply was a very good one. Bob (Secretary McNamara), I would go to the Senator and tell him you want to see what the various generals said to determine whether or not they were wrong--or if what we are doing is wrong.
General Wheeler: I told General Westmoreland of this charge plus the one of corruption. I have not seen his response. I have been out there 14 times. General Johnson has been out there several times. General Chapman has been out there several times. General McConnell has been out there several times. Between us, I think we have talked to every general officer in Vietnam. I have not heard one word of criticism about General Westmoreland's strategy.
The President: Each one of you should write me a memo on the facts and what you have heard. The Senator says the generals think the Bermuda strategy is the one they want. Take this matter up with General Westmoreland, with the Joint Chiefs, and with Senator Russell. Let's get the right answers./3/
/3/Chapman reported his opinion in a February 2 memorandum to the President. (U.S. Army Military History Institute, Harold K. Johnson Papers, Memorandum of L.F. Chapman to President, Feb. 2, 1968) In a February 1 memorandum to the President, General Johnson commented on Kennedy's ideas and the strategy pursued in Vietnam. (Johnson Library, Papers of Clark M. Clifford, 2nd Set [Memos on Vietnam Feb. 1968])
General Johnson: There is some corruption. But there is no disagreement over strategy among our generals.
The President: We cannot have perfection. We have corruption here. General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker and all of you are against corruption. You should point out how much corruption and crime we have in places like Houston, Washington, New York City, and Boston.
[Omitted here is additional discussion of the Pueblo crisis, also printed in volume XXIX, Part 1.]
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