Saigon, February 3, 1968, 1512Z.

MAC 01592. 1. The following is my assessment of the situation as it has developed.

2. The enemy's Tet offensive peaked on 30-31 January and has been ebbing over the past two days. Current actions result primarily from the mopping up of pockets of enemy forces in and around the urban areas of the country. The enemy has caused heavy damage to sections of Saigon, My Tho, and other cities and towns in his rampage of destruction, but he has failed to gain the objectives he sought. The cost to him in losses of manpower have been enormous. It is too early to accept any figure of enemy killed [garble--as legitimate], but I have no doubt that the enemy lost more men in the 72 hours beginning 1800 29 Jan than he has in any single month of the war.

3. The objectives, strategy and tactics of this enemy offensive are becoming clearer. Beginning on 31 January, the VC propaganda organs announced the existence of a new "revolutionary armed forces" responsive to a new political entity called "the Alliance of National and Peace Forces". This organization was touted as a collection of intellectuals, merchants, industrial, political and religious notables. The "revolutionary armed forces" are alleged to contain many elements including defected GVN troops. It is apparent that the enemy attempted to create the impression of spontaneous political and military uprising against the GVN and to suppress the role of the NLF and the VC/NVA military forces.

4. The ruse is transparent, but the goals and strategy of this Tet offensive are indicated in it. The enemy apparently hoped to seize a number of population centers or parts of them and set up an ostensibly non-VC political apparatus in the ensuing chaos. The initial assaults, where possible, were conducted by VC main and local forces and guerrillas infiltrated into populous areas under cover of the Tet celebrations. These were apparently to paralyze GVN control and generate a popular uprising within 48 hours. Then the remaining VC main forces and the NVA would reinforce to exploit the situation. This general pattern of the enemy plan has been substantiated by numerous POW interrogations and by the actual movement and commitment of forces. There were, of course, modifications in various areas for local reasons.

5. The NVA divisions in northern I CTZ were not committed during the Tet offensive. There were some contacts near Cam Lo, but these were due to U.S. Marine initiatives. Elements of the 812th Regiment and one battalion each of the 803rd (both from the 324B Division) and 270th Independent Regiments were committed to the attack on Quang Tri City.

6. In the Tri-Thien MR the enemy committed 80 percent of his locally available forces in attacks on Quang Tri City, Hue and Phu Bai. Only the 9th NVA Regiment and possibly some elements of the 4th and 5th NVA Regiments were held back. In southern I CTZ practically all of the VC units were committed, but the 2nd NVA Division and the newly infiltrated 31st NVA Regiment have not been to date.

7. In the western Highlands, every VC unit was committed along with elements of the 24th and 95B NVA Regiments. The 1st NVA Division retained an offensive posture, but did not attack. Along the coasts of II CTZ, the paucity of VC troops and guerrillas was reflected in the relative inactivity of the enemy. The exceptions were the attacks at Nha Trang by the 18B NVA Regiment and at Phan Thiet by VC units. The remainder of the 5th NVA Division and all of the 3rd NVA Division remained inactive.

8. In III CTZ, it now appears that almost every VC unit was committed with the 7th NVA Division plus the 88th NVA Regiment withheld. A possible important exception is the 9th VC Division. It is possible that at least two regiments of the 9th are in the Saigon-Bien Hoa area, but we are not sure whether they have been committed.

9. In IV CTZ virtually every VC battalion which we know to exist was committed to attacks throughout the CTZ.

10. Thus it appears that the enemy has generally followed his plan to commit VC forces and retain NVA forces for follow up attacks. He has achieved little success to exploit with follow up attacks, but his capability to recycle his offensive remains, and another round of attacks could occur in I, II and III CTZ's at any time. In IV CTZ it appears that there are no large reserves for renewed attacks in the near future.

11. I expect enemy initiation of large scale offensive action in the Khe Sanh-DMZ area in the near future despite the failure of the Tet offensive to achieve its objectives. He has been hurt to some extent by friendly firepower and his losses around Cam Lo, but it is unlikely he would abandon his heavy investment in offensive preparation in that area. It is likely that the uncommitted NVA forces elsewhere in the country will conduct complementing offensive operations. If the enemy conducts these attacks he will no longer enjoy the cover of the Tet holidays, and he will lack the assistance of destroyed VC units. This presents us with an opportunity to inflict the same disastrous defeats on his NVA troops as we have on his VC forces.

CM-2944-68

Washington, February 3, 1968.

SUBJECT
Khe Sanh

In response to your telephone call to me last evening, I asked General Westmoreland to provide me his views as soon as possible on our reinforcement capability in the Khe Sanh area. His reply to me is presented in the following paragraphs for your information./2/

"1. I agree with (General Wheeler's) response on the question of our Khe Sanh reinforcement capability/3/ and would add the following amplification.

"2. Our situation at Khe Sanh as compared with the French at Dien Bien Phu is different in three significant respects. We have supporting air (tactical air and B-52's) for all-weather attack of enemy forces by orders of magnitude over that at Dien Bien Phu. We have reinforcing heavy artillery within range of the Khe Sanh area from USMC positions east of the mountains. We have multiple and vastly improved techniques for aerial supply and we are within helicopter support range for troop reinforcement, logistic support, medical evacuation and other requirements./4/

"3. We now have four Marine Corps battalions and one ARVN ranger battalion with combat and combat service support in the Khe Sanh area. We currently have two brigades of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile), plus one brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, with appropriate light and medium artillery support, located north of the Hai Van Pass, within prompt reinforcing distance of Khe Sanh. We have plans to further reinforce this area on short notice if required.

"4. We have a significant capability to reinforce Khe Sanh by fire in all weather conditions by artillery, tactical air, and B-52's. There are 18 105MM howitzers and 6 155MM howitzers within the Khe Sanh defensive system. Additionally, 16 175MM guns are with the 3d Marine Division forces east of Khe Sanh positioned at the Rock Pile and at Camp Carroll. These guns are within range of Khe Sanh and their fires can be massed as required through the use of the centralized fire direction facility at Dong Ha. In addition to this heavy artillery support, and in contrast to the French situation at Dien Bien Phu, we have a highly effective tactical air and B-52 capability. Radar or "Sky Spot" technique allows us direct tactical air strikes either at night or in zero visibility conditions throughout the Khe Sanh area. In addition to tactical air, our B-52 strikes are also weather independent. During adverse weather in the Khe Sanh area there are frequent breaks of three or four hours, in which we could intensify the air strikes, and insert helicopter gun ships into the area for additional fires as required. If the enemy masses to attack, he will be extremely vulnerable to the massed B-52's against his supporting forces and destructive power of tactical air, gunships and artillery against his infantry. This capability of reinforcement by fire alone could have changed the course of battle at Dien Bien Phu.

"5. Although logistical support will present a major problem, I am satisfied we can resolve it by our multiple means of resupply. Enemy interdiction of the airfield at Khe Sanh will not deny our reinforcement and support capability by helicopters. As pointed out in (General Wheeler's) response to the President, we could also re-open Route 9 for a land line of communication. This would take 22 company days of engineer effort, but with considerable cost in security.

"6. Although not ideal, the tactical situation at Khe Sanh as well as our improved combat techniques and capabilities are considerably different from those at Dien Bien Phu.

"7. Addressing the President's query on additional help required, with the current level of activity we need an additional squadron of

C-130 aircraft, complete with ground handling and maintenance crews, for immediate usage. In addition, I recommend a second squadron of C-130's be alerted for immediate movement if unforeseen contingencies arise. Admiral Sharp may wish to addresf C-130's be alerted for immediate movement if unforeseen contingencies arise. Admiral Sharp may wish to address these requirements from the standpoint of assets available elsewhere in the theater. Additionally, it would be prudent to have heavy air drop equipment in reserve which can be called forward if we need it. We currently have a capability of delivering 600 tons per day for 14 days with no recovery. I would like at least an equal quantity ready for immediate air shipment forward if required. These requirements are also being submitted separately. Acceleration of the issue of M-16 rifles, M-60 machine guns and M-29 mortars to South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) units would improve our posture in economy of force areas. The importance of helicopter assets in the pending battle cannot be overstated. To achieve the necessary helicopter lift for forces deployed to Northern Corps Tactical Zone, I plan drawing on Rosson's (Commander I Field Force) and Weyand's (Commander II Field Force) assets to a major degree. Expediting the rate of delivery of replacement helicopters for assault helicopter companies and assault support helicopter companies would aid in maintaining our situation in the south during the battle in the north. We are also experiencing high loss rates of 0-1 observation aircraft and replacements are urgently needed to maintain our observation and surveillance capability over our newly opened LOC, new areas under pacification, enemy routes of infiltration and enemy base areas. The northern I Corps Tactical Zone has greatly increased our engineering requirements. Construction of a logistical base, the maintenance of Route I in that area, construction of Dye Marker obstacle/strong point system, plus the need of opening Route 9 to Khe Sanh will tax severely our construction capability. Providing the Naval Mobile Construction Battalion yet to be furnished as part of Program 5 would significantly improve our buildup in the north. With regard to Republic of Korea forces, action should be taken to oppose any thought of withdrawing elements of Republic of Korea forces in Vietnam and returning them to Korea. In addition, every effort should be made to re-open negotiations regarding the proposed ROK light division deployment as soon as the situation in Korea will allow. Expedited deployment of the Thai light division, within practical limitation, is most desirable and would permit greater flexibility in the employment of our ready reaction forces in RVN.ty to use COFRAM. However, should the situation in the DMZ area change dramatically, we should be prepared to introduce weapons of greater effectiveness against massed forces. Under such circumstances I visualize that either tactical nuclear weapons or chemical agents would be active candidates for employment."/5/

Earle G. Wheeler

Washington, February 4, 1968, 0144Z.

109831. 1. We recognize here that situation continues to remain fluid in Saigon and throughout the country. We fully endorse the moves you have begun with the GVN in an effort to recover from the physical and psychological blow against the Allied effort. We feel particularly that joint GVN and US task force is good first step and we would hope that it will prove to be the vehicle by which Thieu and the members of his government can be urged not only to take the emergency measures that are necessary to recover from recent events but also to move ahead with the programs outlined in his Inaugural address and his January 25 State of Nation speech./2/

2. In the aftermath of their urban offensive, the VC seem to have achieved a short term advantage, in political if not in military terms. Assuming that the remaining NVA/VC forces can now be rapidly driven from positions they still occupy in cities and towns and the GVN can get on with the business of picking up the pieces, the advantage could be swung to our side.

3. There are some indications which incline one toward the judgment that VC have put significant portion of their resources on this "throw of the dice." Interrogation reports and other intelligence sources support the thesis that they expected and hoped to find a significant percentage of the urban populace ready to join their cause in response to direct exhortations following their show of force in the cities and towns. However, as you have pointed out their expectations do not appear to have materialized.

4. Another interesting indication tending to support the "all or nothing" thesis is the announcement by Liberation Radio of the creation of the "Front of National Democracy and Peace Alliance."/3/ In unveiling what purports to be a wholly new organization, with its sweeping revolutionary call to arms, the NLF has tacitly conceded that its own capacity to stir up and mobilize broader segments of population has remained limited, notwithstanding its claim to be sole representative and spokesman for the SVN people. If this ploy does not produce significant defections from the government side, the NLF may subsequently find itself at a disadvantage in its efforts to represent itself before the world as the one valid organization representing the majority of the people. This suggests the importance of vigorous psywar effort to expose it as just another phony Communist front.

5. Thieu and the GVN on the other hand have been dealt a significant blow and Thieu must move energetically if GVN is to recover from it. Even assuming that the GVN can regain firm control of the situation in the cities, and the VC forces are forced to withdraw, Thieu may encounter important criticism in the press, the National Assembly, and in the Council of Generals, all of whom may seek to blame him for letting the enemy forces strike such a blow. It is important that we do what we can to spur him and to assist him in taking the kinds of measures which will neutralize this criticism and channel it in a constructive direction. But in doing so we would want at all costs to insure that the constitutional fabric so carefully woven over the last 2-1/2 years should not be torn at this time.

6. With this preamble we would like to lay out for your consideration certain of our own thoughts as to what steps we believe might be considered at this time. Essentially these are our first thoughts following the events of this week but they derive from the experience of the past few months. As we see it, the immediate tasks of the government include the following:

a. An energetic and well-coordinated effort to mobilize all elements of the government, particularly the leadership of the National Assembly, in a rededication to the struggle against the enemy.

b. A carefully thought out program of contacting important nongovernmental elements within the body politic and enlisting their support for the government. This would include obviously labor, the religious sects (including even the militant Buddhists if it can be determined that they did not conspire or collaborate with the VC/NVA forces), the intellectuals, and the press.

c. A sweeping re-appraisal of the bureaucracy in an effort to evaluate performance of key officials during the crisis. We would hope and expect that officials on the national, provincial, district levels who performed well during the recent crisis would have their performance acknowledged in some suitable way. By the same token we would expect the GVN to dismiss those who had failed to measure up. (If GVN can be persuaded to conduct such a review, this might provide opportunity we have long sought to get rid of inefficient elements, both military and civilian.) The GVN should get on with the task of clearing house.

d. A useful by-product of recent developments might be a modification in Thieu's sense of timing and priorities. As a result of the crisis he might shift from his cautious, methodical approach to problems and programs to a more dramatic energetic one--or at least give freer rein to those who naturally take a more activist posture. We might come, hopefully, to find him more receptive to our advice in future and more willing to act quickly on it. Crisis might also convince him of necessity of collaborating more closely with Ky and delegating him more authority. Note that Ky appears to have been taking de facto control of task force on GVN side presumably with Thieu's blessing. This would now provide opportunity to discuss and clear projects and programs directly with him without undue risk of damaging Thieu's sensibilities. Thieu might, indeed, be willing to assign him action role and withdraw himself into position of presiding officer.

e. Finally, in addition to our suggestions above and those actions being considered by the joint GVN-US task force, we would like to see an energetic hard-hitting psywar effort organized immediately. This would have three basic purposes: (1) to reassure the populace that the GVN authority is still intact and will be rapidly reasserted; (2) to reaffirm the US commitment; and (3) to exploit what we hope will be a significant disarray and confusion in VC ranks if their offensive fails completely. All the mass media facilities available to the Mission and the GVN should be organized in an effort to achieve those three goals.

7. As stated above this represents only our preliminary comments on a still fluid, fast moving situation. The steps you have taken so far, including your excellent backgrounder, and the apparently helpful first meeting with Thieu-Ky of the joint GVN/US task force seem to us eminently correct. We are very aware of the difficult situation facing you and we intend to be as helpful as possible while at the same time trying to avoid adding to your already enormous tasks.

Rusk

Saigon, February 4, 1968, 1100Z.

17920. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my thirty-seventh weekly message:

A. General

1. Because of the emergency caused by the widespread enemy attacks which began in the early hours of January 31, I have regretfully had to delay this week's message. It thus covers a period of ten days from January 25.

2. The early days of the period, although witnessing a continuation of the massive build-up of enemy strength along the DMZ and the northern part of I Corps, with anticipatory preparations for the Tet holidays underway, began in an atmosphere of relative calm. It began, however, with what to me was an occasion of great significance, an occasion largely overlooked as so many important developments here tend to be because of the concentration on the military situation. Appearing as the nation's freely elected President before the freely elected legislative branch, President Thieu delivered his first state of the union message./2/ It was a sober, positive, and constructive speech, wide-ranging and comprehensive in scope, outlining plans to benefit the Vietnamese people. He began by a reference to the constitutional framework now in place and expressed the hope that the executive and legislative branches can work effectively together to serve the nation. He indicated his plans to move quickly in establishing the other institutions called for in the Constitution, notably the judiciary, the inspectorate, and the advisory councils. But he noted that the democratic system cannot exist only through an external form; that it demands fundamental changes in organizations and laws as well as in political structures and habits; and he noted the importance of the development of political parties.

3. While he mentioned some of the substantial achievements which had already been accomplished, the main thrust of his speech looked to the future. Here he covered both plans for the longer term and short range priority programs on which the government proposed to concentrate in the next six to seven months. These included judicial and administrative reform, expansion of educational opportunities; the development of industry and agriculture; the stimulation of land reform, in the social field, vigorous measures to improve the refugee situation; to expand public health measures; to improve the condition of labor and measures and incentives to bring the youth into the service of the nation. To carry out these programs, he presented a budget of 95 billion piasters which the Assembly is scheduled to take up as the first order of business when it resumes its session February 6. It is almost certain, however, that by mid-year the government will have to submit a supplementary budget since the amounts provided in its present submission for the military effort are inadequate.

4. In dealing with the government's position on the question of peace and negotiations, Thieu stressed the fact that the GVN is merely acting to defend itself against aggression and re-affirmed the government's adherence to the principles established by the Manila summit conference. Implicit in this program is the desire and intention of the GVN to strengthen its position before any negotiations open. The contrast between Hanoi's methods and that of President Thieu's government is very great and, I hope, instructive to the critics of this regime and our effort in support of it.

5. The massive, countrywide terrorist attacks on centers of population which began in the early morning hours of January 31 have been fully reported. I will not attempt to duplicate this reporting here. It is obvious that they were premeditated and planned well in advance. It is equally clear that they were coordinated and correlated with the massive and open invasion in northern I Corps by North Vietnamese forces.

6. It is evident too that the initial success of the attacks was due in part to the element of surprise and to the fact that they were made in flagrant violation of the Tet truce period which Hanoi as well as the GVN had proclaimed. I think it's fair to say also that there was some failure of intelligence on our side, for a sizable number of GVN troops and many GVN officials were on leave.

7. That these widespread, concerted attacks will result in a massive military defeat for the enemy is evident in the casualty figures reported Saturday morning. From 6:00 PM January 29 the beginning of Tet truce period, to midnight, February 2, according to our figures, 12,704 of the enemy were killed, and 3,576, many of whom will become prisoners of war, were detained; 1,814 individual and 545 crew served weapons were captured. Allied losses were 983 killed of which 318 were US, 661 ARVN, and 4 other Free World; the number of allied wounded was 3,483. Enemy casualties for these few days are considerably larger than for any previous month of the war. Based on the enemy casualties, I asked General Westmoreland for an estimate of the total number of enemy committed and he said he thought that this was probably in the neighborhood of 36,000.

8. Enemy military operations have been well orchestrated with their psychological warfare. As you know, for a considerable period, both Hanoi and the NLF have spread rumors that negotiations and a resulting coalition government were imminent after Tet. The inference, of course, was clear: if peace is so near, why go on fighting and getting killed? When the attacks came, the Liberation Radio called for everybody to rally to the revolution, alleged that many ARVN troops had defected, and of course claimed great victories, that the "US bandits and their lackeys had never before been dealt such stinging blows." Liberation Radio also spread the rumor that US forces were cooperating with Viet Cong attacks in order to put greater pressure on the GVN to agree to a coalition of government; and Hanoi Radio announced the formation of a "front of national, democratic and peace alliance" in Saigon and Hue.

9. Given the fact that the enemy has suffered massive military defeat, the question arises whether he has secured in spite of it a psychological victory; whether peoples' trust in the invincibility of the allied forces has been shattered; whether their confidence in the ability of the GVN to provide security has been shaken; or whether on the other hand Viet Cong perfidy in flagrant violation of the truce during the traditional Tet holiday, their use of pagodas, hospitals and residential areas as sanctuaries and their terrorist tactics have aroused peoples' indignation and resentment. While our information at this point on the reaction of the Vietnamese, especially in the provinces, is sketchy it seems apparent that both reactions have occurred. But it also seemed to all of us here that if the GVN would take prompt action, if Thieu would give evidence of strong leadership, would call in all elements in support of the government, that what might have turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory for the GVN and its allies could be turned into a psychological victory as well.

10. It is for this reason, as I have reported, that I saw Thieu Thursday/3/ morning and told him that I thought this was the psychological moment for him to demonstrate his leadership and to galvanize the nation by a statement which would constitute a declaration of national unity. I said it would not only reassure the civil population, especially in the provincial centers, but could also be a positive declaration to give life and meaning to the main programs and priorities he had spelled out in his state of the union message. I suggested that he might want to meet with leaders of both houses of the Assembly and perhaps have them associate themselves with his declaration and intentions. I think Thieu was impressed with the arguments for taking advantage of the present situation to mobilize greater popular support. The next morning, he held a meeting of the National Security Council and included the presidents of both houses of the Assembly to lay out an action plan of relief and recovery for the civil population. In the afternoon, he recorded a speech to the nation which was delivered on TV and radio that same evening.

[Omitted here is discussion of the U.S.-GVN Joint Task Force on post-Tet reconstruction.]

13. One naturally considers what the motives and purposes of Hanoi and the Front have been in staging these massive attacks and apparently preparing momentarily to launch extremely heavy ones in northern I Corps. Were they prepared to suffer these tremendous casualties in order to gain a psychological and propaganda victory? There are some evidences that they might actually have had some expectations of popular uprisings, and in any case they are publicly claiming that these have occurred. The British Ambassador, who has had much Asian experience, remarked that the VC, having made these claims, will suffer, in Asian eyes, a very serious defeat if they prove to be not true. Had they planned these offenses hoping to put themselves in a strong position to enter negotiations, hoping to force a coalition government by demonstrating that the NLF commands the loyalty of the South Vietnamese people and must have a major voice in any peace settlement; conversely hoping to demonstrate that the GVN is a weak puppet government and can be ignored? Or is this part of a long winter-spring offensive which would endeavor to exert pressure to the extent to the enemy's capabilities at least until our elections, hoping if possible to score some major victory, but in any case to inflict heavy casualties on our troops in the expectation that they might create adverse psychological reactions in the United States and thus a change in policy?

14. I am inclined to the former theory. It seems to me that the primary purpose of this particular operation was probably psychological rather than military, that it was designed to put Hanoi and the Front in a strong position for negotiations by demonstrating the strength of the Viet Cong while shaking the faith of the people in South Viet-Nam in the ability of their own government and the US to protect them. This would be consistent with the determination on their part to press towards peace talks.

[Omitted here is additional discussion of the Joint Task Force, politics, economics, Chieu Hoi, and casualties.]

Bunker

Washington, February 4, 1968.

I would speculate that there are two possible reasons why the attack on Khe Sanh has not yet materialized:

--Our B-52 and tactical air attacks may have upset their timing--especially if the air bombardment actually put their headquarters out of operation for a day or so.

--They may have planned the attack on Khe Sanh to coincide with a second round of attacks on the cities. Initial attacks on the cities would be designed to force General Westmoreland to commit his reserves. The second round would keep them committed while they launched a major assault on Khe Sanh.

Since the first attacks did not achieve their objectives, it is conceivable that the attack might not take place.

More likely, the enemy would try to carry out its original plan. If so, we might expect the battle for Khe Sanh to start within the next three days. Various intelligence reports indicate; for example:

--Attack as early as possible before 5 February./2/

--General Loan, police director, believes another attack on Saigon is scheduled for 4 or 5 February.

--Enemy troop movements in Pleiku area indicate possibility of attack the night of 4 February (today our time).

--A second attack is scheduled for Nha Trang ten days after the first attack (6 or 7 February).

--Special communications plans for enemy units the night of 4-5 February.

G

Washington, February 5, 1968, 9 a.m.

Mr. President:

Responding to a question from Elspeth/2/ last night, I explained events in Vietnam as follows.

The war had been proceeding in 1967 on an attritional basis with our side gradually improving its position, the Communists gradually running down: like this

[Omitted here is Rostow's hand-drawn graph with a line labeled "Allies" rising and a line labeled "Communists" falling.]

Behind these curves were pools of military forces and fire power which represented the working capital available to the two sides.

As the documents forecast, the Communists decided to take a large part of their capital and put it into:

--an attack on the cities;

--a frontier attack at Khe Sanh and elsewhere.

In the one case their objective was the believed vulnerability of the GVN and the believed latent popular support for the Viet Cong.

In the other case, the believed vulnerability of the U.S. public opinion to discouragement about the war.

So the curves actually moved like this:

[Omitted here is Rostow's hand-drawn graph with the top line, the right half of which is dotted, rising gradually and the bottom line falling slightly, rising sharply, then falling sharply to well below the beginning point, after which it rises again. At the point where the line falls, it is dotted, coinciding with the dotted line above it.]

The dotted portions indicate the potentiality if:

--the cities are cleared up and held against possible follow-on attacks;

--the GVN demonstrate effective political and relief capacity;

--we hold Khe Sanh;

--we keep U.S. opinion steady on course.

In short, if all on our side do their job well, the net effect could be a shortening of the war.

Walt

No. 101

Washington, February 5, 1968.

SUBJECT
The GVN in the Wake of the Communist Urban Offensive

Since the Communists launched their unprecedented military offensive against South Vietnamese urban centers, the GVN has of necessity concentrated on the security problem it faces throughout the country. As South Vietnamese and Allied military forces continue to cope with North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong troops in Saigon itself and at many other points, the GVN has declared martial law, banned all public meetings and demonstrations, and placed under the threat of severe punishment "all activities causing disturbance to public security and order, that is all political movements lending a hand to Communism under a label of peace and coalition government." In the meantime, it is attempting to restore normal administrative operations in the cities and towns and to provide immediate relief services to the thousands of displaced persons.

Beyond these immediate tasks, however, the GVN will have the problem of countering the adverse psychological impact of the enemy actions. Although information on public reactions is still very sketchy, available reports support the assumption that the Communist effort has convinced many Vietnamese that enemy capabilities are far greater than they had been led to believe and that no area, however "secure", is really immune from attack./2/ In addition to diminished confidence among the urban public, the GVN may well have to contend with lowered morale in its regular and irregular armed forces and in the civil bureaucracy. There may be increased attentisme among some political elements and possibly a greater tendency to support an accommodation with the Communists. In the countryside, the Communist offensive may have already dealt the pacification, Chieu Hoi, and other government programs serious setbacks. Headquarters and support facilities have been disrupted or destroyed in a number of towns, and many pacification and Chieu Hoi cadre presumably are without any guidance and/or in a highly demoralized state. More importantly, however, the Communist attacks have almost certainly raised further doubts among the rural populace as to the ability of the government to protect the countryside when it cannot protect secure urban areas./3/

Thus far, the GVN seems to be attempting to capitalize on popular revulsion against the carnage and the violation of the Tet holiday by the Communists, appeal for national unity, and rally support to the government. President Thieu may even try to assume wider powers beyond those in the martial law decree for a protracted period and perhaps declare a state of "general mobilization," or ask the Assembly to do so. Many Vietnamese in and out of the Assembly undoubtedly have been shocked by the excesses attending the Communist offensive and may be more receptive to GVN appeals for unity and support than has been the case in the past. When the initial shock passes, however, members of the Assembly and other politically-important groups will probably tend to revert to the normal suspicion of the government leadership and to their acute concern with their own prerogatives. At this point, the ability of the GVN itself to remain united and prove by performance that it can respond more than it has in the past to public needs will become an important factor in determining the acceptability of emergency measures. In the final analysis, moreover, much of the GVN's ability to control the political situation will hinge on its ability to improve the military situation. Government statements pointing to the high Communist casualty toll or announcing that the current Communist offensive has been stopped are not likely to be very convincing as long as Communist harassment in and around the towns and cities continues, and as long as the main body of NVA and Viet Cong regular forces continues to pose a serious threat of larger scale actions in outlying areas./4/

Washington, February 6, 1968.

We have gone through the accumulated materials resulting from interrogation of prisoners and documents captured last week, and sought the answers to three questions:

1. Did the VC/NVA troops expect the Vietnamese populace to rise up and support them in their attacks?

2. Did the VC/NVA have any known plans for retreat or withdrawal?

3. What is the VC/NVA evaluation as to success or failure of the campaign?

In general, the answers are as follows:

1. Yes, they did expect assistance and uprising as evidenced by the following responses to interrogation.

A prisoner captured on January 31 in Chau Doc City stated that the attack was to create conditions which would bring the U.S. Government to negotiate in order to proceed with peace. The time was ripe for an uprising. He said that the VC realized that they were committing everything and every person they had in this assault. It was obvious to all that the assault was a "go for broke" matter. He believes that few of the participants expected success, although most of them hoped that they would succeed.

Prisoners captured in Nha Trang (II Corps) state that they were told they could take Nha Trang because of the VC organization in the city. The NVA officers did not believe this but went on with the attack in order to support the nation-wide effort and make success possible elsewhere.

According to one of these who was captured on the morning of February 4, "The current general insurrection campaign will extend for the duration of the Winter-Spring Campaign. Many attacks will continue because the order has been given and cannot be countermanded." He stated that "when the VC/NVA attacked Nha Trang, they expected to be defeated; however, they believed in the general insurrection campaign of South Vietnam."

The Executive Officer of the VC Zone Committee II, Gai Lai (Pleiku), who was captured on January 30, stated that the aim of the present action is to achieve the goals set forth in Resolution 13 of the Lao Dong Party, that is, guide people to strike and demonstrate and to liberate all areas. He also advised that the present offensive was scheduled to last seven days and would end on February 5, 1968.

Three prisoners captured in the Bien Hoa area stated that they had believed that the population would assist in an uprising against the GVN and U.S. forces and in their opinion the anticipated support from the population has not been forthcoming.

2. All evidence points to the conclusion that orders were received to "hold at all costs." Prisoners captured on January 30 in the attack on Pleiku revealed that they had orders to "take Pleiku City or not return." Three prisoners captured in the Bien Hoa area apparently were not provided with withdrawal plans since there was no question about achievement of victory. The prisoners said their orders were to continue fighting until the victory. (Lack of a withdrawal plan and unfamiliarity with the local terrain may account in part for the large enemy losses.)/2/

Four prisoners captured in the attack on Saigon provided the following: Casualties were to be left behind. After Saigon had been occupied, there would be a special detachment to take care of wounded. The Battalion was not to retreat. The objective was to be held indefinitely. Supplies would be brought in later. Troops were ordered to fight until Saigon was taken. A prisoner who died of wounds on February 1 revealed before his death that the major objectives in the attack on Saigon were the Presidential Palace, the radio station, and the Tan Son Nhut Airbase, with orders to hold at all costs, with no thought of retreat.

Another prisoner (believed to be a VC General and currently undergoing more intensive interrogation) revealed that the VC planned to take over Chau Doc Province at any cost. If this failed, then taking over the Province was to be completed before the end of the "Spring Phase," that is, before the end of March 1968. This all came about because of an order from COSVN to use the Tet period as a "unique opportunity to make sacrifices of their lives for the survival of the fatherland." There was no plan of retreat or withdrawal as the VC were convinced of success. This was part of a general uprising throughout South Vietnam, which would reduce the number of U.S. or GVN troops which could be sent in as reinforcements. Thus, if their first attack on Chau Doc City failed, they planned to keep attacking until they achieved success.

Approximately 100 VC prisoners captured in the attack on the city of Rach Gia, Kien Giang Province, with an average age being between 15 and 18 years, revealed during interrogation that the soldiers were given no contingency plan and were directed simply to take the town and hold it until a coalition government could be formed.

3. There is little hard evidence in the form of response to interrogation or captured documents which gives feel for their assessment of success or failure. However, the following does show that plans did not progress as anticipated.

A prisoner captured in Chau Doc City indicated that his troops had been told that the conditions were now right for an uprising of the population and that an aggressive and rapid assault would bring the people to the side of the VC and make untenable the positions of the GVN and American defenders. The uprising in fact did not take place during the attack and the prisoner said that it is likely that this lack of all-out popular commitment to the campaign is having a bad effect on the morale of the VC attackers.

A prisoner captured during the attack on Nha Trang stated that there would be a second attack of the city and that the Special Forces Headquarters, the 62nd Aerial Squadron, and the airfield would be shelled. Shelling had been intended during the first attack but the element in charge of transporting ammunition did not arrive on time./3/

W.W. Rostow/4/

Washington, February 6, 1968.

NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SENIOR
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS

THOSE ATTENDING WERE
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
General Wheeler
Clark Clifford
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson

There was a general discussion of the proposed speech to be given by the President on the Pueblo and Vietnam developments.

Secretary Rusk: Some parts of the speech are unnecessary. I do not think it should be given at this time. Extending tours of duty in Vietnam could have a serious effect on the morale of the men.

General Wheeler: I agree with the consensus here. I think this speech should be made when events are clearer in Vietnam and Korea. I would counsel against public announcement of a decision to extend tours of duty in Vietnam. It would alarm the American people rather than reassure them.

The President: We must lay out this situation in a clear logical explanation of what happened. I do accept your advice that it would be ill advised for the President to do this now.

The President then asked Tom Johnson to read the four points of criticism by Senator Robert Byrd (West Virginia)./2/ The four items follow:

1. Poor intelligence.

2. Poor preparations for these recent attacks.

3. Underestimated Viet Cong morale and vitality.

4. Overestimated support of South Vietnamese people and army.

The President said he was alarmed at this and that the attitude expressed by Senator Byrd seemed to be reflected by much of the comment heard in Washington not only by politicians but by the press.

George Christian: The story circulating now is that we must have a confrontation with the South Vietnamese government to get them to do more.

Walt Rostow: We have more evidence now than ever before about South Vietnam's role in this recent series of attacks. The government was cool. It never broke down. The Vietnamese military took the brunt of the attacks. General Abrams gives them very high marks.

The President: We should get to the Members of Congress information about all of this so that when they return to their homes they know what line to follow.

I want to send South Korea what they need. I am afraid that many people now are working towards the objective of undermining support and destroying our relationship with the South Vietnamese and with the South Koreans, and with many people in this country. There seems to be a great effort to discredit this government and its military establishment. Only yesterday I told Mr. Henry Brandon of the London Daily Telegram that I fully support General Westmoreland and that any talk of his removal is absolutely untrue./3/ I took a bit of the steam out of him by showing him an "Eyes Only" cable to General Westmoreland expressing my full support for him and his actions./4/

General Wheeler: I talked with General Westmoreland this morning and he said he was deeply appreciative of the message from the President. He said that General Abrams would appear before the Press Corps to outline how pleased he has been with the performance of the South Vietnamese Army.

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]

Secretary McNamara: I am very disturbed about what the President said about the leadership, particularly Senator Byrd. He treated Buzz rather badly in testimony this week.

The President: This is all part of a political offensive. They say we had the people believing we were doing very well in Vietnam when we actually were not.

General Wheeler: This reminds me of the time of the Battle of the Bulge. The Germans did achieve tactical surprise both in method and in their timing. They stretched the Seventh Army out like an accordion. The Germans did much like the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, even to wearing United States uniforms. I never heard at that time anybody who wanted to fire General Eisenhower because of bad intelligence. It was a severe defeat for at least one unit--the Army 99th Infantry Division. Having been there, I do know that we lost some of our heavy artillery--15 of our 18 guns. We have had nothing like that during this current battle.

General Westmoreland was aware and concerned about these attacks. He had the highest possible state of alert. Had he not done this, the situation would have been much worse.

We cannot have the precise plans of the enemy without some amazing stroke of luck.

Frankly Senator Byrd surprises me on Khe Sanh, I gave him the best response I could. I tried to put the military victory in context.

The President: I told him he should be defending us rather than attacking us. I disagreed with all points that were made. I say this to let you know what is going on.

Walt Rostow: If the war goes well, the American people are with us. If the war goes badly they are against us. The only way for us to answer this is for the military situation out there to come out alright. I think the men in uniform now have the burden in determining how much support or lack of support we get.

Washington, February 6, 1968.

NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S TUESDAY LUNCHEON MEETING

THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Clark Clifford
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]

(The President then left the room to talk to Senator Byrd who had called the President. The President returned to say that the Senator had called to apologize for his criticism at the morning leadership meeting.)/2/

Secretary McNamara: The Joint Chiefs of Staff want to remove the restrictions around Hanoi and Haiphong, reducing the circles to three miles around Hanoi and one and one-half miles around Haiphong./3/

The President: What is the reason for this?

General Wheeler: Currently there is a five mile absolute limit around both cities. We would like to reduce this to three and one and a-half with Washington approval required inside of those circles.

Secretary McNamara: This was upon land, water and power facilities to route reconnaissance.

Secretary Rusk: This action also opens up the possibility of large civilian casualties and leads to extensive devastation of the area. From what we have seen in other areas this leads to almost total devastation. What to hit is up to the pilot.

General Wheeler: We do not advocate attacking the population centers. We never have before, and we don't ask for that now. I admit there will be more civilian destruction, but we will be going after trucks and water craft. They are secure now, but represent very genuine military targets.

Secretary McNamara: Any attack of this type is very expensive both in the number of U.S. aircraft lost and in civilian destruction. I do not recommend this. The military effect is small and our night time attack capability is small. Civilian casualties will be high. In my judgment, the price is high and the gain is low. The military commanders will dispute all the points I have made except aircraft loss.

General Wheeler: I do not think the effects on the civilian population will be that high. As you know, they have an excellent warning system and most of them go to shelters and tunnels. From that standpoint, civilian loss could be lower than it is in other areas. We have had nothing like the civilian destruction that took place in World War II and Korea. But the targets which are there are military targets of military value. Frankly, this (civilian casualties which might result) does not bother me when I compare it with the organized death and butchery by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong during the last two weeks in South Vietnam. All of this relates to the matter of pressure.

The President: How are our aircraft losses running?

General Wheeler: We are losing more aircraft because the enemy is extending its air defense southward.

Secretary McNamara: We are losing about 40 fixed wing aircraft every month. Our helicopter losses are going up. We had 27 helicopters destroyed and 137 damaged during the past two weeks. During the war we have lost 1700 aircraft. There have been 2025 put in. That is a net gain of 375 wings.

Clark Clifford: The situation is so fluid in Vietnam and Korea now I don't feel it advisable for the President to have any public comment. Any statement now will just augment public concern.

The President: I believe somebody in government should say something. I do not share the view that many people have that we took a great defeat. Our version is not being put to the American people properly.

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of Korea and arms sales to Jordan.]

[The President:] What are we going to do now on these bombing targets?

Clark Clifford: I am inclined to move in the direction that their action over the past two weeks shows a dramatic answer to the San Antonio Formula and to the request for talks. I am inclined to resume the bombing in North Vietnam and go ahead with the suggested three mile and one and a-half mile limits.

As long as the enemy has demonstrated that they are not going to respond positively we should go ahead with this.

The President: Bob McNamara says the loss is not worth the gain.

Secretary Rusk: I would recommend hitting the 14 targets designated inside the restricted areas without authorizing total route reconnaissance.

Secretary McNamara: There are 14 authorized and unstruck targets inside of that area.

General Wheeler: We can go first for the authorized targets although the Joint Chiefs does recommend the removal of the limitation.

Secretary Rusk: Major destruction is involved.

The pilots select the targets. I do not know how much intensive bombing we want to permit in this area.

General Wheeler: I am fed up to the teeth with the activities of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. We apply rigid restrictions to ourselves and try to operate in a humanitarian manner with concern for civilians at all times. They apply a double standard. Look at what they did in South Vietnam last week. In addition, they place their munitions inside of populated areas because they think they are safe there. In fact they place their SAM's in civilian buildings to fire at our aircraft.

We showed during the good weather period that our campaign of bombing cut off Hanoi and Haiphong from each other and from the rest of the country. Photo reconnaissance showed that their air supplies were stacked all over and their turn around time for ships was very lengthy. That turn around time has now been reduced and the ships are able to unload much more quickly.

(The President approved the removal of the five-mile limit, agreed to strike the fourteen authorized targets. After these targets are hit the question of granting permission of armed reconnaissance will be raised again.)

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of carrier escorts and Korea.]

Washington, February 7, 1968, 12:29-1:55 p.m.

NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

General Wheeler: There is continued fighting in the Cholon section of Saigon. We have intelligence indicating there are two enemy divisions in the Saigon area. At Hue and Danang the situation is most serious. The enemy remains in Hue and the strength of the ARVN battalions is down. Early reports say the ARVN battalions are "running out of gas."

Bad weather on the coast has affected air activities, including some resupply. A new attack on Danang is expected.

General Westmoreland said he plans to reopen Highway One so he can take supplies in by road rather than by air.

In the Khesanh vicinity there was a heavy attack on a special forces camp 4 miles from Khesanh. For the first time, the attack was supported by 9 Soviet-supplied tanks. Some of the tanks were damaged or destroyed. The camp held out until daylight, but we have just learned that it was necessary to evacuate Lang Vei./2/

Khesanh was shelled again last night and there was a probing attack against Hill 861.

U.S. casualties so far are: 670 U.S. dead; 3,565 wounded. There have been 1,294 South Vietnamese KIA and 4,448 South Vietnamese wounded. Enemy dead now stands at 24,199 with 5,007 detainees. We have captured 6,216 enemy weapons./3/

General Westmoreland has established a field headquarters in Danang. It will be entitled "MACV Forward." General Abrams will command it for the moment./4/ General Westmoreland and the Senior South Vietnamese Chief of Staff may move to this headquarters to coordinate the heavy activity in the neutral sections of I Corps.

There are some conclusions:

--The attacks have caused fear and confusion in South Vietnam.

--The attacks have aroused anger among the South Vietnamese people. The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong had no regard for life and property in these raids. They also violated the Tet holiday.

--There is some loss of confidence, because of these attacks, in the government of South Vietnam and in the U.S.

General Loan said that his headquarters was getting many phone calls from private individuals in Saigon giving away locations of the Viet Cong. This is encouraging.

We are concerned about stepped up MIG activity. They have been conducting bombing practices. MIGs may be used for the first time in support of ground action or in an effort to shoot down our B-52's. They may also attempt to attack an air base, like the one at Danang. I sent a message to all field commanders alerting them to these possibilities.

Secretary Rusk: What about the possibility of the MIG's attacking a carrier?

General Wheeler: No, I do not think this likely. The carriers do have air caps and are distant from the MIG bases.

The President: Go in and get those MIGs at Phuc Yen.

General Wheeler: We will as soon as the weather permits.

Secretary McNamara: The MIG's would have negligible military effects but they would have spectacular psychological impact.

We do get the feeling that something big is ahead. We do not exactly know what it is, but our commanders are on alert.

The President: I want all of you to make whatever preparations are necessary. Let's know where we can get more people if we need to move additional ones in.

General Wheeler: I have a preliminary list on my desk. I am not satisfied with it.

Secretary McNamara: This would include Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine units.

The President: What about the allies?

General Wheeler: The Australians are incapable of providing more troops. The problems in Korea are such that it will be hard to get the South Koreans to even send the light division they had promised. The Thai troops are in training and to move them in now would be more detrimental than helpful.

The President: So it would be only Americans? Well, I want you to know exactly where you could get them, where they are located now and what we need to do. Get whatever emergency actions ready that will be necessary.

Secretary McNamara: All we would recommend at this time are the three items we had discussed earlier.

There may be some increase in draft calls but this would have no immediate effect.

The President: Do we have adequate hospitals and medical personnel?

General Wheeler: We have ample space, ample supplies, and enough doctors for the present.

Secretary McNamara: There are 6,400 military beds. Of that, 2900 are occupied by U.S. troops and 1100 by Vietnamese civilians. So we have an additional capacity of about 2400.

The President: Look at this situation carefully. If we have another week like this one, you may need more.

Secretary Rusk: How do you interpret their use of tanks?

General Wheeler: They had to bring them all the way from Hanoi. This shows that this plan has been in staging since September. It represents a real logistic feat. They want to create maximum disruption.

Director Marks: Could they do anything at Cam Ranh Bay?

General Wheeler: They could. On this last attack, we caught frogmen in there. They could put rockets in the hills and fire on to the base.

The President: How many of the 25,000 killed were North Vietnamese Regulars?

General Wheeler: Approximately 18,000 were of a mixed variety of South Vietnamese enemy. Approximately 6,000 to 7,000 were North Vietnamese.

The President: How do things look at Khesanh? Would you expect to have to move out of Lang Vei?

General Wheeler: It was not planned that we would hold some of these outposts. We may have to move back that company on Hill 861.

The President: Bob, are you worried?

Secretary McNamara: I am not worried about a true military defeat.

General Wheeler: Mr. President, this is not a situation to take lightly. This is of great military concern to us. I do think that Khesanh is an important position which can and should be defended. It is important to us tactically and it is very important to us psychologically. But the fighting will be very heavy, and the losses may be high.

General Westmoreland will set up the forward field headquarters as quickly as possible. He told me this morning that he has his cables and his communications gear in. He is sending a list of his needs, including light aircraft. We are responding to this request.

The President: Let's get everybody involved on this as quickly as possible. Everything he wants, let's get it to him.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]

Mr. Rostow: The New York Times said today that enemy KIAs were more like the number of weapons captured than like the figures which we are reporting.

General Wheeler: That is not true. We have captured many crew-served weapons. In fact we have captured 900 crew-served weapons on which 4 to 5 men operated. Many of these suicide crews have used only grenades and satchel charges. They have been so heavily loaded that they do not carry hand weapons. Experience has shown that the ratios of weapons to men runs 3 to 4 to 1. This ratio confirms our battle figure counts of enemy KIAs.

[Omitted here is additional discussion of the Pueblo.]

Then I went through the whole summary on Vietnam, similar to what General Wheeler gave here today. Most of them are concerned about the political significance of the offensive.

I pointed out that the Government of South Vietnam had not waived or collapsed. There had been no reports of South Vietnamese defections. There have been no reports of a popular uprising. Not a single one of the provinces or district capitals is held by the Viet Cong.

I told them General Westmoreland made it clear that we can expect further attacks.

[Omitted here is discussion of military assistance programs.]

Washington, February 8, 1968.

Dear Mr. Rostow:

Last evening at the McNamaras you asked if I would give you my personal opinion as to the situation at Khe Sanh, and also the defensibility of the Khe Sanh area./2/

First, let me say that I left South Vietnam on 1 June 1967 and have not returned since. I knew the ground defenses at Khe Sanh as they were at that time but since then many changes have been made. We have three times as many Marines there now and I cannot speak as to the details of their fortifications or the disposition of the troops.

I did feel then, and I do now, that the combat base is of extreme importance to us, both from the psychological and military points of view. I believe the psychological is obvious because of the nature of the war. Militarily, Khe Sanh is the northwest anchor for the entire Quang Tri-Thua Thien defense sector. Its loss would allow the enemy to close in on the Camp Carroll-Dong Ha-Quang Tri City areas to our serious discomfort. To the enemy, Khe Sanh lies at the junction of several natural routes of infiltration into South Vietnam from Laos to the West and North Vietnam itself. Our location denies him easy access to these routes, and forces him to take the long way around. Lastly, Khe Sanh, as you know, serves as a base for certain of our specialized operations in the general area. The maps which we have provided your office portray rather vividly the terrain implications in the area.

In short, Khe Sanh is tactically vital to us, in addition to the psychological factors which would beset us were we to evacuate it.

I am sure that the Lang Vei evacuation assumes significant importance to you./3/ A couple of points are significant here. First, Lang Vei, like all the Special Forces camps, has a mission to provide security in the local area, to conduct reconnaissance, and to train and employ indigenous para-military people who are locally recruited. It did not have the mission to serve as a conventional outpost for the defense of Khe Sanh against large organized enemy formations. Significant also may be the perhaps forgotten concept of Special Forces camps--they were initially conceived as a mechanism which would recruit and employ persons who might otherwise be recruited by the other side. Only after we had had them on the payroll for a period of time did their other missions evolve.

Returning to Khe Sanh proper, all indications point to an attack on Khe Sanh in force, and soon. We can expect simultaneous efforts against Camp Carroll, Con Thien, Dong Ha, and Gio Linh, by fire at least and potentially by ground troops as well. Additionally, we can expect rocket/mortar attacks against Danang, Phu Bai and Chu Lai. The form of the attack against Khe Sanh itself will most probably come from the north, with probable diversionary effort from the west along Route 9. I base this probability on the nature of the terrain north of the base which provides the enemy more cover, which in turn permits him to move his supplies closer to the base and which subjects his troops to our supporting fires for a shorter time and over shorter distances.

I hope the foregoing may prove helpful. Rest assured that I share the assurance which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others have expressed in our capability to retain our hold in the Khe Sanh area. Our 6,000 Marines there will insure this.

Sincerely,

LW Walt

Saigon, February 8, 1968, 1115Z.

18582. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my thirty-eighth weekly message.

A. General

1. Because of the emergency situation caused by the Viet Cong Tet attacks, my last report was sent to you on February 4, just four days ago./2/ Nevertheless, I think enough has happened in the meantime to justify a short report at this time. As more facts concerning the massive Tet offensive of the enemy comes to light and the story unfolds, a number of things become evident. Information is being steadily accumulated as reports come in from the country and Saigon. Consequently, what were somewhat tentative assumptions a few days ago begin to take more definite shape.

2. It seems fairly clear now that:

A) Plans for the offensive were worked out long in advance and with meticulous care. Instances have come to light in which enemy units were infiltrated disguised as civilians to reconnoiter targets, withdrawn, and re-infiltrated again as civilians immediately before the attack.

B) Commitment of enemy troops was considerably larger than the estimate I reported in my last message. Estimates now are that 52,000 enemy troops, plus another possible 10,000 guerrillas, for a total of approximately 62,000 enemy forces, were committed to these widespread attacks.

C) The enemy believed that there would be uprisings in their support and that they would be able to take over many of the cities. This is supported by captured documents and prisoner interrogations which indicated that enemy troops were told they would find popular support, that there would be defections from the ARVN troops, and that reinforcements would follow. Unlike previous heavy attacks, they had no orders covering possible withdrawal. The tenacity with which the VC/NVA have held on to some of the areas they have captured (as in Hue and parts of Saigon) also suggests that the leaders envisaged a seize-and-hold and not a hit-and-run operation. Given the forces available to the VC/NVA, this would not be possible without massive popular and ARVN support. The enemy radio constantly pounded on the theme that the masses were rising to help the Viet Cong, and the government forces were defecting to join with the Communist troops.

A particularly interesting captured document is the Order of the Day from the headquarters of the South Viet-Nam Liberation Army to all military forces in South Viet-Nam. The document has a tone of urgency and calls all enemy troops "to liberate the 14 million people of South Viet-Nam" and "fulfill our revolutionary task." It refers to the attacks as the greatest battle in Vietnamese history and states that the assaults "will decide the fate and survival of the fatherland." It exhorts the enemy forces "to achieve the final victory at all costs."

D) No popular uprisings took place in any city, nor did the security forces defect to the enemy. Initially, many Vietnamese were frightened and impressed by the enemy's ability to attack on such a wide scale, and their confidence in the ability of their government and the United States to provide security was shaken. Now they have observed that the enemy was not able to stand in the face of our forces but has instead fallen back and has been able to remain in none of the cities he has tried to seize. The reaction consequently has changed from one of apprehension and doubt to anger, indignation, and resentment at the treachery of the enemy's attack during the Tet holidays, at the widespread destruction he has caused, and the terrorist tactics he has employed.

E) The enemy has suffered a major military defeat. He has suffered losses on an unprecedented scale. From the early morning hours of January 31 until midnight of February 7, the enemy lost nearly 25,000 KIA, nearly 5,000 detainees, more than 5,500 individual and nearly 900 crew-served weapons. These losses are two and one-half times that of any previous month. Although these losses seem extraordinarily high, they are substantiated to a considerable degree by the number of detainees and weapons captured. Friendly losses have been 2,043 killed (703 US, 1,303 ARVN, and 37 FW), less than one-twelfth of the enemy's. Gen. Westmoreland tells me that this estimate of enemy KIA is computed on a very conservative basis, since neither enemy killed by airstrikes nor artillery have been included. This has been a heavy blow for the enemy, particularly as many of the men killed were among the best they had, carefully trained regulars and commandos, many of them from North Viet-Nam. From a military point of view, he had gained little in return for his heavy expenditure of men and equipment.

F) In inflicting this severe military defeat on the enemy, our forces everywhere turned in a superior performance. A highly encouraging development also was the very commendable performance of ARVN forces. General Westmoreland reports that all the ARVN division commanders were on their toes and performed well, as did the corps commanders. General Abrams has been visiting the ARVN divisions. He returned yesterday from II Corps with glowing reports of the performance of the ARVN 22nd and 23rd Divisions. The Commander of the 23rd Division, with headquarters at Ban Me Thout, allowed no Tet leave and, anticipating an attack, had deployed his troops outside the city; had he not done this, destruction would have been much greater.

G) Although the enemy has suffered a heavy setback, he still retains the capability of launching a second wave attack in Saigon and in the III Corps area. Elements of three enemy divisions, the 5th, 7th and 9th, are in the III Corps area. In northern I Corps, in the DMZ, and the Khe Sanh area, he still has four divisions and farther south is threatening to exert pressure on Danang. As I have previously reported, it is Thieu's opinion that the enemy will endeavor to keep up pressure throughout the summer in I Corps and the central Highlands. In my talk with him yesterday, he added the view that in addition to this pressure, he believed the enemy would continue efforts at harassment and infiltration against the cities in order to pin down friendly troops in defense of the populated areas and would also endeavor to recover territory in the countryside, in what he called a "counter-pacification effort."/3/

H) Enemy attacks have resulted in heavy damage in many cities and towns. We do not yet have an accurate count of the number of houses destroyed or refugees created, but we do have enough information to know that there has been very considerable property damage. As of this morning, the refugee count in the Saigon metropolitan area was 93,000 and for the country as a whole about 190,000. Thus far, with 31 provinces out of 50 reporting, even though sketchily, we estimate the number of evacuees (many of whom will return home as soon as fighting subsides) may reach between 250,000 and 300,000. About 15,000 homes are reported destroyed though this figure will undoubtedly increase. Civilian casualties compiled from preliminary figures total almost 800 dead and 7,500 injured, though this also is probably much under the actual total. Some important installations, such as hospitals, radio stations, and power plants, have also been damaged. The GVN, however, has taken prompt measures to deal with all these problems through the Joint Task Force, which I mentioned in my last message and to which I shall refer in more detail later in this report.

3. It may be argued that the enemy objective was not primarily military, that his military defeat is more than compensated by his political and psychological gains. But I believe clear evidence is emerging that Hanoi expected to take and hold a number of cities. Enemy documents and interrogations clearly suggest that at least middle and lower level cadre and officers thought this was to be the final push to victory. The Order of the Day of the South Viet-Nam Liberation Army would lend credence to this view. Some Vietnamese leaders who know the Communists well tell us that they think the Communists expected to take the cities and so end the war. This, in fact, seems to be a fairly general interpretation among our contacts.

4. As I mentioned in my last message, however, Thieu leans to the theory that the Tet attacks represent an effort to get into a more favorable position for negotiations. He believes that the enemy realizes his strength is ebbing and so took a desperate gamble so they could at least give the impression abroad of great and growing Communist power in South Viet-Nam.

5. I think the two interpretations are not mutually exclusive. It seems possible that Hanoi would actually expect that the Vietnamese people would in many cases side with the invading forces, either out of fear or because of grievances against their own government. The experience of the Buddhist "Struggle" movement in I Corps in 1966, when military and police units sometimes sided with the anti-government forces, may have encouraged Hanoi to believe that it was possible to trigger defections from the GVN security forces./4/ Thus their maximum objective may have been the occupation of some major urban centers and the collapse of the GVN.

6. But the primary objective of winning the war in one great series of attacks on the cities does not preclude a lesser objective. Hanoi may well have reasoned that in the event that the Tet attacks did not bring the outright victory they hoped for, they could still hope for political and psychological gains of such dimensions that they could come to the negotiating table with a greatly strengthened hand. They may well have estimated that the impact of the Tet attacks would at the very least greatly discourage the United States and cause other countries to put more pressure on us to negotiate on Hanoi's terms.

7. But I am convinced that there is now a great opportunity not only to frustrate Hanoi's expectations, but to compound the enemy's military defeat by also turning it to political and psychological advantage for the GVN. Much depends on the promptness and effectiveness with which the GVN acts to return the situation to normal, to set about the task of reconstruction and to care for the victims of the fighting. I have urged on Thieu that this is the psychological moment to assert aggressive, dynamic leadership, to mobilize and energize elements of the government and to let the people know that he proposes to push ahead with the programs he outlined in his state of the nation message. I have stressed the importance of capitalizing speedily on the mood of anger and resentment at the Viet Cong treachery at Tet which is sweeping the nation. And I have urged on him the importance of keeping the people informed about the GVN's programs to help them; that through frequent brief appearances on radio and TV he should tell the people what is going on and seek their support.

8. I have also suggested to Thieu that other Cabinet members supervising emergency activities should speak to the people about their programs and that notables in Vietnamese life should be involved in all these activities and should be encouraged to stimulate efforts by the population. I offered our assistance and participation on these information activities in any way that he thought useful, and left with him a memorandum of specific suggestions./5/

9. I also suggested to Thieu yesterday he might want to consider broadening the base of his government by associating with it in some way prominent and influential civilians such as Nguyen Luu Vien, Tran Van Huong, Mai Tho Truyen, Vo Long Trieu, Ha Thuc Ky, Tran Van Tuyen, Phan Quang Dan, Tran Van An, and others, Thieu said that perhaps such individuals could be asked to serve as an advisory council to the government and that he was considering convening a Congress of Notables, something along the lines of the congress which had been convened in 1966 to promote the movement for elections for a Constituent Assembly to draft the Constitution./6/ He also noted that Ky had gone on television on February 5 to inform the people of the GVN's relief and recovery effort and that he himself will address a joint session of both houses of the Assembly on the morning of February 9./7/

10. Our pacification organization has turned itself into a relief operation for the time being. Bob Komer is managing US support of the GVN's relief and recovery effort under Vice President Ky and has established a command post in the palace with Ky. A small group of bottleneck-breakers and problem solvers are working there to pull together civil-military operations on both GVN and American sides.

[Omitted here is continuing discussion of reconstruction measures and the economic situation.]

Bunker