Docs 71-85
71. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 12, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, General-February 1968. Secret; Nodis/Personal; Packers. Drafted by Harriman. This memorandum of conversation was transmitted to the Embassy in Romania in telegram 117922 to Bucharest, February 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PACKERS)
PARTICIPANTS
Secretary of State Dean Rusk
Governor Harriman
When I telephoned the Secretary to tell him of the unsatisfactory reply we had from Macovescu's visit to Hanoi, he asked me to stop in. I showed him the specific message and told him that in addition, Macovescu had reported verbally that the Hanoi officials had stated that our point of view was unacceptable as it made the stopping of bombing conditional./2/ This confirmed the rejection of the San Antonio formula. I explained that the only glimmer of light was Macovescu's statement that the Romanian Government was prepared to pass any further messages to Hanoi. The Secretary said he thought we should close out this channel, thanking the Government, and specifically for Macovescu's personal efforts. I agreed, with the comment that Hanoi seems to be trying several channels in addition to the Romanians. I pointed to the strange one through Rome and the new one through Algard, the Norwegian Ambassador in Peking./3/ This indicated, I said, that Hanoi was trying out several channels as negotiation feelers--perhaps substantiating one guess that Hanoi had expected general disarray in the United States as well as in the South Vietnam Government, which would lead to negotiations at any price.
/2/In a conversation with Harriman and Davidson, February 12, Bogdan discussed Macovescu's meetings in Hanoi with Dong and Trinh during the period January 22-28. As a result of these contacts, Bogdan noted, his government put forth a new interpretation of a formula for peace involving "new conditions" created for a "new step towards a solution through negotiations." These "Romanian considerations" consisted of an unconditional cessation of bombing by the United States, followed, after "a convenient period of time" for the United States to "prove" that it had in fact terminated hostilities, by talks "on questions of interest to the two parties." According to the memorandum of conversation, "the Governor stated his unofficial reaction is that Hanoi does not wish talks and he commented that Hanoi had paid no attention to cigars." (Ibid.) Macovescu later expanded on the particulars of his visit to Hanoi in conversations with Harriman on March 2 and with Rusk on March 4. (Memoranda of conversation, March 2 and March 4; ibid.)
/3/See Document 66.
Dean asked whether we had answered the Rome feelers. I said I didn't recall that we had but would see that some answer was prepared. We discussed the reply that had gone to Oslo and he agreed that we should await developments there.
I asked him if he had read Senator Mansfield's inexcusable speech in Maine, and since he hadn't and his New York Times was in front of him, I suggested he look at it mentioning that it was on page 8. He read about half of it and said, "well, if we're all wrong we'll be spending the rest of our time in Hobe Sound or otherwise these men will have to eat their words"./4/
/4/In a speech at the University of Maine on February 11, Mansfield described the South Vietnamese political structure as insecure and unstable and declared his opposition to any effort by the United States to "insure that any political structure shall be enshrined over the smoldering ruins of a devastated Vietnam." See The New York Times, February 12, 1968.
He said that the gloom in World War II was much worse than now. I replied that in London in January 1942 there was gossip of Churchill's Government collapsing; Beaverbrook really believed that he was going to be called by the King to take the Prime Ministership. Dean said he didn't see why we should be so distressed. I said that I thought there should be a review of the military program. That Westmoreland had been consistently proven wrong in his military judgment. I wasn't at all sure that his military plans were right; that I could not sit in Washington and suggest a military program, but I felt the program should be reviewed. I hoped that the President would not commit himself to Westmoreland. Our pacification program had received a major blow. As far as I was concerned I did not know what our military plan should be but I was not at all sure Westmoreland was on the right track. To this he made no reply. I mentioned my memorandum (of February 9)/5/ in which I pointed out my opinion that we must have a broadly based government--perhaps this was the time to get rid of Loc, the Prime Minister, who reports indicated was no good. I suggested Huang, or some other political leader, or else Thieu's idea of a broadly based advisory committee which would have real functions not just scenery.
/5/See footnote 6, Document 62.
He again repeated that he didn't see why we should be discouraged; that perhaps he was wrong. He referred to the depression in World War II. I said that that was quite different. Then I was not depressed because I was convinced of our own capacity. The problem today is not our capacity but the capacity of the South Vietnamese to develop a government with the will and spirit; we had to work through them; we could not do the job ourselves. I pointed to the encouragement of the better fighting of the ARVN and other South Vietnamese units without any unit defection but we had no information on individual dissenters. He agreed we should find out how rapidly and how many of the Tet vacationers returned to their units. He also agreed that the clearance of Saigon and other cities had been done largely by Vietnamese troops and should be given credit. However, he spoke about the continued great losses of the Viet Cong. I said that I didn't know yet whether the VC had expected to take such losses and thought them worthwhile. I could not agree with Westmoreland's optimism about attrition. There was some evidence that the Vietnamese Communists were quite ready to accept the ratio of loss as being favorable to their side (I was referring not to this last period but to the previous period). On the whole, I got the impression that, although he admitted that he might be wrong, he did not indicate there should be any change in plans, programs, etc.
72. Vietnam Situation Report/1/
No. 7/68
Saigon, February 12, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2 C (5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity. Secret. The report, disseminated as TDCS DB-315/00518-68, covered the period January 28-February 10. In a covering memorandum to Rostow, February 12, Helms wrote: "This is the cable I mentioned to you on the 'phone a little while ago. I am sending it to you in this form, because I wanted you to have it promptly." (Ibid.) In his covering memorandum transmitting a copy of the report to the President, February 12, 4:50 p.m., Rostow wrote: "This is an extremely well balanced CIA assessment from Saigon of what the Communists have gained and lost; and what our problems are. We are unlikely to have anything better right away." (Ibid.) The notation "ps" on this covering memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
THE TET OFFENSIVE--A PLUS OR A MINUS?
The Year of the Monkey had an inauspicious beginning for the people of South Vietnam as the VC/NVA forces violated the sacred Tet holidays and launched virtually simultaneous attacks against 36 province capitals, five of the six autonomous cities, and numerous other population centers throughout the country. Their objectives have been clearly spelled out in captured documents--to destroy or subvert the GVN/allied forces, eliminate the GVN governmental structure, create a general uprising among the people, and establish a revolutionary government dominated by the National Liberation Front. In what appears to be an almost incredible miscalculation of their own military capabilities and the degree of support they could command from the people, the Communists failed to achieve these stated objectives. It has cost them dearly in manpower--in 12 days some 31,000 killed, 5,700 detained, probably another 10,000 dead from wounds, and unknown number dead from air and artillery strikes--a total probably amounting to more than half of the forces used in this attack. Nevertheless, the enemy's well-planned, coordinated series of attacks was an impressive display of strength which has given him a major psychological victory abroad, dealt a serious blow to the pacification program, and created problems that will tax the energies and resources of the government for many months to come.
The enemy's military strategy consisted of a two-phase offensive. Wherever possible, the first phase assaults were conducted by VC local forces. Psychologically, this was more appropriate than using NVA units, given the enemy's objective of winning the support of the people. NVA forces were used in I and II Corps where VC forces were inadequate, but throughout the country most VC/NVA main forces were withheld for the second phase when they would move in to capitalize on the expected chaos and general uprising.
The passive reaction of the population, the fierceness of Free World and ARVN counteroffensives after the initial surprise and confusion, and the effectiveness of massive air and artillery fire obviously forced cancellation of the commitment of VC/NVA main forces. It is estimated that slightly less than half of the enemy's main force maneuver units outside of those in the DMZ, but well over half of his local force units, participated in the attacks. Thus, he still has substantial uncommitted forces available for a new "second phase" attack.
In spite of the enemy's heavy losses, he apparently still plans a resumption of the offensive on a large scale in the near future. The failure of committed forces to withdraw completely to safehavens and current disposition of previously uncommitted units lend credence to prisoners' statements that the second phase offensive will soon be initiated. Although the VC/NVA main forces would supposedly be better equipped, trained, and disciplined than the primarily low-level troops (cannon fodder) which launched the first offensive, the enemy has lost the element of surprise, does not have the cover of a Tet truce, and has already expended a great deal in the way of men and mat?riel. The consequence of a second "all-out" series of attacks would probably be as disastrous militarily as the first phase. If, indeed, the enemy is preparing for large-scale attacks at Khe Sanh, Quang Tri, Hue, Danang, Dak To, Phu My, Tuy Hoa, Saigon, Can Tho, and My Tho, then he must strike quickly. Though stretched thin, allied forces have consolidated their gains, regrouped, and initiated offensive operations against the enemy's massed main forces with notable success. As time passed, his position is becoming more tenuous and there will be less and less opportunity to achieve his immediate objectives.
Although the enemy has been seriously weakened, he is not on the verge of desperation. He has over half of his main forces basically intact with more men and mat?riel enroute or available from NVN. He has taken substantial losses in the past and shown an amazing degree of resiliency. On the other hand, his logistics and recruitment problems will be greatly increased with such heavy losses from the local and guerrilla forces who provide manpower for support and combat.
As an alternative to a second assault against the cities, the enemy could elect to cut his losses by reverting to more traditional harassing attacks while attempting to improve his position in the countryside. The recent well-coordinated attacks over widespread areas proved the enemy's capability to utilize this tactic. Such attacks on a smaller scale would still gain headlines and have considerable psychological appeal and value to the enemy as they re-raise questions in SVN and the world as to the ability of the allies to provide security to the people. However, after such extensive indoctrination of the inevitability of imminent victory, a reversion to essentially guerrilla warfare would probably cause severe problems of morale among the cadres and a loss of impetus for the revolutionary effort.
It is not yet possible to make a firm assessment of the damage which has been caused to the pacification program, but it probably has been extensive. The pacified areas did not at least initially appear to have been a priority target, probably because most of the VC guerrillas were drawn into local force units for the city battles or were engaged in interdicting LOC's. However, GVN forces providing security for the pacified areas and the RD teams were in many cases withdrawn to assist in the defense of urban areas, leaving the VC free to penetrate previously secured hamlets and conduct propaganda, recruit, acquire food, eliminate the GVN administration, and occasionally terrorize the population. The impact of the VC presence was especially severe in the
larger hamlets which generally are located close to the population centers and were on the VC route of entry. This activity was responsible for part of the large refugee flow into the cities.
With many of the cities in shambles and requiring priority reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts, the development aspects of the program almost inevitably will suffer. In any event, it will be many months before the confidence of the people in the previously secured hamlets can be restored, some of whom felt the VC presence for the first time. One possibly hopeful sign is that many of the VC expressed surprise at the relative prosperity of the people in the GVN areas, contrary to what they had been led to believe. This, together with the military defeat and heavy losses, should contribute to some future defections.
There has naturally been a mixed reaction from the people to the Communist onslaught--initially, it was one of shock at the strength of the attack, and anger at its perfidy. However, even those skeptics who would not previously acknowledge that the large electoral turnouts, the inability of the VC to get a response to calls for a general strike, and the almost totally conscript nature of the VC forces were proof that the VC lacked popular support, can hardly deny it now. Despite the creation of a revolutionary administration, supposedly untainted by association with the NLF, no significant element of the population or of the armed forces defected. The refusal of the people to respond to the VC call for an uprising, and in fact often to render assistance to the government forces, was the key to the failure of the VC plan, and is one of most encouraging aspects of the whole affair.
There are negative factors, of course--the people now have a greater respect for the capabilities of the VC, and this will probably result in some cases in a more cautious attitude toward open support for the government. There is criticism over the government's lack of preparedness, charges of excessive property damage and civilian casualties, and looting by the counterreaction forces, and a persistent belief that somehow the U.S. was in collusion with the VC. However, the population is universally angry at the VC for violating both a sacred holiday and their own truce, and the blame for all of the ills is generally placed on the VC. There was left no doubt in the minds of the people as to the superiority of the government forces and as to who won this engagement. On balance, we feel that in the contest for the hearts and minds of the people, the VC have so far suffered a severe loss. In common danger, there was a tendency to unite behind the government. With a residue of ill will toward the VC which will not be easily erased, the task of nation-building, at least in those areas still under government control, should become a little easier. Much will depend, how-ever, on the skill and alacrity with which the government handles the severe social and economic problems it faces.
The days ahead constitute a severe test for the GVN. There is no question but that the government suffered a serious loss of prestige by its inability to defend its cities. Notwithstanding, there has been at least a temporary tendency on the part of nationalist elements to set aside their parochial interests and rally behind the leadership. This is by no means universal--the militant Buddhists, the Dai Viets, and some others still have refused either publicly to condemn the VC or to support the government actively. Although it was an American idea, clearly the most effective action by the government so far was the creation of the joint Vietnamese/American task force under Vice President Ky to handle the immediate problems of rehabilitation. Whatever closing of ranks behind the government that has accrued can be credited largely to Ky, who has emerged as the "man of the hour." Despite aggravating and bureaucratic problems, some forward movement has been made in reestablishing essential facilities and services. Ky may well have saved the GVN from projecting its usual image of inactivity.
We are not sanguine about future political problems. The schisms which divide this society are deeply rooted, and will inevitably arise again as the first flush of unity begins to fade. Demands will be made for the removal of officials, both national and local, who proved unequal to the task in a crisis, and this will be certain to restore the endemic factional infighting. The military, some of the Catholics, and those favoring a rough, directed system will fault the government for not being tough enough, while others will be concerned over even the temporary sacrifice of democratic processes and the continued preeminent role of the military. The crisis has ignited a spark of unity, but to sustain it will require a successful relief and recovery operation, and a sublimation of personal and partisan political interests which this society has never before demonstrated.
The Communists can be credited with having maintained excellent security for such a comprehensive plan, but they are guilty of a massive intelligence failure. Documents captured over the past four months and interrogations of the prisoners involved in the recent attacks indicate quite clearly that the VC did intend to take and hold the cities, did expect a general uprising, and did plan to install a revolutionary government, as evidenced by the presence of a standby VC administrative structure in the major cities. It may seem incredible that VC expectations should have been so divorced from reality, but there are three factors which probably explain this. First, the Communists are and always have been victims of their doctrine, and in the present case the articles of faith were: "The longer we fight, the stronger we become;" and, "The more viciously the enemy fights, the closer he is to collapse;" and "The people support us and when the urban people have the chance to rise up, our victory will be assured." Second, the leaders have been consistently and greatly misinformed by lower cadres. Given the doctrinal bias alluded to above and the Oriental penchant for telling people what they want to hear, the reports going upward have so misinterpreted the facts that the leaders could not base their decisions on reality. Third, the need for a significant victory after two years of drought may have introduced a lack of prudence. By any rational standard, North Vietnam has been losing too much in order to gain too little. For too long, VC strength and support has been dwindling. The entire nature of the war, the entire environment of the struggle, changed with the massive U.S. involvement. The Tet assault must have been part of an expected VC plan to inflict heavy physical and psychological damage in hope of gaining, if not all their objectives, something which could be construed as a victory.
We are very much aware that we have probably seen only the first of a two-act drama. If the second act repeats the scenario, we will seriously question the ability of Hanoi to continue to carry on this kind of conventional warfare for a protracted period. Whatever else may follow, the Tet offensive in South Vietnam, contrary to much foreign opinion, is not popularly regarded here either as a VC victory or even as an indication of their eventual success. There is a sobering thought for the future, however--if it were not for the presence of U.S. forces, the VC flag would be flying over much of South Vietnam today.
73. Intelligence Memorandum/1/
ER IM 68-23
Washington, February 13, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Files, Job 78-T02095R, SNIE 14.3-1-67, Viet Cong Recruitment and Morale Problems. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A notation on the first page reads: "This memorandum was produced by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research with assistance of the Vietnamese Affairs Staff and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence. It analyzes developments reported through 13 February 1968."
COMMUNIST UNITS PARTICIPATING IN ATTACKS
DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE
30 JANUARY THROUGH 13 FEBRUARY 1968
Summary
A review of field reporting since the start of the current Communist offensive indicates that approximately 58,000 Communist main and local forces were committed in attacks on urban areas and military installations through 13 February. (For detailed data on forces available and engaged in the Tet offensive, see Appendixes A and B.)/2/ Of this total, about 37 percent were North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops and another 29 percent were Viet Cong (VC) main force troops. The remaining 34 percent consisted of VC local forces which had been reinforced for the attacks by the upgrading of local guerrillas. On the basis of MACV's latest order of battle of 115,000 men, the Communists would appear to have committed about 50 percent of their regular forces to the attacks.
/2/Neither printed.
If the reported losses of 32,500 killed in action and 5,500 detained applied solely to the VC/NVA regular forces, the Communists would have lost more than 65 percent of the forces committed to the Tet offensive. This would have been a devastating blow. However, there are a number of pieces of evidence which suggest that such an interpretation would overstate the Communist manpower drain.
First of all, VC/NVA forces participating in the offensive were augmented by numbers of guerrillas operating in independent units or integrated into local force units. Second, there was extensive VC activity to raise new recruits. Third, casualties included laborers conscripted to move VC supplies, as well as a number of civilians in densely populated areas taken under attack. Almost certainly the rate of casualties among new and relatively untrained forces was higher than among hard-core troops.
In summary, a number of factors suggest that the VC/NVA losses, although high, are not as serious as first believed. Most recently, the enemy has been taking advantage of his greater control of the countryside to accelerate recruiting among the rural population. All of these developments make it difficult to assess the current enemy manpower situation with any accuracy./3/
/3/In a CIA memorandum entitled "The Communists' Ability To Recoup Their Tet Military Losses," March 1, the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of Economic Research speculated that it would take the NVA/VC 6 months to recover from their Tet losses, but added the following caveat: "It is entirely possible, however, that they might be able to accomplish full recovery in a much shorter time and that within six months their troop strength would be substantially greater than it was prior to Tet. Everything hinges on the real extent of their Tet losses and on their ability to recruit and impress personnel in the countryside." (Ibid.)
[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]
74. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, February 13, 1968, 1:12-2:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House. McNamara, Rostow, Taylor, Clifford, Helms, and Wheeler left at 2:25 p.m.; Rusk left at 2:32 p.m.; Christian and Tom Johnson left at 2:40 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S
LUNCHEON MEETING
WITH
SECRETARY RUSK
SECRETARY MCNAMARA
CIA DIRECTOR HELMS
CLARK CLIFFORD
WALT ROSTOW
GEORGE CHRISTIAN
TOM JOHNSON
[Omitted here is a brief discussion of Korea.]
The President: Anything new on Vietnam?
General Wheeler: There is continued resistance in Saigon, but it is fragmented. Dalat is clear. The enemy is still holding the citadel in Hue.
There is shooting but nothing important around Khesanh and the DMZ.
The President: What is your evaluation of the light activity around Khesanh?
General Wheeler: They had the hell knocked out of them. They are trying to reconstitute their forces. Their first wave was very savagely handled.
General Westmoreland indicated to me this morning that "things are looking better all over."
The enemy has a new flag with blue, red and yellow. The red represents blood; the blue represents the land; and the yellow represents the revolutionary spirit.
The President: What is the nature of the enemy forces in Saigon?
General Wheeler: The forces in the Saigon area are decreasing. There is still the build-up and the threat across the Cambodian border.
At Khesanh we got that C-130 out. He took off in 0-0 visibility. It was a very gallant action.
The President: How are the C-130s coming?
Secretary McNamara: Westmoreland asked for two squadrons of C-130s. They were sent on February 9.
The President: Is there no problem with the C-130? Do they have enough?
Secretary McNamara: There is no problem at present.
General Wheeler: We do not have with us now a recommendation on reserve call-up. The Joint Chiefs are working on that today./2/
/2/On February 13 McNamara ordered the deployment of one brigade of the 82d Airborne and one Marine regiment to South Vietnam. In JCSM 96-68 sent to McNamara that day, the JCS indicated that 46,000 reservists would have to be called up to active duty to meet immediate requirements and 137,000 more needed to be readied for possible call-up. The text of this memorandum is in The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition, pp. 542-546.
The first troops will begin moving out of U.S. facilities tomorrow night 6 p.m. (These are the first units of the 10,500 authorized and approved for immediate shipment in response to General Westmoreland's request. The Bunker announcement and press guidance are attached as Appendices A and B.)/3/
/3/Attached but not printed.
The Chiefs are preparing a paper, one proposal based on the minimum call-up necessary to support these troops and the second based on the desirable level in case we have to deploy the rest of the 82nd Division and more Marines.
The President: I sure want you and Bob McNamara to get together on one program. Let's agree on these things before you get here.
There are a number of questions which I want you to consider and get answers to me. Those questions are:
1. Why is it necessary to call up reserve units at this time?
a. To be ready for further reinforcement of Vietnam?
b. To be ready for other contingencies outside Vietnam?
c. To reassure allies such as NATO to whom we have military commitments?
d. To contribute to our overall deterrent posture by adding to our visible strength in being?
2. How large should the call-up be to satisfy the foregoing requirements? Can the call-up be diminished by such devices as a reduction in our overseas garrisons in Europe or Korea?
3. Why is it necessary to call up individual reservists at this time? Can't it be avoided or postponed? If not, how many must be called? When? From what sources?
4. What will happen to the reserve units and individuals called up? Where will they go? How long will they serve? Are the necessary housing, equipment, and training facilities ready for them?
5. What are the budgetary implications of these actions?
6. What must be requested from the Congress? What can be avoided or delayed?
7. What will be the manpower requirements for maintaining these increased forces? What will the effect be on draft calls?
8. What will be the domestic and international reactions to these decisions?
9. How should our decision be explained to the domestic and international public? What should be the timing of our statement?/4/
/4/The President had these questions typed and submitted to Rostow on February 15. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs aa-vv)
The next thing I want to discuss with you is the telegram I received from Cy Vance./5/ I will read it:
/5/Telegram 4180 from Seoul, February 12. (Ibid., Korea-Pueblo Incident, Seoul Cables, Vol. II)
There could only be one answer if the President really wants me to go. I have serious reservations, however, about going on to Saigon from here. I fear that decision to this effect could jeopardize any benefit which may come out of our mission. These people are ultra sensitive and in a hurt mood. There is a good chance they would feel they are being downgraded by being made a part of a two purpose mission and by lack of urgency in my reporting to the President on their problems.
Secretary Rusk: Bunker said we should not let the Vance mission be interpreted that the South Vietnamese Government has the same problem with the U.S. Government as does the South Korean Government.
The President: Would you send him?
Secretary Rusk: I want you to get the best information and advice you need.
Secretary McNamara: I think it would be helpful to get a first-hand report from Vance.
Secretary Rusk: Somebody should go.
The President: It looks like it is a question of personalities then.
I think Cy has a point that Pak wants me to get the message from him as quickly as possible.
Secretary Rusk: Also we should not underestimate the trouble with South Korea Vance is handling.
General Wheeler: Admiral Sharp asked me whether we should move the cruiser Canberra from the Sea of Japan back to Vietnam in light of the political problems this might cause with South Korea.
[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]
Secretary McNamara: There are four near-term action programs which are proposed.
Those are as follows:
1. Defer additional reinforcements of U.S. forces in South Vietnam until requested by Westmoreland. Defer "call-up" of reserve units to replace the 6 battalions now being deployed until further information is available as to Westmoreland's additional troop requirements, the extent of defections in the ranks of the ARVN, RF/PF and South Vietnamese security forces and the success of the GVN in restoring
services, coping with the refugee problem, etc. Defer request for new legislative authority.
2. Call up now a relatively small number of the Ready Reserves, approximately 40,000, recognizing that additional call-ups may be required later. This can be done without additional legislative authority. This call-up could be accompanied by a Presidential speech noting that a further call-up may become necessary depending upon developments in Southeast Asia, but that for the time being no legislative action is being requested on either personnel or financial matters.
3. Call up either a small (40,000) or large (130,000) number of Reserves and concurrently request Congress to authorize additional personnel actions to strengthen the Armed forces./6/ Defer request for supplemental financial authorizations and appropriations, but indicate these will be required.
/6/By Joint Resolution of Congress, the following authorities could be granted: (a) Authorize the extension of all enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, and other periods of obligated service of Regular and Reserve members of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. (b) Authorize activation of all needed individual Ready Reservists and extend beyond June 30, 1968 the authority to call both units and individuals of the Ready Reserve. (c) Authorize re-call of retired Reserve personnel. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Call up either a small (40,000) or large (130,000) number of Reserves and concurrently request from Congress both the authority to take the needed personnel actions and the supplemental financial authorizations and appropriations required./7/
/7/The possible increase in our effort in Southeast Asia may require, for Fiscal 1968, additional new Obligational Authority of $1 billion, with additional expenditures of $500 million, and for Fiscal 1969, additional new Obligational Authority of from $2 to $3 billion, with an increase of expenditures amounting to $2 billion $500 million. [Footnote in the source text.]
General Wheeler: Senator Russell said it would be necessary to have a substantial reserve call-up before Congress would approve extension of enlistments.
The President: What would you get with an extension of enlistments?
Senator McNamara: You would get 17,000 extra men per week by extending enlistments. It would raise the readiness of our strategic reserves.
The President: How long would you extend tours?
Secretary McNamara: It would depend on how many men are called up. We would ask for authority to extend one year. We would apply that authority if needed. For example, we need helicopter pilots extended.
General Wheeler: Yes, it would help with helicopter pilots.
The President: What do we do with the Rumanian?/8/
/8/See Document 71.
Secretary Rusk: I think we should just thank him for his help. He brought back nothing.
The President: What about any targets in the Hanoi area?
Secretary McNamara: There are 13 authorized but not hit.
Secretary Rusk: In light of these recent attacks and the negative response to our visitor to Hanoi, I am ready to hit almost anything.
General Wheeler: The Joint Chiefs propose again limiting the circle around Hanoi to three miles and 1-1/2 miles around Haiphong. This would open everything else up to Route reconnaissance.
But these targets do not have to be brought up today, since the weather is bad and there are authorized targets which have not been struck.
The President: How do you feel about this, Bob?
Secretary McNamara: As I have said before, the military value is small. The risk is very high. The chance for civilian casualties is very high.
Secretary Rusk: We can consider this at a later time.
Clark Clifford: To get the reply you did do what I consider a very just and fair suggestion. It seems very reasonable and, in fact, well justified to increase the level of pressure in North Vietnam. I would favor a step up in the military pressure./9/
/9/In a February 13 letter to Clifford, Under Secretary of the Air Force Townsend Hoopes argued that, although the bombing program had caused heavy damage to the DRV, it had not impaired the North Vietnamese ability to infiltrate men and mat?riel southward in order to continue the fighting on an indefinite basis. He recommended a bombing cutback and curtailment of ground actions in order to reduce casualties. (Johnson Library, Clark M. Clifford Papers, Memos on Vietnam, February-March 1968)
75. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts/1/
Washington, February 14, 1968, 1733Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by John Burke of the Vietnam Working Group, cleared by Habib and EA Public Affairs Adviser Oscar Armstrong, and approved by Bundy. Sent to all European posts, all East Asian and Pacific posts, Hong Kong, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, Ceylon, Tunisia, Iran, India, Morocco, and USUN, and pouched to all other posts.
115081. Subject: Initial Appraisal Viet Cong Tet Offensive.
1. Note: Over the last several days Sitreps have been provided to keep you abreast of the developing situation in South Viet-Nam in the wake of the communists' Tet offensive. The following represents a preliminary appraisal of the current situation, which you may draw upon on background as appropriate in your conversations with senior officials of the government to which you are accredited as well as colleagues within the diplomatic corps. It may also be used with reputable correspondents.
2. North Vietnamese and VC forces have succeeded in dealing a major blow against the urban population of South Viet-Nam in the offensive launched Jan 30. Though there is some intelligence which indicates that this initial strike will be followed up by one or more additional concerted efforts, this phase of the offensive seems to be drawing to a close. There is still fighting going on in the suburbs of Saigon, in a section of Hue, and in Dalat, but aside from these areas the attacking forces have been driven from the towns and the Government of Viet-Nam is proceeding to restore order and re-establish security and services in the urban centers. The enemy has also massed regular North Vietnamese divisions near the DMZ and the Khe Sanh campaign is expected soon in that area.
3. The Tet offensive was ordered by Hanoi and the operation was in the planning stage for weeks and probably months before the initial attack. Our forces have captured a copy of the general order for the offensive which begins with the words: "The Tet greeting of Chairman Ho is actually a combat order for our entire army and population." In the midst of their announced holiday truce they mounted an attack on province capitals and district towns throughout the length and breadth of South Viet-Nam. Thirty-eight of the forty-four province capitals were attacked either by artillery or ground troops in force. About sixty district towns were also struck. It now appears that Hanoi committed a tremendous proportion of its resources in the south and took very heavy casualties. Our estimates are that more than 60,000 NVA/VC troops, mostly main and local force, were utilized. A great many of the attacks were suicidal in character. However, on the basis of preliminary interrogation reports of those captured, many of the cadre involved were apparently led to believe that their efforts would be followed up by subsequent VC attacks. Many of those captured have stated that they were not provided with withdrawal plans (in past communist operations withdrawal plans have been an essential feature). In their briefings, communist cadre were also led to believe that the people would respond to their calls for anti-GVN uprisings and would welcome them as liberators. Such a reaction was not forthcoming and in the testimony of POWs, this was apparently a source of surprise and disappointment.
4. We know from captured documents and interrogations, as well as from Hanoi and Liberation Radio broadcasts, that the communists expected to achieve the following goals:
a. Full control of many of the cities. (Instead they retain only a small portion of Hue, part of Dalat, and a few hundred are still holding out in the Chinese suburbs of Saigon.)
b. They expected major defections from ARVN and they have even claimed that entire units had defected. Conclusive reports from our advisers make clear that there were no significant defections and it has been clearly established that one of the units identified by Hanoi as defecting, the ARVN 45th regiment, fought very well against the communists and remains firmly on the side of the GVN.
c. They expected the elected, newly installed GVN to collapse in the face of their offensive. In contrast its executive branch has moved quickly to establish a Recovery Task Force which is mobilizing the Government's resources to provide relief for the many refugees created by these attacks, re-establish services, and organize the task of rebuilding the destroyed areas.
5. There are a number of hopeful and potentially favorable elements in the present situation:
a. Despite the fact that it was caught by surprise and several effectives were on holiday leave, the ARVN performed commendably and indeed bore the brunt of the attack. (As of Feb 12 over 2,100 ARVN troops had been killed and almost 8,000 had been wounded. This contrasts with American dead of approximately 1,000 with an additional 5,000 wounded.) ARVN performance has been attested to by newsmen on the scene. (E.g., CBS broadcast of February 9 from Saigon: "Now that more and more reports are in, the record would seem to show that face to face against the Viet Cong in the battle for the cities the South Vietnamese armed forces performed almost universally well, and this could be the most significant development of this phase of the war. The South Vietnamese armed forces have long been a question mark. There was a period in this war about three years ago when entire battalions would disappear in the face of attack. Nothing like this happened in the past week and a half.")
b. Key groups and leaders, including those within the National Assembly and in opposition political circles, have issued statements denouncing the Viet Cong for their deceitful attack and urging the people to rally in opposition to the VC. Such statements have come from intellectuals (a group of university professors, journalists and writers issued a strong statement on February 11), labor groups (the president of the largest trade union federation in SVN), a former chief of state and unsuccessful presidential candidate, religious leaders (the Director of the Institute for the Propagation of the Buddhist Faith). In addition to these public statements, there have been numerous private assurances of support for the GVN in present emergency from many other political figures including declared oppositionists.
c. Reports almost universally testify to a widespread sense of outrage over the VC violation of Tet. (N.B. Tet is the most important and most sacred of Vietnamese holidays and normally runs for four days. It is a time when families are reunited, usually in the home village or hamlet, gifts are exchanged and religious ceremonies are held in honor of ancestors. Weeks before Tet, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong had publicly declared that they intended to observe a seven-day truce in connection with this holiday. The GVN and allied forces had, on their part, announced a thirty-six-hour truce, but there was no indication that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong intended to shorten their truce as a consequence. Up to the time the attacks took place, Hanoi and Liberation Radio had still not indicated any intention to depart from their seven-day truce.) This sense of outrage at the violation of Tet and the many atrocities committed by the communists during their attacks--e.g., the systematic massacre of entire families could now result in a galvanizing of popular will.
6. There are also less hopeful elements:
a. The initial success of the attacks on the urban centers could well produce a loss of confidence in the ability of the GVN, the ARVN, and the allied forces to protect the people from the VC.
b. The urban population has been exposed for the first time to heavy property destruction and loss of life. Latest figures as of February 12 indicate that refugee count may exceed 500,000, including 217,000 in Saigon and environs. Civilian casualties have been estimated by Chief of State Thieu as being in the neighborhood of 3,000 killed.
c. The pacification program, to which so much importance has been attached, has been temporarily disrupted. To get it back on the track both the GVN and U.S. forces must act quickly and effectively.
7. Over the next few months the true impact of the Tet offensive can be calculated. The initial advantage must be conceded to the NVA/VC forces. They have succeeded in invading the previously-inviolable cities and exposing the urban population to the brutal facts of war for the first time. They have created havoc and suffering and have imposed a heavy new burden on the already overstrained manpower and material resources of the GVN. Obviously, the ultimate success or failure of their urban effort will depend on how well the GVN addresses itself to these new problems. So far it has reacted well. President Thieu and other key members of his administration have shown leadership and a willingness to come to grips with the situation. This effort must, however, be sustained. The populace undoubtedly will be watching GVN leadership.
8. The other side of the coin is just how much the NVA/VC forces spent on the urban offensive. They sustained heavy casualties: over 30,000 dead and almost 6,000 taken prisoner. (Because of their magnitude Vietnamese and American officials in Saigon have checked their figures carefully against such other factors as captured weapons, and are convinced of their essential accuracy.) From interrogations and from their propaganda broadcasts it seems clear that they expected to realize much from this offensive. The fact that they failed to take control of any major town, except for brief periods of time, and their inability to generate any popular support for their effort may prove to be of prime significance. It should be noted that they were willing to announce the formation of an "Alliance of National and Peace Forces" as a propaganda weapon coincident with this offensive. This paper organization was meant to attract intellectuals, merchants, industrialists and politicians and its creation carried with it the tacit admission that the NLF was not the single voice of the South Vietnamese people. This obviously important concession would seem a heavy propaganda price in view of the fact that there was no significant popular rising in response to the urban offensive.
9. The Tet offensive was deliberately ordered by Hanoi at a time when they knew we were actively taking soundings to determine whether the Trinh statement of December 28/2/ represented a sincere intention on their part to enter into meaningful talks and had, in connection with these soundings, imposed restrictions on air activity in the vicinity of Hanoi or Haiphong. Thus, the Tet offensive, taken in conjunction with the communist buildup at Khe Sanh and the harsh denunciation of the San Antonio formula by radio Hanoi, and by Trinh himself on Feb 8, does not augur well for the early commencement of meaningful peace talks. This does not however mean that Hanoi and the supporters of the DRV will not attempt to mount an increasingly shrill propaganda concerto in favor of early negotiations on their terms. Our position on talks remains clear: the San Antonio formula.
/2/See Document 1.
Rusk
76. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, February 15, 1968, 1100Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. This telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 334-341.
19428. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my thirty-ninth weekly message:
A. General
1. As the massive Viet Cong Tet offensive subsides, it becomes increasingly possible to draw certain conclusions. What was blurred a week ago begins to become more clearly into focus. Although it will be several days before we have a fairly accurate country-wide assessment of the physical and material damages certain things are now fairly evident:
A) The enemy has suffered a heavy military setback with nearly 33,000 killed, over 5,600 detained, and the loss of more than 8,000 individual and 1,250 crew-served weapons. A large part of the force he had committed, estimated at about 60,000, has been put out of action. A second wave of attacks against Saigon and some other major cities, which it was feared for some time might take place, has not materialized and there is increasing evidence, for the present at least, that it may not.
B) That Hanoi and the Viet Cong made a major miscalculation in expecting uprisings among the people and defections among the Vietnamese forces. While the GVN may not enjoy great popularity among the people in general, there is strong evidence that in the city and countryside alike the Viet Cong attacks during the last two weeks have caused widespread resentment and bitterness toward the VC.
C) That it seems apparent that Hanoi's maximum objective was to take and hold many of the cities, thereby creating a political situation which would compel the GVN and the US to virtual surrender. The second and fallback objective (and this is Thieu's opinion also) was probably to put themselves in a strong position for negotiations, one in which they could insist as a minimum on a coalition government.
D) That despite the heavy military defeat suffered by the enemy, much damage has resulted throughout the country. The number of evacuees which had climbed to 485,000 yesterday showed a decline of 457,000 today, probably an indication that people are beginning to return to their homes. The number of houses destroyed has now been reported at 48,000 although on the basis of our observations, we believe the figure may be exaggerated. The figures on civilian deaths increased to almost 3,800, and the wounded to nearly 21,000. In addition, there has been substantial damage to industry and to lines of communication. Commercial activity has been slowed, at least temporarily, and will take some time to recover.
E) The economic situation in Saigon and in most of the country is improving. Food prices, which rose rapidly in the first days of the attack, are coming down. Lines of communication are beginning to be opened up. In looking beyond the immediate crisis, economic prospects are less bright than they appeared a few weeks ago. It will take time to restore the damage to industry and the loss of confidence in the business community which the attacks have caused. The Vietnamese economy, however, has demonstrated powers of recuperation in the past and hopefully these negative factors may prove short lived.
F) That the predominant reaction of the people is that of anger, indignation, and a sense of outrage at the VC, especially its treachery in attacking during the Tet holidays, although there is a lot of apprehension and fear of the possibility of future attacks. There is too surprise that the enemy was capable of attacking on such a wide scale in such force and criticism of GVN intelligence capabilities. But there is also a feeling of pride in the performance of the Vietnamese forces, a new confidence in the GVN, and a welling up of the support for it from many quarters. I think it is fair to say, therefore, that the GVN is facing a crisis of confidence. If it reacts quickly and effectively, moves ahead with reconstruction and other constructive programs the resentment of people at the losses they have suffered will be replaced by confidence and gratitude; if not, the GVN can be seriously weakened./2/
/2/In a February 13 memorandum to the President, Lodge noted that the "plus side" of the aftermath of Tet was that in South Vietnam the growth of "a dividend from all the work we have done to bring about constitutional government and a sense of civic consciousness," which he labeled "political energy," was occurring. In addition, the RVNAF had fought well and there was a "remarkable" degree of unity among the GVN leadership. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs aa-vv)
[Omitted here is extensive discussion of measures undertaken by South Vietnam to rebuild in the aftermath of the Tet offensive.]
Bunker
77. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, February 19, 1968, 1050Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
19824. Ref: State 114390./2/ Subj: Command Relationships.
/2/Telegram 114390 to Saigon, a joint State/Defense message to Bunker, Sharp, and Westmoreland, February 13, requested an assessment of the "feasibility and desirability" of developing a command structure that would give COMUSMACV more direct authority over South Vietnamese and allied nation forces. One such plan involved designating Thieu the overall force commander and Westmoreland the field force commander. (Ibid.)
1. I have given careful consideration to the suggestion that a new command arrangement be developed here to increase the authority of COMUSMACV over RVNAF and third country forces. While I agree that we want to consider measures to make our prosecution of the war more effective, I think we must avoid adopting solutions which may in themselves create more problems than they solve. This sums up my reaction to the idea proposed. In saying this, I recognize that the main reasons for such a change in command arrangements are military and I am not in the best position to judge the merits of this proposal from this viewpoint. I have, of course, talked with General Westmoreland who is developing his own thoughts on reftel, and will address this particular aspect of the question in his reply. Our replies will naturally be closely coordinated but I would like to address myself primarily to the obviously sensitive political factors which would be involved in any such proposal.
2. As we have emphasized in numerous messages over the past few months, Vietnamese sensitivities about real or imagined encroachments on their sovereignty and allegations of US domination of their governmental activities have increased slightly. The lifting of censorship of the press last summer, the election campaigns, and the establishment of the National Assembly have all afforded wider means voicing these views. They have often taken the form of highly critical and even vitriolic comment on our massive presence here and its overwhelming effect on Vietnamese society and political life. No matter how we might seek to disguise such a command arrangement, I have no doubt that the Vietnamese will see it for exactly what it is intended to be, and this will only add to the hue and cry.
3. In addition to this internal political factor, such a change in command arrangements would lend itself readily to propaganda exploitation by Hanoi and the NLF, and indeed all critics of the pres-ent Vietnamese Government and of our efforts here. Hanoi's constant reiteration of the phrase "puppets" and the "Thieu-Ky-US clique" would be given added force and indeed substance. Two of our basic and urgent objectives here are to build up constitutional processes and to increase confidence and competence among the leaders of the new Vietnamese Government. In my opinion such a change would tend to undermine both of these objectives. If there were some international umbrella, such as the United Nations afforded for the Korean war command structure, this might make the proposal more digestible, but I do not believe that either the facade of a Vietnamese overall commander for the seven nations grouping would be adequate to this purpose. Moreover, the Koreans themselves would want high-level positions in the command structure and this would only complicate present relationships, which are satisfactory.
4. An added point related to the naming of President Thieu as overall force commander would be that such a move runs in the face of our effort to emphasize his civilian Presidential role under the Constitution. I recognize that he is also Commander-in-Chief of Vietnamese Forces, but the public impression that he is first and foremost a General would be strengthened. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine naming someone with lesser stature to this position.
5. A further consideration of the political side is the likelihood that a fundamental revision of command relationships will stimulate already expressed GVN desires for a more formal status of forces agreement between our two governments. This opens a can of worms which we all want to avoid.
6. In sum, I can see no political advantages from such a revision in command arrangements, and very considerable disadvantages. Subject to more expert views on the military purposes which would be served by this change, would urge that it not be considered at the present time, or in the foreseeable future.
7. General Westmoreland has seen this message and concurs with it.
Bunker
78. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 20, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Chronological File, February 1968. Secret; For Personal Files Only; Absolutely No Distribution. Drafted by Harriman. The meeting began at 12:37 p.m. and lasted until 1 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT
I talked with the President at noon today alone. [Omitted here is brief discussion of domestic issues.]
He then said, "Now what will I say to U Thant?"/2/ I said I had prepared a memorandum as he had asked me to, which he read over and said gave him a good review./3/ I said on the basis of this record he has every right to tell U Thant that there has been no indication from Hanoi yet that they seriously want negotiations. They want the U.S. surrender.
/2/The President met with Thant the next day; see Document 80.
/3/Harriman brought to the meeting a memorandum entitled "Our Efforts To Seek a Peaceful Settlement of the Vietnam Conflict," which detailed the numerous efforts since 1964 of the Johnson administration to seek a peaceful resolution of the war. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Chronological File, February 1968) In a February 19 memorandum to Warnke, Under Secretary of the Air Force Townsend Hoopes decried the administration's dour predictions of the prospects for peace talks following Tet, noting that "only in circumstances under which Hanoi can demonstrate a degree of military muscle [and] can make clear that NVN has remaining strengths and alternatives, will it be willing to accept the risk of serious bargaining from which it knows there will emerge a compromise solution--i.e., something less than its stated war objectives." (Johnson Library, Alain Enthoven Papers, Alternative Strategies 1968)
I said I was still hopeful, however, that they were moving in that direction and that I hoped that we could get talks started before the autumn. He said that would be most desirable. I said they should understand the chance they are running in the election for a tougher U.S. position. He said, "I'm afraid they don't understand that."
I said I was afraid our military did not recognize that it wasn't just the North Vietnamese we were fighting. We were fighting North Vietnam with the full, determined support of the Soviet Union and Red China; that I thought Westmoreland's attrition rate was acceptable to the North since the manpower situation in Asia was unlimited. Also, Kosygin had told me that the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe had offered volunteers, and this offer was open. I am not sure that he liked that comment, but I went on to refer to the recent meetings of the Non-Communist Front. He readily agreed that this was the most important thing that had happened, and did not dispute my statement that this Front would be strong enough to deal with the VC or elements of the NLF, which is not true of the Saigon Government. He did not appear to disagree also with the statement that I felt the eventual solution lay in South Vietnam, even though talks between us and Hanoi might have to come first.
As I left he thanked me for my support and I commented that I thought I should continue to be very blunt off the record and rather careful on the record, as I was still his representative in peace negotiations which should be non-political. This position I would change when the elections grew nearer. I feel sure he fully agrees.
W. Averell Harriman/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
79. Editorial Note
On February 20, 1968, Secretary of Defense McNamara testified in closed session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Tonkin Gulf attack of August 2, 1964, and the supposed attack 2 days later on August 4. The hearings, continuing through February 26, served to cast aspersions on the credibility of the Johnson administration. McNamara, without the Committee's approval, released a statement on his testimony on February 21; see The New York Times, February 21, 1968. The Committee never published a final report on the hearings and accompanying investigation, although McNamara's testimony was made public on February 24. See U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: The Gulf of Tonkin, The 1964 Incident, 90th Congress, 2d Session, 20 February 1968.
The President and McNamara had earlier, on February 19, discussed on the telephone the August 1964 Tonkin Gulf affair and the upcoming Senate deliberations. In response to the President's query about the basis of the criticism by Senator Gore of the administration's role in the episode, McNamara said: "He's just intemperate and I think his real objective is to disassociate himself from any responsibility for anything that's followed, which of course is Fulbright's as well. They want to prove that they were misled, and had they known at the time the facts of the Tonkin Gulf situation they never would have supported the resolution and hence would not in any way be responsible for the escalation in military operations out there that has occurred since then. And if he can't hang it on one thing and you destroy the case on that he pops up two or three places elsewhere with different arguments." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and McNamara, February 21, 1968, 8:29 a.m. and 8:52 a.m., Tape F68.03, PNO 4 and PNO 5; transcript prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume)
80. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, February 20, 1968, 1:05-2:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. Those present at the meeting were the President, Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Helms, Wheeler, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson. The meeting was held in the White House. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) On February 18 the enemy launched a series of "second wave" attacks in three of the Corps Tactical Zones.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON MEETING
WITH
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS
Secretary McNamara discussed his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Tonkin Gulf incident./2/ "So far it's a draw."
/2/See Document 79.
Clark Clifford: [blank in the source text]
Secretary McNamara: Yes. This is highly classified.
Secretary Rusk: Why has Fulbright not let your statement out?
Secretary McNamara: It is obvious he wanted to get out his side first.
Secretary Rusk: If he does, will you go with your release?
Secretary McNamara: Yes. It is a can of worms. They will try to cloud the issue.
The President: Who took the lead in opposing and defending you?
Secretary McNamara: Senator Lausche was on our side. Senator Morse was doing the most damage, trying to prove we provoked the incident. Senator McCarthy was nasty personally. Senator Cooper was decent. Senator Mundt did not find the opening he wanted. Sparkman was marginally helpful. So was Senator Mansfield and Senator Hickenlooper on one occasion./3/
/3/Senators Frank Lausche, Wayne Morse, Sherman Cooper, Karl Mundt, John Sparkman, and Bourke Hickenlooper, respectively.
The President: How long do you expect it to go on?
Secretary McNamara: All day. Senator Morse said it may go on through tomorrow, but I am going to try to cut it off today.
The President: I suppose you have a better case on the fact the attack occurred than on the charge that we did provoke the attack.
Secretary McNamara: I have a good case that there was an attack. They think we responded too soon.
(At 12:23, Secretary McNamara received a call from Phil Goulding. Goulding said Senator McCarthy had already made a statement about Secretary McNamara's testimony before the committee. In light of this, Secretary McNamara said to go ahead and issue his statement.)/4/
/4/McNamara's statement reiterated the administration's contention that intelligence reports had indicated that there was a second attack. See The New York Times, February 21, 1968.
Secretary McNamara said McCarthy went out and told the press that one of the U.S. vessels penetrated North Vietnamese waters. "He just did not listen. That is exactly what I thought would happen."
Clark Clifford: Would the President like to report on his visit with President Eisenhower?
The President: I enjoyed the trip very much. I intend to get away from here Wednesday afternoon and spend the weekend in Texas./5/
/5/During the weekend of February 17-18, President Johnson toured several military installations. On February 21 he left for his Texas ranch and remained there through February 28. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
We first went to Fort Bragg with General Johnson and General Walt. I made a brief speech and stood at an aircraft while the men loaded aboard.
I told them that there were 500,000 of their buddies in Vietnam and that General Westmoreland had asked for their help. I said if they had been out there and needed help, I know they would have wanted us to respond when we were asked.
Those boys expressed no sentiment, but it was obvious to me that none of them was happy to be going. It was a very serious moment to be going. The whole trip was great. Everybody knew what to do. There were no complaints.
General Seitz, Commander of the 82nd Airborne said to me, "This is the proudest moment of my entire life."
About 50% of the men down there were Negroes. I understand they volunteered because of the high morale in the Airborne and the extra pay./6/
/6/The President's first stop during his weekend visit to bases was at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in the late afternoon of February 17. In remarks to 2,500 members of the Army's 82d Airborne Division who were leaving for Vietnam, he said: "We long to see this bloodshed come to an end. Month after month we sought to find an honorable solution to the struggle that has torn Vietnam for 20 years. The enemy's answer was clear. It is written in the towns and the cities he struck 3 weeks ago--in the homeless thousands who fled the scenes of battle--in the army that he has massed in the North near the DMZ. And our answer--your answer--must be just as clear: unswerving resolution to resist these ruthless attacks, as we have resisted every other." For full text of these remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 238-239.
From there we went to El Toro and spoke to the men inside the hangar. After a three-minute talk I walked down rows of men. I told myself--I am at heart a sentimental guy at times like those--that I sure regret having to send those men. One soldier really melted me and brought me to my knees. I asked a boy from Ohio if he had been to Vietnam before. He said yes, he had been there four times. I asked him if he had a family. He said yes, sir, he had a little baby boy born yesterday. There wasn't a tear in his eye. No bitterness showed in his face. But I can assure you I sure stopped asking any men questions for awhile. I saw them load the plane. The people moved with precision. I went inside the plane. There were 94 men in there, all in place. I talked to them a few minutes and then saw the plane take off. That's a rather rough feeling./7/
/7/At El Toro Marine Corps Base in California, the President spoke to Marine formations and an assembled civilian crowd. Noting that "freedom's defense could not be in better hands," Johnson praised the men and underscored the importance of their mission in support of the defenders of Khe Sanh. At the conclusion of his speech, Johnson, as he had at Fort Bragg, came out to the tarmac to talk or shake hands with the Marines as they boarded their transport plane. For full text of the President's remarks, see ibid., pp. 240-241.
From there I went to see men on the Carrier. They are going back to Yankee Station. I met many of the men on the ship. Ninety-five percent of them think we should be doing more in Vietnam. They said they would not mind giving their lives but they were a little more war-like and kept saying, "It's not cost effective to fight the war like this."
I had 25 men in for breakfast. All they knew was that they had a job and they wanted to do it well. They wanted to keep the pilots and the equipment in the air and in good shape. They lost one plane with a flame out and each of them felt a very personal loss of the three men. I would be glad to have any of them looking after my plane. They made a good impression.
I remember one thing about the trip in particular. When I was speaking to the 82nd Airborne I came to a line in my speech when I said, "You are the Airborne." A roar came up from the crowd unlike anything I have ever heard before with "All the way, sir." They like the prestige of the Airborne.
I almost froze in my Captain's quarters aboard the Constellation. I turned the electric blanket up to 9. About 3 o'clock, and every hour after, I went to the door and saw this big hulk of a Marine. I kept telling him, "I am freezing." He kept saying, "yes, sir." But he never moved./8/
/8/At a breakfast with 20 of the Constellation's crew, a sailor questioned why his fellow servicemen had to go to war while "peace-niks got away from the draft by rebelling and having demonstrations." The President replied that "in every war there are always dissenters and this is not something that has happened just in the Viet Nam war and this is not something that happens just about wars. There are always people who are against what is going on in the world. Take, for example, how people are against short skirts." Johnson also told the sailors that he was proud of them, adding "that it is boys like you that make America a free country." (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) According to notes taken by Tom Johnson, a further exchange occurred: "He asked one boy 'If you were President what would you do to change things?' Boy asked 'What things sir?' The President said 'Anything. What goes on that could be corrected?' Sailor said 'I would hit them more.' President explained they would come back at us and there were many more of them than us. Then he was asked about hitting their supply ships. Rostow said they could get their supplies other ways. 'It is hard to keep the roads and railroad closed. In good weather we do a lot of damage. Then they have the ports of Southern China to use. We could make it more difficult to get supplies, but you would run into trouble with Russia and others by closing the ports. You would make Hanoi more dependent on the Chinese than ever.' President: 'We are trying to keep them (meaning Chinese and Russians) actively out of it. If you hit two or three ships in the harbor--it is like slapping me and I would slap back. We don't want a wider war. They have a signed agreement that if they get into a war, the Russians and the Chinese will come to their aid. They have two big brothers that have more weight and people than I have. They are very dangerous. If the whole family jumps upon me--I have all I can say grace over now--that is the reason the Secretaries of Defense and State have to see that what damage we will do them will be in the end not so dangerous. We will do better tomorrow than yesterday, but if we provoke both of them and get them on us, if we have all three actively fighting us--we are trying not to make this a wider war.'" (Ibid., Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings) The full text of the speech given by the President while on the Constellation is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 241-243.
General Wheeler: I'll bet he had orders not to move and nobody telling him to move, even including you, was going to affect his orders.
The President: Well, I quit trying at 6 o'clock. I said, go get Rostow. We had breakfast and then met with all of the men. I can say to you Secretaries and Generals, that even Senator Fulbright couldn't find anything wrong with those men and that operation. It makes me feel sorry that we worry about creature comforts with these men who go back three and four times and who fly 25 hours straight into combat.
The crew was the proudest. They have the major responsibility for getting the men safely to Vietnam.
After the Constellation, we returned to see President Eisenhower and to get his judgment./9/ I think he has been mistreated by history and by misinterpretation.
/9/Johnson flew by helicopter to the home of former President Dwight Eisenhower at Palm Springs. Following a briefing, lunch, and a game of golf with Eisenhower, the President returned to Washington. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) The President's telephone discussion with Eisenhower the next day is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Eisenhower, February 19, 1968, 12:17 p.m., Tape F68.03, Side A, PNO 2-3. In a discussion with Secretary Rusk on February 19, the President noted: "I spent a long time with Eisenhower. He says, 'I don't think you all--one criticism I've got of this administration is I think you're right, I think you're doing what you ought to do, I think you got to be there, but I don't think you understand that the longer the war, the more costly it is.' He said, 'I'd rather lose 25,000 a day for a few days and get it over with than lose 2,500 a month ad infinitum.' And I said, 'Any general would do that,' and he said, 'The man that's got the greatest responsibility on his shoulders of any general in the history of this country is Westmoreland.' But he said, 'Westmoreland ought to be asking for more men and ought to be doing more than he is. And anybody can look at it and see,' and he said, 'I'm afraid that that's your mistake.' So I would gather that's the Republican line." (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, February 19, 1968, 11 a.m., Tape F68.03, Side A, PNO 1; transcript prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume)
He said that he did not intend to play politics with Rusk and McNamara. He said it is a mistake to second guess the people who know the information. He spoke glowingly of General Wheeler and General Westmoreland and General Goodpaster. He said he saw no justification for the criticism of General Westmoreland. He said he remembered in another war when people sat on the sidelines and said there was a better way, but he preferred to leave that to the judgment of the men who had the better information.
He said there were two people he had most respect for. Who would you think they are?
Secretary Rusk: General Marshall?
General Wheeler: Churchill?
Director Helms: General MacArthur?
The President: It was Marshall and Churchill. He told me some stories about General Marshall. He said that Marshall was an impersonal man. He brought Ike up from Fort Sam to handle operations. He ordered General Eisenhower to draft the invasion order and plan. Ike said he guesses he was a little vain and a little cocky and he went to General Marshall and said, "I hope the General knows that I have spent many hours on this plan and that it is O.K." General Marshall told him "Eisenhower, I hope it is too. You may be the one called upon to execute it."
In addition, Eisenhower said that Churchill wanted to go into battle. Eisenhower told Churchill he did not think it was wise to go into battle because of the additional security that must be provided. When Churchill told the King, the King also said he wanted to go. As far as Churchill was concerned, that ended it. He didn't go.
General Eisenhower said that Westmoreland carries more responsibility than any General in the history of this country. He said we should give him everything he needs and then let him fight the war.
I asked him how many allies he had under his command during World War II. He said, including U.S. and allied troops, he had about five million.
I told him General Westmoreland had 500,000 men, so how could he say that Westmoreland had the greatest responsibility of any American general?
He said it was a different kind of war and General Westmoreland doesn't know who the enemy is and there is not any clearly defined front.
Ike said, I am a mean Republican, but I am not going to be partisan on the war.
Then General Eisenhower was asked how he got legislation passed when he was President. He said he told the visitor that he had a Speaker from Texas and a Majority Leader from Texas, both Democrats. He said his leader was Knowland of California./10/
/10/Senator William Knowland, Senate majority and minority leader during the 1950s.
He said he could call in Mr. Sam/11/ and me and say why a certain piece of legislation was best for the country and that the two of us would do it if it were in the best interest of the country. He said this was often not the case with his own party.
/11/Representative Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives, 1940-1961, and Johnson's mentor.
General Eisenhower said that we had always done what we thought was best for the country, particularly when he called on us. He intended to do the same thing now.
He called me and told me of a rough wire he received from three scientists who told him I planned to drop the nuclear bomb. I told him I had talked to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and that no one had recommended nuclear weapons in the last four years.
Now, what do we do with this trip of General Wheeler's?
Secretary Rusk: Can we keep this trip very quiet until Buzz gets there? I am worried about what they might do to the airport if they knew he were coming.
The President: We talk too much anyway. Ike said it is criminal to announce the location of men or units or headquarters. He said the press can talk about the way in which the war is being directed but that it is wrong to say anything about when or where or how it is being fought.
Ike said we should get the other government to restrict coverage and that he never would have said that we were sending 10,500 men. He said he would think General Giap would just love to have that information.
General Wheeler: I will leave tomorrow night and return on Tuesday the 27th.
The President: What should we do while Buzz is out there?
Secretary McNamara: There is nothing we need to do that we haven't done. We should wait until Buzz comes back.
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland said that the intelligence indicated there might be a major attack tonight on Saigon. As of this morning, nothing of a sizeable nature had happened.
Walt Rostow: It has been quiet up until the time of the meeting.
The President: What about targets? Should we retaliate for these strikes?
General Wheeler: The weather is terrible except for an occasional day. We can make systems runs on certain targets. I don't want to sound like a broken record, but I still feel the best thing is to squeeze down the circle and then authorize armed reconnaissance.
Secretary McNamara: May I leave? (The Secretary had to return to the Hill where he was testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.)
General Wheeler showed maps of the Haiphong-Hanoi area. The General pointed to high value targets and said that systems runs on these targets should be considered. He recommended reducing the circles around Hanoi and Haiphong to three miles and 1-1/2 miles and permitting armed reconnaissance.
The General pointed out the northeast arm of the railroad and Highway 1-A. In addition, he pointed out the inland port of Hanoi. He said it was an inland port used for barges to bring in supplies.
Secretary Rusk: I would not object to systems runs. There would be a limitation of 15 miles along the China border. I would hit the highway and the railroad.
Walt Rostow: How about a systems run on Hanoi radio headquarters?
General Wheeler: We could hit it. It is part of the Air Defense System in the area.
The President: Go get it. It has been previously authorized anyway.
General Wheeler: May we reduce the circles to 1-1/2 and 3 miles?
The President: Do you have any trouble with that, Dean?
Secretary Rusk: It will get a lot of civilians but I feel less strong about the matter now. Let me look at this and get back to you later.
The President: Take the 15 mile limit.
General Wheeler: How about a systems run on the Hanoi port?
The President: How do you feel about that?
Secretary Rusk: O.K.
Clark Clifford: O.K.
The President: What is a systems run?
Secretary Rusk: It is bad weather bombing.
General Wheeler: It is not as good as visional bombing.
Clark Clifford: Is it safer with a systems run?
General Wheeler: It is somewhat more safe. Planes can go in at night and also in bad weather.
The President: Do you want to send anybody with Wheeler?
Secretary Rusk: I want to send Habib with Wheeler.
General Wheeler: We have made space for him on the plane.
The President: O.K. What is the enemy up to, Dick?
Director Helms: It is clear the enemy had a poor assessment of what would happen. They thought a political uprising would take place. They did not get it.
Based on the documents, they are now re-evaluating and are much more flexible in their attitude. They are now attacking some cities with mortars and some with troops. Meanwhile, they are not coming out with any real forces for ground attacks. They are busy in the countryside. They have a manpower pool out there to draw on.
What they do in the future depends on what we do.
The President: How did they get the countryside?
Director Helms: All of the ARVN and U.S. forces have come in to protect the cities.
General Wheeler: Not all.
Director Helms: Most. In addition, it appears that the North Vietnamese may not attack Khesanh now. They may wait and try to hold us down and move their troops in along the coast. We have a rough problem at Quang Tri.
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland said the ARVN troops are tired and some have taken rather heavy casualties.
[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]
81. Record of Meeting/1/
Washington, February 21, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room, 2/21/68. No classification marking. The meeting lasted from 11:08 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
MEETING BETWEEN U THANT AND THE PRESIDENT
U Thant reported to the President that he had met with the French Ambassador in New York, Mr. Berard./2/ He told U Thant the French Delegation had reported to Paris. U Thant asked for a statement in writing confirming this. The note received reported the French Delegation reports that North Vietnam considers "The appropriate time after the cessation of the bombing as meaning a time necessary to demonstrate that the cessation is effective."
/2/Armand B?rard, French Representative to the United Nations.
U Thant added that if the Republic of North Vietnam were to be officially notified of such a cessation of hostilities from the United States, then the talks could start immediately. U Thant reported that the impression he got in his talks in New Delhi and Paris are: They want to talk./3/
/3/French Foreign Ministry officials informed Bohlen that on January 30 the DRV had authorized its representatives in New Delhi to discuss with U Thant the issue of Vietnam. (Telegram 9857 from Paris, February 2; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/RAMS) On February 16 the President discussed this upcoming meeting at a news conference, noting that "I have received a good many reports from folks who have visited other capitals." See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 235-236. One such source was the Indian Government, representatives of which had met with their North Vietnamese counterparts both in Hanoi and in New Delhi. The Indian Government also concluded that North Vietnam was prepared to negotiate. (Telegram 115569 to New Delhi, February 15, and telegram 117317 to USUN, February 17; both National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S; and memorandum from Rostow to the President, February 29, 12:15 p.m.; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, March 19, 1970 Memorandum to the President--Decision to Halt the Bombing, 1968, III) The British Government also had transmitted to Washington word of U Thant's message from Hanoi. (Message from British Ambassador Patrick Dean to Rusk, February 13, in telegram 115376 to London and Moscow, February 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
U Thant met with the Hanoi representative on the 7th, Hanoi-Peking attacked him on the Peking radio on the 11th--calling him messenger boy of Washington, etc. Hanoi replied to him on the 13th. His interpretation was--in spite of Peking's attack on him, Hanoi disregarded this and sent a reply. U Thant said the point he wanted to make was in spite of Peking's attack on him, Hanoi always made it a point to answer his questions. He reported Hanoi has been saying if there is an unconditional cessation of bombing and other things, they will talk, "but, of course, they can't be trusted. Peking we never have trusted. Peking Radio has been broadcasting for about three years that we will solve the problem. That is Peking's position. So in spite of Peking's position, Hanoi has come up with this formulation. So this is another instance of Hanoi's independence of Peking. My conclusion is: Hanoi wants to be independent of Peking. Told Ambassador Stevenson also, long ago, my impression is Hanoi is more independent of Peking than either was ever independent of Moscow."
U Thant expressed opinion we could get Hanoi on our side. Thought Hanoi could be weaned away from Peking, but would have been much easier two years ago. He expressed view that if bombing was stopped, Hanoi would talk. In the case of stopping the bombing, he did not consider the DMZ part of North Vietnam and it might be necessary to bomb to stop infiltration of troops. Suggested a message be sent to Hanoi that the President would test their sincerity by stopping the bombing an x number of days. Thought that would make them decide to talk. Test their sincerity, whether to discuss cease-fire, or de-escalation in the South, maintenance of proposed San Antonio Formula--although they don't accept the San Antonio Formula, at least up to now.
President asked how U Thant's suggestions differ in substance from the San Antonio Formula./4/ President said: "I imagine what it would be, the discussions that the bombing would stop, that's one part of it. The discussions would start in a couple of days, that would be two. Three, they could be productive in that they would be on substantive matters and not vituperation and just harassment but they would involve the four points and our points."
/4/In a telephone conversation with Clifford on February 14, the President made the following comment on U Thant's latest peace initiative: "Now U Thant is screwing the thing up and just as much as he can. And he's their agent almost. And he's gone to Moscow and he didn't see anybody but some clerk. Then he dashed over and tried to put it to Wilson, and Wilson's no good, but he did at least tell us what's happening. Now he's going to run over and try to see DeGaulle. Then they're going to come in and demand that we stop bombing tomorrow." He later added: "He's meeting in Paris today and he's got a new message now from North Vietnam--they've sent for him, and they're going to put the propaganda to us again. And it's going to be one of these 'will' is changed to 'should' and 'should' is changed to 'would' and they will meet now and not in 6 months but in 10 days. And they'll do nothing. But if we stop that bombing we've just sacrificed all of our men." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Clifford, February 14, 1968, 9:16 a.m., Tape F68.02, Side B, PNO 1-2; transcript prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume)
U Thant said yes. The President continued by saying:
"And finally, we would assume that they would want us to stay at the table and discuss these things in an atmosphere that would be productive so they wouldn't have a crash program or take advantage while we were talking to try to overrun us at the DMZ, or something like that."
The President reported that he did not see much difference in what U Thant was saying and what was contained in the San Antonio Formula.
President: "The San Antonio Formula says there will be talks--and they will speak productively on the subjects and they don't have to agree to anything else. We assumed, we thought that if you take advantage of this, if you continue to infiltrate and you continue to supply to your troops and you continue to wage war, we understand that. We will continue to supply our troops. We expect that you will do that. But if you take advantage over and above by trying to have a crash program to overrun us, while we are trying to talk to you, if you're going to take our wives and our children out there and try to burn the house down while we are sitting here in the Cabinet Room talks, then we'll have to go out and turn the water on to keep the house from burning. The purpose of the talks is to get somewhere and we are not wanting to take advantage by bombing Hanoi and Haiphong and we don't want you to take advantage by increasing, etc. We can't expect you to let your men starve or run out of ammunition or not get food or something. But we do expect you to not line your trucks up bumper-to-bumper and 30,000 extra men to try to shove over while we are sitting down.
"Now it seems from what you say that there are three elements of our San Antonio Formula: One is we stop the bombing of North Vietnam. Okay. We could do that. Second, that the talks could start promptly--that's today. Three, they could be productive, fruitful, substantive talks. That's all that means, that they're expected to be settled. Then we say, we don't make a condition and we don't exact a promise from you. We warn you, or we notify you, or we think frankly, candidly that if while we were talking, a fire is started with our wife and children--. They say 'We won't take any of it--the San Antonio Formula is out', and they hit 44 cities."
U Thant reported he felt they had changed their attitude. He reiterated he would try to test their sincerity by stopping the bombing.
President. "My experience has always been that these other pauses--that once we pause and they use them as they did for 37 days,/5/ then it takes days and days to get out of the pause and the folks really don't understand and then the good sincere people want to blame us for resuming and so forth, and our men out there feel like we had been duped and we've let them down by tying their hands while these folks come at them, hitting 44 cities at once and all that stuff."
/5/Reference is to a temporary bombing halt that lasted from December 1965 to January 1966.
U Thant reported that was a factor for the President to decide but his feeling was it was worth testing.
President reported: "Now, we yearn for peace. We want self-determination in that area. We have no desire to stay there as a colonizer and occupier. We want to take the resources that we're spending in the war, as I said in Johns Hopkins, and spend in economic development and that not only includes South Vietnam. It includes that area in North Vietnam, just as we have in other areas where we have struggled to protect freedom in Europe, in Asia before, and we want to do that and anything that gives us any hope of the sincerity of the other side in permitting the people themselves to determine what kind of government they want, and for that reason, after Mr. Gromyko indicated to us, that if we could be specific on leaving there--we went to Manila and pointed out that if the infiltration would cease and violence would subside, then we could divert our attention to economic building of the area instead of destroying the area. We still feel that way, very strongly.
"So last week the message that we got from the leader of another country who had communicated our explanations in some detail of what we meant by 'prompt', what we meant by 'productive', what we meant by 'taking advantage of', we had done that before last summer--in August and September--and when we announced the San Antonio Formula. Then we repeated it again through another government and their answer there was the original position--they wouldn't accept the San Antonio Formula just as they didn't last summer and we felt they had not budged very much, if any, from the position they took all along, mainly, their four points./6/ But we are anxious to have peace. We do want to go halfway to meet them. We are desirous of taking the resources we have to stop using them for destruction and try to use them for constructive purposes."
/6/The basic DRV position for the peaceful resolution of the conflict, known as the Four Points, was stated by Dong on April 8, 1965; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 853-854.
The President told U Thant he welcomed and applauded his consistent attempts to try to bring us together./7/
/7/Rusk, Goldberg, Clifford, Katzenbach, Harriman, Bundy, and Sisco met with Thant and Ralphe Bunche, UN Under Secretary-General, at 1 p.m. that day. (Memorandum of conversation, February 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) U Thant's report on his contacts with the North Vietnamese was disseminated in telegram 119559 to London, Saigon, Paris, and USUN, February 22. (Ibid.)
82. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, February 22, 1968, 1200Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 9:08 a.m. and passed to the White House. This telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 342-350.
20175. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my fortieth weekly message.
I. General
1. Since my last weekly message, there have been a number of significant developments in the situation, some favorable, others less so. I shall try to summarize these briefly at the beginning and will endeavor to enlarge on them later in the report:
A) The GVN has continued to press the recovery program with commendable energy. Despite frustrations, substantial progress has been made. In the Saigon area, public services have been maintained, distribution of food has been expanded, prices have come down (now about 20 percent higher that pre-Tet), and the problem of evacuees has been handled effectively. The curfew has been relaxed and people are getting back to their normal occupations. In the cities and towns throughout the country, recovery work is underway, food supplies are adequate, and efforts are being made to open lines of communication as rapidly as possible. The counterparts of the Central Recovery Committee at corps and province level are for the most part working effectively. Perhaps a major by-product of the effort has been that of getting Ministries to work together, horizontally instead of vertically.
B) We have as yet no comprehensive inventory of destruction throughout the country but this is now underway. It is obvious from preliminary reports, however, that destruction has been heavy. Evacuees will probably number from 400,000 to 450,000, of which perhaps 30-40 percent having left their homes for security reasons will be returning. Most of the remaining will be refugees in the true sense in that their homes have been destroyed. We have no accurate count of the number of houses destroyed nor an inventory of the damage to industry. Our latest count showed 61,000 houses destroyed, a figure considerably higher than that of the GVN. As reported in my last week's message,/2/ industrial plants have suffered extensive damage. It is apparent, therefore, that the repair of physical destruction caused by the Tet offensive will involve an extensive and time consuming effort, and a substantial allocation of resources.
/2/Document 76.
C) Further elements in the enemy's strategy developed with renewed attacks on a number of cities during the night of February 18-19 in what appears to be the second phase of the Tet offensive. These for the most part were rocket and mortar attacks directed principally at airfields and bases. Exceptions were the cities of Phan Thiet and Song Be which the enemy entered and from which he was thrown out with heavy losses. But what is evident is that the enemy in effect is attempting an investment of some of the major cities. For example, troops are being moved closer to Saigon and to Can Tho in the Delta. He is making intensive efforts to disrupt lines of communication, cutting Highway 4 from the Delta every night. His present moves seem to confirm Thieu's view that he will continue to attempt to harass, isolate, and choke off the cities. He remarked to me yesterday that the countryside has always been of prime importance to the VC for this reason.
D) The enemy is bringing in heavy reinforcements to the Saigon area and severe fighting has been taking place in Gia Dinh. These reinforcements evidently have been coming from replacement camps in Cambodia. Heavy truck traffic has been noted on the Cambodian side proceeding up to the border and heavy sampan traffic observed from the border inland to Viet-Nam. This raises the question as to how long we can afford to permit the enemy to make use of the Laos and Cambodian sanctuaries as freely and effectively as he has been doing for the infiltration of men and material. I recognize that this is an extremely difficult problem having many complex and sensitive political aspects, and will therefore want to make it the subject of another message.
E) The enemy's present moves, it seems to me, lend credence to General Westmoreland's views and those of President Thieu on the probable future course of his strategy. As I reported last week, General Westmoreland believes that the enemy may be preparing for a major offensive in the northern provinces, perhaps supported also in the Central Highlands, and that he has the capability to mount such an offensive. Thieu's view, which he confirmed again in my talk with him yesterday, is that the present offensive will be followed by a second one which may come some months from now, perhaps around May to July: that in this he will try to pin down our troops in the North, in the Central Highlands, and in defense of the cities; to continue mortar and rocket attacks on airfields in an effort to reduce our air potential; to continue harassment and infiltration of the cities to carry on political "spoiling" and attempt to paralyze the government through terror attacks; and to attempt to regain and hold as much of the countryside as possible. Thieu believes that the main enemy objective is still the countryside, and that his purpose in its control is twofold: to choke off the flow of food and other supplies to the cities, and to be able to demonstrate that he controls a large part of Vietnamese territory before going to negotiations. Thieu believes, therefore, that the enemy's ultimate objective is a political settlement, and his view of timing looks toward the end of 1968 or early 1969.
F) If these views are correct, and they seem to me quite logical, then it appears they will involve a major effort on the part of the enemy. How long he can sustain such an intensive effort, given the losses which he has already taken and which such an effort will inevitably entail, is problematical, especially if we have the men and material to meet and frustrate him at every turn; I think there is no question about the will.
G) It is apparent that the pacification program has suffered a setback, though to what extent it has not been possible to determine. Eighteen of the fifty-four ARVN battalions assigned to pacification were withdrawn for defense of the cities; so apparently were a considerable number of the Regional and Popular Forces and some of the RD teams, though the exact numbers are not known. The consequent impairment of security which has resulted has raised doubts in people's minds concerning the capability of the government to provide adequate security in the countryside. On the positive side, however, is the fact that substantial numbers of the Viet Cong forces were withdrawn from rural areas for the attacks on the cities and that for the first time a large part of the infrastructure has surfaced and been identified. This should make possible a more effective rooting out process.
First priorities, already underway, are to get supplies to the provinces; to get refugees into permanent camps; and to get inspection teams out. The next priorities are to get the forces back into the countryside as soon as possible; to re-establish security; to revive the economy; through psyops to capitalize on the Tet failure; and to attack the exposed infrastructure.
H) Popular reactions have continued to surface. Confidence in the government was at first badly shaken; but at the same time popular opinion hardened against the VC. While the enemy instilled new fear in the city dwellers, he learned that the masses will not voluntarily support him. In the view of many experienced observers, the crisis has generated a greater feeling of unity and more willingness to contribute to the common cause than has ever been witnessed in this country. There are anxieties about the "second wave" attacks, but there is also among many Vietnamese a new esprit; they feel they have met and defeated the best the enemy had, they are proud of their army for the first time in many months, and as Phan Quang Dan puts it, they believe that their government and their system has proved it is "viable" in the toughest kind of situation.
2. Military situation. Since General Westmoreland has reported daily, comprehensively and in detail, developments in the military situation, I shall only give a brief summary of the present outlook. The "second wave" of the Tet offensive is apparently underway. It began with a coordinated series of rocket and mortar attacks throughout II, III, and IV Corps in the early morning hours of February 18. Since then, many cities and airfields, including Saigon and Tan Son Nhut, have suffered harassing mortar and rocket fire. Enemy forces at considerable strength are close to Saigon with the obvious purpose of investing the city. The apparent intention of these attacks throughout the country is to tie down defense forces and prevent them from moving back to the countryside, while at the same time continuing to maintain tension among the urban population and impress them with VC power. The prime enemy objective, I believe, is III Corps and Saigon, although he also poses a threat to Can Tho in the Delta, and a continuing and very serious threat in the northern part of I Corps with four divisions in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.
3. Although we have by no means necessarily seen the whole of the enemy intention or capability for "second wave" attacks, I am inclined to be encouraged by the slowness and apparent relative weakness of his follow-up attacks. Obviously, it was essential from his point of view to hit the cities and the GVN again as quickly as possible. Enemy radio broadcasts made the point that we must not be allowed to get back on our feet. In fact, it appears to me that the GVN, with our help and prodding, has reacted to the new situation, both military and political, faster and better than has the enemy.
4. On the political-economic side, we have reported daily the government effort over the past three weeks to provide immediate relief to the victims of the fighting, show vigorous leadership and inspire confidence by public appearances and statements, and rally all nationalist groups to the support of the government in this crisis.
[Omitted here is discussion of additional measures undertaken by the GVN to rebuild in the aftermath of Tet.]
Bunker
83. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, February 22, 1968, 1850Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 64. Top Secret; Sensitive. The President stayed at the LBJ Ranch February 21-28.
CAP 80484. February 22, 1968. Herewith a summary of a CIA assessment of future Communist military strategy in South Vietnam. I will forward the full text in the next pouch./2/
/2/Not found.
Developments during the past three weeks have made it clear that the Communists now plan to put extensive and sustained military pressure on the urban areas of South Vietnam. At a maximum, they hope to move in and control some of the major cities; failing this, they hope to bring about a deterioration of the governmental authority in urban areas, as well as in the countryside, that eventually would be severe enough to force a political accommodation in the war on Communist terms.
During the last few weeks there have also been a number of indications, apart from the attacks on the cities, that additional shifts in Communist war strategy are in process. Among these has been evidence of plans to use the limited North Vietnamese air arm in a logistic or attack role in South Vietnam. New Communist weapons including tanks and possibly better artillery rockets have appeared in the DMZ area. Signs pointing to heavy new troop infiltration to the south have been noted, while the flow of supplies to the DMZ and down the Lao corridor has continued at a stepped-up pace. Additional enemy road building has also been under way which will improve the Communists' ability to support the military units in both the DMZ and the coastal area of the two northern provinces in South Vietnam.
The developments suggest that the enemy is trying to get in a position throughout this area which will permit him to conduct sustained offensive operations, probably along more conventional military lines than ever before in the war. Recently the bulk of one division of Communist troops from the DMZ area has slipped south into the coastal plains of Quang Tri and, along with NVA elements already in the sector, will probably attempt a sustained campaign to erode and destroy friendly control over the rural population and the cities in the area. It now appears that the Communists are going to make a major effort to hold their positions in the city of Hue, invest or capture Quang Tri, and, if possible, gain de facto administrative control over Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces.
Continued pressure on the allied bastion at Khe Sanh is likely in the course of the Communist effort in the North, with the enemy seeking to tie down a substantial allied reaction force. Whether Hanoi will make an all-out effort to overrun the base remains to be seen; there is some evidence in the shift of Communist troops to the eastward in recent days that the enemy may be reducing his forces in the general vicinity of Khe Sanh. It is possible that he plans at present only to mount a long-term siege operation against the base.
We believe the most likely course of over-all enemy action in Vietnam during the near term will revolve around a major effort in the north combined with selective pressure against the urban areas farther south. The pressure against the cities will include both limited ground probes and coordinated attacks by fire. We think it likely the enemy will make a special effort, both for political and psychological reasons, to harass and disrupt the city of Saigon.
The Communists will also be heavily engaged in trying to consolidate the gains they have made throughout the rural areas of the country since the government's retreat to defend the cities. In particular, the Communists will attempt to revise much that has been achieved in the pacification/RD program, and will utilize renewed access to the rural population to intensify recruitment efforts and the collection of taxes and other forms of logistic support.
84. Editorial Note
A comprehensive analysis of the Tet offensive by the intelligence community began in February 1968. Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms met with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) on February 16. Helms noted that pre-Tet intelligence was deficient in terms of predicting "the precise time of the urban attacks, their widespread scale, and their intensity" because of the lack of penetration of the Viet Cong, inadequate dissemination and analysis procedures, and poor performance by the South Vietnamese intelligence service. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 79-207A, US-8 President Files, US-8 January 1968 to December 1968) In a February 23 letter to Helms, Maxwell D. Taylor, PFIAB Chairman, requested that he cooperate in a study to determine "to what extent, if any, our intelligence services and those of our allies were at fault in failing to alert our military and political leaders of the impending large-scale attack on the cities and towns of South Vietnam." Taylor posed two questions: "Did our intelligence collection agencies obtain all or most of the pertinent intelligence which was available in the circumstances?" and "Was the evaluation of the available intelligence sound and did that evaluation reach the decision-makers in time to assist them in taking appropriate action?" He requested a response by April 1. (Ibid., Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, PFIAB Subject File, 285. Tet Offensive)
In a letter to Taylor on April 1, Helms noted that the U.S. intelligence agencies in Washington, the Joint Staff, the staff of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and the agencies in Saigon had begun the study. The report had not been completed, however, due to "the complexity of the task, the vast amount of material to examine, the necessity to interview commanders and intelligence officers in the field, and our desire to minimize the additional load placed on these officers." Helms did transmit to Taylor an interim report entitled "Intelligence Warning of the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam." Principal among the findings of the interim report was the fact that advance warnings of some of the attacks had been given to senior officials and "as a result, a series of actions were taken in Vietnam which reduced the impact of the enemy offensive." However, other factors to a great extent mitigated this achievement. Numerous reports described attacks on other dates in other areas. In addition, there was a lack of awareness of the full scope of the offensive since the enemy, in emphasizing security even over coordination, had "compartmented" his plans for attack. Despite the abundance of intercepted messages and reports, the exact timing and the scale of the offensive had not been determined beforehand. Not surprisingly, most of those who knew about the coming enemy attack "did not visualize the enemy as capable of accomplishing his stated goals as they appeared in propaganda and in captured documents." Finally, the "urgency" of the attacks felt by those on the ground in Vietnam was not immediately grasped in Washington. (Ibid.)
The final report to PFIAB evaluating the quality of U.S. intelligence before and during Tet, completed on June 7, was received by President Johnson on June 11. The conclusions of the report were:
"a. that the intelligence at hand contributed to the decision on January 25 to cancel the Tet truce in I Corps and to General Westmoreland's action on January 30 putting U.S. commanders on full alert throughout all of South Vietnam just prior to the main attacks;
"b. that intelligence contributed substantially to the result that the attacks on the cities were beaten off and that no permanent lodgements were achieved;
"c. that the intelligence bearing on the Tet offensive proved adequate in that it alerted U.S. commanders in time to permit them to carry out their missions successfully and, therefore, there are no grounds to support the charge of a major intelligence failure;
"d. that the finished intelligence assessments and reporting at the Washington level did not convey the same sense of urgency of the developing military situation as those reaching decision-makers in Saigon and often arrived too late to satisfy the demands of senior officials for prompt information."
PFIAB recommended that the "normal intelligence process" be examined for ways in which its defects could be overcome. (Memorandum from Taylor to the President, June 7; Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, PFIAB, Vol. 2)
85. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, February 24, 1968, 1546Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 3, Tabs A-Z and AA-QQ. Top Secret; Sensitive. Received at the LBJ Ranch on February 23 at 11:17 a.m.
CAP 80542. Herewith Bus and Westy respond to our query of yesterday/2/ with their picture of the situation.
/2/In telegram OSD 2175 to Wheeler and Westmoreland, February 23, Rostow wrote: "Roughly speaking, our appreciation of the situation, as seen from here, runs about as follows: The enemy is preparing to strike in the Western Highlands (Pleiku, Kontum, Dak To). He is apparently bringing major units in towards Saigon. He is, of course, positioned to attack at both Khe Sanh and Quang Tri. He has forces around Hue and Danang; degree of readiness less certain, although major contact northwest of Hue is reported. In the Delta, especially, but elsewhere as well, he is moving rapidly to exploit the relative vacuum in the countryside to recruit in an effort to make up recent losses, to expand rural control, and exert pressure on towns. The effort to close off Route 4 to deny food supplies to Saigon continues, as well as the effort to keep Route 1 closed between Danang and Hue to limit military supplies to I Corps. Diplomatically, the enemy is establishing a whole range of diplomatic contacts
'to explain his victories' and to keep lines open for a later negotiating offensive. We now estimate that more than 60,000 were used in the first wave of attacks at Tet made up as follows: 37 percent North Vietnamese units; 29 percent VC main forces; 34 percent VC local forces. CIA estimates that main force units (North Vietnamese and VC), estimated by MACV at 115,000 in December, were higher than that at Tet. 'Over half' of main forces are available for follow-on major attacks. There is the suggestion in intelligence that additional North Vietnamese regulars are being brought south--perhaps two additional divisions. It may well be that the enemy is about to make a virtually total effort with the capital he has in hand. He may then try to lock us into a negotiation at his peak position before we can counterattack. In particular, he may try to dissipate Westy's reserves by simultaneous attacks at a number of places and take Khe Sanh, if possible. In what way would your appreciation on the spot conform or differ from this thumb-nail sketch?" (Ibid.)From here the enemy situation looks like this:
I Corps--The enemy attacked Khe Sanh yesterday with a heavy attack by fire and continues to adjust his fire to increase the effectiveness of his artillery. The threat to Quang Tri has been reduced somewhat and now consists of the 803rd Regiment attempting to interdict the Cua Viet River, north of Quang Tri City, and the 812th Regiment attempting to cut Route 1 south of Quang Tri City. There are at least eight equivalent combat effective battalions threatening Hoi An and Danang. The battle at Hue involves about eight combat effective battalion equivalents and the fighting is heavy as the enemy attempts to hang on in the city. There is extensive supply activity in A-Shau Valley, and the enemy is building a road from the valley to join Highway 547 which runs to Hue. We have no information on what troop units are located in
A-Shau.
II Corps--The enemy is tactically deployed to conduct offensive operations in the Dak To area. He is capable of conducting ground attacks with seven battalions of the 1st NVA Division supported by elements of the 40th Artillery Regiment. Available evidence indicates that these attacks can be initiated at any time. In Kontum City, the relocation of major units coupled with evidence of detailed planning indicates an offensive action against the city with as much as three infantry and two sapper battalions at any time. In Pleiku City, the enemy does not pose an immediate major threat at this time. He is however, capable of attacks by fire and harassment type activity.
III Corps--The three regiments of the 9th VC Division remain in the northern and western Gia Dinh Province. Elements of the 101st NVA Division have been identified north of Saigon, and a PW from the 141st NVA Regiment, captured in southern Binh Duong stated his battalion was following two others to Gia Dinh. Airborne direction finding located a terminal serving the 2nd Battalion, 274th VC Regiment on 23 February in eastern Gia Dinh. Thus, elements of three divisions threaten Saigon, although some of them have been hit hard in the past weeks.
IV Corps--The enemy is currently attempting to capitalize on the fact that ARVN forces in the Delta have been forced to concentrate upon the defense of urban centers throughout the area. While keeping his maneuver units within striking distance of the major cities and lines of communication, his efforts in the rural areas have centered around recruitment and anti-GVN/US propaganda. It is not clear, however, that he is moving rapidly to exploit the situation in the countryside throughout the corps. During recent weeks the enemy has been able to successfully interdict Highway 4 throughout the Delta. Road blocks, cratering, and harassing attacks have been used to bring traffic on this major thoroughfare to a near standstill. We doubt the enemy believes that this will cut off food supply to Saigon.
Strength--About 60,000 enemy combat and combat support troops were committed in the first two days of the Tet offensive. Up to 25 percent more were committed from the guerrillas, administrative services and political infrastructure. Of the total, about 30 percent were NVA troops. In the three weeks since that time the enemy has committed additional forces (five to seven battalions in I Corps, four battalions in II Corps, five to nine battalions in III Corps, and none in IV Corps). Main force strength at the beginning of the offensive was about 133,000 due to the arrival of the 304th and 320th Divisions. About half of enemy's main force strength probably remains uncommitted, the most significant intact elements being those at Khe Sanh, the DMZ, the Highlands, and four NVA regiments (2nd Division and 31st Regiment) in the Danang-Hoi An area.
Reinforcement--Although a few PW's have stated that the 308th and 30th Divisions are in the DMZ, there is no credible intelligence held by MACV indicating that additional divisions are in or near South Vietnam or enroute thereto. The NVA divisions located in NVN have not exhibited any unusual communications patterns which would indicate southward deployment, although the 308th Division is not currently isolated in SIGINT.
Summary--We agree with you that the enemy can conduct simultaneous large scale attacks against Khe Sanh, Hue, Danang, Dak To, and Saigon. He will no doubt attack other towns and cities at the same time. With due consideration for the location and strength of the enemy threat COMUSMACV has deployed his forces to be in the best posture to counter these simultaneous attacks throughout the country.
While we are prepared to defend against multiple attacks, there is some evidence that the enemy may delay for weeks, even months before initiating his next offensive. In the interim he will attempt to invest the cities and towns, attriting the Air Force of the Republic of Vietnam and weakening the will of the civilians and their loyalty to the GVN. To capitalize on any such delay, together with RVNAF we are proceeding with operations designed to destroy the enemy or to push him away from the towns, while moving to reopen lines of communication and reassert friendly presence in the countryside.
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