Washington, February 26, 1968.

SUBJECT
The Outlook in Vietnam

1. This Memorandum does not seek to explore all aspects of the situation in Vietnam, or its probable development over a long term. It is addressed only to the specific question put to us, i.e., whether developments in Vietnam are apt to involve a continuation of combat into the indefinite future at a level comparable or higher than current levels, or whether it is more probable that either the VC or the GVN will be unable to sustain such a level beyond a few months.

2. The current phase of combat will have a critical bearing on the further course of the war and may even prove to be decisive. We cannot be sure how long this phase will last, but it seems likely that by early summer the immediate results and the longer term implications will be fairly clear to Hanoi, Saigon, and Washington. At present, the key questions concern: (1) the capabilities of the Communist forces to sustain their current challenge, and whether they can continue the fighting thereafter, and (2) the capabilities of the South Vietnamese political and military establishment to cope with the tasks imposed by the present Communist offensive.

3. Hanoi's aims in the present offensive phase are: to register significant military successes against US and especially ARVN forces, and to inflict such heavy losses, physical destruction and disorganization on the GVN as to produce a total situation favorable to a negotiated settlement on Communist terms. The Communists are not likely to have a rigid timetable, but they probably hope to achieve decisive results during the course of the summer. The high importance which Hanoi now attaches to forcing the issue is evident from the risks and costs of the enterprise.

4. The toll on Communist forces has been considerable, even if reported casualties are greatly inflated by inclusion of low level recruits and impressed civilians. To some extent these losses have been offset by measures already taken. Heavy infiltration of both new units and replacements from the North is continuing. A strenuous, last minute recruitment effort was made prior to the Tet attacks. A significant part of the guerrilla and main forces could still be committed. And, at present, the Communists enjoy fuller access to the rural areas, where they are recruiting heavily. They will probably be able to recoup their recent losses, though at some sacrifice in quality.

5. In any case, the Communists probably will maintain their offensive for the next several months and be prepared to accept the high losses this entails. They cannot accept such losses indefinitely, however, and they probably will not be capable again of launching repeated mass attacks of the magnitude and widespread scale of 30-31 January. But they are almost certainly capable of sustaining a high level of combat, including major battles with US forces, assaults on selected cities, and rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military installations.

6. It is possible that the Communists regard the present campaign as so critical to the outcome of the war that they will commit their full resources to a maximum effort in the near term. On balance, however, we think it likely that even if their present push falls short they will wish to be able to sustain a protracted struggle. Hence they will probably not exercise their capabilities in such a profligate manner as to deny themselves the possibility of continuing the struggle should the present phase fail to produce a decisive result./2/

7. The will and capability of the GVN and its armed forces remain the keys to the eventual outcome.

8. In the main, the ARVN has acquitted itself fairly well since 30 January, though the record is uneven. Morale has held up on the whole, and we know of no unit defections. However, the ARVN is showing signs of fatigue and in many areas it has now lapsed into a static defensive posture. Security in the countryside has been sharply reduced. A long and costly effort would have to be undertaken to regain the pre-Tet position. It is highly unlikely that the ARVN will be inspired enough or strong enough to make such an effort--certainly not in the near future.

9. The GVN also performed adequately in the immediate emergency, particularly in the Saigon area. There now appears to be a greater recognition of the need to push forward with additional measures, but the Communist challenge has not yet proved a catalyst in stimulating an urgent sense of national unity and purpose.

10. The overall position of the government has been weakened. Its prestige has suffered from the shock of the Tet offensive; its control over the countryside has been greatly reduced. Popular attitudes are confused and contradictory; the Viet Cong received virtually no popular support, but neither was there a rallying to the government side. Passivity is likely to continue as the dominant attitude in most of the population, but further military defeats could cause a sudden swing away from the government. While the central authority in Saigon is unlikely to collapse, its ability to provide energetic leadership throughout the country and all levels is in serious doubt. It is possible that over the next few months certain provinces, especially in I and IV Corps, will be lost to Saigon's effective authority.

11. The psychological factor is now critical for South Vietnam's whole political-military apparatus. The widespread rumors that the US conspired with the Communists are symptomatic of popular anxieties over the future course of the war and US attitudes toward a political settlement. As yet, however, there are no signs of a crisis of confidence within the government.

12. If major military reverses occur, the political and military apparatus could degenerate into general ineffectualness. If, on the other hand, US and ARVN regain the initiative and inflict some conspicuous setbacks on the Communists and the general offensive appears to be contained, then the GVN might manifest new energy and confidence and draw new support to itself. On balance, we judge that the chances are no better than even that the GVN/ARVN will emerge from the present phase without being still further weakened.

13. We believe that the Communists will sustain a high level of military activity for at least the next two or three months. It is difficult to forecast the situation which will then obtain, given the number of unknowable factors which will figure. Our best estimate is as follows:

a. The least likely outcome of the present phase is that the Communist side will expend its resources to such an extent as to be incapable thereafter of preventing steady advances by the US/GVN.

b. Also unlikely, though considerably less so, is that the GVN/ARVN will be so critically weakened that it can play no further significant part in the military and political prosecution of the struggle.

c. More likely than either of the above is that the present push will be generally contained, but with severe losses to both the GVN and Communist forces, and that a period will set in during which neither will be capable of registering decisive gains.

For the Board of National Estimates:
Abbot Smith

Washington, February 27, 1968, 0332Z.

120937. Ref: Rome 4418, 4419, 4422, 4429, 4440, 4441./2/ From Harriman for Davidson.

1. The full reports of your conversations with Fanfani and d'Orlandi have been most useful in evaluating this North Vietnamese approach. On the basis of what the Italians have told you about the substance and background of these conversations, and particularly in the light of the serious attitude the Italians have taken, we agree that we should give a constructive response to the proposal that d'Orlandi make another visit to Prague as suggested by Ambassador Su. We certainly do not wish to give the Italians the impression we are being negative on following up any possible opening; and, in any event, it would be useful to obtain further insight on just how seriously the North Vietnamese really do view the Italian channel (we have doubts on this score).

2. However, under existing circumstances it would be unwise to suggest any new formulations (as you propose para 4 Rome 4419)/3/ which might give Hanoi the idea that we were weakening on the San Antonio position.

3. In view of the above, it would seem well to keep the Italian channel open for possible future use rather than to pursue it actively at the present time.

4. You should therefore convey the following to Fanfani and d'Orlandi:

(a) Express our great appreciation for their (particularly Fanfani's) efforts and attention they have given to these problems, as well as for the information and background that Fanfani's conversations with North Vietnamese representatives have developed. Secretary Rusk is personally most grateful for Fanfani's interest and effort in this matter.

(b) You should explain to Fanfani that Hanoi has made a number of different approaches to other interested governments since the Tet offensive although they are of more recent date and none of these has been as skillfully and knowledgeably handled as that made through Fanfani. However, it appears to us that Hanoi is undertaking a combined diplomatic and propaganda offensive rather than showing a serious intention to negotiate in good faith at the moment. It would be useful for the Italians to try to discover whether the North Vietnamese look upon contacts with the Italians as expressing a serious negotiating position or as part of a rather widespread exercise to impress a variety of governments.

(c) As you suggest in Reftel 4441, it appears useful for d'Orlandi to visit Prague in order to tell Su:

1) His statements have been communicated to the US and after careful analysis did not seem to US Government to be any more forthcoming than public statements of Hanoi. If Hanoi has any intention of conveying anything new, Su should be requested to point it out.

2) D'Orlandi might on his own responsibility explore with Su anything that Su could suggest which would be more definite on timing and particularly any statements Hanoi would be willing to make as to their intentions relating to the military problem of "no advantage." D'Orlandi may draw on explanations you have provided him as to meaning of San Antonio formula./4/ FYI We have been informed by French and through U Thant on information he received from French that negotiations would start immediately if we announced publicly unconditional cessation of bombing and other acts of war against NVN./5/ Therefore there is no value in making an issue of this point through Su. End FYI.

3) In addition, d'Orlandi might wish to point out to Su that since Hanoi had rejected San Antonio formula, Americans had asked number of questions. For example, does this mean that Hanoi feels free to move men and supplies to the South as they did during the Tet truce last year? Would Hanoi feel free to move troops to the DMZ area in positions to attack US forces south of the DMZ? Would Hanoi consider it has the right to intensify artillery and other fire across the DMZ into US positions in South Viet-Nam?

5. If the Italians express disappointment at the lack of detail in this message, please tell them that we are understandably cautious because of the major military operations now in progress or being planned by North Viet-Nam in the DMZ and the Laos Panhandle. We cannot ignore Hanoi's actions on the ground in interpreting what Hanoi's intentions may be.

6. We agree Davidson should remain in Rome to debrief d'Orlandi immediately following his return (Rome 4421)./6/

Rusk

Saigon, February 27, 1968.

SUBJECT
Evaluation of Tet Offensive

As desired by you, the Senior Liaison Office submits herein its spot evaluation of the enemy's Tet offensive. It contains both my personal opinion and also the opinions of the members of my staff (David Hudson, Calvin Mehlert and Charles Sweet). It's our first total attempt at sorting out and considering the lump sum of what we've seen in the Saigon-Cholon area, what we've read in reports, and what we've heard from a wide variety of Vietnamese and other contacts. Here, then, is our evaluation:

The enemy adopted the meanest attribute of the "Year of the Monkey," that of vicious trickery, to change the nature of the war in Viet Nam at the start of the lunar year. It will mark how the war is waged from now on. The high cost of the enemy was not vital to him. It could be made vital, if there were retribution from an aroused Vietnamese population who were led with more spark and spunk than the present Neville Chamberlain style of Vietnamese leadership. As it is, the enemy has the initiative in this war a month after Tet. Today, too many Vietnamese civilians and soldiers have a sinking feeling in their guts that the enemy is going to outwit us with this initiative. It will take some tough political and psychological judo on top of military muscle to throw down the enemy. There are initial thoughts about this at the end of the paper.

As a starting point, it would be useful to keep in mind the look of things in the enemy's "target area" before the attack. The enemy's immediate target was urban/suburban South Viet Nam, where the bulk of the people supporting the GVN live. On the eve of Tet, this target area presented a picture with many encouraging overtones. Although it also had less pleasing undertones, such as the threat of a full-scale invasion from the North and the debilitating effect of official GVN corruption, these had been identified as problems and pertinent solutions were being tackled.

There was a fledgling Constitutional Government, elected by the people, learning to behave as an administrative-executive-legislative team; it had plans for progress and reform after Tet. There were more than a million and a quarter men under arms, including some 700,000 Vietnamese backed up by U.S. and Allied forces; RVNAF in many places had pushed out actively into the countryside after the smaller enemy, killing him at a high ratio, fighting him further and further away from cities and towns. There was an energetic, nation-wide "pacification" campaign to win back the countryside, with a heavy infusion of U.S. managerial techniques and with Americans to oversee the use of these techniques at every Vietnamese echelon. There was a stirring among the Vietnamese political elements towards the broadening of alliances, towards getting better roots among the people, as moves towards the founding of new political parties. The people of the population centers had a new feeling of more security; there was more safety from the terror of the enemy and there was more money to buy food and gifts for the family celebrations of Tet.

The enemy moved into this target area at Tet, with effective new military weapons, with a hard core of dedicated fighting men who evidently had top generals and political cadre amongst them to share in the dangers, and with a beguiling exposition of political aims. The symbols of moral and political/administrative strength on our side were singled out for denigration or destruction. Thus, the U.S. Embassy, the Presidential Palace, the JGS compound, the Hue Citadel, most provincial headquarters, and police stations were attacked with great vigor; churches, temples, and pagodas were occupied; leaders among the people were sought out for quick murder or kidnapping. Enemy troops fought hard, notably so. Enemy troops behaved as good comrades towards the people, again notably so. Their new weapons were effective against our armor, once again notably so. With all of this, there was attractive political talk of the war soon ending, of the Americans making a deal and leaving Viet Nam to the Vietnamese, of the forming of a new government by the people.

The enemy who came into the cities and fought openly has been crushed militarily, with great loss of life to him, to our military, and to civilians, along with much destruction of public and private property. The physical wounds of the enemy's Tet offensive are being healed through a relief and recovery program which could ease the memory of them to a large extent within this year. The psychological wounds of the enemy's Tet offensive are different, deeper, more dangerous. If too little is done too late, the psychological wounds can fester and be fatal for us. The Tet offensive demonstrated that the enemy is still waging "people's war." He got in among the majority of the people on our side this time. Although he failed in his proclaimed objective of getting the people to rise up against the GVN and the Americans, the enemy has shaken the faith of the people in the ultimate success of our side. An enemy as skilled as this one in the manipulation of mass opinions can be expected to keep up the attack at a point he can recognize as being vulnerable.

One psychological fuse was lit during Tet that might bring a delayed explosion. It deserves attention. Both Vietnamese and American combat forces fought the enemy right out in plain view of hundreds of thousands of articulate city dwellers, the "home folks," instead of far off in the remote countryside or jungle. The Vietnamese home folks not only saw the brutal face of war up close, they also saw RVNAF in a harsh comparison with both Americans and the enemy. The comparison could become invidious, since RVNAF did not always show up well. From some of the emotional outbursts of civilian and military "young Turks" since then, it can be deduced that there is some feeling of shame among them. If reaction to this shame or "loss of face" is improperly channeled, it could turn into a virulent type of anti-Americanism as people acknowledge the obvious fact that the country would have been lost to the enemy if it weren't for American actions. The "young Turks" must be given a good way of "gaining face" again, fast.

When attempting to assess results of the enemy Tet offensive, we should ask what objectives the Communist leaders sought to attain. They told their combatants that people in urban areas would rise up against the government, that ARVN units would defect, and that "revolutionary" committees would be able to take over the administration in many cities. They also told their shock forces that reinforcements would arrive after the first period of battle.

The people and ARVN failed to respond to the Communist appeal, reinforcements failed to appear, and the cities remain under GVN control. Furthermore, the enemy took serious losses. On the surface, it would appear the Communists failed and that, on balance, their offensive resulted in a stronger position for the GVN.

However, it is likely that the Communists, while hoping to attain the larger goals, knew that the chance for success was uncertain, and had other, longer-range, goals in mind, such as:

--striking fear into the hearts of the urban population by demonstrating the inability of the government to provide adequate security.

--terrorizing and demoralizing government civil and military personnel, and their families, the bulk of whom live in urban areas.

--exacerbating existing tensions among top GVN leaders by confronting them with a major crisis, which caused them to view one another in frustration, anxiety, and fear.

--straining American/Vietnamese relations for the same reasons as above, and for others, i.e., seeking to portray the images that U.S. firepower destroyed the Vietnamese cities; that Americans in Viet Nam still live affluently while their Vietnamese allies are without homes, food, etc.

--increasing pressure on the U.S. at home and abroad to withdraw, by seeking to demonstrate the hopelessness of victory and the immorality of our cause (for example, the image of U.S. firepower destroying friendly Vietnamese cities).

--forcing the government to abandon its efforts to expand its areas of authority in the countryside (i.e., the RD program) by compelling it to concentrate on urban defense and recovery; or, alternatively, forcing the government to spread its resources so thinly that it is unable to do anything effective anywhere.

The urban population, at least in Saigon-Cholon, is still somewhat fearful, unsure of the ability of the GVN to face repeated armed challenges in the cities. (For example, on the night of February 24, more than three weeks after the opening of the Tet offensive, VC were reported calling at the homes of people on Ly Nam De Street, District 5, asking for food. The people had no alternative but to provide food since there was no police protection on the streets after dark. Many people in Cholon believe stories that the VC have been cutting off the hands of persons who work for Americans.)

The excessive burden of the demands created by the offensive has further weakened the GVN executive branch which was already plagued by diffusion of power and internal political conflicts. The full powers required for handling the emergency were not invested in the Central Relief Committee nor were they effectively assumed by the President, causing considerable tension within the GVN as a result of its inability to act decisively in a critical period.

Destruction resulting from U.S./GVN bombing and artillery firepower has created some deep resentment against the U.S. and Vietnamese governments, particularly in the refugee camps where Viet Cong agitators are at work. Viet Cong atrocities have created mostly fear but not wide-spread antagonism, except in families which suffered personal losses. Viet Cong propaganda still seems to have more credibility with the people, on this point, than does the information campaign on our side. This can still be reversed, but time is running out.

The Viet Cong have sown the seeds of suspicion and distrust. The rumor of U.S./Viet Cong collusion in the attack is still alive, still talked about among the people. The allegations of Communist infiltration into private organizations, and collaboration by certain individuals with the Viet Cong, have also generated suspicions and have led the government to be overly cautious and at times suppressive in their dealings with private individuals and associations. (The arrest of CVT labor leaders at the moment they were generating an anti-Communist drive hurt our side, helped the enemy cause.)

Public criticism of U.S. policy in Viet Nam has intensified in the U.S. and elsewhere abroad.

GVN resources have necessarily been spread more thinly. In many areas of the countryside, RD teams and RVNAF units have been drawn back into more urban locations, inviting VC takeover of areas formerly under GVN control.

The government's response, beyond defending and restoring security in the urban areas, centered on the formation of the People's Relief Committee headed by Vice President Ky. This Committee performed commendably in coordinating and expediting the emergency welfare relief measures of the involved GVN and U.S. agencies, including such action as:

a. the re-supplying of Saigon and the shipping of emergency relief goods to the provinces;

b. the distribution of rice and food to the refugees and public and the re-opening of rice retail shops with strict government price controls;

c. the protection and repair of public utilities, allowing services to continue throughout the emergency;

d. the resettling and registering of the 150,000 Saigon refugees;

e. the intensification of the government's psychological operation by giving each refugee camp a radio and television, improving the news coverage on radio, and assisting 15 daily newspapers to begin publication;

f. the soliciting of funds, supplies, blood and labor from Vietnamese private organizations and individuals and third countries;

g. the gradual lifting of restrictions and extension of the blue (secure) areas in Saigon;

h. the collection and burning of garbage; and

i. the deployment of inspection teams to the provinces and establishment of a system for culling all pertinent data for Saigon and provinces.

Additionally, the imaginative action of assigning 2,500 RD cadre from Vung Tau to work in Saigon, the noteworthy performances of the Ministry of Health and the City Sanitation and Fire Departments throughout the entire emergency; and the visits of GVN officials to stricken areas brought definite political/psychological gains to the government.

Both Houses in the National Assembly became actively engaged in the relief effort. Initially, each House sent representatives to attend the meetings of the Central Relief Committee. Senators and Lower House Deputies also inspected refugee camps and damaged areas in Saigon and the provinces; Lower House Deputies unable to return to Saigon assisted the provincial officials in the initial relief efforts. Both Houses have issued communiques supporting the government's emergency relief efforts and have requested assistance for the victims from national legislatures of other countries.

Despite these positive actions, the GVN so far has been unable to capitalize on the opportunity the Tet offensive presented and emerge in a stronger position. Perhaps the principal reason for this is the excessive diffusion of executive and political power which is largely the result of the continuing rivalry between the Thieu and Ky camps. As a result, there has been no clear central point of executive and political leadership during the emergency. Because of this key executive decisions have been delayed or not made, particularly those involving joint civil/military considerations (for example, the curfew), and a trend has developed toward creation of two rival political Fronts.

The enemy's biggest "calculated risk" in the Tet offensive was on how the people in the GVN centers would respond to him. True, the enemy asked for public uprising against the GVN and the Americans, which he failed to create. This was a tactical loss to him. The enemy's strategy still will aim for creating an eventual surge of popular support for his cause against ours in the urban/suburban population centers of Viet Nam. The enemy undoubtedly has this aspect of his Tet offensive under intense study right now.

The Communists must make sure that the people's reactions to their Tet violence do not crystallize into a purposeful hatred directed in an effective way against them. The enemy made this mistake against the Catholics and the Hoa Hao years ago. He risked doing it again with other large groups of Vietnamese, by his Tet attack. However, he seems to be getting away with it, although the final psychological effects are still not firm. The emotional flag-raising at the recaptured Citadel in Hue, witnessed by so many thousands of teary-eyed residents, may well spark the nation-wide tide against him that the enemy fears. However, there was no similar polarizing event in which the people could participate in Saigon or other centers. The Hue ceremony could remain an isolated incident instead of becoming the focal rallying point (such as "Remember the Alamo," "Remember the Maine," "Remember Pearl Harbor").

The initial response of the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh population to the Tet offensive was disbelief--some even thought a coup was in process. As the critical nature of the situation became clear, concern for personal safety prevailed. The people soon started to wonder why their government could not protect them; stories of American and Viet Cong collusion in the offensive were widely spread and believed. As fear grew, there was a reluctance on the part of refugees and even volunteers from private associations to become too closely associated with the government although this feeling has now been reduced. On balance, although the people have appreciated the government's efforts to help them, there has also been a tendency out of fear for the urban population to assume a more moral neutral stance.

Political personalities, ARVN officers, civil servants, Northern Catholics, and other strongly anti-Communist groups also reacted initially with fear, for they would lose the most in a Viet Cong takeover; also, for the first time, the war was brought to their doorsteps. As the shock wore off, however, many of the elements came to believe that this may be the last opportunity for "all nationalists to unite and save the nation."

At the moment, many of the people in the capital--and possibly the same is true elsewhere--feel isolated into just their own family groups. Each family is an "island," separated apart from neighbors, the community, the government. In case of another enemy attack, individuals will feel highly vulnerable, their main recourse to comfort or safety being only within the immediate family. Much of this has been caused by the attitude and behavior of the police. Although the securing of Saigon-Cholon owes a big debt to the energy and resourcefulness of General Loan, he also portrayed the image of an emotionally unstable, suspicious, vindictive, and willful person. This image has rubbed off on the forces he commands, further tarnishing their reputation for corrupt venality and saving their own hides in time of trouble. Unless this image is changed, unless there is created some bond of trust and understanding between police and people, we will be leaving a grievous chink in our armor for the enemy to exploit.

The enemy's Tet offensive demonstrated once again the ability of Communist leaders to make a hard strategic decision, marshal their resources in an extremely disciplined way, and deal us a hard blow. At present our strategy is less clear and our resources are not being used in as concerted and disciplined a fashion as the enemy's at least in the political sphere.

If we are to achieve our goal of having a strong, popularly-supported constitutional government and armed forces in South Viet Nam, we must make some hard political decisions now and carry them out with teamwork, skill and discipline of our own.

Specifically, I believe we must do the following:

(1) Help Nguyen van Thieu rapidly become a strong President, under the Constitution. This action has two closely-related facets: helping him develop his own capabilities as the elected leader of his country; and helping him acquire full powers delegated to the President under the Constitution. At present, he has far too little authority over the key elements of the executive branch, i.e., the cabinet, province chiefs, the police and the armed forces. Rapid emergence of Thieu as a strong President with full authority is the first, and absolutely essential step, toward creation of a GVN that works, that can really get things done, which is not the case today. Under a strong President, firm chains of command could be established in both the civil service and armed forces. Until this is achieved, however, the GVN can only muddle along in seeking to carry out critical programs, since the governmental mechanism for effective execution does not exist. We can no longer tolerate a two-headed, Siamese-twin central government with four separate "governments" between it and the people. Thieu and Ky, and their entourages, for many reasons, can never really work together to the extent required, and we should not delude ourselves that they can.

(2) To assist Thieu, as discussed above, far more concerted U.S. political action is needed. As an immediate step, a small political working group should be established under your personal direction, composed of Arch Calhoun, Lew Lapham, a personal representative of General Westmoreland (such as Colonel John Hayes), General Forsythe and myself.

(3) While helping Thieu consolidate presidential power under the Constitution, other critical actions should be taken to create a political base which would complement and reinforce establishment of a strong executive/administrative base. Immediate actions to create a political base include:

a. Real enforcement of the order recently issued by General Cao van Vien that looting by RVNAF personnel will result in summary court-martial, and execution, if warranted. This order should include, if it does not already, squarely placing responsibility for troop conduct on unit commanders. Another general order should be issued, and backed up, stating that every officer and soldier has two duties of equal importance--to destroy the enemy, and to defend and help the people--and that any misconduct toward the people will result in severe punishment. (This is a critical political action because the armed forces, along with the police and RD cadre, remain the principal link between the government and the people.)

b. Acts of political leadership, starting with Thieu, but also by all nationalist leaders, within and without the government, which will create out of the emotions aroused by the Tet offensive, a new spirit of unity, sacrifice, pride and hope among Vietnamese nationalists. Full support by Thieu for the "People's Congress," as a single, united popular Front for emergency purposes, is one such leadership act critically needed now.

c. Create psychological polarity to focus the people's emotions against the enemy as a beast who must be stopped. This can be done through a concerted campaign built around the battle-cry of "Remember Hue!". This requires a continuing revelation of information about what the enemy did to unarmed civilians and to cherished national heritages in Hue, through media that will spread these stories to the widest extent possible, over and over again. One such medium is the Vietnamese ballad; a song is needed, to be sung throughout the country, carried there by VIS, RD cadre, and student choral groups. "Remember Hue!" can be the theme of an address to the nation by President Thieu, of manifestos and speeches by patriots in the new "Fronts." "Remember Hue!" can be included in general orders of RVNAF, used by troops in counter-offensive operations. "Remember Hue!" can be imprinted with postal cancellation marks on all mail in Viet Nam. We must beat the Communists to the punch, before they use "Remember Hue!" first.

d. Help put a stop to indiscriminate expressions of Sinophobia among the Vietnamese in urban centers, particularly Saigon-Cholon. You and the rest of us in the U.S. Mission can make a point of this when talking with Vietnamese leaders. President Thieu can be urged to meet with responsible and respected leaders of the Chinese-ancestry "congregations" in Cholon, to learn what has happened to them and what they have contributed to our common cause, to get a fix on enemy activities among those of Chinese blood, and to exchange pledges of mutual teamwork in the face of national peril. Viet Nam Press can do a feature news item on the favorable actions by the Sino-Vietnamese of Cholon; there have been heroic acts, heavy donations of money, goods, and services in this crisis. We in the U.S. Mission could see that this item is picked up by the world press, that it becomes known to police and other GVN officials where we have an advisory effort. This would give fresh heart to those in Viet Nam's most crucial commercial circles, to get the nation's economy moving again.

e. Devise a feasible means of mobilizing the entire Vietnamese people into the war effort, in an organized way that will make good sense to them and gain their willing support. While this is especially needed by "young Turk" civilians and soldiers to channelize their energies and emotions into constructive channels, many others in the population are in need of having a practical, known way in which they can help against the enemy. The mobilization means and the duties assigned (which include self-defense) have a highly political import. GVN organizations, such as the Ministries of Interior, Youth, and RD, and the newly-formed "Fronts" have concepts on mobilizing the people against the enemy. The U.S. Mission needs to crystallize its own policy on this matter, to gain maximum effect of U.S. support. It is urged that this subject be given early study by the small, political working group described above.

Washington, February 27, 1968.

[PARTICIPANTS]
Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Katzenbach, Bundy, Rostow, Califano and McPherson

McN: Westmoreland wants

105,000 by 1 May

100,000 in two increments: part by 1 Sept, part by 31 Dec

Total: 205,000 men, all but 25,000 (air) in Army and Marines.

This will require a sizeable reserve call-up (minimum 150,000) as well as increased draft. In total, an increase in uniformed strength of 400,000.

In expenditures, at least $10 billion extra in FY 1964. With auto-matic $5 billion in FY 1970, this will put FY 1970 DOD budget at $15 billion above current FY 1969 figure.

Alternatives for President's speech and program:

1) Go with full 205,000. Ask for present surtax request plus additional taxes. Announce economic program (possibly controls on interest, production controls, etc.).

2) Go with full 205,000, economic program, and announce new peace offensive.

Rusk: Basis for peace in Southeast Asia: ending of Communist assaults in Laos, Thailand; we will stop bombing North of 20th parallel if NVN withdraws from Quang Tri province; or stop altogether in that event; or other specific proposal.

McPherson: This is unbelievable and futile.

3) Status quo on forces, with a change in strategy. End US commitment to defend every province and district capital. Protect essential areas. Fight enemy wherever he fights; end search and destroy.

4) (Clifford) Another possibility that should be considered--and I am not pushing it--is announcement that we intend to put in 500,000 to million men.

McN: That has virtue of clarity. Obviously we would have decided to put in enough men to accomplish the job. That and status quo both have the virtue of clarity. I do not understand what the strategy is in putting in 205,000 men. It is neither enough to do the job, nor an indication that our role must change.

5) (Bundy) We must also prepare for the worst. SVN is very weak. Our position may be truly untenable. Contingency planning should proceed toward possibility that we will withdraw with best possible face and defend rest of Asia. We can say truthfully that Asia is stronger because of what we have done in past few years.

Katzenbach took call from Habib in Hawaii. Reports Habib is "less optimistic" about political situation in Saigon than he was when he went out. Reports that there is serious disagreement in American circles in Saigon over 205,000 request. Bunker has doubts about this.

Rusk: If we have to call up reserves, we should take some of our troops out of Europe. Europeans will have to put some more in for their defense.

McN: Agree, if we call 400,000.

Rusk, Rostow think enemy took beating in Tet offensive. Rostow says captured documents show enemy was disappointed, may be unable to mount heavy coordinated attack on cities. Rusk reminds that enemy took 40,000 casualties. No US units out of operation. Rostow says if we can re-inforce Westm. now, he should be able to handle situation until good weather comes to I Corps and NVN.

McN: What then? Let's not delude ourselves into thinking he cannot maintain pressure after good weather comes. (Rostow apparently had air attacks in mind.)

McN: We are dropping ordnance at a higher rate than in last year of WWII in Europe. It has not stopped him.

Bundy: SVN forces uncertain, but almost certainly not as strong as were before. Assessment due from MACV on Feb 29.

Clifford: Look at situation from point of view of American public and Vietnamese. Despite optimistic reports, our people (and world opinion) believe we have suffered a major setback. Problem is, how do we gain support for major program, defense and economic, if we have told people things are going well? How do we avoid creating feeling that we are pounding troops down rathole? What is our purpose? What is achievable? Before any decision is made, we must re-evaluate our entire posture in SVN. Unfortunately Pres. has been at ranch with hawks.

McN: Agreed. Decision must not be hasty. Will take a week at least to work out defense and economic measures, if we go big. Wheeler, Habib will meet with Secretaries Wednesday morning/2/ at breakfast with President. Decision should certainly not be announced that night.

General impression: prevailing uncertainty. Radically different proposals were offered and debated, none rejected out of hand. We are at a point of crisis. McNamara expressed grave doubts over military, economic, political, diplomatic and moral consequences of a larger force buildup in SVN.

Q[uestion] is whether these profound doubts will be presented to President./3/

Washington, February 27, 1968.

SUBJECT
Military Situation and Requirements in South Vietnam

1. I spent the better part of three days conferring with General Westmoreland, General Abrams, General Momyer and the Senior American Commanders in each of the four Corps areas. With Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland, I called on President Thieu and Vice President Ky and, with General Westmoreland, saw General Vien.

2. I have prepared a more detailed report/2/ which you may wish to see later, but the major points are outlined in this memorandum.

3. There is no doubt that the enemy launched a major powerful nation-wide assault against the Government of South Vietnam and its Armed Forces. This offensive has by no means run its course. In fact, we must accept the possibility that he has already deployed additional elements of his home army without our having detected such a move. We must be prepared to encounter enemy use of longer range missiles or rockets (Frog) and limited use of enemy tactical air. All commanders on the scene agree that his initial attack nearly succeeded in a dozen places and the margin of victory--in some places survival--was very very small indeed. Whether he intends to expend himself fully at the current level of intensity or hold out enough to fight next year is not known. However, the scope and severity of his attacks and the extent of his reinforcement are presenting us with serious and immediate problems.

4. The South Vietnamese Armed Forces performed remarkably well in most places, most elements were not hurt too seriously, and are on the road to recovering their fighting strength, but they are not yet out of the woods. On 20 February RVNAF forces had 97 effective and 58 ineffective battalions. The ineffective battalions seemed to be recovering fairly rapidly. The Regional and Popular Force situation is not yet clear. There is some question as to whether the South Vietnamese Armed Forces have the stamina to withstand the pressure of a prolonged enemy offensive. General Westmoreland has already been forced to move to their assistance in a number of important areas. Commanders are unanimous in the view that the VC would have achieved a number of significant local successes at the outset, except for timely reinforcement by US forces. At the moment there are ten US battalions operating in the outskirts of Saigon against a number of enemy regiments which have encircled the city. US forces are carrying the brunt of the action at Hue and are preparing for large scale actions in the northern two provinces, in the Highlands, and around Saigon. With respect to northern I Corps the major engagements may be at Hue and Quang Tri instead of Khe Sanh.

5. The enemy has undoubtedly been hurt, but he seems determined to pursue his offensive--apparently he has the capability to do so. There has been a substantial withdrawal of ARVN forces from the countryside in order to protect the cities and towns. Therefore, unless ARVN forces reenter the countryside quickly it may go by default. In my meetings with President Thieu, Vice President Ky and General Vien, I emphasized the need for ARVN units to move out of the cities and towns into the countryside and operate against the enemy infesting the environs. All three agreed, but they commented upon the serious effect on the urban population of a recurrence of the Tet operations. General Westmoreland is working with General Vien to implement a program whereby urban security would be turned over in a major way to Police Forces supported by small mobile military forces held in reserve to reinforce the police when they encounter enemy forces with which they can not cope. Most commanders believe that ARVN will need, or--just as importantly--think it needs, assistance from US forces for this purpose. Thus, at the very time General Westmoreland is redeploying and otherwise preparing to meet major thrusts by large NVA forces, he is forced to pick up part of the tab from ARVN. This is especially true in and around Hue, Saigon and the II and IV Corps.

6. It is the consensus of responsible commanders that 1968 will be the pivotal year. The war may go on beyond 1968 but it is unlikely that the situation will return to the pre-Tet condition. The forces committed and the tactics involved are such that the advantage will probably swing one way or the other, during the current year.

7. US forces are in good combat shape. Air support has not been significantly degraded. Increased requirements for rapid reaction by US forces has placed a premium on helicopter availability in the face of increasing battlefield losses. In-country airlift is increasingly critical. Logistical support is marginal in the northern I Corps but will improve with the opening of Hwy 1 and with temporary facilities now being built for over-the-shore supply. Equipment loss rates are up and we must review the adequacy of replacements and spare parts programs.

8. In many areas the pacification program has been brought to a halt. The VC are prowling the countryside, and it is now a question of which side moves fastest to gain control. The outcome is not at all clear. I visualize much heavy fighting ahead. Casualties will probably remain high. Equipment losses will continue at a high level. ARVN may prove to be a bit shaky under sustained pressure. The government will have enormous problems with refugees, civilian casualties, morale and recovery.

9. If the enemy synchronizes his expected major attacks with increased pressure throughout the country, General Westmoreland's margin will be paper thin. He does not have a theatre reserve. We can expect some cliff-hangers, and with bad luck on weather or some local RVNAF failures he may suffer some reverses. For these reasons he is asking for additional forces as soon as possible during this calendar year.

10. General Westmoreland wants, as a matter of urgency, a mechanized brigade consisting of one tank battalion and one mechanized battalion and one infantry battalion from the 5th Mechanized Division. He also wants an armored cavalry regiment and the remainder of the 5th Marine Division/Wing, and the acceleration of the deployment of certain supporting units now programmed for deployment under Program 5.

11. These immediately required forces, which he hopes to receive before the first of May, will permit him to deploy additional armored elements to reinforce along the DMZ and will include a capability to cope with a potential enemy armored threat. He hopes that this will permit him to disengage at least some elements of the lst Air Cavalry Division or the 101st Airborne Division for the beginnings of a theatre reserve. The additional requirement, which he considers necessary as soon as possible, but not later than 1 September 1968, includes the ROK Light Div, the remainder of the 5th Mechanized Division and associated elements. The armored elements of this force could be deployed in a mobile defense of the DMZ thus releasing the remainder of the airborne infantry or air cavalry forces for employment elsewhere as a substantial theatre reserve. This would also permit the repatriation of the brigade of the 82d Airborne Div.

12. As a matter of prudence, particularly in light of the protracted NVA buildup, General Westmoreland states a requirement during the calendar year for an additional infantry division to anticipate possible deterioration of some ARVN units, and to provide a reasonably available two-division theatre reserve at all times of the year.

13. It is my judgment that General Westmoreland requires a theatre reserve of about two divisions. The deployment of the 5th Mechanized Division, the armored cavalry regiment, and additional Marines would permit him to shake loose either the air cavalry or the airborne division as a theatre reserve. Additionally, at the onset of the good weather season in the DMZ area (from May to November), he could probably extract the other Army division to constitute an adequate reserve. If Hanoi deploys additional elements of the home army, this reserve might also be committed and additional force requirements would be generated.

14. The rough estimate of added strength required for the three force increments is:

15. The spread sheet attached sets forth the major units included in the above strength figures./3/

Earle G. Wheeler

Washington, February 28, 1968.

NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING TO DISCUSS
GENERAL WHEELER'S TRIP TO VIETNAM

ATTENDING THE MEETING
The President
The Vice President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Clark Clifford
General Taylor
Under Secretary Paul Nitze
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson

General Wheeler: This is a summary report. By later today the full report should be ready./2/

The ARVN were not as seriously hurt as some reports indicated. The ARVN were not fragmented although units fighting in Hue in some cases are down to 25% strength.

The ARVN are held up in the cities and fear a recurrence of attacks similar to the ones on the cities during Tet. They seem to be looking back over their shoulders.

General Taylor: What about communications into the hinterlands?

General Wheeler: The communications are there, particularly to the district towns. What happened in the areas outside the towns is the difficult thing. There is a lack of knowledge about some outposts.

Secretary Rusk: What's the mood of General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker?

General Wheeler: Both are concerned. Westmoreland is concerned about the military situation. Bunker is pushing the government to get on with the job.

The President: Buzz, we are very thankful that you are back and appreciative of what you are doing.

I want Dick Helms to give us a summary of the situation as he sees it today.

Director Helms: It is difficult to give a summary of the situation since we are in the middle of the battle. The Communists are in high gear. This military activity may continue 3 to 4 months. Their objective is to wreck the Government of South Vietnam and its military structure. If, in the process, they can hit the U.S. units, that is okay. But their principal objective is against the ARVN.

The allies are on the defensive. The enemy does have the initiative. The enemy still has 50% of its main forces units intact and they are now in a position to get manpower additions from the countryside.

The ARVN fought well but they have had a hard time. The net of this is that the ARVN is in worse shape today than before Tet. I am concerned about defections since the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese have treated the people in the countryside rather decently. We may have to confront the possibility of desertion.

The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese may ruin themselves if they go "flat out." I doubt that the Government of South Vietnam will collapse. It looks like there will continue to be more fighting and stand-off. I don't think it will be a decisive period for or against either side. The longer this thing is drawn out, the less likely I think negotiations are.

General Wheeler: I talked to General Westmoreland and all of the senior U.S. commanders. I also talked with Ambassador Bunker, President Thieu and Vice President Ky. There were a number of factors which surprised me. I certainly learned things I did not know before:

--The Tet attack was very powerful and nationwide.

--The enemy's prime objective was against the ARVN and the Government of Vietnam.

--The enemy also wanted to destroy our logistic base and our command and control system. They were also after our air power.

--The enemy planned on a major uprising and many defections. Our press had led the North Vietnamese to think the ARVN army was a pushover. That proved to be untrue.

--The enemy has laid land lines down the Laotian panhandle. This will permit them to operate on radio silence and give their orders through land lines. This will make it much more difficult to monitor their intelligence.

--The margin of victory was very thin in a number of battles.

--What the future intensity of the conflict will be is an unknown.

--We do know that more Tet-type attacks are planned.

--The enemy is still hanging in around the cities. They are still trying to infiltrate into Saigon.

--The ARVN performed well. There were no defections. There has been some underpar performance due to poor leadership.

--The RF and the PF carried the brunt of the fighting. Many elements of the ARVN were shot down.

--I think it will take a minimum of 3 to 4 months before the ARVN returns to its previous strength. There are 58 ineffective battalions and 97 effective battalions as of the time I left. The RF and PF situation is not entirely clear.

--The regular troops did take more casualties than the RF and PF forces.

--We believe about 40,000 enemy were killed. We cannot count the number wounded and missing.

--On the Vietnamese side, there were approximately 12,000 KIA's and wounded.

The President: What you are saying is that the ARVN has been seriously hurt?

General Wheeler: Out of 140-150 battalions, 58 are ineffective due to losses of one type or another.

General Taylor: Are all back from Tet?

General Wheeler: A number are back but we still do not know.

Paul Nitze: When ARVN units fall below 60% of full strength, they then call them ineffective. This suggests that a lot of men disappeared who are neither missing, or wounded, or killed in action.

General Wheeler: I have here a paper which was written on 31 January by the Military Affairs Committee and the Current Affairs Committee of the Liberation Army./3/ We believe this document to be authentic.

In it the Viet Cong say their principal objectives were: a general offensive to destroy the ARVN, an effort to neutralize military and political support and to generate a general uprising.

They failed to get an uprising. There was no ARVN desertions. They did not capture the military targets they set out to capture. In many cases their attacks were ill-timed and ill-coordinated.

The document continues to say that they have problems with morale, with personnel, and need to continue the general offensive. They recommend pressing on with actions. They want to concentrate on our forces and take the "must win" areas like Saigon and Hue.

They told the units to avoid attacks on U.S. forces because of the heavy casualties that would result. They postponed their "victory day" 3 to 4 months. They told their forces to continue to attack their bases and harbors and to destroy the Vietnamese units and do everything they could to cause defections.

There is a major problem with the ARVN withdrawing to the cities and towns. They are worried about the security in the urban areas. I pointed this out to Thieu and Ky and told them that they are letting the countryside go by default.

Thieu and Ky recognized the danger in this and both of them said "we are faced with a dilemma." They said that they cannot afford to have another Tet offensive in Saigon and in other towns.

The government is most worried about maintaining the support of the people.

There are these other observations:

--Pacification is at a halt.

--The Viet Cong cannot roam at will in the countryside.

--The worse situation on pacification is in I Corps north. The next worse is in I Corps south. The best pacification now is in II Corps.

--None of the pacification programs is satisfactory to us. Bob Komer said the situation was not satisfactory anywhere.

--As to our own forces, they are in good shape. The Air Force was not significantly degraded by the attacks. There has been an increase in helicopter losses, but there are more helicopters in Vietnam today than there were before Tet.

The equipment loss rate is up in all categories.

--Westmoreland is working to open Highway 1 in I Corps.

The President: Did we ever do anything about getting civilian contractors into these areas to build some of these bridges and other projects?

Secretary McNamara: We are going to increase the work being done by these contractors.

General Wheeler: I asked about this. General Westmoreland said they can employ productively about 25,000 civilians.

The President: Use them to the maximum. This might save us from sending more troops from here.

General Wheeler: The construction engineers told me they have plenty of activities to keep the contractors busy.

The President: Be sure it is done.

General Wheeler: 1968 will be a critical year in the war. There is heavy fighting ahead. The losses will be high in men. The losses will be high in equipment.

The question is, can the ARVN withstand another wave of attacks. The government has many problems, among them are the refugees, many civilian casualties and the continuing problem of morale.

The military situation is this: General Westmoreland must have a sufficient force in I Corps to hold securely those two northern provinces.

The enemy still has several courses of action open. They could attack Khesanh. They could leave a holding force around Khesanh and move south to attack Quang Tri and Hue. They could attack Danang. He does have the tactical flexibility. We know he is building a road in northern provinces to use for tanks and artillery. In short, General Westmoreland has no theater reserves. He has been stripped of his reserves.

He needs reserve forces for three reasons:

1. To repulse any enemy invasion.

2. To destroy the enemy forces and their bases.

3. To exploit enemy defeats.

It is my judgment, and the judgment of General Westmoreland, that we must move into the Delta to catalyze the ARVN into action. The margin of victory was very thin in many of the battles over the Tet. The margin between defeat and victory in many areas was surprisingly narrow. In the Delta three battalions of U.S. troops were sent to help the ARVN. If it had not been for these battalions, several key province towns could have been overrun.

The second surprise I had was that we came very close to losing Tan Son Nhut Air Base. It was touch and go there. This attack was blocked by battalions coming in and hitting the enemy from the rear. It was close. Around Danang, we had another close call. We had to put people down by chopper and then move them to catch the enemy second North Vietnam Division. It was close there too.

General Westmoreland said he was thankful for the troops which had been sent. He said they had a good effect on the ARVN and on the people.

The President: Are all of them there now?

General Wheeler: All are due there today.

The President: How long will it be before they are ready?

General Wheeler: The 82nd should be ready now. The Marine units should be ready in a few days.

Westmoreland handled this bad situation well because of three things:

1. Mobility

2. Fire power

3. Flexibility in command.

As you can see from the attached table (see attachment)/4/ General Westmoreland has asked for three packages.

By 1 May he wants a brigade of the 5th mechanized division; 1 armed cavalry regiment; 3 artillery battalions; 4 engineer battalions; other elements of the 5th Marine division; a Marine air wing and other units.

General Westmoreland wants more armor for where there is a threat the armored cavalry regiment is good for opening and securing roads.

If the President approves this, we propose a Four Structured Planning Meeting at Honolulu with representatives of the Joint Chiefs, General Westmoreland and the service secretaries to go over these requests and get the exact details ironed out.

The President: What are the alternatives?

General Wheeler: The only alternative to this, in our judgment, is a decision to be prepared to give up areas in lieu of more troops. Without the reserve, we should be prepared to give up the 2 northern provinces of South Vietnam. This, of course, would be a political hazard. It also would give the North Vietnamese a strong position for negotiating. It would, I believe, cause the collapse of the ARVN.

The President: What about those 65,000 troops the ARVN was supposed to provide?

General Wheeler: You will get them. They have begun steps to draft 18 and 19 year olds. They are recalling men to active duty who haven't served 5 years. President Thieu assured me we would get more than 65,000 if they could be absorbed and supported by the U.S. Government.

General Westmoreland thinks they can go above 65,000 this year. General Westmoreland wants them to concentrate on mobilizing their army, since the ARVN are frequently outgunned by the enemy. This is one reason why they are reluctant in some cases to fight.

The President: How is the recruitment of enemy coming?

General Wheeler: This is a matter of conjecture. We do know that they have brought their forces up by at least 3,000 men.

Prior to Tet they had approximately 225,000 troops of all types. By infiltration, recruitment and other steps, they were able to get this number up to 240,000 by the time of Tet. We estimate they lost 40,000 killed; 5,000 disabled; and 3,000 prisoners of war who are military types. This totals about 48,000 enemy out of action. We now estimate that they have approximately 200,000 effective fighting units.

(At 9:35 the meeting moved to the Sitting Room.)

General Wheeler: There were several North Vietnamese divisions which were relatively untouched including the 9th and the 5th. On the border, the first NVA division was relatively untouched. They back-stopped main force VC units. I think the two divisions around Khesanh have taken a good shellacking.

Director Helms: I worry about those figures on casualties and enemy strength being used. I am not sure how accurate they are.

General Wheeler: They are the best we have.

Secretary Rusk: What is General Westmoreland's strategy? What are his priorities? Is he tied to the towns?

General Wheeler: He feels he must have sufficient forces to hold.

General Taylor: Can he do it with these reserves (referring to the 200,000 requested).

General Wheeler: Yes, I believe so unless the enemy ups the ante.

The President: Are we adequately prepared for Khesanh?

General Wheeler: Yes, sir.

The President: Do you think that it will be there (Khesanh) or elsewhere?

General Wheeler: We do not know. We know that we have about 5900 men at Khesanh with a Vietnamese ranger battalion. These units are heavily supported by air and artillery. We are pouring in air.

The price the enemy would have to pay would be a very high one if they were to try to take Khesanh. General Westmoreland does not believe they can take it.

We have been bombing the enemy very heavily outside of Khesanh. They are being pushed severely. Just this week we hit an ammo dump and set off 4-1/2 hours of secondary explosions.

Westmoreland thinks the enemy can attack Khesanh or move south toward Hue and Quang Tri.

The President: How far is that?

General Wheeler: About 60 miles. The enemy could leave a holding force in the area.

The President: As I understand it, they have 40,000 to 50,000 men in a 40 mile area. We have 5000 men in Khesanh. We would bring in by plane or by road the necessary reinforcements if this position were attacked. Is it possible that the enemy has moved in more troops?

General Wheeler: Yes, Sir, it is possible that he could have moved in more troops. We ran into 3 tanks and we know that the enemy has a brigade of paratroopers. While we are on that we need CIA to give us some good photo reconnaissance of downtown Hanoi and the production centers. In addition, one prisoner of war said he saw 20 tracked vehicles with what appeared to be Frog missiles on them. In short, the enemy could show up with more forces in the south than they have shown before.

The President: What about our taking the initiative ourselves? Is there anything we can do other than just sitting and waiting for them to attack?

General Wheeler: As far as new bombing efforts there is nothing new in the cards. We could plan an amphibious operation in the north, but we do not have the capacity to do it at this time.

Secretary Rusk: I think the President is talking about new initiatives in I Corps moving our units to attack rather than being on the defensive.

General Wheeler: Well, the 1st Cavalry Division is engaged in offensive actions against the enemy.

The President: It seems to me for months we have been waiting for them to move. They may be recouping and replacing their losses during this time. Does he plan any surprise moves of his own?

General Wheeler: He plans to move along the road and clear it. In addition, he is sending out patrols on foot to locate the enemy and get prisoners and move against them when possible.

The President: So he really has no initiative of his own other than to interrupt their road building and to patrol.

General Wheeler: No, except the 1st Division is engaged against the enemy at Hue.

The President: We may get some dazzling and shocking surprises. Perhaps we have overbuilt Khesanh. It looks like the enemy can pick and choose his own time and place. Does Westmoreland have any plans to attack them? I am not questioning his strategy. I am just trying to find out what the situation really is. As I understand it, he is prepared to move with other forces to attack the enemy if they attack Khesanh. Also he is prepared to move against anything coming down into the south. If they move across the DMZ, he will counter-attack.

How many men are programmed for him?

General Wheeler: 517,000 in the next 90 days. These are part of the Program 5 package.

The President: What do you have available to send to him in the next 60 days?

General Wheeler: We have not had a chance to go over this thoroughly.

Secretary McNamara: General Westmoreland has asked for 105,000 additional men by May 1. He has asked us to do it in 60 days, but I don't think we can do it in less than 90 to 120 days.

The President: Where will these troops come from?

Secretary McNamara: They will come in two increments resulting from a call up in reserve forces. There would be two call ups in the Army, the first for 90,000 and the second for 70,000. There would be about 50 to 60 thousand Marines called and about 20,000 Navy and Air Force. This would total about 250,000 in reserve call up. In addition, we would need to extend tours up to 6 months and increase the draft call in May.

The President: Then we would call up the reserves and extend enlistments up to 6 months.

Secretary McNamara: Yes, we would ask for an extension of enlistments for 6 months for a period of authority extending for 8 months from now. No single man would stay in longer than 6 months, but the need for this authority may extend for the next 8 months.

As I see this total program, it would add 2-1/2 billion dollars to the 1968 budget. It would increase the 1969 budget by $10 billion. It would increase the 1970 budget by about $15 billion.

Of course, we would have to expand production of helicopters, ordnance, air power, and ground support equipment.

The President: How is the M-16 production coming? Colt is working 3 shifts now on a 5 day a week basis. There will be a second source coming in. We get production of about 29,000 rifles now and expect this to be up to 40,000 by the end of the year. A total of 683,000 M-16's have been produced so far.

In addition, we would open several new camps. There would be a need to open Camp Chaffee in Arkansas and Pickett Hill in Virginia. In addition, we would open Camp Roberts in California and Indiantown Gap in Pennsylvania.

The President: Could you handle all of the equipment and supplies for all of these bases?

Secretary McNamara: Yes, the Marine units could be ready in 8 weeks. The Army units could be ready in 12 to 16 weeks. We would immediately call 57,000 Marines and 90,000 Army. At the time of the announcement we would also say that this would be followed by an additional 70,000.

The President: What type of men are these that would be called?

Secretary McNamara: They are of three types:

1. World War II and Korean veterans.

2. Men who have already fulfilled two years of active service and are now in the active reserves.

3. Men who have 6 months training and have had less active service.

There will be lots of griping but I don't think the problem will be serious.

The President: What problems are there now?/5/

Washington, February 28, 1968, 6:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

I sent the attached draft memorandum to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Clifford.

At the end of a quite fruitful discussion of more than 3 hours,/2/ Sec. McNamara recommended (and Mr. Clifford concurred) holding this directive until the first draft reports are available on Saturday./3/ We would then, when the materials were in, present a directive to you.

On the other hand, if you wish to have a directive like the attached completed earlier, this could be arranged.

I will not attempt to summarize the discussion which involved many points of view and touched on a wide range of issues. Aside from differences on the troop issue, with which you are familiar, these were some of the points that seemed to be agreed:

--From our point of view--and the Communist point of view--1968 is the "year of decision" in Vietnam. Not that the war will necessarily end this year, but its outcome will be foreshadowed by the events of this year.

--Whatever we do about troops, a maximum effort must be made to get the best conceivable performance from the GVN and the ARVN. In this connection, we may wish to nail down and include in any budgetary proposals a mobilization effort in Vietnam going beyond the 65,000.

--We must come to grips in our own mind with the terms of an acceptable negotiation and begin to talk in a mature way with the GVN about what we would regard as an acceptable outcome.

--Whatever the decision on troops, we may wish to give Westy a new, more precise and updated directive, stating the objectives which we aim to achieve.

--Joe Fowler made the following points:

--What is required on both the military and financial side is an Act of National Will.

--He would regard the increase in the military budget as a "not unmixed evil" since he believes a tax bill will then move, although probably at the expense of further reductions in civilian expenditures.

--Our presentation should not merely include Vietnam but the need to make our military credibility more clear in Korea, Middle East, and elsewhere, since he believes that the Communists, together or separately, are probing at us in a number of directions.

--At the end Clark Clifford gave assignments under each of the headings in this draft directive, which are to be completed by Saturday. The committee that met this afternoon will then work over the week end on a statement of alternatives and on its recommendations.

--We underlined, at the close of the meeting, once again the extreme requirement for security.

Walt

Washington, February 28, 1968.

As I indicated at breakfast this morning,/5/ I wish you to develop by Monday morning, March 4, recommendations in response to the situation presented to us by General Wheeler and his preliminary proposals.

I wish alternatives examined and, if possible, agreed recommendations to emerge which reconcile the military, diplomatic, economic, Congressional, and public opinion problems involved.

In particular, I wish you to consider, among others, the following specific issues:

--What military and other objectives in Viet Nam are additional U.S. forces designed to advance?

--What specific dangers is their dispatch designed to avoid, and what specific goals would the increment of force, if recommended by you, aim to achieve: in the next six months; over the next year?

--What problems would we confront with respect to appropriations and the budget; and what measures would you propose to deal with those problems?

--What problems would we confront with respect to balance of payments; and what measures would you propose to deal with those problems?

--Should we go forward with an increment of U.S. forces; what negotiated posture should we strike, in general; and what modifications, if any, would you recommend with respect to the San Antonio formula?

--Aside from the question of negotiations, what other diplomatic problems would we confront, and how should they be dealt with?

--What special effort can we and should we take at this time with respect to improving the political and military performance of the South Vietnamese?

--How should we frame our proposals for the Congress with respect to: objectives; legislation required (e.g., selective call-up); appropriations?

--What major Congressional problems can be anticipated, and how should they be met?

--Aside from your recommendations on the dispatch of forces and reconstitution of reserves, what steps are required to build up a production base for our over-all military effort?

--What problems can we anticipate in U.S. public opinion, and how should they be dealt with?

You should feel free in making this report to call on the best minds in the Government to work on specific aspects of the problem; but you should assure the highest possible degree of security up to the moment when the President's decision on these matters is announced.

Washington, February 29, 1968.

1. I believe the Wheeler recommendation should be accepted for four reasons:

--In view of the enemy's new strategy of intensive engagement,/2/ the forces are required in Viet Nam if we are to avoid excessive military and political risk.

--The further U.S. commitment in Viet Nam and the build-up of reserves are required to deflate the widespread view that we are too thin and that pressure or aggression might be successful in the Middle East, elsewhere in Asia, and perhaps, even, in Europe.

--This is a Presidential election year and a classic period for Communist adventure: we should not go into this period over-extended--either in Viet Nam or in general.

--Our two most responsible men in the field have asked for additional forces: Westmoreland and Bunker.

2. Specifically in Viet Nam:

--The Communists are acting on the assumption that 1968 is the year of decision: we must accept that and make the decision turn the right way.

--The Communists are engaging their forces at more than twice the average rate of 1967--quite aside from the Tet peak. Westy is, therefore, thin on the ground in terms of his minimum requirements. The pressure may ease in May; but we cannot be sure; and post-May he will need more forces to retrieve losses suffered in the winter-spring offensive and to have bargaining weight should negotiations emerge.

--These forces are needed in part to give the ARVN both the assurance about the security of the cities and to make possible joint U.S.-ARVN operations in the Delta and elsewhere in the countryside. We could face a disastrous political situation if the enemy consolidated the countryside and then called for negotiations with the majority of the people in his hands.

--The present situation--for us and the enemy--is one of both losses and opportunities, since the Tet offensive began. The outcome (say) two months from now of the whole battle since Tet depends on what happens between now and then. If we send some forces now--and Westy knows others are on the way--he will be able to do much more than if he has to work off thin margins.

--Right now the enemy may be introducing an additional two divisions from the North. The intelligence is uncertain, but somewhat firmer than a few days ago.

3. If we accept the Wheeler recommendation we face, of course, many problems.

--We must develop a precise list of concrete things we want the GVN and ARVN to do, and use maximum leverage to get the South Vietnamese to do them on schedule. (Incidentally, I regard the GVN performance since Tet as B+, in fact remarkable for a developing nation confronting a desperate attack of this kind. We cannot set impossible standards. We can set precise, maximum realistic goals and hold feet to the fire. Perhaps a Guam meeting with Thieu and Ky might be in order--or even a troop contributors' meeting.)/3/ Tab A is a possible list of legitimate U.S. requirements.

--Since negotiations may be thrust upon us--and we certainly want them if they promise an honorable peace--we must face up to what we think and begin consultations with Thieu. We do not intend to sell them down the river; but we cannot postpone peace--if it is reachable--until every VC is killed or until in some psychological sense the GVN is ''ready."

4. The dispatch of additional forces could be the occasion for a new directive to Westy setting the limits of his mission in terms of concrete U.S. political objectives in SVN and Southeast Asia./4/

5. There may be strong political forces generated in directions we do not wish to go:

--Invade Laos, Cambodia, North Viet Nam. We may wish to mount such operations at some time. We should not rule them out. But as I read Westy's situation, he has his hands full for the next months inside South Viet Nam. I see no reason that, if we recover equilibrium in the late spring, the President should be forced to move where he does not believe it wise to go.

--Bombing Haiphong. We may (or may not) wish to hit Haiphong and Hanoi harder; but for coming months the weather is bad; we need our air in ground support; the arguments about not engaging the USSR and making Communist China the primary route for supply are still relevant. If the President makes his decisions now, I do not think he can be realistically forced into a policy which cannot now be executed. Several months from now I believe he will still command the capacity to maintain his freedom of decision.

--Mining Haiphong: Fresh look!/5/

--Pull troops out of Europe. This must be met by making our case not merely in terms of Viet Nam but thickening up our total deterrent position. We don't want a Berlin or NATO crisis. But we have a right to demand of NATO Europe--and Germany in particular--the fullest possible financial and balance of payments cooperation.

6. Taxes.

From my limited knowledge, Joe Fowler's assessment--that these moves could break the tax stalemate--makes sense. But, as he has suggested, the whole enterprise--Viet Nam forces, global reserves, taxes--must be put as an Act of National Will, in terms which transcend Viet Nam and, even, Southeast Asia.

7. Public opinion.

I am no expert; but I sense three things:

--frustration at our defensive posture, and real fear;

--a hawkish balance in the country;

--a desire to do something about the situation./6/

With appropriate prior consultation with leading citizens--as well as Congressional leaders--I believe the package is viable.

W

Saigon, February 29, 1968, 0940Z.

20798. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my forty-first weekly message.

A. General

1. It is now four weeks since the enemy launched his Tet offensive. Many factors are still only partly known in this new situation, but I thought it would be worthwhile to try to make a preliminary assessment of where we stand. This will have to be a rather rough approximation since it will be some time before the returns of the comprehensive and detailed examinations now underway will be in. Nevertheless, I believe the following general points can be made:

A) It is evident that the enemy made a heavy commitment of his forces to the Tet offensive, some 62,000 plus guerrilla and other elements in supporting roles; that more than half of the forces committed have been destroyed and more than 10,000 weapons captured, a figure which tends to substantiate the reported personnel losses. These heavy losses would appear to have a number of consequences: many enemy units are expected to be ineffective for a considerable period; a heavy replacement flow will be required from North Viet-Nam which is likely to result in a significant increase in the proportion of NVA troops in South Viet-Nam; and there is a possibility that he may be forced to reassess his strategy, for example the all-out offensive versus the "conservation of forces" policy, the attack on urban areas versus his "frontier" strategy, or the desirability of going into a primarily guerrilla war posture.

B) This reassessment of strategy by the enemy may be influenced by the psychological effect on him of the heavy losses and defeats he has suffered. He mounted an intense propaganda effort prior to the attacks, thoroughly indoctrinated his troops with the idea the winter-spring campaign would be the decisive and concluding period of the war, that a coalition government would be formed, and their hardships would cease. Now the enemy propaganda is talking about a long war, and there are no further references to "victory this spring." It would seem logical that this pre-Tet psychological buildup would be followed by a letdown as the enemy troops come to realize that they have not won the final victory, but on the contrary have taken very heavy losses only to be thrown out of all the cities they attempted to seize. Probably the letdown will be most rapid and severe among VC provincial and regional forces, guerrillas, and infrastructure. If this should take place, it may well result in an upturn in Chieu Hoi rates.

C) It is clear also that the enemy made a major miscalculation in believing that the people would rise to support his forces. A recently captured document makes this even clearer than before. COSVN order dated February 1, a critique of the first phase of the Tet offensive, points to the lack of popular uprising and ARVN defections as key failures. But, as I have noted before, failure of the masses to actively support the enemy does not necessarily mean there is solid popular support for this government; and among many elements of the population, there is widespread apprehension and fear of further attacks by the enemy. Nevertheless, opinion has hardened against the enemy, and GVN efforts to assist the victims of the fighting have probably improved the government's image in certain quarters. In some areas, popular indignation against the enemy is running very high. The post-attack feeling of national unity and willingness to cooperate with the authorities remains strong. Granted there is still a considerable distance to go to create a solid, enduring climate of opinion which can be described as strong, positive support for the government as against the present essentially anti-VC feeling! Nevertheless these are positive elements in the present military picture.

D) There are factors on the other side of the ledger. The enemy has shown a capacity for continued heavy infiltration from the North. Indeed it seems apparent that this was substantially stepped up in the months immediately preceding the Tet offensive, a fact which raises acutely the question of what measures should be taken to reduce substantially infiltration through Laos and Cambodia. The enemy has also been able to equip his troops with increasingly sophisticated weapons; they are in general better equipped than the ARVN forces, a fact which has an adverse bearing on ARVN morale. And the enemy has demonstrated flexibility, skill, resourcefulness, discipline, and determination. That he suffered such a severe setback has been due to the skill, tenacity, and bravery of our commanders and troops and those of the ARVN, to our mobility, and to our superiority in artillery and air power.

E) It seems apparent also that a number of options are open to the enemy. If instead of reverting to a policy of a prolonged war, or a guerrilla posture, he decides, as Thieu believes he will, to go "fast" in the months ahead with the objective of putting himself in a strong posture for negotiation, we may be approaching a decisive period in the war should this be his decision, and provided we act quickly and decisively to meet the threat! If we take positive action now, and this, of course, involves getting the GVN to take a whole range of decisions and actions, I am confident in our ability to meet the threat successfully. It is possible indeed that this could shorten the conflict and bring us more quickly to a decision. Thieu sees this in a time frame encompassing late 1968-early 1969.

F) The physical destruction caused by the Tet offensive has been heavy and widespread. One-hundred two cities and district towns were attacked, creating at present count some 550,000 evacuees, of which it is expected some 30-40 percent will return to their homes when security is restored. The number of houses destroyed now stands at 66,400, but this does not yet take into account figures for the heavy destruction at Hue. The present count of civilians killed stands at 4,700 with another 19,500 injured, but again this does not include figures for Hue. These figures give some idea both of the magnitude of the problem and of the time and resources that will have to go into the recovery effort. But assisted, prodded, and supported by our people, the government reacted well at the outset and is now showing more drive and effectiveness than at any time since my arrival in this country. While its performance is not beyond criticism, it is better than many of us expected, and far better than press reports indicate. We have to bear in mind the limitations of the human resources available here in drawing a fair judgment. Most important, I believe, is the fact that the government has recovered faster and is moving more swiftly than the enemy. Both sides are tired and disorganized in the wake of the near Armageddon, which the enemy provided, but our side is reviving more rapidly.

G) The relief and recovery program is moving ahead with no apparent loss of momentum since Ky turned over the direction of the Central Recovery Committee to Prime Minister Loc. This in part is the result of a more active participation on the part of President Thieu who chaired the Feb 24 and 28 meetings and has exhibited both comprehension and decisiveness in his interventions. He has told me he plans to chair the task force twice a week in the future. It is also due in part to the surprisingly effective performance of Minister Doan Ba Cang who has turned out to be a more hardnosed and efficient coordinator than Gen Thang. It is also due to the very effective efforts of Bob Komer, Gen Forsythe, and our staff. At this writing Saigon is approaching normal in many ways: prices are down to 15 percent above the pre-Tet level, rice distribution is back in the retailers' hands and no longer poses a problem, public utilities are functioning, there is a uniform 1900 to 0700 curfew throughout the city. One-hundred-sixty-nine thousand evacuees are being cared for, the work of clearing away the rubble is well underway, and the long task of rebuilding has begun. While moving more slowly in the provinces in many cases, relief and recovery is also going forward there in a satisfactory manner.

H) Having failed to hold the cities, the enemy is now keeping up harassment of the urban population and attempting to dominate the countryside. The second wave of the offensive, as I mentioned last week, is in many ways becoming a race to re-establish control in the rural areas. Both enemy and friendly forces were withdrawn from the countryside to take part in the fight for the cities. That phase seemed to end Feb 25 when President Thieu attended an emotion-filled ceremony at which the Vietnamese flag was again raised over what remains of the ancient and sacred city of Hue./2/ If Thieu is correct in his analysis of the enemy strategy, the present enemy concentrations near the cities and harassment by mortaring and rocketing of the urban populations is intended to tie us down to urban defense while he attempts to take over and hold as much of the countryside as possible. Interrogation of an enemy officer in I Corps supports this view of the enemy intentions. Thieu is fully aware of this, so are General Westmoreland and Gen Vien, and our troops are beginning to move back into the rural areas.

I) Pacification has been set back but contrary to some press reports certainly is not dead. While it is imperative that we move fast, we have by no means lost the race. About one-half of the RD cadre have remained in their assigned hamlets with the other half working in the urban areas. Some provinces were relatively untouched, and in at least 16 provinces it should be possible to get the program back on the rails rather quickly. Thirteen provinces were hardhit and we estimate that it will take a minimum of six months to get the program there back to the pre-Tet level. By corps areas, we can say the situation in I Corps is bad, with the program suffering most severely in the northernmost provinces; in II Corps it is in relatively good shape; III Corps is in worse condition, though we view the situation there as very serious in only three provinces, but those three include two provinces which are neighbors of Saigon, Gia Dinh and Bien Hoa. IV Corps is perhaps the most serious problem with something approaching areawide paralysis prevailing in that key region.

J) It is clear that we must move rapidly. Given a free hand, the enemy will use the people in the countryside, step up recruitment, replenish food stocks, and erode previous GVN pacification gains. Instructions have gone out to Vietnamese forces and US advisers to seize the initiative and to go on the offensive, roads and waterways are being re-opened and commercial traffic is beginning to move north of the Mekong. The next step is to break the RF/PF out of their defensive shells, and to get all RD teams back to their hamlets. While some risks are involved, it seems to me important that we do not over-commit ourselves in defense of the cities. Our ability to take the offensive, especially in the countryside, will be psychologically important both in restoring the morale of the South Vietnamese population and in persuading the enemy that he cannot possibly win militarily./3/

2. The effects of the Tet offensive on the Vietnamese economy must be rated as adverse and seriously damaging, without significant positive offsets. Estimates of the physical damage have been reported elsewhere. It is doubtful that the extent of this widespread damage will ever be estimated accurately in money terms, but for a country whose capital wealth is low, it is a severe blow. If peace and security were now restored, one could imagine a rapid recovery of the sort that often takes place after localized natural disasters. But the continuation of fighting and insecurity will make the recovery longer and more difficult for Viet-Nam. Reconstruction will inevitably divert resources from the war and the pacification effort. In the meantime, the effect, both monetary and psychological, on people who have lost their homes, seen factories and places of business destroyed, and communications interrupted will be hard to sustain.

3. Another result of the damage inflicted during the past month and the consequent reconstruction effort will be a buildup of inflationary pressures. It seems certain that GVN expenditures will increase by at least 10 billion piasters. At the same time, disruption of economic life will inevitably lead to reduction of tax revenues, probably by the same order of magnitude. Our preliminary estimates show more than a doubling of the increase in money supply, from 19 billion piasters to more than 50.

[Omitted here is discussion of the impact of Tet on the business community, the GVN's overall performance during and after the attacks, reconstruction and mobilization efforts, pacification, and the political response to Tet.]

Bunker