95. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

Washington, March 1, 1968.

SUBJECT
Questions Concerning the Situation in Vietnam

How does Hanoi view the present phase of the war; for example, has Hanoi concluded that a protracted conflict is impossible and that it must gain victory this year or collapse?

1. Hanoi's strategy of revolutionary warfare in South Vietnam has always embraced two propositions: to prepare for a protracted struggle and to seek victory in the shortest possible time. From the introduction of large US forces in 1965, through the summer of 1967 the emphasis was on the probability of a prolonged war of attrition. Some backing away from the protracted war theme became evident in captured documents and Hanoi's propaganda later in 1967. In our view the intensity of the Tet offensive and the exertions being made to sustain pressures confirms that Hanoi is now engaged in a major effort to achieve early and decisive results. Yet the Communists probably have no rigid time-table. They apparently have high hopes of achieving their objectives this year, but they will preserve considerable tactical flexibility.

2. It is still not altogether clear why the Vietnamese Communists chose this course of action at this time. They certainly were not desperate or fearful of early collapse. A reconsideration of their capabilities to succeed in a long war may have been a contributing factor. And they probably regarded the balance of forces as sufficiently favorable to warrant a major and widespread offensive. The fact of Presidential elections in the US may have influenced their decision, and, of course, the tactical advantage of the Tet truce played a role in the immediate timing. In any case, it does not appear that they undertook the present offensive because they had concluded that protracted conflict was no longer feasible for them.

What are the capabilities of the NVA/VC forces to sustain their present offensive, and, if they choose to, continue a prolonged war thereafter?

3. There is no doubt that the Communists have already paid a high price in the present offensive phase. They have not only lost manpower, but also quality resources such as the special units employed in the Tet attacks. Nevertheless, prior to Tet there was apparently a strenuous drive to bring units up to strength with new recruits and upgraded guerrillas. Complete guerrilla units also were merged with local forces to form larger elements. Infiltration of replacements and units from the North has probably been heavier than previously believed. A part of the Main Forces has been withheld from major combat. Finally, an intensive effort to raise new levies is underway in the rural areas, where the Communists now enjoy fuller access. Thus, it is conceivable that the enemy's gross strength is not significantly lower now than it was in the latter part of 1967.

4. The Communist supply position might be a factor limiting combat capabilities in the next few months. Many forces are now deployed away from their bases at the end of longer lines of supply. Expenditures of ammunition and losses of equipment have been relatively high. These factors will be offset in some degree by the extraordinary stockpiling that evidently took place before Tet and by the increased availability of manpower in the countryside which will permit the continued portering of military supplies and food to VC/NVA forces.

5. While not strictly a matter of physical capability, the Communist position is much enhanced, for the time being at least, by their possession of the strategic initiative. Within limits this permits them to choose the time and place of combat and to keep US/ARVN forces pinned down and dispersed in static defense of many potential targets.

6. Accordingly, we believe that the NVA/VC forces have the capability to sustain a relatively high level of combat and occasionally to intensify it over the next several months, including rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military installations, major battles with US forces and assaults on selected cities. At the same time, the Communists will have resources to consolidate their hold on formerly pacified and contested areas.

7. It is conceivable that the Communists regard the present campaign as so critical to the ultimate outcome of the war that they will commit their full resources to a maximum effort in the near term, even at risk of very high losses. But it is far more likely that they probably will not use their resources in such a reckless manner as to deny themselves the possibility of continuing the struggle well beyond the next several months.

What is the Communist attitude toward negotiations: in particular how would Hanoi deal with an unconditional cessation of US bombing of NVN and what would be its terms for a settlement?

8. The Communists probably still expect the war to end eventually in some form of negotiations. Since they hope the present military effort will be decisive in destroying the GVN and ARVN, they are not likely to give any serious consideration to negotiations until this campaign has progressed far enough for its results to be fairly clear.

9. If, however, the US ceased the bombing of North Vietnam in the near future, Hanoi would probably respond more or less as indicated in its most recent statements. It would begin talks fairly soon, would accept a fairly wide ranging exploration of issues, but would not moderate its terms for a final settlement or stop fighting in the South.

10. In any talks, Communist terms would involve the establishment of a new "coalition" government, which would in fact if not in appearance be under the domination of the Communists. Secondly, they would insist on a guaranteed withdrawal of US forces within some precisely defined period. Their attitude toward other issues would be dictated by the degree of progress in achieving these two primary objectives, and the military-political situation then obtaining in South Vietnam.

11. Cessation of bombing and opening of negotiations without significant Communist concessions would be deeply disturbing to the Saigon government. There would be a real risk that the Thieu-Ky regime would collapse, and this would in fact be part of Hanoi's calculation in accepting negotiations.

What is the likely course of events in South Vietnam over the next 10 months, assuming no change in US policy or force levels?

12. In the assumed circumstances a total military victory by the Allies or the Communists is highly unlikely in the next 10 months. It is manifestly impossible for the Communists to drive US forces out of the country. It is equally out of the question for US/GVN forces to clear South Vietnam of Communist forces. It is possible, however, that the overall situation in this period will take a decisive turn.

13. We think it unlikely that this turn could be in the US/GVN favor. To be sure, Communist forces are now exposed to aggressive counteraction, their supply lines are extended, and some base areas may be vulnerable. Morale may be poor in some of the units which have suffered heavy losses. But we see no evidence yet that the GVN/ARVN will be inspired to seize the initiative, go over to the attack, exploit the Communist vulnerabilities, and quickly regain the rural areas. We doubt they have the will and capability to make the effort.

14. Far more likely is an erosion of the ARVN's morale and effectiveness. We do not believe that the GVN will collapse, or that the ARVN will totally disintegrate. But there is a fairly good chance that Communist pressures will result in a serious weakening of the GVN/ARVN apparatus and an end to its effective functioning in parts of the country. In these circumstances, virtually the entire burden of the war would fall on US forces.

15. The Communists too will be weakened by further offensive efforts. Losses will be heavy, combat effectiveness will be lowered, and morale will be damaged by the failure to achieve a complete victory. Even though their situation vis-a-vis the ARVN will be strong, their forces will probably not be in a position to register decisive advances unless they radically escalate the war by an all-out invasion.

16. In sum, there is a high risk that both the ARVN and GVN will be seriously weakened in the next months, and perhaps decisively so. Our best estimate is that in the assumed circumstances the overall situation 10 months hence will be no better than a standoff.

What is the likely NVA/VC strategy over the next 10 months if US forces are increased by 50,000, by 100,000, or by 200,000?

17. We would expect the Communists to continue the war. They still have resources available in North Vietnam and within South Vietnam to increase their troop strength. Their strong logistical effort and their ability to organize and exploit the people under their control in the South enable them to counter US increases by smaller increases of their own. Over a ten-month period the Communists would probably be able to introduce sufficient new units into the South to offset the US maneuver battalion increments of the various force levels given above.

18. We cannot foresee the outcome of future combat resulting from the increase in US forces. The Communists would probably have to modify their current tactics, especially if the US increments were large enough to permit the formation of a strategic reserve as well as providing for the partial relief of the ARVN. In some places, they would retreat from the urban areas, trying to hold as much as possible of the countryside.

19. The prospect of heavy US reinforcements might persuade Hanoi to gamble on an all-out invasion from the North to seize Northern I Corps before reinforcements could be committed. It is also possible that the Communists would greatly expand their military pressures in Laos. The purpose of such a move would be to draw off US forces from South Vietnam, and to indicate that, unless the war was ended, the US faced a continued expansion of its commitment.

20. We would not expect the addition of any given number of US troops to change the policy or attitude of the USSR or China. Both would be willing to increase assistance in weaponry and Peking would offer more manpower for North Vietnam. Both would be concerned that the US would still be frustrated and would eventually be led to invade North Vietnam. But neither China nor the USSR would be likely to enter the war in response to a US buildup, and neither would be likely to take drastic diversionary moves outside of Vietnam.

21. The general international climate would certainly worsen for the US. There would be greater apprehension that the war in Vietnam would inevitably expand to the point of a US conflict with China, and perhaps even with the USSR. Many countries would blame the US for not trying to negotiate with Hanoi. International pressures for an end to the fighting would increase. At the same time, some US allies in Asia would be relieved that the US chose to reinforce rather than accept an unfavorable political settlement.

What is the likely Communist reaction to a change in US strategy toward greater control over population centers, with or without increased forces?

22. In general the Communists would view this move as a success for their strategy. Their tactical response in such circumstances would depend mainly on the nature of US enclaves. If these were fairly large and embraced much of the outlying countryside, the Communists would believe them to be porous enough to infiltrate and harass, much as they are doing now. If the defensive perimeters were fairly solid, however, the Communists would not try to overrun them in frontal assaults. Instead, they would concentrate for a time on consolidating the countryside and isolating the various defended enclaves, in particular interdicting supply lines and forcing the US to undertake expensive supply movements from out of country. A Communist-controlled regime with a "coalition" facade would be set up in "liberated" areas and attempts at terrorist activity inside the enclaves would be undertaken. Hanoi would hope that a combination of military and political pressure, together with the dim prospect for achievement of the original US aims in the Vietnam struggle, would eventually persuade the US to extricate itself through negotiations.

Washington, March 1, 1968.

ANALYSIS OF COMUSMACV FORCE REQUIREMENTS
AND ALTERNATIVES

Section I--Purpose

A. The Problem. To provide military advice on the military implications of several courses of action to defeat the enemy offensive and to regain the initiative in Vietnam.

B. Study Objectives. The study examines five alternative military courses of action. Each is examined as to its ability to attain the following military objectives:

1. First, to counter the enemy offensive and to destroy or neutralize the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) invasion force in the north.

2. Second, to restore security in the cities and towns.

3. Third, to restore security in the heavily populated area of the countryside.

4. Fourth, to regain the initiative through offensive operations.

C. Examination of the Options. The following questions are posed which bring out the significance of each of the options examined:

5. What military objectives are advanced by the option (in six months; 12 months)?

6. What specific dangers is the option designed to avoid (in six months; 12 months)?

7. What specific goals does the option achieve (in six months; 12 months)?

8. Does it achieve the objectives? If not, where does it fall short? What modifications of strategy and/or objectives are indicated?

9. What personnel and procurement actions are required to support the option?

10. What specific units will be deployed and what time schedule?

11. How are these forces generated, and what combat forces remain in the CONUS?

12. What are the estimated dollar costs?

D. Conclusion. After this examination (of the pros and cons), the options are compared in order to provide a conclusion as to which of the options is the most advantageous from the military viewpoint.

Section II

Summary

1. The enemy, since November, has increased his forces in South Vietnam by at least 41 maneuver battalions, some armored elements, a large number of rockets, and additional artillery. There are indications he is preparing for the use of limited air support, including logistical air drops and bombing missions.

2. In the MACV proposal (options 1 and 1A), the number of maneuver battalions provided roughly offsets the increase in enemy forces. In the lesser options, the enemy buildup is not matched. Furthermore, there are indications now that additional enemy forces are on the move to RVN.

3. The basic strategy which must be followed by MACV in any circumstance is to defeat the current enemy offensive both in Northern I Corps Tactical Zone where it is the most formidable, in the Highlands where it is highly dangerous, and throughout South Vietnam in defense of the government and the cities and towns. In many places, allied forces have lost the initiative to the enemy. They are meeting the threat in the I Corps Tactical Zone, are in a marginal position in II CTZ, and elsewhere are committing the bulk of the South Vietnamese forces to the defense of cities and towns. Allied forces are not conducting offensive operations of any great magnitude or frequency and therefore they are not wresting control of the countryside from the enemy.

4. Under the smaller options, that is the current force plus 6 battalions already deployed (Option 2), or Option 3 which provides an additional 6 battalions within the 50,000 strength add on, the capability to meet the enemy offensive is definitely increased; however, this added capability may well be required in the II Corps Tactical Zone alone. It may permit MACV to break loose a small airborne or air cavalry reserve to conduct reaction or limited offensive operations. The intermediate Option 4 of 100,000 additional troops should permit the constitution of about a one-division reserve which could reinforce in any threatened area such as Khe Sanh or the Highlands or could undertake slightly expanded offensive operations. As long as the enemy employs the forces now available to him in synchronized attacks, it is not realistic to believe that this size force can guarantee security throughout South Vietnam's rural areas. However, the accomplishment of this mission of providing security in the populated countryside also depends very heavily on the speed with which Vietnamese forces recover and the effectiveness with which they are able to operate.

5. If the enemy offensive can be broken with sustained heavy casualties, then, and only then, will the cities be secure and the countryside reentered. Even with the largest force contemplated (Option 1) it will not be possible to perform adequately all of the tasks unless the current enemy offensive is decisively defeated. This, therefore, is the first and most important task upon which all else depends. If the offensive can be broken, then all of the other tasks become possible with the forces in Option 1.

6. It is not possible to predict whether the forces now available in Vietnam will be able to break the offensive without additional help, considering the magnitude of the enemy buildup and his clear willingness to expend forces with small regard for casualties. Military prudence requires that we react and respond to his escalation and initiative. The larger and faster our response the better. It is not possible to draw clear and compelling distinctions between the effects to be expected from the incremental differences in the various options.

7. If the forces now in Vietnam or the forces under any of the options prove to be inadequate to break the enemy offensive, or if, conversely, the enemy sustained offensive breaks the Vietnamese armed forces (even short of destroying the GVN), then our objectives in South Vietnam and the tasks associated with them will be unobtainable. Specifically, we would be unable to regain the initiative, that is, we would not be able to conduct offensive operations at the scope and pace required either to prevent further enemy buildup or to reenter the countryside. This would force US and allied forces into a defensive posture around the major population centers.

8. The major risks involved in such circumstances are:

a. Enemy forces would retain the initiative and could move a number of divisions now tied down along the borders and around the Khe Sanh against the populated areas where their attacks by fire would be demoralizing.

b. By holding the countryside, enemy (particularly VC) strength would increase.

c. The enemy could consolidate both geographic areas and segments of the population and probably could establish a credible Revolutionary Government which, as a minimum, would be a strong position for a negotiated settlement, but more importantly might bring about the collapse of the GVN and the removal of any reason for US troops to remain in South Vietnam.

9. Therefore, immediate action to break the enemy's current offensive is not only the first but the decisive requirement.

10. In each of the options discussed in the following sections, sizeable support forces are included which will provide support not only for the additional combat troops but also for those of the recent (Feb '68) emergency deployments and the additional light ROK division soon to be deployed.

(Note: The analysis of each of the options assumed the approval, by separate action, of deferral of the civilianization program as prescribed in Program 5. This provided an authorized base-point strength level of 537,500. (525,000 Program 5 troop level PLUS an additional 12,500 spaces provided by deferral of the civilianization program. Each of the force levels examined are additive to the amended Program 5 force level of 537,500.)

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED OPTIONS

[Omitted here is another table, entitled "Spreadsheet Summary of Options--Effect of MACV Objectives," in which the options were assessed in greater detail.]

Section III--Conclusions and Recommendations

A. It is concluded that:

1. Additional deployments to Southeast Asia should commence as soon as possible in order to defeat the present enemy offensive, improve the security of allied forces in South Vietnam, and regain the initiative.

2. The larger forces of Option I and IA will greatly reduce risks to Free World forces in SVN and will accomplish US objectives more rapidly than the forces of the other options.

3. Restrictions on military operations in Southeast Asia have prevented the most effective application of allied military power.

4. The current capability to respond appropriately to additional force requirements is extremely limited.

5. Deficiencies in personnel, equipment, and facilities cannot be overcome in time under present policies and procedures, and requires extraordinary measures to accelerate procurement and production.

B. It is recommended that:

1. Immediate actions be taken to provide forces of Option 1; specifically:

a. Extension beyond 30 June 1968 of the authority to order to active duty units of the Ready Reserve for a period not to exceed 24 months;

b. Authority to order to active duty individual members of the Ready Reserve for a period not to exceed 24 months;

c. Authority to extend for a period not to exceed 12 months: enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, periods of active duty for training, periods of obligated service, or other military status, in any component of the Armed Forces of the United States;

d. Obtain selective industrial mobilization as required to accomplish production of material necessary to equip and sustain forces for the prosecution of the war;

e. Immediately accelerate procurement, to include delegation of authority to the Services to negotiate non-competitive cost reimbursable contracts.

2. Restraints on military operations in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam be removed.

[Omitted here are Sections IV-IX, in which the options are separately explored, and Appendix A, "Detailed Threat Assessment."]

Saigon, March 1, 1968, 1130Z.

20928. For Secretary Rusk from Bunker. Pass OSD for Secretary Clifford.

1. You have noted in a recent public statement that we may be entering a climactic stage in Viet-Nam./2/ I believe that indications here tend to support this view. There are many factors which may have convinced Hanoi that it should gamble on a broad and carefully phased all-out effort. These include our steady grinding down of their forces, the effects of the bombing in the North, the successful constitutional process in South Viet-Nam, the beginnings of results on pacification, and possibly other factors which are difficult to judge, such as a revised Hanoi estimate of the trend in American public opinion. We are not yet clear on Hanoi's aims, but an attempt to engage us in negotiations in 1968 after such a military effort, combined with its current diplomatic and propaganda offensive, is one possibility.

2. I think it would be useful at this point to review Thieu's current analysis of Hanoi's three-phase strategy (Saigon 18561 and 19925)./3/ The first phase involved military efforts to seize terrain, to create as much destruction as possible, to build up heavy casualties, and to pin down GVN and allied troops in the northern I Corps and central Highland areas. Second, to continue to harass the cities, intensify infiltration, increase popular tension, and build up the guerrilla forces and infrastructure. This would include interrupting supplies from the countryside to the cities, pinning down troops in urban areas, and facilitating political spoilage in these areas through propaganda and agitation. Third, to undermine the pacification program by extending VC control in the countryside through a counter-pacification program. Thieu thought that following these three efforts, Hanoi would decide whether to negotiate, if her position remains strong enough, or to fade away. Thieu believes that Hanoi and the NLF will be able to maintain this pace until the end of the year or early 1969, before moving clearly in one of the two indicated directions. I am inclined to agree that even with higher losses they have the capacity to continue at least through the summer and into the fall at this general level of activity, unless we and the GVN are able to pose new problems for them by going on the offensive on both the military and political fronts.

3. Hanoi's presumed change in strategy presents both a heightened risk and an important opportunity for us. We must at any reasonable cost eliminate enemy chances of major gains, especially in the two northern provinces, lest this undermine already shaken South Vietnamese morale. We should, however, be quick to exploit the opportunity created by the enemy's heavy losses in the Tet offensive, and possibly in a subsequent Thua Thien-Quang Tri action. If the GVN can, as we hope, recover quickly enough from the Tet onslaught and take advantage of the opportunities offered by the new situation and we can initiate counter-offensives in certain areas while containing the NVA in northern I Corps, the combined effect may be to put Hanoi under sufficient pressure to shorten its planned time frame.

4. We are pushing the GVN leadership as hard as we can to get forces out into the countryside and to counter-attack where feasible, to accelerate civil recovery, and to rally the people in a policy of national unity. We believe that we are getting some results from the GVN in what are admittedly difficult circumstances for them, but as I have said before it is essential to bear in mind what human resources we have to work with here in assessing the possibilities for a more effective leadership and more rapid progress.

5. There are a number of complementary measures which only Washington can take, however. They involve factors which we cannot fully judge from here, but which we believe could powerfully reinforce the GVN effort and perhaps ultimately contribute to shortening the war.

A) First, while we recognize the many problems involved in the early despatch of a limited number of added combat troops to Viet-Nam, we believe that they would reinforce our ability to exploit the enemy's heavy losses and perhaps to make new moves to deal with infiltration through Laos, as indicated below.

B) Second, accelerated modernization of the South Vietnamese forces is of military and moral importance. The introduction of Russian-designed assault rifles, light and heavy machine guns, anti-tank rockets and artillery rockets into Viet Cong military units has increased the enemy's combat power to a major degree and has adversely affected morale of the Vietnamese armed forces, since they are now out-gunned at battalion level and below. This subject has been addressed by General Westmoreland through military channels.

C) Third, the enemy's Tet offensive has given us an opportunity to underline the importance of the San Antonio formula as a prerequisite to any cessation of the bombing in the North and to talks with Hanoi. Both the President and you have recently reaffirmed this position and this has reassured the GVN leadership. I should point out here that the Tet offensive has clearly had an effect here of hardening the GVN's public and private position on negotiations and related questions such as the status of the NLF and overt contacts with it. In fact, with the present state of Vietnamese morale, following the shock of the Tet attacks and their aftermath, I believe that an early move by us to engage in bilateral talks with Hanoi would have a most damaging political effect here. Continuing close consultation with the GVN on these matters and the latter's inclusion at an early stage in any negotiations with Hanoi assume even greater importance now.

D) In assessing our bombing policy in the North, we can see some advantage in increasing the pressure on Hanoi by adding certain military targets, provided they are of military value and do not increase substantially the likelihood of greater civilian deaths and casualties. Certain decisions have already been taken in this sense and perhaps there is nothing more that should be done in this direction. There is some evidence that Hanoi expected retaliation for the Tet attacks, however. We have been forebearing in recent weeks and months in our effort to indicate to Hanoi that we were ready to talk, but their response has been the series of vicious attacks in South Viet-Nam over the Tet holidays and their diplomatic offensive designed to put pressure on us.

E) I urge prompt completion of contingency planning and appropriate responses should Hanoi introduce spectacular new weaponry or other major new military moves. Examples of this are possible enemy bombing south of the DMZ, attacks on our carriers, use of the Soviet Frog missile, or extensive use of armor in SVN. Such intensifications of the NVN military effort would inevitably further affect South Vietnamese morale by emphasizing their relative inferiority in terms of weapons and equipment.

F) Areas of continuing special concern to me are Laos and Cambodia. As I have pointed out earlier (Saigon 28293 of June 17, 1967)/4/ and repeated several times since, I consider it essential to develop some effective way of greatly reducing the major infiltration through Laos, which should make the situation here much more manageable. There has also been increasing circumstantial evidence of enemy supplies, including weapons and ammunition, coming through Cambodia. Since the effort to strengthen the effectiveness of the ICC there does not seem to be prospering, I believe that early consideration should be given to other measures which will deter the growing NVA/VC use of Cambodia and the apparent resupply from this quarter. Our measures should be applied in such a way as to bring pressure on Sihanouk to deal more forthrightly and concretely with the problem. They should combine political, psychological and any required military actions. With these twin problems of Laos and Cambodia in mind, I have convened a SEACOORD meeting on March 7, at which Ambassadors Unger and Sullivan, Admiral Sharp, General Westmoreland and I will review the situation in those two countries and recommend courses of action to deal with them./5/

6. I recognize that some of the steps suggested above will be regarded in certain circles as degrees of escalation, and to be frank about them, they are. What I believe should be weighed against this factor, however, is the apparent all-out nature of the present enemy strategy which suggests that he is playing all his military cards short of inviting some kind of open Chinese or Soviet participation beyond the reportedly growing use of Chinese labor to replace North Vietnamese manpower. In deciding on our actions, we of course wish to avoid steps which might make such external military involvement more likely for reasons of face or desperation. Our objective should be to take measures which will encourage the North Vietnamese leadership to seek negotiations on an acceptable basis, in recognition of our determination to continue on our present course until they do.

7. I hope that these suggestions will receive prompt high-level consideration so that we can capitalize on the enemy's exposed position at a time when it may count the most.

Bunker

Moscow, March 1, 1968, 1515Z.

2983. Literally eyes only for Under Secretary from Ambassador. Ref: State 122443./2/

1. Before addressing specific action alternatives I submit following general observations applicable to all. Much would depend upon general setting in which given action took place. If any of them come out of the blue or in situation which appeared to reflect U.S. decision to achieve clear military victory, Soviet reaction would be far stronger than if it appeared to be effort to offset military reserves. Important also would be current weight of opinion in Politburo between hawks and doves of which we know little. However Soviet frustrations at Budapest Conference, probable effect on Soviet leadership of their own propaganda which has been increasing in stridency recently and which has tended to strengthen Soviet commitment not only to NVN but also to NLF, and effect on leadership of other problems such as Middle East and Korea, all, it seems to me, have operated to make Soviet reactions more likely to be vigorous than was the case a year ago.

2. It should also be noted that the Soviet reactions would not necessarily be confined to Vietnam. They could increase tension in Germany, particularly in Berlin, in Korea and Middle East. They could revert to all-out cold war and in any event would step up diplomatic and propaganda activity.

3. In all of alternatives mentioned I would expect increased Soviet military aid which in some cases might go as far as use of volunteers if North Vietnam would accept them, although most likely in anti-aircraft and other defensive roles. In some cases they might ask for use of Chinese airfields. I should think supply of medium range rockets or other sophisticated equipment a real possibility.

4. Following are comments on specific cases although I must admit my crystal ball is very cloudy:

A. Mining of Haiphong Harbor would certainly provoke strong Soviet reaction. As a minimum would expect them to provide minesweepers, possibly with Soviet naval crews. Because of increased dependence of NVN on China for supplies as a result of such action, Soviets would read into this wider implications related to the Sino-Soviet quarrel.

B. Intensified bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong area might cause Soviets to arm their merchant ships or possibly even escort them if one were sunk. If heavy civilian casualties resulted they might persuade NVN to agree to bring matter to the UN and would at least organize worldwide propaganda campaign and possibly push for international boycott.

C. An Inchon-type landing would probably cause extremely grave reaction. Nature Soviet action would be affected by what Chinese Communists did. Soviets would not wish to be in a position of doing less. They would probably consider landing as prelude to full scale invasion and destruction NVN government regardless of how we described the operation.

D. I doubt that our activity in northern portion of DMZ would be regarded as very serious but raids beyond that would cause stronger reaction depending somewhat upon how it was reported in world press. They would be concerned that we might be launching trial balloon and that their failure to react strongly might invite actual invasion.

E. I am inclined to believe they would take US/GVN ground action in Laos less seriously than similar action in Cambodia, particularly if this followed further successful Pathet Lao/NVN offensives.

F. I think there would be very little Soviet reaction to increased U.S. deployments in SVN although there would probably be some increase in quantity and quality of military equipment supplied by Soviets. The same would be true of request for massive budget increase.

5. In sum, any serious escalation except in South Vietnam would trigger strong Soviet response although I believe they will endeavor to avoid direct confrontation with us in that area. A prior bombing pause would mitigate their reaction to alternatives discussed even though we might have to resume after short period because of increasing infiltration or clearly unacceptable demands put forward by NVN at start of negotiations. Anything we can do that would diminish picture Soviets have built up in their own minds of U.S. pursuit of worldwide offensive policy, as for example progress toward Middle East settlement, would probably make them more tolerant of our actions in Vietnam.

Thompson

Saigon, March 2, 1968, 0947Z.

MAC 2951. In order to quickly furnish information required by your JCS 02430,/2/ I am replying to your questions piecemeal. This relates to the purely military area referred to in para two of your message.

Question A: What military and other objectives are additional forces designed to advance?

Answer: (1) Defeat and evict from SVN the new NVA units now present in western Quang Tri and central Thua Thien Provinces, to include the Ashau Valley and base areas 101 and 114.

(2) Maintain positive governmental and military control over Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, particularly the populous areas of the coastal lowlands and the DMZ area. Be prepared to block or interdict the infiltration/invasion routes from NVN through Laos.

(3) Destroy VC/NVA main force units and base areas in the remainder of I Corps and in the northeastern coastal and northwestern Laos border areas of II Corps.

(4) Reduce the "calculated risk" currently entailed in our economy of force posture in II and III Corps by providing the added flexibility and "punch" of an armored cavalry regiment.

(5) Conduct aggressive and continuing offensive campaigns throughout the coastal areas of II Corps and into traditional enemy base areas and sanctuaries in III Corps along the Cambodian border; especially in war zones "C" and "D". Restore the offensive combat and pacification momentum lost in III Corps as a result of the enemy's Tet offensive and the requirement to transfer the 101st Airborne Division (-) to I Corps to stem the NVA incursion into Quang Tri.

(6) Be prepared for contingency operations if required.

Question B: What specific dangers are their dispatch to SVN designed to avoid, and what specific goals would the increment of force, if recommended by you (the committee), aim to achieve--in the next 6 months?

over the next year?

Answer: (1) (Predicated on the scheduled delivery of forces indicated during your Feb 68 visit.) Additive forces would serve to forestall the danger of local defeats due to the tactical degeneration or temporary disorganization of some ARVN units in the event of another general enemy offensive coupled with a massive invasion across the DMZ. The need to be prepared to support or reinforce ARVN units that are surprised by the nature and intensity of VC/NVA attacks became manifest during the enemy's Tet drive and must be recognized in US troop requirement and deployment plans for the foreseeable future. By providing a two division mobile "swing force" which could be positioned and employed as required, the need to draw down on forces directly engaged in territorial security tasks probably would be reduced. Thus the danger of losing popular confidence in and support for GVN/US capabilities, policies and aspirations as a result of temporary military or psychological setbacks would also be diminished.

(2) Provision of the immediately required additional forces also would make it possible to apply continuous pressure to some degree in all corps areas and thus reduce the danger of allowing the enemy the opportunity to solicit support from the population and to reorganize, refit and recoup so that he could soon field rejuvenated units, despite heavy losses suffered during the Tet offensive. This is particularly important in view of the enemy capability to move additional divisions south through the Panhandle or DMZ without any clear intelligence indicators of such action. (This matter is of particular concern to me.) These forces will also make it possible to retain that degree of flexibility and rapid responsiveness necessary to cope with an apparent new enemy tactic of searching for thin spots in our force structure or deployment in order to launch his concentrated mass attacks.

(3) In the next six months the presence of the Armored Calvary Regiment in II or III Corps would reduce the degree of calculated risk inherent in the economy of force posture in those areas, provide added territorial security and further the goal of providing added combat flexibility. Addition of another Marine regiment and its division headquarters in I Corps would thicken troop density in critical I CTZ, add to combat flexibility and improve command and control capabilities in that critical area.

(4) Over the next year the increment of force would make it possible to:

A. Move progressively from North to South with a continuing series of hard hitting offensive campaigns to invade base areas, interdict and disrupt infiltration routes, and eliminate or evict VC/NVA forces from SVN.

B. At the same time, the highly mobile exploitation force (two divisions) would be available to splinter enemy aggression or to exploit opportunities for tactical success anywhere in SVN without reducing the minimal essential force necessary to guarantee maintenance of security in those areas where successful military campaigns have already been waged.

C. Addition of the new division in III Corps during this time frame would re-establish the capability for conducting constant operations in and around war zones "C" and "D" and make possible the constant use of a division size force in the IV CTZ which capability was removed with transfer of the 101st Airborne Division (-) to I Corps. In addition, combat operations conducted by this division would provide added security for LOC and the vital seat of government and economic center of Saigon.

D. With the total additive combat forces requested it will be possible to deal with the invader from the North, and to face with a greater degree of confidence the potential tank, rocket and tactical air threat as well as the ever present possibility that he may reinforce with additional elements of his home army.

Other data and answers will follow./3/

Warm regards.

On March 2, 1968, the Clifford Task Force began its comprehensive reassessment of Vietnam policy by considering a preliminary draft of a memorandum to the President. This memorandum and its accompanying backup materials were prepared in the Department of Defense by a staff under the direction of Leslie Gelb of the Office of International Security Affairs (ISA) and was reviewed by the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs Paul Warnke, Deputy Assistant Secretaries Morton Halperin and Richard Steadman, and Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis Alain Enthoven. The staff compilers suggested that an increased level of forces alone would not lead to the achievement of the U.S. political or military objectives in South Vietnam. The enemy would match any augmentation, the additional troops would be inadequate to drive the Communist forces out of South Vietnam, having 700,000 troops would lead to a "total Americanization of the war" which would serve to undermine the effectiveness of and confidence in the South Vietnamese Government (GVN), and the call-up and consequent expenditures would lead to severe domestic problems within the United States. The only way to achieve eventual success was for the GVN to provide effective military and political leadership for its people. Thus, the preliminary memorandum concluded, U.S. troops should no longer engage in attriting the enemy through search and destroy operations. Instead, U.S. combat units should confine their operations to providing security for the populace and to supporting operations undertaken by the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). For text of this memorandum, see The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition, pages 561-568. The interagency memoranda and reports comprising the backup material numbered over 40 attachments and are in the Johnson Library, Alain Enthoven Papers, Draft Presidential Memorandum on Vietnam 1968.

Notes of the meetings of the Clifford group have not been found. However, the meetings are described in Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention (New York: David McKay, 1969), pages 171-181; Larry Berman, Lyndon Johnson's War (New York: Norton, 1989), pages 176-180; Herbert Schandler, Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam: The Unmaking of a President (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pages 143-156; and Clark Clifford, Counsel to the President, pages 492-496.

In an article he wrote in 1969, Clifford noted the general tenor of the answers to the questions he sought to address during his review. Clifford received no assurances that the additional 200,000 men would turn the tide; instead there was "no way of knowing" how many more soldiers might be needed. He further found that the augmentation would require a reserve call-up of approximately 280,000, an increased draft call, and an extension of tours of duty. Clifford also was told that the enemy could match the build-up, that the costs of the build-up would be $12 billion by 1969, that bombing would not stop the war or decrease U.S. casualties, that U.S. troops would continue to carry the load since the ARVN "were not yet ready to replace our troops," that there was "no plan for victory in the historic American sense," and that there was "no agreement on an answer" as to how long it would take to win the war of attrition. See Clark Clifford, "A Viet Nam Reappraisal: The Personal History of One Man's View and How It Evolved," Foreign Affairs 47:4 (July 1969), pages 601-622.

According to The Pentagon Papers, the group did not reach a consensus on a new strategy but requested that Warnke and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Philip Goulding draft a new and "less controversial" paper than the preliminary memorandum. The new Draft Presidential Memorandum was discussed by the Clifford group on March 3. It recommended:

"1. Meeting General Westmoreland's request by deploying as close to May 1 as practical 20,000 additional troops (approximately 1/2 of which would be combat).

"2. Approval of a Reserve call-up and an increased end strength adequate to meet the balance of the request and to restore a strategic reserve in the United States, adequate for possible contingencies.

"3. Reservation of the decision to deploy the balance of General Westmoreland's new request. While we would be in a position to make these additional deployments, the future decision to do so would be contingent upon:

"a. Continuous reexamination of the desirability of further deployments on a week-by-week basis as the situation develops;

"b. Improved political performance by the GVN and increased contributions in effective military action by the ARVN;

"c. The results of a study in depth, to be initiated immediately, of a possible new strategic guidance for the conduct of U.S. military operations in South Vietnam." (The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition, page 573)

The final version of the Draft Presidential Memorandum is printed as Document 103.

Washington, March 3, 1968.

CAP 80644. Following is General Westmoreland's report on offensive operations in Vietnam:/2/

Although there have been no highly publicized major operations launched against the NVA, there has been a general resumption of aggressive offensive operations throughout the country.

Yesterday, Gen Vien and I visited Gen Thang, the new IV Corps Commander, at Can Tho. Gens Eckhardt, Weyand and Ewell/3/ were present. This was the initial meeting of our forthcoming offensive. My philosophy was expressed as fot thirty days the enemy tried to effect a coup. His plans were based on the twin assumptions that the people would rise up and join his forces and that the fighting spirit of the RVNAF was low. The record of the past thirty days has proved that the people are sound, they will fight for their freedom. The armed forces have proved that they do have fighting spirit. There were no traitors; nearly all units fought well. The enemy was misled by his own propaganda.y his own propaganda.

The question is often heard, "When are the VC going to attack again?" This type of thinking is unacceptable. The VC are tired, they have suffered heavy casualties, they are staying in their positions attempting to pose as a threat, but, at the same time, hoping that we will remain defensively oriented around the cities and not attack them.

We must stop thinking about the next VC attack and start thinking, all of us, of continuing to carry the attack to the enemy. We are fully capable of doing it. It is true that our forces have been operating at a fast pace for thirty days and we have suffered heavy casualties. Some may be tired. However, the main thing now is our state of mind. It will be the side that perseveres and carries the fight to the enemy that wins. And we are going to do it.

Throughout the country we are moving to a general offensive.

In IV Corps Gen Thang has just taken command and he is working on plans to launch a major offensive in Dinh Tuong Province, commencing on 6 or 7 March. It will involve a major portion of the 7th ARVN Division and about two thirds of the 9th U.S. Division under Gen Ewell. Gen Weyand will provide helo support, an air cavalry troop and additional artillery. The objectives of the operation will be to defeat the four main force battalions in Dinh Tuong, restore the security around My Tho, secure and repave Highway 4, reestablish--and relocate as necessary--the Regional Forces/Popular Forces outposts, and further the regional development program. This operation will be the first event of a major corps wide offensive which Gen Thang will initiate. It will have one name (Vietnamese) and will be properly publicized so as to make the broadest possible impact.

In III Corps, a similar plan is being worked out by Gens Weyand and Khang. It will embrace the five provinces around Saigon--and will be a one named joint U.S./VN operation. It will also be one of the largest ever conducted in III Corps and will continue until the enemy is defeated or driven out of the area. It will commence nearly simultaneously with the IV Corps offensive and will be properly reported so as to have maximum impact.

At the same time, in northern I Corps, we will move into high gear in the next few days. With over 20 percent of all U.S./ARVN maneuver battalions in this area, and with the logistic situation improving daily, we are in an excellent posture as to commence a broad offensive.

The operations in I & III Corps will be supported by the maximum use of tactical air and B-52 strikes. For the time being, I must keep priority of air at Khe Sanh but I am prepared to make massive shifts, particularly of B-52s, to Ashau Valley or to III Corps, when the weather permits tactical air to provide visual attack support for Khe Sanh.

In II Corps, we are not planning on one major offensive. However, the ROKs are on the move along the coast in a multi-battalion operation. Gen Peers/4/ is prepared to wage a major battle against the enemy forces in Kontum or Darlac Provinces. His spirit is aggressive and he has the exact frame of mind required to conduct the economy of force operations which his situation requires. Peers has a new counterpart, Maj Gen Lu Lan, who at the outset has displayed an aggressive spirit.

On Monday Gen Vien and I are meeting with Gens Weyand and Khang and their division commanders to discuss their plans for the immediate implementation of this offensive strategy.

Tomorrow afternoon Vien has invited at my suggestion the Free World commanders to his headquarters to give them the benefit of his offensive attitude. Since it is not within Vien's character to use forceful language I will provide the necessary emphasis in a follow-up.

Today I will visit Gens Abrams, Cushman and Rosson/5/ to review their plans.

I hope that the impact of these simultaneous major operations will convince the people in SVN and Washington that we are not waiting for either the VC to resume the initiative, or for someone to help us. The time is ripe to move out and we will do so.

We will emphasize the offensive nature of the current operations in future reports, without distorting the perspective.

Washington, March 4, 1968, 1:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

SUBJECT
The Clifford Committee

1. After much debate, there should be before you at 5:30 this afternoon an agreed paper./2/

2. The essence of the agreement is:

--We should send to Westy in, say, the next three months, whatever we can send him that would be helpful in the tense battle he may face before the weather changes; but the condition of our Reserves does not permit us to get much to him in this time interval (perhaps 30,000)./3/

--We should call up Reserves sufficient to meet the rest of his requirements if it is later judged that the rest of his request must and should be met;

--These two actions require that we reconstitute the U.S. strategic Reserve. The exact scale of this reconstitution has not been agreed in the group nor the exact recommended combination of increased draft call and Reserve call-up. All hands agree, however, that our basic national security position requires the reconstitution of our Reserve position if we are not to tempt aggressors in various parts of the world.

3. It was agreed that we should make a maximum effort to encourage and induce improved Vietnamese military and political perform-ance. The particular headings for discussion with and pressure of the GVN are pretty well worked out.

As part of this effort there should be a program for improving the equipment of the ARVN; and a rough package has been worked out for that purpose of, say, $400 million.

4. It was agreed that there should be a fresh review of our strategy in Viet Nam; that this should be urgently conducted and completed before you are asked to make a commitment to send Westy forces beyond the tranche recommended for the next three months.

5. On the economic side, Joe Fowler would propose that the increased budgetary outlay for Fiscal 68-69 be offset dollar for dollar mainly by a tax increase, but he believes a program reduction of civilian outlays in Fiscal 69 will be required in the $2-$3 billion range. He has further recommendations in the field of manpower policy and administration and wage/price policy, but does not recommend formal wage and price controls. Since the recommended package is only now beginning to take shape, Secretary Fowler has not discussed it with Okun, Zwick,/4/ or Califano.

You should know that the discussion we have had in these days has been colored by one major uncertainty and a widely shared reservation. The uncertainty is: what are enemy capabilities, and what are U.S. and ARVN capabilities in the days, weeks, and several months ahead?

We all have the feeling that the battle is likely to be pretty close. If the enemy brings in additional North Vietnamese forces, it could become dangerous for our side; and it will go badly for our side unless we can induce the ARVN to go out and fight in the countryside. On the other hand, if we and the ARVN prove capable of taking the offensive along the lines in Westy's latest cable, we could make 1968 the year of decision. Thus, the performance of the Vietnamese and the ARVN is critical and the exact state of the enemy which we won't know until we engage him or he engages us. Therefore, in looking ahead over the next months and considering Westy's request, we don't know whether we are being asked to send forces to prevent a radical deterioration in our side's position, or to permit him to conduct in the second half of the year a vigorous offensive.

The reservation, which goes deep in State and Defense, is that the additional forces would constitute a gross over-commitment of U.S. military resources to Viet Nam without bringing us closer to a resolution of the problem. Behind that judgment, in turn, is a feeling that we can only attain our objectives in Viet Nam by a negotiation which brings the Viet Cong into the political process, and this negotiation, in turn, may not be much advanced by putting additional U.S. forces into the country. Secretary Rusk, for example, is thinking in terms of setting an absolute limit on U.S. forces and then leaving the rest of the job up to the South Vietnamese.

The group did not address itself to an extremely important question, which is precisely how this package would be presented to the Congress and the country.

I have some ideas about this; and I am sure others do also.

As for the Congress, there was a general feeling that this will be a difficult matter; probably possible; but we might confront some extremely ugly and determined opposition from Fulbright, Gore, etc.--perhaps including a filibuster.

The differences of view about bombing and mining Haiphong were so profound within the group, and other issues so urgently required resolution, that the bombing question was put to one side for separate and later treatment.

Walt

Washington, March 4, 1968.

General Westmoreland has requested an additional 205,000 troops (beyond the 525,000 personnel now authorized). He asks for the deployment in three packages, by May 1, September 1 and December 31.

General Wheeler believes we should prepare ourselves to meet the request for an additional 205,000 personnel and should act to increase and improve our strategic reserve in the United States. An initial staff examination of requirements indicates that to achieve both will require:

a. A call-up of reserve units and individuals totaling approximately 262,000 (194,000 in units, 68,000 as individuals).

b. Increased draft calls.

c. Extension of terms of service. These actions would produce a total increase in end strength in the Armed Forces of approximately 511,000 by June 30, 1969. (The staff examination referred to above included spaces to add 31,500 troops in South Korea and a US naval proposal to add two cruisers and fifteen destroyers to the naval forces in Southeast Asia. If these proposals are disapproved in their entirety, the figures above will be decreased to approximately 242,000 and 454,000 respectively.)

A build-up of roughly these dimensions would enable us to meet the Westmoreland request and, in any event, would reconstitute the strategic reserve in the United States.

We recommend:

1. An immediate decision to deploy to Vietnam an estimated total of 22,000 additional personnel (approximately 60% of which would be combat). An immediate decision to deploy the three tactical fighter squadrons deferred from Program 5 (about 1,000 men). This would be over and above the four battalions (about 3,700 men) already planned for deployment in April which in themselves would bring us slightly above the 525,000 authorized level. The argument for this immediate action, and detailed schedules of availability is contained in Tab A./2/

2. Either through Ambassador Bunker or through an early visit by Secretary Clifford, a highly forceful approach to the GVN (Thieu and Ky) to get certain key commitments for improvement, tied to our own increased effort and to increased US support for the ARVN. Details are in Tab B./3/

3. Early approval of a Reserve call-up and an increased end strength adequate to meet the balance of the Westmoreland request and to restore a strategic reserve in the United States, adequate for possible contingencies world-wide. Supporting discussion and details are in Tab C./4/

4. Reservation of the decision to meet the Westmoreland request in full. While we would be putting ourselves in a position to make these additional deployments, the future decision to do so would be contingent upon:

a. Reexamination on a week-by-week basis of the desirability of further deployments as the situation develops;

b. Improved political performance by the GVN and increased contribution in effective military action by the ARVN;

c. The results of a study in depth, to be initiated immediately, of possible new political and strategic guidance for the conduct of US operations in South Vietnam, and of our Vietnamese policy in the context of our world-wide politico-military strategy. Supporting discussion is in Tab D./5/

5. No new peace initiative on Vietnam. Re-statement of our terms for peace and certain limited diplomatic actions to dramatize Laos and to focus attention on the total threat to Southeast Asia. Details in Tab E./6/

6. A general decision on bombing policy, not excluding future change, but adequate to form a basis for discussion with the Congress on this key aspect. Here your advisers are divided:

a. General Wheeler and others would advocate a substantial extension of targets and authority in and near Hanoi and Haiphong, mining of Haiphong, and naval gunfire up to a Chinese Buffer Zone;

b. Others would advocate a seasonal step-up through the spring, but without these added elements.

The opposing arguments are in Tab F./7/

In proposing this course of action, we recognize that there are certain difficulties and negative factors, outlined in Tab G. Additional problems we can anticipate in US public opinion are at Tab H./8/ Nevertheless, we believe that this course of action, in its essential outline at least, is urgently required to meet the immediate situation in Vietnam as well as wider possible contingencies there and elsewhere.

Washington, March 4, 1968.

The President: As I told you last week, I wanted you to return today with your recommendations in response to General Westmoreland's request. Among the things I asked you to study were the following questions:

1. What particular forces are you recommending that we dispatch immediately? How do we get these forces?

2. How soon could we formulate what we want from the South Vietnamese?

3. What difficulties do you foresee with your recommendations, both with the Congress and financially?

(There was an Agenda for the meeting prepared by Walt Rostow. That agenda is attached as Appendix A.)/2/

/2/Memorandum from Rostow to the President, March 4. (Ibid., Declassified and Sanitized Documents from Unprocessed Files, Vietnam)

As I understand it, Clark Clifford, Secretary Rusk, and Rostow and others have been meeting on these questions in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Walt Rostow: That is correct.

Clark Clifford: Paul Nitze and I started to work on this Friday night./3/ As you could understand, with the time pressure we placed upon ourselves there still may need to be refinements and adjustments to the program I will discuss.

/3/March 1.

We have tried to make this document clear and understandable. (Undersecretary Nitze passed out prior to the meeting copies of a "Draft Memorandum for the President." A copy of that document is attached.)/4/

The subject is a very profound one, and I consider it advisable to outline the difficulty we face and the central problem which your advisers see you facing.

As you know, from time to time, the military leaders in the field ask for additional forces. We have, in the past, met these requests until we are now at the point where we have agreed to supply up to 525,000 men to General Westmoreland.

He now has asked for 205,000 additional troops. There are three questions:

1. Should the President send 205,000?

2. Should the President not send any more?

3. Should the President approve a figure somewhere in between and send an alternative number?

Your senior advisers have conferred on this matter at very great length. There is a deep-seated concern by your advisers. There is a concern that if we say, yes, and step up with the addition of 205,000 more men that we might continue down the road as we have been without accomplishing our purpose--which is for a viable South Vietnam which can live in peace.

We are not convinced that our present policy will bring us to that objective.

As I said before, we spent hours discussing this matter. For a while, we thought and had the feeling that we understood the strength of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. You will remember the rather optimistic reports of General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker last year.

Frankly, it came as a shock that the Vietcong-North Vietnamese had the strength of force and skill to mount the Tet offensive--as they did. They struck 34 cities, made strong inroads in Saigon and in Hue. There have been very definite effects felt in the countryside.

At this stage, it is clear that this new request by General Westmoreland brings the President to a clearly defined watershed:

1. Do you continue to go down that same road of "more troops, more guns, more planes, more ships?"

2. Do you go on killing more Viet Cong and more North Vietnamese and killing more Vietcong and more North Vietnamese?

Even were we to meet this full request of 205,000 men, and the pattern continues as it has, it is likely that by March he (General Westmoreland) may want another 200,000 to 300,000 men with no end in sight.

The country we are trying to save is being subjected to enormous damage. Perhaps the country we are trying to save is relying on the United States too much. When we look ahead, we may find that we may actually be denigrating their ability to take over their own country rather than contributing to their ability to do it.

We recommend an immediate decision to deploy to Vietnam an estimated total of 22,000 additional personnel. We would agree to get them to General Westmoreland right away. It would be valuable for the general to know they are coming so he can make plans accordingly.

This is as far as we are willing to go. We would go ahead, however, and call up a sufficient number of men. If later the President decides Westmoreland needs additional reinforcements, you will have men to meet that contingency.

The President: Westmoreland is asking for 200,000 men, and you are recommending 20,000 or so?

Clark Clifford: The strategic reserves in the United States are deeply depleted. They must be built up. Senator Russell has said this. We do not know what might happen anywhere around the world, but to face any emergency we will need to strengthen the reserve.

Out of this buildup you can meet additional requests from Westmoreland in the event you decide he needs more than the 22,000 later. The first increment will meet his needs for the next three to four months.

Westmoreland must not have realized it, but it would have taken much longer than he had anticipated to provide the men and units he originally requested anyway. We could not meet that schedule.

We suggest that you go ahead and get the manpower ready. If they are not really necessary for Vietnam, they can be added to the Strategic Reserve to strengthen it.

We are not sure the present strategy is the right strategy--that of being spread out all over the country with a seek and destroy policy.

We are not convinced that this is the right way, that it is the right long-term course to take. We are not sure under the circumstances which exist that a conventional military victory, as commonly defined, can be had.

There will be considerably higher casualties if we follow the Westmoreland plan. It just follows that if we increase our troop commitment by 200,000 men, there will be significantly higher casualties.

We may want to consider using our men as a "shield" behind which the government of South Vietnam could strengthen itself and permit the ARVN to be strengthened.

Under the present situation, there is a good deal of talk about what the Arvn "will do" but when the crunch is on, when the crunch comes, they look to us for more. When they got into the Tet offensive, Thieu's statement wasn't what more they could do but that "it is time for more U.S. troops." There is no easy answer to this.

If we continue with our present policy of adding more troops and increasing our commitment, this policy may lead us into Laos and Cambodia.

The reserve forces in North Vietnam are a cause for concern as well. They have a very substantial population from which to draw. They have no trouble whatever organizing, equipping, and training their forces.

We seem to have a sinkhole. We put in more--they match it. We put in more--they match it.

The South Vietnamese are not doing all they should do.

The Soviets and the Chinese have agreed to keep the North Vietnamese well armed and well supplied.

The Vietcong are now better armed than the ARVN. They have:

--better rifles

--better training

--more sophisticated weapons (mortars, artillery, rockets).

I want to give a whole new look at the whole situation. There is strong unanimity on this. If it were possible, we would want to look at the situation without sending more troops to him. But we should send the 22,000--that is, until a new policy decision is reached. And that 22,000--that will be it until that decision is made.

We can no longer rely just on the field commander. He can want troops and want troops and want troops. We must look at the overall impact on us, including the situation here in the United States. We must look at our economic stability, our other problems in the world, our other problems at home; we must consider whether or not this thing is tieing us down so that we cannot do some of the other things we should be doing; and finally, we must consider the effects of our actions on the rest of the world--are we setting an example in Vietnam through which other nations would rather not go if they are faced with a similar threat?

It is out of caution and for protection that we recommend these additional forces.

I can assure the President that we can reexamine this situation with complete protection to our present position.

We do recommend the following actions:

1. A callup of reserve units and individuals totaling approximately 262,000 (194,000 in units; 68,000 as individuals).

2. An increase in the draft calls.

3. Extension of terms of service.

These actions would produce a total increase in strength in the Armed Forces of approximately 511,000 by June 30, 1969.

This proposal includes 31,600 troops for deployment to South Korea. I would oppose that. It also includes a U.S. navy unit.

If the troops for South Korea and the naval units are disapproved, the figures would be decreased to approximately 242,000 reservists called up and 454,000 total increase in troop strength.

If you do wish to meet the additional troop request, or further demands of Westmoreland you can do it out of this pool of 242,000.

If you did not, the Strategic Reserve would be strengthened by their addition. This would, in the opinion of the JCS, put the Strategic Reserve "just about right."

As part and parcel of policy decisions, it is important to have a very clear understanding with the government of South Vietnam. They should know that your eventual decision about more troops and more use of U.S. support depends to a large part on their attitude.

We should tell the South Vietnamese that the General has asked for 200,000 more troops, but we are giving only 25,000. We should let them know that you are delaying your decision until you know what the GVN will do about:

--removal of the poor unit commanders

--meaningful steps to eliminate corruption

--meeting their own leadership responsibilities

--not only saying they will do something, but meaning it as well.

If they are not, we should know it now.

I suggest you allow yourself greater degree of latitude and flexibility. There possibly is another plan which can be utilized. There may be another way to avoid more bloodshed to us, possibly by letting go some areas.

We should consider changing our concept from one of protecting real estate to protecting people. We need to see if these people are really going to take care of themselves eventually. I am not sure we can ever find our way out if we continue to shovel men into Vietnam.

We have looked at all your questions. The answers to each of them are included in the context of the document before you tonight.

We say, for example, that this is not the time to negotiate.

We have spent the last three days trying to reach a consensus. As we sat together and cross-fertilized, we have reached a general consensus on this.

Of course, if we had to vote on sending the straight 200,000 men or no men, we would come out all over the lot . . . we would be split all over the place.

This is the overall approach we would recommend.

The President: Does this change the tour of duty?

General Wheeler: The tour of duty in Vietnam is not changed. We feel this is an essential reason for the high morale. It is the total length of service which will be lengthened.

The President: Does it affect the man with 4 years service the same as the draftee?

General Wheeler: Yes, sir. It would apply to all types. Of course, there are some men we would not want to extend.

The President: Have we done this before (extend tours)?

Undersecretary Nitze: Yes, sir. At least twice. At one time, the Secretary of the Navy had the authority to do this. I did it for a period during Vietnam. The Congress took this authority away last year to put it on an equal basis with the other services.

General Wheeler: We did it at the same time of the Berlin airlift. Also during the Cuban missile crisis, I believe.

Secretary Rusk: Mr. President, without a doubt, this will be one of the most serious decisions you will have made since becoming President. This has implications for all of our society.

First, on the review of strategic guidance: we want the Vietnamese to do their full share and be able to survive when we leave. This was one of the things that saved us in Korea. The question is whether substantial additional troops would eventually increase or decrease South Vietnamese strength.

We may very well find that there are equipment factors that would create competition among our new U.S. forces being sent out to Vietnam and the South Vietnamese. Many of us would like to see the ARVN equipped better and supplied with the M-16 rifles.

We must also consider what would happen to our NATO troop policies. To reduce NATO troops is a serious matter indeed.

We have also got to think of what this troop increase would mean in terms of increased taxes, the balance of payments picture, inflation, gold, and the general economic picture.

We should study moving away from the geographic approach of Vietnam strategy to a demographic approach.

On the negotiation front, I wish we had a formula to bring about a peaceful settlement soon. We do not. The North Vietnamese are pressing against Laos and Thailand. The Chinese are leaning against Burma and Cambodia.

During the day we had two additional comebacks on two probes which we made. The Shah of Iran saw Hanoi's representative. The Hanoi representative pressed the Shah to get us to accept some of their conditions--those Hanoi had laid down. He said he wanted to see the Shah again./5/

The Rumanian was in again. I asked him if after the winter-spring offensive the Hanoi government would take a different position. He said he thought they were giving some thought to it./6/

I think we should make public some of our peace efforts. Clark Clifford has outlined well the problems. Appendix G and H/7/ will show the divisive element we must face if we move forward with this decision.

The President: Why not an extension of enlistments at the same time of the callup of reserves? Why can't we have the callup now, with the extension of enlistments later if needed?

General Wheeler: The extension is the best way to quickly build up the Strategic Reserve. We need men with leadership and experience to train new men and to expand and improve our replacements.

Nitze: We could say that no man would be extended for more than a certain period of time.

Wheeler: On that point (whether Congress will go for an extension of enlistments) you have a better feel than I.

President: Russell says you must call up reserves before extending enlistments.

Wheeler: The callup must be phased anyway. When you announce callup, you should announce the dates of the callup of the units.

I talked to the JCS today. General Chapman says he needs a certain number of Marine Reserves to fill out the 4th Marine Wing.

Clifford: I suggest a package approach including:

--the callup of reserves

--extension of enlistments

--callup of individuals.

By the time Congress took action on the extension, we would be calling men up anyway. If we did not get extensions we would be along with the regular unit callup anyway.

President: I don't question the need for a callup. How many men can you get by voluntary extensions?

Nitze: Very few. We got only 900 last time.

President: What about incentives?

Wheeler: We have some very good incentives.

President: How much of an increase in draft calls?

Nitze: About an increase of 150,000 men in 6 months. The draft call is up to 48,000. They have been running 30,000. The increase would have them running about 45,000.

President: How about men who haven't served?

Wheeler: They are not as well trained. We need men with experience.

In FY 68, 341,000 men are to be inducted. Need an additional 100,000 this year.

Rusk: What is annual increment of inductees?

Wheeler: We have enormous pool of men available.

President: How many in Project 100,000?/8/

Nitze: 60,000 approximately. In Phase I, quota was 40,000. There were 49,000 volunteered. In Phase II, there is a quota of 100,000. In first three months, 31,000 have volunteered. That is far above quota for that period.

Fowler: We would need an entirely new fiscal program to offset expenditures dollar for dollar. I would forecast an increase in expenditures of $2.5 billion in fiscal 68 and $10 billion in fiscal 69. There would be an adverse balance of payments impact of $500 million.

The adoption of this program would require a new fiscal program. These things are necessary:

--a new fiscal package

--a new mutual security package (separating all project assistance for South Vietnam, Thailand, and Korea from the current foreign aid arrangement)

--agreement on reserve management

--increase in the tax proposal so that we could offset expenditures

--cut low priority civilian programs (a $2-$3 billion cut in program outlays would be required).

An increase in the force level by 500,000 men would put pressure on manpower and employment. The cream of the labor force, men twenty years of age or older, already is way down low in unemployment.

We will have some area and skill shortages. This will have its pluses and its minuses. We could then begin to focus our training and manpower development programs on a specific area or specific skill. We could, by this, minimize the manpower shortages.

We would have to have additional procurement. There would need to be an assessment of materiel and supply program. Also judgments must be made on our economic and stabilization policies. I would ask Okum, Martin, Zwick and I to determine if--

--standby credit controls should be used

--we should have authority to deal with flareups in the wage-price field.

Dick Helms: I feel that the study of the last 3-4 days has shown that we must replenish our Strategic Reserve. If you look at conditions throughout the world, you can easily see that we need it.

Rusk: I would go to Congress for specific actions not for a statement of policy such as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. We do not want a general declaration.

President: In the Senate we face a real problem. Anything that requires any authority may result in a filibuster.

Wheeler: If we could provide Westy with the troops he wants I would recommend they be sent. They cannot be provided. This (the 22,000) is what we can do by 15 June.

I find nothing wrong with going along with this track. I recommend these additional forces: 4 battalions of infantry; 3 tactical fighter squadrons; an additional 6 tactical fighter squadrons (2 by 1 April; 3 by 1 May; 1 by 1 June); 1 Marine RLT of the 4th Marine Division; and 1 Battalion of Seabees (700 men).

This is all we can do by 15 June.

With the callup of the reserves, you still can meet Westmoreland's request by 1 September and 1 December--but not by May 1.

President: Why Seabees?

Wheeler: We need to expand that unit of personnel.

Walt Rostow: There are two matters that need to be looked into in this study:

1. The question of North Vietnamese Reserves. There are two schools of thought on this. Some believe they can put additional men into battle easily, and match our forces. Some think they are limited.

2. I think we should cast aside the generalities about military solution vs. diplomatic solution; or population strategy vs. real estate protection.

I agree we must build up the ARVN and the GVN. They are the reason we are there. Ought to bring them along on the Southern solution. That is, we need to talk candidly with them and develop a frank dialogue about the matters between us.

We need to look for a fresh summary of the reasons for mining Haiphong. There may be additional military steps to resolve the matter sooner.

The Russians really have not had difficult choices. We should look at a course of harder as well as softer policy.

Nitze: I differ with Walt on that. We need to build up the Arvn and the government. The real impact depends on whether the ARVN can pick themselves up. We must use the ARVN more effectively.

It is clear that our strategic reserves are inadequate. We must rebuild them.

Wheeler: Prior to Vietnam, the Strategic Reserves had 12 divisions (9 Army and 3 Marines).

Now they have 4-2/3 Army (none of which are deployable) and 1-1/9 Marines (not deployable).

Nitze: We must get into negotiations some time soon. These fellows are not necessarily the key (the contacts such as the Rumanian or the Shah).

We must make up our own minds when we want to cease the bombings and see what happens.

We have to look at what we can do to get into negotiations. We must choose our own time. We should do this no later than May or June.

Rusk: We could stop the bombing during the rainy period in the North.

President: Really "get on your horses" on that.

Vice President: I have no comment on anything. I really just have been learning tonight.

General Taylor: We are all for this recommendation tonight--but all for different reasons. I frankly was startled to learn that we can't send more than 22,000 men.

I also want to know if this is a year of despair or a year of opportunity. I think it is the latter.

Westy may get into trouble between now and June. He could lose a lot of politically valuable terrain.

We should bear this in mind. The first three pages of the document. I agree with that.

The tab on new Strategic Guidance./9/ I agree we should review this, but we may not be able to reduce the blood requirement, the troop requirement, and the other necessities.

Let's not delude ourselves about the ARVN. They will try--they will give us the right answers--but don't count on them to do too much in a short period of time.

President: Have you told Westmoreland you would only send this number and we could give no more by June 1?

Wheeler: No, I will tell him after this meeting.

President: Tell him to forget the 100,000. Tell him 22,000 is all we can give at the moment./10/

Rusk: I see new fighting has begun.

Wheeler: They are planning to crank up a new offensive. I told Westy that combined operations would draw the ARVN out.

President: If the ARVN are not equipped as well as the Vietcong, isn't that a sad commentary on us?

Nitze: It may be possible to supply all ARVN with M-16s, and grenade launchers and machine guns. We have armed personnel carriers on the way out to Westmoreland now.

Wheeler: We are also shipping tanks and choppers.

President: Have we gotten through the engine bottleneck on the choppers?

Nitze: No

President: Let's do everything we can on choppers. Otherwise, I am going to bring that over here to handle. Get them working six day weeks, if necessary.

Washington, March 5, 1968.

The President: I will be meeting with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow evening. Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Aiken, and Hickenlooper./2/

Secretary Rusk: You should remind them that we were not bombing Hanoi and Haiphong about six months of last year. He (Senator Fulbright) doesn't seem to give us credit for that.

The President: Well, Nixon has taken note of it. He has accused us of gradualism and stated that we would have ended the war sooner had it not been for this policy of gradualism./3/

Secretary Rusk: There may be a point to that. If back under President Kennedy we had recommended and approved putting in 100,000 men it might have saved things.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]

The President: O.K. on that. What about the suggestions of last night?

Secretary Rusk: There is one idea which would throw additional responsibility on Hanoi. (Secretary Rusk read a statement about cessation of bombing.)/4/

My guess is that it would last about three days. It would not hold up if they attacked Khesanh or the cities. By the time the bad weather had ended, if there is no response by Hanoi, we could resume it.

General Wheeler has some targets with him today. They consider the possibility of bombing inside Haiphong itself. This is not a recommendation yet. We will see what develops.

General Wheeler: I sent General Westmoreland the message you asked me to give him last night. I told him of the report of your committee and that we did not have the capability to send more than 22,000 men to him at this time. But I emphasized that no decision has yet been made on this.

The general said he is going to publicize the offensive U.S. troops are about to undertake.

Clark Clifford: I feel not. If the offensive does not come off as well as planned, we would have an added burden.

Secretary Rusk: Let's emphasize what we have done after it is over--not our expectations or what we will do.

The President: Let's don't get these people to expect more than we can deliver.

Rusk: It's fatal to promise more than we can get. Also, it is wrong to expect more of the ARVN than we can deliver.

The President: It looks like we should have two or three suppliers of choppers and weapons.

Also, it appears we are about to make a rather basic change in the strategy of this war, if:

--we tell the ARVN to do more fighting.

--we tell them we will give 20,000 men; no more.

--we tell them we will do no more until they do more.

--we tell them we will be prepared to make additional troop contributions but not unless they "get with it."

I frankly doubt you will get much out of them unless they have a good coach, the right plays, and the best equipment.

Secretary Rusk: Let's put on a massive helicopter program. We always can use them. There is substantial demand for their use as civilian evacuation. They will be put to good use, no matter what the number.

The President: Let's get that firm on a 7-day week, three shifts. I see that Paul Nitze was wrong. They are not on it now. The engines are the limiting factor. Let's do something to clear that up. Let's get that M-16 production up too--right away.

Rusk: What about the possibility of getting foreign production of choppers.

General Wheeler: I think the President is aware of the feeling in the Congress about "buying at home."

Clifford: The chopper firm can go to 3 shifts, six days a week. They need the 7th day for maintenance. It is interesting that the firm is opening a new plant in Charleston, S.C. This will get production up from 200 to 300/month.

The President: Do we want to talk over this strategy change with Congress?

Clifford: That depends on the President's attitude toward the recommendations.

The President: I am ready to sign on except for how we handle the announcement--what we say and the timing of it.

I would be guided by Senators Russell, Mansfield, Rivers and Dirksen on what to say--as well as talks with the other leaders. I think we should announce the reserve call-up with a full explanation.

I think we should say at the same time that we may ask for specialists and the extension of tours of duty.

Let's make it clear that we are not going to lengthen the tours in Vietnam. The tour there will still be 12 months.

Buzz, you and Clark go this afternoon and talk with Russell. Tell him you are about to recommend this to the President. See if he can swallow:

--a call-up of reserves

--authority to call specialists

--extension of enlistments.

If he can, let's see if he can "march it through" the Senate and the Congress.

Clark Clifford: The first thing Russell will want to know is what Westmoreland has asked for.

On these figures, I want to know if they should include the 31,000 for Korea and the naval cruisers and destroyers. 511,000 total strength sounds large; 454,000 sounds better.

I think the lower figure (without the 31,000 for Korea and the naval vessels) is easier to sell.

General Wheeler: I think we should work on three solutions, and the JCS is doing that:

Solution One: The full package of 511,000. This includes the troops for South Korea and the naval vessels.

Solution Two: This includes 8,500 men for Korea for the security of the air bases. It would drop out the two cruisers and the 15 destroyers.

Solution Three: No cruisers. No destroyers. No troops for South Korea. On this, I suggest we talk in terms of a call-up of 240,000 with an end strength of 450,000.

General Taylor: Have we promised the Koreans anything?

The President: No.

Secretary Rusk: In Korea, they have a population which is entirely with its forces. We do not want a conventional war. And we do not see any evidence of any offensive intervention by North Korea into the South.

The President: Let's get Colt working around the clock on those

M-16s. Also let's consider opening two additional sources of supply. Waive that contract with Colt, if necessary before June. Let's get on with this. Don't wait until June either.

General Taylor: Is that the fully modified version of the M-16?

General Wheeler: Yes.

General Taylor: Is the powder any problem?

The President: Is that the ammo?

General Wheeler: There is no problem on that. They have worked this out./5/

The President: I agree with General Johnson on this proposal to hurry-up the dispatch to Vietnam of 3 maneuver battalions. Their current ETA is March 28, April 6, and April 15.

What about the 2,250 B-52 capability?

General Wheeler: We can give him surge capability, but not a sustained level.

Clark Clifford: Are you (The President) authorizing me to take whatever steps that are necessary to increase chopper and M-16 production?

The President: Yes. Let's also give the South Vietnamese the best equipment we can.

Get the engine company high behind. Let's see if somebody else can't make that engine.

Secretary Rusk: I think we should investigate the possibility of foreign production.

The President: Let's also look at the fixed wing plane proposal. That proposal will run $2.29 billion.

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of Berlin.]

The President: I will talk with Russell about the Gulf of Tonkin. He may have put Hollings up to proposing that the resolution be withdrawn, and then vote against his own motion to get people to take sides.

The hawks want the others to put up or shut up.

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the retrieval of a Soviet missile.]

Washington, March 5, 1968.

SUBJECT
Herewith what I tried to convey to you on Sunday/2/

American public opinion can stand a long drawn out military campaign with few casualties or a relatively short campaign with high casualties (such as World War II which from the American standpoint began with heavy combat operations in December 1942 and ended in April 1945, i.e., two and one-half years). But American public opinion cannot stand a long drawn out war with high casualties. As far as the overwhelming mass of public opinion is concerned, the big thing is U.S. casualties. If they go down, none of the other things matter very much. And Vietnamese civilian casualties would go down too.

It would be most imprudent to expect quick results in Viet-Nam. The central purpose, after all, is to build a nation and this involves psychological changes which usually come gradually. As realists we should assume a protracted effort--hopefully with low casualties. If things should go quicker than we expect, so much the better.

The policy of the U.S. military in Viet-Nam has consistently--and rightly--been to conduct what is called "offensive operations." But these are defined as "search and destroy"--and this raises serious questions.

Such a definition clearly implies a belief that an exclusively military victory is conceivable and that if we just get out and destroy enough Viet Cong the war will come to an end. This is the so-called "war of attrition."

Such a war was sound doctrine in World War II, but it is not realistic in the Viet-Nam war. It is not possible to win the war by killing the enemy by military means on the ground in South Viet-Nam. The hard core terrorist guerrilla certainly cannot be reached that way. He will only be reached when the people give enough information about the terrorists so that they can be rooted out by police-type methods. This is what is meant by "pacification" which, in turn, is the first step in "nation-building." And the North Vietnamese soldier can be better reached by bombing North Viet-Nam and by being apprehended when he reaches his so-called "safe haven" in South Viet-Nam.

The following questions, therefore, arise:

a) has there not been unnecessary killing of people on our side because of the policy of "search and destroy," in particular by the devastating effect of our artillery and airpower on Vietnamese civilians and buildings?

b) has not this tactic failed to do the job?

c) has it not also created an undue number of refugees?

d) has it not made heavy demands on precious intellectual and physical energies which might otherwise have been aimed at nation-building, which is the most promising way to achieve a durable result?

Might we not, therefore, do much better if we defined the phrase "offensive operations" as meaning "split up the enemy and keep him off balance"? In accordance with this definition the U.S. military would be playing its own utterly indispensable part: acting as a shield behind which the Vietnamese nation-building and pacification operations can take place.

Someone who enjoys the President's confidence and has a good grounding in military and political matters, but who is not in the regular military hierarchy, should see whether a policy of "split up and keep off balance" would not result in fewer U.S. casualties, fewer refugees and at the same time actually expedite the pacification program, by relea