Docs 108-131
108. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 6, 1968, 10:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 65. Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
Herewith some personal thoughts on the war.
Objective: The art of the next two or three months would be to produce a situation in which Hanoi decided to end the war. If that is impossible, the objective is to produce a situation in the second half of the year in which our side is clearly moving forward.
Present Situation: We are clearly in the midst of an unresolved critical battle. The enemy is committed--having taken stock of his immediate post-Tet situation--to continue to throw forces into the battle at a rate almost four times his average for 1967: he is losing about 1,000 KIA per day as opposed to 241 per day in 1967. He did increase his order of battle in the days before Tet--with several additional North Vietnamese divisions, North Vietnamese fillers for VC main force units, plus hasty recruiting for VC units. But there is no evidence he can sustain present rates for more than a matter of a few months.
At the moment the enemy appears to be trying to pin Delta and Saigon allied forces close to the cities; draw Westy's reserves to the Western frontiers (Kontum-Pleiku); and strike a decisive blow in I Corps. The threat forming up around Hue is major (perhaps 5-6000 enemy troops). Westy is trying to put his Delta and Saigon forces on to the offensive; deal with the Western highlands economically; fight a decisive battle in I Corps.
To maximize the chance that we achieve our objective, these things should happen:
--the ARVN and the GVN should put on a performance which convinces Hanoi, the U.S., and Moscow that they are viable and must be considered a major factor in a settlement;
--above all, Westy must win as decisive a victory at Hue--and in I Corps--as he can;
--the U.S. must behave in the days ahead in a way to make clear we have the will and staying power to carry on;
--the supply prospects for North Viet Nam over the coming months and year must be worsened;
--the GVN--from a position of strength--must put forward a powerful new appeal and proposal for peace in the South.
The proper timing of this sequence is critical.
A Proposal for Consideration:
The best trigger point would be:
--a major battle around Hue, initiated either by the enemy or by Westy going out to get these forces before they are set;
--plus some success in the battles Westy tells us are about to begin as Thang moves to the offensive in the Delta and our forces move out simultaneously against the enemy's Saigon divisions. This should happen in the next few days.
When the battle is joined we do two things:
--go for the Clifford package, beginning with a reserve call-up;/2/
/2/The Reserve call-up may not be able to wait until the battle is joined; but the best time to mine the ports--should you decide to do so--would be at the height of battle. [Footnote in the source text.]
--mine the North Vietnamese ports with delayed-action mines, telling international shipping to get out of North Vietnamese territorial waters.
At Tab A is a fresh analysis of the mining problem done by Bob Ginsburgh at my request./3/ Mining by itself would not be decisive; but it will be costly to the enemy. The maximum predicted Soviet reaction would be to bring in mine-sweepers and shoot their way through. (This is what the Czech general, recently defected, has said; but since we're not blockading, there is nothing to shoot except mines.)
/3/Not printed.
Against this background--and assuming some tactical success in the forthcoming battles--we persuade Thieu to take the offensive for peace:
--appealing to all Vietnamese to stop the bloodshed;
--offering to talk to any Southerners on the basis of converting the war into politics under a constitutional one-man-one-vote system.
We could accompany the offer with a temporary stoppage of bombing.
The whole sequence hinges, of course, on some tactical success on the ground in coming days and, especially, one clear-cut victory--hopefully at Hue. Thieu must feel he is operating from some strength.
Not since the Civil War has quite so much hinged for our country on immediate battlefield events.
As for Hanoi and the Russians: I do not believe a Communist takeover of South Viet Nam is regarded as a vital Soviet interest. The Chinese will oppose, but are not likely to occupy North Viet Nam. Hanoi may have entered the winter-spring offensive with the same judgment at high levels that they have conveyed to low levels; namely, 1968 must be the Year of Decision.
What happens if we fail in I Corps? I doubt that the North Vietnamese can drive Westy from I Corps; but a setback would not be a good occasion for a peace initiative. But we should proceed to lay the extra burden on the North Vietnamese supply system via mining.
This is a line of thought--not a firm recommendation. I believe it deserves some examination.
Walt
109. Editorial Note
From 6:47 p.m. to 9:22 p.m. on March 6, 1968, President Johnson discussed Vietnam with Senators J. William Fulbright, Mike Mansfield, John Sparkman, George Aiken, and Bourke Hickenlooper. The group discussed Secretary of State Rusk's forthcoming appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to testify on the war as well as the ongoing Senate debate over the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. In response to comments by Fulbright that the resolution was null and void due to the possible decision being made to send over 200,000 troops to Vietnam, the President endeavored to explain why he had introduced such a resolution to Congress in 1964 and how it related to his current policy decision:
"I sent up the resolution on Southeast Asia because I told the Security Council members that I was not going to commit troops or get into any compromising position with these folks unless I had the approval of Congress. I had a thorough study and review of the law and precedent in this area. My legal advisors told me how many times we had gone into an area without the consent of Congress and without a declaration of war. I told them that I did not want to follow that procedure. Then I had a resolution drafted copying as nearly as possible President Eisenhower's Formosa resolution and Middle East resolution. This draft resolution was taken to the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Armed Services Committee. I also reviewed it with Congressional leadership.
"I don't care about resolutions but this is the only way I know how to try to get a formal expression from Congress of their views. It was not designed to bind them because I don't consider the Tonkin Gulf resolution binding on any man up there. If any man doesn't think what we are doing is right, he has an obligation to say so. And there's not a man in the Senate who is unwilling to dissent.
"The question is how we can minimize our problems and make this job easier and mine easier. Also how can we make them more effective. I know full well that all of you are my friends and all of you want to help the President. I also know that you do have differences. Your intentions and your good judgment and your experience are well known to me. I have never doubted them. I know that each of you would be there if I were in deep trouble. I have always sought the advice and counsel of Congress. I have never taken any position on foreign policy in the Senate that I didn't talk to Mansfield and Fulbright. We have to work together without leaking our meetings and conversations to the newspapers.
"We have no commitments on extra troops. We have 500,000 odd out there. They want extra troops now. But we are looking at the entire picture. We are looking at our situation with regard to men and equipment. The South Vietnamese are drafting their 19-year-olds now and they have given us assurance they will draft 18-year-olds. They are cleaning up their Army and improving it. We must avoid being dangerously weak here at home. We have 6 divisions in reserve. The Joint Chiefs have wanted to call up the Reserves for some time. I have tried to avoid going on a war and war-controls basis. Calling the Reserves is the first step that reaches into every home. In addition, the Reserves have their problems. They do not have the best equipment. However, if we need to call up large numbers, we are going to have to call in some Reserves. We are exploring every avenue open.
"Fulbright was right when he said Vietnam has poisoned the whole world. Everything goes back to it. But the bombings make it more difficult for North Vietnam and help us to protect the DMZ."
During the course of the meeting, Fulbright responded:
"I do not want to give a false impression. I don't have the slightest idea how to run the war and I have never given you advice on it. The war has a psychological impact as well as a financial impact. What I am trying to do is create a climate which I think would make it much easier for you to stop the war short of victory. I may be making a mistake but I cannot see the future of this war. It is not worthwhile, what we are paying for it. I do not think there is a good way to stop it. I don't want to argue the details. I am trying to make my own position clear. I hope to create a sense that reconciles this country as best I can to settlement here that may not be palatable under other circumstances. I can't see anything that can be accomplished by military means that will cost lives and dollars and disrupt our political relations with Russia and other countries. I do not think it is going to be a victory like we had in World Wars I and II. I don't want to run the war. I just want to state my position."
Fulbright later added:
"I just think this war is a disaster. I think that we are going down the drain if we continue with it. This is their country. They live there. They are poor and don't have much to lose. We have a lot to lose. I think that this was originally a miscalculation and we have to admit that it was. That country has no industry, has no obligation, has no balance of payments, has no gold, and none of these problems. We are involved in a little country that isn't worried. We are beating ourselves for nothing. In my opinion we are playing the Communist game. We just ought to get out of that country any way we can."
The full record of the meeting is in the Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room, March 6, 1968, 6:47 p.m. to 9:22 p.m.
110. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 7, 1968, 3:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs N-Z and AA-KK. Secret.
Mr. President:
Clark Clifford and Bus Wheeler are against your sending a message to Gen. Westmoreland at this time along the lines of the draft which I forwarded to them./2/
/2/An attached telegram from the President to Westmoreland drafted on March 6 reads: "As you know, we are considering most seriously the suggestions Gen. Wheeler brought back from his trip to Vietnam. In the meanwhile, I wish to tell you how much comfort and inspiration your message to General Wheeler of March 4 brought to me. I was raised by Mr. Rayburn to believe that West Point produced better professional military officers than the halls of Congress. My feeling at this distance is that the enemy has been hurt by the first five weeks of his winter-spring offensive more than our side. Like all great battles, this may be close. But my instinct tells me you are right: every South Vietnamese, U.S. and allied unit--every cook and bottle washer--ought to be inspired in the days ahead with an offensive spirit. Within the limits of what you regard as prudent, I believe it is now time for our side to go all out. In any case, as you enter this crucial counteroffensive, you should know you have my confidence and my prayers." (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, 2 C (8) 3/68, General Military Activity)
There are two major reasons:
--Clark believes very strongly that we should not now take an optimistic view of the war, but let the facts speak for themselves and hope that in 4 or 5 months things will obviously be better.
--He also believes we should not influence Westy in what tactical course of action he should pursue: perhaps pursuing the enemy all out is right; perhaps not. He does not believe the President should get into this.
Quite aside from the message--and addressed more specifically to the report of the backgrounder in Vietnam yesterday--Clark would like to speak with you about our general public stance towards the war, in Presidential and other public statements. He would like to urge great caution about optimism.
Hold message/3/
Arrange appointment for Clifford
/3/The President checked this option.
Walt
111. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell/1/
Washington, March 7, 1968, 4:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Russell, March 7, 1968, 4:10 p.m., Tape F6802.04, PNO 13-14. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
President: Scoop Jackson called down and talked to my man Califano and said he had been talking to you and he was very worried about something Fulbright was doing and he thought that I ought to see a group headed by you and him and a couple of other fellows, Symington, I think, and Stennis. I called Jackson back./2/ I was at lunch. He called Mansfield. I spent 3 hours with Fulbright last night--with Fulbright and Mansfield and Bourke Hickenlooper and George Aiken and John Sparkman./3/
/2/The President called Jackson at 3:44 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found.
/3/See Document 109.
Russell: Well, you didn't do much of a Johnson sales job on him evidently.
President: No, he's got problems, Dick, that man has. He has got problems. And I listened to everything they had to say from 6:30 to 9:25 and just nobody present except those five and me.
Russell: Mansfield?
President: Mansfield and Fulbright and Sparkman, Hickenlooper and Aiken.
Russell: Well, they all are of a different mind about this thing.
President: They're all of the same mind except Fulbright and he didn't show much. I was real worried about Fulbright. I said, "Senator, now let's play President awhile. What would you do if you were President? What would you like to do?" Well, he said, "I would like to negotiate." I said, "Well, I would too." He said, "Why don't you negotiate?" I said, "Because they won't negotiate." He said, "Well, there must be some way to make them negotiate." I said, "Well, you tell me--you write me and you tell me how to do it. I don't know how to do it." Well, he said, "It just goes to show." He said, "By God, I never did want to be in this." I said, "I didn't want to be in it." He said, "Well, I didn't say you got in it. I know they were there when you came in, but--." And it was that way for 2 or 3 hours. And we got to Sparkman and Sparkman said, "I don't like it. I don't want it. I wish we didn't have it. But I don't know what I can recommend that we do, Mr. President." I got to Hickenlooper, and Hickenlooper said, "Well, I will just say this. I don't want this to be a committee to conduct the war" and said, "I don't know what we can get by Morse and Fulbright debating back at Rusk on televisions all over the world in the middle of a critical period." He said, "I don't want this to be a Civil War committee. We can't conduct the war." Fulbright said, "Now, look here, Bourke, I don't want it to be a Civil War committee either." They got into a little argument and I just sat there and listened to it. Mansfield said, "Well, I wanted to confer with you and now we announce this." I said, "No. I want to meet with some of the House people and I'm meeting with all of the House chairmen this afternoon and then I want to meet with some of the Armed Services people and Appropriations people and there is not anything I know to announce. If I say I saw two or three Senators, well, the other twenty that I didn't see object. So unless we want a lot of publicity, let's try to talk this thing out. I will take any suggestions you want to make and say we will consider them. Mr. Mansfield, any time you want to bring any groups of Senators to me, you can see me the day that you call. You just call and I will make the plans." Fulbright said, "Well, we think that you are the complete captive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," and said that I was saying to Dick Russell--he implied as he went everything he said you agreed with. He never did say that, but that was the implication.
Russell: Well, did he call my name?
President: Oh, yes, two or three times. He would say, "Now, Dick Russell and I see alike on this" and then he wound up by saying--
Russell: It must have been some very minor thing.
President: It was--just enough like an old cow, if you ever milked in the country days, you've been too long away from the milk pail, but just as you get the bucket full, she dragged her tail through the top of it and leaves a little streak. That is the way he dragged your name through it.
Russell: And usually she would slap hell out of you with the tail too.
President: That's right. That's exactly right. Hit you right in the face with it. But anyway--he has no plan or program. I said, "What do you want to do?" He said, "I want to run us out of this war. You are a complete captive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is what they say." And I said, "Well now, Senator, that is a little bit unfair. I am not a captive of anybody. I am listening to you Senators. I have talked to more Senators today than I have generals and I have to listen to the best advice that is available to me and consider it."
Russell: My complaint is the other side. You haven't paid enough attention to them.
President: Well--
Russell: He's made a hell of a mean speech and Bobby Kennedy made a meaner one and Nelson/4/ has been raising hell for about 10 minutes. And John Tower made a very strong statement on the other side. He started off with the assumption that you were getting ready to call up 200,000 men to send out there. Of course, I hadn't heard anything about that. I know that you ought to call up some and you need some reserves mighty bad because we haven't got anything left in this country at all except two brigades of the 82d [Airborne Division]. But he had you sending 200,000 more out there. He said he had rumors and reports that that is what you were getting ready to do--send 200,000 out there.
/4/Senator Gaylord Nelson.
President: It's very much rumors like this nuclear attack the other day. We haven't made a decision. We don't really know what we're going to do. We do know that, as I asked General Wheeler to go out and brief you when you were at the hospital, I have asked him to get everybody's opinions on what we ought to have and most of the Armed Services people have thought for some time we ought to replenish our strategic reserve. It is getting pretty low and you have thought so more than anybody else and they have had the feeling--pretty generally agreed by Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs--that we ought to call up some reserves and perhaps, as I told you when I went home the other day before I went down to Georgia and that trip, that we ought to call up these units and ask for permission to call up selected specialists and the authority we need and probably extend the terms of enlistment--authority to do that and you said, "Well, we can't do that, unless you call up the reserves."
Russell: I am not in favor of that, Mr. President, I want to make it perfectly clear, until we get up some of these fellows that haven't served at all.
President: I understand that and I don't plan to put the first first but that those are the things that are being considered. Now, how much of that would ever go to South Vietnam, if any, has not been determined. We do not know. Clifford is of the impression and feeling that we oughtn't to decide at this moment, that we ought to go ahead and make our decision on filling out the strategic reserve--we had twelve divisions, I believe, and it is now down to about six now--and that he thinks that is an invitation to weakness to the rest of the world and that we ought to call up these folks, but we ought to be sure that we are prepared for them and have something for them to do and know exactly what we are doing and we are studying all of those things now. They even suggested that he might want to go out and have some conversations with the allied leaders, particularly with the Vietnamese, to see how they are coming with their 19-year old drafts, and the 18--
Russell: Well, that has been brought up a half dozen times on the floor--calling up our boys at 18 and not calling up theirs until they are 20 or 21.
President: Well, that is not true. The average of ours is 20.4 and it was 20.9 last year. They are calling their 19s now and they will call their 18s in June. And if we called up the same proportion of our population, we would have between 9 and 10 million instead of the 3, so that is not a very--
Russell: Well, I don't hardly know how to reply to all of this because it is so damn general and deals with suppositions of which I have no knowledge at all. I want to say something but damn if I can see any place to put my teeth into other than to build up a straw man. Then you go calling up reserves--that would make me look silly.
President: Well, I think you ought to say that first the Committee of the Congress and the reservists themselves have been urging that they be called up because we have a strategic reserve--twelve divisions when we got into this thing and it is down to six and they ought to be called up. Now, the President has had the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to talk to you about it, the President has talked to the other chairmen [sic] about it, you believe the President has talked to a good many Senators, and if any Senator wants to talk to the President about it you are sure the President will be glad to hear his views. There has been no President that has ever consulted so much with the Senate as the present President. Now, so far as the Senate running the war, this is something else.
Russell: No, of course, the Senate cannot do that.
President: That's what Hickenlooper said last night and made a very effective statement and it had an effect on both Fulbright and Mansfield. In fact, Fulbright got a little irritated by it. Now, I asked them not to say that they met with me, and I just--but I think it is very improper to indicate that nobody has consulted when he came down and spent 3 hours.
Russell: He indicates that the Congress has been kept in damn complete ignorance and he went on and said that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense just lied to him on this Tonkin Gulf Resolution when they testified./5/
/5/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 280.
President: Yes, he says that all the time. He interprets when McNamara said they were not in territorial waters. At the same time McNamara said that, they claimed--
Russell: Well, this letter the crew wrote, you know. But I didn't see anything so damn bad about that. If I were out there I would want out too.
President: Well, Fulbright is just trying to justify his position of not wanting to be for the war and being an ass in voting for Tonkin Gulf. That's all--that's what he's trying to do. But I think you all ought to say--you and Jackson and the rest of you--that the President has talked to you--talked to you more than he ought to sometimes. He had the Joint Chairman and the Joint Chiefs come to see you last week before last and called you last week himself and he has asked for your advice on the reserves from time to time and the Congress has been urging, and the reserve organizations too, that they be called up for a long, long time. We did have twelve divisions and now we are down to four and a half and one and a half--about a total of six.
Russell: We haven't got six on active duty, have we, Mr. President?
President: They told me they had about six available in the strategic reserve--four and a half plus one and a half.
Russell: Well, these boys that are selling flour and silk today and going to call them up tomorrow--I just can't believe they are as good as they think they are.
President: I didn't say they're good at all. I just said that they said we ought to have twelve and we did have twelve and we'd worn it down to six.
Russell: They're all reserves. We just have about one and a half that are regulars.
President: That's right, that's right.
Russell: Well, I'll go back in there and make up my mind on it, but I just hate to get up there and go floundering around when I don't know what the hell I'm getting at. Fulbright doesn't know what he is talking about and I hate to do the same thing just because he is.
President: I think I would just take the position that any Senator that wants to talk to the President, the President will be glad to talk with him.
Russell: He hasn't raised the point that you wouldn't see anybody.
President: Mansfield said--
Russell: He hasn't said that. He just said he thought we ought to be apprised before you do anything else. That's what he said.
President: Congress ought to be consulted and hadn't been.
Russell: I don't know. I didn't get the part that they ought to be consulted and hadn't been.
President: Well, that is what Jackson said.
Russell: Well, he sort of leaves that inference, but he didn't say that. I was sitting there listening to him myself. He just probably left that inference with those who heard it.
President: Well, now, if you think any of them ought to come down here--I had thought--
Russell: I don't think any of them want to come. I think if you kept Fulbright right at your elbow all working hours for the next 6 days he would be of the same thing as he is right now and I don't think you would change him one iota. So I am not urging you to see anybody. All I could say was that Tydings/6/ came over and asked me if I knew how many reserves were going to be called up and I told him, "No, I didn't know." That was all I could tell him.
/6/Senator Joseph Tydings.
President: Well, I don't know either. Tell him the President--
Russell: I told him that.
President: Well, you can just tell him now. The President doesn't know himself how many he's going to call.
Russell: I told him that I did not know how many were going to be called up. He's gone dovish. He got up and said he thought me and Stennis and Symington ought to be apprised and ought to keep being advised about it. But hell, we have already given these people the war plans in advance, which has cost us a whole lot. This has been the most openly fought war that ever has been fought.
President: Say that. Please say that, and say what Eisenhower said to me the other day--that I would have given any amount of money to have known about the enemy what they know about us.
Russell: Of course. We tell them in advance what is going on.
President: And I see now from the intelligence this morning that they are asking for the copies of the film of Rusk and Fulbright debating. They'd like to have it at night for all of the European capitals. This is one that is coming up next week.
Russell: They put them on television?
President: They want to, and Rusk has got to go up on foreign aid. Well, I have asked them not to and now he's got to go up on foreign aid.
Russell: Well, he doesn't have to go on television.
President: Well--
Russell: I'll be damned if I would do it. Just surrendering to them after he has held out and everybody has been sympathizing with him.
President: Well, you see, the Committee voted overwhelmingly eleven to four, but this fellow Mundt/7/ got in and played a little politics to order him up.
/7/Senator Karl Mundt.
Russell: That is just a little politics, of course. Mundt is a hawk as far as the war is concerned. Well, I'll go out here and see what the situation is--if they are still talking about it.
President: Thank you, Dick.
Russell: Bye.
President: Bye./8/
/8/In a telephone conversation with Rusk the following day, the President discussed the meeting with the Senators and the issues raised in his telephone conversation with Russell. A statement calling for a more intensive effort to secure negotiations by the administration had been issued by 18 Congressional representatives on March 4. Regarding action to counter this and other Congressional criticism, the President stated: "Now I think we have to try first to see if there are any initiatives--political or diplomatic--that we can get in the mill that will cover that front a little bit for us where we are just not static and doing nothing. We ought to see if there is anything possible there. I think the second thing we ought to see is what would be the best legislative approach to this thing before we act on additional troops. We're going to have to act--we're going to have to call them up and we don't want to assume the burden of having an affirmative resolution because they can filibuster it and we can't get it passed and then that would be a failure and that would fold. So I think we ought to see what we can do. My judgment would be, just guessing, that to get Russell to move to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin with the understanding that if they did repeal it that we would pull in our horns or something and then a motion to table that would lie and then after 4 or 5 days you would cut off debate on that." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, March 8, 1968, 10:35 a.m., Tape F6802.04, PNO 15; transcript prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume)
112. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) and the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/
Washington, March 8, 1968, 0048Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, William C. Westmoreland Papers, #30 History File, 1-31 March 68 [1]. Secret; Eyes Only; Immediate. Received at 0314Z.
JCS 2721. 1. I had a most interesting and informative conversation today with our new Secretary of Defense, Mr. Clifford. He is a very astute, intelligent and able man who is closely in touch with Congressional leaders, the business community, and the heads of the news media agencies. As you no doubt know, he has been the trusted advisor to four Presidents. In my judgment, apart from his important official position, he is a man of stature and achievement, one whose views must be accorded weight.
2. The main points he made with me this morning were the following:
A. The Tet offensive mounted by the enemy came as a great shock to the American public. He believes that this shock was the greater because of the euphoria engendered by optimistic statements in past days by various spokesmen supporting administration policy in South Vietnam.
B. He is concerned at the lessening support for the war effort; he cited satiric articles by Art Buchwald as reflecting the beliefs of many people that actualities in South Vietnam and what is said are poles apart.
C. He thinks that the American public cannot stand another shock such as that administered by the Tet offensive. He believes that we have laid ourselves open to the possibility of an additional setback with the American public by playing down the effects of the Tet offensive on the GVN, the RVNAF, and on the South Vietnamese public. One government spokesman (who shall be nameless) was ridiculed a couple of weeks ago for what the press considered to be wild overstatements in minimizing the strength and cunning of the enemy and the impact on the GVN.
D. He considers that additional substantial attacks over a fairly wide area of South Vietnam could create a credibility gap with the American public and the news media which would be virtually unbridgeable.
3. I must admit that Secretary Clifford's assessment is shared by me although, not having the contacts he enjoys, I cannot document the feelings in the business community and among the news media as can he. Nevertheless, I have been upset by views expounded in the news media, in the Congress, and in letters from the public to me that we are fighting a war which cannot be won; that unending hordes of North Vietnamese are surging against South Vietnam; that the GVN is corrupt and inept; that the South Vietnamese people are either solely interested in making money, largely by stealing from American sources, or are completely apathetic as to the outcome of the war, that the senior GVN military are war lords vying for power and are unconcerned about saving their country.
4. During our conversation Mr. Clifford called my attention to a key article by Gene Roberts on the front page of The New York Times of 7 March. The article is datelined Saigon 6 March, and puts in quotes a number of expressions of opinion attributed to "a senior military spokesman."/2/ Among these which aroused the Secretary's concern are these:
/2/In telegram MAC 3280 to Wheeler, March 8, Westmoreland replied that he was the "senior military spokesman" referred to in the March 7 story in The New York Times. "My comments were based on my best estimate of the current situation, and I chose the opportunity to make them known because of my concern for the local attitude, particularly that of the Vietnamese, since there is constant talk of a second wave attack," Westmoreland explained. "You know of my efforts to attempt to reverse this defensive attitude and get on the offensive, which action is necessary if we are to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the enemy and to reverse the adverse trend now apparent in the countryside in a number of areas." He pledged to conform to Clifford's guidance. (Ibid.)
A. A general statement that the military command is less worried now than at any other time during the last five weeks about a general second wave of attacks against Saigon and other population centers. This is followed by "I don't believe the enemy has any great capability to assume any general offensive in the near future. He has been hurt and hurt badly. He is tired. His logistic efforts have been adequate to support his campaign thus far, but there is evidence of developing logistic problems."
B. "But I do give him a capability in I Corps north where he has large forces near Hue. In my opinion, Hue is the next objective."
C. A general statement to the effect that supply and transportation problems and a steady pounding by American bombs have weakened the enemy's position around Khe Sanh and have decreased the possibilities of immediate attack. Apropos of the foregoing, Mr. Clifford remarked that of course he does not know whether the quotes attributed to the spokesmen are correct. In this connection, he asked that I obtain the tapes of the press interview or stenographic notes if there are no tapes.
4. The Secretary continued that he believes our best course of action is to be conservative in assessments of the situation and enemy capabilities. Otherwise, we could have the American public subjected to the second shock. In particular, he expressed the following views:
A. Do not denigrate the enemy.
B. Do not indulge in forecasting enemy plans or our plans.
C. Do not make predictions of victory.
D. Do express the view that there is tough fighting and that the enemy has residual capabilities not yet committed.
E. This conservative approach, he feels, would put us in a strong public information position. If we suffer some reverses, the public will not be shocked. If we achieve some successes, we can modestly and without overplaying the situation claim and receive some kudos.
5. The Secretary particularly stressed the impact of statements such as that appearing in the Times article on public opinion and in Congress in connection with your request for additional forces. He pointed out that your programs will require the call-up of on the order of 240,000 reservists, extension of terms of service, and authority to call to active duty individuals in the reserve pool. End strength of the armed forces will increase by 450,000 or more by end FY 69. In his view, these requests will be made much harder perhaps impossible to sell if we do not adopt a sober and conservative attitude as to the military, political, economic, and psychological situation in South Vietnam.
6. I pointed out to Secretary Clifford that you have a difficult problem facing you. No commander can afford to be pessimistic and apprehensive in dealing with his troops because such an attitude in the commander engenders poor morale and defeatism in his forces. The Secretary replied that he fully recognized the dilemma facing field commanders in this regard. Nevertheless, he feels that a conservative public stance will be in the over-all benefit to our public image and to the support we will receive for administration policies in pursuing the war to a successful conclusion. He considers that you can tell your senior commanders you are deliberately adopting this attitude for the purposes extensively discussed above and, at the same time, encourage them to approach the job with optimism and an [3 illegible words].
7. I believe this guidance from the Secretary of Defense is so critical to our military effort in Southeast Asia that you should devise some way of passing it on without attribution as command guidance to your commands and public information staffs. Needless to say, if you have comments, I will be pleased to have them. Warm regards./3/
/3/In an unnumbered telegram to Wheeler, March 10, Sharp replied: "The guidance from Secretary Clifford is appreciated and is being acted upon. Intend continuing efforts to insure credibility in all public statements, and am advising all subordinate commands of the necessity for conservative expressions of opinion on both good and bad aspects of the war." (Ibid.)
113. Editorial Note
From 2:24 to 4:13 p.m. on March 8, 1968, President Johnson met with a group of his senior foreign policy advisers that included Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle Wheeler, Special Consultant Maxwell Taylor, Special Assistant Walt Rostow, Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William Bundy, and Presidential aides George Christian and Tom Johnson. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Although no notes of the meeting have been found, Clifford wrote notes of telephone calls he made that morning in preparation for the afternoon meeting. The first set of notes marked 10:30 a.m. concerning his conversation with Rostow reads:
"Rostow
"1.) 2:00 p.m. luncheon.
"2.) Bring Buzz Wheeler.
"3.) Would like to add the 20,000 & keep it within the 525,000--
"A.) by not replacing certain of the non-combat troops.
"B.) Any other ideas to accomplish the Pres' purpose.
"4.) Should Clifford go to Vietnam or Taylor or Vance.
"5.) Leans toward resolution repealing the Tonkin Gulf."
The second set of notes marked 11:00 a.m. was from a telephone conversation Clifford had with the President at 11:09 a.m. and reads:
"The President
"1.) Review record of yesterday in Senate.
"2.) Wheeler and I see Russell-Stennis-Symington-Scoop Jackson.
"3.) We have 525,000 planned. Have more going.
"4.) Can replace rotation of one returning.
"a.) Might have to go over ceiling.
"5.) May have to break ceiling.
"6.) Reserves were 12 now only 6.
"7.) Have message set forth plan.
"8.) Hatfield Resolution--not good.
"9.) Russell could present motion to repeal Tonkin resolution.
"10.) Look at supplies--
"a.) M-16--Helicopters--Planes.
"b.) How can we get air and combat people out too.
"c.) How do we get Congressional determination.
"d.) Pres' plan:
"1.) Call up reserves.
"2.) Armed services & Appropriations. Wheeler and I should appear.
"a.) Russell says no reserves--no extensions.
"3.) [blank]
"e.) Proper way to present plan.
"1.) In one package.
"2.) Or piecemeal--callup first & then Congressional help." (Ibid., Clark Clifford Papers, Notes Taken at Meetings [2])
114. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
CM-3098-68
Washington, March 8, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Files, VIET 370. Top Secret; Sensitive. Received in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at 11:29 a.m. on March 9. A notation indicates that Clifford saw the memorandum.
SUBJECT
COMUSMACV Force Requirements
1. Subsequent to our meeting with the President last Monday evening,/2/ at his request I passed on the recommendations of the Special Committee to General Westmoreland for his comments. Specifically, I informed him of the substance of the Committee's recommendations to:
/2/
See Document 104.a. Authorize immediately the deployment of the three tactical fighter squadrons (two Air Force and one Marine) deferred from Program 5.
b. Authorize at once the deployments to Vietnam of approximately 22,000 additional personnel, this force to be comprised of (1) six tactical fighter squadrons, (2) one Naval Construction Battalion, and (3) the 4th Marine Expeditionary Force (-).
c. Initiate Reserve call-up and take other necessary actions to improve our strategic posture in the U.S.
2. General Westmoreland's partial comments have been received. He states that the immediate deployment of the three tactical fighter squadrons would greatly enhance the tactical air support available to ground units. He points out, however, that construction at Nam Phong must begin immediately if the two F-4D squadrons scheduled in May are to be accommodated. Units can be deployed as soon as an austere capability has been developed. Moreover, the operation at Nam Phong is dependent upon the necessary transportation for POL, munitions, supply, etc. If Nam Phong is not ready on 1 May, the two F-4D squadrons scheduled into that base could be temporarily located, one at Udorn and one at Ubon for a period not to exceed 30 days. He further points out that the six tactical fighter squadrons shown in paragraph 1b(1) above are over and above the F-4D squadron now in Korea which he assumes will remain in Korea, and they do not include the F-100 squadron now on temporary duty at Phu Cat. He recommends that this squadron be converted to PCS and remain in place. Finally, in regard to air deployments, he recommends that the Marine Expeditionary Force be deployed with three rather than four squadrons. Four squadrons in addition to the one deferred from Program 5 cannot be accommodated at Chu Lai.
3. General Westmoreland states that although immediate authorization for deployment of 22,000 additional personnel would provide much needed combat and combat support forces, the combat service support forces now in Vietnam are insufficient to support our present force structure. This is especially critical in view of the recent deployment of the 3rd Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division and RLT 27 to the I Corps tactical zone without the appropriate slice of combat support. He emphasizes the absolute requirement to provide the support forces identified with the increased deployments prior to or at the same time the tactical forces are deployed. In this regard, General Westmoreland has this date forwarded his specific strength recommendations for the immediate essential combat service support forces to provide adequate support for combat units in I CTZ, including the 3rd Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, RLT 27 and Army units which have been redeployed to Northern I Corps tactical zone. This request has not yet been validated by CINCPAC, but is currently under consideration here by the Joint Staff in anticipation of early action by Admiral Sharp's headquarters.
4. Finally, General Westmoreland recognizes that the forces which were contained in the Committee's recommendations were apparently based upon the capabilities of the Services to produce troops for deployment. He states that there has been no change in his appraisal of the situation since my visit to Vietnam and thus there has been no change in his requirements as originally proposed.
Earle G. Wheeler
115. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/
Washington, March 9, 1968, 0130Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message File, 1 Mar-31 Mar 1968. Top Secret. Repeated to Sharp.
JCS 2767. Ref: JCS 2766./2/
/2/In this telegram sent to Westmoreland on March 9, Wheeler noted that since the decision on future deployments had been reserved, "for the purpose of your developing the 30,000 man package you should not count on approval of any future deployments." (Ibid.)
1. By now you will have received the above message asking your desires concerning the composition of the 30,000-man package, over the above the Program 5 ceiling, to be deployed by 15 June 1968. The reasons that I am querying you rather than relying upon your earlier requests are these:
A. Your recently forwarded a request for 3,316 personnel to support forces already deployed.
B. I wish to emphasize to you the decision has not yet been taken to deploy the 30,000-man package; however, there appears to be substantial agreement that this is the proper course. Furthermore, I wish to emphasize that no decision has been taken to provide you forces over and above the 30,000-man package.
C. You will need to make a choice of units from those which we will have available following the reserve call-up. A listing of forces available for deployment by 15 June is contained in the reference.
D. I am concerned that, if we worked up a 30,000-man package here based upon your earlier requests, you would end up with an unbalanced force in South Vietnam, perhaps one which you could not support; therefore, we need your views as to what is needed to give you a balanced force./3/
/3/In telegram MAC 3385 to Wheeler, March 11, Westmoreland proposed two alternative add-on packages. The first included only those forces available by June 15 and thus consisted of a much greater Marine Corps contribution. The second package included forces available after June 15, a "better" mix of forces, and was Westmoreland's preferred alternative. (Ibid.)
2. As I informed you in my earlier message it is agreed that the 12,545 civilianization program will be canceled. This action raises the Program 5 ceiling to 537,545. The staff assures me that the subject 12,545 personnel are now in-country and that no civilianization of these military spaces has taken place. If this is not the case please advise me.
3. I do not wish to shunt my troubles on to you; however, to guide you in your thinking and planning, I feel I must tell you frankly that there is strong resistance from all quarters to putting more ground force units in South Vietnam. The call-up of reserves and the concomitant actions that must be taken will raise unshirted hell in many influential quarters, and I find that there is substantial sentiment that the 30,000 increment should not be deployed. I tell you this because I feel you must know that, while a reserve call-up will improve markedly the CONUS strategic reserve and put us in a position to honor further requests from you, you should not count upon an affirmative decision for such additional forces. With this cheerless counsel I will sign off. Warm regards.
116. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 10, 1968, 11:20 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 7 D (2), 12/67-3/68, News Media Coverage of Viet Nam. Confidential. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
Herewith my judgment on today's New York Times article on troops./2/
/2/The continuing debate within the administration over further troop deployments became public on March 10 when reporters Neil Sheehan and Hedrick Smith published an article in The New York Times that extensively revealed details of the policy assessment. For full text of the article and discussion on it, see The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition, pp. 584-589.
1. The materials were mainly gathered from medium-level officials in both State and Defense, who oppose the sending of more troops to Vietnam.
2. These officials either made available, read, or summarized--probably the latter--from one of the working papers prepared for the Clifford Committee, which made the argument against more troops.
3. I find no evidence that officials who worked directly on the Clifford Committee spoke to the writers of the article; and some indication that they did not. I regard the article as the product of dangerous insubordination which can only be met by an early decision by the President and a full account of where we stand in the winter-spring enemy offensive and what we intend to do./3/
/3/There was some indication that these reporters were on the trail of the story 2 days earlier. Smith told his friend Richard Ullman, who worked in Warnke's office, that "a comprehensive account of what had been happening within the U.S. Government since the Tet Offensive" would soon be published. (Memorandum from Ullman to Warnke, March 8; Johnson Library, Clark Clifford Papers, Vietnam (1 Feb 68-15 Mar 68) [1]) In a note to Clifford, March 8, Goulding wrote: "Nick Katzenbach called me this afternoon to say that Neil Sheehan--who covers the Pentagon for the Times--had been calling various State people with the 206,000 figure, but without the detail that Smith apparently has. That indicates how they are operating--the State men for the Times are working this building and the Pentagon men working the State Department. Paul, Nick and I are all surprised that it has taken this long for something to surface. I see nothing constructive we can do about it." (Ibid.)
Incidentally, my impression of the Westmoreland counteroffensive, described in a dispatch, March 3, to General Wheeler,/4/ is that it is going quite well in I Corps and around Danang. Thang has taken hold in the Delta. He deserves all the support we can give him. In III Corps we have not yet engaged the divisions near Saigon; but I presume this is imminent.
/4/See Document 101.
Walt
117. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, March 11, 1968, 1142Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 10:48 a.m.
21733. Ref: State 124584./2/
/2/In telegram 124584 to Saigon, March 5, the Department transmitted the text of the paper attached as Tab B to Document 103. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
1. I agree that the question of additional US troops for Vietnam raises fundamental questions regarding our policy here. As the paper contained in reftel indicates, the positive and negative effects of an increase on the Vietnamese Government and people involve difficult judgments affecting both our long-range and short-term objectives here.
2. A critical element in judging the effects of an increase in US forces is obviously the size of that increase. General Westmoreland, based on his understanding of the capabilities of the military services to deploy trained units, has recommended that the first increment should amount to an additional seven combat maneuver battalions plus an MP battalion. These forces are needed to partially offset troops which have already been dispatched to northern I Corps. If Pres Thieu's analysis of enemy strategy and capability is correct, NVA/VC forces can be expected to mount another major offensive in the late spring or summer. This offensive must be decisively defeated. Even though Vietnamese forces will be building up during the time between now and summer, we can not expect them to be fully trained, equipped and in place before this phase occurs. I would therefore favor earliest deployment of the first increment recommended by General Westmoreland. The question of the dispatch of forces beyond this increment should be reexamined at a later date in the light of the situation during the summer months. The comments that follow relate to the general problems I forsee resulting from additional US forces, although I believe these problems will be manageable if the increase is limited to the numbers proposed under General Westmoreland's recommendation for a first increment. I am not attempting to address in this message the effects of the proposed deployment of additional US forces in terms of measures required in the US to back up this action and give us the required reserve forces, since these are matters which have to be determined in Washington.
3. I agree that the deployment of additional US troops would probably stiffen the GVN's will at a critical time and would be a further affirmation of our commitment and of our capability to meet it. The countervailing factor that it could tend to further Americanize the war and give the Vietnamese an escape route from their responsibility is an important consideration, however. The Tet attacks have given the anti-Communist elements here both a shock and a shot in the arm, as reftel indicates. The question now is how to take advantage of this without imposing impossible demands on the government, which will tend to make it throw up its hands and slip away from its responsibility, leaving us to carry the main burden. I think the answer to this will turn both on the size and deployment of additional US forces and on the availability of equipment and other support needed to allow the GVN to increase its military effort promptly. In other words, we need to maintain a careful balance between modernization of RVNAF and the build-up of our own forces. One of the clear lessons of the past few weeks has been that the Communists have given all out support in terms of military equipment and supplies for the NVA/VC and they have been able to outgun those RVNAF forces that are still equipped with our older weapons. Our modernization program for RVNAF is just beginning to make progress. We cannot afford to let this program slip and must examine each major item carefully to insure that RVNAF gets a fair share and that the momentum and confidence inspired by issue of the new items is not lost. The number of additional US troops contemplated for deployment should not have any appreciable effect upon the modernization and improvement of RVNAF. In fact, these two matters should go hand in hand to increase the momentum of the overall build-up of strength and capability in country to progressively destroy the enemy. I consider it most urgent that we get the weapons RVNAF needs over here as expeditiously as possible, in order to maintain the momentum of the GVN's present mobilization plans. I view this matter as both a short and long term objective, while in contrast the provision of additional US forces is a necessary but a short term goal.
4. I am concerned about sizable additional US forces because of the effects of our overwhelming presence here and the possibility that the destructive effect of our type of warfare will nullify some of our basic purpose. By this I mean that we will increasingly come to play the role of a colonial power, whether intentionally or not. For this reason, I think we must maintain a very careful balance between what we undertake to do ourselves and what we can achieve through pressure on the GVN, always bearing in mind what the GVN is capable of in terms of its own human resources. However, bringing in the additional US forces presently contemplated should not add seriously to the problem of an overwhelming US presence at this time, since these forces will be deployed in the hinterlands fighting VC and NVA units, where destruction and visibility should be minimal. Additional forces when added to the proposed RVNAF build-up, should permit us to regain our momentum and accelerate it beyond that of 1967. The foregoing general observations underlie some of the specific comments which follow in the numbered paragraphs of the paper quoted in reftel.
5. I agree with para 3 that the GVN has the capacity to improve the security and political climate, and thus its image in the US, but the definition of this capacity must be a realizable one. Therefore, the range of decisions and actions to be required of the government must be keyed to a realistic assessment of what they can do, rather than an ideal related primarily to what we or American public opinion would like to see. No matter how much we achieve here, the American press and probably certain of our own Congress will never regard it as sufficient, given their tendency sometimes to demand standards of perfection which even we have not attained. I am confident that we and the GVN can do what is necessary, but in deciding what this is, we must take sufficiently into account the fact that this is an underdeveloped Asian nation torn by decades of war and with limited human resources, endeavoring to function under a new and unaccustomed form of government in which it has had little practice and less tradition.
6. Re para 5 I agree that a high-level mission to Saigon can play a helpful psychological role in this situation and Sec Clifford would be the ideal person to head it. I would be inclined, however, to recommend that the mission come at a somewhat later date, perhaps in April, to evaluate what is being done and to give an added push to our effort, I could then continue with the task of laying before the government what we expect of it and of getting this effort under way. I should note at this point that most of the decisions and actions listed are ones on which we have already been pushing the government and on which they have already begun to take encouraging action. This does not mean they cannot do more, but merely underlines the fact that we in the Mission, as well as the GVN, are basically on the same wave-length with Washington in terms of our objectives, and of the time-frame within which we are working.
7. Re para 6--mobilization, I have already reported on Pres Thieu's decision to accelerate the mobilization process and his desire to provide between 100,000 and 125,000 additional men for the armed forces during the next six months. In this regard Pres Thieu envisages the extensive use of units on Fairfax type operations to protect the cities, their environs, and the LOCs. We are working with the GVN to maintain key civilians in their government functions where they cannot be spared or replaced. Gen Westmoreland informs me that FY 68 program for the expansion of the Vietnamese armed forces involves an increase of 64,000 men. Only approximately 25,000 of this force increase has been realized. The current approved program is therefore short approximately 40,000 men, for which equipment has been programmed. In accordance with this program, these 40,000 men were to be used to fill existing units and to activate the following major elements: approximately 80 RF companies and 250 PF platoons, 1 artillery battalion, 1 engineer battalion, 1 separate infantry regiment, and 2 infantry battalions to flesh out existing regiments. If additional men are mobilized, RF/PF units could be organized and equipped with WW II-type weapons available by virtue of receipt of more modern weapons by ARVN. Gen Westmoreland's proposed FY 69 program involves an increase of 93,000. A formal request for approval has been submitted through his channel. Therefore it is Gen Westmoreland's opinion that the number of men Thieu plans to mobilize can be conscripted, trained and equipped. Assuming that 125,000 men are mobilized during the next six months, this will result in a net increase of approximately 60,000 men in RVNAF over current strength in consideration of estimated losses of approximately 10,000 per month through casualties and desertions. There will be shortages of some equipment until FY 68 programmed quantities are delivered and until FY 69 items are programmed and available from production. Individual weapons will again be of the WW II type and vehicle shortages will have some effect on mobility. However, these problems are believed to be manageable. The major problem is one of leadership, where it is estimated that officer and NCO requirements may be difficult to fill. We feel that we should encourage Thieu and the Joint General Staff to proceed soonest with their mobilization, not only to form additional units that are sorely needed and to fill up their ranks, but to deny this manpower to the Viet Cong, who are, themselves, in desperate need of manpower.
8. Re para 7--Thieu/Ky relationship, this has been one of many main preoccupations since my arrival almost a year ago. This relationship continues to have its peaks and valleys, and it is now in one of its valleys, but I shall continue to devote my fullest energies to maintaining it and to encouraging a greater unity of leadership on all sides. The objectives outlined in paras 7 and 8 are those which have guided me in the past and I will continue to pursue them vigorously.
9. Re para 9 and 10--getting the GVN back into the countryside, this is a point on which Gen Westmoreland and I have been pressing the top leadership continuously for the past few weeks, and as I have reported, Thieu and Ky are fully in accord with it. While there have been circles in the military leadership who have been too conservative and reluctant to move out into the countryside, we believe that some success has already been achieved, and in most areas this effort is already well underway. We will continue to press vigorously in this direction and to furnish the necessary support to make it possible for the government to take the initiative without fear. Westmoreland and I agree regarding the vital role of the province chiefs and their staff and the sense of mission of the ARVN units and we intend to pursue the evaluation process at all levels.
10. Re para 11--drive on the VC infrastructure, I agree that the pres-ent situation offers an opportunity which must be exploited promptly and vigorously and we are already engaged with the GVN in this process. It will be pushed with even greater vigor.
11. Re para 12--government reform and anti-corruption campaign, Pres Thieu is as you recognize, already moving in the desired directions and we will keep up the pressures on him to accelerate the reform and to assure that it achieves the desired purposes. I agree that incompetent military commanders, province chiefs and civilian officials must be removed and that we should make our own views on such persons known. The way in which this is done, however, is something on which the judgment should be left to those of us here on the spot. We understand the objective and agree with it. The only point I would like to make at this stage is to emphasize that these changes involve very complicated relationships among the leaders here, especially in the military, and that we must not allow our eagerness for change to outweigh the overall objectives of maintaining unity of leadership. I recognize that Thieu is overly cautious and reluctant to move in such matters, and I will continue to press him as needed, but we must accept the fact that the definition of what is possible must in the last analysis remain his, since he is the President.
12. Re para 13--the united front. I agree that in order to take fullest advantage of the nationalist spirit of cooperation, we must prevent personal rivalries and differences from undermining this effort. The Thieu/Ky relationship, the relations between the executive and legislative branches, and the inter-play of political groups and leaders all bear on this picture. One cautioning note which I would like to sound here is that when we choose to stimulate Vietnamese initiatives for national unity, they should be related to the actual political situation here and should have lasting meaning in Asian terms, not just American ideas of what we think they should develop. The skepticism with which the National Salvation Front is viewed by many Vietnamese as evidence that the introspective Vietnamese often finds a hidden meaning and purpose in what to us seems logical and reasonable. We will continue to press for meaningful efforts to unity the nationalist elements here and to create the basis for longer-term political activity.
13. Re paras 14-16, we will be formulating further proposals on economic measures along the lines suggested in these paragraphs.
14. I believe that the factors discussed in paras 17-19--US actions and leverage, have already been addressed at the beginning of this message. I would merely reiterate here my general feeling that the emphasis should remain on enlarging and modernizing RVNAF and that US force increase should be limited to what we consider essential to maintain the offensive and to overcome certain geographic advantages which the enemy has, without unduly widening the war or over-Americanizing it. I know that this definition requires careful spelling out but I would hope that this could be our basic guideline in doing so.
Bunker
118. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 11, 1968, 4:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 66. Literally Eyes Only.
Mr. President:
The Apostolic Delegate, the Most Reverend Luigi Raimondi, asked to see me this afternoon. He carried a memorandum which proposed that, without the prior knowledge of Hanoi or Washington, a legitimate neutral source invited the following to appear at a conference at a certain time and place: U.S., GVN, Hanoi, and NLF. The three members of the International Control Commission (India, Canada, and Poland) would also be invited. The inviting neutral country would also ask both sides to de-escalate the violence, including a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam.
The Holy See, after examining the project, said that it was impossible to back it without both sides, at least, being informed. Therefore, Rev. Raimondi was willing to have me read the memo; make any remarks I cared to make; but not keep and circulate the memo.
I read it and told him that he should ask for a session with Secretary Rusk; let him read and return the memo; and get his observations. My own observations were these:
--The memo is based on the assumption that both sides wish to negotiate, but cannot find a way to do so without believed disadvantage. It was unlikely that this was the case; but no idea or hypothesis that might bring peace should be excluded.
--The proposal called for a "gradual reduction" in the violence; but called for a flat "cessation of bombing of North Vietnam. " Whatever proposals were made should be well balanced and symmetrical, in my judgment.
--The memo suggested Sweden as an ideal authentic neutral--I noted that out of its own political life, Sweden had gotten itself into a somewhat awkward relation to Vietnam. He immediately said that Switzerland would certainly be better.
--I concluded by repeating that he should regard my remarks as personal; and should seek out Secretary Rusk./2/ I told him that anything coming from the Holy See or from himself personally would always be taken most seriously by this government.
/2/See Document 139.
I told him that I would, of course, inform the President; but I would not circulate a piece of paper about this project within the government beyond that.
He asked me to convey his respects and best wishes to the President.
Walt
119. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to President Johnson/1/
CM-3102-68
Washington, March 11, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 911 (5 Mar 68) IR 3134. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Copies were sent to Clifford, Nitze, and Warnke.
SUBJECT
Ambassador Lodge's Memorandum
1. Ambassador Lodge in his memorandum dated 5 March 1968, addresses himself to two major problems and then touches on a number of related matters./2/ The first of these has to do with the level of military forces in Vietnam and their employment. The second has to do with the importance of strengthening the police structure within the cities and towns in order to comb out the Communist organization, so that local political institutions and agencies can operate.
/2/Document 106.
2. Taking this last point first, I am in complete agreement with the Ambassador's very perceptive analysis. In fact, now that the enemy is involved in large-scale infiltration of the cities and towns, the effectiveness of police and security forces has become as important as any other measure. If the towns are lost from within, this would be just as fateful as if they were seized from without. I do have the impression that Ambassador Bunker and the entire mission in Vietnam also agree on the importance of this matter. Current plans to expand the police are consistent with this view and the very elaborate organization under Ambassador Komer, including the special organization for the attack on the infrastructure, are all moving in this direction with all of the imagination and energy at their disposal.
3. With respect to the level of forces and their employment, I believe that there is a widespread misunderstanding about the purpose and the nature of the so-called "search and destroy operations" conducted by U.S. forces in Vietnam. It may be that the term itself is misleading. I define "search and destroy" as offensive operations designed to destroy enemy units, bases and supplies.
4. General Westmoreland has been pursuing three military objectives in South Vietnam, which require that he find and destroy enemy forces:
a. Destroy, neutralize or eject the North Vietnamese Army;
b. Destroy, neutralize or induce the defection of the Viet Cong military and political apparatus; and
c. Extend the control of the Government over all of the people of South Vietnam and all of its territory.
5. In my view, which is shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it will be necessary, for a number of reasons, to continue to conduct offensive operations in Vietnam. Among the more prominent reasons are these:
a. Even if the missions assigned to the commander were to be wholly defensive in nature--that is, to defend the government in Saigon, in the provinces and districts and to defend and secure the major population concentrations--it would be necessary to conduct offensive operations against the enemy forces which threaten the government, cities and towns, and the people.
b. The geographic configuration of Vietnam is such that the population frontier is long and indefensible by any system of static defense.
c. If our forces were to fall back along the population frontier, the enemy could mass large forces anywhere in the mountain and jungle hinterland and strike deeply, with force and surprise, into the population areas. Such strong enemy attacks would have excellent prospects for initial success. Then, in order to eject him, it would be necessary to mass large allied forces and subject populated areas to the effects of the heavy firepower which would be required to destroy or eject him. This would lead to the kind of destruction we have seen in Saigon, Hue, and many other cities and towns. Civilian casualties would skyrocket, new refugees would be created, and over a period of time almost total destruction would ensue throughout South Vietnam.
d. Even though it is sometimes more difficult to fight in the deep jungle and mountains, as at Khe Sanh, Dak To and Plei Me, the interests of both the United States and the Vietnamese people are better served by fighting outside the populated areas. Put another way, it is better to have the two divisions which surround Khe Sanh back in the mountains than in the city of Hue--and it is better to fight the 1st NVA Division at Dak To, for example than in Kontum City or Pleiku.
e. In order to defend the population, it is necessary to patrol in strength in the interior to find large formations and then to strike at them with strength. It is exactly operations of this type which best succeed in keeping the enemy "split up and off balance" so that he can attack less frequently and less effectively against the primary population targets in South Vietnam. These are the operations which now fall into the reporting category of "search and destroy".
6. Concerning two other points made by Ambassador Lodge:
a. I can find no basis for correlating the length of wars with casualty rates and degree of public support. In this connection, you will find the enclosed statistical comparison (Tab A)/3/ of interest.
/3/The attached Tab A, a chart comparing various wars in terms of length, battle deaths, and deaths per month, noted that World War II had the highest casualties per month but "was fully supported by the American public" while "the war in Vietnam (measured from the introduction of U.S. ground combat units) has been shorter than the Korean War and the death rate has been less than one-third."
b. When Ambassador Lodge speaks of censorship, he has put his finger on a problem which has been plaguing General Westmoreland. It seems perfectly clear that we are channeling to the enemy, through the press, information which is extremely helpful to him. This is a real handicap to the Allied forces in Vietnam and certainly one which complicates the successful prosecution of operations.
7. Ambassador Lodge expresses thoughts about the requirement for additional forces beyond those "to enable us to keep faith with the troops in exposed positions". Our forces in Vietnam today, as during the past three years, have been employed primarily to hold off the main forces of the enemy--increasingly North Vietnamese--so that the very process described by the Ambassador could go forward behind their protective screen. By reinforcing from North Vietnam with well over three divisions in two months, General Giap has simply rendered our shield less effective. If I understand General Westmoreland's basic requirement for additional forces, it is simply to prevent the relative balance of force from going badly against him. If the balance of force improves in favor of the enemy, as it has in recent months, the enemy automatically increases his ability to mount attacks, or to threaten attacks, in an increasing number of places. In his current offensive, he has posed threats in precisely those areas which Ambassador Lodge correctly identifies as being the most critical--the cities, the towns and the concentrations of heavy population.
8. With respect to over-all strategy in Vietnam, I would make this observation. We are now engaged in the most crucial phase of the war. The events of the next three or four months could fundamentally alter the nature of this war. In my view, it is not timely to consider fundamental changes in strategy when we are fully committed in what could be the decisive battles of the war.
Earle G. Wheeler
120. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, March 11, 1968, 6:57-8:18 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. Those attending were the President, Rusk, Clifford, Nitze, Wheeler, Taylor, Helms, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS
The President: Dean, we are very proud of you up there today (testifying before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on Vietnam and Foreign Aid)./2/
/2/On March 11-12 Rusk appeared in a public hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the first time in over 2 years. Except for a brief statement on foreign aid the first day, Rusk responded to the Committee's questions on Vietnam and specifically on the impending troop augmentation decision and the 1964 Tonkin Gulf incidents. Rusk also described the reassessment then being undertaken by the administration on Vietnam, an exercise that he referred to as an "A to Z review." In addition to putting Rusk on the defensive by criticizing Johnson's Vietnam policy, Fulbright and the other Senators unsuccessfully pressed for a pledge that the administration would consult with the Committee prior to reaching any final decision. See The New York Times, March 11-13, 1968. In a telegram to Bunker assessing his appearance at Fulbright's hearings, Rusk noted: "As I assess the internal mood of the country here, I am deeply convinced that (a) the performance of the South Vietnamese and (b) some clear news of important military successes would help most of all in morale on the home front." (Telegram 129797 to Saigon, March 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
Secretary Rusk: As you all know, I testify again tomorrow at 9:30 a.m. I do not want to be caught off guard up there tomorrow by anything which you may be discussing here today. Should I leave or stay?
The President: You have had a rough day. Why don't you go on and get rested for tomorrow. You and Clark can get together later to go over what we have discussed.
(The President and the group then reviewed at length the recommendations and answers to questions which are attached.)/3/
/3/Not attached. In this March 11 memorandum to the President, Clifford listed seven questions and appended responses. These questions concerned Westmoreland's add-on package request, the Marine Corps figures, the status of the troops "in the pipeline," additional tactical aircraft, reserve call-up, Program 5 deployment, and equipment for allied forces. (Johnson Library, Clark M. Clifford Papers, Vietnam (1 Feb 68-15 Mar 68) [1])
The President: I see that Westmoreland prefers Alternative Two. (The President then read: "I prefer the second alternative. By providing seven additional maneuver battalions as compared to three in the first alternative, it maximizes my combat firepower . . ."--from General Westmoreland's cable to General Wheeler 11 March 1968)./4/
/4/See footnote 3, Document 115. In a memorandum to the President prior to receipt of this telegram, March 11, 9:50 a.m., Rostow noted: "As instructed, I have spoken with General Wheeler as well as Clark Clifford. The questions were put to Westmoreland. There is as yet no reply. The reply may come in today. General Wheeler says that he hopes there will be a little time to 'scrub down' Westmoreland's recommendations before they come to you. Therefore, he is inclined to think that it would be better to make the critical decision tomorrow rather than today; but he and Clifford will be in touch with me later." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs N-Z and AA-KK)
This would be roughly 30,000 men?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir.
The President: Was Westmoreland limited in this?
General Wheeler: Yes, we told him this was all that we had the capability of providing in this time period. I recommend that we send him these men as soon as we can. Of course, it will be necessary to call up the reserves to do this.
The President: Can we relate this 30,000 to a specific request from General Westmoreland?
General Wheeler: The first increment he asked for out of the 206,000 was 90,000. But as I said this is all we can provide in this period. But this does not relate to a specific request from him.
Secretary Clifford: In this cable, he says that the second alternative is better than the first.
There then was a general discussion of force levels. General Wheeler said that if the President approves the recommendations the total troop level would be brought up to 578,000 including Program 5 (525,000) completion, the elements of the 82nd airborne and Marine RLT already sent, along with the new troops.
The President: I do not want to be having a seminar on strategy back here while our house is on fire. I want to get Westmoreland what he needs to get him through this emergency period. Let's get those civilian contractors working wherever possible and get some strong, tough strawbosses running things out there.
(About a twenty minute discussion followed on the specifics of the attachments.)
121. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, March 12, 1968, 1:29-2:32 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House. Those attending were the President, Clifford, Helms, Wheeler, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH HIS
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS
AT THE
TUESDAY LUNCH
The President watched portions of the Senate Foreign Relations hearings on television. He saw questions and answers given to Senator Dodd, Senator Pell, Senator Gore, and Senator Fulbright.
General Wheeler gave to the President two cables which he had drafted to be sent to General Westmoreland. Those cables are attached as appendixes A and B./2/
/2/Not attached. One telegram is printed as Document 122, and the other is cited in footnote 2 thereto.
General Wheeler said that the weather was so bad that there was no need to consider targeting.
The President asked the group to look at the financing of the troop build-up very carefully. "We must have $1.8 billion without the build-up. With it we will need more than that--you have to have about $4 billion. Look into that."
All of you should also consider whether the President should make a statement. Give some thought on what we should say on the matter.
I want Clark and General Wheeler to talk to Congressman Rivers and Senator Russell as well as Congressman Mahon as soon as he returns from Texas. Have Russell get any of the people from the Appropriations Committee for this meeting.
All of you moderated my judgment in that Monday meeting after I returned from Puerto Rico./3/ I was ready then to say that we should call up the reserves to strengthen the strategic reserves; to ask Congress for authority to call up selected reservists; to use this as a basis for a new position on the tax bill; and to ask for authority to extend enlistments. That Monday session did moderate my judgment some. I do think we should evaluate our strategy. It is a good idea from time to time to have a good, sound review. I only hope we don't get over-run in the meantime.
/3/See Document 105.
I want to get the judgment of Senator Russell and Congressmen Rivers and Mahon and others about how we deal with Fulbright on this.
Since Secretary Rusk undoubtedly would like a little rest after that hearing, I don't think we really have much more we need to cover here. There is nothing we can do on anything else, is there?
Walt Rostow: No sir, not that I know of.
122. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/
Washington, March 12, 1968, 2014Z.
/1/Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message File, 1 Mar-31 Mar 1968. Secret; Eyes Only; Immediate. Repeated to Sharp.
JCS 2848. Deliver during waking hours. Ref: JCS 02847./2/
/2/Telegram JCS 2847 from Wheeler to Westmoreland, March 12. (Ibid.)
1. By referenced message I have informed you of upcoming actions to meet alternative two of the force requirements expressed by you in MAC 3385./3/ This message will provide you further background as to the situation here and its impact on force deployments to SEA. The following factors are important:
/3/See footnote 3, Document 115.
a. Leaks to the press have resulted in a rash of stories, reflected in debate in the Congress, that you have asked for an additional 206,000 troop augmentation.
b. There is substantial opposition in the Congress to any further deployment of forces to South Vietnam. Moreover, prominent Senators are demanding that the President seek Congressional approval before undertaking further deployments of U.S. troops.
c. A great many knowledgeable Congressmen and news media personnel know full well that the CONUS reserve cannot support any substantial additional deployment without a call-up of reserves.
d. It is anticipated that Members of Congress and the news media will criticize the Administration regardless of what is done; i.e., some will criticize because further deployments are made while others will criticize on the basis that more was not sent.
2. At a meeting at the White House last night/4/ to discuss the augmentation you requested in MAC 3385, the highest authority stated that, in response to questions and criticism, he proposes to say in effect: Westmoreland asked for these forces (30,000) as soon as possible; they were all we could realistically get to him to bolster his combat strength during the next three to four months. We intend to build up the CONUS strategic reserve in order to improve over-all capabilities. We will look at other requirements if and when the situation necessitates.
/4/See Document 120.
3. Furthermore, I was directed to keep you informed of the status of our forces in the United States so that you will not in future be placed in the position of asking for something that does not exist or is not available.
4. I will appreciate as always any comments you may care to offer. Warm regards.
123. Editorial Note
The impact of the war in Vietnam in domestic politics became a significant factor during mid-March 1968. On March 12 Senator Eugene McCarthy made a surprisingly strong showing in the balloting for the New Hampshire Democratic Presidential primary by winning all but 4 of the 24 delegate votes. His tally represented a significant repudiation of the administration's policies. McCarthy's relative success encouraged Senator Robert Kennedy to enter the Presidential nomination race on March 16. Five days prior to this announcement, Kennedy adviser Theodore Sorensen met with the President at the White House to present Kennedy's position on Vietnam. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Although notes of this meeting have not been found, Johnson did discuss the meeting in three telephone conversations with Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago, Illinois, on March 13 and another on March 15. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recordings of Telephone Conversations Between Johnson and Daley, March 13, 1968, 5 p.m., 10:49 p.m., and 11:22 p.m., Tape F68.05, PNO 1-5, and March 15, 1968, Tape F68.05, PNO 6)
Both Sorensen and Kennedy met with Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford at 11 a.m. on March 14. In this meeting, Sorensen and Kennedy suggested that the Senator would not declare his candidacy for the Democratic nomination for President if Johnson agreed to appoint a commission to re-evaluate U.S. policy in Vietnam. Kennedy suggested that he and nine others would direct the commission toward changing the course of the war. That same day Clifford discussed the proposal with the President in a meeting at the White House. The President concluded that he could not accept the proposal since it would "appear to be a political deal." Clifford then reported the rejection of the idea to Sorensen and Kennedy. (Ibid., National Security File, White House Famous Names, Robert Kennedy) According to transcripts of a telephone conversation at 6:15 p.m. that evening, Presidential aide DeVier Pierson further explained to Sorensen why the President had rejected the idea of establishing the commission: "He feels that public announcement of such a group would be interpreted in Hanoi as a weakening of our position and would have an adverse effect on our own people--particularly in State and Defense Departments--and appear to undercut their efforts." (Ibid.)
124. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, March 14, 1968, 1030Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 7:30 a.m. The telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 372-379.
22088. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my forty-third weekly message.
A. General
1. In my last two messages,/2/ I reported on our preliminary readings on the effect of the Tet attacks on the situation countrywide, and their meaning in terms of enemy strategy. It is clear that we must push ahead not only with the recovery program to get things back to the pre-Tet normal situation, but also move ahead as rapidly as possible toward achievement of our longer range priority objectives, i.e., mobilization, reorganization of the armed forces and civil administration, pacification, the attack on corruption, and economic measures. These latter will first have to be concerned with a restoration of the badly damaged economy, and in restoring confidence in the business and farming communities before any real advances can be envisaged. Taxes will have to be increased to close the inflationary gap and a vigilant watch kept on the upward pressure on prices. In surveying the situation this week, I can report progress on both the recovery effort and on some of our longer range objectives. At the same time, there are areas where we face continuing difficulties.
/2/See Documents 94 and 107.
2. Progress is evident in the following areas:
A) President Thieu is continuing to take an increasingly active and decisive role in the government, providing more effective and more visible leadership than at any time in the past. Because of his temperament, he does not give the picture of the dynamic, charismatic leader that we might think of as ideal. But he has shown increasingly a desire to take hold of the reins and I think he is doing better in both American and Vietnamese eyes. He has continued to chair meetings of the Central Recovery Committee where he has made quick, sound decisions, pushed his Ministers to rapid action, and in general imparted more of a sense of urgency and confidence in the Vietnamese bureaucracy. He has moved to speed up mobilization, has taken steps on administrative reform, outlined his tax proposals, and enforces austerity measures, including the closing of bars and nightclubs, and imposed a ban on luxury building.
B) In pushing the relief and reconstruction effort, Thieu made a second personal inspection in Hue March 9, where he gave further impetus to the relief effort by making on-the-spot decisions and a display of interest and concern. While in Hue he made a point of contacting ordinary people and touring the entire city to see and hear their problems first hand. General Forsythe, who accompanied Thieu, tells me that the gratitude and warmth of the people toward him was obvious. Remembering the attitude of the Hue population toward the central government in the "Struggle" and even in the recent past, this response to Thieu is doubly significant. On March 11, Thieu also made a brief radio and TV appearance, as I have been urging him to do, in which he launched the official campaign for voluntary contributions to a national fund for the Tet victims.
C) The relief and reconstruction effort is continuing to move forward with good results. Universities and some other schools have reopened, relief convoys are moving to Hue and the Delta, distribution of relief supplies continues, and reconstruction is underway. Some 81 million piasters have been hand carried in cash to the provinces to speed the relief effort. In Saigon, the curfew has been cut by two hours, resulting in improved morale, and the port is functioning much better, the discharge rate now having reached 8,000 tons per day. Prices continue to move downward. Nationwide, the number of refugees now stands at about 500,000 and will probably continue to decline as people whose homes have not been destroyed move back as security is established. Other statistics, though not final, also testify to the magnitude of the problem. The number of houses destroyed is now estimated at 74,000 and civilian casualties at 9,100 killed and 21,200 wounded.
D) The movement back into the countryside has begun. At least 321 of the 555 RD teams are in the hamlets; 93 out of 109 Truong Son (Montagnard) teams are also in place. The President has also issued instructions that all RD cadre would be sent back to normal RD duties effective immediately, and that they therefore would no longer be supervising refugee camps, manning command posts, guarding cities and towns as they have been doing in some instances. Both General Cao Van Vien and RD Minister Tri have been making personal inspections, urging on rural officials an aggressive return to the pacification effort. The RD Ministry also has 12 teams in the countryside to develop the necessary program changes to adapt RD plans to the present situation.
E) On the military side, an encouraging development was the fact that both volunteer enlistments and draftees jumped dramatically in February. There were 10,084 volunteers in February compared with 6,059 in January and 3,924 in February of last year. Over 10,600 draftees also reported for induction in February, as compared with 3,766 in January and 4,006 in February of last year. It is worth noting that despite personnel losses in the recent heavy fighting, RVNAF unit strength is generally satisfactory and GVN forces are maintaining a high level of combat effectiveness. Of the 155 RVNAF maneuver battalions, 98 were combat effective as of February 19, but this had jumped to 118 by March 1. Average countrywide present-for-duty-strength of RF companies is 99 (full strength, 123) and for PF platoons is 29 (full strength, 35).
F) A Civil Defense Directorate was established in the Ministry of Interior March 7. The organization of local units is going forward throughout the country, and at latest reading there were nearly 19,000 volunteers in 20 provinces.
G) The Prime Minister has signed a decree on the organization and functions of the new Directorate General of the Civil Service which should provide a sound institutional base from which to launch an effective reform program within the civil service.
H) Tran Van Don successfully held his national congress to form a broad, nationwide anti-Communist front on March 10. While there were some conspicuous absences among the invited notables, attendance was impressive in terms of the wide span of political elements represented. Also noteworthy on the political scene this week was the passage by the lower house of the national budget, with no significant changes from the administration draft. The budget now goes to the Senate.
3. Among the difficulties still confronting us are the following:
A) Perhaps the most negative development this week has been an obvious tendency on the part of some Vietnamese leaders to return to politics as usual. While the success of the Tran Van Don congress testifies to the continuing strength of the feeling of national unity which emerged from the Tet offensive, there have also been disturbing signs that characteristic Vietnamese factionalism is again emerging. Most troublesome in this category have been reports of intention by Ky, particularly spread by his supporters, to force a change in the power structure which would give Ky more authority. Some reports even went so far as to suggest a forcible change in government leadership might be in the offing. I took up this matter specifically with Ky yesterday morning and will report on it in more detail in the political section.
B) Related to the Thieu/Ky problem in the continued activity by Tran Van An and Nguyen Van Huong to form political organizations which are generally viewed to be in competition with Don's front.
C) Another matter is the effort by some lower house Deputies to place on the house agenda a motion of no confidence in the government, although at last report it appears that this may not materialize.
D) The enemy continues to pose a formidable military threat in several areas. He is apparently having considerable success in recruiting to make up for losses as well as continuing to reinforce his shattered units by infiltration. The situation seems to be most serious in the Delta. Ky told me this morning that General Thang had reported to him last Saturday that 367 outposts had either been overrun or their complements withdrawn to defend the [garble] and that some 2,000 men, with as many weapons, are unaccounted for; whether they were killed or deserted is not known. There are reports that Viet Cong recruitment starts at age 14 for guerrilla forces and even as low as age 10 for hamlet defense units. Harassment by mortar and rocket fire, sometimes accompanied by ground assaults or the planting of rumors of pending offensives, have created fear and uncertainty among some urban dwellers as well as a lack of confidence in the ability of the GVN to provide security. But with the U.S. and ARVN troops beginning to go over to the offensive, the initiative appears to be shifting to the allies. Communist documents have emphasized the need for "continuous and fierce attacks" to prevent the allies from going on the offensive. The enemy's fears may be justified, for last week a majority of the ground contacts were allied-initiated, with the enemy generally attempting to disperse into small units to avoid combat. The low level of enemy activity and the unusual risk in attempting to bring in supplies by sea suggests that he is having logistic difficulties, or that he is trying to conserve his strength for another big effort. I Corps is an exception to this general statement where the enemy seems to be preparing for large scale conventional warfare.
[Omitted here is discussion of the situation in the countryside, political activities, and economic matters.]
Bunker
125. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, March 14, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs N-Z and AA-KK. Confidential. In an attached covering note transmitting the memorandum to the President, March 14, 7:50 p.m., Rostow wrote: "Here is how I summarized Dean Acheson's proposal, after his exposition at lunch today." The notation "ps" on the covering note indicates that the President saw the memorandum; the President also wrote: "Walt--Call me--L."
SUBJECT
Summary of Dean Acheson's Proposal/2/
/2/The President lunched with Acheson that day from 2:04 to 3:09 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) They discussed the results of Acheson's inquiry on Vietnam, for which the President had granted Acheson, despite his unofficial status, government-wide access. The former Secretary of State concluded that the public would never support the large augmentation as requested, and thus the war had to be brought to a conclusion as soon as feasible. He suggested that the President organize a group to assess Vietnam policy. In response to Johnson's comment that the military remained optimistic, Acheson replied, "Mr. President, you are being led down the garden path." See Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953-1971 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 256-259.
1. We should make available such forces as we can muster and are needed in the next emergency months.
2. We should immediately set about a study in which the brightest and ablest civilians and military in the Government take part.
3. This study should consist of:
--An examination of what has happened over the last year in Vietnam, including, of course, the Tet offensive and its aftermath. This should be a careful, factual effort.
--We should then examine, looking ahead over the future, what we can expect from the government of Vietnam and its military forces in undertaking its share of the allied studies: staying together; improving its quality and energy of government; improving its military importance.
--We should then analyze how we can deal with North Vietnam and its military forces. We should look backward at what we have done, our successes and failures. What could we do?
--On the basis of an assessment of the past, the GVN possibilities and the possibilities of coping with the North Vietnamese, we should then launch ourselves on a path looking towards progressive disengagement over whatever period of time we judge appropriate.
WR
126. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Air Force (Hoopes) to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
Washington, March 14, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1250, VIET 381, 1968. Secret.
SUBJECT
The Infeasibility of Military Victory in Vietnam
As a contribution to current deliberations and to your own ongoing review of the situation, this memorandum argues the case that the idea of military victory in Vietnam is a dangerous illusion, at any price that would be compatible with US interests, the interests of the people of South Vietnam, or the cause of world peace. Secretary Brown agrees that it should be forwarded for your consideration.
Military victory--that is, the destruction or ejection of NVN forces and reduction of VC guerrilla forces to impotence or at least to a level that is manageable by ARVN alone--has been the implicit (though not always clearly recognized) goal of US policy at least since the decision to build up American manpower in 1965. It continues to be the unexamined assumption of General Westmoreland's strategy, of his request for additional forces, of the JCS support for his strategy and his requests, and of all other proposals for intensifying or enlarging our war effort in Vietnam.
Moreover, military victory (as defined above) appears to be a necessary precondition for the realization of a US political objective which defines "free choice" for the people of SVN as a process necessarily excluding NLF/VC from participation in either elections or government. Whether or not this definition reflects the true US intent, it is clearly the position of the GVN and has not been rejected by the USG. As is known, even non-communist politicians are now being jailed by the GVN out of fear that they will open a dialogue with the NLF. These facts suggest that if military victory is not feasible, the US political objective must be redefined.
One's assumption about the necessity or feasibility of military victory is therefore a critical fork in the road. Reaffirmation will lead in the direction of a larger and wider war effort aimed at destroying the NVN/VC forces. Refutation will lead to adoption of a far less ambitious strategy, aimed at protecting the people of South Vietnam, permitting a stabilization of the US resource commitment at tolerable levels, and followed by a prompt, utterly serious effort to achieve a compromise settlement of the war that reflects the enduring political and military realities in Vietnam. It is imperative, at this watershed in our Vietnam experience, to subject the assumption to the most searching re-examination. Our future ability to formulate rational policies for VN depends on this.
The history of our involvement in Vietnam, particularly since 1965, has been marked by repeated miscalculations as to the force and time required to "defeat the aggression," pacify the countryside, and make the GVN and ARVN viable without massive US support. Each fresh increment of American power has been justified as the last one needed to do the job. Responsible political and military officials have consistently underestimated NVN/VC strength and tenacity, have promoted uncritical notions of what US military power can accomplish in the political and geographical environment of SEA, and have indulged in persistently wishful thinking as regards the present capacity and real potential of the GVN and the ARVN. It is important that these misjudgments be kept in mind as we weigh the alternatives that now lie before us.
The following points contain some material that may already have come to your attention. The purpose here is to combine all of the relevant arguments and bring them to focus on the root question of whether military victory is feasible.
[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum, in which Hoopes discussed several factors that mitigated against continued escalation in Vietnam. Military action had not increased popular support for the GVN, which was compounded by its inability to control its own territory. Significantly, the bombing campaign had failed to deter the enemy because of support provided the DRV by the Soviets and Chinese. In addition, the air war's impact on manpower was minimal. As a consequence, Hoopes argued, "on balance, NVN is a stronger military power today than before the bombing." The introduction of the troops Westmoreland wanted would cause a number of difficulties and likely would not make much difference in terms of proportional strength. The DRV could "neutralize" the proposed augmentation of 206,000 U.S. troops by deploying only 50,000 new troops of its own. With so many troops in South Vietnam, the casualty rates would rise with resultant political costs to the administration but without altering the fundamental conditions of stalemate in Vietnam. In addition, the impact of the force augmentation would be detrimental to efforts to reform and invigorate the GVN, would have a deleterious impact on the U.S. economy, and could significantly undermine the domestic political order. An alternative means of attacking the enemy by intensive bombing that included crop destruction could be more effective in terms of sapping enemy will but would prove too costly to implement.]
Townsend Hoopes
127. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Washington, March 14, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Secretary of Defense Files, VIET 370. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Southeast Asia Deployments
The President would like us to meet General Westmoreland's latest request for an additional 30,000 troops. Therefore, I plan to issue a new Southeast Asia deployment plan, Program #6, with a total military personnel strength of 565,500. This number includes the 525,000 in Program #5, the 10,500 emergency reinforcement on loan to MACV, and the new request for 30,000. The Deputy Secretary of Defense will reply separately to your request for cancellation of the civilianization program.
I would like us to comply substantially with General Westmoreland's preferred alternative. However, I would prefer to substitute Army and Air Force units of similar types for the Marine Corps units on his list. Because of the high fraction of the Marine Corps already deployed, the Marines would find it very difficult, perhaps impossible, to sustain the additional deployment under current personnel tour policies. Moreover, substitution of Army and Air Force units would permit us to use the Marines in missions closer to those for which they are designed.
Therefore, I would like to propose the following approximation to General Westmoreland's preferred alternative.
|
Strength |
Deployment Date | |
|
A. U.S. Army |
||
|
Infantry Bde (3 Inf Bns) |
4500 |
15-30 June |
|
Mech Bde (1 Inf Bn, 1 Inf Bn (Mech), 1 Tk Bn) |
5041 |
12 July |
|
Avn Co, Sep Bde |
238 |
15 July |
|
Armd Cav Sqdn |
1030 |
15-30 June |
|
MP Bn |
955 |
15-30 June |
|
Cbt Svc Spt |
3316 |
|
|
Cbt and Cbt Svc Spt |
9120 |
|
|
Subtotal |
24200 |
|
|
B. 7th AF |
||
|
4 TFS |
2164 |
15 April |
|
FAC/TACP |
191 |
1 June |
|
Airlift |
741 |
1 June |
|
Support |
929 |
|
|
Subtotal |
4025 |
|
|
C. USN |
||
|
NSA DaNang Support |
1775 |
|
|
D. Total MACV |
30000 |
The Secretary of the Army proposes to meet the request for a mechanized brigade by deploying a brigade from the 5th Mechanized Division. He now believes it cannot be ready to deploy before 12 July.
Moreover, for the reasons noted earlier, I would like to substitute an Army infantry brigade and support personnel for the 27th Regimental Landing Team and support personnel that deployed in February. Therefore, I would propose to substitute 7,363 Army personnel for Marines in the first half of July. The Army can provide the personnel; the Secretary of the Navy now believes the 27th RLT can be sustained until then./2/
/2/In a March 14 memorandum to Nitze, Resor noted that the replacement would require an additional call-up of units with 13,500 personnel and a corresponding increase in the MACV ceiling. (Ibid.)
Would you please inform General Westmoreland of these proposals, and of my preference for them, and ask him whether he considers the substitutions satisfactory./3/
/3/In a March 14 memorandum to Nitze, Wheeler noted that he would inform Westmoreland of the substitute package. In addition, he inquired whether his understanding that reserve units and individual reservists would be called-up but terms of service would not be extended was correct. Nitze indicated "no" on the memorandum and wrote: "Would like to know what we are going to do, of course." (Ibid.)
Paul H. Nitze
128. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 15, 1968, 3:25 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 7, Meeting Notes. Top Secret.
Mr. President:
Herewith the proposals for the 5 p.m. meeting./2/ I have ascertained from Paul Nitze that:
/2/See Document 130.
--this is a consensus agreed upon completely within the Pentagon; that is, all the members of the JCS and the service Secretaries, as well as Clifford and Nitze;
--the Strategic Reserve call-up (para 3) would be announced at the same time as the call-up to support the thirty thousand deployment, but it would take place later: beginning approximately April 15;
--the cost of this package would be for FY 1968 $2 billion extra. To this must be added the $3.4 billion extra to which we are already committed by actions taken. The extra cost for FY 1969 is "much less" than the $10 billion we had earlier envisaged. Nitze will have an approximate calculation in time for the 5 P.M. meeting.
I will organize some questions for you promptly, but I wanted you to have this right away./3/
/3/In a memorandum to the President that day, 4:20 p.m., Rostow listed 10 questions that the President could ask during the 5 p.m. meeting. In addition, Rostow suggested that the President discuss the suggested timing of the announcement, ARVN expansion, a general Vietnam policy review, arrangements for Congressional consultation, and guidance to Clifford and Rusk on the announcement speech. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 7, Meeting Notes)
Walt
129. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 7, Meeting Notes. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
SEA Deployments, the Strategic Reserve, and Related Actions (U)
1. What should be the composition of the forces totaling 30,000 men to be sent to General Westmoreland?
We have agreed on a package including 24,200 Army, 4,025 Air Force, and 1,775 Navy personnel. We have also agreed we should bring back the 27th Regimental Landing Team and support units, totaling 7,363 Marines in July, and replace them with Army. This would bring the approved South Vietnam deployment to 565,500 U.S. military personnel, including the 10,500 deployed in February. These deployments can be sustained with current personnel policies, without new legislation. For details see Tab A./2/
/2/Tabs A-C are attached but not printed. Tab A listed Army, Air Force, and Navy units by strength and deployment date.
2. What callup of reserves do we recommend to support that deployment?
We recommend a callup of 36,621 Reserve and National Guard personnel, including 31,600 Army, 3,497 Air Force, and 1,524 Navy. This is within the scope of existing law. For details see Tab B./3/
/3/Tab B listed the reserve military units that would be requested in an immediate recall to active duty.
3. What additional callup of reserves do we recommend to reconstitute the strategic reserve?
We recommend a follow-on callup of 48,393 Reserve and National Guard personnel: 45,300 Army to bring our active strategic reserve to 7 divisions (5-1/3 Army, 1-2/3 Marines); and 3,093 Air Force. For details see Tab C./4/
/4/Tab C listed the Army and Air Force units that could be recalled to build up the strategic reserve.
Alternative Executive Orders to implement this are at Tab D./5/
/5/Not printed.
Clark M. Clifford
130. Editorial Note
On March 15, 1968, the President met with his advisers from 5:15 to 7:10 p.m. to discuss the call-up of reserves and the Program 6 deployment to Vietnam. Those present at the meeting included Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Justice Abe Fortas, General Maxwell Taylor, Special Assistant Walt Rostow, and Presidential aides George Christian and Tom Johnson. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Clifford began the meeting by stressing the need for two call-ups, one of 50,000 and the other of 48,000 men, and whether they would necessarily be sent to Vietnam:
"Clifford: As far as the numbers are concerned about this first call-up, this 50,000 call--that number comes out, because everybody knows about it and all you have to do is begin to figure out who has been called and it doesn't take anybody very long to put those numbers together. Now, as far as the deployment of the men is concerned, and no decision has been made on that, that I know of, insofar as the announcement is to be made, that is open. That is the 30,000 plus the 13,000 [Westmoreland] says he needs as support troops, so there is 43,000 that we presently plan on sending to South Vietnam in addition. Now . . .
"President: What does this bring your ceiling up to? Your strength . . .
"Clifford: It's going to bring it up to, I'd say, 579 [thousand]. The original figure of 525 [thousand], then you must send that emergency shipment of 10.5 [thousand], I believe we call it. I believe with the 82d Airborne and 27th Marine [Divisions], that really became 11 [thousand]. I think . . .
"President: You add that on to 525 [thousand] or 510 [thousand]? I didn't think we had reached the ceiling on them.
"Clifford: Oh, but we had. They had fellows in the pipe line to bring it up to the ceiling. That was definitely in addition to the 525 [thousand]. You got 525 [thousand], then the 11 [thousand with] the 82d Airborne and 27th Marines, your new group of 30,000 which you are sending over, and this support group of 13,000, and you have a total, when they all get there, of 579,000.
"President: So it's 10-525-10.5 sent in emergency the other day and 43 are going?
"Clifford: That's right.
"President: That makes 579.
"Clifford: 579 is right.
"Christian: Don't put in that 12.5 [thousand].
"Clifford: On that civilianization program, we had left that out because there is still a possibility that Westmoreland may be able to find 12.5 [thousand] civilians and fill those slots. If he doesn't--if he can't find 5 or 6 thousand or so, that would bring the total up a few thousand or more depending on how many slots are unfilled when he tries to fill them with civilians and he can't."
Following a further discussion of civilian personnel and the possibility of Australian augmentation, the conversation turned to the public announcement of the move:
"President: Now what would we do--we would say that roughly half of those people would be in strategic reserve, the other half over a period of from now until August would be available for Vietnam. We would not announce when they went to Vietnam until after they had arrived. Is that a fair statement?
"Rusk: Well, you would want to say that in advance or would you say that you are calling up 90,000, in the course of the next 30 days, or whatever the period is to get these two groups, to strengthen the strategic reserve forces in the United States. We anticipate that some of those may be available and may have to be used to strengthen General Westmoreland's forces and that others simply will be used to strengthen the strategic reserve.
"President: It's going to leak out, just what you do, and the first man you consult.
"Christian: Let me put this out. The Washington Post already has the 98,000 figure. They've got it [wrong]. I got an inquiry just before we came in here--couldn't understand what he's talking about. He said the Pentagon reporter has said 98,000 men had been told they are being sent to Vietnam. He's got the figure though.
"President: That's before I got it.
"Clifford: We just got the 98,000 figure--as Paul and Buzz and I worked the figures over at luncheon today. Now, there had to be a meeting this morning of a number of military personnel and civilians to work out this whole package, but we finally worked out these numbers here, then we came around to this figure of 98,000 at luncheon today."
The group then discussed the desirability of announcing two smaller augmentations. Both Rusk and Clifford noted that the difficulty with this approach lay in attempting to communicate to the public what percentage of those being called up would go to the strategic reserve and how many might be deployed for service in Vietnam. Clifford stated: "There is always the present intention that exists, it seems to me--I think the President takes quite a burden right now if the story gets out--that there are 98,000 men being called up and the administration is rather hazy about it--so the supposition is that they are all going to go to Vietnam. So the headline is '100,000 more men to go to Vietnam.'" In response, the President later interjected: "I think it goes back to what I said originally. We are going to call up 98,000 and half of them will be scheduled for the strategic reserve and the other half will be deployed in Vietnam between now and August. Now that's the facts and I don't know how you do it. We've been doing it that way all along up to 525 [thousand] and try to change it now."
The issue of broaching the augmentation to Congress received considerable attention:
"Christian: Mr. President, I think we might consider, in view of what you have just said, as to whether or not this might be the appropriate time to expand on what Secretary Rusk told me the [Senate Foreign Relations] Committee about studying from 'A to Z' and maybe use that in connection with the announcement on the call-up of reserves--sort of a double-barrel formalization of something--just for talking purposes here as to whether this might help offset all the hollering we are going to get tomorrow and over the weekend and make it appear, and truthfully so, that we are taking a good hard look at the Vietnam situation in conjunction with . . .
"President: I had interpreted the Secretary's statement a little differently on 'A to Zs'--that each day we study what everybody ought to be trying to do and what we are doing and we're flexible and we're hoping for suggestions. But that does not mean that we are considering a policy and trying to form a new one and that the one we've had is a mistake.
"Christian: I think it is dangerous to do that whether we are--if we could do it in such a way to show that we want to expand on what he said--not go beyond . . .
"Rusk: I don't see how we'll get out of that without a lot of speculation without substance."
The President recognized, and Rusk underscored, the importance of informing the Congress of any public announcements that the administration would make beforehand. The following discussion ensued:
"Fortas: I wonder whether it is necessary to say that you are going to do step one and step two about the reserves all at the same time. Listening to what you say, it seems to me that this could be cut up into two parts. I'm not talking about the conversations of disclosure with the Congressmen, but in terms of what the official statement will be. If you say we are calling up 98,000 people, no matter what you say after that the public impression is going to be that 98,000 will be going to Vietnam. If you could break that up with an interval of time between the two and still handle it so that there is no--that you don't mislead anybody which I suspect would be quite possible because there are two separate and discreet actions--I think it would avoid getting a wrong impression to the public. For example, if in your first statement that is made, it is that we are going to call up 48,000 for the reserve and they will be available to go to Vietnam and we are surveying what the need will be for an additional call-up for our ready reserve within the United States. And don't let anybody push you into a figure on that. I mean in terms of public--and do that later because I--it seems to me that if you say you are calling up 98,000 people and no matter what you say after that, it's going to be 98,000 people to Vietnam.
"President: I think it could be justified too, if you could figure out those that are sent out--Airborne and those that are sent out, Marine--I think there would be much merit in our saying if we--General Westmoreland--must have 30,000 people now and for that reason in addition to what he has and we have to support him. And so we've got 48,000 [sic]--that's what is going out now. And then when we make the other announcement two weeks later we could say that we have sent from this country recently up to 50,000--we're going to have to replace those--we'll call-up some to take a position in this country for those that have gone out of country--if that is an accurate statement.
"Clifford: I have had the same feeling that Abe has had from the very beginning, that as soon--and I think he made a brief reference to it earlier--as soon as you pick out some 98,000--some odd [number] that immediately becomes 100,000 and the headline is 'one hundred thousand more troops to go to South Vietnam' and there is nothing that you can say to them that is going to persuade them any to do different. I think we are much better off if we can separate them and there is no real problem in that regard."
The President reached a decision near the end of the discussion:
"President: Well, let's move our people then. Let's decide that one. Let's brief our people on the fact that we have gone over with Westmoreland and there have been a lot of figures published and some said 200 [thousand] and some said 100 [thousand] and some said 90 [thousand] and we have it down now to where we are ready to recommend or considering suggesting to the President after consultation with you, approximately 50,000 that will go out there, which will give us 30,000 fighting men plus the supporting units and so forth.
"Clifford: All right.
"President: Now, we are undertaking a study to see how we call-up our strategic reserve and we'll probably have a figure--we would hope not any bigger than that, but just to give them an idea that [it] won't be too large; we're studying that and we don't want to get accurate, but just give them an idea that won't be too large--we're studying another figure and we'll come up with that when we get it.
"Clifford: Because that's going to be the first question that Senator Russell will ask. He will say, 'Well, okay, if Westy thinks he needs them, all right, but now what are you going to do about the reserve?' We've been talking to him--well, then, it brings very much into focus, and we're studying it.
"President: Well, I wouldn't get definite on it but I would say we are hopeful that we can get that figure where it won't be any more than the other one, maybe a little less--fill out these units specifically.
"Clifford: I think there's . . .
"President: 48,000, you see . . .
"Clifford: I think there is real value in the public [announcement].
"President: You can say it will be a little less. I think that will keep them from announcing a figure because they won't know, you see, and it will actually be, if we go through with it, if we decide that it would be. So watch that we don't make either decision, but for consultation purposes you will say to them that you'll send--this is the figure you've got--and say, 'Now we will study in the next weeks ahead. We'll be back in touch with you with that, but we think now just from the glance that we have made at it--and not being firm--that it will be probably less than this figure.' All right, Abe, go ahead. Is that satisfactory, Buzz?
"Wheeler: Yes, sir. If we can do this a week or ten days afterwards, then we can cut it."
The discussion then focused on the necessity to cut back on troop deployments elsewhere in the world and what Fortas termed "the impact of it in terms of expense and particularly in terms of public attitudes." The meeting concluded with additional discussion on budgetary constraints arising from the augmentations. (Ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
131. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/
New York, March 15, 1968, 2307Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET. Top Secret; Nodis. Received at 7:36 p.m. In telegram CAP 80671 to the President, March 16, Rostow transmitted the text of this telegram with the following introductory paragraph: "Herewith Goldberg proposes we go for a bombing cessation and a negotiation promptly. In my judgment, the right time will be a few months from now--assuming Westy and the GVN weather the winter-spring offensive in tolerably good shape." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6 C, 1961-1968, Peace Initiatives: General International Initiatives (Retrospective Accounts)) The notation "ps" on Rostow's telegram indicates that the President saw it. The President was at the Ranch March 16-18.
4152. Eyes only for Secretaries of State and Defense. Please pass White House for the President--Eyes Only. From Goldberg.
Secretary Rusk has made it clear in his statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the entire situation with regard to Vietnam is under review from A to Z./2/ It is my understanding this review encompasses not only military aspects but also possible moves toward a political solution. It is on the latter question that I should like to advance the following thoughts for the consideration of those engaged in this policy review.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 120.
Recent developments in our country have demonstrated that there is grave concern among the American public whether the course we have set in our Vietnam policy is right or holds promise of results commensurate with the cost--concern which has been deepened by the reverses we and the South Vietnamese suffered during the Tet offensive, by the apparent lack of energy, effectiveness and appeal of the South Vietnamese Government, by the mounting rate of American casualties, by the extent of the destruction of life and property in Vietnam, and by reports that requests have been made of the President for substantial troop reinforcements in South Vietnam. This concern reflects a growing public belief that the war in South Vietnam is increasingly an American war, not a South Vietnamese war which the US is supporting, and, further, that the war cannot be won on this basis without ever-mounting commitments not worth the cost.
As I see it, under our democratic processes, if public support is permanently and substantially eroded, we will not be able to maintain let alone intensify the level of our military efforts in Vietnam. This is not to say that decisions on this matter should be controlled by the normal fluctuations of public opinion concerning the progress of the war. Major presidential decisions cannot and should not be made on the basis of a day-by-day reading of the public's temperature. It is my considered opinion that the very best way to prevent further erosion of public support from taking place is to make a new and fresh move toward a political solution at this time. Moreover, and independently of this, I believe on the merits that a fresh move toward a political solution should be made now.
The question which then arises is: what new and fresh effort should be made? In my view, there is only one feasible step at this time which offers any possibility of making progress toward a political settlement and, at the same time, of being received by the American public as a good-faith move toward such a settlement. Stated simply, that step would be to put into effect the San Antonio formula by assuming Hanoi would not take advantage of the bombing cessation and without seeking prior assurance from Hanoi on this point. There are obvious risks in this course of action. Nevertheless, I believe it must and should be taken.
It is pertinent to recall what the President said at San Antonio:
"As we have told Hanoi time and time and time again, the heart of the matter really is this: the United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussion. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation."/3/
/3/See footnote 5, Document 2.
Taken at its face value, this formula does not call for any prior assurance that North Vietnam would not take advantage of a cessation of the bombing. Rather, it foresees that we will act on the "assumption" that North Vietnam would not take such advantage. Therefore, the step I propose would not involve a departure from the policy enunciated by the President.
Since the San Antonio formula was enunciated, we have had explicit public and private statements from North Vietnam that: A) talks between the US and Hanoi would follow relatively soon after an end to the bombing and other hostile acts against the North; and B) no subject matter would be excluded from the talks. This leaves the way open for us to insist in such talks that the first order of business would be appropriate arrangements to ensure that Hanoi does not use the bombing cessation to obtain a military advantage.
In specific terms then, my suggestion, based on the San Antonio formula, means that--without announcing any conditions or time limit--we would "stop" the aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam, for the limited time necessary to determine whether Hanoi will negotiate in good faith; in my view this can best be determined by what actually happens during the talks rather than any advance verbal commitments of the kind we have been seeking.
There are, however, many things which my suggestion does not mean:
A) It does not mean we would refrain from bombing the main infiltration routes through Laos or within South Vietnam;
B) It does not mean we would cease or refrain from intensifying our bombing in the Khe Sanh area, the northernmost provinces of South Vietnam, and any other point in the South where VC/NVN troops are concentrated;
C) It does not mean we would discontinue naval bombardment south of the 17th parallel of Hanoi's supply and infiltration operations by sea;
D) It does not mean we would be inhibited from rotation or normal augmentation of our own forces in the South during the bombing cessation or the subsequent talks--unless, of course, those talks resulted in an agreement concerning non-augmentation of forces;
E) It does not mean, finally, that we would be precluded from resuming the bombing if, in fact, North Vietnam were in bad faith to take military advantage of the bombing cessation.
In addition to and concurrently with the bombing cessation, I would urge that we pursue the following courses:
1. Go privately to the Soviets and the Bloc countries to enlist their strong support toward ensuring that, on the one hand, Hanoi does not take military advantage of the bombing cessation and, on the other, that Hanoi will promptly begin negotiations which will be fruitful. We would also be in a strong position, having followed Soviet and bloc advice on stopping the bombing, to urge that they use their supply leverage in support of a political settlement;
2. Enlist the support of others (e.g., France, India and other non-aligned countries) toward the same end;
3. Enlist similar support from the Pope and the Secretary General;
4. Attempt to obtain, at an appropriate time, the support of the Security Council for our diplomatic effort prior to any resumption of the bombing. Resort to the Council, timed so as not to undermine our other political initiatives, will additionally serve to satisfy Congressional and public opinion in favor of involving the United Nations and to minimize the difficulties which would be involved at any time bombing is resumed.
I realize fully the course I am proposing would have repercussions and implications for the government in Saigon, particularly at this time. But a growing erosion of support by the American people for our present policies would have far greater repercussions and implications for that government.
In the Vietnam situation, like almost all potential negotiating situations, there can never be an ideal time for negotiations. If things are going well militarily, the natural inclination is to look upon negotiations as unnecessary. If, conversely, things are going badly militarily, the disposition is to look upon negotiations as disadvantageous. In light of our past experience in Vietnam, there will not be, in the foreseeable future, an ideal time for negotiations. Were we to decide upon a substantial military build-up, I see no reason to believe that our adversaries are incapable, given the support they are receiving, of stepping up their military response, rather than being forced within practical time limits into negotiations under circumstances more advantageous to us than the present.
My strong conviction about the need for a move toward negotiations now is based upon the considerations. No forseeable time will be better for negotiations than the present, and never has a serious move toward a political settlement been more necessary.
Goldberg
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