Docs 132-148
March 16-31: De-escalation and the March 31 Speech
132. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, March 16, 1968, 0050Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Rusk.
131330. Nodis outside the Department. Literally eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. The President is facing some decisions which may well require him to make a major speech to the nation around the middle of next week involving troops and the call-up of certain reserves. There could be important advantages in a "mobilization" type of speech by President Thieu beforehand to which reference could be made. Please give me your quick reactions to the feasibility of some such speech and the major elements which Thieu might be able to include, including possible reference to an additional 100,000 men, the steps taken in the draft in the recall of veterans, and any more steps on civilian programs. A strong assertion by Thieu that the South Vietnamese accept their full responsibility for the struggle and are going all out to meet it is the sort of thing we are looking for. I would discuss this only with Westmoreland for purposes of the present turnaround. What we need is your judgment as to what you think will be possible.
Rusk
133. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 16, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War-Miscellaneous Materials 1968. No classification marking.
Dear Mr. President:
Yesterday you suggested that I should testify next week before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I replied that I thought Clark Clifford should testify. The reason for my reply was that I have not been, and possibly should not be, privy to the reasons for limiting consideration to Option A in the chain from A to Z. As a result, I do not feel myself to be in a position properly to defend the Executive Branch in a debate before the Foreign Relations Committee which would undoubtedly spread from MAP to the major policy issues before the country.
It has been and is my view that other options should be considered before deciding to adopt Program 6. I discussed with Bob McNamara before he left, and subsequently with Clark Clifford, a proposal for an alternate course of action to the one we have been following. Basically it couples a negotiating position similar to that proposed today by Ambassador Goldberg with a strengthening of our strategic reserve. A copy of the proposal is attached./2/ Since it was prepared, the gathering financial crisis adds weight to options which could achieve a wider base of Congressional, domestic and international support than Option A.
/2/Attached but not printed is Nitze's February 27 proposal.
I fully realize the tremendous burdens which you, as President, are called upon to bear. I send this now only because I believe the issue to be of profound importance.
Sincerely yours,/3/
/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.
134. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, March 16, 1968, 1140Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 7:28 a.m.
22276. Literally eyes only for the Secretary from Bunker. No distribution outside the Department. Ref: State 131330./2/
/2/Document 132.
1. I am reasonably confident that I could convince Thieu to make a speech of the sort you have in mind before the middle of next week.
2. He has told me that he is eager to do whatever he can to help us in the present situation and I know that he appreciates the problems which the President faces in making decisions for the future relating to our effort in Viet-Nam. I have discussed this matter with General Westmoreland who agrees that there are quite a number of useful points which can be made regarding the new initiatives on the GVN side relating to the military situation, mobilization, and getting back into the countryside for resumption of the pacification effort.
3. As to the content of the speech, one of the major emphases would certainly be the foregoing complex of efforts to beef up their military capacity. Within this I believe quite a number of points can be covered regarding their intentions with respect to manpower mobilization and training, and the time frame which Thieu is considering. In terms of civilian programs, I think there are several useful points which can be made regarding reorganization of the civilian administration, replacement of province chiefs and their new channel of authority to the central government, and the plans for training new and qualified personnel for key positions in the future. The renewed efforts against corruption, outlined in detail in the Prime Minister's March 14 speech,/3/ would be another useful point to meet criticism in the U.S. A section of the speech could be devoted to the very praiseworthy GVN efforts to move rapidly for the relief of more than 500,000 refugees, as well as the plans for housing reconstruction, which has already been started here and will soon be moving in Hue and other hard-hit areas in the provinces. I would also hope that he might describe some of the effort to unify the nation politically, including his relations with the assembly and perhaps some kind words about efforts to draw various groups and interests together in a national front.
/3/In this speech, Loc described punitive anti-corruption measures undertaken against 74 government officials and military officers. See The New York Times, March 15, 1968.
4. In brief, I think there are enough positive elements which could go into speech to make it worthwhile, even though many of them have already been covered in public statements and speeches. One of the problems of course is the deliberateness with which Thieu approaches such matters as major speeches and this difficulty in preparing a text rapidly. Perhaps we can help him in this respect. If you conclude that such a speech is desired, please let me know promptly so that I can try to get to him on Monday to discuss the matter and give him some ideas./4/
/4/In telegram 131731 to Saigon, March 16, the Department stressed that Thieu should avoid any reference to additional allied assistance since "the important thing is to present a picture of South Vietnamese determination to do everything possible to help themselves with the greatest energy and dedication." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S) The Department also wanted Thieu to emphasize the steps already taken on corruption and mobilization. (Telegram 131765 to Saigon, March 18; ibid.) In addition, he could mention the ARVN's need for equipment but should not use lack of equipment as an excuse to avoid rapid military expansion. (Telegram 131744 to Saigon, March 17; ibid.) Thieu agreed to make the speech along the lines suggested to him by Bunker. (Telegram CAP 80693 from Rostow to the President, March 17; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 1 EE (3), 3/16-31/68, Post-Tet Political Activity) In the March 21 speech, which Bunker described as "the best and briefest he has made since taking office," Thieu announced plans to increase the RVNAF by 135,000 men through an expanded draft, extensive recalls to active service, and other measures to rally and invigorate the Vietnamese people. (Telegram 23308 from Saigon, March 28; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
Bunker
135. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, March 16, 1968, 1709Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs N-Z and AA-KK. Top Secret. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
CAP 80675. For the President. So that you can stare at it, I have translated the Acheson idea into the following draft directive for the team leader.
A key question is: who should head the group?
Perhaps the best choice would be Cy Vance. But his being about Washington would lead to leaks. His quality is such that it might well be worth taking that risk or even letting it be known that he is doing a Vietnam review job.
Other possible candidates: Max Taylor, Dean Acheson.
Draft Instruction
I wish you to direct a study which will look back to the past and forward to the future with respect to our Vietnam policy. The study should be completed by May 15, 1968.
These are the questions which I should like answered from all the data we now have available and can promptly generate:
1. What progress did we make--and fail to make--in the period between mid-1965 and Tet 1968?
2. What elements of fear and hope, weakness and strength, led Hanoi to mount the winter-spring offensive?
3. Where does Hanoi stand with respect to its objectives, as of the time this study is completed? What are its options as you think Hanoi sees them? To what extent are they dependent on what the United States does? What do you believe Hanoi will choose?
4. What can we expect from the Government of Vietnam and its armed forces with respect to: unity; executive and administrative energy; scale; modernization and effectiveness in combat during the balance of calendar year 1968? 1969?
5. What increments of military force can we expect--or, realistically, induce--from our present fighting allies? Could the circle be widened?
6. What are the prospects for inhibiting or blocking the flow of North Vietnamese forces to the South in the light of our experience with bombing North Vietnam; with the technology of the so-called barrier; and with the use of air and ground forces against North Vietnamese forces?
7. What is the state of the North Vietnamese armed forces? What regular reserves are available for dispatch to the South? What is their demonstrated and potential capacity to provide replacements in both quantity and quality?
8. What is the present state of the control over the population of South Vietnam, particularly in rural areas? What are the prospects for the balance of 1968? 1969?
9. In the light of your analysis and judgment, can we envisage as realistic a policy of gradual reduction of U.S. forces in Vietnam: in the balance of 1968; 1969; 1970?
10. At what moment--if any--could you envisage as potentially effective a U.S. or GVN negotiating initiative? What should be the character of that initiative?
You should feel free to pose and answer other questions you judge relevant to past or future policy in Vietnam.
In developing your report, you should assemble a team of the most knowledgeable and able Vietnam experts in the government; for example, George Carver, William DePuy, Philip Habib, William Jorden, Roy Wehrle. (A DOD representative is needed. The obvious choice is Richard Steadman. He feels strongly that Vietnam is hopeless. But, more important, I cannot recommend him until it is firmly established that he was not involved in The New York Times leak.) They should, if necessary, work virtually full-time on the project.
You should feel free, of course, to consult with other officials in the government and, on a discreet basis, with outside experts as well.
136. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/
Washington, March 16, 1968, 2045Z.
/1/Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message Files, 1 Mar-31 Mar 1968. Secret. Repeated to Admiral Sharp and General Johnson. In JCSM-159-68 to Clifford, March 15, Wheeler recommended obtaining authority to call up individual reservists, the retention of personnel currently on duty, and increases in end-strength. (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 1499, 320.2 Vietnam, 121-370.5 1968)
JCS 3024. Ref: MAC 03651./2/
/2/In telegram MAC 3651 to Johnson, March 16, Westmoreland continued to insist upon the deployment of the full divisional structure and promised to send a troop list for the entire force package. (U.S. Army Center for Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message Files, 1 Mar-31 Mar 1968)
1. In the light of referenced message and earlier messages on the same subject, I wish to inform you of where we stand with regard to MACV force augmentation. As preliminaries there are four things you should know:
A. Due to leaks here in Washington and in Saigon, there has been created an extremely difficult political and public atmosphere regarding the deployment of any augmentation to SEA.
B. You are very busy and, therefore, perhaps do not realize the monetary crisis through which we are going at this very moment. This subject has many ramifications which I will not detail, but the situation is serious to the point that it impinges directly and heavily upon Congressional and public attitudes toward further sizable expenditures of money in FY 68 supplemental and in FY 69 for the purpose of reserve call-ups and further deployments to you.
C. It is fair to state that the combination of further troop deployments and the critical fiscal situation has placed the government in as difficult a situation as I have seen in the past five years.
D. All of these things have, I judge, together with the gloom and doom generated by the Tet offensive, affected heavily public support for our war effort. The latest polls show that 69 per cent of those interviewed favored a phased withdrawal of our forces from SEA. To put it succinctly and frankly, I am concerned by these developments, and I believe that you should be aware of them. However, I caution that you do not reveal to anyone that this is the situation as I see it and is as serious as I believe it is.
2. With the foregoing in mind, I have three bits of information which I believe you will welcome:
A. The 30,000-man package will very probably be approved along the lines of my message to you which proposed deletion of the Marine element and substitution of an Army infantry brigade therefor.
B. I think that there will be acceptance of your retaining the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, and being provided an Army brigade to replace the 27th Marine RLT.
C. In line with B. above, I think that you will be provided the 13,400 support package for the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, and the 27th Marine RLT (or its replacement).
3. Now as to the referenced message: I suggest that you not forward a proposal to change the composition of the 30,000-man force at this time. We are far enough down the road that such a proposal on your part might well cause the whole package to come unglued. Moreover, there is a political problem involved. Much of the force you will be getting is drawn from the reserve; i.e., from Army and Air Force National Guard and reserve sources. The Army has had some difficult days in an attempt to restructure reserve units better to serve the needs of the Army as a whole. This has caused much bad feeling and much contention in the Congress and in reserve circles. I am sure that they are waiting to see if the Army calls up their separate brigades and immediately slaps a Regular Army division commander and staff on top of them to build them into a division. With all else that is going on, we don't need that. Of course, at some later time you might be able, just as you did in the case of the Americal Division, to scrape up some spaces and parts within your forces and with a small augmentation from the CONUS (which is not in the cards today) form another division, if that is your goal.
Warm regards.
137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, March 16, 1968, 2210Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Bundy and approved by Rusk.
131732. No distribution outside Department. Literally eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary.
1. In connection with our possible decisions as foreshadowed in State 131330,/2/ we have a number of staff proposals concerning our negotiating posture as we announce our actions. One would be simply to reiterate the San Antonio formula and take the same line that we have done in recent statements. However, two other possibilities have been raised on which we need your judgment as to the South Vietnamese reaction.
/2/Document 132.
2. The first of these would be to treat the various Hanoi statements reported to us in recent weeks as indicating that Hanoi at least clearly understands our "no advantage" assumption, and hence to go ahead with stopping the bombing in the near future. We would of course need to consult with the GVN before taking such action, but now need your judgment as to the GVN reaction and the broad effect in South Vietnam of carrying out such a proposal. We would of course insist on prompt talks and on observance of the "no advantage" assumption if we did in fact stop.
3. The second proposal that has been put forward at staff level is more modest. Its essence would be for us to restrict our bombing actions against North Vietnam roughly to the area south of Vinh, accompanying this by the simplest and most open-ended announcement possible, along the following lines: "After consultation with our allies, the President has directed that US bombing attacks on North Vietnam be limited to those areas which are integrally related to the battlefield. No reasonable person could expect us to fail to provide maximum support to our men in combat. Whether this step can be a step toward peace is for Hanoi to determine. We shall watch the situation carefully."
4. The timing of such an action/announcement could be prior to, concurrent with, or after the presentation of force increase proposals to the Congress. Among the considerations that we have in mind are the following tentative judgments:
a. For the next month or so the weather in the Hanoi-Haiphong area would mean that the proposal would not make a major difference from a military point of view.
b. Full bombing would be resumed if there were a major attack on Khe Sanh or a second round of attacks on the cities.
c. We would not send Ambassadors rushing all over the world to convert the bombing action into negotiations but would simply sit back and wait for Hanoi to respond.
d. It would shift away from theological debates about words and put the problem on the de facto level of action. If Hanoi took no corresponding military action, the bombing would be resumed.
e. It would be very important for us not to embroider the statement with all sorts of "conditions" or "assumptions." Just take the action and see whether anybody is able to make anything out of it.
f. The "areas which are integrally related to the battlefield" would presumably be as far north as Vinh. Bombing below that area should be intensive and without wraps.
5. As I said at the outset, there would obviously be other elements in any final judgment, notably whether the effect on the Congress and the American public would be on balance favorable, and so on. We would also need the most thoughtful assessment of how Hanoi would respond; it would be our best judgment that they would not take any real step toward peace, but it is conceivable that they might hold their hand at Khe Sanh and against the cities for some time, and this would require at some point a military judgment whether this situation would be to our net advantage.
6. What we most need from you, though, apart from any general thoughts you may have, is whether such a proposal could be sold to Thieu (in conjunction with disclosure of plans for at least limited US force increases and also proposals for improving ARVN equipment), and whether the initiation of this action might--even if Thieu had agreed--have serious disturbing effects on South Vietnamese will and morale. We are of course well aware through your reporting of the deep rejection of any new negotiating approach or peace initiative at the present time, and the equally deep sensitivity to any implication that the US may be dealing separately. The question is whether this action would arouse these emotions and to what degree. We would like your thoughts on what sort of timing it might take to obtain GVN concurrence if you think it wise to see this.
7. May we have your judgment on the South Vietnamese aspects of these proposals at your earliest convenience, together with any comment you wish to make on their general wisdom at this time? If it is your conclusion that any change in our negotiating posture at the present moment would not be wise, we would like your general thoughts as to the possible future timing of any similar actions./3/
/3/In telegram 22548 from Saigon, March 20, Bunker warned that many South Vietnamese were angered that a strong reaction against the DRV was not undertaken immediately after Tet; as a result, a U.S. move toward negotiations could cause a considerable anti-American outburst. Bunker advised delaying any peace initiative and consulting with Thieu and Ky at every step. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
8. I want to emphasize that the foregoing are among alternatives being considered at the staff level only. They have not been presented to higher authority for consideration. You may be sure that you will not be confronted with any sudden decisions and that you will be afforded full opportunity for consultations.
Rusk
138. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, March 18, 1968, 1200Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
22386. 1. I took Ambassador Komer to report privately to President Thieu on his Washington visit, as part of our current effort to get the GVN moving faster. Thieu was very receptive, and we had a long, two-hour discussion.
2. I told Thieu that Bob Komer had given me such a disturbing appraisal of the great concern in Washington over the current situation and GVN performance that I wanted President Thieu to get the same candid appraisal firsthand. We carefully noted that this was not an official call on instructions, but rather an effort on my part and Komer's to make sure that President Thieu understood the full magnitude of Washington concerns.
3. Komer dwelt heavily on the deep discouragement of the U.S. press and public, as well as the large segment of the U.S. Congress, at the success of the VC Tet offensive and the slowness of the GVN's response. He pointed out that this had greatly strengthened anti-war sentiment among much influential U.S. opinion and had re-enforced the growing criticism of the administration for even considering further Viet-Nam force increases at a time when the GVN was not carrying its own share of the burden. The GVN was regarded as moving too slowly in reforming its machinery, in recovering the countryside, counter-attacking the enemy, and rebuilding the cities.
4. On the contrary, Komer stressed, he found the President and his chief advisors determined and unflappable. However, Komer felt compelled to say in all candor that he found the highest levels in Washington also deeply disappointed and concerned that the GVN was not moving faster on the civil and military fronts.
5. To re-enforce this point, Komer cited various criticisms which he found at high levels. He emphasized that the constant reappearance of Thieu/Ky dissent gave an impression of divided and uncertain management at just the wrong time. It was regarded as a critical impediment to dynamic and unified GVN leadership./2/ The press and critics were using this theme to argue that even the top GVN leadership couldn't hang together. The proliferation of efforts to organize "national fronts" was also cited as evidence of the inability of the Vietnamese to pull together.
/2/In telegram 22205 from Saigon, March 15, Bunker reported on his meeting that day with Thieu during which they discussed his rivalry with Ky. Bunker described the conflict as "damaging to the image of the GVN both here and abroad" and stressed to Thieu the need to resolve this problem. Thieu placed considerable blame for the impasse on Ky and expressed anxiety about entrusting him with an important function such as the anti-corruption campaign, "since he was surrounded by corrupt people." (Ibid.) In a meeting with Ky 5 days later, Komer warned against any "extra-constitutional moves" as "there was no doubt in his mind that U.S. would do everything in its power to prevent any power grab." (Telegram 22549 from Saigon, March 20; ibid.) A March 20 memorandum prepared by the CIA Station in Saigon assessing the Thieu-Ky relationship concluded that "while Ky must be warned that coup talk is simply unacceptable and contrary to both GVN and U.S. interests, it would be best if Thieu rather than Ky could be induced to play the major role in the resolution of the 'Thieu-Ky problem' using Ky's announced dissatisfaction to our advantage in encouraging Thieu to be more aggressive in this regard." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 1 EE (3), 3/16-31/68, Post-Tet Political Activity)
6. Komer went on to say that he had been told repeatedly that the GVN did not seem to be moving fast enough in purging its own ranks, despite the plus from removal of two corps commanders and several province chiefs. Since Washington regarded the next few months as critical, it also had difficulty in understanding why ARVN could not conduct more of a full-scale counteroffensive to relieve the threat to the cities and recapture the countryside. Further, there was much criticism of the lack of solid action to date against corruption, and even of the weakness of Prime Minister Loc.
7. Komer summed up by expressing his own personal view that it would be difficult for the U.S. to justify yet further support for the GVN, or perhaps even sustain the present level of support, unless the GVN took more drastic steps to show it was rising both to the enemy threat and to the great opportunities which Hanoi's all-out offensive was creating. He felt that the U.S. position would be critically dependent on what the GVN itself did over the next few months to convince the U.S. administration, Congress, and public that it merited such support. He apologized for having to present such a gloomy view, but repeated that he and I felt we owed it to Thieu because in the last analysis only Thieu as president could galvanize the GVN.
8. Thieu expressed appreciation, and recited some of his difficulties in getting the GVN to pull together. He mentioned jocularly that he even had to deal with rumored possibilities of a coup. I seized the opening to remind him again that Washington supported him and only him as the duly-elected President, and that a coup would most certainly risk withdrawal of U.S. support to Viet-Nam. We doubted whether our Viet-Nam policy would survive another coup.
9. Thieu then asked candidly, "Should I have a change of government?" When I asked him what he meant, he asked frankly whether he should change Loc and other Ministers. I replied that I recognized the difficulty of Loc's position. He also struck me as a very intelligent man, but he did not seem to be a particularly good executive or manager who knew how to use his power to make decisions. Komer added that in his and General Forsythe's almost daily meetings with the Central Recovery Committee over the past six weeks, they had both been struck by how the President or Ky would take decisions but how the CRC became more of a debating society when Loc was in the chair.
10. Thieu dissented from our view, saying that he thought Loc had the capability to make decisions but was caught in a very difficult position in the middle (between Thieu and Ky). Though Loc had been proposed by Ky, he was being hampered in taking many decisions because of fear of offending the Ky group. For example, Loc knew who was corrupt (Thieu cited the Customs Director, the Port Director, and some others whose names we did not catch), but these were Ky appointees whom Loc feared to remove. The President had told Loc that he would back Loc in any changes, but Loc was concerned over "cutting off Ky's arms and legs." Loc meant well but was hamstrung by being in the middle.
11. Komer suggested giving Loc a specified period--say two months--in which to perform on pain of dismissal. Thieu smiled but did not respond. Next Komer suggested strengthening the Prime Minister's office by making Doan Ba Cang Deputy Prime Minister with power to pull the governmental machinery together on the recovery front. Cang was tough-minded and was performing brilliantly; however, he lacked the authority to compel Ministers to respond.
[Omitted here is discussion relating to the pacification program.]
Bunker
139. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 18, 1968, 3:30 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Lions. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Davidson. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. Raimondi also saw Harriman the previous week at the time Rusk was testifying before Congress. (Memorandum from Harriman to Rusk, March 12; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, General-March 1968)
SUBJECT
Vietnam Peace Proposal
PARTICIPANTS
Archbishop Luigi Raimondi, Apostolic Delegate to the U.S.A.
The Secretary
Daniel I. Davidson, Special Assistant to Ambassador Harriman
Archbishop Raimondi told the Secretary that last February a person connected with the official and diplomatic sector, a specialist in international law, presented a solution for breaking the impasse preventing the two parties to the Vietnamese conflict from meeting. This idea was for a third party to issue an invitation to talk at a specific time and place. This would get around the current situation where no one feels free to take the first step although both sides say that they are ready for talks./2/ The Archbishop handed a memorandum, prepared by the person he had referred to above, to the Secretary./3/
/2/The source of the idea was Harvard University law professor Roger Fisher. According to Kissinger, Fisher said that he had contacted officials of the Polish, Swedish, and Papal governments. Fisher was told by Polish UN delegate Bohdan Tomorowicz that Hanoi would accept the essence of the San Antonio formula but not make direct assurances to the United States. Only the Apostolic Delegation had agreed to act as an intermediary. (Memorandum of conversation between Davidson and Kissinger, March 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Lions)
/3/Not found. Several detailed analyses of the memorandum are ibid.
After slowly reading the memorandum the Secretary said that it contained a very important idea that touches on many things which have been done or attempted. The Secretary said he did not want to give an off-the-cuff reaction.
The Archbishop said that he had not expected an immediate reaction but did wish to inform the Secretary that he would welcome suggestions the Secretary might have. For example the role given to Sweden could be given to Switzerland or to any other country. Archbishop Raimondi emphasized the importance of the two parties technically remaining unaware of the proposal and said that he was somewhat hesitant with leaving a copy with the Secretary but would trust his judgment.
The Secretary said that the U.S. had thought of trying variations of the plan at various times. We had been thinking of suggesting that the two co-chairmen or the three ICC nations send representatives to a site such as Geneva who would be present to talk to anybody who came to the site. This method could avoid procedural difficulties such as the role of the NLF. As the various groups converse with the representatives it might lead to suggestions on how to move to peace.
One of the problems that requires close attention said the Secretary is the proposal for a reduce fire without a previous understanding or arrangement. The Secretary pointed out that the GVN holds all provincial capitals, six autonomous cities and all the district capitals and asked whether it could make use of the road network connecting these towns during a reduce fire. The Secretary repeated that he was not in any way judging the proposal./4/
/4/In telegram 133723 to Saigon, March 21, the Department informed Bunker of the proposal but cautioned him not to mention it to Thieu. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/LIONS)
The Archbishop said that the Holy See would not go ahead unless exploration revealed the possibility of success since the Holy See was not interested in academic exercises.
The Secretary told the Archbishop that the Holy See's interest is greatly appreciated and that the memorandum would get immediate and careful study./5/
/5/Harriman suggested that Raimondi be told that a Polish commitment to attend the meeting was required before the United States would proceed on the initiative. (Memorandum from Harriman to Rusk, March 27; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, General-March 1968) According to a March 28 memorandum of conversation, Harriman, with Rusk's concurrence, suggested that Raimondi sound out the Poles on this matter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Lions)
140. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, March 18, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 1 EE (3), 3/16-31/68, Post-Tet Political Activity. Secret; Nodis. Prepared by Jorden on March 19. Rostow supplied talking points for the meeting in a memorandum to the President, March 18, 1:25 p.m. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Meeting Between the President and Ambassador Bui Diem
The President met late yesterday with Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem in the President's office. Purpose of the Ambassador's call was to review the present situation in advance of Bui Diem's return to Saigon this week for consultation with his Government. William J. Jorden of the NSC Staff was present. The meeting began at 6:30 p.m. and ended at 7:10 p.m.
The President welcomed the Ambassador and remarked on his early return to Saigon. The Ambassador said he planned to underline three things in his talks with his own President and other Government officials:
(1) the mood in the United States and the rising tide of criticism against American involvement. He planned to stress the extent to which the criticism is aimed at the Vietnamese themselves and their lack of vigorous action.
(2) the desperate need for improved performance by the Vietnamese--especially the Army and the Government. He would stress the need for the GVN to attack such social evils as corruption.
(3) the need for President Thieu and Vice President Ky to work in harmony and to form an effective team.
The President indicated he thought these were all matters worth emphasizing. He said that criticism was indeed rising here and that he was under heavy pressure.
He was firm in his conviction of the rightness of our course in Viet-Nam. And he planned to ask the Congress and the American people for additional sacrifice and expenditures. But he said we could not do the job alone. The Vietnamese had to bear a heavier load, too.
He noted how much of the criticism focused on Vietnamese actions or lack of action--the slowness in drafting Vietnamese youth, the misuse of AID supplies, the buying of draft deferments, the corruption of officials and others.
The President noted that some officials had been removed but he thought indications were that more should be ousted. He suggested that the Vietnamese ask MACV for a list of inefficient or corrupt commanders and then "get rid of them."
The Ambassador noted that present plans called for drafting 65,000 Vietnamese in the next few months. They were now thinking of raising that to 100,000 or 125,000 and perhaps even 200,000 by the end of the year. He said this kind of increase raised problems of equipment, training facilities and budget support. The President assured him of our help in meeting equipment requirements.
The President asked Jorden to prepare a memo for the Ambassador listing the 8 or 10 things we think need most to be done. The Ambassador assured the President he would use such a memo in his talks with his own officials./2/
/2/In a March 20 covering memorandum transmitting this memorandum to Rusk, March 20, Bundy wrote that it was "based upon the recent exchange of messages with Ambassador Bunker on what needs to be done in Viet-Nam as a matter of priority." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
As the Ambassador was about to leave, the President wished him success and asked him to tell President Thieu and Vice President Ky to "work together and get moving."/3/
/3/In a meeting on March 20, Rusk told Diem to "emphasize that the problem of public opinion in the United States is directly related to the feeling our people had as to the dedication and performance of the Vietnamese Government and armed forces. It would be good news that would make an important difference in the attitude of the people of the United States if it were clear that a maximum effort was being made by the people involved in Viet-Nam." (Telegram 134107 to Saigon, March 21; ibid.) Diem also met with Clifford on March 20. Clifford told him that the United States and Vietnam had to end the war before the American public's support for it ended, although "the results of this conclusion will not be very satisfactory to the GVN or to us or to Hanoi or to the NLF" since "everybody is going to have to give up a lot." (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1250, 1968 Files, VIET 091.112)
W.J. Jorden
141. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 19, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to Katzenbach.
SUBJECT
Checklist for Any Major Announcement--Luncheon Topic
As we consider a major announcement of forthcoming actions, I submit the following checklist:
1. How and when do we inform Saigon and our allies?
I believe this should be done at least a day or two in advance in Saigon, and at least a day in advance for the Manila allies. A related question is whether we make any determined effort to get additional contributions. We probably can get a Korean light division under negotiations already under way, and the Australians might go up just a little. However, I see no other prospects, and would strongly recommend against any publicized push.
2. How do we depict the situation, both in Viet-Nam and in relation to our world-wide need for an adequate strategic reserve?
On Viet-Nam alone, we need a careful and considered statement of the enemy's strategy and new capabilities, on which to base the fundamental argument that we are acting to meet what they have done. On the world picture, there are delicate problems in whether we point to any specific threat area as justification for bringing our strategic reserve up to an adequate level.
3. Do we announce flatly an increase in our force ceiling in Viet-Nam, together with the timing of deployments?
On the one hand, to give a flat deployment schedule plays into Hanoi's hands. On the other hand, Congress and the country may require a firm new "ceiling" to avoid the implication that we are committing ourselves to the full extent of the total force increase. This is a dilemma in which the answer will require careful review of such a possible position as stating that we now believe X thousand additional forces, over and above the 525,000, will be required and are earmarking in that sense but without giving the dates.
4. What do we say about any revision of strategy?
We could use some such formula as that Westmoreland is being instructed to give primary emphasis to the protection of populated areas, but this raises the question of whether we mean to abandon Khe Sanh and the highlands. On the other hand, if we have no language suggesting any change of emphasis, we will be accused of simply going on with more of the same. The underlying fact, as we believe the DOD studies will show, is that any change can only take place over a period of time.
5. Do we mention bombing policy in the announcement? If not, what are we going to say about this to the key committees, with a high likelihood that it will leak?
It still seems to me that we require a broad decision in principle by the President between a seasonal step-up within current limitations, and serious consideration of the JCS expanded proposals, including the mining of Haiphong. Surely we cannot avoid this issue in the Armed Services Committees, and whatever we say will come out.
6. What is our posture toward negotiations?
All of us have felt that we should not modify the San Antonio formula or take any dramatic new initiative. It may be that the Papal proposal would be helpful outside the limits of any announcement./2/ However, we face a broad question of how the announcement refers to our view toward possibilities of peace in the coming months.
/2/See Document 139.
7. What does the announcement say about tax proposals and budget cuts?
Whatever is being worked out with Congressional leaders may well have to be specified in the announcement to avoid damaging psychological effects on the dollar. If domestic cuts are involved, these will need to be presented and sustained.
8. How fully do we argue the whole case for continuing in Viet-Nam?
It seems to many of us that the situation calls for an unusually sober and full statement of the reasons why we are going on. A simple reiteration of the past rationale will not do. It would be my own feeling that we should lay stress not merely on our commitments but on the continued importance of our stand in Viet-Nam for confidence in Southeast Asia--with full treatment of the current threats there and also a good deal more than the President has ever said about the favorable trends in Southeast Asia that our stand to date has made possible.
In short, the announcement may well need to be a very major state paper almost on the scale of a state of the union message. If we fail to spell out real answers to these questions, we will leave the field wide open and have to tidy up in any event during the hearings or through further public statements.
In the circumstances, I strongly urge that a task force be designated to work on the whole of this statement under conditions of utmost secrecy, and that no timing for the announcement be set until we have reached virtually final agreement on the terms of the announcement.
142. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, March 19, 1968, 1:01-2:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House. Those attending were the President, Rusk, Clifford, Helms, Wheeler, Rostow, Fortas, Jones, Christian, and Tom Johnson; the Vice President joined the meeting at 1:30 p.m. and McPherson at 2:30 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH HIS FOREIGN ADVISERS
AT THE
TUESDAY LUNCHEON
[Omitted here is a brief discussion of an unrelated matter.]
Secretary Rusk: We need some good news from Vietnam, Buzz.
General Wheeler: News is basically good. They are clearing out the enemy around Saigon.
There have been successful offensive operations in IV Corps. Nothing is happening in II Corps. News is good in I Corps.
We will see an effort to grab Hue. It could be a sizable operation.
Mr. Rostow: The Vietnamese seem more willing to contemplate offensive actions of their own. The enemy hasn't.
Secretary Clifford: The enemy may feel he is doing so well politically that he need not do anything militarily. They see:
--Debate in the Senate
--The New Hampshire primary
--Quarrels over the war in Congress
The President: Can we talk on the Goldberg-Bowles proposal?/2/
/2/See Document 131.
Secretary Rusk: I met with Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Harriman and Under Secretary Katzenbach. Goldberg says to go ahead with the San Antonio formula even though there is no response from the other side. He thinks it would unify the country. I don't think it will affect the doves.
I would be more inclined to have de facto bombing in the north halted and see if we get de facto response from Hanoi. I think we should go over it with Ambassador Goldberg.
Secretary Clifford: I am not impressed by the merits of the Goldberg proposition. I think it would be fruitless.
You have your committee of senior advisers. They met prior to the Tet offensive. They were briefed--you met with them. You had unanimous expression for carrying on as you were in Vietnam.
A lot has taken place. I wonder if it would be of value, if in the last three to four months--if you were to find that the same men either affirmed their attitude or reached a change of attitude. It would be of considerable help to you.
The group of Dillon, Dean and the Republicans was a very good group. Bob Murphy and Cabot Lodge were also included in it. We should get the benefit of their substantive opinion. Then we could say you were meeting again with the same group.
Drew Pearson wrote around that time about the group.
The President then asked Tom Johnson to get these quotes.
The President: I would add General Ridgway. He was not a critic. The net of what he said was that he was concerned--that we have these alliances and responsibilities in Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Mideast. He thinks we do not have enough strength to meet a new crisis. He thought we should have stronger strategic reserves.
He was not critical of any person. He had no magic formula.
They think a lot of Ridgway, as they do of Reischauer. It might be good to have them in.
The President read notes from the Dean Acheson meeting he had last week./3/ He said nothing much comes out of these big meetings.
/3/See Document 135.
It would be a mistake to get a new super-Presidential board.
Mr. Rostow: November 2 was the date of that meeting.
The President read the notes of the November 2 meeting which had been written by McGeorge Bundy./4/
/
4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 377.Secretary Clifford: The names of the group who have met with the President before are:
| Dean Acheson |
William B. Murphy |
|
George Ball |
Henry Cabot Lodge |
|
McGeorge Bundy |
Nicholas Katzenbach |
|
Douglas Dillon |
Secretary Rusk |
|
Arthur Dean |
Secretary McNamara |
|
Abe Fortas |
Clark Clifford |
|
General Taylor |
Director Helms |
|
Omar Bradley |
George Christian |
Of these, eleven were outside government:
Dean Acheson--hawk
George Ball--dove
McGeorge Bundy--for de-escalation
Douglas Dillon--dovish
Arthur Dean--hawkish
Abe Fortas
General Taylor
Omar Bradley
Robert Murphy--hawkish
Henry Cabot Lodge--hawkish
Clark Clifford
Secretary Rusk: Lodge thinks we should do less search and destroy and build up the South Vietnam forces.
The President: There are two or three dangers in this:
1) We comply with the Senator Kennedy demand.
2) We create doubt about the fact we are doubtful.
3) We were charged with handpicking.
4) It might harden public position against us.
Cyrus Vance should be in that group.
We will not change any dove anytime with anything.
Abe Fortas: There are three problems:
(1) The general public attitude
(2) The merits of the situation
(3) What we can do to get people behind your program.
Abe Fortas: Are we doing this as a defensive mechanism? If so, it is good. I think the committee would be a defensive public relations move. As that, I would wait a little while. It is a negative defensive thing to blunt the other side.
In summary, it is a good thing to do. We need to keep it from being excessively hawkish. I support a firm policy. We should get to work to mount public support for what we are doing.
The President: What is the Douglas committee doing?/5/
/5/Former Senator Paul Douglas headed an eight-member committee which publicly supported the President's insistence upon reciprocal action prior to an extended bombing halt.
Walt Rostow: It's still here.
Abe Fortas: It should (1) Blunt the attack of the doves. It should have a new job. (2) Mobilize the people behind us. (3) Maybe there are some fresh ideas it could give.
Secretary Rusk: There is safety in reconvening this group since you met before. It would be an advantage of getting their views.
The President: What about Reischauer and Ridgway?
Secretary Clifford: We could get the same group to look at developments since they last met. It would be valuable to get the judgment of the same group in light of the last four months.
Announcing it publicly would have two defects:
(1) Senator Kennedy would say he persuaded you to set it up
(2) The group is very hawkish.
I would use the group as a confidential advisory group.
If you did it from a public relations standpoint, I would start from scratch.
Walt Rostow: The timing should be related to:
(1) Whether or not South Vietnam goes ahead with 125,000 new troops
(2) How Westy's April offensive looks
(3) Logistical base for operations against Khesanh is reduced. The timing may matter.
General Wheeler: I would have the same group. I would get the views of the same men. A reappraisal might be important indicators of public opinion. To establish a new and larger group will be counter-productive.
You will get no benefit out of it. The first group would benefit you. The second (new) group is a trap.
The President: Let's set it for this weekend. Let's try it Wednesday./6/
/6/March 26.
What about Ambassador Bowles?
Secretary Rusk: I will take care of him.
[Omitted here is a brief discussion relating to the Middle East, Rhodesia, and Panama.]
The President: What is the situation on troop deployments, Clark?
Secretary Clifford: Senator Russell will go along with a plan for 50,000 reserves--43,000 to Vietnam.
30,000 for Westmoreland
13,000 for support
43,000 deployed
Russell would also go along with calling up 48,000 more reserves to fill the places open in the strategic reserves of this country. He is grateful of the build-up in strategic reserves.
This would build up to 7 deployable divisions versus 1-1/2 now.
I also met with Senator Stennis. He is for the call-up but not unless we broaden the scope of the war. He would like a plan to expand the war.
We told him General Westmoreland wanted 43,000 troops to protect over what we already have. Senator Stennis said O.K.
Senator Smith is strong for a call-up. She wants to call the U.S. people to arms to rally the people here.
Senator Scoop Jackson would go along with the plan.
Senator Milton Young gave general approval.
Senator Symington is opposed to the call-up. He thinks we should get out. He thinks the dollar will depreciate.
Congressmen Mendell Rivers and Bates would go along. Congressman Rivers wants a settlement on the nuclear frigate. Representative Mahon will go along with it. He was shocked about the money it will cost.
The Defense Department will move when the President is ready to move.
We should give consultation and notice to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and also the House Foreign Relations Committee. That should be done the same day the announcement is to be made.
Senator Russell is quite upset about the invasion of the defense field of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
We feel some prior notification should be given to the two Foreign Relations Committees.
Secretary Rusk: We should have an executive committee to notify our allies: Gorton, Thieu, Pak, and the Prime Minister of Thailand.
I still am concerned about the details one puts out publicly. I don't want to give exact figures.
Secretary Clifford: We can separate it some. Out of the first 50,000 some will be deployed to South Vietnam. Out of the second group they will fill our strategic reserves.
Senator Smith expressed hope that there would be a joint session of the Congress. We feel this would be too much since nothing is asked of Congress at this time. We are not asking for extension of enlistments or a call-up of selected reservists. We propose a speech to the nation on television by the President.
Secretary Rusk: I agree it should be on television.
Secretary Clifford: We should deal with the military situation, international situation, political situation, the situation with the GVN and ARVN, the 120,000 call-up of 18 and 19 year olds.
It will look better if the GVN calls up 125,000 of their own men. We also would discuss what, if anything, the allies are doing. The ARVN is being raised from 700,000 to 850,000 troops.
We must face up to the international monetary situation./7/ All of that should go together.
/7/Five days before, intensive speculation undermining world currencies had caused the London gold market to suspend trading.
General Wheeler: Here is a statement on the deployment. This is being coordinated by General Westmoreland.
Secretary Rusk: Ambassador Bunker is working with Thieu to get him to make a speech by Wednesday.
The Vice President: What about weapons to South Vietnam, particularly the regional forces and popular forces?
General Wheeler: We are doing more. (He then gave a list of equipment the U.S. is providing.)
The President: Are we final on our costing?
Secretary Clifford: We are as close as we can get. I refer to the memo of March 16. We estimate $10 billion.
The President: Get Bill Jorden, yourself, Harry McPherson, Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford, Justice Fortas, along with Budget, Treasury, Council of Economic Advisers to get a first draft of the speech by Thursday. I will be gone Friday and Saturday.
(Harry McPherson entered the meeting at this point.)/8/
/8/The President called McPherson at 2:01 p.m. and requested that he join the meeting. McPherson arrived at 2:30 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
I meet with the leadership at 6 p.m. today./9/
/9/The President met with the Congressional leadership from 6:16 to 7 p.m. (Ibid.) No record of the meeting has been found.
George Christian: I don't expect you can talk about this with the leadership without it leaking.
The President: If we announce the call-up of 48,000 reserves--most of whom go to Vietnam--I have directed the Secretary of Defense to have his department study the possibility of a call-up for strategic reserves here, to give us seven divisions of the strategic reserves.
We do not have plans for their deployment to Vietnam.
Secretary Clifford: That would meet it very well.
Secretary Rusk: Many would say the seven divisions are about to go to Vietnam. They would say we are going to get our strategic reserves in order.
Abe Fortas: You might talk about the first call-up for Vietnam and make sure our ready reserves are adequately strengthened.
The President: I could say we are calling up 48,000 people, a substantial portion of whom will go to Vietnam, and with our world responsibility I am directing the Department of Defense to look at the call-up for our strategic reserves.
General Wheeler: You could say on the second call-up, it is in order to replenish and build up our strategic reserves. The number will approximate the first call-up.
The President: How do you cost it out?
Secretary Clifford: Let's see what our people feel on that.
The President: Let's check that out with Secretary Fowler.
Walt Rostow: (1) We need information on an increase in forces because of those brought in by North Vietnam from information by the CIA. (2) We need information on the general North Vietnamization of the war--the proportion of the North Vietnamese fighting in South Vietnam today.
Director Helms: I will look at it. It is in the range of 50,000.
General Wheeler: 30-35 battalions.
Director Helms: On the Neil Sheehan article,/10/ all copies were passed out in Clark Clifford's office on March 2. No other copies were ever distributed.
/10/See footnote 2, Document 116.
The memorandum on Pacification was then passed out./11/
/11/Not found.
143. Memorandum for the 303 Committee/1/
Washington, March 20, 1968.
/1/Source: National Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Vietnam 1965-1968. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten note reads: "303 Committee approved on 10 April 1968."
SUBJECT
Expansion of the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) Program
1. Summary
Originally called the Counter-Terror Team Program when it got underway in 1964 as part of the 12-point covert political action program developed under NSAM 328,/2/ the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) Program has undergone an almost complete transformation since early 1966. From a program geared primarily to harassment of the Viet Cong in their own areas, it has been changed to one working almost exclusively on the collection of intelligence on, and capture of, key members of the Viet Cong infrastructure in the countryside. Its effectiveness in this new role is amply attested to by the amount of intelligence collected and Viet Cong captured and equally by the fact that the program is considered to be the single most effective instrument in the Mission's joint attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure with the South Vietnamese. In consequence of this [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Ambassador Komer to expand the program from a present personnel strength of about 3,500 men to 6,000 by the end of FY-69. Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland have endorsed this expansion, as has Asst. Secretary of State William Bundy. The total cost for the Program for FY-68 and FY-69 will be $13.2 million.
/2/NSAM No. 328, April 6, 1965; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 242.
2. Program
The PRU Program is the latest evolution in the continuing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] effort in Vietnam to exploit unconventional and paramilitary techniques in the war against the Viet Cong. The basic concept has always been to employ covert tactics for executive action missions by small teams using ambush, disguise, night operations and the whole gamut of classical techniques of this kind of warfare. In its earlier version this program was called the Counter-Terror program and the objective was to administer to the Viet Cong the same kind of medicine that they had been serving up to the Vietnamese Government and people. While the Counter-Terror Teams were effective in their role of harassing the Viet Cong in their home territory, there were certain drawbacks in the management and problems in the implementation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in 1966. These stemmed from the difficulty of keeping this rather sensational program from public scrutiny and from difficulties in controlling the 40 or so province chiefs through whom the program was implemented. In mid-1966, the name was changed to the PRU and the units retargeted to the specific and limited task of collecting intelligence on the Viet Cong secret power structure in the countryside by capture of members of this organization. In effect the mission became that of long range police patrol penetrating into areas from which ordinary police are barred to apprehend identified subversives participating in the conspiracy against the GVN. An indication of the effectiveness of this program is that, over the past year, 11,000 operations were conducted resulting in over 5,000 intelligence reports disseminated and the capture of 2,500 Viet Cong, in addition to 3,300 killed and 1,200 wounded. The PRU were thus responsible in one year for capturing or otherwise eliminating Viet Cong equaling roughly twice the number of men engaged in the program. Because of this record of effectiveness, Ambassador Komer has requested [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] increase the size of the program from about 3,000 to 6,000 men by the end of FY-69.
3. Factors Bearing on the Problem
a. Origin of the Requirement--This requirement results from the need to augment the Saigon Mission's capability to collect intelligence on, and capture, members of the Viet Cong infrastructure and is in specific response to Ambassador Komer's request that the PRU program be increased to 6,000 men by the end of FY-69.
b. Relationship to Previous 303 Committee Actions--On 26 July 1965, the Committee was given a briefing on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] covert operations in Southeast Asia in which the Counter-Terror program was included as part of the overall Political Action Team program. Policy approval was given at that time subject to further discussions with the Bureau of the Budget concerning the supplemental appropriations for FY-66.
c. Operational Objective--[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] objective is to enhance the Saigon Mission's capability for collecting intelligence on the Viet Cong infrastructure.
d. Proposal--[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] proposes to expand the existing PRU program from its present personnel strength of about 3,500 to 6,000 by the end of FY-69. This entails substantial construction costs for increasing the size of existing training facilities to accommodate this larger number of men, increased support costs for the additional men on duty, and the cost of re-equipping existing units with M-16 rifles, to keep pace with the increased firepower demonstrated by the Viet Cong during the Tet offensive.
e. Risks--There are essentially no security risks in this operation. The adverse U.S. publicity and Congressional interest generated by the predecessor Counter-Terror program stemmed partly from the somewhat sinister ring of the name and from the absence of an overt and legitimate sponsor. The redirection and renaming of the program, coupled with the Vietnamese Joint General Staff directive which places the program logically within the Vietnamese military hierarchy, have transformed the program from a colorful and somewhat conspicuous effort into a low profile activity which appears merely to be another of the many American sponsored programs in Vietnam. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] sponsorship is known to some of the older newsmen in Saigon and anyone who is interested would have little difficulty in ferreting out this fact, but the modest size of the program, even if expanded to 6,000 men, appears inconsequential against the background of the massive American involvement in Vietnam.
f. Timing of the Operation--Preparations for the expansion have been completed and can be undertaken immediately upon receipt of policy approval and the necessary supplemental funds.
4. Coordination
a. Department of State--This proposal has been approved by Assistant Secretary Bundy of the State Department.
b. U.S. Mission and MACV--This proposal has been approved by Ambassador Bunker and by General Westmoreland.
c. Host Country--This program has been coordinated with the Vietnamese Joint General Staff which has issued a directive providing ostensible sponsorship for the program.
5. Recommendation
Because of the demonstrated effectiveness of the PRU program against the VC infrastructure and its importance to the overall U.S. effort in Vietnam, it is recommended that the 303 Committee endorse the continuation and expansion of the program as outlined above. It should be understood that the continuation and expansion of this program as recommended will result in a total program cost for FY-68 and FY-69 of $13,227,000. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]/3/
/3/The minutes of the April 10 meeting of the 303 Committee, recorded in an April 11 memorandum for the record, read: "The expansion of the PRU Program in Vietnam was approved by the principals. Mr. Bohlen asked a number of questions concerning the extent of direct control [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Mr. Rostow was interested in the coordination of PRU intelligence production with military interrogations." (National Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Minutes, 1968)
144. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
CM-3129-69
Washington, March 20, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Clark M. Clifford Papers, Memos on Vietnam: February-March 1968. Top Secret; Sensitive. Received at OSD at 10:53 a.m. on March 21. There is a notation that Clifford saw the memorandum. That same day, Clifford also received a memorandum from Enthoven in which the U.S. position vis-a-vis the air war was likened to the NVA/VC position in the ground war; namely, that both sides could control the rate of losses in these respective arenas. (Ibid., Alain Enthoven Papers, Strategy)
SUBJECT
Answers to Certain Questions
1. What would be the military effect of a cessation for a specific period of time of offensive air operations which include the delivery of air munitions in (a) the Hanoi and Haiphong areas; (b) north of 20? North Latitude?
Answer: The weather begins to improve in the northern part of North Vietnam about 15 April; usually the change is complete by about 1 May. Past experience indicates that we can expect about four days of weather suitable for visual air attacks in the month of April. Militarily, our air operations north of 20? N. Latitude at this time of year are harassing in nature, not destructive; i.e., the few radar controlled air strikes exert psychological pressure primarily on the people and the Hanoi government, rather than destroying military supplies and facilities.
Conclusion: If a cessation of offensive air operations involving the delivery of air munitions north of 20? N. Latitude were implemented during the period from now through 15 April 1968, we would be giving up relatively little military effect on the enemy.
2. What quid pro quo could be asked in return for the cessation of bombing operations as specified above?
Comment: Any quid pro quo sought should be tangible and measurable. For those reasons, vague specifications such as the reduction of infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into the south would be meaningless. Moreover, while a proposal for cessation of VC/NVA rocket and mortar attacks against urban areas in South Vietnam might seem attractive, the fact that we would propose to continue air and naval offensive operations south of 20? N. Latitude and in Laos would give the opposition to U.S. policy an opportunity to demand as equitable the cessation of all offensive operations against all of North Vietnam; i.e., the quid pro quo could be and would be characterized as insincere and deliberately unacceptable to the Hanoi regime. In the same way, any proposal which would modify the San Antonio formula and link a limited cessation of offensive air operations to prompt and productive talks would seem to be dangerous. In the first place, such a proposal would be proclaimed by the opposition as a withdrawal from the San Antonio formula; in the second place, we are in our poorest negotiating position since the summer of 1965. A formulation which meets the tests of tangibility and measurement, but without the dangers involved in other proposals mentioned, would seem to be the following:
a. In reciprocation the North Vietnamese would be expected to cease the delivery of artillery, rocket and mortar fire from positions in North Vietnam and within the DMZ against U.S., ARVN, and free-world military positions south of the DMZ; and
b. Enemy forces would be withdrawn from the neutral DMZ established by the Geneva Accords of 1954.
Conclusion: Any quid pro quo sought should be tangible and measurable, and not susceptible to being twisted by the opposition to our policies in Southeast Asia. Therefore, a suitable quid pro quo could be: a. a proposal that the North Vietnamese cease artillery, rocket and mortar fire against Allied positions south of the DMZ from locations in North Vietnam and within the DMZ; and b. enemy would be withdrawn from the neutral DMZ established by the Geneva Accords of 1954.
3. What would be the military effect of proposing a cease fire if the proposal were accepted by the enemy?
Comment: The effect would be disastrous. As an example, there are now 53 enemy battalions located in the two northern provinces of South Vietnam. Of these, 16 battalions are in the vicinity of Khe Sanh; 13 battalions are in the eastern portion of the DMZ; 24 battalions are located in the Hue area, apparently positioning themselves for renewed attacks on that city. This same situation is found in many other areas of South Vietnam. This means that there are at present substantial areas of the country occupied by VC/NVA forces. If a cease fire were offered and accepted, these areas would remain under control of the enemy. He could resupply these forces and augment them with impunity in order to expand his control over the countryside and/or prepare for renewed offensive operations at a time and at places of his choosing. Moreover, in such a situation, the South Vietnamese Armed Forces would probably lose all offensive spirit and could not be relied upon to withstand renewed widespread attacks as they did during the Tet offensive. In sum, a cease fire, militarily, is simply a more dangerous form of the enclave concept.
Conclusion: A proposal for a cease fire, if accepted by the enemy, would place Allied forces in a position of maximum military disadvantage.
4. The foregoing comments in response to your questions address only the military factors involved. There are, of course, many political factors, both foreign and domestic, which should be weighed. On balance, it would not seem that any political factor would support a proposal for a cease fire.
5. I have not consulted with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the preparation of these answers.
Earle G. Wheeler
145. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, March 20, 1968, 0833Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received at 7:32 a.m.
22548. No distribution outside the Department. Literally eyes only for the Secretary from Bunker. Reference: State 131732./2/
/2/Document 137.
1. I appreciate the opportunity to comment at an early stage on the very important questions raised in reftel since, as you have indicated, actions on them clearly will have major effects here which should be taken into consideration before decisions are made. I recognize that considerations relating to the situation in the US may be overriding, but I am setting forth my very frank views on the problems which I believe may follow here if these courses of action are initiated in the near future. I will make some general comments first and then discuss the specific courses of action in the light of these more general comments.
2. As you indicate in para 6 of reftel, we have reported the general attitudes here towards early negotiations or peace initiatives fully and they do not need to be repeated in detail. In addition to a continuing sense of uncertainty and some residual fear of further enemy attacks on the cities, which underlie the GVN sensitivity on new negotiation initiatives, there are one or two additional factors which lie under the surface. One is the latent feeling which I sense many Vietnamese have that there should have been some form of immediate retaliation against NVN after the savage Tet attacks. This has not been explicitly voiced by Vietnamese leaders but I suspect that it is there. The recent initiatives by Ky and Loan that some of their followers are urging a "march to the North" and a declaration of war against North Viet-Nam probably represent, inter alia, a reaction to this frustration.
3. This factor has a bearing on the general question of Thieu's position if he should agree to a proposal from us along the lines indicated. Thieu, as you know, has shown himself to be very responsive to our wishes and needs, even if he has not always moved with the speed and vigor we might hope. In doing so, he has made himself vulnerable to charges of being unduly influenced by the Americans, and this may be one of the motives that lie behind these nationalistic initiatives by Ky and others. Thieu could therefore find himself in a very delicate position if he should give his concurrence to our proposals unless Ky is equally committed in whatever is done.
4. The timing of these moves will be critical to our success in getting GVN support, or at least understanding, for them, and I regard full consultation with GVN leaders as essential. From the viewpoint of putting Hanoi on the spot, I can see that an early initiative might have some advantage, but from a South Vietnamese viewpoint it could create problems that the GVN may not be able to cope with. At the present moment the mood of the people, especially in the countryside, is still fluid and a move by us to make a concession to Hanoi and the VC without a quid pro quo could be widely misinterpreted and could feed the latent anti-Americanism which the VC have been cleverly exploiting in recent weeks. It could revive the earlier rumor of US-VC collusion. It could also reverse the favorable trend of opinion in the urban areas where the new mood of unity and anti-Communism is still quite strong, as shown for example by the large number of young men volunteering for military service. We are also just at the point where the Vietnamese armed forces are taking the offensive against the enemy and are moving back out into the countryside. We do not want to take any action which might discourage this trend as we have been working hard to encourage it for the past few weeks. In short, a premature move towards negotiations could unsettle the favorable trend of Vietnamese opinion and action at a critical moment, encourage the fence-sitters, doubters and rumor mongers, and possibly discourage new ralliers from the other side.
5. On the other hand, a few more months might make all the difference in reestablishing Vietnamese confidence in themselves (and in us) and in their ability to overcome the Tet attacks and to move ahead demonstrably on priority objectives. It would also afford time to judge more accurately the effect of the Tet offensive on the enemy's capability and to demonstrate our own intentions regarding further military and other support for the GVN, including equipment for augmented Vietnamese forces. Time, in other words, should work to our advantage in terms of Vietnamese receptivity to further negotiations initiatives, whereas too early a move might have an extremely negative effect and undo much that we and the GVN have been trying to accomplish since the Tet attacks. As you know, Thieu, Ky, and Do have frequently said to me that a political settlement is needed and desired by the Vietnamese people who have been at war off and on for more than twenty years. They consider, however, that the timing of negotiations aimed at a settlement is critical and must be related to the strength of the GVN's position. They all feel strongly that it is too early now to get engaged in such an effort.
6. If I may look at this proposition also from Hanoi's viewpoint, I imagine that the leadership there might regard an early move on our part without any reciprocity from their side as an indication of the success of their Tet offensive and of their diplomatic and propaganda campaign around the world. They might well conclude that the situation in South Viet-Nam has been shaken more than they probably now think and that in the US our resolve with respect to Viet-Nam has been weakened. I am inclined to agree with you that Hanoi would not take any real step toward peace, but their leaders would seek to give a world-wide impression that they were doing precisely this, and I believe we might find it difficult to resume bombing in these circumstances. The holding of their hand at Khe Sanh, which may be their intention in any case, and which we could never really be sure of, could leave us with the same major commitment of forces in northern I Corps that we have now. Moreover, it would be a situation without any real military advantage since we would have to remain prepared for any eventuality there. I also question whether the holding of their hand against further attacks on the cities would have real significance in military terms, since it seems increasingly likely that they no longer have the capability to undertake successfully wide-spread and destructive attacks on a scale comparable to Tet. Further harassment of the cities and of lines of communication seems more likely. Our military posture will be further improved in the meantime if Vietnamese forces are built up substantially and American forces are augmented to some degree. In sum, I find it difficult to believe that Hanoi's response to these measures will bring us any advantage, either politically or militarily.
7. With respect to the two specific proposals you outline, the first alternative (para 2 of reftel) would create the greatest difficulties for us here. I recommend strongly that we not pursue this course, since from a Vietnamese viewpoint it would bring out all the disadvantages I have mentioned and it would also mean giving up our principal card without obtaining anything in return.
8. If your second proposal were adopted, it would be easier to obtain GVN concurrence. I believe, nonetheless, that it would still have most of the negative effects I have discussed above if initiated prematurely. The conditions spelled out in para 4 would be helpful in presenting the matter to the GVN leadership, although I suspect that they will still see major difficulties if this course is initiated in the near future and certainly if it is done before we have indicated publicly our intention to increase our forces in Viet-Nam. Generals Westmoreland and Momyer are currently studying the probable effects of confining the bombing of NVN to roughly the area you have in mind and it would be useful to have the results of this study in hand in order to determine its military effect.
9. In conclusion, I should say that while I do not want to exaggerate the effects here of our initiating an action along the lines indicated, I believe that if it is done prematurely, it runs the very real risk of undermining much that we have accomplished here and of stimulating latent Vietnamese doubts about our intentions. As I have indicated, we must consult Thieu and Ky and we must give them time to consider the effects of such action on their situation. This might mean a few days or possibly a week. I expect, however, that it will disturb them deeply and that they will urge us to defer such actions for at least several months when they expect to be in a stronger position to bring other elements of Vietnamese opinion, military and civilian along with them in support of any new initiative by us.
Bunker
146. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
Washington, March 20, 1968, 8:44 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Clifford, March 20, 1968, 8:44 a.m., Tape F6805.02, PNO 5. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
Clifford: One very quick item. I had a telephone call from Mac Bundy yesterday late in the afternoon. I thought he seemed exceedingly friendly and cooperative. Had no sympathy whatsoever for Bobby's entry into the race./2/ We had a little talk about the problems of Vietnam. He said he knew we were going through quite a difficult and critical period and made the offer if he could be of any help at all, you only had to let him know and he would be glad to come down and help. Now, I pass it on to you because I thought you might want to consider the advisability--if you thought well of it--of calling him and perhaps asking him to come down. This is a very important speech that has to be written. I spent a couple of hours with Harry McPherson yesterday afternoon and I had the feeling that maybe Mac could be quite useful during this particular period.
/2/Reference is to Senator Robert Kennedy.
President: Yes, I think it would be very good. I think what we've got to do, too, is to get out of the posture of just being the war candidate that McCarthy has put us in and Bobby is putting us in, the kids are putting us in and the papers are putting us in. Lindsay/3/ is out advocating rebellions this morning and not responding to the draft and things of that kind. The Mayor urges youth to aid war resistance, and they've got 4-column front-page pictures. Now when the head of the biggest city goes to doing things of that kind, you've got to really look at the picture. And I think that if we could get your people, your men like, I don't know who they are over there, I certainly don't want some of the civilians that are giving us trouble, but if we could get, if we had any young men at all, I think Goodpaster is one we ought to look at, DePuy maybe, sit down with some of Rusk's people, one or two there, maybe Habib and perhaps Bill Bundy, and see what it is that we could use with our left hand. Our right hand is going after their jaw with an offense on the war front, but we ought to have a peace front too simultaneously and use both fists--not just one, not fight with one hand behind us, so that we can say we are the peace candidate--but we are the true peace candidate. We're not the Chamberlain peace--we're the Churchill peace. We are not the guy that is going to throw in the towel and let them take Athens. We are the Truman who stands up and finally saves Greece and Turkey from the Communists. And that, of course, there is a temporary peace, and if we surrendered, you would have peace until they got their government installed and then by God you'd have a bigger war than ever. Now we have got to develop that. But in order to do it, we have got to come up with something. Now Goldberg's plan is not worth a damn, but if we could say that we are going to cut off Hanoi and Haiphong for a period, a specific period, now we are not going to touch them, and if they will cut off on the DMZ or some other area, where it's real reciprocation, then we'll respond and something of that type where it's really to our advantage, where the Russells just can't murder us./4/ We ought to do that. We ought to have some kind of something on peace because they're concluding now that we are getting in shape and getting into pretty quick with McNamara's peace talks, his "Harvard stuff," and all the stuff they are putting out--you can see from Nitze's letter/5/--where we are just the Goldwater of '68 and we can't take that.
/3/Mayor John Lindsay of New York City.
/4/Reference is to Senator Richard Russell.
/5/Not further identified.
Clifford: That is right. That is right.
President: We can't take it and hold because people like Daley/6/ and them are not going to hold.
/6/Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago.
Clifford: They won't hold. Really right in there, what it is, we are out to win, but we are not out to win the war--we are out to win the peace.
President: That is right.
Clifford: And that is what our slogan could very well be--win the peace with honor--and I think we have got to get that thought over. Now I have been giving consideration to offers of de-escalation. I don't know whether they have anything, but if we could begin to start a negotiation toward de-escalation, something to the effect that, now if we could have an agreement with the North Vietnamese, that we would let Hanoi alone if they would let Saigon alone. I don't know that it is very practical, but considering something of that kind, we can't stop, but if there is some program of a gradual de-escalation that the parties could get into, we could then get in a better posture.
President: That is right. I don't think they can do it because their announced thing is to do this job this year and that is why they are coming out of the woodworks and hitting us as they are--so they are not going to take anything off-limits. But if we could take something off-limits for a period that didn't really hurt us, and it seems to me that the weather is not too good anyway, and it seems to me that we could say that we're now going for several days without hitting Hanoi and Haiphong--it seems we have gone 2 months without it--we ought to say that to the public though. And we go in with a sporadic raid, we don't get any real benefit out of it but we say now we are going further, but if you want to respond you let us know and we will go to a Geneva Conference or something. I think you and Rusk ought to try to explore something that we could offer in that way. My own thought is that we ought to stress this peace thing and we ought to stress the permanence of it--and anybody can get an umbrella and have a temporary one, but that just means more people get murdered later--but that we are willing to have a Geneva Conference. We are willing to sit down and pull our troops out of there as soon as the violence subsides. We're willing to take our treasure and go back and help rebuild it as we did under the Marshall Plan and kind of add on to my Johns Hopkins speech a little, add on to Manila a little, but we've got to have something new and fresh that goes in there, along with the statement that we are going to win.
Clifford: Right. But we have to be very careful of what it is we say that we are going to win.
President: That is right.
Clifford: I think we would frighten the people if we just said we are going to win. They would think, "Well, hell, that just means we are going to keep pouring men in until we win militarily," and that isn't what we are after really.
President: Well, your President does and we don't want to appeal to them too much. We have got to appeal to them some but we sure as hell don't want to frighten the people. That's the thing that gives you the most support that you've got and I bet that if you pay a little attention to the 45 percent that want to do more instead of the 5 percent that want to pull out we will have a different attitude. But I just can't ever get Fulbright, but I can't afford to lose Russell. Now, if I lose him, we've got nothing. That's what we have got to remember. So we have got to get something that will not hurt our men materially, like Hanoi and Haiphong for a period, for a month, for two weeks, for something that Buzz Wheeler can tell them we wouldn't do anyway. Then we've got to make that public. We're not going to get these doves, but we can neutralize the country to where it won't follow them if we can come up with something.
Clifford: Yes, that's right. I think you put your finger right on it. We have a posture now in which Kennedy and McCarthy are the peace candidates and President Johnson is the war candidate. Now we must veer away from that and we can do it. What we need is a policy now that is a consistent far-ranging policy, but which we don't have. I think we need a policy of the kind that--say a five-step policy, Mr. President, that we will continue to exert the military pressure. That I know we have to do. We'll never get anything from them if we don't do that. So, as you say, with our right hand we continue to exert the military pressure, then I think we have to have a well thought-out program that we try with our left hand. Step number one. Then that might be some kind of mutual de-escalation that really doesn't hurt us. If it isn't successful, we might move to step number two. Now at some stage in this matter, if nothing else works, then I think we have to keep in mind that before the [Democratic Party National] Convention, then if not before the Convention, before the election, I think we have to work out some kind of arrangement where we start some kind of negotiation.
President; Well, you can't do that but one way, you know, and these folks are not wanting to do that. They want to get rid of us.
Clifford: I know. Yes, that is right. But I still think there is a good chance to do that if it is prepared properly and if we work up to it in this plan. All I am saying is we don't have such a plan. The major task now is to come up with it and I intend to give a good part of my time and effort to see if we can't come up with such a plan. But what I think at the moment is, with this important speech coming, I think it would be a good idea if you felt well of it to call Mac back and say come on down and help us, Mac, and he offered to do it./7/
/7/The President called Bundy at 9 a.m., immediately following this conversation. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of this conversation has been found.
President: Thank you.
147. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, March 20, 1968, 5:08-7:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Transcribed by Jorden on February 13, 1970, from Tom Johnson's handwritten notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. McPherson also took notes of the meeting; his handwritten notes are mistakenly dated March 19. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File)
PRESENT
President, Vice President, Rusk, Clifford, Fortas, M. Bundy, B. Bundy, Bill Jorden, W. Rostow, G. Christian, H. McPherson, Amb. Goldberg, Tom Johnson
President: I asked all of you here to help me prepare a well thought out, well-balanced statement. Let's explore ways to strengthen our ways militarily and diplomatically; let's find new ways to strengthen our society and our nation. You are people of good experience, imagination and initiative. Let's look at every suggestion.
Let's see what we could do we haven't done better.
Let's see how we can improve ourselves.
Let's do what we said we would do at Johns Hopkins./2/ If we are silent and nothing new is said, people really will think we are stale. Harry has drafted a statement.
/2/Reference is to the President's speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 245.
Economic people believe we must have a tax bill if we are to have a dollar.
10-10-5 billion.
10 billion in taxes
10 billion in appropriation cuts
5 billion in expenditures
We know it is going to be tough. Last year we put in a 10-2 formula. We have a strain on the economy, not just by Vietnam. We must add on $5 Bill. for Vietnam./3/
/3/Earlier that day the President and his chief economic advisers discussed the costs and impact of the new program for Vietnam. The total package involved a $10 billion tax bill, a $10 billion reduction in obligations, and a $5 billion reduction in expenses. At one point during the meeting, Fowler noted: "On the floor, a tax bill is related to the Vietnamese addition. I see a sharp loss in the Democratic votes. The reason is the same as that given by Church or Proxmire--economically they don't agree. They must have a national unity package. I would present this as a bipartisan bill to restore confidence in the dollar." (Notes of the President's Meeting with his Fiscal Advisers, March 20; Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings)
This speech ought to have in it for our needs to get:
--military strength
--economic strength
--diplomatic strength
--peace
I want war like I want polio. What you want and what your image is are two different things.
--let's meet emergency needs in strength
--a reasonable offer on peace
I want McGeorge Bundy and Arthur Goldberg and the Vice President and Rusk and Clifford and Fortas and B. Bundy (what not to do).
Mac and Harry will have . . .
M. Bundy: Let's not worry over draft. Let's go around room.
--what troubles people most
--what can we do
--a lot of easy answers are being peddled on other side of street.
President: Any suggestions?
Rusk: Major peace proposals aren't promising unless there is a cessation of bombing. There are serious political and military risks to bombing halt. We have been exploring bombing limitations in North, leaving open bombing above the DMZ. It also would look bad to segments here at home to have bombing halt at same time as calling up reserves.
We are being divided by rejections by Hanoi.
(Rusk read statement he proposed that the President use.)/4/
/4/The statement read: "After consultation with our allies, I have directed that U.S. bombing attacks on North Viet-Nam be limited to those areas which are directly related to the support of their forces invading South Viet-Nam. No reasonable person could expect us to fail to provide maximum support to our men in combat. Whether this step I have taken can be a step toward peace is for Hanoi to determine. We shall watch the situation carefully."
Unless we are prepared to do something on bombing, there is no real proposal for us to make.
We put two ideas to Bunker:
1) San Antonio formula without any indic. from other side
2) limited cessation in northern part of NVN
He was negative on both./5/
/5/See Documents 137 and 145.
You can't couple a reserve callup with a bombing cessation. Let's make a generalized speech without a major move.
Rostow: Criticism (should be Critics) of our position believe we're intent on creating a constitutional and democratic government by pursuing last VC until he is dead.
They see capacity of VC to hit the cities.
I do not think we can move Thieu to a Greek solution--offer of VC coming into govt.
Part of peace thing:
--Communists have tried to overthrow GVN and ARVN. They failed.
We are seeking one-man, one-vote constitutional system.
We need to turn war to the ballot box.
Rusk: Public opinion has taken element of hope from so many people.
M. Bundy: I think the problem is to have to make a statement when weight of feeling is well, another . . .
--tax issue
--more troops
--more costs ($5 billion)
Is there a way of conveying an impression that we are more willing for peace. Or say "this is about it."
It will get better. Moral of Tet was GVN . . . (sic).
It would be irresponsible to say we could, but we want to.
Clifford: 3-4 important functions:
1) Need reiteration of importance of Vietnam. People are asking themselves that question again.
2) Danger that is inherent if we lose all SEAsia. Those who have the simple, easy solutions are not visible (viable?).
3) Why are we sending more troops.
Sen. Stennis said I am not in favor of sending more troops to VN unless we expand the war.
Stennis said he was against another buildup. Enemy has moved in more troops in northern I Corps.
There are indications that next 3-4 months could be critical period in the war.
1. Support Marine bases
2. Increase our effectiveness
3. Critical period
Must answer charge that this is becoming an American war.
People are very concerned about ARVN sitting back and letting us do the work.
Coupled with needs of military we do have [something] to offer?
We have made reasonable offer to Hanoi.
They have made no effort in that regard.
Offering a program of de-escalation of the war.
We could offer a beginning of gradual de-escalation.
We could . . . stop bombing 75 mi S of Hanoi-Haiphong (20th).
We would stop all bombing N. of 20th if enemy would stop artillery, mortars and rockets in DMZ area.
This would be acceptable trade for the military.
They would get some benefit out of it.
This could be considered reasonable.
Then we will have another.
This takes edge off "war candidate" vs. peace candidate.
Rusk: We would expect them to stop bombing in DMZ./6/
/6/According to a transcript of this meeting, the course of discussion at this point went: "President: Dean, do you want to make any observations on that? Rusk: I think, that, if you--that would mean that we would expect them to stop shooting in the vicinity of the DMZ while we continue to bomb heavily in there. I don't see how they can be expected to stop something and then they would be subject to the most intensive bombing we could lay on them." (Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
M. Bundy: Suppose you turn it around.
Say you can't stop bombing without their doing something.
Idea of getting something started is good.
Clifford: Could say Hanoi would withdraw its men from DMZ.
M. Bundy: Aren't you better off if you do this privately?/7/
/7/The meeting's transcript reads as follows: "Rusk: Would you offer them the two northern provinces of South Vietnam? Clifford: Well, what we would like to do would be, Dean, to make the proposition one that would be reasonable enough so that there would be some chance I suppose. McGeorge Bundy: Aren't you better off without a definite proposal in the speech? If you simply say that you're doing this and you've made communications to show why you're doing it you keep the channel available to them. You look more open than if you offer a trade to which everyone will say it is unreasonable--if he wants to. Clifford: I'm not sure just the words will do it. McGeorge Bundy: It's unilateral, if you do something, you've really done something and I've never been a believer that the real pause of the kind that the Times wanted would get us anywhere and I think it is militarily very dangerous. But I think this speech does need a left hook in it somewhere." (Ibid.)
Clifford: Value of it is psychological.
They are not likely to accept any proposition.
Kennedy and McCarthy aren't coming up with much.
"Let's try something like this."
M. Bundy: That's OK.
Rusk: Whether or not this is a step toward peace is up to Hanoi.
M. Bundy: President is not about to escalate like you say. But what do you lose.
Bombing that far north doesn't do that much good.
President: It brings fury and violence from abroad.
M. Bundy: Risk is that our campaign friends will say we have President running./8/
/8/
Bundy's full response is transcribed as: "I think there is risk about it--that we ought to look at (it) which is our campaigning friends will say, 'Well, that's half a loaf now we've got the President running--if he would only put the other half on the table then I wouldn't have to run' or whatever they say to that. I don't think that is a very good argument, but I think we ought to walk around it." (Ibid.)Goldberg: Our problem is profoundly serious. I am going to talk frankly. I have a different approach. If a peace move is to be made without hope . . . You have tried to use both hands. It has not been successful in convincing world opinion or domestic opinion. Peace move must be realistic one. Say I cannot offer you the prospect of anything better. Let's don't go with a proposition which will not be acceptable. Let's be realistic. Only thing Hanoi wants is suspension of bombing. Where it will lead nobody knows. Hanoi sees it as a possibility for starting talks. I think we should do that.
M. Bundy: I agree with you on a full suspension.
Goldberg: I thought militarily we could do it.
Cessation doesn't mean . . . Khe Sanh would be unprotected. Reinforcements could continue. No departure from San Antonio.
To move this way would be a meaningful thing.
You yourself have made this point. Hanoi said they wanted government in South to settle issue.
We could put on agenda
--Hanoi stop aggression against South
--U.S. stop bombing against North./9/
/9/Goldberg made an additional comment here: "What would be the logical subject for talks with Hanoi if the United States and Hanoi entered into talks? The logical subject would be this. Say to Hanoi that you stop your war against the South. The United States, you stop your war against the North. I do not believe, I haven't seen what Ellsworth said, that that type of agenda should disturb the South. It eliminates the air war, the problem of a simple agenda, and it relates to stopping the war in Hanoi against the South and the South against the North. And that is the subject particularly within the accomplishment of the United States and Hanoi. We are bearing the brunt of the war against the North. And Hanoi is carrying the war to the South so that the problems which really--we're not agreeing or promising to discontinue the war in support of Saigon in the South. There is commitment on that, and no agreement. That may enter into discussions. And if it does enter into discussions, then, of course, the discussions will have to be enlarged. But I have often wondered at this stage of the game why it was that Hanoi has so pinpointed the discussions to be the United States and Hanoi--and has not put up the barriers for those talks or anything of that sort." (Ibid.)
President: Would I combine with talk on reserves?/10/
/10/According to the transcript, several individuals interrupted Goldberg by voicing questions at this point. Goldberg's response was: "I am asked two questions. Would I combine this proposition together with your talks about reserves and what about the shelling?" (Ibid.)
Goldberg: I would not combine it with troop speech.
I would make peace proposal or a support of war speech.
I would not combine the two.
In UN Eastern Europeans are fed up with being taxed by this war (Czechs, Poland).
Do know it is costing USSR over $1 billion a year.
They may have their Bill Fulbrights too.
Clifford: If that was fruitless, would that interfere with an all-out effort later on?
Goldberg: It won't be seen in good faith if you couple it with troops.
Rostow: In world opinion, bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong has impact. One Soviet indication, he made distinction between bombing battlefield and around H-H.
M. Bundy: Restraints have not been made clear.
B. Bundy: They were disclosed on background.
President: We paused 6-1/2 months around H and H.
[Unattributed comment]: Russell said he would support callup only if we take out Haiphong.
President: You won't change Bobby or McCarthy by this.
Goldberg: You have made many approaches.
President: 30 of them.
Clifford: Is it your feeling that the President could make this proposal of stopping the bombing . . .
Goldberg: Doesn't use "permanent".
Clifford: Is it your belief they would talk?
Goldberg: It is my hope. I think talks . . . should talk.
Rusk: Why shouldn't they talk. They get talks and put in men and a sanctuary.
[Unattributed comment]: I never said anything about Laos.
President: You have another Panmunjom.
Goldberg: On Panmunjom, commonly assumed we lost more men when talk started.
Suppose you had continued with no Panmunjom, how many men would we have lost?
We have lost handful of men since Panmunjom. We get more out of this.
President: Wouldn't you remove one of Marines, . . . one of their most protective elements?
Goldberg: I would double sorties around troops. Use more effective sorties in South.
Clifford: As of now, would not have an appreciable effect.
By mid-April weather will improve.
Would mean giving up more then than now.
President: Think bombing keeps lead out of our men's bodies.
Clifford: It is not a clear-cut case. Military thinks it adds to difficulty of NVN getting supplies to South. Airpower is not proving to be very effective in this war.
M. Bundy: If we lost at Khe Sanh while stopping bombing we would be in a hell of a shape.
Rusk: Moscow cares more about what is happening in NVN than what is happening in South.
President: Bunker says you are trying to crawl. He says let's pour steel to him.
Fortas: 1) Speech should have limited objective
Reasons for callup
Economic impact
No architectural plans for conduct of war and search for peace.
2) This is time when we must be firm and courageous. It is possible to make some bad mistakes of timing. No time for a major offer. It will be seen as sign of weakness.
3) National concern is a question as to whether SVN affairs are being maturely, competently handled. It is a feeling of insecurity.
This is due to mixture in carb(uretor?). It is because of our own sensitivity to criticism, our own dislike of bloodshed.
In my opinion--on this speech--Clifford lined up points well to sending more troops. Must be in framework of strength and resolution.
I can consider it most unfortunate to state offers now. Senators Kennedy and McCarthy will see it as empty gesture. Hanoi will see it as an admission floundering around in an effort to get a bigger piece of candy.
On that point, problem of a cessation of hostilities . . . we can never handle except on the merits.
Time may come in June or July. Meanwhile, we must be firm in our hearts and in our resolution. We must avoid unilateral proposals.
I weigh evidence.
Cessation of bombing. I don't see it.
That is a one horse-one rabbit deal. That is wrong time and wrong occasion for that.
Should stress what SVNese are doing.
Can we get SVN General placed on Joint Council.
Our people give SVN little credit for their victories.
Clifford: I feel a great sympathy for that approach.
We must talk about ultimately we will prevail. Conditions were susceptible. That did lead to ultimate victory.
Continued application of strength and power does not show us the road to ultimate success.
[Several unattributed comments]:
That disturbs me.
Mere application of physical force doesn't do it.
You must stop the supply lines.
You can't unless you go with force into Laos. Then Cambodia. Then Haiphong. What about docks harbor at Haiphong.
Doesn't stop. Would make it more difficult, but they could still bring them in.
Clifford: I don't believe any approach to Hanoi at this time will be accepted.
Fortas: Neither do I.
Time and sequence of events is not right. Very little is to be gained from unilateral moves at this moment.
The task is to give this country confidence in the competence of handling this war.
Need feeling of calmness and soundness of military side.
President: How can you give them confidence?
--more troops
--more taxes
--more reserves
Fortas: Let's don't show lack of confidence in our competence. People don't understand.
President: Bill, what is your . . .
B. Bundy: I see alternatives as Goldberg.
Hanoi is not ready to do anything.
Hanoi really doesn't want to talk.
I would defend the record.
We should explore 3rd party efforts.
Let's give SVN front and center and let them build themselves.
Stress somber picture,
I find it somber, indeed.
Enemy has more maneuver bns. than we in I Corps.
M. Bundy: Could you add in language of Thieu notion we are trying to get their proportion of the effort increased.
B. Bundy: [No remarks indicated]
Goldberg: Isn't real issue if we continue our effort with additions with SVN additions, can we do it without erosion of public support be far more difficult? [sic]
Aren't we in a race for time if we continue as we have? Isn't continuing the effort and increasing it--the economy's involved--wage and price controls may be required. Can we do it?
I don't believe we can.
President: I visit with folks who have worked on this problem.
I will meet with group in coming days.
I agree with what Goldberg started out with. Real question is that we may be misleading them.
Let's separate peace things. Do it right. Take Italian proposal--Clark proposal--Let B. Bundy get all they have got.
Let's work up an agenda on possibilities. See which are worth pursuing.
Harry, you get with the 2 Bundys.
Get two proposals.
Rusk (?) Proposal.
Reasons
1) support our men
2) meet their new troops
3) different strategy
Let's look at this tomorrow.
President: Is there any advantage of having Souvanna Phouma here to discuss danger to his country?
There is nobody but us who will stand up.
British won't.
Theories of our treaties was that we would stop the Hitlers of tomorrow.
If they march, they will be met.
Let's get peace out of it except we're ready to talk.
Situation at moment is very serious one. We must support the men we have there./11/
/11/The President had made two hard-line speeches in the days prior to this meeting. On March 16 he spoke before a meeting in Washington of the National Alliance of Businessmen. His speech was a rousing call to rally around his Vietnam policy: "As your President, I want to say this to you today: We must meet our commitments in the world and in Vietnam," he proclaimed. "We shall and we are going to win." See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 402-405. In remarks to the National Farmers Union Convention in Minneapolis on March 18, the President stated: "We hope to achieve an honorable peace and a just peace at the negotiating table. But wanting peace, praying for peace, and desiring peace, as Chamberlain found out, doesn't always give you peace. If the enemy continues to insist, as he does now--when he refuses to sit down and accept the fair proposition we made, that we would stop our bombing if he would sit down and talk promptly and productively--if he continues to insist, as he does now, that the outcome must be determined on the battlefield, then we will win our peace on the battlefield by supporting our men who are doing that job there now." See ibid., pp. 406-413.
148. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 21, 1968, 1:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, March 19, 1970, Memo to the President, Decision to Halt the Bombing, 1967, 1968, [I]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only.
Mr. President:
I indicated briefly to you yesterday morning the sequence which I have come to believe we should follow in the months ahead with respect to Vietnam policy./2/ I am putting it on paper so that you can consider it for what it may be worth.
/2/From 10:15 to 10:44 a.m. on March 20, Rostow and Jorden met with the President to discuss a proposed draft of the President's speech on Vietnam. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
1. A firm Thieu commitment to an additional 135,000 South Vietnamese plus other Vietnamese action to assume a greater proportionate responsibility in the war. His speech of today takes us some distance down that road, but of course it will require follow-up day by day./3/
/3/See The New York Times, March 21, 1968.
2. U.S. military offensive actions. I attach, to refresh your memory, Westy's plan to go on the offensive in I Corps in April./4/
/4/Attached but not printed.
I believe he should be encouraged to move out, if anything, at an accelerated pace. You should be aware that at this particular time, enemy units seem to be pulling back in a number of places, including Khe Sanh. We do not know what their intention is:
--to regroup for later attacks?
--to avoid casualties which their forward positions have permitted us to impose upon them?
--to let McCarthy and Bobby Kennedy fight the war for them?
But the fact is there and, for the first time since the Tet offensive began, enemy casualties and ours are falling back toward the average levels of 1967.
I do not believe we should wait to see what their next move is: I believe Westy should go out and face them. In any case, it is important that over the next month or so the military news from Vietnam shows that we have the military initiative and they are not simply hunkered up waiting for another enemy blow.
3. As this new military position becomes more clear to our people, we should then shoot for a major peace offensive targeted for, say, May 1st. As you know, I believe that Thieu and the South Vietnamese should be the center of it; but we should play our part and we should bring the Pope, the Roumanians, the Russians, etc., into the game to the maximum.
4. Meanwhile, we should be using the time to develop a strategy for the next year on the assumption that Hanoi will not respond to the peace offensive of May. In particular, we should consider three strategies:
--a continuation of our strategy of 1966-67; that is, regaining our position in the countryside, extending pacification, and grinding along on the basis of slowly reducing the VC manpower base in the South, which we are doing at the rate of about one million per year through movement to the cities, plus refugees from VC areas, plus extended control in the countryside.
--a so-called population control strategy in which we would keep U.S. as well as Vietnamese forces in a position to give more regular and steady protection to the South Vietnamese population centers rather than grappling with the North Vietnamese units at the frontiers. Westy would defend his policy of 1966-67 as a population protection strategy in the face of North Vietnamese pressures across the frontiers. But it is conceivable that, after very careful analysis with Westy on the scene, some practical difference could be identified between the policy that he has been following and a policy of so-called population protection. As you know, I am skeptical of any abstract debate of this proposition until it is tested against actual force distributions and utilization on the spot in detail.
--a policy of forcing a decision from Hanoi and its allies.
The latter strategy involves adopting one or more of the following three courses of action:
--mining the North Vietnamese harbors and trying to interdict the transport routes from China;
--invading the southern part of North Vietnam and blocking the transport routes from, say, Vinh, to both the Mugia pass into Laos and the roads to the DMZ; or
--moving into Laos on Route 9 and blocking on the ground the Laos transport routes into South Vietnam just south of the 17th parallel.
In different ways, any one of these three actions could put a very tough set of decisions to Hanoi and to its allies. I happen to believe that if the South Vietnamese government is on its feet and tolerably effective; we are moving forward militarily in the south, even if slowly; our terms for a settlement remain modest and legitimate; that neither the Soviet Union nor Communist China would escalate the war and that we would have a chance of bringing it more quickly to an end. I feel in my bones that after the Tet offensive, things can never be quite the same, and that a simple return to the 1966-67 strategy will not wash.
What I am recommending is simply that we carry out the most careful staff work on these alternatives from the present forward, so that you can make a rational judgment as to which way we go if the May peace offensive envisaged here should fail.
Walt
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