Docs 170-193
April 1-May 3: Discussions on the Site for Talks
170. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, April 1, 1968, 1110Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
23612. 1. For obvious reasons, I asked to see Thieu, immediately after listening to President's speech,/2/ and saw him this afternoon for three quarters of an hour.
/2/See Document 169. The Department transmitted general guidance for discussion of the President's decisions in circular telegram 139524, April 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
2. I opened by saying I was as surprised as he must have been by the President's announcement with respect to his candidacy.
3. Thieu immediately asked what significance was to be attached to it? Has the President really closed the door? Was there no possibility of a draft at the convention?
4. I said I had no inkling whatsoever that this announcement was coming and I have so far had no instructions. I therefore have no special information to provide him on this decision. I could only give him my personal view: The President, by taking this step, has a free hand to pursue the new policies which he announced and which represent no departure from his stand on Vietnam; and he has cut the ground from under the critics of his Vietnam policy. He has lifted Vietnam out of domestic politics and is asking the country and his opposition to face up squarely to what must be done.
5. Thieu said he was making a speech tonight on the anniversary of the promulgation of the Constitution, and tomorrow at 1000 hours he will have his joint press conference with Ky./3/ He had obviously to deal with the President's speech and would welcome any advice. The rumors in Saigon were that this represents a change in U.S. policy, that the President abandoned his policy on Vietnam, that Kennedy will clearly win the nomination, and so on.
/3/During this press conference, Thieu asserted: "I have said many times that if the allies cannot continue their assistance, we will fight on alone." Both he and Ky assured their people that they would work together. (Telegram 23956 from Saigon, April 4; ibid.)
6. I suggested he ought probably avoid speculation and interpretation on these lines, and say these were domestic U.S. questions on which he did not think it appropriate to comment. He nodded vigorously, saying that was what he intended to do. As for the rest of the speech he found it unexceptional. It was flexible and very carefully constructed, and it would give him no difficulties. "President Johnson in this speech," he said with a smile, "was more Asian than we Asians."
7. He said he was sorry the President did not indicate that he had consulted with the GVN leaders on the substance of the speech, since he would be asked if this was the case. He intended to handle this by saying that contents of the speech, except for the last part about the President's personal intentions, came as no surprise since it was discussed with him in advance. He intends to stress the many favorable features of speech, and make reference to GVN's support for the need to search for a peaceful solution.
8. Thieu asked how long the restriction on bombing would apply and what we regard as a "significant response" from Hanoi. I said, as I told him at our previous meeting, we have no specific period in mind but thought it might run four weeks or so, or longer, and that we thought Hanoi's reply would probably be negative.
9. Thieu said he thought Hanoi would deal with the new statement on two planes. Officially they would say it was not responsive to their demand for a complete cessation of all bombing. Privately Hanoi would circulate rumors that the speech shows that even President Johnson recognizes his hawkish policy has failed and that he has now abandoned it.
10. Comment: Thieu was unflappable during the conversation. He was constructive, did not appear to be alarmed by this most unexpected turn of events, and was more puzzled than worried. I think in the back of his mind is the feeling that the President has by a bold stroke removed Vietnam from domestic U.S. political controversy, confounded his critics, and won the first round in the political campaign./4/
/4/Bunker also reported in his 46th weekly message to the President on the South Vietnamese reaction to the news of Johnson's peace offer: "The general reaction to your speech was at first confused and fearful, but as the text became widely available and was studied carefully, reactions were generally favorable. While there remains some fear, particularly with the man on the street, that the decision to sharply reduce the bombing may be a sign of American wavering in the face of the enemy, most opinion makers here now see it as a necessary gesture toward American and world opinion." (Ibid.) This telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 403-410.
Bunker
171. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator J. William Fulbright/1/
Washington, April 1, 1968, 4:03 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Fulbright, April 1, 1968, 4:03 p.m., Tape F6804.01, PNO 10. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
Fulbright: Hello?
President: Hello?
Fulbright: Mr. President, Bill Fulbright.
President: Yes, Bill. How are you?
Fulbright: Well, I just wanted to congratulate you on a very great and unselfish act of statesmanship.
President: Well, thank you, Bill. I'm mighty glad to hear it.
Fulbright: I heard it last night and, of course, it was a big surprise to me. It was a very unusual circumstance. I happened to be out making a speech myself, and we suspended it and listened to yours. But you made a very fine impression, and if they don't respond to it, well, I just can't understand it at all.
President: We called in--I wanted to talk to you but we didn't get to talk. They told me--Clark [Clifford] said he was going to talk to you. He thought you'd be back--was it Saturday/2/ night? Did you come back?
/2/March 30.
Fulbright: Yes. Clark did call me right after I got back from Arkansas.
President: Well, we talked to Dobrynin yesterday/3/--I wanted to tell you. We don't want it out, but I asked him and told him we'd sent for Tommy [Thompson], and that we wanted to go as far as we could in this country without having mutiny in our own forces and that we were going to eliminate everything except that below the pass where they're directly hitting the DMZ and Mu Gia Pass--that road that's bumper to bumper. We felt if we didn't protect that, well, we'd lose thousands of casualties and it would be reprehensible, but that we would be glad if they saw fit not to shove their crash program up our bottom there--to even pull out there if there's any chance of talking or anything. And we felt that he had a real responsibility and we'd been doing pretty well with them. I knew that hadn't admitted it, but Thompson thought we had a good record and we'd had lots of things--the consular treaty, and the exchange agreement, and now the non-proliferation. We had a lot of other things we had to live with, and this is a chance for them to show some responsibility. And they were furnishing this equipment, and we weren't hell-bent on furnishing it and we didn't want anything. We wanted to pull out. We never had wanted to be there. I'd asked them not to go in there in '54, unless everybody go in with us. They were there when I came in as President. I had to get out or do the best I could. I've done the best I could. I'm sure I've goofed and made a lot of errors, but I've done the best I know how and I just wished that he'd get his people. Kosygin told me he thought I was--had done about what he expected, and he thought he could market my product at Glassboro, and gave me to believe he thought we were going pretty far. But I never did hear from him. I thought he ought to go all the way now. He [Dobrynin] didn't say what he'd do--very courteous, very polite, seemed to be very pleased with what we were saying. I didn't go into the last part of the speech. I thought, though, that it might have taken a little local play away from the proposal here at home. On the other hand, I thought it relieved us of any political connotations or the fact that we're just trying to do what somebody wanted us to do to get votes. And most people thought it had a better impression in other capitals because it had that on it--that after all, nothing I want except peace. So, he went away, I think, impressed. And we are working very hard. We sent word to the Pope at the same time. We gave U Thant advances through Goldberg. I had General Ridgway and Mac Bundy and a large group of folks in here--about 15--last week, [including] George Ball, and we looked at everything we could do. They spent two days on the briefings and analyzing it. And this seemed to be the thing--we had, I need not tell you, strong divisions in our government on it. I'm going to try to go out and meet some of the military people in a few days to try to hold everything--keep them aboard, certainly, while this is going on.
/3/See Document 168.
Fulbright: I think you took a very courageous stand. I don't know that I can do you a bit of good at all. I'd be willing to try, if you want me, to talk to any of these people. I have been on reasonable relations with Dobrynin and the Polish Ambassador, [and] the Yugoslavian Ambassador./4/ I don't know whether it'd do a damned bit of good, and I don't want to do it unless you think it might. I just offer that. If there's anything else I can do to try to persuade them that there's an opportunity for them, [that] they ought not to pass it up.
/4/Jerzy Michalowski and Veljko Micunovic, respectively.
President: Yes, I think that would be good, and--
Fulbright: You want me to do that?
President: Yes. Yes, I think so. Let me see who we talk to and let me call you back or have Clark or Chip [Bohlen] call you.
Fulbright: The three that I know are the Russians, the Pole, and the Yugoslav. I don't know the--
President: Well, I have the feeling that the Polish have been trying to help us and I believe the Yugoslavs too and I think it would be good to talk to both of them. And I think I would--I would say that we in this country, certainly the President, regardless of what we may differ on anything else, that we had rather find a way to stop the killing of our people, ours and theirs, more than anything else in the world and we're trying to do it, and if this is not the way, and they've got a better one that would endure, we'd like to have it, and that now is the time to let Tommy Thompson and Averell [Harriman] go over there and start something.
Fulbright: Well, I think it is a good play. They really ought to respond. I think it may take them a few days because it probably comes as a great surprise and they've been fighting so damned long. It takes a few days for them to kind of--
President: Well, we're prepared to stay for several weeks. We don't want to do anything rushed. We talked about Rusk, we talked about Bohlen, we talked about different ones, and they finally thought that Averell had been handling all the talks at all the other countries. But we needed a professional, and so we decided--everybody thought Tommy Thompson was respected and if we had to get the Soviets, he would be the best one with them to use. I hope you think that's all right.
Fulbright: Yes, he's a good man.
President: I haven't talked to him, but that's what the Departmental people and Clark thought he would be the best. Clark suggested him to me and he's being of a good deal of help. And I wish you'd spend whatever time you can with him because he respects you and likes you and I think that we can bring the government a little closer together in these days ahead when we all need to be that way.
Fulbright: Yes, Thompson is a good fellow. I like him. That's fine. I'll do what I can.
President: Thank you, Bill.
172. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, April 2, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Transcribed from a handwritten text. The meeting, which took place at a luncheon in the Mansion of the White House, began at 1:01 p.m., but there is no indication when it ended. The President returned to the Oval Office from the Mansion at 4:55 p.m. Those attending were the President, Clifford, Katzenbach, Helms, Wheeler, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Pres[ident]: I believe we should brief the House and Senate on the bombing restrictions. It may be we should brief the press.
C[lifford]: I have been on the phone all morning about it.
K[atzenbach]: Mood on Hill is terrible./2/ I think you should say you are going up to the 20th parallel. We must do this--otherwise, we take Hanoi off the hook. 1st target selected was a bad one.
/2/That morning on the Senate floor, Fulbright led an attack on the bombing cutback, describing it as "not a significant change at all" and a move that was unlikely to induce North Vietnam to enter into negotiations. Mansfield noted that the President's "inexact language" left room for interpretation of the extent of the halt. See The New York Times, April 3, 1968.
P[resident]: I wouldn't amend the decision. I would clarify it. Tell them where the line is if necessary.
Pres.: We stopped hitting 90% of the population and we have nothing in return. Did you tell Fulbright it was 20th parallel?
C: It was Saturday evening./3/ I told him it was the 20th parallel.
/3/March 30.
Pres.: I want the 4 of you to meet with them on it. Show them the Tass comments./4/ Momyer scared me about the order we already had issued. Said NVN trucks were running with lights on.
/4/On April 1 the Soviet news agency Tass described the offer by Johnson as not conforming to DRV demands to enter into talks, as reported in The New York Times, April 3, 1968.
W[alt] R[ostow]: Trucks are now running with lights on at night. They are getting a lot of them through.
Pres.: I think they have 12 inches and they want 6.
C[lark] C[lifford]: Russell was concerned about us limiting ourselves at a time when men are coming through. He thought pause was a mistake.
Pres.: What was the theory of taking out the 20th parallel?
K: Wanted to relate the pause functionally rather than geographically.
G[eorge] C[hristian]: The problem is that speech/5/ said we are stopping bombing in area of DMZ. This attack was 200 miles north of the DMZ.
/5/See Document 169.
C: If we limit ourselves below 20th they will take advantage of it. It would be grave mistake to go below 20th parallel. Odds are 100 to 1 Hanoi will turn us down. Best thing we can do is to show a continuing effort. We have done that. We told Dobrynin it was 20th parallel./6/
/6/See Document 168.
Pres.: Military can say they intend to bomb right up to 20th parallel.
Helms: Impression of speech was it was squeezed tight to DMZ.
Clifford: Might prepare clear statement of where we are--to give intent. Give statement to press and to Congress.
Pres.: Statement won't stop it. Have to have briefings on the Hill.
Clifford: I think everything we need to say can be put in a statement.
Katzenbach: Can't you say concentration will be so. [south] of Vien, with certain targets north.
Clifford: Nothing wrong with that.
Pres.: Read section of speech given Sunday night (insert). Does that trouble any of you?
Wheeler: Not I.
P: 1st call I got after speech was Mrs. McCarthy; Ted Kennedy; Ernest Gruening; George McGovern. I knew something was wrong when all of them approved.
(Harry McPherson enters with text of remarks which was shown Fulbright and Mansfield.)/7/
/7/McPherson came in at 1:37 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
C: I do not think all of us should go up with a briefing, which . . .
R[ostow]: It is 180 degrees from DMZ to 20th parallel.
P: How far was this target from DMZ?
W[heeler]: 205 nautical miles.
C: 90% of our sorties have been along DMZ. Only 10% up in the northern [part]. The President's purpose was to take a unilateral step to reduce significantly the level of violence. Consequently, attacks have halted in the area of North Vietnam containing almost 90% of its population and three-fourths of its land. In the remaining quarter of NVN--from the 20th parallel just north of Thanh Hoa south to the DMZ--where in the President's words "the movement of troops and supplies are a threat to allied forward positions," attacks are continuing. This area--known as the Panhandle--is the funnel through which troops & supplies must flow both directly south to the DMZ & west to the Ho Chi Minh trail directly to the battlefront.
P: Mansfield got impression it was "just" north of DMZ. This pause is only going to aggravate the hawks and won't please the doves.
WR: I thought Dobrynin took it seriously and would report it so. We took cities and main population centers off./8/
/8/The next day the administration released a statement specifying the 20th parallel as the restriction line and explaining that the President had left the reference vague so that the United States would not be committed to a fixed sanctuary. See The New York Times, April 3, 1968.
[Omitted here is discussion of the situation in the Middle East and the Pueblo crisis. Additional unattributed remarks written presumably by the President read: "1. Refer troop level to Pentagon. 2. No more troops levels until I approve. Where they are used against our men. Over 90% of sorties were within 50 mi. of DMZ. In no event bombing will not be north of 20th parallel."]
173. Telephone Conversation Among President Johnson, Senator Mike Mansfield, and Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
Washington, April 2, 1968, 2:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Among Johnson, Mansfield, and Clifford, April 2, 1968, 2:10 p.m., Tape F6804.01, PNO 11. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
Mansfield: Mr. President, a great deal of flap is going on up here among a good number of the Senators relative to this bombing which took place some 200 miles north.
President: Wait a minute. Let me put Clark Clifford on here a second. Go ahead.
Mansfield: Are you on, Clark?
Clifford: I'm on, Mike.
Mansfield: There is a good deal of flap going on up here about this recent report, which I haven't seen, about the bombing 209 miles north of the DMZ. The general impression seems to have been that what the President said the other day was the bombing would continue north of the 17th parallel and the general impression was that it would be confined, oh, I would say no further than the Mu Gia Pass, which is about 80 miles north, to give the protection to our troops or to stop the recent infiltration of men and materiel./2/
/2/On April 1 bombings occurred near Thanh Hoa, 205 miles north of the DMZ (and only 81 miles from Hanoi) but below the 20th parallel. Goulding stated that the bombings were "within the framework" of the March 31 restriction; unnamed officials described the exact area of the bombing cessation as "undefined." See The New York Times, April 2, 1968. In an April 3 memorandum to the President, Rostow justified the attack on Thanh Hoa, specifically noting that it was a major transit point for men and supplies going into South Vietnam and Laos and that it also contained an airfield that was recently active. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6 G (3), 4/1-10/68, Talks with Hanoi)
President: I think that is Marcy's impression. There's not anything in my comments that says that at all. The decision was based, as you know, on the 20th parallel, and as Bill Fulbright knows because I read you the text that had "20th parallel" on it and we briefed Russell and Fulbright and all of them on it. We didn't brief the god-damned mousy old women who serve as staff members, so they've been going around very concerned. Now we have a concentration point up there--marshaling yards where they unload their trucks to send steel to put in the butts of your Montana boys and mine. They are below the 20th parallel. We took the cities off and we took 90 percent of the population off and we took these power plants and the POLs and the other things around these civilian populations. But we did not take anything off below the 20th parallel. The 20th parallel was the line. Now the diplomats felt we ought to describe it in the language we did, that I have ordered aircraft and vessels to make no attack on North Vietnam except in the area north of the DMZ where the continuing enemy buildup--this is one of the big build-up points--directly threatens Allied forward positions, and where the movements of their troops and supplies are clearly related to that threat.
Mansfield: Yes, sir.
President: Now, General Momyer was in last night./3/ They don't like our setting the 20th parallel, but that does give them 200 miles to stop these trucks in without going into a city and hitting an old woman or bothering any Communist or killing any children or hitting any hospitals. It is just primarily area roads with 10 percent of the population. Now that's what we said. We said it specifically until the diplomats thought it would be a little better to generalize it. But the text I read you was the 20th parallel. The briefing we gave Fulbright was 20th parallel. The briefing we gave Russell was 20th parallel. But instead of saying 20th parallel, the State Department people thought that instead of just drawing a hard line there and saying that "Boys, you can marshal everything you want to right up on that line, we won't touch you." That is what is happening in Haiphong. We have told them we have made concessions here not to bomb Haiphong, so they have got their damn storage area there. Momyer said it just looks like one big truck yard full of supplies. Now when we tell them we're not going to do something, they take advantage of it immediately. So, when they wrote this paragraph, they eliminated the 20th parallel, which is the decision we made, you and Fulbright and Clark briefed the Senators on, and said that we will stop our bombing except in the area north where a continuing enemy build-up directly threatens. Now that is an area right up to the 20th parallel and the place that they hit yesterday was probably a target that was selected a week ago. But it is a marshaling yard where a bunch of trucks got supplies coming right into our boys. Of course, it is probably three hours away from them at 60 miles an hour. By airline, it is 180 miles. By round circuitous road, it is 209 miles. So they hit that. Now, most of the strikes are within, oh, 50 or 60 miles. Clark thinks that out of a hundred we hit yesterday, that probably 90 percent of them are within 50 or 60 miles. They've already come down. But it you can get up there where they are breeding, if you can get them one month pregnant, we sure want to do it. We don't want--because we will have so damn many of them bumper to bumper down on the DMZ, if we can stop when we do it. So, what we have done--Hanoi is really turning down and Tass is turning it down, we think--we thought so all of the time, we did not want to express any doubt, but we just hope the Senate doesn't turn it down for them. We told Marcy that this morning when he called and said he was getting worried. Then he got Fulbright worried. Fulbright called me last night and he said it was the greatest move that was ever made and he heard the speech and knew what I said./4/ But I would hope that without our . . ., I guess we will just have to come and say the 20th parallel is what we've said to everybody and that's the order that went out and just say, now then, that permits them to come right in, and on the one inch over the parallel they know they are immune, and that is bad and our military people don't like that. But we can do that if it satisfies some folks like Marcy. He's upset. He has called us early this morning and our people have been working on it.
/3/The President and Rostow met with General William Momyer, MACV Deputy Commander for Air Force and the Commander of the 7th Air Force, Pacific Air Force, from 6:37 to 7:46 p.m. on April 1. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of their discussion has been found.
/4/See Document 171.
Mansfield: Well, I haven't even seen Marcy, but several newsmen have asked me and called to my attention--what I'm getting at is the impression was created by your speech was that it would be adjacent to the DMZ for the protection of our troops and now it is 209 miles or so north and questions are being raised about it.
President: Well, the answer is that, I don't know, I can't control a man's impressions. That is a power I don't have. But I can control my language, and my language says, "The area north of the demilitarized zone where the continuing enemy build-up directly threatens Allied forward positions and where the movement of their troops and supplies are clearly related to that threat." Now that could be one mile out of Hanoi, Mike. It is not 200 miles, 190 or 180. I didn't want to say the number of miles. I did say that I wouldn't hit Haiphong, which we didn't want to say because they have these supply centers, because I had the impression that the doves were raising hell about our bombing the cities. I didn't know they did not want us to bomb the trucks that were hitting our men.
Mansfield: No, no. No, no. But they had the idea, and I think it was the general impression among the whole population that you would be hitting them just north of the DMZ for the primary purpose of protecting our men who are along that area. And then the story comes out 209 miles north. Then they were wondering, "Well, gee, what does this mean? How far do they have to go north to give protection to the DMZ?"
President: Well, I think to give real protection you have to go all the way, right in Hanoi and Haiphong. But to try to make an earnest appeal, we say that 90 percent of your population and most of your area, about 75 percent of your area, is off-limits to our bombers. We have the air fields, we have the build-up yards, the concentration points, that aren't 220 miles or 215 miles by road, not airline, but by road. Every time we can hit one of them and catch them with a lot of supplies, why we are going to do it, even if it offends Mr. Cooper--just got to protect our men. And that is what we said. We didn't say "just." They have raised the question down here with us, I think Marcy or some of them, that we said "just north." Now, we didn't say that.
Mansfield: No, no. "In the area north."
President: We say, "except in the area north where the continuing enemy build-up threatens allied positions." Now that is not anything that says it will be 10 miles or 200.
Mansfield: No, no. Technically, what you said is correct, Mr. President. All I am conveying to you is the impression from your speech that many of them thought this did not mean 200 miles north to get a marshaling yard but maybe as much as 40 or 50 miles north of the DMZ itself.
President: Well, it means that if you want to be real factual and they want to tie us and put us in a straitjacket, and that means, I'd like for them to be with us a little bit, but if they want to tie us, you can say 20th parallel.
Mansfield: No, I don't want to use that name because--
President: that's what I read to you. I just went over the text of the speech I read to you and it has in it the 20th parallel and we just went over the briefing with Fulbright and it has the 20th parallel. And we just went over with Buzz Wheeler what we told Russell and Rivers and that's 20th parallel. We were telling you all in confidence and we didn't necessarily want to tell the North Vietnamese that you can stack up on the eight yard line and away from the 20th parallel. But I think it has got to the point where that maybe you ought to say that the area north where they have the build-up extends as far up as the 20th parallel.
Mansfield: Up to.
President: Yes, sir. That involves 180 miles airline from the DMZ. Now that's about 3 or 4 hours drive by truck and we want to stop those trucks. If they would quit, as I said in the speech, the next paragraph, if they would quit running down there, we would stop it all. I said, "Even this bombing could come to an end if our restraint is matched by restraint." But I--now, you know how it is being matched? General Momyer said it is being matched--for the first time they are turning their lights on at night because they are in such short supply that they have to get supplies through there and they are taking the losses they suffer when they run with their lights on and they are damn near bumper to bumper. We knocked out nearly, I believe, 60 of these yesterday. So if we sit here on our fanny and let these marshaling yards, concentration points load up, unload one truck and put it on another one and come down there, then we will not be able to stop what we have got to stop in order to protect these men.
Mansfield: Well, I've got the arguments, Mr. President, and I will do my best.
President: I'll try to get Clark to send you a statement you can use with these sentences and I would remind both Fulbright and Russell we have briefed them on the point parallel and if we have to say it then I just think we have to say it on account of our own tenderfoots.
Mansfield: Well, we will try not to say it and I hope nothing comes up, but I wanted to be prepared if something did come up.
President: Now, one other point here that you ought to know for our benefit. We will get you the exact number, but Clifford has the impression--and this is his first initiative, I guess he, I don't know whether he is going to want to take many more or not, this is, he is cutting his teeth on this one--but his impression is that of the first 100 sorties, 92 or 93 of them were within the first 20 or 30 miles because that is where he has really got the last chance to stop them, but 6 or 7 of them are where they've started. Do you see what I mean?
Mansfield: I see.
President: And the others are in-between. It is like a football game going from here to New York and you all go in the car. You try to stop them when you get up to Brooklyn Bridge, but you may want to stop some of them out here when they go across the Potomac.
Mansfield: That is right.
President: Here is Clark.
Clifford: Just one added comment, Mike, that is along the same line as the President but might put it in a little different perspective. What the President had in mind and what he was saying at the time was if we are going to give our direct attention to those areas where we see the actual troops and war materiel moving to the enemy that's going to be used against our boys, and that's what he meant. He might well have said at the time that we are going to give our preferred attention to the area north of the DMZ and up the line of supply, but in no event will we bomb north of the 20th parallel. He might have said that. What we did was we sent our sorties over, we found massed trucks down in Route Package 1, which is 40 or 50 miles north of the DMZ, and we sent most of our sorties in there. As we sent our reconnaissance planes up north of there to see what else was going on, they found this situation existing up at Thanh Hoa, and that's maybe 12 to 15 miles south of the 20th parallel. Well, here is this massing taking place at this assembly point. That's all part of the same pipeline. But our major emphasis, which is as the President said, I think the statistics will show, which we will put in a statement, but I think 90 percent of our effort was directed close down toward the DMZ because that is where the biggest build-up is.
Mansfield: Well, Clark, I have got to go in for a vote pretty soon. Send me down a memo/5/ as soon as you can, and if this comes up, I will do the best I can with the information you and the President have given me.
/5/Not found.
Clifford: Good, Mike.
174. Notes of Telephone Conversation/1/
Washington, April 2, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Chron./Sched.--April 1968. Secret; Personal; Nodis.
NOTES ON TELEPHONE CONVERSATION:
TO MR. KATZENBACH FROM GOV. HARRIMAN
Gov. Harriman called Mr. Katzenbach concerning the military reports on bombing deep in NVN; H said had talked to Clark Clifford, but was sorry at that time did not know of "military spokesmen"./2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 173.
K. said was having lunch today and discussing the subject.
H. said he is strongly recommending to the President that he make public statement for the press clarifying--said would send K. a copy./3/ H. continued that Clifford had told him the JCS were reluctant approve 20th parallel; if the President wants to overrule the Chiefs that's certainly within his power. K. said Clifford is sitting with a 3 to 2 vote on the 20th parallel. H asked who, to which K replied apparently Navy and Air Force go along but not the Army and Marines; it was 2 to 2.
/3/Attached but not printed is an April 2 memorandum to the President from Harriman, in which Harriman called bombing so far into North Vietnam a "disastrous trend," which he urged the President to reverse, and requested that the President issue "an immediate clarification of the bombing restraints." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Chron./Sched.--April 1968)
H. said he thought these fellows are trying to sabotage it and try to make a liar of the President; the President has to at least answer with something very clearly and if later on gets specific information, agree. H. said had been talking to INR and they told him details--if found traffic on Route 7 increased or if found accumulation of military units or material, or supplies then revise the decision.
K. said he thought that made sense. H. added that he was using word "disastrous". That Clifford defends military because they were told 20th parallel and he calls this "fuzzy" language. Unfortunately I didn't know what had gone. Perhaps it is better for K. to give him (Clifford) what we have from Rome and Canada. Hanoi is going to be let off the hook completely that H. impression was that 20th parallel was the maximum.
K. When they looked at the language of the speech the orders had not yet gone out. The President approved the orders after approving the language; K supposed that that is essence of Clifford's argument.
H: But the Chiefs have a responsibility to the Commander and Chief--and they will make the President, our Commander and Chief, a liar.
K: Give me a copy and I'll take it to lunch and give it to the President.
175. Editorial Note
The North Vietnamese response to President Johnson's offer of peace talks came on the morning of April 3, 1968. Broadcast over Radio Hanoi, the message chided the Johnson administration for enacting the partial bombing halt and labeled it a "defeat and at the same time a shrewd trick." While Hanoi recognized that the United States had not unconditionally stopped the bombing of its territory, it was ready to make a move as well. At the end of the message was the following declaration: "However, for its part, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares its readiness to appoint its representative to contact the U.S. representative with a view to determining with the American side the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam so that talks may start." Following an impromptu discussion of the message from North Vietnam with 40 European news editors, the President read the statement to the press at 5:05 p.m. and pledged that on the basis of this response, the United States would establish contact with North Vietnamese representatives. For text of the North Vietnamese response and the President's remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pages 492-493. The Department transmitted these statements to the Embassy in Saigon and to Secretary of State Rusk in New Zealand in telegram 141172, April 3. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
An April 3 memorandum on "Hanoi's Motives" by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency summarized the conclusions of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The memorandum noted the change in tactics that the North Vietnamese response represented and suggested a number of motives for this shift. One reason may have been that Hanoi believed that President Johnson would resume the bombing and other offensive operations on an even larger scale if the North Vietnamese did not respond promptly. Second, North Vietnam might have already decided to respond to the partial halt in order to force a complete cessation, to influence U.S. public opinion, to create divisions between Washington and Saigon, and to undermine the South Vietnamese morale. Third, the North Vietnamese likely regarded the halt and offer to talk "as a decisive change in U.S. policy--an admission of unwillingness to continue the war, and a first step towards accepting the consequences." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (Helms) Chrono., Jan.-Jul. 1968)
A more detailed analysis of Hanoi's motives was circulated on April 8 to the President and his top foreign policy advisers. This memorandum, from Abbot Smith, Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, to Director of Central Intelligence Helms, suggested three possibilities. One was that the North Vietnamese leadership was "highly optimistic" in believing that the tide of the war had turned in its favor and thus would "begin talking while still fighting." Another possibility was that the North Vietnamese were "uncertain" and thus "the President's initiative offered an opportunity--though not an ideal one--to give greater emphasis to the political aspects of the struggle." Additionally, the North Vietnamese might have appraised the situation as "pessimistic" due to the losses they suffered at Tet and therefore "the President's statement provided a way out." Other contingencies explored in the memorandum included possible domestic turbulence inside North Vietnam or struggle among the top leadership. In conclusion, the memorandum argued that "Hanoi considers that it can register further military successes at costs it can afford to bear even if it would prefer not to, that it believes the will to persist is beginning to crumble on the US/GVN side, and that hard bargaining combined with continued military pressure can bring a favorable outcome." (Ibid.) A similar analysis by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research appeared in Intelligence Note No. 240 from Deputy Director George Denney to Acting Secretary Nicholas Katzenbach, April 4. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
176. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 3, 1968, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Kennedy, Robert F. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 11:41 a.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) The President discussed the meeting beforehand with Chicago Mayor Richard Daley. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Daley, April 3, 1968, 8:23 a.m., Tape 6804.01, PNO 13) Soon after the meeting began, the President received a call from Clifford at which time they discussed what to say to Sorensen. (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Clifford, April 3, 1968, 10:30 a.m., Tape 6804.01, PNO 14)
Memorandum of Conversation: The President, Senator Robert F. Kennedy, Theodore Sorensen, Charles Murphy, and W.W. Rostow, 10:00 a.m., April 3, 1968
The President opened the conversation by saying he had received Senator Kennedy's wire./2/ He was pleased at its spirit and wished to explore whether they could find areas in which the Senator could be helpful to the nation at this critical time.
/2/Kennedy sent a telegram to the President on April 1 requesting the meeting. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Senator Kennedy said he was glad to do so and wished to do so.
The President said that he found the situation confronted by the nation the most serious he had seen in the course of his life. The nation was vulnerable abroad and at home. In Vietnam the situation in Saigon was quite troublesome. The Thieu government left much to be desired; but if that government went--if there were a coup--we would probably not get a government as good. This is about as good a government as we are likely to have. It is reasonably responsive to what we have urged upon it. It is now doing some of the most important things. Thieu would wish personally to do more, but he cannot get all he would like any more than the President can.
The nation needs a tax bill, or the dollar and the international trade and monetary system will be in mortal danger. It is a question of weeks, not of months.
The Middle East situation is explosive. The Soviets are likely to take actions detrimental to the peace. The President faced that problem in June when the Soviets were about to act. He turned the fleet around at that threat. But, essentially there are forces in the Middle East which are beyond our control. Hussein cannot survive another set of raids on Jordan; but the Israelis cannot have their buses blown up and children killed without taking action.
It has been very difficult for the President to cope with these problems while under attack every day from Nixon, Senator Kennedy, Senator McCarthy, and the nation's enemies--as well as certain of our allies. For example, Senator Fulbright made great difficulties yesterday, although he had been fully briefed by Secretary Clifford, as had the other appropriate leaders in the Senate. We had briefed the U.K. and the Soviet Government on exactly what we intended to do in our bombing limitation. The President had consulted a large group of outside experts, who had examined the whole question of bombing pause and Vietnam policy in general.
There was also irresponsibility with respect to the question of our planning to use nuclear weapons. A rumor started somewhere. Some woman may have telephoned a Senate committee. Instead of calling the Secretary of Defense, they went directly to the press. Secretary McNamara had told him that, in his whole period as Secretary of Defense, the question of nuclear weapons had never been raised with him, nor with the President. A group of scientists then got excited. They wired General Eisenhower. When they were queried, they said they were not worried about President Johnson using nuclear weapons but about General Eisenhower advocating their use. This kind of irresponsible behavior was unsettling.
The President said he had only one desire: to do the best he could for the country. He doubted that he and Senator Kennedy would be far apart if they sat at the same table. He had taken himself out of the election to remove any possible suspicion that what he was doing was self-interested. He would try to lead the country in the next nine months. He had great faith and trust in the judgment of the people.
The President said that he would have his own judgments and would exercise them, but except for a few fund-raising dinners, he planned to keep out of campaign politics.
Senator Kennedy said that he thought the President's speech was magnificent. He understood the difficulties and burdens borne by the President. He regretted the lack of contact in recent times, and said that a lot of it "was my fault." He would like to be of help to the President. He would try to help and make an effort. He understands the difficulties in the Middle East. He had had different ideas about Vietnam and expressed them. But he understood that the President's speech had been made in the interests of the nation. He had always understood that President Johnson had placed the national interest as paramount. If there is anything he can do to help, he would like to.
The President responded that there was a great deal that he could do. If Senator Kennedy and the leaders in both parties wished to act in that spirit they could make a great contribution to national unity. He said that he hoped Senator Kennedy would keep in touch with Nick Katzenbach. When Nick had said that he had avoided contact with Senator Kennedy, the President had replied, "that's too bad--he should make contact." The President trusted him fully. He feels the same way about Senator Ted Kennedy, who has generally taken enlightened positions. Secretary Clifford would be glad to see Senator Kennedy anytime. The President had instructed Clifford to keep in touch with Senator Fulbright, and hoped that a new face in the Department of Defense would open up a new relationship.
The President himself would be available to Senator Kennedy or to his people. During this period the President would try to keep in touch with the spokesmen for various political groups. If national unity and a common outlook could be achieved, that would be good. But of course there would be no attempt to muzzle differing views.
The President then turned to the military situation in Vietnam and said that the enemy was bringing down men and supplies in an effort to achieve a decisive military victory. General Momyer had told him that they were for the first time running their trucks at night with their lights on. It was the President's duty to order a bombing policy that would hold back from South Vietnam as much of the supplies as possible. On the other hand, the President's position was not inflexible. Westmoreland had asked for five aircraft squadrons. We didn't have them immediately available and would have had to call up National Guard units. The President decided to take aircraft away from bombing Hanoi and Haiphong and put them into the area south of the 20th parallel. Senator Kennedy should be aware, however, that Hanoi and Haiphong are being used as military storage areas. The streets of Haiphong are full of military supplies.
On Nick Katzenbach's advice, the President had drafted the speech in terms of the functional purpose of the bombing in the panhandle of North Vietnam rather than in terms of a geographic area. Fulbright had been briefed, but didn't mention this. Although Russell and Stennis and others had noted that they had been informed. Mansfield had heard the full text of the speech at a time when the 20th parallel reference was still there./3/
/3/See footnote 2, Document 172.
Then a Hanoi newspaper said the President had said "just above the DMZ." This was backed up by a Tokyo newspaper, and before we knew it, Members of Congress and newspapermen were stating that the President had misled them. The President had to go back and have the tape replayed to prove that he had, in fact, followed his text exactly. One of our serious problems is the willingness of some in this country to play the enemy's game.
It had not been easy with the JCS. They voted 3 to 2 in support of the limited bombing cessation, and would not have done it without Bus Wheeler's leadership.
The President underlined that the purpose of his strategy was to underline that he was taking a first step and would be prepared for other steps if there was a response.
The President then went through the attached memorandum and its two tabs with the Senator./4/ Mr. Rostow went over the map with the Senator, pointing out precisely which routes and points south of the 20th parallel it was necessary to cover in order to protect our forces.
/4/Not found.
The President then resumed by saying that he had shaved his position on Sunday/5/ night just as fine as he could. He had to bear in mind not only making the most generous offer to Hanoi that was possible, but also the protection of his men and the position of our allies. What he had done had been difficult for Thieu and Ky; for the Thais and Koreans. He will try to move further if it is possible, but we must not be too confident that the Hanoi statement (which the President had made available to Senator Kennedy) was an authentic peace offer.
/5/March 31.
Returning again to the map and to the language used in the speech, the President explained the danger of a line permitting the enemy a sanctuary, as in the case of Korea, and explained how Nick Katzenbach's suggestion had been negotiated between Katzenbach and Harry McPherson. He said, however, that the responsibility was only his own.
Senator Kennedy said he was glad to have this explanation. He had understood from the President's speech that he was making a great effort. He had not understood the bombing limitation passage, but he had not criticized it. He was glad to have the explanation now.
The President explained Clifford's conception of a step-by-step de-escalation. He said Tommy Thompson and Governor Harriman were ready for negotiations if the other side were ready.
Mr. Sorensen interjected that he had found the language of the speech excellent. As a speech writer, he thought it extremely well done. The whole manner of presenting the President's case was that of a man searching for peace and prepared for peace. The President noted that the letters to Kosygin were better drafted at the time Sorensen was working in the White House than now. He noted also that Harry McPherson was not a belligerent-minded fellow and had helped to give this speech the right tone.
Mr. Sorensen said the briefing had been extremely informative. It was a helpful session. He said there was an inclination in the press to divide us, but we don't wish to keep divided. It would be good for the country if we were closer together. The President repeated that Nick Katzenbach would make available anything we had, as would Secretary Clifford. We would brief Senator Kennedy and his people just as we brief General Eisenhower and Mr. Truman.
If they had any suggestions for policy we would be glad to receive them and discuss them. In this way we could avoid the violent disagreements which are damaging both to the Democratic Party and to the nation. We must all pull together at this time. The President said that he felt no bitterness and no vituperation against Senator Kennedy nor against Senator McCarthy nor Nixon. He wanted to get peace above all. Some were urging him to stop all the bombing. But he had to take into account that towards the end of last year and early this year the North Vietnamese had sent down into South Vietnam large additional forces. Westmoreland, when he was here, had asked for a very substantial increase in the forces available to him. Secretary McNamara had worked it out so that we increased his forces by 45,000--to 525,000--planning to get the balance that Westmoreland wanted from the South Vietnamese (65,000) and extra divisions from the Thais and the South Koreans. The President had insisted that we get as much of the forces promised Westmoreland out by the end of 1967. By airlifting some, we had gotten out 102 of the 106 maneuver battalions promised Westmoreland by Christmas. Meanwhile, the South Vietnamese had raised their target from 65,000 to 135,000. The South Vietnamese had fought very well during the Tet offensive. Abrams tells us that of 149 maneuver battalions only 8 performed in an unsatisfactory way; 40 performed with military distinction; the balance good or better. We are now rushing equipment to them to improve their fire power.
In addition we are sending 13,500 support forces for the 82nd Airborne and Marines that we had sent out by air at the height of the crisis. This includes artillery, Marine communications, and other units necessary for sustained operations.
We shall call up some Reserves, but only when we are clear that they have a mission, equipment, and something useful to do. The New York Times story about a request for 206,000 cost the nation a billion dollars in gold./6/ The President had turned down all requests beyond these supporting forces; although he intended to build back the reserves to a position where we had seven deployable divisions, as opposed to the 12 we had when we began to send forces to Vietnam.
/6/Reference is to the March 10 story that broke news of the troop augmentation request; see footnote 2, Document 116.
This could involve a callup of something like 30-50,000 men.
This is the President's present plan and he does not intend to do more than this, but situations could arise which would require more. The Congressional committees had urged for a long time that the President call up the reserves even to the level of 460,000. McNamara had resisted this for three reasons: it put the country on a war footing; it would cost a lot; and it was not necessary. As Senator Kennedy will recall, we learned from previous callups that there is a danger that the men will have nothing to do. The President was determined not to repeat that error and was insisting that the callups from now on take place only when the mission was clear and all arrangements had been made. He had learned from his son-in-law, Pat Nugent, what could happen: briefings on the weather which had already been on the radio earlier in the day, and sitting around reading magazines.
Additional expenditures would be required for two additional M16 factories; to run the helicopter plants 7 days a week rather than 5. We would get the Thai division beginning in the middle of the year. It looked for a time as though the Koreans might wish to pull out their two divisions from South Vietnam, but we made it clear that if this happened, we would have to send our troops now in Korea to South Vietnam. We still hope to get the Korean division. We also had the expenses of the callup and movement of forces in connection with the Pueblo crisis.
We are encouraging the South Vietnamese to think about talking with the NLF. Thieu is amenable, but faces many difficulties in South Vietnamese politics. Ultimately the President believes they will talk. Bunker works at it every day. He now has Berger beside him. He believes it is better to move them step by step rather than to be excessively tough and blow apart the frail political structure in Saigon. At our urging, Thieu has removed weak Corps commanders and installed new and more capable province chiefs.
The President then turned to the Stockholm conference. He said that the results were good. The Germans had stood up with us against the French. The British had accepted a very tough budget and the pound was steadier; but the whole international monetary system would remain fragile until the Congress passed a tax bill. This was absolutely critical.
The U.S. experts had worked out a surcharge which exempted those under $5000 income. And this was fair. It may, however, have been too complicated. It would have probably been easier to restore the old rates. That was Wilbur Mills' view. If we had the old rates, our tax income would be $24 billion higher than it will be this year. The surcharge bill would give us an extra $9 billion.
The President said that, in retrospect, he never should have repealed the tax bill. And his advice to his successor will be: Never lower taxes.
The President then summarized his key concerns for the nation:
--Vietnam;
--the Middle East;
--the tax bill and the deficit; and
--the question of the cities and race tension.
With respect to the latter, he hopes to emerge with as much money as we had last year for the cities. If he got the tax bill, he would be prepared to cut an extra $5 billion from expenditures, including about $2 billion from Defense. It would be painful, but possible. He does not wish to go beyond a $5 billion expenditure cut. Under these circumstances, he feels that he could bring the deficit down to the range of $8-$10 billion and that would be manageable and would stabilize the dollar and the international monetary system.
He expected Congress to cut aid and space appropriation. And he expected cuts also in roads and agriculture. He hoped that the poverty would have at least as much as last year. We might have to follow the procedure of awaiting the completion of the 15 appropriation bills by June 30 and then taking something like 2% off payrolls and 5-10% off controls. This would bring the budget from $186 to $181 billion, of which $2 to $2.5 billion would be non-Vietnam defense. The President is intent on not abandoning his basic domestic programs.
The President then said the Senator might wish to know that he was going out to Honolulu this weekend to talk with Westmoreland about his successor--and if it were Abrams--Abrams' successor.
The President explained Operation Pegasus and the opening up of the routes to Khe Sanh./7/ On the whole, he thought the South Vietnamese had responded well to the Tet attacks; were coming back in pretty good spirit with an apparent willingness to stand increasingly on their own.
/7/Operation Pegasus referred to operations involving the clearing of Route 9 to Khe Sanh which began on April 1.
Mr. Rostow then explained at somewhat greater length how the enemy's attack on Khe Sanh had proceeded; the role of air power in the withdrawal of some units; and the objectives of Operation Pegasus.
The President then repeated that Senator Kennedy should feel free to talk with Katzenbach and Clifford and also in the White House to Mr. Murphy, DeVier Pierson, and Walt Rostow at any time.
The President then said that he proposed that George Christian tell the press that the Senator had sent him a wire offering his cooperation. The President had accepted the suggestion. The Senator had come in and they had generally discussed the international situation: Vietnam and the whole picture. They might be meeting again from time to time. They did not go into politics.
Senator Kennedy then said that he wished to ask a question about the President's political position. He had the highest admiration for what the President had said in his speech, but he wished to know where he stood. Would the President oppose Senator Kennedy's candidature? Would he mobilize political forces against him? The President replied that he hadn't talked to any other candidate. Mrs. McCarthy had called him; but he had not gone beyond what he had said in his speech.
He had told the Vice President last year that there was no certainty that he would run in 1968; in fact, he rather thought he would not run. The President said he does not wish to forego his options. He does not wish to mislead Senator Kennedy or anyone else. It is his hope that he would be able to stay as close as possible to the statement he had made on Sunday night and keep the Presidency out of the political arena, if that can be avoided.
The President said that he was not pure or holier-than-thou; but he was simply scared about the position of the country. He had asked the Vice President to meet him later during the day./8/ He would go over the same ground as he had with Senator Kennedy. The Vice President had been an exceedingly good Vice President. He would not advise him whether or not to run. The President's objective in the months ahead was to try to get as much done as he possibly could; to get as nearly universal support for his actions as he could, Democratic and Republican. He would like his successor to take over with as few problems as possible. If he thought he could do that job and engage in politics, he would have run. He concluded that he could not do it. Speaking subjectively, the President said that he thought he had done more for the young via education; for the Negro; and for the colleges--via the higher education bill--than any other President. But the fact is they feel a detachment from the President. This has been heightened by what Senator Kennedy, Senator McCarthy, and the Republicans have said. The President concluded that the country would not be served by having a controversial President in the middle of a campaign at a time when the nation faced such grave issues.
/8/Immediately after the meeting with Kennedy, the President saw Humphrey. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Notes of this meeting have not been found.
The President went on to say that in fact he had not wanted to be Vice President and had not wanted to be President. Two men had persuaded him to run in 1960: Sam Rayburn and Phil Graham./9/ They had said that unless Johnson were on the ticket, John Kennedy could not carry the South. Without the South, Nixon would win. He would have greatly preferred to have continued to be the leader of the Senate.
/9/Former Senator Sam Rayburn and former publisher of the Washington Post Philip L. Graham.
The Vice Presidency is a job that no one likes. It is inherently demeaning; although no one ever treated a Vice President better than President Kennedy had treated him.
The President said, "I found myself in this place and did the best I could." He had the feeling that perhaps Senator Kennedy did not understand his feelings about President Kennedy. When he accepted the Vice Presidency, he felt he went into a partnership with President Kennedy. They disagreed seldom, but they did disagree a few times. Once on civil rights, for example, involving an Executive Order including the banks and savings institutions. A few times President Kennedy was a little irritated with him and showed it; but no one ever knew; although on one occasion President Kennedy had asked Robert Kennedy to talk to him about a matter of disagreement.
As President he had continued to look on his task as a partnership with President Kennedy. He felt he had a duty to look after the family and the members of the firm which they had formed together. He had never asked a Kennedy appointee to resign. He had never accepted the resignation of a Kennedy appointee without asking him to stay. As President, he had felt President Kennedy was looking down on what he had done and would approve.
The President said he felt the press had greatly exaggerated the difficulties between Senator Kennedy and himself.
Summarizing his attitude towards the campaign, the President said he would vote; he would not forego the possibility of stating publicly his views; but he planned to keep out of pre-convention politics and keep out of the convention. He recalled President Truman's ineffective advocacy of Harriman at the Democratic convention. He doesn't plan to do that. On the other hand, he is making no commitments and he may say whom he will vote for.
Mr. Sorensen then pressed the point by asking: Can Members of the Administration work for one or another Democratic candidate? The President said he had no hard and fast rule; he would like to think about that. It is a decision he will make perhaps sometime down the road. He wants no role as a king-maker; but he also wishes to keep his options open. When he was in Chicago and saw Dick Daley he didn't talk about the nomination. He may at some future time but he has no plans. As for members of the Administration becoming involved with one or another candidate, this is a matter he would like to consider before making a decision.
The President said that he had told only Secretaries McNamara and Rusk what he planned to do before he did it. Shrewd observers might have guessed something, however, through the decision of Governor Connally. Governor Connally had said he was willing to run for Governor only if the President was going to seek another term. It might have been noted that Governor Connally did not run.
The President is conscious of what the Senate did to President Wilson and President Truman. He simply did not command the leadership to get the results the nation needed.
As for the candidates, he had not talked to them and they have not talked to the President. He wanted it understood that he had a warm affection for the Vice President. No one has ever served a President better in that post. The Vice President has not indicated whether or not he is going to run. The President simply doesn't know.
The President received more than 5000 telegrams in response to his speech, many asking to whom should they now turn. The President had answered them politely but did not respond to that question.
Senator Kennedy then asked this question: If the President decides to take a position on a candidate, would he inform Senator Kennedy before he does so? The President said: I will try to honor that request if I can be that cool--unless I lose my head in response to a particular situation.
Senator Kennedy said, I merely ask that so that I can be clear in my own mind as to your position. The President then said he would call Senator Kennedy if he decided to take a position in the campaign.
Senator Kennedy said he regarded the President as a brave and dedicated man.
The President then said that he would summarize his position and attitude as follows: He does not believe the country understands the gravity of the international position. There are many points of trouble: Vietnam and the Middle East, notably, but also Frei/10/ is in trouble; there is trouble in Brazil; Ayub/11/ is ill and no one knows who might succeed him; the India/Pak tension is just beneath the surface; the whole South East Asian situation is fragile in Indonesia, Thailand, and Laos.
/10/Eduardo Frei Montalva, President of Chile.
/11/Mohammed Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan.
In addition, there is the monetary situation, race problems, and the cities.
The President would do his very best to get peace. He was not optimistic, but he thought all would benefit.
He would do his best to have a good summer. In fact, there would be more jobs this year than last; there would be more money for urban activities, although not as much as he wanted. The Ford group was getting well organized to provide jobs in the private sector; there were more housing starts in the cities. On the other hand, there were all the disruptive liabilities of an election year. He would do anything he could to maintain a stable country.
He would like to emphasize that things are more dangerous than people realize. He hopes that his successor can do better.
Concluding, the President said that he had responded to Senator Kennedy's telegram because it was right for him to do so. He would try to behave the way he would wish Senator Kennedy to behave if their positions were reversed. He had already talked in this vein to Mrs. McCarthy. He would talk with the Vice President. The Senator should understand his great affection for the Vice President. He feels towards him the way, perhaps, Ted Sorensen feels toward Senator Robert Kennedy. But he intended not to involve his office in the campaign because:
--he would not be effective;
--it would not be consistent with what he wants to do with the Presidency; and
--if he were to get in campaign politics, he would have been involved on his own behalf.
He wishes to keep the freedom to do and say what he feels right later in the campaign, but he does not plan to enter it.
The President said that if there were any way in which he could have avoided being a Presidential candidate in 1964, he would have not run then. He wants Senator Kennedy to know that he doesn't hate him, he doesn't dislike him, and that he still regards himself as carrying out the Kennedy/Johnson partnership.
W.W. Rostow/12/
/12/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
177. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, April 3, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Transcribed from Tom Johnson's handwritten notes. Those attending the meeting, which lasted from 12:29 to 1:29 p.m., were the Vice President, Katzenbach, Goldberg, Fowler, Clifford, Clark, O'Brien, Smith, General Taylor, Interior Secretary Stewart Udall, Commerce Secretary Cyrus Smith, Under Secretary of Agriculture John Schnittker, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare-designate Wilbur Cohen, Housing and Urban Development Secretary Robert Weaver, Secretary of Transportation Alan Boyd, and Presidential aides John Macy, Leonard Marks, Barefoot Sanders, Mike Manatos, Ernest Goldstein, John Roche, Ervin Duggan, Charles Maguire, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A full transcript of the recording of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
Pres[ident]: Appr[eciate] your dedication to country, loyalty to me, and your unselfishness. Many of you came here and stayed on at my request, faithful, competent, and served country well. Doubt anybody has sacrificed more. Doubt there has ever been a more dedicated Cabinet. All of you have been interested in bettering humanity. I will understand if any of you have to stand aside. I would be happy for you to stay until the last day. I will talk to each of you.
We have some indication from Hanoi we are evaluating.
Sen. K[ennedy] came in this morning./2/ Spent an hour. Briefed him on international developments. He said he would try to meet dangers that face country--tax, monetary, city, int'l problem. Told him Rusk-Clifford-Fowler and all would be available to him and to all of candidates.
/2/See Document 176.
Told V.P. expect him to know anything. I want to stay as close to position I outlined as possible. I do not want to be a king-maker. I was a trustee of the K[ennedy]-Johnson partnership. I looked on my work as if JFK was watching everything I did. I think he would give us an A+. I explained that to Sen. K[ennedy]. I am free man--first American, public servant, [then] Democrat. Said same thing to V.P. Told Kennedy that V.P. has been A triple plus V.P. (12:37--V.P. w/moist eyes). I figured I was a B+ V.P. and HHH was an A+++ V.P.
I did what I did because thought I ought to do it. Country is in damn serious danger. Danger in Vietnam--danger in Middle East. We have problem in L.A. Negroes are marching in cities. Needs of civil disorders. Demands of Senate to cut $6 billion. We must have a tax bill. Didn't see how I could do that running with my motives being questioned.
I am going to try to stay as close to statement as I can./3/ Told Bobby I could announce tomorrow but I don't intend to. I am doing this because I want country to be better. Told K[ennedy] country be made better. Told him anything in State would be told him by Katz[enbach] & Rusk to all.
/3/Reference is to the President's March 31 address; see Document 169.
[Udall]: Because I am senior,/4/ I speak sentiment[ally] that we regret what you said the other evening. But you put your country, & unity of your country, before everything else. It has been a great honor to serve you. It will be a great administration in history.
/4/According to the transcript of the recording of the meeting, Udall stated: "I am senior in age of those who originally served with President Kennedy and then yourself." (Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
Katzenbach: Hanoi came out with statement this morning. In reality, we are not bombing above 20th. This is further than Hanoi has ever gone. Treat it as a willingness to get together.
Clifford: The offer of Sunday night/5/ was a first step. It seems clear this is their first step. This appears to be a departure from [their] previous position about unconditional cessation of bombing. I would recommend a reciprocal step from Hanoi./6/
/5/March 31.
/6/According to the transcript of the recording, at this point, Clifford stated: "I think one significant comment of heretofore, Hanoi has insisted that it will not have any talks with the U.S. unless the United States unconditionally stops the bombing. Now this appears to be a departure from that previous position they have taken. Because they say, if our translation has its merits, that 'the parties will get together to decide with the U.S. side the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other acts of war by the United States so the talks could be begun.' Now it seems to me that we have the right, within the framework of the President's offer of Sunday night, to construe this as a reciprocal gesture on the part of Hanoi, and I would certainly, along with Nick, be ready to recommend--certainly should (it) also appear feasible--that we construe this as a reciprocal step on the part of Hanoi and now proceed to the second part of the program that the President had in mind."
Briefing made three main points:
1) Calling up add'l reserves for support of 11,000 emergency increment.
2) Effort to turn fighting over to SVN more.
3) Unilateral cessation of bombing above 20th parallel where 90% of people live and 75% of territory.
Sorensen said language in text was better than using 20th--less combative.
Sen. Fulbright-Russell-Stennis were told about it. Looks as though Fulbright wanted to reject it before Hanoi.
Katzenbach: Purpose of speech was to explain why bombing would continue in DMZ and area north of it where supplies continued to flow. Foreign governments knew 20th parallel was line.
Pres[ident]: We would endanger our troops to cut out all bombing. It was a 90% stop in population and 75% stop in territory./7/
/7/In a memorandum to the President, April 3, 2:45 p.m., Rostow noted the "potential" of U.S. military strength on the ground in South Vietnam and advised that this position be improved as talks progressed. (Johnson Library, William C. Westmoreland Papers, #31 History File, Apr 68 [II])
[Omitted here is a discussion of the Stockholm conference on the international monetary system and an assessment of an upcoming march on Washington.]
178. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, April 3, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Transcribed from Tom Johnson's handwritten notes. Those attending the meeting, which lasted from 3:15 to 5:05 p.m., were the President, Clifford, Wheeler, Katzenbach, Bundy, Helms, Rostow, Goldberg, Harriman, Thompson, Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
W[alt] R[ostow]: 1st item is what should we say this afternoon.
Pres[ident]: I have said we are studying it.
WR: We should add, "we are consulting with our allies." That is a note we should strike.
Pres: I agree with Bill Bundy's points of this morning.
Katz[enbach]: There are 2 points--1) Must say consulting w/ allies; 2) You should make an affirmative response. We should not create public appearance of hesitancy.
C[lark] C[lifford]: Showed Pres. the language of their translation.
Pres: O.K. Katzenbach, Clifford and Harriman go to treaty room and get Goldberg to go over it. We will issue it.
WR: Urgent cable to Saigon. We have a draft cable./2/
/2/Telegram 141172 to Saigon, April 3. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
Helms: Effect of this on GVN will be terrific.
Pres: We must prevent everybody from getting hopes up. We must be aware of it.
Katz: Nobody disagrees with that.
WR: We can improve the pace of the negotiations by military means.
Pres: I would not change bombing order in north. If we have to go up to Route Package 4, let's look at it here first because newspapers & critics will make it appear we are not of a peaceful mind. I don't believe any Pres. has followed his advisers more closely or backed them more with his support. I have tried to be as restrained as I could.
CC: The debate in the Senate has been washed away by events. Hanoi responded in manner beyond (their) furthest dreams.
Pres: It's easier to satisfy Ho Chi Minh than it is Fulbright.
CC: Let's keep mil. pressure on in SVN & along DMZ. Also call up reserves. That has a salutary effect on Hanoi.
Pres: Look at Wisconsin--most pacifist state in Union. Nixon vote & Johnson vote & Reagan vote show support for our position vs. McCarthy./3/
/3/On April 2 McCarthy won the Democratic primary and Nixon won the Republican primary in Wisconsin. Small yet significant primary ballots were also cast for Johnson, whose name remained on the ballot, and for Reagan, who was not officially a candidate but represented the Republican conservative wing.
CC: Timing--when should it be released?
Taylor: We must get the GVN on board. Let's not rush into it.
Pres: We are not rushing. Ought to do 2 things: 1) ought to go out to Bunker; 2) get statement out.
Goldberg: I agree. We cannot hesitate. For first time they have been willing to meet to discuss circumstances for a complete pause.
WR: Isn't it to go into diplomatic contact saying Averell and Tommy [Thompson] are heading for Geneva?
Katz: Statement today has to be affirmative in view of past statements.
(Katz, Clifford, Goldberg retired to work on statement.)
Bundy: [I] have consultative messages ready to go.
Rostow: After this, have balanced statement to people urging unity--say exploring . . .
Pres: I don't know. Let's be awfully careful. Westmoreland didn't want me to get into Tet. People who will violate that will violate anything. Let's listen to old hands. That's why I have Tommy & Averell & Max Taylor. Let's look & think & get collective wisdom. Let's look at it carefully. Time to keep your head is when everybody else loses theirs.
Thompson: What will objective of talks be?
Taylor: Should we push our agenda?
Bundy: Contacts are one thing. Substantive talks are another. Talks are whole different area of sensitivity.
Taylor: We can explore dimensions of problems.
Thompson: The first thing is the San Antonio formula. Soviets--they worry about "productive."
Harriman: That has been stretched out.
WR: Withdrawal of DRV from 2 northern provinces would be (in) return for stopping bombing in panhandle.
Wheeler: To stop bombing you want something tangible. You can measure withdrawal--also artillery & rocket attacks against DMZ. I want to monitor what they are doing w/recon. planes along DMZ.
Harriman: We must get to see what they will do.
Taylor: Under S.A. formula, I don't see how you can.
Bundy: We said "attacks across the DMZ". Have not said any movement along DMZ would be violation.
Wheeler: They have no right in DMZ. Neither do we.
Taylor: Talks should be (on) mutual de-escalation.
Harriman: There must be no danger to our men. The Pres.' speech has supplanted S.A. speech.
Wheeler: I agree.
Taylor: S.A. formula has been mentioned in Pres.' Sunday night speech.
Bundy: There must be over-flights. No give on that.
WR: Critical element will be what fellows are doing on the ground. If we are chewing them up we are in much better negotiation stance.
Harriman: If we can gradually reduce military action, that is good.
WR: Then get beefed up ICC into DMZ.
Thompson: What about our reinforcements?
Bundy: The gut issue is what is normal rate of infiltration.
Goldberg: I think you should give the statement personally.
[Unattributed remarks:] Changes--made a statement which includes the following paragraph with respect to peace in Vietnam & Southeast Asia. Copy of President's statement inserted.
Bundy: We will have trouble from allies.
Harriman: You are only repeating what you have said all along. They will be just as angry if we . . .
Katzenbach: How about "as soon as we have consulted with govt. of SVN & other allies."
Taylor: I like Nick's formula.
CC: Let's make it a clean & complete acceptance.
Pres: How will we establish contact?
WR: Through Vientiane. One thing that can wreck this for us is for allies to collapse under us.
179. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 4, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8 I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos--General. Secret. In an attached note transmitting the memorandum to the President, April 4, Rostow wrote: "Herewith, as usual, Gen. Taylor produces a lucid and cogent memo on the first phase of the negotiations with Hanoi." The notation "ps" on the covering memorandum indicates that the President saw Taylor's memorandum.
SUBJECT
The Coming Meeting with the Hanoi Representatives
At your luncheon yesterday,/2/ I was impressed by the need to reach a prompt decision among ourselves as to the purpose and scope of the coming meeting with the Hanoi representatives. They are likely to arrive determined to limit the discussion narrowly to agreement as to "the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other war acts by the U.S. against the DRV." In my opinion, it should be our primary objective to verify the likelihood of "prompt" and "productive" negotiations in any second round of substantive negotiations during which the enemy would not take advantage of the suspension of bombing--i.e., check the likelihood of compliance with the San Antonio formula. Not only is it important that we explore these points before we become trapped in a cessation of bombing, but it is to our interest to accomplish as much preliminary work as possible in this first meeting when our opponents are still under the pressure of the present level of bombing. We can afford more foot-dragging here than would be tolerable in a follow-on negotiation with bombing suspended. In the light of these considerations, the agenda of the meeting should include the following:
/2/See Document 177.
a. An understanding as to what actions would cease if the U.S. accedes to the Hanoi demands. Our side should make clear that in agreeing to stop "other acts of war" we will not include unarmed reconnaissance of North Viet-Nam or attacks against targets at sea or on land outside of the limits of North Viet-Nam which are related to infiltration or other aspects of the war in South Viet-Nam.
b. A verification of the promptness and likely productiveness of follow-on negotiations. To make such a verification, our negotiators should obtain agreement as to the date, place and attendance of the next meeting. Furthermore, they should seek agreement as to the agenda because we know from past experience that debate over this subject as well as that of the attendance could be dragged out interminably if not agreed to in advance. Furthermore, it is impossible to form a judgment of probable productiveness of talks unless we know in advance the subjects which will be addressed.
c. A unilateral statement of what we mean by our assumption that during these talks "Hanoi will not take advantage of our restraint." In the course of this unilateral declaration, we should also make clear that we are not going to tolerate foot-dragging in the follow-on negotiations and that we are resolved in such a case to break off discussions and to resume full scale bombing.
If you accept the foregoing outline as the desired agenda for the first meeting, then it seems to me very important to reach an agreement within our own family on the following points which are presently unresolved:
a. Where and when do we wish the follow-on negotiations to take place?
b. What is our preferred agenda for the follow-on negotiations?
With regard to the latter point, it is my view that the agenda of the follow-on negotiations should include the following topics:
a. Mutual agreement to cease reinforcements from outside South Viet-Nam.
b. The conditions governing the eventual withdrawal of foreign forces.
c. Disposition of the Viet Cong. This is likely to be the hardest point to negotiate since it includes such matters as the amnesty arrangements permitting their return to South Vietnamese society and political life, the subsequent participation of the Viet Cong in the political life of South Viet-Nam, provision for the economic resettlement of the Viet Cong and the removal of those so desiring to North Viet-Nam.
d. The conditions for a cease-fire. It is important, I think, to hold this item to last since it in itself is as difficult to negotiate as all the foregoing items. However, the cease-fire arrangements should be made easier if both parties know how they have come out in the agreements on the preceding points which constitute the political settlement.
Since the coming meeting with Hanoi representatives is likely to be the prelude to the follow-on substantive negotiations and since the ground work for the latter must be laid in the former, it seems to me very important that a single negotiating team with the same leader represent our side at both meetings. As this will be the most important diplomatic encounter since Panmunjom where the war may be won or lost, we need the best talent in the country on the negotiating team and a very able, tough chief negotiator thoroughly conversant with the ramifications of the Viet-Nam situation to head it. Clark Clifford, Cy Vance or possibly Alex Johnson would seem to me to meet these requirements./3/
M.D.T.
/3/In an April 3 memorandum to the President, Rostow noted that he and Taylor did not believe that Harriman should be "the man to carry this negotiation--should it develop--beyond its first stage" since he was not in the best of health and he did not possess "an understanding and sympathy for the South Vietnamese." They instead recommended that the President select Vance as "the man who will carry this negotiation for the long pull." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 70)
180. Notes on Telephone Conversation/1/
Washington, April 4, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Chron./Schedule--April 1968. Confidential; Personal. Prepared by Davidson.
NOTES ON TELEPHONE CONVERSATION FROM
GOV. HARRIMAN TO SECRETARY CLIFFORD
Gov. said was hoping get some decisions today; asked if C.[lifford] had decided whom he wanted to have go with H.
C. said the main man would be military since there were so many military aspects to the matter. He had suggested name to the President. However, no decision yet since Pres. had gone to NY and would be back this afternoon; the Pres. had indicated he probably would want to talk to Westmoreland over the weekend when he sees him in Honolulu.
Gov. said he had heard rumors as to whom they had in mind; had known him for years; had been appointed Gov's liaison when Gov. was Chairman of the Three Wise Men in Paris./2/
/2/Reference is to General Andrew Goodpaster.
C. said yes; that he is really topflight fellow; whether decision would be made to release him for this kind of thing or whether they have some other place where he is needed, he did not know.
Gov. asked if he was head of the school now, to which C. replied affirmatively; that they had in mind taking him out and putting him on a much more important job. C. asked if Gov. had any idea when mission would take off. Gov. said Monday would be meeting, which would mean Sunday morning take-off, but we of course had not heard from the other side. C agreed probably would not hear yet.
Gov. continued that lined up somebody from the WH and somebody from the Department--he always travels light--and that it is terribly important to have someone from Defense whom C and the Chiefs trust. C. asked how Gov. would react if he able to come up with an able civilian to go along with the military. Gov. said this is going to be rather long, tough discussion; that in the long run they would need somebody from the civilian side; Gov. would be glad to take him along to break him in.
C. said he had an awfully able fellow--Paul Warnke; that he's really top-flight, but will have to think about it; that he (Warnke) carrying a big load and would be hard to replace. Gov. said he knows him quite well, having dealt with him on negotiations as well as on PW's, and thinks he is good fellow, if you can spare him. C. said he'll look into it.
H. said that if C. can settle "that military fellow" and Paul, he would be elated. That he would like terribly strong team in whom C. and the Chiefs would have full confidence./3/
/3/According to notes of a telephone conversation that same day, Harriman discussed Goodpaster's possible detail to any potential negotiation team. Rostow also mentioned that Jorden would be the White House's addition to the team, a move that Harriman lauded. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Chron./Schedule--April 1968)
181. Notes of Meeting/1/
New York, April 4,1968, 3:47-4:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held at the United Nations. Those attending were the President, U Thant, Goldberg, Jones, and Tom Johnson. The President was in New York for the day in order to attend the ordination of Archbishop Terrence James Cooke. The President had requested that Goldberg arrange the meeting with U Thant following the service. (Ibid., President's Daily Dairy)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
U THANT--SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
U Thant: Thanks for your helpfulness. You were very magnanimous in the process for peace. I congratulate you. I regret your decision. Your speech will generate a process for peace in Vietnam.
The President: That is encouraging. We tried to convince our people some move had to be made. We felt this was a step. I hope conditions will permit it to be a big step. If there is any recognition of it we will take another one. I will not do anything to endanger my men. We are hopeful it will permit initiation of some exchange. That will be encouraging.
I have asked Ambassador Goldberg to brief you on the speech.
U Thant: Thank you for that. As I indicated to you it is important that Peking has not broadcast Hanoi's statement up to 1 a.m. today. Hanoi ignored Peking.
Peking Radio never broadcast some statements. Hanoi doesn't care about Peking's attitude. These are factors that indicate Hanoi is somewhat independent of Peking. This indicates relative independence of Hanoi from Peking. You should keep this in mind. It is difficult for even doves in Hanoi to come in with a statement like they did yesterday.
On Monday I transmitted a message to Hanoi:
--Not to react negatively immediately to the President's speech.
--Please consider it carefully and react after very carefully reading it.
--Also told General DeGaulle not to react negatively.
I have nothing to advise on the next step. But this is a very important step. Hanoi really wants to talk to you.
There are some procedural questions. I think Geneva would be the best place since Geneva has historically been involved. When I was in New Delhi, if parties agree to talks, she will be privileged to have them in New Delhi as Chairman of the ICC. The French also said, not officially, the French Government would be privileged to host talks in Paris.
I am at your disposal. My sole concern is to contribute as best I can to bringing about peace. Coming from the country I do, our experience in Burma in World War II--95% of our people were elated--we worked for them. The more they stayed, the more Japanese stayed on, the more bitter the feelings were. We began to regard the Japanese as foreigners--just as the British. Now our relations with the Japanese are excellent. Now all my people are very anti-Communist. The Communist backbone was broken in Burma with advisers.
I think you should test Hanoi. Hanoi is very independent of the Communists. In the final analysis, they will come with non-aligned constitution. It is necessary that U.S. has a long and difficult task. I have a high regard for Thompson and Harriman. I hope Goldberg can be involved. I am at your disposal. I leave this evening for Geneva. If possible, I may talk with Bo.
There is no immediate prospect for a resolution. I may talk to Bo.
The President: That would be very desirable. Your evaluation and assessment is a reasonable one. You demonstrate a very constructive attitude. I appreciate your statement and your doing what you did Sunday. I do not hold out much hope from this message, but I do have hope. I wanted to appeal to the UN and ICC and others who could be in a position to help. I asked the Soviet Ambassador to come down. I spent some time with him.
The Soviets thought we would never get out of Vietnam because of investment and bases there. Rusk and Clifford and I put in a plan--a modification of the Goldberg plan. We would help both of them if we could, if they would let us.
From the Kosygin talks in Glassboro,/2/ I don't think they understand Americans. We want to communicate the hope of tomorrow.
/2/Reference is to the President's meeting with Kosygin during June 1967; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 207.
I have tried in this effort to stop the bombing against most of the people, and it continues only where these efforts directly threaten our men.
I stretched this as far as I could. Goldberg wanted to stop it all. But I could not endanger our men. If they would not have a crash program, O.K. But now they are desperately rushing in supplies. Ninety percent of the population is above the 20th parallel.
Secretary Clifford feels we have 9-10 months to do what we can for this world. We have to take some chances.
182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, April 4, 1968, 0139Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Read and Davidson on April 3; cleared by Harriman, Read, Bundy, and Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. Also sent to Vientiane and repeated to Saigon and as Tosec 74 to Rusk in Wellington during his visit to New Zealand for the ANZUS Council meeting. The text of this message was repeated in telegram 142994 to New Delhi, Moscow, Paris, and London, April 6, and transmitted to U Thant in telegram 143091 to The Hague, April 7. (Ibid.) For a record of the ANZUS meeting, see Document 183.
141478. Literally Eyes Only for Secretary and Ambassadors.
1. As quickly as feasible please deliver following written message to highest ranking DRV official you can reach.
Begin Text. The USG has noted the April 3 statement of the DRV indicating "its readiness to send its representatives to make contact with U.S. representatives".
The United States accepts the proposal of the DRV. Ambassador W. Averell Harriman will be available forthwith to establish contacts with the representatives of the DRV. For its part the U.S. would propose that such contacts be established in Geneva on April 8, 1968, but the U.S. will attempt to meet any reasonable alternative suggestions of the DRV for time and place for establishing such contacts. End Text.
2. Please report soonest on action taken to deliver foregoing or any problem which arises in connection with delivery./2/
/2/In telegram 5597 from Vientiane, April 4, Sullivan replied that Hurwitch hand-carried the sealed message, which included a request that it be transmitted to Hanoi, to the DRV Embassy. When told that the Charge, Nguyen Chan, was "out shopping," Hurwitch left the message with his secretary. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
Katzenbach
183. Record of ANZUS Council Meeting/1/
Wellington, April 5, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 4 ANZUS. Secret; Limdis. Rusk represented the United States, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake acted as host and represented New Zealand, and Minister for External Affairs Paul Hasluck led Australia's delegation to the Seventeeth ANZUS Council meeting. The record was prepared by Robert Lindquist, Country Director for Australia and New Zealand in EA.
[Omitted here are the opening remarks by the delegations, followed by a report on the British withdrawal from Southeast Asian affairs.]
III. Viet-Nam
Holyoake suggested passing on to other agenda items and asked if anyone had comments regarding Viet-Nam.
Hasluck said he had three questions:
1. In the light of the Tet offensive is there perhaps some need for improvement of allied intelligence techniques? The Secretary recalled that prior to the offensive we had received a fair amount of strategic information and as a result U.S. forces were on a general alert. However, we did not have adequate detailed intelligence information as to specific timing, targets, etc. This is due, he said, to a number of factors, including apathy and fear on the part of local population, and he agreed that improvements in this area would be desirable.
2. How long can the North Vietnamese sustain their present level of military effort, Hasluck queried? The Secretary responded that this is hard to estimate. In fact, he said, they would have the capability to maintain military operations almost indefinitely. However, this would not mean that they would not decide to stop operations for a variety of reasons, including materiel and manpower costs.
3. How effective will 135 thousand additional South Vietnamese troops be and how soon will their military effectiveness be achieved? The Secretary replied that South Vietnamese recruits are given a nine-week basic training course and thus would begin to show up in military units about June. He noted that two-thirds of GVN forces are volunteers and that the now effective policy of battlefield promotions has had good effect on military morale.
Hasluck asked the Secretary's assessment of the domestic South Vietnamese political situation. The Secretary replied that relationships between Thieu and Ky are improving and leadership cooperation now is more satisfactory. Neither, however, is a dynamic figure capable of inspiring and guiding national efforts. We have made clear in Viet-Nam, the Secretary said, that the one thing we cannot tolerate is a coup against the constitutional South Viet-Nam Government that has been established. The Secretary predicted that the upcoming period of contacts and possible negotiations with North Viet-Nam would be difficult and troublesome and he said we hope that problems can be avoided by consultation with the GVN and other allies.
[Omitted here are discussion of issues relating to SEATO, Japan, and Laos, and a joint communique issued at the conclusion of the meeting.]
184. Editorial Note
When President Johnson ordered the partial cessation of bombing, private individuals acting as unofficial negotiators were in North Vietnam. Americans Harry Ashmore and William Baggs of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, who had been involved in overtures to the North Vietnamese in 1967, were granted entry visas by the North Vietnamese Government in March 1968 in order to facilitate the peace process. Following a briefing by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William P. Bundy, Ashmore and Baggs arrived in Hanoi on March 29. As a result of their conversation on April 1 with Hoang Tung, a spokesman for the Hanoi regime, Ashmore and Baggs reported to Ambassador to Laos William Sullivan through the offices of the Indonesian Ambassador to North Vietnam, Nugroho, that their efforts had produced tentative procedures for the initial meetings between the United States and North Vietnam. In an April 2 covering memorandum transmitting an intelligence report on the channel to the President, Walt Rostow noted that it appeared that "our two blind hogs (Baggs and Ashmore) have found an acorn." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 70) In telegram 6972 from Vientiane, April 2, however, Sullivan notified the Department of his skepticism at having "to play cloak and dagger with these two characters." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
Following another conversation with Tung on April 4, Ashmore and Baggs assisted him in composing an aide-memoire on April 5 which they believed had approval from the highest levels of authority in the North Vietnamese Government. Immediately returning to Vientiane, they turned over the aide-memoire to Sullivan, who subsequently transmitted it to the Department in telegram 5650, April 5. It reads:
"The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has repeatedly protested against the U.S. action in illegally laying hold of civilians and military personnel on board fishing boats and freighters even in the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam demands that the United States stop all its arrogant acts, respect the sovereignty, territory, and security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and release immediately, unconditionally and without any need for an agreement between the two parties, all citizens of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam now being illegally detained. As for the captured American pilots, they are regarded by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as guilty to the Vietnamese people. Acting upon orders from the U.S. Government, they have bombed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, an independent and sovereign country, killing civilians and destroying property of the Vietnamese people. However, in accordance with the humane and lenient policy of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, they have enjoyed good treatment. On the occasion of the last Tet festival, for the first time, three of the captured U.S. pilots were released in view of their correct attitude during their detention. With regard to the 'limited bombing' of North Vietnam announced by President Johnson, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam made clear its view in its April 3, 1968 statement. The U.S. Government has not seriously and fully met the legitimate demands of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, of progressive American opinion and of world opinion. However, for its part, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declared its readiness to appoint its representative to contact the U.S. representative with a view to determining with the American side the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, so that the talks may start." (Ibid.)
The Department requested that Ashmore and Baggs return to Washington. (Telegram 142968 to Vientiane, April 6; ibid.) After a conversation he had with Ashmore and Baggs in Tokyo as they were en route to the United States, Ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson reported that they considered the message from Tung to be an official reply to the United States. In addition, Ashmore and Baggs noted that they had confirmed to Tung their transmission of the aide-memoire. (Telegrams 7219 and 7220 from Tokyo, April 7; ibid., S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Sept. 11, Meeting XXI)
Once back in Washington, Ashmore and Baggs briefed Ambassador Harriman on their visit, but the message did not have the impact they expected it would. Rostow decried the fact that they had "acted as negotiators" and "took a position that washed out reciprocal action by the DRV if we stopped bombing." (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, April 6; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile, Chronological, Vol. I, 3/31-4/10/68) In an April 12 letter to Secretary of State Rusk, the President railed against any further such private contacts since they always seemed to result "in a posture of quasi-negotiation which misleads Hanoi and undercuts our position at home." (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 72)
The full report of Ashmore and Baggs was submitted as a memorandum to Harriman dated April 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Sept. 11 Meeting) For Ashmore and Baggs' account of their overture, see Mission to Hanoi (New York: G.P. Putnam's, 1968), passim. Bundy's comments on the particulars of this book are in a memorandum to Rusk, September 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
185. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, April 6, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting, which was held in the White House, lasted from 1:30 to 5:10 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Westmoreland was in Washington because the President's planned trip to meet with him in Honolulu was canceled due to riots following the April 4 assassination of civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND
THOSE ATTENDING WERE
The President
General Westmoreland
Nick Katzenbach
Averell Harriman
General Wheeler
General Taylor
Dick Helms
Clark Clifford
Harry McPherson
George Christian
Abe Fortas
Horace Busby
Jim Jones
Walt Rostow
Tom Johnson
The President: I want General Westmoreland to report on:
a. Successor to General Westmoreland
b. Deputy Commander
c. Military Advisor
d. Views on Harriman draft
e. Suggestions he has to Harriman
f. Report on military position in Vietnam, particularly at Khesanh and along DMZ
g. Evaluation of enemy
h. Evaluation of ARVN
i. Evaluation of tactics
General Westmoreland:
1. Since Tet enemy has suffered colossal military defeat. He has lost 60,000 men and 18,000 weapons.
2. I say to Ambassador Harriman he will be negotiating from position of strength.
3. The enemy has manpower and logistical problems.
4. North Vietnam has 20,000 men moving down. He needs 40,000 to fill depleted ranks. He needs replacements everywhere.
5. Tet offensive dates back to last summer. Lost their advocate of protracted war strategy. They moved away from that strategy in September 1967 and initiated a major two-phase offensive, first stage was the offensive at Dak To. He attempted to cut Highway 4 leading to Delta to put economic pressure on Saigon. This was designed to take headlines from inauguration of newly-elected South Vietnam government and secure real estate. This was designed to be coup d'etat. He thought he would get a public uprising and mass defections in ARVN and by whole units. He was deceived by the American press into thinking the ARVN were no good. He found they were stronger than expected.
Viet Cong infiltrated with the crowd.
He did catch South Vietnam off guard in many places.
Intelligence showed he would attack in Tet period but not on D-day for psychological reasons.
He expected to dominate the "3-10 military district" and to be successful in the highlands.
I chose to hold Khesanh. We reinforced in December and January. We wanted to force him to commit. It was small enough to supply by air.
The enemy suffered severe defeat at Khesanh. He lost 10,000 to 15,000 men and 325th had to retreat to Laos.
I know there was great concern back here about Khesanh. This was a Dienbienphu in reverse. We created best targets we have had during the war. From mid-January until a few days ago we had 6,000 secondary explosions and 1,300 bodies seen on the ground, knocked out 900 bunkers and 300 gun positions.
North Vietnamese are not ten feet tall as press has portrayed them. The Dienbienphu veterans are old, grey-haired men now.
The ARVN performed well. Introduction of M-16 to ARVN has helped them greatly.
We should have produced M-16 rifles sooner and given them to ARVN one year earlier. But we got in patent fights and debates between lawyers.
Harriman will have hand with four aces and enemy will have a hand with two deuces.
He has 8-2/3 divisions in North Vietnam now. He could bring down two divisions, well-equipped but not well led.
He could set up multiple fronts. He has DMZ fronts, MR 10 front, 10-3 front.
The President: What do you think of South Vietnam government and Army?
General Westmoreland: My advisers made a study of the South Vietnam armed forces:
a. Navy }
b. Marines } received high marks
c. Air Force }
d. Army--5% poor; 28% excellent
67% satisfactory
RF and PF fought well except in 4th Corps. Only 2% did not.
Enemy made maximum use of weapons. They were superior to ARVN weapons.
As for government, Thieu is gaining stature and self-confidence.
There is a conflict between Thieu and Ky but I am not worried about it.
I think they both should stay.
There is friction between Thieu and Vien/2/ because of quarrel between two wives.
/2/Cao Van Vien.
Vien will resign when I leave (Westmoreland). That will not hurt. He has been very receptive to advice. Kim or Tri/3/ may come back to head Joint General Staff.
/3/Le Van Kim and Nguyen Bao Tri.
Would bring Kim back as Minister of Defense and Vy/4/ as chief of Joint General Staff.
/4/Nguyen Van Vy.
Vy is respected by other generals, but he would not be a dynamic leader.
We need a replacement for 3rd Corps commander.
4th Corps commander is breath of fresh air.
I had Abrams explain U.S. attitude toward the war to South Vietnamese commanders. I gave them a hard-line pep talk. I made analogy of Battle of Bulge. This appeals to them very much.
Walt Rostow: Were they shook up over bombing pause and President's announcement?
General Westmoreland: They were puzzled by it. I urged the South Vietnamese to take the fight to a weakened enemy.
General Taylor: Was Thieu concerned?
General Westmoreland: I explained it to them. They are sensitive about a coalition government but they are reconciled to moves we have made so far.
Newspapers tried to make them believe this would lead to Communist takeover.
Walt Rostow: What about necessary equipment of RF and PF?
General Westmoreland: We will give them M-2's and BAR's plus machine guns and mortars. We are giving them light anti-tank weapons.
General Taylor: How can you bring this home to American officials? It is not a losing proposition.
Dick Helms: If you relieve a seige of a bastion, you get headlines.
The President: He has worse problem with press than we do.
General Westmoreland: I am under instructions to play down relief of Khesanh.
Clark Clifford: What is situation around Khesanh?
General Westmoreland: There are still 7 or 8 battalions there. I do not know if they will stand and fight.
General Wheeler: Why have they counterattacked Hill 471? He may have been trying to protect corridor.
Clark Clifford: How is Route 9?
General Westmoreland: This route will be open next Tuesday./5/ We will not try to maintain permanent security. We will route convoys in there.
/5/April 9.
General Taylor: How are you supplying Khesanh task force?
General Westmoreland: By air and land, air drop extraction.
General Wheeler: I feel that playing offensive low-key was prudent and wise. Press discounts MACV briefing session.
The time has come for efforts back here to look at relief of Khesanh in proper perspective. There is great story here. Not a single day when supplies haven't been dropped in. Bombing support has been great.
Westy had two divisions tied down.
Clark Clifford: What is the situation in A Shau Valley?
General Westmoreland: It is an unusual piece of terrain 20 kilometers long and 1 kilometer wide.
The enemy has dominated and developed in the Valley. I hope to go in during May. Enemy moves by truck. He has upgraded road east toward Hue.
A Shau is at division line between Northeast and Southeast. Weather bad except in April and May. It is a major logistic base. It goes through tip of Laos. Enemy has strong anti-aircraft system in there. We captured 23 mm munitions.
Harry McPherson: Have you noticed any change in the enemy since the peace overture?
Is the enemy in a position to capture a city, score a tactical victory, or attack Saigon?
General Westmoreland: He will have some initiatives.
The President: What would happen if we stopped all bombing?
General Westmoreland: It would facilitate their supply during rain, Laos supply roads would be bad anyway. But he can run convoys in North Vietnam day and night and build up.
The President: If he accepted San Antonio formula, what would our situation be?
General Westmoreland: It is going to be tough to determine whether or not he is "taking advantage."
The enemy will insist on cease fire in South. This would be an intolerable condition.
The President: What about his forces at home?
General Westmoreland: He can bring down two divisions in the next 2 or 3 months.
General Westmoreland: 20,000 in two divisions. He could recruit 21,000 in the South. He could augment by 60,000 men. He may lose 60,000 by that time.
We think we are inflicting 20,000 losses a month on him now.
He may withdraw into Cambodia. I am skeptical about Phnom Penh (Cambodia) as site for talks. Many Cambodians are working with Viet Cong.
If we could bomb over there it would be very disconcerting to him.
The President: They would impeach me.
Nick Katzenbach: Senator Mansfield thinks Sihanouk is the greatest leader in the Far East.
The President: Have they ordered fire stopped against DMZ?
General Wheeler: Pattern of attacks remain relatively constant. We have encountered less resistance North and South of Route 9.
Averell Harriman: I agree that a cease-fire is impossible. In de-escalation we talked about demilitarization of the DMZ.
General Westmoreland: I hope he does fight.
The President: Are you glad he changed his tactics?
General Westmoreland: Yes, sir.
It has accelerated the attrition inflicted on the enemy. He has suffered a military defeat of major magnitude.
The President: Is the light at the end of the tunnel any nearer?
General Westmoreland: Yes, South Vietnam can take over bigger share of burden. Losses in the last few days have made that statement more credible.
Clark Clifford: Under what condition would a cease-fire be acceptable?
General Westmoreland: I do not see the acceptability of that.
Nick Katzenbach: When you think of a cease-fire, do you know another way to approach it?
General Westmoreland: We would like for the North Vietnamese to go home and turn in their weapons.
Abe Fortas: We must have a different term from cease-fire.
Clark Clifford: One of the great goals on the minds of Americans is for a "cease-fire."
One of the big problems is that we would have tough time determining if they were "taking advantage" without aerial reconnaissance.
General Wheeler: Near DMZ we must have low-level reconnaissance. First test of de-escalation step is that they must be tangible.
The President: Do we have a contact?
Nick Katzenbach: Message in Vietnam was transmitted.
Tonight Collingwood will be on television from Tokyo./6/
/6/In Hanoi Charles Collingwood, a reporter for CBS, met with senior North Vietnamese leadership, including both Dong and Trinh. In reporting to Sullivan on his meetings, Collingwood noted that most of what was contained in the aide-memoire on opening initial talks was repeated in an interview he had with Trinh. Trinh had added that the DRV had "unhappy memories" of Geneva and preferred Phnom Penh, which would be less expensive for them. (Telegram 5652 from Vientiane, April 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Sept. 11, Meeting XXI) Collingwood broadcast this interview from Tokyo on April 7. In an April 11 memorandum to Katzenbach, Hughes observed that Trinh had "apparently sought to avoid a rigid separation of the 'contact' and 'preliminary talk' steps" and seemed to "merge" both phases together. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
Walt Rostow: We could jump them. Say we have a response we are following.
Averell Harriman: On April 3 you learned of Hanoi message, you acted on it and message was delivered by midnight.
The President: I am ready to play honest with Collingwood. I think somebody is playing dirty pool with me.
Nick Katzenbach: On 6:30 broadcast, Collingwood will take two minutes. Let's put out that we took initiative. His information was given to U.S. government and will be acted on promptly.
Did the President establish contact?
Yes
On day of April 3.
We have information it was received.
We notified them in Laos.
Nick Katzenbach: When we gave similar message in Moscow we were told they already had information. We sent it to the French, to U Thant, to Dobrynin here and to the Indians./7/
/7/In telegram 3409 from Moscow, April 6, DCM Emory Swank reported that he had passed the message to DRV Ambassador Nguyen Tho Chan in Moscow that day. Chan mentioned that he was familiar with the message. (Ibid., POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) Thompson and Bohlen had discussed the Vientiane message with Dobrynin the previous day. (Memorandum of conversation, April 5; ibid.) See also footnote 1, Document 182.
We established contacts.
We have further information which does not appear to be a response to our proposal for Geneva.
You saw statement from Hanoi. You conveyed willingness to accept on same day. We have informal contacts which do not appear to be an answer to what you say./8/
/8/Before Collingwood's broadcast, Christian read a statement to the press on April 6 that described the message passed to the DRV Embassy in Laos 2 days earlier and added: "The United States Government has not yet received a formal reply from the Government of North Viet-Nam. We have received messages through private individuals recently in Hanoi, but these do not appear to be a reply to our proposal. We hope to receive an official reply from Hanoi soon." For the full text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, April 22, 1968, p. 513.
186. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, April 7, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The notes were prepared on April 8. The meeting, which was held in the Cabinet Room from 3:05 to 4 p.m., followed the President's luncheon with Westmoreland and Rusk. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A complete transcript of the meeting and a summary are ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room. A list of participants is at the end of the notes.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
GENERAL WESTMORELAND
The President: General Westmoreland will visit with General Eisenhower. Let's not make him late.
Walt Rostow: General Westmoreland will discuss future deployment at the DMZ.
General Westmoreland: We want to move ahead on strong-point obstacle system. The enemy artillery and rockets forced a deferment in this program. Khesanh has been relieved.
The President: Can we replace U.S. troops there with Vietnamese?
General Westmoreland: Yes, sir. First link-up of troops at Khesanh was a Vietnamese battalion.
Clark Clifford: We must look into the M-14 utilization.
Secretary Rusk: You may want to give them to RF and PF.
The President: Get the answer on M-14's as soon as you can./2/
/2/According to the transcript of the meeting, the group discussed the M-14 rifle, noting that a large number were on hand but were not being to sent to Vietnam because of a problem with the powder charge in the cartridge, an issue that was being resolved. The President stated: "If we should get the right answer on M-14s, we've got it made because you've got a million of them that are ready, so that's what we want to get the answer on, and then start hauling. And then get Thieu and Ky and all their crowd and get things boosted up and show them how much better equipment we are going to get them and then say, 'God damn it, let's go, because we are going out of office in January here. Wheeler has just got one year term left and I've just got nine months and Westy hasn't got but three or four months, and we want to get this thing as far along as we can. You fellows have got to carry on.'"
Walt Rostow: Point 2 is a discussion of operational plans under conditions of a total bombing cessation.
General Westmoreland: We need a better company level-battalion level radio. Want recommendations on this.
On general offensive operations, I have talked to Thieu and Vien to get South Vietnamese moving on all intelligence.
I will have another meeting to give South Vietnamese another spur. Intelligence must be sharpened. We must have a psychological war campaign.
Operational plans under conditions of total bombing cessation would be no different than those we now have.
Secretary Rusk: We must make sure assumption of not taking advantage holds during bombing stand-down./3/
/3/According to the transcript, Rusk said: "Hanoi supported the action that you took last Sunday, but if you go into a complete bombing stop without insisting upon the assumption you stated in the San Antonio formula, we'll have deep trouble all of our own. so we've just got to make it clear that assumption remains in effect, and if they think they are going to be able to go full-blast while we are stopping our part of the war, then we are in real trouble."
The President: Should we give the message we sent to Hanoi.
Nick Katzenbach: No, we gave a digest of it yesterday./4/ Let's get rid of Baggs and Ashmore.
/4/See footnote 8, Document 185 .
The President: We will name Abrams as Westmoreland's successor.
Have Cy Vance and General Goodpaster drop in and out of negotiations as military.
Send Goodpaster as Abrams' successor temporarily./5/
/5/According to the transcript, on this point the President stated: "I would, if it is at all feasible, have [Westmoreland] say to General Eisenhower today that we would like for Goodpaster to start out--my thought would be to have a diplomatic, political head of the negotiating team and a military department representative too, and I would suggest that we try to have Averell since he has been designated, and anybody else we designate, they resign. I want them to resign to me instead of Averell. Have Averell there, and then ask Cy Vance to take Goodpaster for the military operations, and Cy can drop in and out because if he has to come home, it's not too long. He wouldn't be able to go a year or two, but he would be able to go a month or two and back and forth, and Dean says he thinks that would work out all right. He is free to do this without being encumbered anywhere else. I believe he might get along with them. Then, we use Goodpaster and whoever else that backed him up until July in these things, and then we could send him on out to be Abrams' deputy when Abrams moves up, and that would cover both waterfronts. Even if this thing got deep and we couldn't carry him, we would have to make a choice which we could make--which is more important. But that would be the tentative plan." In his news conference of April 10, the President announced Abrams' appointment as COMUSMACV. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 504-507.
General Wheeler: Let Services nominate the Deputy.
The President: Talk to Averell about this. I will talk to Cy. Get Vance to replace Thompson./6/
/6/Thompson returned to Moscow on April 17.
The President: I am ready to announce Abrams now.
General Wheeler: I am ready.
Clark Clifford: I am ready.
The President:/7/ We talked about morale of troops. You keep a constant check on that.
/7/According to the transcript, at this point the President received a call from Califano, who reported on rioting in Washington and elsewhere and a request from Governor Spiro Agnew for the dispatch of federal troops to Baltimore.
General Westmoreland: I will.
The President: Resumption of reconnaissance flights.
Clark Clifford: We stopped reconnaissance north of 20th parallel during delicate period.
When do you want us to resume it?
General Westmoreland: My opinion is that we need good intelligence
--MIGs
--SAMs
--New roads
--Traffic into Haiphong
We must resupply agent teams in North by air./8/
/8/Documentation on the Special Operations Groups operating inside North Vietnam is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXVIII.
Clark Clifford: We need to keep our reconnaissance going. Unless we do we are working from blind hand.
Secretary Rusk: We must have occasional reconnaissance flights up there.
Clark Clifford: We will start an occasional reconnaissance program.
The President: What have we agreed to do that we haven't done?
Clark Clifford: Callup 24,000 reserves./9/ We are all in agreement on this callup. We will proceed on that basis.
/9/This figure included the 13,500 previously promised to Westmoreland with the balance constituting replacements for units rotating home.
The President: I am ready. I want them to have something to do.
Clark Clifford: We will be ready to assure you they have guns, equipment, training program.
General Wheeler: I am going to see General Johnson and check on this today.
The President: You want extra men and fighter squadrons.
General Westmoreland: I would like to have 3 squadrons and 2 squadrons as part of 13,500 program.
General Wheeler: We need to get these carriers rehabilitated.
Clark Clifford: I have got to cut $3 billion out of DOD budget.
Clark Clifford: We will have last report on question of bombing by 7:00 a.m. tomorrow. I am willing to make a flat, categorical statement that no U.S. planes hit N.W. North Vietnam.
The President: What else do we need to do?
General Westmoreland: I like the idea of stationing men in Hawaii./10/
/10/These troops were to form a strategic reserve.
The President: What do you plan to put in Hawaii?
General Wheeler: If callup is limited to 24,000 we can't put troops in Hawaii.
The President: Any SAMs around Khesanh or in DMZ?
General Westmoreland: No, I put no credence in that report.
General Wheeler: There are two just above DMZ.
The President: When is Bunker coming in?
Nick Katzenbach: Wednesday,/11/ 10:00 a.m.
/11/April 10.
General Westmoreland: We will either meet in Hawaii or not./12/
/12/After this meeting the President and Westmoreland met with the White House press corps to discuss the General's report on Vietnam. For text of their statements, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 498-499. In telegram 24137 from Saigon, April 6, Bunker described Thieu's uneasiness, which was "based on fear and suspicion that the U.S. in its anxiety for peace will concede too much"; Thieu also warned about "a morale collapse here in two or three days" if it appeared that the United States was willing to make concessions in the negotiations with the DRV. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 71) As a result, Rostow recommended that the President send a "reassuring message" to Thieu through Westmoreland. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, April 6; ibid.)
The President gave Westmoreland a letter for Thieu dated April 7 in which the President proclaimed: "At the same time I want it clearly understood by you and the South Vietnamese people that my offer Sunday night does not in any way dilute our commitment to our goal of peace and self-determination. We are ready to seek an honorable peace but at the same time a vigilant America stands ready to defend an honored cause whatever the price, whatever the burden, whatever the sacrifice that duty may require. As I have said, the United States will never accept a false solution to this war." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pres. Thieu Correspondence) The Embassy was notified of the letter in telegram 143730 to Saigon, April 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S) Bunker reported in telegram 24409 from Saigon, April 10, that Westmoreland had discussed with Thieu that morning his meeting with the President and the letter. (Ibid.)
ATTENDING THIS MEETING WERE
The President
The Vice President
Secretary Rusk
Clark Clifford
Nick Katzenbach
General Westmoreland
General Wheeler
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
187. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, April 8, 1968, 12:15-1:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. Secret. Drafted by Christian. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Walt Rostow
George Christian
The President examined a proposed reply to Hanoi's message which arrived through our Ambassador at Vientiane at 4:00 a.m./2/
/2/The North Vietnamese response was transmitted to Washington by Sullivan in telegram 5697 from Vientiane, April 7. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In an attached covering note transmitting the telegram to the President, April 8, Rostow noted: "Here is the official reply to our message of April 3-4. It is virtually identical with that given independently to Baggs and Ashmore, on the one hand, and Collingwood on the other." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile, General, Chronological Summary, Vol. I [2 of 2]) The DRV reply preempted a message to the DRV Embassies in the Soviet Union, India, and Laos, which noted that communications passed through Ashmore and Baggs or Collingwood, or to the Swiss Government through the DRV Ambassador in Peking were not considered official by the U.S. Government. In addition, the DRV was requested to clarify its position through the Embassy in Vientiane "or through an official communication in any manner it desires." (Telegram 143098 to Vientiane, New Delhi, and Moscow, April 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) During a brief press conference at the White House on April 8, the President publicly confirmed receipt of the DRV message through Vientiane, and indicated that he would meet with Bunker at Camp David the next day. For text of his statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, p. 500.
Secretary Rusk said that the South Vietnamese would have a strong preference for New Delhi as the site of the talks. He said there was something to be said for Rangoon. The President said he would prefer Rangoon or Djakarta. Mr. Rusk proposed that we suggest a range of four cities.
Secretary Clifford pointed out that the President and others have said that we would meet anywhere, anytime. The President said, "We have to assume there is drinking water there." He was referring to the need for communications and other facilities necessary for discussions.
Secretary Rusk said the North Vietnamese might choose Vientiane and this would not be a bad place for us. The President said that from their selfish standpoint he would think they would take New Delhi. Secretary Clifford said if he were the North Vietnamese he would stick [to] Phnom Penh because it is their first choice and they are trying to test us.
The President said he had heard General Westmoreland's views for many hours, was still sorting it out in his mind how to interpret them./3/ He said he did not accept Westmoreland's view that North Vietnam is crying for peace because of battle wounds. He said he saw some bitterness in the General, who feels he has been made the goat and has been pulled out because he didn't get support in Washington.
/3/See Documents 185 and 186.
Secretary Clifford said that General Wheeler had reported that Westmoreland had some bitterness but none toward the President.
The President said that Westmoreland was Marshallesque and reserved, but he did tell Mrs. Johnson on the telephone that he got full support from the Commander-in-Chief.
The President said that Westmoreland reported that he had a good meeting with President Eisenhower.
The President and the two Secretaries discussed the method of bringing Cyrus Vance into the talks as a companion of Ambassador Harriman. The President said he wanted Vance's participation to be on a joint basis with Harriman./4/
/4/Earlier that morning, the President met with Vance to discuss the peace negotiations. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Notes of the meeting have not been found.
The President then discussed the possibility of bringing Ambassador Bunker to Camp David tomorrow. The two Secretaries thought this would be a good idea. Neither felt the President should attend the King funeral.
The President said Bunker's big job is going to be to work on the South Vietnamese. He said they have to realize we've got to finish up by January 20. The President said Bunker is highly important in achieving this.
The President urged Secretary Clifford to solve "the gun problem." He said, "If you can't shove the M-16's, shove the M-14's as fast as you can."
Secretary Clifford said he understood the ARVN did not want the M-14 because it was too heavy, but he would get onto the situation again.
188. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, April 9, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Instructions for Governor Harriman
Governor Harriman and I wish to confirm our understanding of today's review of the draft instructions.
Our understanding is that today's meeting confirmed the instructions in accordance with the attached draft. On the specific question of paragraph 5(c), dealing with the rate of infiltration of North Vietnamese troops, our understanding is that Secretary Clifford's suggestion was adopted, i.e., that no change would be made in the instructions, but that Governor Harriman should understand that, in presenting this point, reference should be made to the increased infiltration rate of recent months as abnormal, and the clear record should be that we were thinking in terms of a normal rate such as had prevailed when the San Antonio formula was first given to the North Vietnamese last August.
We further understand that we would not include under paragraph 5 a record indicating expectation that the North Vietnamese, in response to our bombing cessation, would be taking advantage if they did not accept demilitarization of the DMZ and/or compliance with the Laos Accords. In other words, these matters would not be used as examples of "not taking advantage." However, we would expect that they would be raised--either in the contacts or in the talks--as early US objectives.
We suggest that, if you approve, this memorandum and the instructions be given to Secretary Clifford and Mr. Rostow to be sure that there is complete agreement on the way these matters will be handled./2/
/2/No approval is indicated. Concurrence on the instructions came at the afternoon meeting; see Document 189.
WPB
Attachment
INSTRUCTIONS FOR GOVERNOR HARRIMAN/3/
/3/A notation at the top of the page reads: "Draft as reviewed at the White House April 6, 1968."
Basic Objective
To make arrangements with the North Vietnamese representative for prompt and serious substantive talks looking towards peace in Viet-Nam, in the course of which an understanding may be reached on a cessation of bombing in the North under circumstances which would not be militarily disadvantageous. Such understanding to be within objectives defined below.
Specific Objectives
1. Cessation of the Bombing
The US is prepared to agree to a cessation of naval, air and artillery bombardment of North Viet-Nam. In keeping with North Vietnamese statements, it is our understanding that such action on our part will lead promptly to talks in which both sides would be free to raise any elements which they believe would lead to a peaceful settlement. We are prepared in these talks to make arrangements to this end, including agreement on announcement of bombing cessation and subsequent talks.
2. Prompt Talks
Substantive talks should be held within 3 to 7 days following the cessation of bombing.
3. Serious Talks
We should seek explicit confirmation by the North Vietnamese that any topic relevant to the substance of peace could be raised in the substantive talks.
4. Participants
In any substantive discussions we expect to take account of the interests of the South Vietnamese Government and of our Manila allies. Participation in any such discussions affecting South Viet-Nam must not exclude the Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam./4/
/4/In an April 8 memorandum to Helms, Carver described the views of the so-called "Non-Group" on the instructions. This group was an informal subcabinet-level group, chaired by Katzenbach and comprised of varying membership, which met weekly to discuss issues relating to the war. Most of the "Non-Group" took issue with this sentence in the instructions, which they believed "was designed to be fuzzy and not to direct that we will insist upon GVN participation in any such second-stage discussion," and recommended that it be clarified. (Central Intelligence Agency, SAVA (Carver) Files, Job 80-R01720R, GAC Chrono., April 1968-May 1968)
5. Not Taking Advantage
We should provide an adequate basis for the expectation that North Viet-Nam would not attempt to improve its military position as a result of the US cessation. North Viet-Nam should understand that the US would regard as acts of bad faith inconsistent with its restraints any such attempts. We would consider as examples of bad faith:
a) Artillery or other fire from or across the DMZ.
b) Ground attacks across the DMZ or the massing of additional forces or supplies in North Viet-Nam or the DMZ in a manner which poses a direct threat to Allied forces in South Vietnam.
c) An increase in the movement of North Vietnamese troops and supplies into South Viet-Nam.
6. Reconnaissance Flights
The US intends to continue certain reconnaissance flights, and the record should not preclude such flights.
189. Notes of Meeting/1/
Camp David, Maryland, April 9, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. Top Secret. Drafted by Christian. The notes are a digest of a series of meetings that occurred on April 9 at Camp David. Bunker arrived at Camp David at 8 a.m. with Rusk, McNamara, and Wheeler, and immediately joined the President, Rostow, Christian, and Jones. After breakfast the group met in the living room of the Aspen Lodge from 9:04 until 10:30 a.m. Following brief remarks to a group of reporters, the group continued to meet from 10:50 until 12:25 p.m., when the President left to greet Bundy and Harriman at the helipad. A working lunch began at 12:50 and lasted until 1:25 p.m., when the President retired for a nap. The President rejoined the discussion at 2:15 p.m. The meeting ended at 4:15 p.m., and the President, accompanied by Bunker and Harriman, answered reporters' questions. Those who had arrived that day returned to Washington at 4:30 p.m. by helicopter. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) For the President's statements to the press, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 500-502.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING AT CAMP DAVID
ATTENDING THE MEETING
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
Ambassador Bunker
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Jim Jones
Ambassador Bunker arrived at the Aspen House at 8 a.m. The President met him at the helicopter pad.
The President discussed the advisability of canceling the Austrian dinner./2/ The consensus was that it should go on if at all possible.
/2/Reference is to the scheduled dinner the next day with Austrian Chancellor Josef Klaus.
Ambassador Bunker: Thieu is acting like a leader. The Vietnamese forces did better than the press indicated. None of the things the enemy expected to happen happened.
President Thieu has moved ahead on a great many fronts--mobilization, upped it from 65,000; civil side, 14 new province chiefs and will be putting in more, increased taxes by decree and put tax bill to the assembly, ten draft laws on various subjects, closed black market and bars and nightclubs.
He and Ky are working together better. On April 2 their joint press conference tried to put to rest the division--put Ky in charge of Civil Defense. Ky will preside over several councils; and Ky was very pleased. They're conferring together two or three times a day. I've always thought it was manageable.
Ky would like to replace Prime Minister Loc, who is not very effective. He is leaning toward Tranh Van Huong, the best of the lot.
There's uneasiness about the negotiations. Thieu is calling in corps commanders today to soothe them./3/
/3/In an April 8 memorandum to Katzenbach, Habib described the widespread fears of a U.S. "sell out" among South Vietnamese governmental and political leadership. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
Everything is in the right direction. Since November 1 this government has really made quite substantial advances.
The Tet offensive gave them confidence, spurred them on. They reacted well on recovery.
The Vietnamese forces are doing well.
General Wheeler: They have more actions going for them than before Tet.
Secretaries Clifford and Rusk: Did the attitude of the American people (Ambassador Diem's message)/4/ cause some of this?
/4/Not found.
Ambassador Bunker: He was very helpful. As far as I can see, the Tet offensive had more effect in the United States than in Vietnam.
It caused a physical and psychological damage, uncertainty, questions about security. But this phase has passed because of good reaction of the military.
Thang carrying on many more initiatives in tough IV Corps where the Viet Cong have been for twenty years. They are making steady progress and much faster progress. There were many elements of strength we didn't realize were there.
Thieu says Tet offensive based on weakness and not strength . . . wanted to get to negotiations and willing to sacrifice men to get in better posture.
Thieu thinks they will make one more big effort this summer--to keep the pressure on in I Corps and Highlands; harass cities--airfield--try to hold on to as much real estate as they can, so they can go to negotiations and say "we control a lot of territory."
The President: What are the big problems now?
Ambassador Bunker: In the Vietnam forces, some changes of command are needed, more equipment and sophisticated weapons. It is very important for their morale to get better guns.
They're trying to do almost too much. We need to help them on what they can do.
The negotiations are very sensitive to them. We have to move with deliberate speed; they are worried, apprehensive. I didn't get to him on the announcement we would talk until thirty minutes after he heard it on the radio.
The indications of sensitivity are: They think they need an Ambassador here who is not quite as close to the United States as Bui Diem.
It is important that I have time to talk to Thieu before the next step. The PF are vulnerable to propaganda. The Viet Cong tell them peace is coming./5/
/5/In an April 6 memorandum to Bunker, Komer described Thieu's acceleration of recruitment for the RVNAF and an administrative revision of the four corps but cautioned about the administrative and military "foul-up" that could come from poor planning for the build-up. (U.S. Army Center of Military History, DepCORDS/MACV Files, Westmoreland Memos, RWK 1967-1968)
Secretary Rusk: Can't we do it the other way around?
Ambassador Bunker: They're under cover, hard to find. But we can do something here.
General Wheeler: They've had good intelligence of attack in Pleiku area. They're trying to spoil it.
(There was then a short break in the meeting.)/6/
/6/The President made a telephone call to Tom Johnson at 9:04 a.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
(Ambassador Harriman and Secretary Bundy were invited to fly up for lunch.)
Secretary Rusk: If we do better militarily, will news coverage from Vietnam improve?
Ambassador Bunker: Oh Lord, I don't know.
Mr. Rostow: How serious is the stagnation in the economy?
Ambassador Bunker: Beginning to pick up. Commodities are moving from the Delta. Viet Cong concentrating more on road interdiction. Moving convoys by water to Delta and back with rice.
The President directed Secretary Rusk at 9:35 a.m. to have Bundy dispatch a reply to DRV./7/
/7/In telegram 5720 from Vientiane, April 9, Sullivan reported that Chan gave him a letter which read: "Pursuant to the note of 8 April 1968, we wish to inform you that, if the government of the United States agrees with the choice of Phnom Penh for the preliminary meeting, the ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the Kingdom of Cambodia Nguyen Thuong will make contact 12 April 1968 at Phnom Penh with the American representative having the rank of ambassador. This will be a preliminary contact designed to prepare official conversations between the two parties." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) The message, received in the Department at 2:18 a.m., was sent to Camp David as telegram CAP 80762 where it was received at 7:45 a.m. (Ibid.) The message was preceded by a Radio Hanoi broadcast the previous evening which also offered Phnom Penh as a site for the talks. (The New York Times, April 9, 1968) While the DRV preferred the Vientiane channel, the message was also passed through Moscow. (Telegram 143634 to Moscow and New Delhi and telegram 3435 from Moscow, both April 9; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
Bundy's reply, transmitted in telegram 143729 to Saigon, April 9, reads in part: "The USG notes that agreement has now been reached that there should be contacts between representatives of the two sides at the rank of Ambassador. We affirm that the American representative will be Ambassador Averell Harriman. In its note of April 4 the USG expressed a preference for Geneva as the place for contacts between representatives of the two sides. The note of the DRV of April 8 expresses preference for Phnom Penh. Phnom Penh presents difficulties for the USG because of technical problems arising from the absence of a United States mission at that location. Therefore, the USG suggests any alternative location equally convenient to both sides, specifically, Vientiane, Rangoon, Djakarta, or New Delhi. Any of these locations would be acceptable to the USG if agreeable to the host Government. Ambassador Harriman would be prepared to meet with a representative of the DRV at a mutually agreed location on Monday, April 15, or as soon thereafter as is agreeable to the DRV. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, the USG notes that none of the Americans recently in Hanoi has been authorized to represent the USG on any of the matters which are the subject of this exchange of notes." (Ibid.)
Mr. Rostow: Where is pacification?
Ambassador Bunker: Chieu Hoi low, but better than reports. We are getting out into countryside. Most of RD teams are back. Thieu very good on pacification; wants to simplify system and Komer agrees. Concentrate on hamlets where population is and along the routes of communication.
Pacification's weakness is that it comes from the top--needs to come from the bottom.
When attack came, they largely bypassed hamlets and attacked cities and towns. Before Tet we figured 5400 hamlets were secure--this is down by 800, but only 200 were attacked and are either contested or under VC control.
In going into negotiations, let's keep in mind we are strong and not weak./8/
/8/In an April 8 memorandum to Bunker, Komer argued that as a result of the enemy's defeat at Tet, "our bargaining position is a lot stronger than Washington seems to think." He noted that this position would erode if cleavage between Washington and Saigon arose. "Yet if we can't convince Washington, we'll be in a descending spiral out here," Komer concluded. (U.S. Army Center for Military History, DepCORDS/MACV Files, Chron. File, Komer (1968))
Thieu thinks May-October will be enemy's next big effort. But we'll never again be surprised. We can defeat them, or we may spoil it before it ever comes off.
I try to be objective. The Tet offensive was harmful, but mostly psychological.
Mr. Rostow: How prepared are they for negotiations?
Ambassador Bunker: Not at all. They think those who want to live under Marxism should go north.
Mr. Rostow: Have they given any thought to the Viet Cong coming in as a political party, but not in government?
Ambassador Bunker: Not as a party. They realize NLF is highly organized and disciplined, coalition would lead to a takeover like Czechoslovakia.
From the standpoint of the GVN this is not a good time for negotiations. In three or four months they'll be stronger.
Secretary Clifford: If they are getting stronger, etc., why do they feel such a concern for the NLF?
Ambassador Bunker: They are not afraid of them militarily, but politically. They are fearful if they take to their bosom, they'll end up running the show.
Walt Rostow: You can reject a coalition if you hold the line, but we are for a one-man, one-vote proposition. The Constitution bars Communism, but does not ban land reform party.
(At this point there was a picture break on the patio--10:45 a.m.)
Ambassador Bunker: It would be a good idea to ask Thieu to meet you in Honolulu just before you see Park.
The President: Get Gorton/9/ settled down on his date to come here--that leaves several others. Meet Thieu there, send him back out, announce date for State visit./10/
/9/John Gorton, Australian Prime Minister.
/10/Telegram 144253 to Saigon, April 9, instructed the Embassy to deliver a message from the President inviting Thieu to meet with him at Honolulu on April 18. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pres. Thieu Correspondence) When Thieu expressed reluctance due to the fact that he had yet to determine a replacement for Loc (who for the time being remained Prime Minister), Rostow sent a message from Camp David to Bunker and Bundy in Washington requesting that Thieu come to Honolulu on April 17 or April 18 if possible. A notation on the message, dated April 10, reads: "Amb. Bunker talked with the President--President agreed message should not be sent." (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, 1 EE (4), Post Tet Political Activity) Bunker called the President at 2:22 p.m. on the afternoon of April 10 soon after the President had returned to the White House. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
I will be in Honolulu early part of next week for a day with Thieu and a day with Park--Monday/11/ and Tuesday . . . Thieu on Monday and Park on Tuesday.
/11/April 8.
Dean, get out to Gorton and others that when the situation makes possible we will be seeing Thieu, not for policy change but to make ready for his visit later.
Ambassador Bunker: Put it up to Thieu to see if he wants to bring Ky.
The President: On the matter of reserves, how much do you recommend on the first call-up?
Secretary Clifford: 24,500, and do it tomorrow./12/
/12/In a press conference on April 11, Clifford announced the call-up of 24,500 reservists and a new troop ceiling of 549,000. He also stated: "We have concluded that Americans will not need always to do more and more but rather that the increased effectiveness of the South Vietnamese government and the South Vietnamese forces will now permit us to level off our effort and in due time to begin the gradual process of reduction." For text of Clifford's remarks, see Department of State Bulletin, April 29, 1968, pp. 552-554, and The New York Times, April 12, 1968.
The President: Will Thieu make the 135,000?
Ambassador Bunker: It looks O.K. He wants to do 135,000 plus another 25,000.
The President: What about our equipment for them?
General Wheeler: I think we'll make it.
Secretary Clifford: Combat units of ARVN have M-16s by June 68, RF and PF in July [will have] 3/4 of M-16s that come out will be going to ARVN.
General Wheeler: From a practical point of view, must arm U.S. troops with M-16 first or the roof will blow off the Capital.
The President: Buzz, are we taking a gamble on not trying to stop infiltration except in Panhandle?
General Wheeler: We lost a little by pulling back. But not on the Hanoi-Haiphong cutback. We are losing something from Than Hoa south to the 19th parallel. We wish we could give a good hard knock in the next day or two.
Secretary Clifford: We feel comfortable with the 19th to avoid mistakes.
General Wheeler: Between Laos Panhandle and strikes above DMZ, we're using as many sorties as we ever did.
(Averell Harriman and William Bundy arrived at 12:40 p.m.)/13/
/13/Before he went to Camp David, Harriman met with Nitze and Warnke at the Pentagon to discuss the military aspects of the upcoming negotiations with the North Vietnamese. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Chronological Files, April 1968)
Mr. Harriman: Geneva has many advantages from our point. New Delhi, if in Asia, for the larger talks.
(At this point, the meeting was recessed for lunch.)
The President: Could this be a Tet ploy?
Secretary Rusk: I think they want to get rid of all the bombing of NVN. They seem to want to go through with their part of war full-scale. The first talks will be tough. Hang in there. Either get them to make concessions or get them to take the responsibility for breaking off the talks.
Walt Rostow: Their military position is not strong, but they think their political position in the United States is strong.
Ambassador Bunker: I agree. I think they're doing it to exploit our position here.
The President: Would they have come along with feelers if we
hadn't made our speech?
Mr. Bundy: They may have been wanting to tease us. And quickness with which they responded indicated they might have had something in mind, but probably not what resulted.
Secretary Clifford: If they play us for fools, Buzz and I have some choice targets we want to recognize.
Mr. Harriman: They broke the '62 agreements before the ink was dry. We should see positive results.
The President: The stronger we are offensively, the better our position on negotiations will be.
The group agreed with the President.
The President: Thieu is doing better on TV--reaching a lot of people?
Ambassador Bunker: Yes--and also radio. He is making shorter speeches. He does very well.
2:30 p.m.:
The President: Are we all agreed on draft instructions to Ambassador Harriman? Mr. Clifford?
Secretary Clifford: Yes, sir./14/
/14/In notes of the meeting in a memorandum for his personal files, dated April 9, Harriman observed: "Bunker seems to lack an understanding that President Johnson has the balance of this year to carry out his policies, and that there is little chance that American opinion will support a 30-billion dollar war in Vietnam, with the present rate of losses, for much longer. He has not adjusted himself to the realities of the American people's unwillingness to continue indefinitely at the present rate." He also described Clifford's intervention to prevent alteration of instructions for the negotiating team by recommending that Bunker's proposals be given to the negotiators only as guidance. "There is no doubt that Clifford's initiative saved the instructions from mutilation," he concluded. (Ibid.)
The President: Gen. Wheeler?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir.
Ambassador Bunker: I have a couple of questions. Can they continue to infiltrate 10,000 and let them continue to use Laos as a corridor? There they've built up all-weather roads.
Secretary Rusk: Our assumption has been there would be no more than the general level at the time the San Antonio formula was presented. Perhaps we should talk about reduced infiltration.
General Wheeler: 6,500 last September.
The President: So they've about doubled.
Secretary Clifford: The condition at the time of San Antonio was my position with the Congress.
Ambassador Bunker: The present increases may be able to make up the terrific losses which have occurred.
Ambassador Harriman: What is the most important military de-escalation they can take?
Ambassador Bunker debated whether Laos should be included in efforts to reduce infiltration.
Secretary Rusk and General Wheeler: We ought to at least insist that all parties subscribe to the 1962 Geneva accords. We should re-establish the DMZ.
Ambassador Bunker: The most important thing is to keep Thieu going--don't let him think we're selling him out./15/
/15/Following this meeting and the departure of the guests, the President and Christian met with Sharp. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) According to notes of this meeting, Sharp discussed military matters in Vietnam and recommended Admiral John McCain as his replacement for CINCPAC. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File) On April 11 the President named Abrams as COMUSMACV and designated Goodpaster as Abrams' deputy.
190. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 11, 1968, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 71. Secret.
Mr. President:
Herewith the short and the longer cable from Sullivan./2/
/2/Attached but not printed are two telegrams. Telegram 5777 from Vientiane, April 11, reported the receipt of the DRV letter. Telegram 5784 from Vientiane, April 11, transmitted the text of the DRV letter, which acknowledged receipt of the April 10 U.S. letter and reaffirmed the DRV view that "a preliminary contact between the representatives with rank of Ambassador of both parties has as its goal that of permitting the American side to determine the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV and (of permitting) the two parties to agree on the date, the place, and the level of official conversations. It is a preliminary contact that is necessary to engage in rapidly with a view toward beginning the official conversations between the two parties with the least delay." Expressing surprise that the United States was "now refusing the choice of Phnom Penh for preliminary contact between the representatives," the DRV proposed Warsaw as an alternative. The letter next designated Nguyen Thuong, DRV Ambassador to Cambodia, as the DRV representative if the preliminary contact took place at Phnom Penh, but named Ha Van Lau as representative if the contact took place at Warsaw. Finally, the DRV agreed that the contact would begin April 15 at Phnom Penh, or April 18 at Warsaw. At the end of the telegram, Sullivan commented that he thought the choice of Warsaw indicated that the DRV did not want "a particularly quiet set of contacts." (Ibid.)
It is clear that Hanoi's objectives are:
--to take our temperature;
--to see if we're capable of being pushed by the U.S. doves into a location we obviously do not want;
--to use the question of place as propaganda around the world, as Sullivan notes in his final paragraph of comment.
I informed Bill Bundy of your view, and he said that he would draft in the sense you directed, but he believes we should walk around the question and look at all its implications before making a final decision. I told him to prepare a draft for submission to you, and that you would decide if you wanted a meeting on this matter./3/
/3/The reply, transmitted in telegram 145154 to Vientiane, April 11, outlined "certain minimum standards of fairness and equity" for the location of the contacts, such as the requirement for a neutral country where both sides had adequate representation and communications. In addition, the preliminary contacts should take place in an Asian capital. The previous offer of the four acceptable locations was reiterated. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) The reply was delivered at 1340Z on April 12. (Telegram 5806 from Vientiane, April 12; ibid.) In an April 12 note to the President, Jones noted: "Walt talked to Goldberg who has talked to U Thant. U Thant will send a message to Hanoi saying he believes Rangoon will be the best place for talks. Goldberg asked that U Thant's message be kept secret. U Thant thinks Hanoi chose Warsaw because of a great deal of pressure from China." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile, General, Chronological Summary, Vol. I [2 of 2])
If we decide to turn down Warsaw, I believe we should enter the propaganda fight openly by explaining precisely why we need a place where the South Vietnamese and our other allies, including their press, can operate comfortably--which neither Phnom Penh nor Warsaw permit. If we are silent, we shall be pilloried. If we fight for a good neutral place, I think we can carry opinion with us.
Walt
191. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) and President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 11, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Chronological/Schedule, April 1968. No classification marking. The President's Daily Diary notes a telephone call by the President to Harriman at 11:46 a.m. on April 11. (Johnson Library)
Governor Harriman called the President.
H--Mr. President, I wanted you to know I feel very strongly that Warsaw has a number of advantages over any other place.
The President--I have rejected it outright, flat, all the way. I saw where the State Department said it was excellent. But as long as I am President we are not going to Warsaw where we have been once before and negotiate in that kind of atmosphere. I feel strongly it ought to be neutral, have adequate communications and some of the other people with experience feel the same way, such as Ellsworth Bunker.
H--I would also hope to be among those consulted.
The President--Yes, you have told me your opinion now. I would also like to be consulted and decide before the State Department decides. I have drafted and just LDX'd my reply./2/
/2/See footnote 3, Document 190.
H--I will obey orders.
The President--I hope so.
H--But I hope I can always tell you how I feel. I have to tell you this was a major step forward in kicking the Chinese out of the situation. The people in Eastern Europe want to end this conflict and have a reasonable settlement. It doesn't bother me to negotiate in an Iron Curtain country.
The President--It does bother me. I don't want any part of Warsaw, Czechoslovakia, or any of these other Eastern European countries. I think it ought to be in Asia, in a neutral territory. We shouldn't be dictated to through Tass./3/
/3/The DRV proposal of Warsaw was first disclosed through a report from the Soviet news agency Tass. According to a memorandum of conversation, April 11, Katzenbach chided Dobrynin for Soviet release of the offer through public channels, which tended "to give the impression that what we are engaged in is a propaganda exercise rather than a serious effort to bring about peace in Vietnam." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile--Paris to be filed) In a memorandum of conversation with Dobrynin, April 12, Thompson noted: "In the course of my talk with Dobrynin today, I probed to find out whether the North Vietnamese had been in contact with the Soviets about their recent move for talks with us. He said he had no information to indicate that they had consulted the Soviets before the President's speech on the matter but that the North Vietnamese had informed their Ambassador in advance of the reply they were making to our proposal. (I believe he was referring to our proposal of Geneva.)" (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) According to a more detailed memorandum of this same conversation with Dobrynin dated April 12, Thompson told him that "Warsaw was almost like our proposing Taiwan." (Ibid.) Christian read a statement to the press acknowledging the Tass dispatch, the DRV message in Vientiane, and the U.S. reply. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 29, 1968, p. 551.
H--I am a fellow who takes orders. I have dealt with these countries for a long time, and I think my judgment is better than Bunker's.
The President--It may be. It may be better than mine.
H--But I would like to be able to tell you how I feel.
The President--You did you see.
H--We have a tough proposition to get the kind of peace you want in Asia. We have got to use all of our resources to get it.--I am a soldier. I obey orders.
Note: (I understand that in addition to Katzenbach and Bundy, Clark Clifford agrees in favoring Warsaw. W.A.H.)
192. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) and Cyrus R. Vance/1/
Washington, April 11, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Chronological/Schedule, April 1968. No classification marking.
V called H to talk about his announcement about accompanying WAH had got to the press, and that he had been in touch with Geo Christian about it, and they had confirmed it, etc./2/ Conversation turned to site of contacts:
/2/Reference is to the announcement that Vance would join Harriman as a member of the negotiating team. See The New York Times, April 11, 1968.
H--There was a flap this morning about this Warsaw business.
V--I would have liked it myself. It seemed to me fine.
H--The offer was a slap in the face at the Chinese. The Eastern Europeans are frightfully keen to see the war over for the same reasons as the Western Europeans--they don't want to see a confrontation between the US & the USSR. But the President has decided against it, partly because Bunker was with him this morning and Bunker thought it would create difficulties in Saigon. He was very firm.
V--I think Averell, we are going to get into a real problem if we keep saying "no".
H--I know. But he made the decision. And that's that. So we have to--the statement has gone back to them that on reconsideration we thought Asia was probably the right place as they had first thought. That we were quite ready to consider any of the places they had mentioned. Neutral places, where the local people are not committed. This isn't the language they use. But it ought to be a place where they each have missions so we could have reasonable communications. So we have gone back on that basis. I don't disagree with you at all. But the boss made the decision.
H--I am afraid it was bad luck. The trouble was that TASS announced it. And the President assumed that Moscow had leaked it. But this was a name correspondent from Hanoi who put it on the air. We can't very well criticize them for doing that because our correspondents do that all the time. We had it here from Sullivan about the same minute in the Code Room. The President heard it on the air first. That was naturally not very pleasant. And Bunker there, having breakfast, said for God's sake, "no". I think Clark, Nick, Bill Bundy, agree with me. I am sorry because I think we need people in place that can help us. But there is logic in this and Nick's put out a revised statement. I don't know what they will do. We have accepted the date of the 18th.
193. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, April 11, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room. No classification marking. The President met alone with Mills from 2:26 to 3:10 p.m. (Ibid., Daily Diary) These are summary notes of the meeting; a complete record of the meeting is the transcript made from its recording. (Ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S NOTES ON MEETING IN CABINET ROOM ON
APRIL 11, 1968 WITH WILBUR MILLS
The President said he was sorry he was late but had to try to get off a message to Hanoi./2/ Congressman Mills asked what the situation looked like and the President said they were just propagandizing; that they wanted to trap us. He reported to the Congressman that we had said we would go anywhere and that we will, but that assumes they have got good drinking water and communications so they are trying to get the U.S. to go to Cambodia, which they could not do. The President then said we suggested New Delhi, also Rangoon and Burma. We also suggested Jakarta, Indonesia and later suggested Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 190.
The President reported we would be willing to go to Singapore, Japan or any place that was fair, but they came back with Warsaw. He said they want to propagandize and they get Fulbright to say why is Johnson delaying. He said he would go anywhere. He explained that if we went to Warsaw we would just be at their mercy and the President said he was trying his best to defend us. The President said the basic things necessary--communications for both sides so they can go back and let the governments know what is happening.
The President said:
"I've got to tell my Senate, I've got to tell my people what is involved. I can't do it if we don't have communications. I've got to consult with Military men about the effect of this and all that and second it is a neutral territory where they are not advocates, and the press is not Prussian and Bunker told me this morning--he is the wisest man we've got in our whole department and he was in helping me on it and he said now I negotiated a bunch of agreements. I negotiated three yesterday and they didn't even know what was being negotiated. I negotiated the Panama Canal by taking the Ambassador and going off in hiding for three days. I negotiated the Dominican Republic by getting off the desk. I negotiated the Indonesia by hiding down there at Middleburg. But if you try to negotiate in a county fair or chautauqua--whenever you say something on one side it is just like negotiating with labor unions--they go out and put it in the paper and the other side flares back, Nixon flares back and you never negotiate anything and you just can't budge except in a neutral atmosphere. That is what he told me yesterday and again today. So that's our problem there."
The President reported to Congressman Mills that he was signing the Civil Rights Bill that afternoon. He said he was doing so so he wouldn't go off and get all blown up a little later.
The President reported he had tried to avoid a message to Congress because he could not forego riots. The President said that he had to do something because he was being accused of running out. He said he had to resolve the question--bearing in mind what was the wisest position for the country. He said his own feeling was that there is not anything more important, not even the Hanoi thing, than for us to be fiscally responsible.
He went on to say that there was much division on this subject and Congress kept switching around. He said they go one way and then another. He said that yesterday the Senate had turned down his budget by more than a two to one vote, and that it all meant nobody was taking leadership now and that is the way it is now. He said that he tried to take leadership, but that he could not deliver Mills, could not deliver Mansfield, and could not deliver Russell Long. He said it did not do any good for him to talk because he did not have the horsepower to deliver any of them. He said we have got to try to find out something we can do and all get together and study it. The President said:
"I am willing to get behind you; if I could appoint you President I would take Ways and Means and do what you think about it. I can't do that. My God, I have given all I have got. I have given my life--my political life. I have walked out. Now I did it. I did it gladly. I don't regret it. I am happy about it, and I don't want to see this country go down the drain, and I am more aware about it than you are. And I think I know more about it than you do. I don't think you see what is happening. And I don't think the Congress sees. I don't think the Senate sees. And I think there has got to be a position somewhere in between what you want in the way of a tax bill and what we want; what you want in the way of expenditures and what we can take in middle of the year expenditures. We have to find that. Now, I don't know where that is. I am unable to put that together at my old age. I put together lots of things, but I thought that not as a candidate would help, but Hell, I think it is as bad now as it was before. So I don't know what to do."
[Omitted here is discussion of budget legislation.]
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