Docs 194-221
194. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, April 13, 1968, 1145Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Crocodile. Received at 8:04 a.m.
24711. 1. I saw Thieu and Ky separately this afternoon to report on my trip to go over ground of where we stand on negotiations and Harriman's instructions. They created no difficulties.
2. I told Thieu the President had suggested Honolulu meeting in order personally assure him of our support of him and South Viet-Nam as we move into new phase. I said President and others in Washington were encouraged by what I had to report on VN Govt's post-Tet efforts, offensive spoiling operations, growing confidence here, etc.
3. Turning to our estimate of Hanoi's next moves I said they clearly want talks and only question now is where and when. We expect Hanoi will concentrate at exploratory talks on getting total cessation of bombing. Our agreement to that will depend on Hanoi's agreement to hold substantive talks within a few days of cessation, and talks must be serious and embrace all relevant topics. I outlined our position on "no military advantage" and gave examples of bad faith. Finally I said we intend continue reconnaissance.
4. I did not make specific reference to GVN participation in substantive discussions with Hanoi. Instead suggested Thieu, Ky and FonMin constitute small group to meet as necessary on policy with Berger, Calhoun and me; that Calhoun and FonMin would keep in daily touch; that VN liaison group negotiations would be reporting, not policy deciding group, and that we would be happy supply them with secure communication channels.
5. Thieu agreed to all this and asked a few questions on what "no military advantage" meant and how we could assure this. Gave him a few examples, such as noticeable increase in troops moving south or across DMZ, and he did not press this hard. He was more concerned as to whether we would regard escalation of fighting in South as a breach of faith after total cessation. I avoided direct answer saying we intend to maintain offensive pressure on enemy in South during negotiations. His second concern was what he called "the danger" that Hanoi will ask for complete cease-fire in South, soon after they get cessation of bombing in North. I said we very conscious of this danger, and so far as we are concerned a de-escalation and cease-fire in South would be subjects for later not early discussions.
6. Thieu said in addition to Bui Diem, their liaison team would have a military man, possibly their Ambassador to Canberra or London,/2/ and probably the Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Tran Chanh Thanh.
/2/Tran Kim Phuong and Le Ngoc Chan.
7. Thieu said we had his agreement to go along on basis I had outlined.
8. Talk with Ky: I went over above ground with Ky, with much the same points raised and with same result. He is strongly of view that Hanoi is hurting, wants negotiations, and will move swiftly to get total cessation of bombing and total cease fire. Latter, he said, would be "disastrous" now. Enemy has taken severe punishment during and since Tet and at Khe Sanh, and we must keep hitting them. We must not agree to cease fire. Spirit of South Vietnamese forces is now high, and there is growing confidence. He has just returned from Fourth Corps area (he made trip by road), RD cadres are now back in most places, Gen. Thang is encouraged, and he came away with feeling things are moving there.
9. I told Ky of procedural proposals I had discussed with Thieu for joint consultation here. I said separate meetings with Thieu and Ky were time-consuming. There was need for speed in consultations once negotiations started, and we should all meet together. He agreed.
10. At end Ky said he also approved way we were approaching preliminary talks and instructions to Harriman. In this connection, he said great danger would arise from Hanoi's efforts divide US and South Viet-Nam. We must not allow that to take place./3/
/3/In INR Intelligence Note No. 283 to Rusk, April 17, Hughes described South Vietnamese reactions to the prospect of negotiations and the impact of that prospect upon the South Vietnamese. There was a prevailing mood of "quiet bitterness" over concern that the United States would acquiesce to the DRV demands for linking a full halt to a peace settlement and forcing a coalition government on the GVN. On a positive note, however, Hughes observed that internal divisions among the top leadership of the GVN had "apparently defused." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET S) Additional reporting on South Vietnamese attitudes toward the peace negotiations is in telegram 25197 from Saigon, April 19. (Ibid.)
Bunker
195. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 13, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile, General, Chronological Summary, Vol. I [2 of 2]. Confidential. Sent as telegram CAP 80812, April 13, to the LBJ Ranch where the President had traveled the previous day.
SUBJECT
qoute any time, any place unquote
I promised a memo outlining the way we are handling this problem.
Line Nick Katzenbach took in small backgrounder yesterday was:
(1) When we, in the past, stated our readiness to meet at any place, we assumed Hanoi preferred quiet, private contacts. Now, Hanoi has, by its own choice, made discussion of a site a public issue. Hanoi is trying to take propaganda advantage of the U.S. statements by pressuring us into a disadvantageous meeting place.
In addition, we have noted:
(2) It now is clear that the site of first contacts may well become the setting for more formal talks. Thus, the site must meet certain minimal requirements. These are:
--place where U.S. and NVN have diplomatic representation;
--where GVN and other allies and interested parties would have ready access;
--where the host government is not involved with either side in the Vietnam war;
--where we can expect even-handed treatment for the press of both sides;
--where official communications are adequate to the needs of both sides.
(3) We note that President's statement of March 31 (to which Hanoi responded) said we were ready to meet quote at Geneva or any other suitable repeat suitable place unquote. In our formal note to Hanoi we repeated the suggestion of Geneva but said would try to meet quote any reasonable alternative suggestions unquote./2/
/2/See Documents 169 and 175.
(4) A message received from Hanoi said the place of contact will be Phnom Penh quote or another place to be mutually agreed upon unquote./3/
/3/See footnote 7, Document 189.
(5) We had indications Hanoi would prefer a site in Asia. Cambodia is the only country in Asia--except for North Vietnam and Communist China--with which we do not maintain diplomatic relations. We suggested four capitals of Asian neutral states--all of which would be acceptable and where NVN is represented./4/
/4/See footnote 7, Document 189.
(6) Warsaw is capital of a communist country--one that sides openly and actively with North Vietnam. Most of our allies are not represented there and might not even have access. Tight local controls could limit access to friendly powers and to the noncommunist press. Harassment and intimidation of our delegation would not be unlikely./5/
/5/In INR Intelligence Note No. 270 to Rusk, April 12, Hughes noted that North Vietnam proposed Phnom Penh "to place us in the most difficult possible position," but believed that Warsaw would be an acceptable "fall-back position" for the United States and was surprised at its rejection. Hughes speculated that a period of deadlock would follow. He suggested that proposing a site either unofficially or through a third party would break the impasse. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
(7) We recall the experience in Korea at Kaesong (in communist territory) where our delegation had to travel to and from under a white flag and where we were totally at the mercy of the other side in arrangements and facilities. We got even-handed treatment only when we moved to Panmunjon in the demilitarized zone.
196. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 13, 1968.
Nick Katzenbach could only raise Bill Fulbright. Hickenlooper was in transit somewhere.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 72. Confidential. Apparently sent to the President at the Ranch.
Nick found Fulbright quite understanding about Warsaw. He said that we might think, if we have to, about making a deal: Warsaw for the preliminary contact; Geneva for the conference of substantive talks. Fulbright took the occasion, however, to attack Harriman as a Hawk, saying that we could not be serious about seeking peace if Harriman was our negotiator.
Clark Clifford contacted Margaret Chase Smith, Mendel Rivers, William Bates, Stu Symington, and Richard Russell. He found them all quite comfortable with our position and grateful that they had been informed.
In the course of the conversation, Clark underlined a thought which he suggested I pass along to you. One of the purposes of his press conference/2/ was to begin to suggest to the American people that we have a long-range plan leading to our disengagement as the South Vietnamese expanded their armed forces and their capabilities for dealing with the military problem. He feels that it is particularly important now for us quietly to introduce this theme because it is not certain that the negotiations will be productive. If they are, they may take a long time. If they break down, we must have a concept for continuing our commitment in Vietnam for the long pull but on a basis which has some light at the end of the tunnel. Therefore, he is inclined to believe we should play the negotiations in low key without excessive optimism and keep part of the public attention focused on the idea we have come to a ceiling in our forces and are looking to slow but ultimate disengagement. He believes the President might pick up this theme from time to time. I suggested Thieu also might occasionally speak in this vein.
/2/See footnote 12, Document 189.
197. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith)/1/
Air Force One, April 15, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE. Top Secret. Received at 3:07 p.m.; no dispatch time is indicated. Rostow was with the President on board Air Force One en route to Honolulu. Smith forwarded the message to Rusk under cover of an attached note.
Please communicate following to Sec Rusk personally from the President.
President wishes Sec Rusk to see Dobrynin and make points set out below--underlining Soviet interest in responsibility for present exchanges leading to successful negotiations along lines discussion at Camp David.
Same points should be made by Goldberg to U Thant, urging Rangoon again./2/
/2/Rusk telephoned Goldberg at 6:48 p.m. to inform him of the President's request. Notes of the conversation are ibid. Goldberg met with U Thant on April 17; see Document 199.
It is now two weeks since the President stopped the bombing of North Vietnam in the area containing 90 percent of the North Vietnamese population and more than three-quarters of the area of North Vietnam.
The President had two purposes in mind in taking this unilateral step.
First, it would be matched by a comparable step in deescalating war.
Second, it would lead promptly to contacts and negotiations. With respect to the first, our information is that North Vietnamese are engaged in a massive effort to bring additional military forces into South Vietnam.
We must consider whether, in effect, they intend to take advantage of our restraint.
With respect to the second objective, the United States has proffered Geneva--plus Vientiane, Rangoon, Djakarta, and Delhi, four Asian neutral sites--as suitable and appropriate points for initial diplomatic contacts.
Any fair minded observer must judge the sites proposed by Hanoi as not neutral.
The United States believes it urgent that a neutral site soon be found--convenient and suitable to both parties--preferably in Asia, the region most directly and vitally interested in secure and stable peace in Southeast Asia./3/
/3/Rusk met with Dobrynin that evening at 7 p.m. After the meeting, Rusk dictated to Smith a message for the President which reads: "Within minutes after receiving the President's message I saw Ambassador Dobrynin and made the points suggested by the President almost verbatim. Substantially the same points had been made to Dobrynin earlier by Ambassador Thompson and Ambassador Harriman at my request. Dobrynin was aware that my demarche to him was a direct result of a message which I had just received from the President from Honolulu. Dobrynin made no direct comment except to say that he would relay the message immediately to his government. He asked about other possible sites and I said that other possibilities could of course be considered. I also explained to him the importance of a neutral site where we could have on-the-spot liaison with our allies. He asked if we had made that point to Hanoi and I told him that we had not because we thought it might increase difficulties for Hanoi. He seemed to think that liaison with our allies was a reasonable point and could help Hanoi understand what is in our minds. He told me that he would let me know of any response from Moscow." (Ibid.)
Signed Rostow
198. Notes of Meeting/1/
Honolulu, April 16, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Transcribed from Tom Johnson's handwritten notes. The meeting, which lasted from 10 a.m. to approximately 1 p.m., was held at CINCPAC. The principal individuals attending were the President, Wheeler, Ambassador to Korea William Porter, Chief of Protocol Angier Biddle Duke, Rostow, Bundy, Vance, Murphy, Sharp, McCain, General Charles Bonesteel of the Joint Staff, and Krulak. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
[Omitted here is a briefing on events in Korea and Vietnam.]
Pres[ident]: Go into infiltration from North. What about 17,050 in April? Looks like twice as much infiltration in last 4 weeks than anytime before.
Wheeler: Westy said not all going to SVN. They are replacement & new units. Looks like substantial increase in last 2 months.
Pres: Has modification of bombing affected this?
Sharp: Haven't been able to detect it.
Wheeler: Since Jan., 80,000 enemy KIA. Not back to pre-Tet position.
Pres: What effect will weather in Laos have on inf[iltration]?
Sharp: Can move easier because of air strikes. Some weather/road problems. Not sure how far he can go.
Pres: Do you think he suffered as a result of Tet?
Sharp: Yes, sir.
Wheeler: Also, we know he did because of no 2nd level of attacks. He wants to mount them but can't.
Rostow: Have we taken stock of strength of main-force units?
[Speaker not indicated]: MACV assesses all captured units against strengths. Figures are impressive, but aerial reconnaissance does not reflect main infusion into S[outh]. No large number of replacements seen yet.
Pres: Are they regrouping or running?
Wheeler: He is avoiding contact where possible & attempting to get recruits. Our people are carrying the fight to the enemy.
199. Telegram From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) in Hawaii/1/
Washington, April 17, 1968, 1449Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6 G (4)b, 4/11-24/68, Talks with Hanoi. Secret.
CAP 80921. Following is Ambassador Goldberg's report of his conversation with U Thant: on a site for contacts with the North Vietnamese.
Re: Vietnam
Summary: Amb Goldberg and Sisco met with SYG and Bunche to review current state of matters re site of U.S.-NVN talks. Goldberg stressed reasons why Warsaw or any other Communist capital caused difficulties for U.S. as a site, our strong desire to get talks started promptly, and our willingness to consider neutral sites where proper atmosphere could prevail with reasonable communications, and opportunity for proper liaison with our allies./2/ SYG confirmed he sent message to Bo over weekend through French indicating our preference for Rangoon and willingness to meet there on 16th./3/ SYG has not received reply; he pointed out that since he had to work through French, Bo had not received this message until Sunday morning, April 14.
/2/Bunche told Goldberg in a telephone call on April 12 that U Thant had met with Mai Van Bo that morning. Bo requested that Thant persuade the United States to accept Warsaw as the site for talks since the President had said he would meet with representatives of Hanoi "anywhere, any time." (Notes of telephone conversation by Sisco, April 12; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 72) As reported in telegram 2798 from Warsaw, April 12, the Polish Government also pressed for acceptance of its capital, at Hanoi's behest. (Ibid.)
/3/In a memorandum to Rusk and a separate memorandum to Rusk and Katzenbach, both dated April 13, Sisco confirmed that Goldberg had requested that Thant transmit to the North Vietnamese the U.S. preference for Rangoon and a meeting there on April 16. However, he noted the impression that Thant had received from Bo regarding the importance of China's reaction to any potential site, especially in regard to places like India and Burma, governments with which China had poor relations. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) Thant sent this message to Bo by way of the French Mission to the United Nations. (Telegram 12705 from Paris, April 16; ibid.)
1. Goldberg said he had been asked by Pres Johnson to speak to SYG and to express our concern over delays in getting talks started and our desire to get prompt agreement on venue./4/ Goldberg said there are number of possible sites which would be acceptable where neutral atmosphere could prevail. It important that site provide for proper atmosphere where all concerned could be treated with dignity, moreover important site permit opportunity for proper liaison with our allies. Goldberg pointed out difficulties we have with Phnom Penh and detailed reasons for our difficulties with Warsaw or other Communist capitals as site. He reminded SYG we have made number of suggestions including Rangoon where we confident Ne Win would approach matter with proper neutral spirit. SYG interjected that he sure Ne Win would agree to have Rangoon as site if both sides agreed.
/4/See Document 197 and footnote 2 thereto.
2. Goldberg confirmed to SYG that we are maintaining our contact in Vientiane. SYG said he transmitted message through French to Mai Van Bo over the weekend, expressing our preference for Rangoon and our willingness to meet there on 16th. Since French FonOff was closed Saturday evening for Easter holidays, French did not get message to Bo until Sunday evening. SYG then made same points which Bunche communicated to us over this past weekend. SYG said important consideration for Hanoi is Peking and that Hanoi wishes to keep its reaction as little violent as possible. He attributes particular significance to fact Hanoi responded positively to Pres Johnson's speech against Peking's advice. He cited Chou En-lai postponement of his trip to Phnom Penh as a reflection of Peking's irritation that Sihanouk had agreed to Phnom Penh as a site. He said Hanoi finds Delhi very difficult because of bad relations between India and ChiComs. For same reason, though not as difficult, Rangoon is in same category. Hanoi had suggested Warsaw because it felt Peking's reaction would be less violent. In SYG's judgment Hanoi will probably be more agreeable to Geneva or Paris than Delhi, Rangoon or Djakarta but he had no info to confirm this.
3. Goldberg confirmed that Geneva would be acceptable to U.S., although we had suggested Rangoon on assumption that being an Asian capital it would be more convenient to all concerned. In response to SYG's query, Goldberg confirmed that we have approached Russians to seek their support for a neutral site. Bunche reported that Malik seemed optimistic and said at a recent luncheon that in his judgment talks would get started within a week. SYG expressed hope for early agreement and despite difficulties Hanoi has with Delhi as a site, his judgment is NVN meeting with Kaul indicates Delhi not necessarily precluded. SYG asked Goldberg whether Paris would be acceptable to U.S., and Goldberg responded that no such suggestion or proposal had been made but that his personal judgment was that this probably would be acceptable since our basic objection was to meeting [in] a Communist capital.
4. In closing SYG mentioned that he had discussed with Bo question of NVN sending a correspondent to UN which had been previously raised with SYG some months ago. SYG said he was not making any proposal to U.S. at this time. He realized that this would be very difficult for U.S. From his own point of view if NVN decided to send someone it would be helpful as a point of contact since his operation is cumbersome, having to go through third parties to reach Hanoi. He stressed to Goldberg that he had made clear to Bo that he had not discussed this matter with U.S. nor could he guarantee that should NVN decide it wished to send a correspondent that he would get a visa. SYG said that if Hanoi so decided, he would let Goldberg know so that matter can be discussed. Goldberg said that without making any commitment we would be prepared to discuss the matter if the occasion arose./5/
/5/That same day, the DRV announced that it would appoint as Minister Xuan Thuy, a former Foreign Minister and member of the delegation to the 1961-1962 Geneva Conference on Laos and the man who would likely lead the DRV delegation in the upcoming peace talks. In telegram 5852 from Vientiane, April 17, Sullivan described Thuy as "a sophisticated and urbane person" who strictly adhered to the "Hanoi party line." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, April 18, 1968, 2113Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE. Secret; Flash; Exdis; Crocodile; Nodis. Drafted by Read, cleared by Harriman, and approved by Rusk.
149160. 1. You should immediately arrange delivery to DRV Embassy with appropriate salutations the following message:
Text
The USG has made clear its readiness to enter into contacts with the DRV without further delay. The concern of the United States is to save lives--to serve the cause of humanity, not to make propaganda.
To have the best chance for success, initial contacts should occur in a setting fair to both sides.
The USG has proposed four countries in Asia as appropriate sites for the initial contacts: Laos, Burma, Indonesia/2/ and India, and the US remains of the view that Asia is the proper region for discussions of peace in that area. In addition, the US has suggested Switzerland as an appropriate site.
/2/In telegrams 149726 to Djakarta and 150327 to Rangoon, both April 19, the Department expressed hope that the negotiations would occur in either capital. It also noted in each telegram: "It may be that the addition of ten more sites to our list would make it a little easier for Hanoi to accept one of the original sites we suggested, although we have no indication whatever out of Hanoi that such would be the case." (Ibid.)
These five countries do not exhaust the list of appropriate sites. If their governments are willing, the United States representatives are prepared to meet with representatives of the DRV in Colombo, Tokyo, Kabul, Kathmandu, Rawalpindi,/3/ and Kuala Lumpur./4/ If the DRV prefers a European site, the USG is ready to meet in Rome, Brussels, Helsinki or Vienna. US representatives, Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Vance, are ready to meet at any of the suggested sites at the earliest date suggested by the DRV. End Text.
/3/In backchannel telegram 6221 to Rawalpindi, April 18, Ambassador Benjamin Oelhert was instructed to deliver to President Ayub Khan a message from President Johnson requesting him to discuss with Kosygin the possibility of Rawalpindi as a venue. (Ibid., POL 27-14 VIET) Ayub's reply, as reported in backchannel telegram 311 from Rawalpindi, April 19, in part reads: "As requested by you, I immediately took up with Mr. Kosygin the question of a venue for Vietnam peace contacts. His reaction was that after your repeated statements that you would be prepared to hold talks anywhere at any time, there should be no problem about the selection of a venue. He considers that you might agree to Warsaw where both sides have official representatives. He further considers that talks can begin at once following a positive response from you. He said that the selection of a site does not depend on USSR but is for both North Vietnam and USA to decide. It is purely my personal assessment that whatever may be the Soviet public stance, inwardly they too are anxious that talks should start and peace should be restored as soon as possible." (Ibid.)
/4/On April 17 and 18 The New York Times published stories concerning an April 16 meeting among U Thant, Goldberg, and Sisco, and asserted that Thant would suggest Paris as a site for talks. In a memorandum to Rusk the same day, Harriman described Thant as "the best intermediary to make a suggestion of a new location to both Hanoi and ourselves." If Thant was to be used, Harriman advised that he be given several capitals to suggest, such as Colombo, Vienna, Kabul, and "including Paris." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject File, Vietnam, General, April 1968) In telegram 4647 from USUN, April 18, Goldberg reported that he had informed Bunche of the additional U.S. proposals and that Paris would be expressly left off the list. In turn, Bunche noted that Paris had not been formally proposed although the Secretary-General had mentioned it in his talks with Bo. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In an April 18 memorandum to Rusk, Harriman argued for Paris, noting that especially Manac'h and Sainteny would be invaluable in overcoming any impasse if the talks were held there. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject File, Vietnam, General, April 1968) The President discussed these initiatives with Daley the next day. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Daley, April 19, 1968, 10:21 a.m., Tape F6804.03, PNO 1-2)
2. Secretary Rusk will be making public statement along foregoing lines at 1630 Washington time today, so delivery should be effected with maximum speed./5/
/5/For text of Rusk's statement, see Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1968, p. 577. On April 20 the DRV rejected all of the sites proposed by the United States, noting that it did not have representation in the suggested venues and that these nations were not in fact neutral. See The New York Times, April 20, 1968.
Rusk
201. Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, April 21, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE. Secret. In telegram 151356 to Bangkok, Canberra, Manila, Saigon, Seoul, and Wellington, April 23, the Department noted: "We are suggesting to Hanoi that they consider an appropriate and suitable capital, not yet proposed by either party, where our representatives could have a private discussion limited solely to the question of selection of a site for contact." The Ambassadors at these posts were directed to "emphasize that subject matter for discussion in this private contact would be limited to site selection. By this means we seek to end debate over mutually agreeable site." (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Some Alternatives on a Site for Talks with Hanoi
1) A neutral ship
--ask U Thant to arrange
--ask host country to propose
(Note: we suggested a ship for armistice talks in Korea)
2) Accept their choice for "contacts" (i.e. Phnom Penh or Warsaw) if they accept our site for "talks" (Rangoon, Delhi, etc.)
3) Send a representative (possibly our No 2 negotiator) to Warsaw to make contact with Hanoi's representative to arrange a mutually agreed site
4) Negotiate a site through already established contacts (e.g. Vientiane with our Ambassador and their Charg?)
5) Ask the Pope to propose Vatican City as the site
6) A rotation plan--one month in their spot, one month in ours, e.g. Phnom Penh and Rangoon, Warsaw and Delhi
7) Rotation plan between capitals of the Co-Chairmen (i.e. London and Moscow)
8) Ask the Co-Chairmen (British and Soviets) to agree on and propose an "appropriate" site
9) Rotate talks among the three ICC capitals (Delhi, Warsaw, Ottawa)
10) Get a third party (e.g. U Thant, Co-Chairmen, etc.) to propose Bucharest
11) A site on the DMZ in Viet-Nam with guarantees for the security of the site base camps and access roads (as in Panmunjom)/2/
/2/Jorden's memorandum is attached to an April 22 memorandum from Bundy to Rusk in which Bundy commented on these proposals. He opposed the idea of a neutral ship as a "gimmick" and termed the Vatican a "non-starter," described the British and the Soviets as a "weak team" but thought that the proposal of Bucharest had possibilities, although he preferred Geneva or even Paris. (Ibid.) In a memorandum transmitting Jorden's memorandum to the President, April 22, Rostow noted that Rusk's "preference is something like para. 4 in attached list; that is, diplomatic discussions about sites between our Ambassador and theirs in either Warsaw or Vientiane." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 72)
Bill
202. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
CM-3230-68
Washington, April 22, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 284--Order of Battle. Top Secret. In the attached covering note to Helms, April 22, Wheeler wrote: "Dear Dick: Attached is my memorandum to Clark outlining Westy's views on the current Order of Battle strength problem. I share Westy's concern in this matter. I cannot help but feel that airing these greatly increased strength figures at this time would be detrimental to our effort in the long run. Sincerely, Bus." The CIA's differences with MACV over Order of Battle estimates had grown since the previous fall. The issue is outlined in a paper Enthoven submitted to Clifford on June 28 entitled "Uncertainties About VC/NVA Force Levels." (Johnson Library, Alain Enthoven Papers, Statistics on the War) The CINCPAC/MACV dissent to the CIA's analysis is in a joint MACV/PACOM memorandum to Helms, April 19. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 284--Order of Battle)
SUBJECT
VC/NVA Order of Battle
1. As you know, MACV and CINCPAC representatives are in Washington attempting to reconcile total enemy strength issues growing out of the leak of CIA figures in the New York Times./2/ They report that CIA representatives are about to forward a paper to Mr. Helms with total enemy strength including political infrastructure of 480,000 to 615,000, about twice the previously agreed figures. They base these figures on essentially the same evidence and argumentation which were reflected by USIB in the formulation of SNIE 14/3/67./3/ The only new element in the CIA case was the correct assertion that MACV OB figures do not always reflect all-source evidence. MACV representatives have agreed to adjust figures on this basis, but this has made no appreciable effect on the wide CIA divergence from the SNIE.
/2/At the MACV-CINCPAC conference, MACV refused to accept any substantive changes. (Memorandum SC No. 07068/68 from Paul Walsh, Deputy Director, Economic Research, to Helms, May 2; ibid., O/DDI Files, Job 78-T02095R, April 1968 OB Conference)
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 397.
2. The primary item of MACV's disagreement is the CIA position that the so-called insurgency base, consisting of self defense forces, secret self defense forces, assault youth, etc., should be quantified at a strength of 210,000 to 230,000. The MACV position is that quantification is not possible, and that it gives the enemy credit for thousands of people who exert no military effect. DIA holds that some quantification of the insurgency base is possible.
3. MACV's refusal to quantify the insurgency base stems from the following factors:
a. A representative cross section of prisoners picked up during the Tet offensive were questioned by MACV. Not one has admitted to being a member of any of the organizations which CIA would quantify as "the insurgency base."
b. If there were these thousands of people armed and in sympathy with the enemy, that is, in the "insurgency base," then it is likely that they would have joined the enemy during the recent Tet offensive. On the contrary, the population rejected the Viet Cong; they did not flock to their cause.
4. There is a much larger issue involved here than intelligence methodology. The acceptance of this inflated strength, which General Westmoreland believes cannot even be estimated with any degree of confidence, is contrary to our national interest. The effect that its inevitable public announcement would have on the American public, which recognizes no qualification in semantics between "military" and "insurgency base," is obvious. The enemy, for his part, would be given a psychological tool of incalculable value in any subsequent negotiations.
5. I am substantially in agreement with General Westmoreland.
Earle G. Wheeler
203. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, April 22, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE. Secret; Nodis; Crocodile.
SUBJECT
Next Steps on a Location for Contacts
1. Rejection of Warsaw.
We have instructed Gronouski Saturday to make it crystal clear to the Poles that Warsaw is not acceptable./2/ While this will doubtless reach Hanoi, the repeated Hanoi propaganda that we have not categorically responded on Warsaw--plus the U Thant message from Mai Van Bo to the same effect/3/--seems to indicate that we should submit a formal message to Hanoi, through Vientiane, that Warsaw is unacceptable.
/2/In telegram 150456 to Warsaw, April 20, the Department instructed Gronouski to inform the Polish Government that the United States would not accept Warsaw as a site since it was likely that "Hanoi's hopes of pressing us into Warsaw has caused them to delay in looking at other sites." (Ibid.)
/3/See Document 199.
In so doing, we could take the occasion to argue quite bluntly that Warsaw is out principally because of its avowed role as a supplier of grant military equipment to NVN. We could latch on to Hanoi's own complaint that some of our latest 10 suggestions were "support bases" on our side; presumably this would refer to Japan and Malaysia; but we could point out that none of our 10 have actually supplied grant military equipment, whereas the Poles have.
At the same time, I think there would be considerable propaganda advantage if we were to narrow our criteria to a simple and single criterion of "an adequately impartial atmosphere." We could go on to say that such an atmosphere almost necessarily involved adequate and dignified treatment, with communications facilities, for representatives of both parties, adequate press access and facilities, and no difficulty in fair access for liaison representatives from vitally interested allies on both sides. This would be a far more palatable presentation of what we are actually after, would meet Hanoi's propaganda point that we have now raised "four conditions," and would be much more consistent with the fact that 10 of our 15 nominations have been places where Hanoi does not have resident representatives.
In short, I propose a message to this effect as our first move, and believe it should be done today. I will revise your existing draft in this sense.
2. US Proposal of Another Site.
In my judgment, we should clearly not do this. Hanoi will have grave reservations about accepting anything that we have proposed, even secretly. With 15 already in the hopper from us, we have no need to do more as our own initiative in any event.
In my judgment, we should also refrain from further public comment at this point beyond a simple restatement of the position we have taken, perhaps adding a reference to the use of diplomatic channels as the best way to handle the matter. Even the ship idea seems to me to partake much too much of a gimmick, at least coming from us. It follows that, if the President is to say anything on the subject, it should be a simple and moderately stated defense of the position we have taken to this point. I re-worked the Saturday draft in this sense, but would now strongly suggest omitting the ship idea or any new proposal.
3. Getting Someone Else to Propose a New Site.
This seems to me by far the most promising avenue. The questions are:
a. What site would we like to see proposed?
b. What would be the best channel through which to get it proposed?
c. What would be the other elements in the scenario, notably the timing of consultation with Saigon and the allies, and getting required assurances that the prospective site would provide facilities for our allies and the press as required?
I address these questions below, with a recommendation at the end.
Choice of Site
On Bucharest, we have an intelligence report that the Romanians are interested. Bunker thinks he could sell it in Saigon, and our Ambassadors to the allies are hopeful with the exception of Unger/4/ as to the Thai; however, if we got Saigon aboard, the Thai could hardly cavil.
/4/Leonard Unger, Ambassador to Thailand.
Bucharest can be distinguished from Warsaw in the following respects:
a. A Romanian is President of the General Assembly.
b. The Romanian diplomatic record is accurate and impartial.
c. The Romanians have been fairly muted on Viet-Nam at least in the past year.
d. While Romania is on record as supplying assistance that includes defense items, we have every reason to believe the quantities have been token.
e. Romania is conspicuously the most independent of the Eastern Europeans and--it could be argued--should be at least as acceptable to the Chinese as Warsaw. Like Warsaw, it has a Hanoi Embassy, and also Soviet and Chinese Embassies.
f. Romania has had no record of interference with the press in recent years--as Warsaw has--and it has no present internal political problem such as Polish antisemitism. (The latter point might have particular weight in some liberal Jewish circles here.)
On the other hand, Bucharest would still have some negative factors in Asia simply because it is a Communist capital./5/
/5/Bucharest continued to remain a possible site. In an April 20 memorandum commenting on East European sites, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Walter Stoessel noted that despite physical limitations, Bucharest was attractive because "Romania has been relatively restrained in its criticism of U.S. policy in Viet-Nam and has attempted to play a constructive role in the conflict." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In telegram CAP 81020 to the President, April 20, Rostow relayed an intelligence report which said that the Romanian Government was fully supportive of the proposal to use its capital and would endeavor to facilitate discussions in Bucharest. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 72) In telegram CAP 81024 to the President, April 21, Rostow reported that several of the allied nations would not object to Bucharest. (Ibid.) Telegram 152367 to Bangkok, Canberra, Manila, Seoul, and Wellington, April 24, reported that Thieu "was prepared to go along" with Bucharest as a site for the talks if no better alternative could be found; the Ambassadors were urged to prepare their counterparts for the possibility of Bucharest's selection. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In a conversation with Bogdan on April 25, Harriman noted that the United States would not propose Bucharest but would accept it as a site for contacts, although not as the place for substantive talks. (Ibid.)
The second possible site in several minds is Paris. DeGaulle's vitriolic criticism of the war, the overwhelmingly hostile French press, and unlimited press access can all be considered drawbacks. On the other hand, Paris would probably be far more acceptable and explainable than Bucharest in Saigon and with our allies. The South Vietnamese have representation there, and so do all of our allies./6/
/6/In an April 23 memorandum to Wallner, which was transmitted to Davidson the next day, John Gunther Dean, a political officer at the Embassy in Paris, discussed the pros and cons of Paris as the site for initial talks. In arguing in opposition to Paris, Dean advised that accepting it as the site "would be tantamount to rewarding DeGaulle for his past unfriendly position on Vietnam," cautioned that the French Government had followed a policy of "benevolent neutrality" toward Hanoi and thus might undertake actions during the talks that would further favor the North Vietnamese, and warned that the French media and Vietnamese exiles in Paris would provide a great deal of anti-American pressure. He noted in Paris' favor that its access, communications, and diplomatic representation were good; the city was large enough for informal meetings on a discreet basis; and the French could possibly prove useful by reporting on the DRV delegation and by ensuring a role for France in postwar Indochina. (Ibid., S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Daniel Davidson Negotiating Papers, French) Wallner discussed this matter in telegram 13000 from Paris, April 23, noting in particular: "I take the liberty to rehearse the disadvantages which as seen from here far outweigh the obvious material and technical advantages of access to all parties, good communications and excellent accommodations." (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
A third site, foreshadowed in one Indian report from a North Vietnamese representative, would be Cairo. Nasser has been considerably less hostile than DeGaulle, and one can assume that he would accede to the necessary arrangements. Nonetheless, our own makeshift diplomatic status there, plus the emotional aspects of identification with Cairo at this moment, seem to argue strongly against it.
Who Should We Get to Propose a New Site?
In the case of Bucharest, we could act through U Thant to Manescu, or we could approach Manescu, through a friendly third country such as the British. If we did the latter, we could have the British spell out the assurances we would need, so that we would have this under way at the same time.
If we wish Paris to be proposed, we could certainly get U Thant to do this.
Other Elements of the Script.
Whoever we use, we should make clear that we cannot finally accept the site until we have consulted with Saigon and our allies. We should do this just as soon as we have some plausible official report that the proposal is in train.
Moreover, we need to be sure that we get--either directly or through third parties--the required assurances.
Conclusion.
This course of action has much to commend it, but it is inherently cumbersome and could involve misunderstanding. Bucharest, with the British going through Manescu, seems the best bet for discretion and responsibility. If we use U Thant at all, we risk distortion and getting ourselves out on a limb.
204. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, April 22, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes Files. Secret. The President had returned from visiting the LBJ Ranch in Texas earlier that day aboard Air Force One. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Meeting With the President, Monday, April 22, 1968, 6:00-9:00 p.m.
PRESENT
The President
Secretary Dean Rusk
Secretary Clark Clifford
Walt W. Rostow
The President asked Mr. Rostow to define the problem.
On the basis of the attached memorandum (Tab A),/2/ he said that we had come to a point where it was to our interest to attempt to break the deadlock on the site for "contacts." Our objective should be:
/2/Document 201.
--To produce a formula which would induce Hanoi to move, if it now faces real problems with a site and wishes to talk.
--To create a situation, if Hanoi would not move, which would convince our people that we had done all that was possible.
In the latter case we could resume full-scale military action with public support.
Mr. Rostow cited the list of possible initiatives to break the log jam, as developed by William Jorden, and suggested that the Secretary of State be heard.
Sec. Rusk said the best way to proceed was to raise with Hanoi the possibility of private ambassadorial talks in either Warsaw or Vientiane, narrowly addressed to arranging a mutually-agreed site for "contacts."
The President indicated that he preferred Vientiane.
A draft was prepared, in line with Sec. Rusk's proposal, in which we would propose that the ambassadors in Vientiane meet for this narrow purpose; but we would withdraw Vientiane from our list of places for the proposed subsequent "contact."
There were two reasons for the latter condition:
--Vientiane was one of the places on our list which Hanoi did not like, and it was judged fair to soften that point by withdrawing it from our "contact" list;
--The initiation of this principle would make it more difficult for Hanoi to propose Warsaw for the ambassadorial discussion of site, because we would have created the precedent that the place for discussion of site would not be the place for the contact itself.
The President continued to feel somewhat uneasy about proposing a site for private ambassadorial talks, which we had already proposed for "contact" and which they had refused.
Sec. Clifford then underlined his grave uneasiness with our proposing Vientiane. He suggested, instead, that we simply give Hanoi the option of listing, say, three locations which had not previously been considered by either side for the limited private discussions.
It was generally agreed this was about as fair a proposal as we could make; and our people would judge it so, if it were made public. Moreover, we would probably not have difficulties with our allies in private discussions to establish a site at almost any point Hanoi might suggest, since the talks would not be substantive. We could, therefore, take very considerable risk on this point.
After several drafts were formulated and examined, the attached was agreed by the President and dispatched by the Secretary of State to Vientiane for transmission to Hanoi. (Tab B)/3/
/3/The text of telegram 151353 to Vientiane, April 23, was attached. The telegram requested Sullivan to pass to Chan a note which read: "The United States proposes that we give consideration to additional capitals, not previously considered by either side, for the sole purpose of private discussions to agree on a site and time for proposed contacts. The United States hopes that the DRV will find this suggestion reasonable and will indicate, say, three appropriate locations suitable for this limited purpose. The United States Government will give the response of the DRV prompt consideration." (National Archives and Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
Underlying the discussion was agreement that there would be great frustration in the U.S. and difficulty in subsequently conducting the war at full throttle unless the President's initiative of March 31 resulted in some kind of contact with Hanoi and a clear demonstration that they were not operating in good faith.
WR
205. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, April 23, 1968, 2:15-3 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House. Those attending were the President, Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Helms, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson. Wheeler and Helms left the meeting at 2:35 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S TUESDAY LUNCHEON
MEETING WITH HIS
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS
Secretary Rusk: The message to Vientiane should be briefed generally to the allies./2/
/2/See footnote 3, Document 204.
The President: Was the flash gotten out?
Secretary Rusk: The message to Vientiane was delivered. The message to Bunker has not been./3/
/3/Telegram 151361 to Saigon, April 23, informed Bunker of the message to Vientiane and requested that he consult the GVN especially on Bucharest as a site. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
The President: Somebody asked me how I read accurate accounts of what Hanoi is doing. I tell them I read leaks from the State Department in the New York Times.
Secretary Clifford: We may get an inquiry back from the message to the effect when will we stop all bombing?
Secretary Rusk: A "forum" is a "forum" as I put it to reporters in my backgrounder about the March 31 speech.
The President: There will be no speech this week. What are the indications on a Saigon attack now?
General Wheeler: A captured Colonel said this plan of attack was expected. It was unfortunate it leaked because we could have clobbered them. It is the first time since the Civil War that we have given away information like this.
We have the following courses of action:
First, go back to RP 6 for 48 hours including Hanoi and Haiphong./4/
/4/Route Package 6 was the bombing run over the northeastern portion of North Vietnam.
Second, executing attacks selectively in Haiphong.
Third, executing attacks selectively in Hanoi.
I would not recommend it on military or political grounds. It would only be pinprick and would result in high losses.
The fourth course of action would be to open up the 19th and 20th parallel area for all types of attacks. I would recommend this as well as a resumption of Water [Sea] Dragon./5/
/5/Naval operations off the coast of North Vietnam.
In summary, nothing north of the 20th parallel should be hit.
The weather will start turning in May. We had one good day only since March 31. I would recommend opening the area between the 19th and 20th parallel for three or four days.
The President: Lets get maps--photography and estimates and I'll meet on it.
Secretary Rusk: I wouldn't object to route reconnaissance between the 19th and 20th parallels.
Secretary Clifford: Let's wait two or three days for a response to the message.
Secretary Rusk: If there were a major attack on Saigon, I would go back to RP6.
The President: It would bother me if we didn't. I am surprised Buzz did not recommend it. If they hit us, let's call them and raise them. We can't sit back and let them hit us without letting them have it.
Secretary Rusk: I want to hit Hanoi and Haiphong if they hit Hue and Saigon.
Secretary Clifford: From the military standpoint, the military results of a few days does not justify the military gains. If the President wants to make a decision--
The President: I think we are going through a temporary armistice. I think they will break it as soon as it suits them.
Mr. Rostow: [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Secretary Rusk: If there is a major attack on Saigon or Hue we should look at a heavy response.
The President: Do we have a plan to respond with if they take advantage of our restraint? I want maximum results if they violate the restraint we have shown. If they do, let's damage them as much as possible without being reckless.
They are having a celebration. There is no incentive for them to act. I will not act until May 1 unless they take advantage of us.
Let's have the plan in case they violate it. Let's rub out the leak on the 19th. The 20th is what we agreed to, not the 19th.
Secretary Clifford: We will have ready a plan for use against Hanoi and Haiphong.
The President: We want it to be appropriate.
Secretary Rusk: Put it on key targets.
The President: Phucyen airfield--you may want to hit it.
General Wheeler: They have IL-28's on it increasingly.
The President: Goldberg tells me NPT/6/ will be put off until September, then past election.
/6/Reference is to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Secretary Rusk: There is a feeling that the General Assembly should not get involved in domestic political issues.
Secretary Clifford then discussed the MACV announcement of missions against North Vietnam--the pros and cons of changing present method of announcement, and the problem that will arise when sorties now mounted in Laos are shifted to North Vietnam as Laos weather deteriorates.
Secretary Rusk: We have group sorties in limited missions. We can't stop putting out announcements. Put more sorties into a mission.
General Wheeler: There was a press policy of being completely open on everything.
The President: Let's explore this. Also let's explore the whole area of press relations. Perhaps some South Vietnam rules out there. I don't know why we haven't had censorship out there. This AP report of the VC Colonel wasn't helpful.
Secretary Rusk: Our principal power is what we ourselves say.
George Christian: There is very little power. The best limitation is what we ourselves put out.
[Omitted here is discussion of strategic arms issues.]
The problem of entering base area 607 in Laos was discussed./7/
/7/Base Area 607 was just across the Laotian border from Thua Thien Province in South Vietnam. A limited conventional penetration of the area was planned in connection with the Operation Delaware/Lamson 216 thrust into the NVA operational areas in the Ashau Valley. In memorandum CM-3265-68, April 29, Wheeler informed Clifford about the specifics of the operation. (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 72 A 1499, Vietnam 381, Jan-April 1968) For further documentation on the offensive, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol XXVIII, Documents 356-364.
Secretary Rusk: I would send indigenous forces in with U.S. advisers. Our Ambassador (Sullivan) has great problems with this. We should limit this to "Ashau Valley fighting."
General Wheeler: Westy wants to put one battalion in for 3-5 days. We will call it the Ashau Valley operation.
Director Helms: All you have are primitive tribesmen in the area.
General Wheeler: Ambassador Sullivan is worried about three sites for Air America flights being knocked out. We have a plan to hit Route 7 up to the 20th parallel.
The President: Let's get the Defense supplemental up, together with other items.
A situation report was given on the progress with M-16s and helicopters.
Secretary Clifford: By July we will have provided all combat ARVN with M-16s. We have two additional sources for M-16's now in line. We have Colt on a 7-day a week, 3-shift basis. They are pushing for 50,000 M-16s this month.
We will turn out almost 700,000 more M-16s.
The helicopters are going well. We got prior clearance on April 10 from the committees. It will take $477 million for 1,075 more choppers. A program for additional engines is underway./8/
/8/In an address before the Associated Press luncheon the previous day, Clifford noted that the comprehensive review he undertook during February and March had "confirmed the judgment, already reached by President Thieu, that the South Vietnamese were ready to take on more of the responsibility and to carry more of the military burden." For full text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 13, 1968, pp. 605-607.
The President: Are we losing choppers and planes?
General Wheeler: We are losing helicopters, not aircraft.
Secretary Clifford: We lost 11 in one action. We are comfortable with helicopters.
Secretary Rusk: You wrote the candidates that you would brief them in 1967.
The President: Put those two items on my desk--what we did before. I will decide after that.
Secretary Rusk: We must not be silent on the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.
The President: Let's take it up later.
206. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 24, 1968, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, General, April 1968. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at Harriman's home in Georgetown.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
PARTICIPANTS
Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large
I asked Ambassador Dobrynin to come to call at N Street this morning. The Secretary suggested that I inform him of our latest message to Hanoi through Vientiane./2/ I found that the Secretary had mentioned the subject to him last night at the White House reception, but I was able to explain it in greater detail. I underlined that we hoped Hanoi's and our Ambassadors or representatives could get together in some place where we both have representatives and come to an agreement on a mutually agreeable site for contacts. We had the impression that any capital we mentioned would be turned down by Hanoi as a matter of face.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 204.
He asked whether Warsaw was out, and I replied that it was, definitely. He then asked whether we had any particular places in mind, and I said no. I said I thought almost any place, now that we had made the point of turning Warsaw down as a supplier of military equipment to North Vietnam. He asked in which countries we both had Ambassadors or representatives. I mentioned the first four that we had proposed, adding Paris and the several Eastern European countries including Romania. He inquired about Algiers. I explained that Algeria had followed the UAR's lead in breaking with us last June.
I asked him whether there were any further questions he wanted to ask, as the Secretary wanted him to be kept fully informed. He asked a few questions about negotiations, whether we envisioned a Geneva-type conference. I told him our mind was open. It would depend a good deal on how the discussions developed and what Hanoi wished. I said he should not hesitate to inquire if he or his Government had any questions, as I would try to answer them.
He asked about the political scene, and whom I thought very privately would get the Democratic nomination. I said I thought it was too early to make an intelligent guess. He spoke of knowing both "Bobby" and Hubert Humphrey well. He assumed that Hubert Humphrey would get the support of President Johnson, to which I agreed.
(Harriman copy only: He then told me a joke that was going around the Diplomatic Corps of President Johnson's preference for a successor: First, Hubert Humphrey; second, Nelson Rockefeller; third, McCarthy; fourth, Nixon; fifth, Ho Chi Minh; sixth, Kennedy)
[Omitted here are brief personal remarks.]
207. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, April 25, 1968, 0900Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 5:43 a.m. This telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 419-425.
25643. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my forty-eighth weekly message.
A. General
1. The past week seems to have been, in a sense, one of suspended animation. There has been a feeling of expectancy in the air, people waiting to see whether talks will get underway, and where they will be held. Your statement on the need for agreement on a site to which the interested parties would have adequate access under conditions which would be fair to both sides/2/ is considered here to be eminently reasonable and is strongly supported. At the same time, I have the impression that the general feeling of apprehension, the fear of American abandonment, which I reported in last week's message,/3/ has subsided somewhat; although some anxiety is still evident there is much more confidence in our intentions. I think it is fair to say that concurrently there has been some hardening of popular and government attitudes and positions in respect to negotiations and the whole range of questions they raise. In the speech of the Prime Minister on April 17, in the resolutions adopted by the Confederation of Vietnamese Labor Unions, and in the two anti-Communist meetings held in Saigon over the weekend, as well as in statements by members of the government and the Assembly, opposition to any form of coalition with the NLF, insistence on the freedom and territorial integrity of South Viet-Nam, on its primary role in negotiations, and its determination to carry on, alone if necessary, to see that the fruits of its long struggle are not lost through negotiations have been emphasized repeatedly.
/2/Reference is to the President's remarks on April 15. For the full text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 511-513.
/3/Telegram 25197 from Saigon, April 19. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
2. Your joint communique with President Park has had a good effect here./4/ Virtually all Vietnamese leaders were much reassured by the statement regarding Vietnamese participation in the peace talks. I think this statement alone has taken a good deal of the edge off of their fears. Vietnamese in general also seem to be more encouraged than otherwise by the delay in finding an acceptable site for preliminary contacts. The snag over a site has at least had the merit of demonstrating to them that we are not going to be bullied or cajoled into dealing with Hanoi on whatever terms it chooses to demand. The delay has also given many people here time to absorb this turn of events and to evaluate more soberly the meaning of your March 31 speech, various subsequent allied statements, and Hanoi's response.
/4/For this joint U.S.-South Korean communique, which contained a statement of dedication to the cause in Vietnam, see Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1968, pp. 575-577.
3. Leaders such as Tran Van Huong and the head of the Senate's independence bloc, Senator Nguyen Van Chuc, this week publicly expressed confidence that the U.S. would not abandon Viet-Nam. Prime Minister Loc's speech, which I have mentioned, is generally positive in tone. He noted that Thieu is trying to carry out the promises made at Manila, referring to the establishment of constitutional government and the attack on corruption as examples. He added that freedom loving peoples everywhere are "looking with confidence at the role and leadership of the United States in the task of stopping the Communists' bold invasion." He then said that in the light of GVN performance "Viet-Nam has the right to expect from her allies that they keep the promises they made in Manila/5/ with the view to halting Communist inroads."
/5/Reference is to the Manila Declaration of October 1966 calling for the withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops from South Vietnam within 6 months of enemy disengagement. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. IV, Document 281.
[Omitted here is discussion of military, political, civil, and economic matters.]
Bunker
208. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, April 25, 1968, 1106Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Crocodile. Received at 6:56 a.m.
6057. Ref: Vientiane 6055./2/
/2/Sullivan reported in telegram 6055 from Vientiane, April 25, that a reporter saw two North Vietnamese diplomats coming to the U.S. Embassy in order to arrange the 4:30 p.m. appointment. Sullivan surmised, therefore, that the meeting would be observed by the local press. (Ibid.)
1. Hurwitch and I called on Chan and Con at 1630, in accordance arrangements reported reftel. Chan apologized for asking us to come to him, but said that he felt press too active at our Embassy. We confirmed to him that Con had been sighted in his visit to us and that we were probably followed to his place in any event.
2. Chan opened conversation with small talk about our recent visit to Luang Prabang and about other matters of no direct import. In due course, he turned to note which Hurwitch had delivered April 23./3/ He said he wished make an observation. That note had spoken of "private discussions" and yet we had in very short order told the world press about the note. This indicated there was a difference between our words and our actions.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 204.
3. I challenged Chan on this point and said that a careful study of what had been said in Washington would indicate that nothing had been said about the contents of the note or even giving precision about the date when it had been delivered. Our spokesmen had merely answered a direct question by admitting that a communication had been passed since the note of April 18./4/ I undertook to send him the exact text of what was said. (We will send material from USIS wireless file tomorrow.)
/4/Document 200.
4. Chan repeated that this was merely an observation and dropped the subject. He then went on to recite one sentence which contained the whole sum and substance of the meeting, to wit: "My government has received your note of April 23 and is studying it." (This same sentence was repeated verbatim twice again before seance ended.)
5. We sought to determine whether Chan had any indications about the time frame in which he expected "study" to be completed. He merely repeated his sentence.
6. Chan then led conversation to his "surprise" that we had turned down Phnom Penh and Warsaw. I returned favor by citing our "astonishment" that they had not replied to Geneva, New Delhi, Rangoon, etc. I pointed out that Geneva was city where I had met so many of his colleagues such as Xuan Thuy and Ha Van Lau. This subject petered out on that general line.
7. Next he turned to local situation and asked what I thought Lao attitude was. I said that most of their thoughts were turned to possibilities for "honest negotiations" and universal compliance with 1962 Geneva Agreements. This led on to some more tit for tat about Souvanna, U.S. and DRV "assurances" of peace, Ho Chi Minh's respect for the King, etc. No hits, no runs, no errors, nobody left on base.
8. We concluded by assuring him that our Embassy was always open and that we were ready to receive a reply at any time. He said he would not fail to let us know.
9. When he emerged, AP correspondent Goldsmith and local stringer were in driveway, took pictures of handshakes, etc. They then raced us back to Embassy and asked if they could report that "ball was now in U.S. court." My only comment was that "ball was still in the air."
10. Comment: Rather difficult to analyze this whole performance unless it was effort to eschew role of "dog in the manger" and give some impression of action. My spies tell me that Soviets and Poles both visited Chan this morning. There may, therefore, be some pressure from that general direction to keep Hanoi looking active rather than immobile./5/
/5/In telegram 6075 from Vientiane sent eyes only to Vance, April 26, Sullivan noted: "During my conversation with Nguyen Chan yesterday, he asked me what I could tell him about Ambassador Vance. I said you were an old retired undersecretary of Defense with a bad back and a twisted knee, that you had lynched Negroes in Detroit, suppressed Turkish patriots in Cyprus and conspired with warmongers in Korea. Chan seemed gratified. If there is any other good word you would like me to put in for you, pls let me know." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
Sullivan
209. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, April 25, 1968, 5:50-7 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room. No classification marking. These notes are a summary of the transcript of the meeting's recording. Those attending the off-the-record session were the President and Tom Johnson and a group of editors and reporters from the Washington Star that included Newbold Noyes, Crosby Noyes, A. William Hill, Charles Seib, John Cline, Burton Hoffman, John Cassady, Paul Hope, Mary McGrory, Tommy Noyes, Jack Horner, and Bernard Gwertzman. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
SUMMARY OF MEETING WITH REPORTERS FROM
WASHINGTON STAR AND PRESIDENT IN CABINET ROOM
The President was asked if he would be willing to talk a little bit about how he thought the campaign year was likely to develop and if he had any ideas on the subject.
The President reported that he did, but that he was not the best informed; that he had not been in as close touch with it as he normally was and would like to be. He said that he felt back in March when he made the announcement that he felt that was the best thing he could do to try to bring about talks and some solution of this serious problem that is killing so many of our boys and killing so many other people every day out in Vietnam.
The President said:
"I had the impression--rightly or wrongly--that as a candidate, being in the nose cone, so to speak, or the volcano, or the typhoon, that others in the world would misjudge our situation and feel like they had pressures on the President that would require him to take actions that he might not think were most desirable because of his own political problems. I thought the simplest and easiest and best thing to do would be to just say that I did not want to become involved in any personal partisanship in the campaign myself and that I would try to keep the Presidency from being involved during this period."
The President told the group that he felt the best interests of the country could be served better if he did not get into partisan politics. They asked him if he thought the Vice President would run and they were told he had not been confided in. He told them he did not feel he could do what he was doing and at the same time sit behind the scenes and manipulate some campaign.
The President told the group there were several conflicting viewpoints on the success of the Tet offensive. Some people think that as a result they are anxious to talk. The President did not agree. He expressed the opinion that he did not think the Tet offensive was a gain for them militarily. He felt that psychologically they would benefit from it and believed they had. Other viewpoints differed among some of the professional people./2/
/2/In a brief news conference an hour prior to this meeting, the President responded to a question about variant reporting out of Vietnam concerning the military situation: "I don't know what conflicts you are talking about." The unidentified questioner responded, "Stories about an impending attack and then reports to the contrary." Johnson replied, "We do have reports like that." The President also announced Goldberg's resignation and replacement by Ball. For the full text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 537-539.
The President told them that there was no difficulty in meeting in private and trying to select a site for any possible talks, but for public meetings--that was a different story. He told them that we had said we would meet in Geneva or any other suitable place. They came back and said they would meet in Cambodia or Warsaw or a mutually acceptable place so it narrowed down to suitable or mutually acceptable--those three words. Ours was suitable and theirs was mutually acceptable. They indicated they would like to do it near at home and not far away and where maybe Russia is present, China is present and they would be wanting to talking to them. On the other hand, we would want to be talking to the South Vietnamese probably, the Australians, the Koreans, Philippines and others. The President then told them of a number of suggested sites. Warsaw, Cambodia, and Laos were some of those. The President said that places like Warsaw--we would have no way of communicating with our people and in Cambodia it was being used as a haven for North Vietnamese and he felt that these things would not be good.
The President then outlined to them some of the things that were taking place in the war in Vietnam, how the North Vietnamese were moving supplies, etc. from over in Cambodia to be used against our men. He said the same thing was true in Haiphong; that it was an arsenal and the streets were just packed with implements and storage which have been unloaded from the docks and it's just one great big armory and they are completely immune from anything./3/
/3/According to the full transcript of the recording of the meeting, the President noted that 70,000 more NVA troops had infiltrated southward since the partial bombing halt. Admitting that only 30,000 of this number had infiltrated since March, Johnson did, however, see this as an overall increase in infiltration. (Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
The President said:
"I think our two big problems, the two biggest problems I have as President. I'm not talking about personal problems, but Presidential problems. One, trying to keep the country from dividing to a point where we are impudent [imprudent?] and two, trying to keep Ho Chi Minh from dividing us to the point. The Intelligence report this morning practically all of it was devoted to what Minh had said about the lack of wisdom of our government. And North Vietnam is really putting it out quoting our own people to do their job for them.
"So that is a problem I have tried to meet on March 31st. I mean in some degree to get it away from them. The second one is to keep him from dividing us with our Allies. They are frightened to death. And I think they have that same feeling in South Vietnam, that if this ball bounces the wrong way that they--all of them--will be assassinated and they would be run over, they would be locked up and they would be in concentration camps and they'd be slaves--if the Communists take over they would be slaves for the rest of their lives. And they don't think they are going to be guaranteed anything so they are upset. And my two big tests, I think, are whether I would be able to get our country to think our policy is a reasonable one and give me support, not as a Democratic candidate for re-election, but as President of the country until January."
The President was asked if he thought there was any chance of getting a settlement in Vietnam by January. He told them he would not want to prophesy; that he wanted to and hoped so and that he was working feverishly at it, but did not want to make any predictions.
The President said he did not see why they would not accept something which he thought would be to their advantage--"we will come home and you go home and we will take whatever resources we can get the Congress to give us and we will try to help rebuild North Vietnam and South Vietnam and Laos and Southeast Asia like we did in Europe with the Marshall plan. That ought to be pleasing to Ho Chi Minh. I think presently he feels like he is entitled to South Vietnam and he's going to try to get it if he can and I don't think he can get it during my political lifetime. I don't think he could have got it if I had been there four more years. But I think he feels that he is somewhat immune, that we are not going to take over his government and we are not going to try to install a new system in his country. He had had his eye on this country all these years and I think that he feels that sometime he can do in Washington what he did in Paris. I think that he must be realizing that he cannot--that it is unlikely that he will have another Dien Bien Phu. But he must be encouraged by the performance here."/4/
/4/The President added: "And I was trying to take away some of that encouragement by letting Senator Kennedy and Senator McCarthy and [Republican candidate Harold] Stassen and Nixon and them talk out these political issues and debate their views on Vietnam and other things and try to keep the government together. That's what I am going to do if I can." (Ibid.)
There was then discussion on the proposed march on Washington.
[Omitted here is discussion of the international economic situation.]
One of the group said he wanted to ask one last sixty four dollar question and that was whether or not there would be anything that would make the President change his mind about running. His answer was that he did not think so, that he did not see any./5/
/5/The President added a final comment on Vance's appointment to the peace delegation, in particular noting: "He has a serious physical problem and a serious financial problem and I keep him working just as much of the time that the body will bear and the bank will permit." (Ibid.)
210. Letter From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Washington, April 26, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Vietnam, General, April-Dec. 1968. Top Secret; Nodis; Personal. In a telephone conversation 2 days later, the President and Wheeler discussed the impact of the bombing halt on the military situation in Vietnam. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Wheeler, April 28, 1968, 11:10 a.m., Tape F6804.03, PNO 3)
Dear Bus:
In connection with our brief conversations regarding deescalation in South Vietnam, I want to put on paper the following thoughts of possible negotiated mutual deescalation.
I start with the premise, which I know you share, that a cease-fire is not practical at this time. We must therefore prepare for a fight-and-negotiate situation. In negotiations for any mutual deescalation, we should have first in mind the improvement of conditions to permit the GVN to expand its political influence and military control.
Fundamentally, I believe that in considering deescalation, we should emphasize the kinds of actions on the part of the NVN/VC which would be easily verifiable. My judgment is naturally affected by the fact that North Vietnam did not live up to its signature on the Laos Agreement for one day.
The kinds of deescalation by NVN/VC which would be of immediate value to us include:
(1) The reestablishment of the DMZ.
(2) The withdrawal of two divisions from the DMZ/I Corps area back into North Vietnam.
(3) The reduction of the flow of reinforcement of men and materiel to the south. (This would create some difficulty in policing.)
(4) Ending VC interference with traffic on the main highways.
(5) Ending mortar and rocket attacks on our installations and the cities.
(6) Ending of terrorist actions within the cities, and perhaps as a second step, in the villages.
I suggest that a study be made of what we could afford to do in return for some of the above restraints on the part of the NVN/VC. I would not suggest attempting to match each action by a parallel one by us, but rather to list in the same way various steps which we might be willing to consider taking, providing meaningful action were taken by the NVN/VC. We would have to await the development of the negotiations to make a decision on exactly how we play each card.
I am afraid that negotiations may well be protracted, and, as I have said, we will have to continue a fight-and-talk policy, but I would hope under conditions in which the GVN would be able to expand its moral influence and physical control in the country.
The rallying of the people of South Vietnam is a vital factor in the political and military developments. The continued support of the American people is another consideration that must be borne in mind. In the postwar period, we have found the American people have supported action abroad for a longer time than was first estimated, providing they were able to see light at the end of the tunnel.
Sincerely,
Averell/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Harriman signed the original.
211. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, April 27, 1968, 1130Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Crocodile. Received at 8:02 a.m.
6113. 1. Septel transmits an English translation of full text of note which I received at 1600 today from North Vietnamese Charge Nguyen Chan. Operative paragraph is as follows:
"In answer to the note of the American Government dated April 23, 1968,/2/ the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam believes that it is necessary for Hanoi and Washington to engage in conversations promptly. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has given instructions to Mr. Do-Phat-Quang, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the Peoples Republic of Poland, to be prepared to enter into discussions with the Ambassador of the United States at Warsaw the 30th of April 1968 or several days thereafter, regarding the place and the date of conversations between the two parties."
/2/See footnote 3, Document 204.
2. After Hurwitch and I read this text, we observed that the suggestion of Warsaw was not really responsive to our note of April 23, in which we had proposed "additional capitals, not previously considered by either side," for the limited purpose of agreeing on a site and time for the proposed contacts. Chan's reply was a bland but studied statement that his government was fully aware of the contents of our note of April 23.
3. We then went on to point out that his unofficial French translation used the word "conversations" rather than "contacts" in this paragraph. I asked him to check this against the Vietnamese text and to see if this was an accurate translation. Chan studied the text and confirmed that it was. (Our Embassy Vietnamese language officer confirms that "conversations" is correct.) I asked if he could explain the meaning of this change in wording from "contacts" to "conversations." He referred to AFP story from Hanoi which had characterized his Embassy as a "letter-box," and said he was only authorized to deliver these notes, not to explain them to us.
4. I went on to say that, without prejudice to what Washington might feel about their nomination of Warsaw again, this change in vocabulary was bound to introduce "complexities" and we would doubtless need some explanation of what this was all about. Did it, for example, involve the complete elision of the "contacts" phase of the process, or were they merely attempting to hold "contacts" under a guise? Chan simply repeated his status as a postman, not an interpreter.
5. I finally said that I, too, would speak as a postman and would therefore refrain from comment on all the statements which were made in the first two paragraphs of his note. Instead, I would assure him that, despite the several confusing questions raised by his third paragraph, we would send the full text to Washington immediately./3/
/3/The first part of the note reads: "The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has suggested to the Government of the United States the choice of Phnom Penh or Warsaw as a place for preliminary contacts between representatives with the rank of ambassador, with a view to prepare for official conversations between both sides. But the American side has raised objections; in addition it has advanced unjustified conditions for the choice of a site and has proposed fifteen other places. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has declared that the fifteen places proposed by the United States are inadequate and that the objections of the American Government to the choice of Phnom Penh and of Warsaw are without foundation. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam reaffirms that at this time. It is clear that the Government of the United States is deliberately seeking to delay conversations between both sides. This attitude is in complete contradiction to the declarations of President L.B. Johnson and of other American officials saying that they desire prompt negotiations with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and are ready to go anywhere. In the meantime, the Government of the United States continues to intensify the naval and air bombing against an important part of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, from the seventeenth to the twentieth parallels; the Navy of the United States continues to violate Vietnamese territorial waters and Vietnamese air space. The Government of the United States must cease unconditionally bombing and all other acts of war on all the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Such is the legitimate demand of all the Vietnamese people and of the progressive people in the United States." (Telegram 6114 from Vientiane, April 27; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
6. Comment: This note is obviously a very tricky maneuver which merits careful study. It looks to me from its tenor that it may be intended for publication. However, even in a public forum, it would seem to beg some explanation. On the other hand, it may be worded with deliberate imprecision in order to evoke another "Trollope ploy," since, read at its most liberal variant, it would suggest that "conversations" of substance could start even while the bombing continued. The price we would have to pay for achieving this movement would be the agreement to meet for a limited purpose at the Ambassador-in-residence level at Warsaw, thereby enabling Hanoi to claim one brass ring on the first swing of the merry-go-round.
7. It is doubtful that I will get any explanations of the third paragraph through Chan, even though I asked for them. It is also a moot question whether a note from Washington asking for explanations would advance matters substantially, since they presumably expect us to piece the puzzle together from its internal construction. Given the fact that paragraph 2 talks about ceasing bombing (but does not pose this as a prior condition to "conversations") and given the fact that the business in Warsaw is characterized as "discussions" (word taken from our note of April 23) it would seem to me that there is a reasonable case to assume that the "contact" phase has been dropped.
8. A reply from Washington, carefully phrased to assure that Ambassador Gronouski would talk only about time and place, but also assure that the next immediate phase would be full-fledged substantive conversation while bombing and other acts of war continue, would put us in position to assume a pure "fight-talk, talk-fight" situation, possibly with less strain on our alliances than the three-phase scenario proposed in our note of April 23. It would be trading some "form" for some "substance," and, in the long run, possibly giving us the better of the bargain.
9. On the other hand, merely accepting their note as it now stands, without stipulating our own provisions, runs the very real risk of letting Hanoi turn the Ambassador-in-residence "discussions" into a "contact" phase in which Ambassador Gronouski would be expected, as a condition precedent to agreeing upon a date and place for conversations, to "determine the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other acts of war," as DRV specified in its original note proposing Warsaw.
10. It would seem to me therefore that, if we are willing to accept Warsaw as a place for "discussions," we should stipulate that those "discussions" are exclusively to fix the date and place for "conversations" which would address all matters of substance between the two parties, including those matters mentioned in paragraph 2 of Chan's note. This would assure that subject of bombing could only come up in the "conversations" rather than in "discussions," and in some place like Geneva rather than Warsaw.
11. If this, however, is to be done, it should also be pointed out that the very last words in the third paragraph offer an ambiguity. "The two sides," as it reads in Vietnamese, or "the two parties," as it reads in French, is broad enough so that it could include the U.S. and all its allies on one side of the table, and the DRV and its friends and allies on the other side. Whether it is prudent at this stage to try to pin this one with precision in a reply is questionable. It might presumably, however, be a major issue in the "discussions" that Ambassador Gronouski may be called on to conduct. The imprecision with which it has deliberately been phrased in this particular note is possibly dictated by the problems Hanoi will have in handling the question of Chinese association with these "conversations."
Sullivan
212. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between Secretary of Defense Clifford and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, April 27, 1968, 10:20 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE. No classification marking.
TELEPHONE CALL FROM SECRETARY CLIFFORD
C has read all the messages./2/ Sec said the President called and President feels very strongly this not responsive and they are still trying to drag us in kicking and screaming to place where clearly we don't want to go; they ignored our proposal about suggesting a capital not previously mentioned by either side. President feels very strongly we cannot use Warsaw for this purpose. President wants us to go right back to them. Sec said we are now considering whether we suggest another place, some place else where they have an Ambassador. Sec said it is hard to find a place where they have an Ambassador where we have one and which has not already been named by either side. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, USSR--that just about wraps it up./3/
/2/See Documents 211 and 213.
/3/According to notes of a telephone call Rusk received from Rostow at noon that day, Rostow told him that the President was considering keeping the discussions at Vientiane, offering to continue the talks in countries where both the United States and the DRV had representation, such as Algeria, Guinea, Indonesia, Laos, Mali, Tanzania, and Egypt, or bringing in a mediator such as the Pope, U Thant, or UN General Assembly President Manescu. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In telegram 4812 from USUN, April 27, Goldberg reported that he told Manescu of U.S. interest in Bucharest as a site. Manescu replied that his government "will not avoid facilitating serious action for peace and being the theater for that action." (Ibid.)
C believes they have accepted 90% of the offer we made because the main offer we made was reversing the procedure we were on, saying let's go back to the beginning and have talk to be limited to discussion of time and place; they have agreed to that. C said they have left it at lowest level of contact, our Ambassadors in Poland. C thinks this contributes strongly to thought this would be solely time and place. They know we have named negotiators and that we are not going to let Gronouski get into negotiations any more than they would let their Ambassador in Poland get into them. C thinks we can arrange the meeting in such way that it not difficult problem for the President to accept this offer. C said every problem the President had about Warsaw is now eliminated because it is very low level. C said we really should consider with all seriousness unfortunate results that could occur if we turn it down.
C hopes he, Sec, Rostow, President might have chance to talk about this at length, with a preliminary meeting between C, Sec and Rostow. Sec said President feels very strongly about this. C agrees but said President's first reaction would be an emotional one. C said President doesn't know the burden he is carrying in this country to refuse to have some kind of talk; the country is holding him personally responsible. Sec said he would call Walt and see if he can arrange for a meeting when the President gets back.
11:30 a.m.
C said he just had a long talk with President who agrees C and Sec should be talking while President is gone. President won't be back until 5:00 or 6:00 and C doesn't suppose President would want to see them today but likely want to see them tomorrow. C asked Sec if he could come over for lunch. It was agreed Sec and Katzenbach would come to C's office as soon as Vice President's TV appearance was over. C will not have anyone from his side, just C, Sec, Katz and Rostow./4/
/4/
The President lunched from 1:10 to 4:02 p.m. that day with Rusk, Rostow, Clifford, Wheeler, Fortas, Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Notes of the discussion during this luncheon have not been found.
213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, April 27, 1968, 2216Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Crocodile. Drafted and approved by Bundy, and cleared by Rusk, Clifford, Rostow, and Robert Houdek of S/S-S.
154613. You should arrange to deliver following note to North Vietnamese Embassy. If in your opinion it can be done without creating an issue, we would prefer that you ask North Vietnamese Charge to come to your Embassy to receive note.
"The U.S. Government agrees with the statement of the Government of the DRV, in its note of April 27,/2/ that it is necessary for Hanoi and Washington to engage in conversations promptly.
/2/See Document 211. On April 27 the Department informed the Embassies in Thailand, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Korea, and New Zealand of the DRV message and this reply in telegram 154614. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
The U.S. Government notes that the DRV has now agreed that representatives of the two countries should hold private discussions for the sole purpose of agreeing on a location and date.
The U.S. Government notes that the DRV did not respond to its suggestion of April 23 that we meet for this limited purpose in a 'capital not previously considered by either side.'/3/ The U.S. Government suggested the DRV might wish to indicate three appropriate locations suitable for this limited purpose. The U.S. Government does not consider that the suggestion of Warsaw is responsive or acceptable.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 204.
The U.S. Government is prepared for these limited discussions on April 30 or several days thereafter. The U.S. Government would welcome the prompt response of the DRV to this suggestion."
Rusk
214. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, April 30, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE. Secret; Nodis; Crocodile.
SUBJECT
Thoughts on Getting a Site for Contacts
1. The Current Exchanges in Vientiane. It seems to me that Hanoi is finding it annoying that we are able to depict the Vientiane discussions as a continuing serious effort; both yesterday and today, they have attacked my remarks, limited as they were. This suggests to me the strong possibility that they may hold up some time on any reply to our last message and even seek to give the impression that things have broken down.
2. Utility of Direct Contacts Elsewhere. Even if Hanoi should propose some place for direct discussions on a site for contacts, it is very hard to know just how we would instruct our representative. He could try to draw Hanoi out on its reasons for not accepting any of our sites, but the odds seem heavy that he would simply reiterate Warsaw. Any chance for progress would appear to depend on a third party to whom we could refer in any suggestion we put on the table. Otherwise, I suspect we would be up against a basic unwillingness on Hanoi's part to accept anything that comes directly from us.
3. The Basic Situation. I continue to feel strongly that time is not at all on our side. Whether it is right or wrong, fair or unfair, the impression is dominant in Europe that we are responsible for the delay, and the same impression is widespread here. Moreover, any new offensive action on the other side could at any time present us with a most serious dilemma. If we break off or delay progress on that ground--and still more if we take retaliatory bombing action--we are again likely to emerge very sharply minus in the propaganda arena. It is very hard for us to get away from the fact that we have engaged, since April 1, in a highly publicized "major offensive" called "Complete Victory," and that more recently we have engaged in publicized offensive operations in the A Shau Valley and elsewhere. Obviously, these were right actions on our part, but the fact is they put us in a very difficult position to contend that any offensive actions on the other side are a reason for changing our approach or engaging in retaliatory military action.
4. Third-Country Possibilities. In my judgment, this means that we should be focused very hard on getting an acceptable third country invitation to both sides as rapidly as possible.
a. On Bucharest we are well advanced and could hear at any time from the Romanians that they are prepared to behave in the necessary way. Nonetheless, I question seriously whether Bucharest--while it would be accepted with a grimace in South Viet-Nam and by our allies--would be the best place. To the American public, it would not be easy to distinguish from Warsaw. Its acceptance would cause many to argue that we had been captious about Warsaw. Moreover, rejection of Warsaw and ultimate acceptance of Bucharest might well be depicted in South Viet-Nam and among our allies as indicating a pattern of our fighting for a time and then yielding to accept what really amounts to much the same thing. This seems to me to be a poor pattern to set at the outset of this negotiating process.
b. Tehran has now been suggested for a possible third-country initiative. While this would be of some mild use in keeping the ball in the air, the fact is that the Shah has taken a strong public position in support of our Viet-Nam policy. The odds are overwhelming that Hanoi would reject Tehran, and would have wide support in doing so--since the press would immediately dig up the things the Shah has said, plus the fact that there has been an Iranian medical mission in South Viet-Nam.
c. Paris has obvious difficulties, well outlined by Wallner last week. Nonetheless, as Chip Bohlen has pointed out, these difficulties relate much more to Paris as a site for talks than as a site for contacts. It is abundantly clear that the South Vietnamese would strongly prefer Paris to Bucharest, and it has the overriding advantage that all of our allies, as well as the South Vietnamese, have resident representation. All in all, Paris seems to me by all odds the least worst site--of those likely to be accepted by Hanoi. Moreover, a third-party offer of Paris--if rejected by Hanoi--would put us in a very much stronger position on the propaganda front.
d. Vienna seems to be a long-shot possibility, if we can rely on reports that the North Vietnamese are not really hostile to it. Nonetheless, it suffers from the fact that it is our suggestion, and an offer directly from the Austrian Government seems unlikely to be accepted by Hanoi, or to gain for us in the propaganda sense if Hanoi failed to act or turned it down.
5. Conclusion. My own conclusion is that we should consider an immediate step to get Paris proposed by a third party, on a quiet and official basis. The obvious party--and I think without difficulty for this purpose--would be U Thant. We can send Ambassador Goldberg to him with a simple message that if Paris were to be quietly proposed, without fanfare, we would be prepared to accept it--although we most definitely do not believe it wise to take a public position. U Thant would almost certainly pass the message to Hanoi. Either Hanoi would accept and we could get started, or we would have a much stronger case if they delayed or turned it down.
215. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, April 30, 1968, 10:50 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, April 30, 1968, 10:50 a.m., Tape F6804.03, PNO 5. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
President: Dean, can't we do something on Bucharest before we get another proposal from them?
Rusk: I talked to Arthur [Goldberg] yesterday about it. He's seen--he's in touch with Manescu and has not heard anything back from him on this.
President: I'm tired of waiting on that though. That's just--
Rusk: Well, the key is to whether representatives of our allies could be there.
President: Well, let's find out from them direct if we can't some way, because we've waited a week on it. We went out to Thieu and then we went out to everyone else. We've waited. We found this ploy and I don't want any more delays if I can avoid it on Bucharest because I don't--I think they'd have a little trouble turning down Bucharest. What I think we ought to do, I think we ought to just say to them, if it's just for the site, let's make it as limited as their reply was on Warsaw. Now everybody's ready to go to that whether by God they had it or not. So, I wouldn't worry too much if they refuse to let us have somebody come in there on the first talk. Why, we could fuzz that up and go alone if we had to on Bucharest. I wouldn't feel so bad about it. I'd much rather do it than gamble on getting drug in by Paris. I'm getting very squeezy about that. I keep reading these interviews. What I'd like to do is try to say if I could, direct as I could to our Ambassador, we would, if you'd suggest it publicly, we would be, there'd be a very prompt response, period, or something like that.
Rusk: Well, I think Manescu made this point pretty strongly that on Bucharest the Romanians could not volunteer it. Maybe we ought to use U Thant--see if he could work it out.
President: Well, I don't like U Thant. Is there another channel somewhere?
Rusk: Well, I might try, let's see--
President: This gets us into all that Goldberg flak. We had a day of him yesterday. You have no idea how much time that man has taken.
Rusk: Well, let me find out first from the Romanian Ambassador here before lunch whether he's gotten anything back on this, and then I'll have a suggestion at lunch as to how we can get going on it.
President: I'm sure Clark will be against anything else until we get the Clifford formula over with. But I'm not. I'm going to do something and I'd like to do it right if I could. But I've waited now a week on Bucharest and I just in my bones know it would be difficult to, it would be a problem for them. At least it would show that I was not too adamant, that I had some flexibility, if I was to go that far. The Pope's going to ask us, I think tomorrow./2/
/2/
In a telephone conversation with Daley 2 days earlier, the President stated: "I've got two or three little plans in the mail that might work out on our peace thing, might give us a little chance. We got a little closer to a site yesterday, and I haven't told another human this, but I'm playing with His Holiness a bit to try to get him to take a step or two that we think might be productive, and he tentatively agreed to it. He has to talk to some of his people. So, we're working at it every day, and things are lightening up some there." (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Daley, April 28, 1968, 6:45 p.m., Tape 6804.03, PNO 4)Rusk: Let me see what I can do about it.
President: All right.
216. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, April 30, 1968, 1:25-2:25 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the White House. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE TUESDAY LUNCHEON
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Secretary Rusk: On site problem, Rumanian Ambassador said they expected to hear today on whether they would accept other representative.
We need third party to propose Rumania: British-U.N.-India. I prefer India to suggest Rumania. Algerians want to get into this./2/
/2/Other intermediaries involved with the site selection included India, Indonesia, Switzerland, and the Vatican. In telegram 155877 to New Delhi, April 30, the Department requested that Bowles assess whether India could play a role in finding a mutually agreeable site, such as Bucharest, Algiers, Dar es Salaam, and Cairo, but any such proposal would have to be submitted by the Indian Government "as its own idea." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In telegram 13492 from New Delhi, May 1, Bowles expressed confidence that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi would undertake the request. (Ibid.) Bowles subsequently delivered such a message to the Indian Government. (Telegram 13617 from New Delhi, May 2; ibid.) The administration also received an offer from the Indonesian Government, which had been encouraged by Poland, for the use of one of its naval cruisers, to be stationed in the Tonkin Gulf, as the site. (Telegrams 6312 from Djakarta, April 26, and 6360 from Djakarta, April 28; ibid.) In addition, in consultations with North Vietnamese representatives in Peking, Switzerland concluded that the Hanoi leadership most likely would accept either Geneva or Paris as the site for talks. (Memorandum of conversation between Swiss Ambassador Felix Schnyder and Harriman, May 1; ibid.) Finally, in an April 30 message delivered by the Apostolic Delegate Luigi Raimondi, the Pope proposed the Vatican as a site. (Ibid., POL US-VAT) The President's letter of appreciation to the Pope was transmitted in telegram 158496 to Rome, May 5. (Ibid.)
The President: Let's talk about that later. Let's be prepared for three or four places. Bucharest is okay.
Walt Rostow: The bombing targets are between 19th and 20th parallels.
Secretary Clifford: The flow is increasing. Captured documents do not indicate an enemy moving toward peace.
There are four targets south of the 20th with military value, but there is a serious political situation. This could indicate failure on quest for sites. It could also show them we mean business and bring them back to reality.
(General Wheeler showed photographs of four sites.)
The President: Dean, (Secretary Rusk) do you have any trouble with it?
Secretary Rusk: No.
General Wheeler: Do locks bother you?
Secretary Rusk: No.
General Wheeler: No civilian casualties would result.
Secretary Rusk: Time is running out.
The President: Do you recommend it, Buzz?
General Wheeler: Yes.
Secretary Clifford: I would not recommend it immediately. Let's wait and get response from Hanoi. It could disturb relationship we are trying to build with them.
Let's hold up for a reply.
Secretary Rusk: Is that airfield getting muddy?
General Wheeler: Yes. There are significant military implications to the airport.
The President: I do not want to go to Paris. I think they are not in the least interested genuinely in peace. We need to find out what my March 31 speech has done to us.
I do not think Bunker's proposal/3/ will get us to the peace table by the elections. I believe they are giving us same treatment they did at Tet.
/3/Bunker requested ICC representatives to convey to the North Vietnamese categorical U.S. rejection of Warsaw and the need to continue to search for additional sites. (Telegram 25903 from Saigon, April 29; ibid., POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In backchannel telegram Saigon 339 to Rostow, April 30, Bunker noted: "In conclusion, I believe that what is most needed is a continuation of the present U.S. attitude of firmness and patience combined with announced willingness to meet with the other side on reasonable terms. I see no need for dramatic or hasty actions to demonstrate our reasonableness and the genuineness of our intentions. On the other hand, I believe that we should make known in accurate but non-polemical terms the military advantage which Hanoi is taking of this prolonged period of haggling in order to reinforce Communist elements in the South through the infiltration of unprecedented quantities of men and supplies. In another week or so, we may be forced to indicate to Hanoi that, in the absence of progress on talks, we shall have to re-examine our bomb restriction policy. This may jar loose a decision on their side, but we should be serious in issuing this warning, and not do it as a bluff." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 84, Ellsworth Bunker Papers, Vietnam Telegrams--Chronological)
This is the 30th day of the pause. We are going into our fifth week. We counseled patience, but you have to look at the calendar. We have to start laying the groundwork for what may come.
Do you think, Buzz (General Wheeler), that time is limited when we can continue to keep the area above the 19th off limits without hurt?
General Wheeler: Yes sir. They are moving men and equipment south quite rapidly.
(CIA Director Helms gave paper on infiltration into South.)/4/
/4/Not found.
The President: Can't we hit anything in water between 19th and 20th?
General Wheeler: No sir.
The President: What is answer that you use to counter hitting them in nose only rather than going way up?
General Wheeler: There is no nose. There is a network of roads. Plus there is no way to get them all at the "gate."
Secretary Rusk: The boys in Laos want us to extend bombing East.
The President: Is Sullivan worried?
Secretary Rusk: He is for it.
Secretary Clifford: Sullivan favors alternative A. We prefer alternative B to hit area in Laos./5/
/5/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXVIII, Document 361, footnote 3.
CIA Director Helms: A is ten miles from 20th. B is 15 miles from 20th.
The President: Let's take out B now. See how it looks.
Walt Rostow: MACV wants a briefing on what is going on in Haiphong-Hanoi area.
We have three questions: (See Question 8--Section marked)./6/
/6/Presumably an attachment distributed at the meeting; not found.
Let's lay it out in matter of fact way.
George Christian: We should show the photos and give facts on increase in infiltration.
Secretary Rusk: I do not think we should show pictures. It looks like military pressure on you. We should have quiet backgrounding.
Secretary Clifford: There should be backgrounding in both Saigon and in Washington. I do not think the pictures should have been used. We want to go on with reconnaissance.
The President: Is there anything on Ike?
General Wheeler: He is resting comfortably. Nothing serious at the moment.
We can get benefit without showing pictures. Information on infiltration would be good to get out.
The President: I do not want Ho to get impression he can take this country away from us. We are not reeling under the Doves' attack. I have talked with a number of people. We have left Ho with the impression that we are leaving the country.
We have got to be very careful.
I am going to have a televised news conference later this week. I am not going to give them the impression we are tied down or running out.
President Park agreed to give 5000 military or 6000 civilians.
The State Department reporters' notes were terrible. I told him we would get him an additional $100 million over the $300 million we had already given him. Park said July 1 was target date.
I would like to look again at expediting supplies.
General Wheeler: He has 10,000 support troops for men from Korea.
Secretary Clifford: Gave the President a brief memorandum on $100 million--how it is to be used./7/
/7/Not found.
217. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 1, 1968, 12:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile Paris to be filed. Confidential. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
You may wish to consider calling in the members of the Vietnam negotiating team, plus the senior members of the government who will be backstopping the effort--if it ever begins--and talking to them along the following lines.
1. All members of the government must understand that in dealing with Hanoi--and their Communist friends--we are not dealing with diplomats in the old classical 19th Century tradition. They may well behave in formal diplomacy with correctness, skill, and lucidity. But they view diplomacy as the net outcome of their ability to influence the following factors during the negotiation itself:
--the military situation on the ground;
--the political situation inside South Vietnam;
--U.S.-GVN relations;
--"world opinion" and U.S. political forces that might bear on the Executive Branch.
2. As a government we shall, therefore, have to fight the battle on all these fronts, in addition to diplomacy itself. Our experience with the first month since the President's March 31st statement already demonstrates this fact beyond doubt. Therefore, the President wishes the government to think automatically in terms of all these dimensions of the negotiation in relationship to one another and to working towards a total U.S. policy which advances our interests.
3. Beyond that the President wishes those concerned to know that one major reason that he withdrew from candidacy was to assure that the positions taken in the months ahead on Vietnam would be positions that he judged right in the U.S. interest, freed of any short-run U.S. political pressures. The President wishes peace in Southeast Asia at the earliest possible moment. He wishes all members of the government to apply to this end all the imagination, skill, experience and insight of which they are capable. But this Administration will only settle for an honorable peace as we understand it.
4. Therefore, the President asks all members of the government to operate as a united team. There will, of course, be differences of view among us and debates on this move or that move at one time or another. These debates and discussions must be kept wholly within the family. We are negotiating with Hanoi, not with each other. That negotiation should take place between governments and not between the U.S. government and the press./2/
/2/In an effort to mute Congressional criticism of the site discussions, Johnson noted the following during a telephone conversation with Fulbright on May 2: "Now that is what is happening. This is in the Hue area. They're getting ready to hit us, according to their intelligence and their conversations, in the next 10 days. They have brought down between 30 and 40 thousand men since March 31--since this offer. We haven't brought in any, but we have that many more to face. If you are out there, that is what you are up against. We think they have brought between 75,000 and 100,000, since the Tet offensive, from North Vietnam. Now I don't believe much that they are going to pick any site and I think they are using this. The pressure we ought to put on them is to put pressure on nearly any damn site in the world and that's what you ought to be suggesting. Say, I don't speak for anybody, but I don't see what's wrong with Bucharest, I don't see what is wrong with Cairo, I don't see what is wrong with the Vatican and the Pope--his secretary of state has been most sympathetic with them, I can assure you, just leaned over with their side. They've called for us to stop the bombing and they've called for them to stop their thing. There could not be a more neutral place. Bucharest is Communist, so I don't guess they could cuss us there. Algeria is. I just can't understand it. So let's keep the heat on them and you help me do that instead of talking about this damn Cambodia. I know Mansfield loves Cambodia and he has great confidence in them, but they are running over with enemy troops now. Just like Poland is grinding around the clock to supply equipment. And I think it's as reasonable to ask an allied group to go to Poland as it is to ask North Vietnam to go to Thailand." (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Fulbright, May 2, 1968, 10:47 a.m., Tape F6804.03, PNO 8-10; this transcript prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian)
Walt
218. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 426-432.
Saigon, May 2, 1968, 1135Z.
26229. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my forty-ninth weekly message.
A. General
1. I have not detected much change in the mood of the GVN or the people since my message of last week./2/ Although some anxiety is still evident, the feeling of apprehension regarding American intentions, apparent in early April, has very considerably lessened. In my talks with Thieu within the last few days, he has exhibited a quality of orderly thinking about the plans and purposes of the enemy's politico-military strategy and has viewed with a quiet self-confidence our ability to cope with the next enemy offensive which he is certain is coming. He believes our spoiling operations may have delayed Hanoi's efforts to launch another offensive, but that it cannot be long delayed, the timing probably May or early June. One excellent result of your March 31 statement and Clark Clifford's speech/3/ has been that the Vietnamese are really beginning to face up to the fact that the time will come when they will be on their own. This, together with the after effects of the Tet offensive, has meant that the GVN and the Vietnamese people are buckling down to the job of mobilizing their resources with much greater energy and determination than they have heretofore exhibited. In this Thieu has taken the lead. He had grown in stature and in confidence and is beginning to exhibit qualities of real leadership. He has set about the numerous tasks involved in getting the mobilization bill through the Assembly, in setting up machinery for its implementation, and restructuring the government so that it will function more effectively, and making plans to broaden its base in order to widen popular support with characteristic thoroughness; also with characteristic caution in view of the sensitive problems and relationships involved with Ky, the military, Loc, and others./4/
/2/Document 207.
/3/See Document 169 and footnote 8, Document 205.
/4/Bunker reported in telegram 26386 from Saigon, May 4, that 2 days earlier Thieu saw Tran Van Huong to discuss Huong's assumption of the premiership. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
2. In fact, I have some fear that, spurred on by our urging, as well as by the other factors I have mentioned, the GVN may be trying to do too many things at once, its reach may be beyond its grasp. There are obvious limitations on the human resources available to it and on their capabilities and these are being strained to the limit. There are, however, some untapped resources both here and among individuals abroad which should be utilized. I have previously urged Thieu to bring back competent people who, for one reason or another, have either left or been forced to leave the country, but whose talents under the changed conditions now existing, I believe, could be put to good use. We can also help by influencing the government to concentrate on the priorities. For the immediate present, I think these are a) getting the right kind of mobilization bill passed with adequate and effective machinery for its implementation; b) the restructuring of the government, broadening its base to give it wider popular support and organizing itself so that decisions can be taken more quickly and, of equal importance, followed through and implemented: good decisions often are made by Thieu at the top, orders are given to carry them out, but the breakdown comes in the follow-through; c) effective pulling together and coordination of all the GVN pacification activities, as the US supporting side is coordinated; and d) a continuing program to equip, train, and improve the Vietnamese armed forces.
3. Enemy propaganda has stressed the theme that 1968 is the year of climax and it seems to me that there is reason to believe that Hanoi in fact now intends to move on the negotiating, as well as military front. I also think that the present stalemate in agreeing on a site for negotiations is a preview of the kind of tactics we may expect from Hanoi, that it is prolonging the stalemate in order to strengthen its military posture in South Vietnam, to continue a massive infiltration of men and materiel, and trying to get the maximum propaganda advantage out of what it chooses to picture as our unreasonableness./5/
/5/The first two consultative meetings between Embassy and GVN officials on negotiations were held May 2 and 6. (Telegrams 26094 from Saigon, May 3, and 26630 from Saigon, May 7; ibid., POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
[Omitted here is discussion of political, military, civil, and economic issues.]
Bunker
219. Letter From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/
Washington, May 3, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 911/305 (26 April 68), IR 3867. Top Secret; Sensitive.
Dear Averell:
This is in response to your letter of 26 April suggesting that a study be made of those deescalatory steps which we could afford to do in return for some illustrative restraints on the part of NVA/VC forces./2/
/2/Document 210.
I am enclosing three attachments which explore this subject. The first is a "shopping list" of possible deescalatory steps by both sides with no attempt to match or equate individual actions (Enclosure A). The second attachment contains some two-sided deescalatory steps (Enclosure B). My evaluation of the contents in these two attachments is that deescalation probably would be feasible only in the DMZ area. Beyond those specific actions related to "no advantage" validation, neutralization of the DMZ, and POW exchanges (thru US Step 10, Enclosure B), the risks become high due to the difficulty of validating compliance by the enemy in most cases. For example, if he agrees to withdraw certain units from a specified area, how can we be sure that he has not augmented remaining VC units with NVA filler personnel? If he agrees that NVA will not attack certain areas or LOCs, how would we know whether a subsequent attack was carried out by the VC or the NVA? These are some of the practical problems in validation that would cause us difficulty.
My view of deescalation centers on three points: (1) Deescalation of military pressure will not be operationally feasible until negotiations reach a productive stage; (2) The objective of any deescalatory step should be the verified withdrawal of NVA forces from SVN. Otherwise, we can become entangled in piecemeal deescalatory steps that would only buy time for the enemy and provide him the capability to cheat; (3) Initial deescalation should focus on the DMZ to test the good faith of North Vietnam.
I recently exchanged views with Westy on the subject./3/ He pointed out quite correctly that a negotiated deescalation is manageable only if NVN approaches the problem with complete sincerity, since monitoring withdrawals accurately would be virtually impossible. If areas for mutual withdrawal result from negotiations, he identified five areas, in order of priority, which promise the greatest gain in relation to the risks involved: (1) Any or all of II CTZ, less the coastal provinces; (2) Northern III CTZ--specifically Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long provinces; (3) Western I CTZ, less Quang Ngai province; (4) Coastal areas in II CTZ, less major bases and installations; (5) Quang Tri province.
/3/This exchange is contained in telegrams CJCS 4270 to Westmoreland, April 19, and MAC 5388 to Wheeler, April 23. (U.S. Army Center for Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message Files, 1-30 April 1968)
In his view, the enemy would likely select the following areas for mutual withdrawal calculated to cause the greatest difficulty to friendly forces at the least expense to North Vietnam: (1) Capital Military District (CMD) Central III CTZ; (2) IV CTZ; (3) Quang Tri/Thua Thien provinces; (4) Remainder of I CTZ; (5) Coastal provinces, II CTZ; (6) Kontum and Pleiku provinces.
I'm sure you understand that these are preliminary assessments for the current time frame. Without doubt, we will continue to see considerable shifting of NVA/VC forces. Such assessments will, of necessity, continue to be reviewed. Some additional comments by Westy are also attached to this memorandum (Enclosure C)./4/
/4/Printed from an unsigned copy. Enclosure C, attached but not printed, summarized Westmoreland's views on the negative aspects of mutual withdrawal, the mechanics of implementing such a withdrawal, and preferable alternatives.
Enclosure A
HYPOTHETICAL DEESCALATION STEPS
|
BY US |
BY NVN |
|
1. Stop artillery or other fire into or across the DMZ. |
1. Stop artillery or other fire from or across the DMZ. |
|
2. Agree to neutralization of DMZ. |
2. Stop ground attacks across the DMZ or the massing of additional forces or supplies in North Vietnam or the DMZ in a manner which poses a direct threat to Allied forces in South Vietnam. |
|
3. Agree to inspection and verification procedures in DMZ: (a) ICC; (b) Joint Commission. |
3. Desist from any increase in the movement of North Vietnamese troops and supplies into South Vietnam. |
|
4. Take one or more of the following actions: |
Note: The above items could be further broken down into sub-items. |
|
5. Offer safe conduct to exfiltrating units. |
4. Remove forces from southern portion of DMZ. |
|
6. Provide transportation to enemy desiring transit north. |
5. Remove supplies from southern portion of DMZ. |
|
7. Pull back US troops from DMZ a certain distance. |
6. Remove forces from northern portion of DMZ. |
|
8. Remove US troops from a specified area. |
7. Remove supplies from northern portion of DMZ. |
|
9. Cease leaflet operations. |
8. Agree to neutralization of DMZ. |
|
10. Place ceiling on in-country reinforcements. |
9. Agree to inspection and verification procedures in DMZ: (a) ICC; (b) Joint Commission; (c) non-interference with unilateral inspection. |
|
11. Discontinue use of newer type weapons. |
10. Take one or more of the following actions: |
|
12. Relinquish low level recce. |
11. Cease attacks on US bases. |
|
13. Discontinue ground operations in border area. |
12. Cease use of heavy mortars/rockets against province and district capitals. |
|
14. Limit size of ground operations to battalion size force. |
13. Cease ground attacks on province and district capitals. |
|
15. Cease construction/operation of the obstacle barrier. |
14. Cease attacks on specified roads, railways, and water-borne traffic. |
|
16. Stop use of (pick one): |
15. Conduct no operations larger than battalion size. |
|
17. Cease operations from out-of-country: CVAs, patrol ships, air operations from Guam, Thailand. |
16. Withdraw some NVA forces to a specified area in SVN. |
|
18. Stop use of B-52s. |
17. Withdraw some NVA forces to sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. |
|
19. Stop use of armed helos. |
18. Withdraw some NVA units from SVN to NVN. |
|
20. Provide amnesty for the VC. |
19. Cease incidents of terrorism and sabotage. |
|
21. Stop close tactical air support in SVN. |
20. Force VC to cease tax collections. |
|
22. Stop providing equipment in-country to TCCs. |
21. Remove NVA forces to a specified distance north of the DMZ. |
|
23. Cease-fire. |
22. Remove SAMs from area north of DMZ. |
|
24. Disestablish certain logistic bases. |
23. Announce and observe a cease-fire. |
|
25. Implement provisions of Manila Communique for withdrawal. |
24. Comply with Geneva Accords of 1962 (remove NVA troops from Laos). |
|
25. Make command and control communications in the clear. | |
|
26. Cease propaganda broadcasts. | |
|
27. Negotiate with GVN. | |
|
28. Recognize the GVN as legal government. | |
|
29. Recognize the 17th parallel and two Vietnams. |
Enclosure B
TWO SIDED DEESCALATORY ACTIONS
(Listed in Desired Order of Accomplishment)
|
Sequence |
Mutual Deescalatory Step |
Impact on NVN |
Impact on US |
Impact on SVN |
Remarks |
|
1 |
Neutralization of the DMZ by removal of all military forces. Includes prohibition of artillery fire across the DMZ. |
--test of intentions. |
--remove some pressure on I CTZ. |
--no risks to SVN security. |
Neither side has a legal right to be in the DMZ. True neutralization of the DMZ should precede consideration of sub-sequent sequential deescalatory steps. |
|
2 |
Exchange POWs. |
--test of good faith and intentions. |
--psycholog-ical boost if successful; added resolve if turned down. |
--willing to ex-change. |
If NVN is seriously interested in mutual steps to deescalate, the exchange of POWs should be early step in this process. |
|
3 |
NVA/US withdrawal from a geographic area (e.g., a province). |
--would remove pressure from NVA and permit regroupment. |
--could for-feit use of bases. |
--would require diversion of ARVN forces from other missions. |
The specific areas that would be the subject of a negotiated withdrawal should be determined by COMUSMACV based on the then existing tactical situation. In general, I CTZ and highlands are probably the most appropriate areas to try this plan. |
|
4 |
Cease offensive air/ground operations in a specified area. |
--NVN would accept if own forces were threatened; not likely to agree in area where its strength is superior. |
--intelligence collection would suffer. |
--would sustain pockets of territory under VC control. |
The effectiveness of this type of deescalation would depend largely on the progress of negotiations toward a final settlement. It should not be undertaken in the early stages of talks. This step is completely unacceptable from a military point of view unless accompanied by substantial NVA withdrawals. |
220. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, May 3, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 284--Order of Battle. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; CIA Internal Use Only.
PARTICIPANTS
CIA:
The Director, Mr. Richard Helms
Mr. Paul V. Walsh
JCS:
The Chairman, General Earle G. Wheeler
Lt. Gen. George S. Brown
Executive Col. D.P. McAuliffe
Maj. Gen. William E. Depuy
Col. A.C. Edmunds
DIA:
The Director, General Joseph Carroll
Maj. Gen. Grover Brown
1. This meeting convened at 1030 on 3 May 1968. It was called by General Wheeler in response to Mr. Helms' offer to brief the Chairman on the community problems in estimating enemy strengths.
2. Mr. Helms opened the meeting by explaining generally the inability of the intelligence community to reach agreement on estimates of enemy strengths in South Vietnam. He pointed out that in addition to differences in estimates on agreed OB categories, there was a fundamental difference on whether certain categories of forces--the so-called irregular groups--should be quantified and included in the estimates.
3. Mr. Walsh gave a brief run-down on the CIA concept of an insurgency base and the elements contained in it, and presented a comparison of the CIA and MACV estimates.
4. General Carroll and Mr. Walsh discussed the various problem areas in the estimates, the points of disagreement and possible alternatives for their resolution.
5. The consensus of the meeting is summarized in the following points:
a. These estimates have a high degree of political sensitivity and all concerned should exercise the utmost discretion in dealing with them and controlling their dissemination.
b. There is a real need to present these estimates in such a way that the combat threat is clearly distinguished from political or irregular threats. The qualitative differences within groups should also be considered and probably new terminology needs to be created.
c. The disagreement on some elements--e.g., Political Infrastructure--could probably be eliminated if the terms were redefined.
d. The current method of attrition, its shortcomings, and the impact this has on maintaining strength estimates is in need of a basic overhaul.
e. The requirement that monthly OB reports be published is a basic contributor to the confusion and problems associated with strength estimates.
6. General Carroll was instructed to draft for General Wheeler's signature a message to MACV indicating that there are a number of soft areas in the estimates which warrant immediate investigation, and making the following points:
a. MACV should examine the entire question of attrition with a view to devising better methods.
b. Consideration should be given to differentiating the combat threat between full-time and part-time guerrillas.
c. Consideration should be given to the best means of presenting and quantifying the elements not included in the military OB.
d. The question of definition of Political Infrastructure should be reexamined.
7. It was agreed that all concerned must go back to the drawing board and that CIA and DIA would cooperate in working out new formats and definitions and resolving existing differences.
8. Mr. Helms agreed that he would withhold dissemination of the CIA figures pending completion of this reexamination.
9. General Wheeler agreed to take steps to reduce MACV's OB reporting requirements, particularly those generated by OSD/SA./2/
/2/The CIA intelligence estimate SC No. 10295/68, "North Vietnam's Ability to Withstand Manpower Attrition," was submitted to the JCS on June 10. (Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Files, Job 78-T02095R, Briefing Paper for General DePuy, The Attrition of Vietnam Communist Forces) In a June 11 memorandum to Helms, Wheeler noted that the enemy might suffer losses of 350,000 during 1968 and suggested that while the enemy still was intent upon military victory, he doubted that the Communist forces "can absorb such losses over a protracted period of time and maintain the level of battlefield effectiveness required to pursue this strategy and attain his goals." (Ibid.) The CIA-DIA estimate of NVA presence in South Vietnam, as later published in August, was some 40,000-60,000 greater than that of MACV of roughly 100,000. In addition, the CIA-DIA estimates of main and local forces, administrative cadre, and guerrillas, as advanced in December, were all substantially higher than those of MACV. The contrasting range in total enemy forces was 265,000-355,000 by the CIA and DIA to 233,305-239,305 for MACV. (CIA Memorandum, "Chronology of the VC/NVA OB Problem," October 22, 1969; ibid., OER Papers on OB) Additional periodic CIA estimates of the enemy's strength are ibid., MACV Press Briefings and OB Problems. For further discussion of the dispute over the enemy order of battle, see Harold P. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968 (Langley, Va.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998), pp. 85-141.
Paul V. Walsh
Deputy Director
Economic Research
221. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 3, 1968, 7:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 74. Secret; Sensitive; Crocodile.
Mr. President:
Here is the full text of the Hanoi message, plus Sullivan's comment./2/
/2/The attached telegram was received at 1:49 a.m. in the Department of State, but the "comment" by Sullivan in telegram 6241 from Vientiane, May 3, was received at 12:24 a.m. In a telephone call at 1 a.m., Rostow informed the President that word had been received from the North Vietnamese that they had agreed to open discussions at Paris in a week's time. The President replied: "Well, I'd rather go to almost any place than Paris." While Rostow saw little opportunity of substituting another site, he noted that at least the South Vietnamese would be much more comfortable with Paris than Warsaw. Rostow urged caution in any reply to the North Vietnamese, however, given their intention was solely to discuss the full cessation of bombing and other military actions. In addition, Rostow reassured Johnson that the bombing could be restarted if the conditions laid down in the San Antonio formula were violated. The President added that he did not want word of Hanoi's offer to leak out before a response was discussed. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rostow, May 3, 1968, 1 a.m., Tape F68.06, PNO 1; transcript prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian)
I read this as indicating that your handling of this matter over the past month has convinced them:
--That you were in no hurry and were firm;/3/
/3/In a May 2 memorandum to Rostow, Jorden discussed the reasons for the administration's firmness in insisting upon "a site where both sides can be sure of equal and fair and disinterested treatment." (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 74)
--Meanwhile, our men in the field, the GVN, and the ARVN convinced them that time was not their friend.
I don't think they are going to be easy to deal with; but I do believe that we enter this from a position of strength and a sense on their side that the clock is ticking against them:
--It was they who rejected the option of waiting until after the election;
--It was they who rejected a stage of negotiation devoted merely to discussing time and place;
--It was they who added the phrase "to have subsequent conversations on the problems of interest to the two sides"--their version of "productive negotiations" from the San Antonio formula.
Paragraph 5 of Sullivan's cable is a just tribute to his Chief./4/
/4/This paragraph in telegram 6241 reads: "Congratulations to those in Washington whose eyeballs are made of such stern stuff. Among our Asian friends, these two successive retreats by Hanoi from firmly held positions will be taken as a sign that the North Vietnamese are badly hurting and need negotiations in a very real way."
But our reply will have to deal with: "to determine with the American side the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other American acts of war against the DRV."
My first reaction is that our reply should quote the following passage from your speech of March 31 to lay a basis for our position: "Even this very limited bombing of the North could come to an early end--if our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi." But you will, of course, wish to consider this matter this morning in the light of the views of Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford.
W.W. Rostow/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment
Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/6/
Vientiane, May 3, 1968, 0418Z.
/6/Secret; Nodis; Crocodile.
6243. 1. Following is an unofficial translation of the unofficial French version which accompanied the note handed to Ambassador Sullivan by NVN Charge today.
"(1) The Government of the DRV has declared itself ready to name its representative with the rank of Ambassador to contact the representative of the U.S. at Phnom Penh or Warsaw in order to prepare for official conversations. World public opinion has warmly welcomed this correct attitude and demanded that the U.S. answer promptly the proposal of the DRV Government.
"But the American side, although it has repeatedly declared itself 'ready to go anywhere' for conversations, has made condition after condition for the choice of a site. It has, besides, suggested places incompatible with its own conditions.
"On April 23, 1968, the American side has raised a new question, suggesting that the two sides engage in private discussions about the places and the date of contact and consequently should choose in addition a site for these private conversations.
"As a sign of good will the Government of the DRV gave instructions to its Ambassador at Warsaw to be prepared to enter into discussions with the American Ambassador regarding the place and the date of conversations, but the American side refused.
"(2) Since the declaration of April 3, 1968 of the Government of the DRV, preliminary contacts should have been undertaken leading to official conversations between the two parties but the U.S. Government has deliberately engaged in dilatory maneuvers./7/ In the face of the situation the Government of the DRV believes that official conversations between Hanoi and Washington should take place immediately. The Government of the DRV has decided to name Minister Xuan Thuy as its representative to engage in official conversations with the representative of the USG to determine with the American side the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other American acts of war against the DRV, and to have subsequently conversations on the problems of interest to the two sides. The Government of the DRV favorably receives the attitude of the French Government which is disposed to offer Paris as a place for conversations between the DRV and the U.S., as the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Couve de Murville, declared on April 18, 1968. The Government of the DRV considers that Paris, as well as Phnom Penh and Warsaw, is a suitable place for the official conversations between both sides. These official conversations will begin on May 10, 1968, or several days thereafter.
/7/The United States had deemed acceptable the Indonesian offer of a peace ship in the Tonkin Gulf, but the DRV rejected it the following day. (Telegrams 156173 to Djakarta, May 1, and telegram 6429 from Djakarta, May 2; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In a memorandum to the President, May 1, 12:50 p.m., Rostow noted that the Indonesians were "selling the idea in Hanoi in part on the grounds that our Allies could be excluded." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6G(6), Talks with Hanoi)
May 3, 1968"/8/
/8/Telegram 157530 to Seoul, Manila, Bangkok, Canberra, and Wellington, May 3, notified the Embassies of the DRV message. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) Telegram 157542 to Vientiane, May 3, instructed Sullivan to deliver the following message "at once" to the DRV Embassy: "The USG accepts the time and place proposed by the Government of the DRV in its note of May 3." (Ibid.) The DRV acknowledged this acceptance in a hand-delivered note to the Embassy in Vientiane. (Ibid.) In telegram JCS 4785 to Sharp and Westmoreland, May 3, Wheeler informed them of the DRV message and cautioned about a possible military offensive by the enemy prior to the start of negotiations, noting that "a bloody repulse of some spectacular initiative by NVA/VC forces" would serve to strengthen the U.S. negotiating position. (Ibid., RG 407, Litigation Collection, Westmoreland v. CBS, MACV Backchannel Messages to Westmoreland, 1-31 May 1968)
Sullivan
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