Paris, May 20, 1968, 1820Z.

14365. Delto 100. Subject: Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Zorin./2/

1. After considerable squirming in an effort to induce Governor Harriman over to Soviet Embassy, Ambassador Zorin (accompanied by First Secretary Bogomolov) finally came to lunch May 19 with Governor Harriman and Ambassador Shriver at latter's residence. Zorin was cordial enough in his own stiff way, but as expected he kept himself within the strict limits of Soviet public position, and consequently nothing resulted from meeting on matters of substance.

2. Governor Harriman set forth the US position, emphasizing the important unilateral step taken by the President in his speech of March 31st, and explaining that US could go no further without some indications of restraint by Hanoi. He noted our disappointment that rather than restraint, Hanoi had increased flow of troops and material to the South. He said that meeting in Paris resulted from the President's initiative and was based on Hanoi's acceptance of the President's statement in March 31 speech. Instead of discussing substance of what would be necessary to permit the US to stop the bombing completely, Hanoi representatives were simply using the meeting to make propaganda.

3. Zorin's reply, repeated throughout conversation with little variation, was that North Vietnamese position was clear (and was supported by USSR): no further steps could be taken or even discussed until US unconditionally stopped bombings of DRV. North Vietnamese came to Paris not on basis of the President's March 31st speech, but on basis their own declaration of April 3rd;/3/ they were not bombing US, US was bombing them, and nothing could be done until this stopped. Harriman disputed this and pointed out that even in Hanoi's April 3 statement and others since, Hanoi had indicated each time that they expected some discussions prior to a decision by US to stop bombing completely.

4. Zorin was not responsive to any suggestions made by Governor Harriman and Ambassador Shriver to get talks out of current impasse. When Governor Harriman suggested possibility of private informal meeting with North Vietnamese, perhaps with Soviets present, Zorin said anything like that was "far off." Ambassador Shriver said rather than some formal agreement, perhaps one could envisage private understandings, maybe even some informal listing of steps that might be taken as first measures; what was fundamental was that in order to stop bombing US had to have some view of road ahead. Zorin merely replied that "US should be under no illusions," that whatever the forum, Hanoi would not move ahead until bombing stopped. In repeating this he added at one point that he did not believe that unless bombing was stopped Hanoi would make any moves before US elections.

5. In response to this, Governor Harriman emphasized that if Hanoi did not show some restraint, US as a military necessity could not continue bombing restraint indefinitely and might have to resume unlimited bombing again and perhaps other measures. (This was stated not as threat but as a consequence that might follow from Hanoi's continued delays.)

6. Recalling that Kosygin had assured him the USSR wanted to see fighting stopped in Vietnam, Governor Harriman spoke of USSR's influence in Hanoi and emphasized role USSR could play in helping talks out of current impasse in direction of settlement. To this end Governor Harriman said he wished to have frank dealings with Zorin and others in Soviet Embassy, and was prepared to call on Soviet Ambassador at his Embassy at a later stage, particularly as American Embassy was surrounded by press. While conceding nothing on substance and reiterating that unconditional US bombing cessation was essential first step, Zorin agreed emphatically that contacts should continue, both through himself and also through Soviet Minister Oberemko and Bogomolov with others from US side.

Shriver

Washington, May 21, 1968.

ATTENDING THE MEETING
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson

Mr. Rostow: We have an urgent matter to decide with reference to tomorrow's instructions to our representatives in Paris. The point is on total cessation vs. partial cessation.

Secretary Rusk. The word "cessation" means total. Harriman told Zorin in meetings and word may get around to NVA./2/ I would not put it to the NVA in general meeting tomorrow and let it get around to NVA indirectly.

Secretary Clifford: I had not seen the cables before. This is a bad time to come out with a threat. I would do it privately first in any case.

Director Helms: Communists believe things said privately. They do not believe things said publicly.

General Wheeler: It could be taken as an ultimatum.

The President: It's o.k. to say it privately. That's o.k. with me if you want to. Where are we in Paris and Moscow?

Secretary Rusk: The NVA has three illusions they follow:

(1) No NVA troops in South--fraudulent.

(2) Crest of NVA military success in South--misinformed.

The President: Could it be true?

Secretary Rusk: They believe they are in strong position. They may be misinformed.

(3) Third point is that world opinion will force us to accept major change in policy.

(4) We do not have governmental pressure on us.

(5) World opinion won't make us change our course.

I do not think we should change our course. NVA has already discredited itself in Paris with contention they have no troops in the South.

We should see what they are willing to do if we will stop the bombing.

We may get something out of talks in Moscow, but we doubt it. Stewart goes there tomorrow night.

Bombing between 19th and 20th parallels--should we move in? Let's hear the CIA paper on the situation between the 19th and 20th.

Director Helms:

(1) Continued flow of supplies

(2) Increase in flow of ammunition

(3) No flights since 11 May of MIGs at airfield

(4) AA situation is same

(5) Infiltration continues as before

General Wheeler: All of North Vietnam show 97,000 North Vietnam on move into Laos or South Vietnam. [sic] Peak seems somewhere in July. High level of reconstruction--lines of communication and supply plants. South of the 20th parallel, 5 or 6 battalions of SAMs and light anti-aircraft extended.

Evidence bears out conclusion they are stepping up their capabilities, both in the South and defending itself in the North. Therefore, we should resume between 19th and 20th parallels. There are political considerations you must take into account./3/

Secretary Clifford: I feel same as last week. We have had a good week. We had to go through this week. We are in a better posture in standpoint of world and domestic opinion. The opponents have been inflexible. Have not sought to seek means of agreement. We have given image of nation seeking peace. They have given impression of nation seeking only propaganda.

Second, they weakened themselves with ridiculous statement about not having troops in the South. We will continue to improve our position. I would not want to jeopardize our position just now by bombing between the 19th and 20th parallels.

San Antonio formula has been overtaken by events. We are in a sound position now. We must ask them to do something to match our restraint. If we were to extend bombing we might have problem of them insisting that we stop all our bombing. Negotiations have gone on for only 10 days. They may do something serious. They may find out their strategy is not working well. We must watch to make sure we do not change our position. We got North Vietnam to the bargaining table by the President's offer of moderate restraint./4/

There is no particular pressure on us at the present time. I know of no pressure to extend bombing by Congress, by public, by press.

Life Editors think the President is on the right track.

The next general approach--the targets are not worth it. They have not been using the airfield. It does not constitute clear and present danger to us now.

South of the 19th parallel, there are 50 new trans-shipment points. Benefit of bombing is only temporary.

South of the 19th parallel our methods are effective. We had 3,000 sorties in February, 5,000 in March, 7,000 in April and 9,000 in May.

General Maxwell Taylor's memo says resumption of bombing is available at any time./5/ We should use this only when it would produce maximum effect in Paris.

The last point, as long as matters proceed this way, it is important to help keep talks going from political standpoint.

I urge us to keep talks going

--keep bombing off 19th and 20th parallels

--keep talks going

Secretary Rusk: I hate to freeze to the 19th ourselves. We should not have dramatic attack, but we could engage MIGs. I would recommend route reconnaissance across the 19th parallel.

We should not have rigid limits on the 19th. I would take two steps of route reconnaissance and engaging MIGs.

The President: I agree with you, Dean.

Secretary Clifford: We voluntarily limited ourselves to the 19th. We have made progress in Paris. I do not want to shift our positions. I think it is worth postponing for another week.

It doesn't help us to do this. We are waiting for them to de-escalate. The heat is on them. If we go back in, we remove some of this heat.

The President: How long can we go on with 19th without getting trapped into never being able to do anything above the 19th?

I think our force brought them to table, not our eloquence of March 31. All we are doing now is to let them build it back up.

There are advantages to our bombing between the 19th and 20th.

Their terror hasn't blown up the peace conference.

We have a duty to try to stop all we can from coming into the South.

I never thought we would stay out of 19th and 20th. I think we should do it if it's to our military advantage.

I am under the impression military people feel very strongly that we should bomb up to the 20th. Isn't that right?

Wheeler: (Nodded "yes".)

Secretary Clifford: That is right. Military does feel that way. We haven't had any incidents above the 20th which would upset the talks. I do not think it would substantially reduce the flow if we went up to the 20th more than 20% or 25%. We are doing a good job south of the 19th parallel.

The benefit does not warrant the chance or the risk; it will make it more difficult for him to take a step down.

The President: The longer we stay out, doesn't that make it more difficult to go back?

Secretary Clifford: No.

Secretary Rusk: I think it does make it more difficult.

Secretary Clifford: I happen not to agree with that.

The President: Buzz, what do you think?

General Wheeler: Militarily, it is a hub of communications and trans-shipment points. You have heavy 1-A leading out.

I would dispute fact they could replace Than Hoa.

Between the 17th and 19th parallels, there are smaller trans-shipment points, POL facilities, etc. Rear depots are large (Haiphong and Hanoi).

Selected items shipped to forward depots. South of that, they have distribution points. There is a big concentration in Hanoi and Haiphong. Next biggest, Theu Huoi and Vien. Then the smallest ones are southward.

Militarily, you should go ahead.

Political factors may outweigh this.

The President: Do we suffer from this restraint?

General Wheeler: To a degree. It's not quantifiable. The enemy gains when you permit him to put supplies close to the lines safely.

The President: How much do we suffer in Hanoi and Haiphong--not striking them?

General Wheeler: Military price is going up. Weather is clearing. From the 1st to the 15th monsoon changes. Good bombing until mid-September. We have had six clear days for bombing in May.

The President: Clark, how long would you wait?

Secretary Clifford: My approach is pragmatic. We made practical decision not to go above 19th to avoid incidents above 20th.

The President: I thought we decided to lay off for awhile until things cooled off. I thought we pulled back to appeal to Fulbright after first thing we did was to bomb right up to the 20th the day after the March 31 statement.

I think every day the clock is ticking.

Mr. Rostow: Issue in Paris is whether we can be pushed into another unilateral action toward total cessation of bombing.

Second, Harriman told Soviet ambassador we cannot sit indefinitely. It would give us some credibility to move forward a bit.

Secretary Clifford: I think a sufficient answer to them is refusal to stop the bombing--we don't need to move it forward.

I do not want to take action which will produce minimal results. Perhaps we will take only 1,000 of 4,000 tons out.

The President: I don't want to go on doing this. Everything we do is not total. North Vietnam may misread this as a voluntary act of foolishness.

Secretary Clifford: I feel this deeply. I do not want to appear stubborn.

The President: Shouldn't we stop what we can? What rewards have we gotten from this? Haven't we let more men and ammunition get through because of this?

Secretary Clifford: It is entirely possible.

The President: When was the last strike on Hanoi?

General Wheeler: The last strike was on April 1.

Secretary Rusk: I would be against dramatic strike. I would be for planes doing something--route reconnaissance or air to air or hit coastal shipping.

Secretary Clifford: You can go up to the 20th when conditions warrant.

The tone of last week has been general support for your policy. Something will come out of Paris conference. I hope so.

With limitations placed on the military, we have no real plans to win the war. If you limit--

--no invasion into the north

--no mining of harbors

--no invasion of sanctuaries

Then I do not believe you can win militarily.

Our hopes must go with Paris.

Enemy controls the situation in the South.

--they can hit and run

--they can attack cities

--they can control casualties

We can hope only for success in Paris. We are in a war we can't win.

In the fall of 1967, the North Vietnamese decided earlier plans were no good. They put their stack in. That was Tet. They didn't win. Now, they may have concluded it is a good time to have a political settlement.

They can't win war militarily. We can't win the war militarily.

The President: I disagree.

General Wheeler: I disagree to some extent.

Secretary Rusk: We have sought to keep North Vietnam from overtaking South Vietnam by force. We have succeeded in that.

Secretary Clifford: Hanoi cannot win the war militarily. They know that. That doesn't mean we have won it.

I do not believe they are going to give up that effort unless we reach some agreement in Paris. If Paris does not come off, we will be back where we were before. They are not running out of manpower. They can continue at rate indefinitely.

The Soviets and Chinese will continue to help them. We must settle at Paris. Otherwise, I do not see a conclusion ahead. I see it dragging on indefinitely.

We lost so many men. They don't seem to be bothered by their loss of men. We had a rapid erosion in support. March 31 changed all that.

We will start another period of erosion. I want to bring about a good result in Paris. We should not do anything in Vietnam.

Secretary Rusk: We will not get a solution in Paris until we prove they can't win in the South.

Secretary Clifford: They have already seen they can't win in the South. They have turned to Paris hoping for a political deal.

Secretary Rusk: It is worth their sending men to Paris in return for no bombing of the North. That is a real bonus.

The President: I will put it off again against my judgment. Let's wait until Wednesday. I think we should hit everything below the 20th parallel. Let's wait until Wednesday.

I like Dean's suggestion of planes out hitting certain targets.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo.]

On the Filipino engineering unit:

General Wheeler: They can't support it until June.

Secretary Clifford: They want to go down from 1,800 to 1,400.

General Wheeler: 70 per week isn't getting much attention.

The President: What is the progress with the Korean troops?

General Wheeler: South Korean Minister of Defense will be here next week.

Secretary Rusk: The Soviets want to sign NPT in Geneva.

The briefing of Presidential candidates was discussed.

On the state of the Strategic Reserves:

Secretary Clifford: We'll come back to you on that one.

The President: How are the expenditures running in the Department of Defense?

Secretary Clifford: About as expected.

Secretary Rusk: Are you saving any money by not bombing North Vietnam?

Secretary Clifford: Now, now--you can't put it on a cost basis. The B-52s really do cost.

The President: What do you think of our military situation in Vietnam, Buzz?

General Wheeler: We are in a good position.

The President: Are we stronger or weaker?

General Wheeler: Stronger.

The President: Any problems with changes in South Vietnam government?

Secretary Rusk: I don't think so. It will represent 60% of the votes.

Washington, May 22, 1968, 10 a.m.

Mr. President:

You asked for my comments on Clark Clifford's memorandum of May 20 relating to Amb. Bunker's cable on an appropriate response in the North if Saigon is again attacked./2/

Clark's view is that: under the language of the March 31 speech an attack on Saigon does not fall under the category of matching restraint by Hanoi. He does not see a link between our cessation of bombing in the North and attack in the South on the cities. He believes that the restraint we should seek is a reduction in the flow of men and materiel from the North into the South.

He could have strengthened his formal argument, as others have done, by noting there is a certain danger in raising the question of how Hanoi uses its forces in the South, because on that basis they could try to restrict our military activities in the South.

What Clark does not deal with is the view--strongly felt in South Vietnam--that we could have serious morale problems among troops and civilian population in South Vietnam if two circumstances converge:

--A prolonged stalemate in Paris, with the bulk of North Vietnam a sanctuary;

--Another major attack on Saigon or Hue, or both.

In short, while Clark can make a perfectly good, logical and quasi-legal case, based on the language of the March 31 speech, he is not wrestling with a problem which could become more real with each passing day and which could become acute if, say, after another month of fruitless talks in Paris and another month of sanctuary in Hanoi-Haiphong, Saigon gets hit hard again with another 100,000 refugees, etc.

We must think about this problem very hard in the light of the two reports in the last day that Hanoi plans to stonewall in Paris until the Democratic nominee is chosen; and then stonewall further if that candidate is Sen. Robert Kennedy. The underlying postulate of Clark's view, as presented at lunch yesterday,/3/ is, I believe, this: We can hold a tolerable basis of support for our policy in Vietnam indefinitely if there are some kind of talks in Paris and, I would add, if U.S. casualty figures are not excessive. If Paris breaks up, he fears an erosion of U.S. support for the war.

It follows logically that he wishes to take absolutely no risk that we trigger an end to the Paris talks--or even give the other side any kind of credible excuse for breaking them up.

In turn, he is very anxious, therefore, to keep the bombing between the 19th and 20th parallels available as a riposte to another attack on Saigon, or something equivalent. I would guess that he feels they would not walk out if we replied by bombing up to the 20th; they would walk out if we resumed operations against Hanoi-Haiphong.

What Clark's analysis does not say, in my judgment, is what policy we should follow if there is no break in the Paris talks and if they continue to "read the telephone book" to us each time we meet. I doubt that we can sit still indefinitely under those circumstances.

But whatever I may think, the problem which should be systematically addressed is this: What are our alternatives if we face a telephone-book strategy in Paris until the Democratic convention plus a telephone-book strategy until November if Senator Kennedy is nominated in Chicago, plus a telephone-book strategy until the end of January 1969 if Sen. Kennedy should be elected in November. Our options are roughly these:

--to hold bombing to the 19th parallel;

--to move bombing to the 20th parallel;

--to resume bombing on the old pattern in Hanoi-Haiphong;

--to resume bombing in Hanoi-Haiphong plus other measures which might force Hanoi and its allies to an earlier decision.

I have in mind, for example, mining the North Vietnamese harbors and/or sending some of our forces northward across the DMZ./4/

All the current indicators are that Hanoi does not now plan to negotiate seriously with us, on the basis of your March 31 speech; but these current indicators may not be correct. They may be putting out the Bobby Kennedy stories because they feel that we are so anxious to get a settlement soon that this might force us to soften our position on a further unilateral de-escalation. We might get something out of Stewart's talks in Moscow./5/

Nevertheless, I believe it appropriate that, on a contingency basis, we begin to examine the options open to us if they continue simply to stonewall in Paris.

Walt

Washington, May 22, 1968, 12:15-1:10 p.m.

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the political situation in France.]

The President: Asked Under Secretary Katzenbach to comment on the talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: We are still in the propaganda phase. We have made serious proposals but have received no answer from the North Vietnamese who even refuse to acknowledge there are any North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. The Hanoi representatives are prepared to stay in Paris and even read the telephone directory if necessary to keep nonproductive talks going for a long time.

The President: The North Vietnamese made a pretty good trade. They get partial suspension of the bombing for merely sitting and talking in Paris.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: The fate of the discussions in Paris turns on the military situation in Vietnam.

The President: Why is Secretary Clifford optimistic?

Secretary Clifford: We are making progress in the talks in Paris.

a. The Paris talks are a propaganda-plus for us. The North Vietnamese public posture is suffering. Ambassador Harriman is taking a reasonable and positive position, resulting in public opinion gains for us. The absurd position taken by the North Vietnamese concerning their refusal to acknowledge that their troops are in South Vietnam is hurting them. This will lose them public support.

b. It is important that we have forced the North Vietnamese to talk even though we are still bombing a part of North Vietnam. For three years Hanoi has said it would not do this. In addition, the interdiction bombing which we are now doing is causing them more damage than our previous bombing program.

c. Hanoi has not issued an ultimatum stating that it would break up the Paris talks unless all of our bombing of North Vietnam stops./2/

It is doubtful that the Paris talks were a good deal for the North Vietnamese. Our interdiction efforts continue and we are in a position to try for a deal more advantageous to us.

The North Vietnamese came to Paris to negotiate seriously. They hope to erode support for the war in the United States by causing high U.S. casualties. They will fail in this. They will conclude that they cannot prevail militarily and will then seek to negotiate a political solution of the war./3/

The President: Asked for a study from CIA within the next two weeks which would be sent to the JCS for their comment, giving: a.

present rate of North Vietnamese losses and the length of time they can support such losses; b. the quality of the men being infiltrated into South Vietnam and the training they have received; and c. the number of officers available to them, i.e., the accuracy of reports that the North Vietnamese have a shortage of officers./4/

USIA Director Marks: World press reaction to the Paris talks has been good. A study made by USIA of the world press supports this conclusion./5/

[Omitted here is discussion of Germany and European security issues.]

The President: Turning again to Vietnam, asked for a joint State/Defense/CIA paper recommending what policy should be followed if there is no break in the Paris talks./6/ The options are to hold the bombing of North Vietnam down to the 19th parallel as is now being done, move the bombing up to the 20th parallel, return to the bombing pattern we had before March 31, or return to the pre-March 31 bombing pattern, plus intensification.

There is no evidence that the North Vietnamese will negotiate seriously. They will do no more than remain in Paris to talk rather than negotiate until the next Administration takes over. We should be cautious and not say anything which might divide us from our South Vietnamese, Australian, Korean, and Philippine allies.

Ho Chi Minh's objectives are to divide us from our allies and to divide us at home.

We should be cautious in making statements about what we expect to come out of the Paris talks. UK Foreign Minister Stewart may get something during his coming visit to Moscow. We are not making much progress. However, the North Vietnamese cannot do a Panmunjom, i.e., talk endlessly without progress, because time will run out on them on January 20 when a new Administration comes in.

Bromley Smith

Washington, May 23, 1968.

SUBJECT
Negotiations

It does not appear to me that we are preparing either Hanoi or our own and the international public for an action which I feel sure we will have to take in Paris in the near future. We are reacting far too little, it seems to me, to actions of Hanoi in raising the level of military action in South Viet-Nam while heckling us to stop the bombing. By our quiescence, we seem to accept as a matter of course the continued high rate of enemy infiltration and repeated acts of accentuated violence--I am thinking particularly of the recent shelling of Saigon for which there has been no reprisal and, indeed, no strong protest to indicate that we take these things seriously. In their fight-talk campaign, the other side is increasing the fighting in the South while trying to talk us out of our freedom to retaliate in the North.

We have three readily available responses to Hanoi's increasing belligerence and to the intransigence of their negotiators at the conference table. The first is to resume bombing back to the 20th parallel. The second is to bomb throughout all North Viet-Nam as we did prior to March 31. The third is to go beyond former bombing levels and include therein the mining of Haiphong harbor.

The timing of these steps is, of course, of great importance as is the preparation of public acceptance for them. I believe that the first step, bombing to the 20th parallel, should be taken now and the fact acknowledged as soon as the press raises the question. Concurrently, we should communicate privately to the Hanoi representatives what we have already said to Zorin with regard to our inability to continue to limit our bombing to the 20th parallel without prompt evidence of restraints on their side. At the same time, we should make clear to the Hanoi representatives in Paris that they are wasting their breath in calling for a total cessation until they match the restraint which we have already shown.

With the warning on the official record, we should then make repeated public statements explaining and justifying what we may have to do. About a week after the warning, in the absence of a conciliatory move from them, we should resume our pre-March 31 pattern of bombing. A further expansion of the bombing would remain for the time being an ace in the hole.

In my judgment, these tough positions are inevitable and the sooner we take them and establish our firmness with the other side, the sooner we can get on to serious business.

I would not worry too much about a possible walk-out by our adversaries, although we can expect them to threaten it and even go through the motions. In the Panmunjom negotiations, you will recall that there was a prolonged break because of inability to agree on the issue of the involuntary repatriation of prisoners of war, but eventually the other side gave in and came back. In the Paris negotiations, I would anticipate similar gestures but also a similar capitulation if we keep a remorseless military pressure on them throughout.

M.D.T.

Saigon, May 23, 1968, 1030Z.

28053. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my fifty-second weekly message.

1. The last week was noteworthy for a number of items:

2. On May 18th President Thieu announced the resignation of the Loc Cabinet, his decision to reorganize the government, his invitation to Tran Van Huong to serve as Prime Minister and Huong's acceptance. In an excellent brief speech Thieu paid tribute to the accomplishments of the Loc government, sought to set at rest unfounded rumors which had been circulating about the attitude of the military, the Buddhists, the Southern separatists, and threatened discriminations against Northerners. He made it clear that he had no intentions of replacing the corps commanders, that he would not tolerate discrimination in any form and called attention to the fact that the Congress, representing the whole people, exercised supervision over the activities and effectiveness of the government. He called on people of all persuasions to extend comprehension and assistance to the new government in the common cause.

3. Tran Van Huong is now engaged in intensive consultations with a broad range of political figures, clearly hoping to establish as wide a base as possible for his new Cabinet. Thieu told me yesterday that he will be meeting again in the afternoon with Huong to go over the Cabinet list, that they have planned to talk with Vice President Ky today, and that he hoped to announce the new government by Friday or Saturday at the latest./2/ It is planned to reduce the Cabinet from the 17 to 13 or 14 and to set up a smaller group, in the nature of a war cabinet, consisting of Thieu, Ky, the Prime Minister and two or three others who will meet daily to deal with urgent matters and see that decisions are implemented. Thieu indicated that most effective of the present Ministers would be retained, though not necessarily in the same positions: Lu-Y (Health), Sieu (Transport), Tri (Revolutionary Development), Vy (Defense), Tinh (Finance), and possibly others. Huong has been at some pains to make clear the fact that he wants to put together a balanced team in terms of regions and other interest groups.

4. Reaction to the Huong appointment continues to come in and is generally favorable, although there are some who prefer to reserve their views until the composition of the Cabinet is known. Huong has a reputation for personal integrity, honesty, toughness, and a fighter against corruption; he also has a reputation for stubbornness, of which Thieu is aware but which he believes will not prevent their working well together. Thieu told me a week ago that Huong's concern was that he be given enough leeway to work to the end of more effective and honest government. Thieu is prepared to do this and said that he had gone through a long list and "the fact is there is no one to appoint Prime Minister except Huong."

5. In addition to the generally favorable comment on Huong's appointment it was encouraging that one of the leading extremist Buddhist figures, Thich Phap Tri, denied publicly that the An Quang group was opposed to Huong, and in fact expressed satisfaction at the appointment.

6. Unfortunately, as so often in the past, there has been irresponsible reporting on the appointment of the new Cabinet. The reports of a serious crisis or showdown between Thieu and Ky over the Huong appointment appears to be lacking in foundation. While Ky is unhappy over developments, because of Huong's known independence, I know of no evidence that he will attempt to do anything to obstruct it./3/ In fact it is reported that the conversation Huong had with Ky last Tuesday/4/ went very well, and that Huong handled it with tact and skill. The AP story of May 17 which predicted a Thieu-Ky showdown over the appointment of the new Cabinet was written by a new correspondent recently arrived in Viet-Nam after some years of service in Latin America who accepted at face value one of the countless rumors always circulating in Saigon.

7. That Hanoi's current strategy is an all out effort, militarily and psychologically, to strengthen its hand in negotiations continues to be evident. While as I reported in my last message/5/ the enemy's major attack on Saigon was broken off, he is covering his withdrawal with a series of rocket and mortar attacks on a variety of targets. This has included indiscriminate firing at Saigon in the early morning hours of May 19 and additional mortar and rocket attacks against the capitals of Ba Xuyen, Dinh Tuong, and Binh Thuan Provinces early on May 21.

8. The indiscriminate attacks on civilians in Saigon have had an impact in psychological terms as well as added to the list of dead, wounded, and homeless. Three Vietnamese police and three civilians are known dead; 32 civilians and one American soldier are reported wounded; and some 500 people have had their homes destroyed. The home of Nguyen Luu Vien, Deputy Prime Minister in Ky's last Cabinet, was hit by a 122 mm. rocket just after he had gotten his family awake and downstairs. He and his family suffered scratches but were otherwise unhurt. He dismissed the attack as blind terror designed to impress world opinion as proving that the Communists are masters in South Viet-Nam. Nguyen Phu Duc, an advisor to President Thieu, had an experience very similar to Vien's.

9. In our fifth joint discussion on problems of negotiations yesterday morning Thieu gave his estimate of Hanoi's objectives and brought up a subject which is obviously of increasing concern to the GVN, i.e., how long the present situation of a partial bombing halt with no reciprocity can be allowed to go on./6/

10. Thieu said that the VC/NVA is "testing our patience" and are in no hurry to engage in serious talks. They mean to exploit the partial bombing halt for as long as possible in order to increase infiltration and to mount new large scale attacks. He was concerned that the death and destruction which is daily visible in the cities would have a cumulative psychological impact on the people. Statistics of VC/NVA losses (which the enemy can still afford in any case) make little impression on most people, but the destruction of their homes is evident. Their faith in the government strength and capacity to protect them from these attacks will more and more be sapped. Thieu believed that within another month the enemy would probably launch another major attack, and would continue harassment of the cities in order to discredit the GVN and attempt to create an uprising against it.

11. Thieu felt that the talks so far in Paris have been favorable to our side and that we should use the time to attract international support, but should be careful not to allow our patience to be misread as weakness. He expressed the view that Hanoi would attempt to measure our patience and to exploit the us political situation; that they might attempt to await the development of our political campaign to form a judgment as to the desirability of moving toward a settlement or of awaiting installation of a new administration. He added that though this question was of great concern to him, he thought that we could "wait a while, but not too much longer," before putting a time limit on Hanoi's delaying tactics at Paris. Do observed that the enemy was clearly "taking advantage" already of the partial cessation.

12. Thieu, Ky and Do have all commented favorably on the performance of our delegation at Paris, and especially on Ambassador Harriman's statements.

13. It is also increasingly apparent that Hanoi's current strategy of all out effort to strengthen its hand for a political settlement is directed at the countryside as well as the cities. Documentary evidence shows that the enemy is placing new emphasis on destroying the local GVN administrative structure, and on setting up a VC administration in its place. His effort to strengthen his apparent political base in the cities by organizing front groups is being supplemented by a campaign to organize rural "liberation committees" at provincial, district, village, and hamlet levels. This effort, I think, is designed among other things to reinforce the NLF claim to such wide control over the people in the countryside as to justify a major role for it in a coalition government.

14. The other side of the coin, however, is the evidence disclosed by recent documents and interrogations of some of the senior Communist officers who have rallied recently. These have brought out a number of signs of growing Communist morale problems in the wake of their heavy losses and defeats during the Tet and May offensives. LTC Tran Van Dac, a political officer in the area north of Saigon, states that allied air and artillery strikes have caused severe mental tension among Communist troops and cadres. Problems of supply and the evident discrepancy between VC propaganda and the reality regarding both ARVN/allied fighting spirit and the extent of popular support for the VC have also had a depressing effect on morale. Another report indicates that most of the people living in VC controlled areas are weary and that the VC promises to bring an end to the war this year will have a disastrous effect on morale if this does not occur. A result of this attitude has been an increase in desertions out of fear of combat losses and an overwhelming desire for survival inspired by the recent peace negotiations. Against this background of declining morale a document captured in Binh Duong Province prepared by the chief of the political staff of an element subordinate to COSVN emphasizes that the purpose of the peace talks, as the Communists see it, is to confirm the defeat of the allies and a VC victory. It states that nothing can be expected from diplomatic debates unless a major military victory is achieved. Consequently VC personnel must not let themselves be lured by peace illusions but most support peace negotiations by fighting harder to achieve more decisive victories; a significant contrast between the mood at the top and in the lower ranks which speaks for itself.

[Omitted here is discussion of pacification, urban recovery, and additional political, economic, and military issues.]

Bunker

Washington, May 24, 1968, 1913Z.

170294/Todel 220. Ref: Paris 14616./2/ UK Embassy passed this morning to Secretary identical text contained reftel, which we have repeated separately to Ambassador Thompson and Bruce.

In addition, following message from Stewart was conveyed to Secretary:/3/

"I was very glad to have the message David Bruce passed me on Monday./4/ It was also most valuable to have the opportunity of discussing the course the talks have taken in Paris with Sullivan and Davidson./5/ Both of these 'briefs' were helpful when we were preparing for my present visit to Moscow.

Pat Dean will be giving your people a detailed account of my talks with Gromyko here today. He was perfectly friendly and relaxed but it was clear to me that he had no insight into how the North Vietnamese in Paris intend to play their hand. His presentation to me of the North Vietnamese position was entirely orthodox and uncompromising. Under pressure he fell back on the basic thesis that the United States was the aggressor and therefore it fell to the U.S. to make all moves towards the next stage in the talks in Paris.

I made it clear that I thought it perfectly reasonable for the United States to insist on some measure of restraint by the North Vietnamese before the United States could proceed to an unconditional cessation of the bombing of the North. I said that I thought this indication could best come by an act of de-escalation in the DMZ. The Americans were not seeking a more favorable position but they could not accept a less favorable one. If Hanoi would act in this way it would remove the first block to progress in Paris and we could then go forward to deal with the many other difficult questions which remained. As regards an eventual political settlement I said that the U.S. wanted to ensure that the people of South Vietnam had a free choice. I warned Gromyko that he could not count on a static political situation in the United States. If there were no visible response from Hanoi to the pull-back in the bombing and U.S. soldiers were to be in danger, there would be a serious risk of a movement of U.S. opinion which could make the situation much worse.

This could be a most important turning point for better or for worse. If Hanoi were to ignore this factor and let this opportunity slip they would bear a very heavy responsibility.

Gromyko listened very carefully to all this. His response was unsympathetic and routine. He drew a distinction between official and public opinion in the United States and professed to doubt whether opinion in America would allow the Government to take a tough line again.

I have no reason to doubt that he will pass on a full account of these exchanges to the North Vietnamese.

As a parting shot Gromyko made it absolutely clear that the convening of the Geneva Conference or any other similar conferences was totally 'unrealistic in present circumstances.' I did not take him to mean however that he was not content to keep the co-chairmanship on ice and he did not dissent when I reminded him of the communique issued after the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow when we agreed to do all we could 'jointly or singly.'

We brought home no bacon today. At the same time I am sure it is right to keep pegging away at the Russians both in order to keep them, as they would wish to be, in the picture and because I am sure that they cannot afford not to pass on all that I said to Hanoi and Xuan Thuy in Paris."/6/

Rusk

Paris, May 25, 1968, 1749Z.

14709/Delto 154. From Harriman.

1. I called on Zorin at his Embassy this morning for about an hour's talk, accompanied by Embassy officer Perry. Young Bogomolov interpreted./2/

2. In reply to my question, Zorin admitted he had instructions to keep in contact with me in accordance with my suggestion to Dobrynin. I said I felt sure Soviet Government wished to see fighting stopped, and therefore I would tell him frankly of our impressions of our conversations to date. I described the futility of across-the-room highly publicized speeches, and Hanoi representative's refusal of my suggestion to undertake unpublicized discussions. I suggested that he might wish to encourage the NVN delegation to have informal contacts with us through a member of the delegation or staff. He said this was impossible until we stopped bombing.

3. After some discussion, he asked whether I suggested contacts between one member each of the delegations, or more than one. I replied either, and urged him to think over my suggestion.

4. He gave me the usual line, handed Stewart by Gromyko./3/ I explained in detail that we considered the President's March 31 speech the basis for our meeting, and rejected the idea that the only reason for meeting was to learn the hour and date of bombing cessation. I said that if this was all, no meeting would have been necessary. I explained our interpretation of the language of Hanoi's April 3 statement, which proposed "contacts with the view of determining with the American side" etc. I told him we had constantly been ready to talk about the cessation of bombing, but would insist upon discussing at the same time relevant matters on the basis of the President's speech.

5. One point of a little less rigidity on his part came when I said we would not insist on an agreement for restraint, that we would accept signs of restraint instead of words. He seemed interested in this and asked whether we had made this clear to the other side. I said yes, but if he thought there was any doubt I would make it clear again on Monday,/4/ but suggested he might wish to bring this to their attention as well. I explained that unfortunately Hanoi had thus far increased the movement South and the action around the DMZ, rather than shown any signs of restraint. When he refused to pass any messages to NVN representatives as intermediary, I said that I wasn't asking him to tell me what he was going to do, but that I would assume that in accordance with his instructions he would bring this to the attention of the other side./5/

6. Several times, when he stated Hanoi's rigid position, I said that if the North Vietnamese maintained that attitude I thought the situation would become dangerous. I made no threats, but emphasized the kind of pressure the President would be under from public opinion, which would complain that Hanoi, while enjoying a limitation of bombing, was not talking seriously or showing restraint.

7. The best I can say is that Zorin was somewhat less argumentative and at least listened courteously. He will certainly report our talks to Moscow.

Harriman

Washington, May 25, 1968.

SUBJECT
Possible Changes in our Bombing Pattern

Paris 14694,/2/ just received, seems to me to make excellent sense. It suggests we initiate selected bombing between the 19th and 20th about next Wednesday,/3/ to give a chance for us to convey a general warning message before then. I would add that I think we would make considerable gains in Saigon if we authorized Bunker to consult with Thieu before we actually took the step. Thieu would certainly agree, and this could be a safety valve on his general concerns.

On the question of resuming bombing north of the 20th, at any point, we have under way the project described in Tab A attached, and will have submissions Monday--on which we will try to base a decent summary analysis. In essence, it seems to all of us at this moment that resumption north of the 20th is not now an imminent issue. The difficult contingency would be a major attack in the Highlands and particularly a major attack on Da Nang or Hue. We should be getting our thoughts in order against these contingencies, and particularly looking at the one-shot option.

For your background, you might be interested in reading Tab B--an Agency draft evaluation of the whole situation--and Tab C, which is my own assessment of where we stand and my suggestion of how we might play the next 3-4 weeks in Paris./4/ The latter was pouched to Habib last night, and seems to be pretty generally agreed at staff levels here.

STATE-DEFENSE-CIA PROJECT

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION UNDER CERTAIN
ASSUMED CONDITIONS

Terms of Reference

The first assumption is that Hanoi continues to be totally inflexible in Paris and in particular to reject any form of reciprocal restraint in return for our stopping the bombing. This is a fixed assumption.

A second assumption--which may vary in degree--is that the North Vietnamese continue a high level of military action in the South. This might simply be scattered attacks all over the country, but there are indications that it may include a major offensive in the Highlands, an attack on Da Nang or Hue, and other such specific and identifiable major surges in offensive action.

A basic issue to be examined under the project is what course of action we should adopt in the face of such an assumed situation. The project should also examine timing factors that could affect when we undertook any of the possible courses of action.

The courses of action we are asked to examine are as follows:

Option A: Going on roughly as we are in Paris and other diplomatic channels registering only generalized indications that we cannot continue indefinitely to apply present restraints, and not changing our bombing pattern in the North./5/

Option B: Resuming bombing and other military action between the 19th and 20th parallels.

Option C: Hitting selected targets in Hanoi and Haiphong, on past patterns.

Option D: Hitting targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas, plus additional targets not previously struck in these areas and elsewhere north of the 20th.

Option E: In the event of a major enemy offensive action in the South, carrying out a one-time strike north of the 20th, directed at a major target or targets not previously struck.

For Options B-E, there is the clear question of how and to what degree we should progressively signal our impatience so that the change in pattern does not come as a total surprise.

In the succeeding individual pages, the key questions are listed, with assignments for initial draft contributions to be received not later than Monday noon.

Washington, May 25, 1968, 1:54 p.m.

ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON WERE

Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Director Helms
General Wheeler
Walt Rostow
Justice Fortas
General Taylor
George Christian

The President: We have received a wire from Ambassador Harriman./2/

Secretary Rusk: Vance told me on the phone he was a little reluctant about route reconnaissance. Cy prefers pinpoint.

The President: What about their air activity, Bus?

General Wheeler: They're carrying out an unprecedented number of training flights north of the 20th parallel, both with IL-28's and MIGs. They haven't been south of the 20th parallel since May 11.

Mr. Rostow: They're using Bonnie and Clyde pilots.

General Wheeler: They're hoping to take Danang and hold it for a day.

The President: What are the respective strengths there?

General Wheeler: We've got more horses than they have.

General Taylor: When General Westmoreland is here, make the maximum public relations use of him.

Secretary Rusk: Will there be a strategy change under Abrams?

General Wheeler: The pattern will be about the same. He may consolidate forces.

Mr. Rostow: Who will keep an eye on the ARVN?

General Wheeler: One of his staff.

The President: How will the new Vietnam Cabinet be received in the court of public opinion?

Secretary Rusk: I believe it will be plus marks--be stronger in terms of political solidarity.

The President: I'm afraid they're going to divide off Ky.

Secretary Rusk: He's taking wait and see attitude.

Director Helms: It is dangerous--Ky keeping his generals close to see if Thieu goes too far.

The President: Should Ky come here with Thieu? Ask Bunker to think about it./3/

Secretary Rusk: I don't believe we should have a joint session for Thieu. It won't do us any good.

The President: Clark, anything new to report?

Secretary Clifford: I was before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee./4/ There was a good deal of discussion about Paris and the bombing. They have a good understanding of what the Communists are up to. They seem to be relaxed about things.

(General Wheeler discussed the offensive action planned to disrupt enemy threat to Ben Het. It would involve some bombing and artillery in uninhabited area of Cambodia used for North Vietnam retreat.)/5/

Secretary Rusk: I need time to think about it--especially B-52s.

General Wheeler: I don't need a decision for several days. I would like to have it Monday or Tuesday./6/

Secretary Clifford: I see a military need, but concerned because of negotiations. Before we do it, let's talk to our representatives in Paris. Maybe we should have Vance back after the Monday meeting. We also can discuss with Cy the bombing north of the 19th parallel, and clear up the North Vietnamese interpretations.

General Taylor: That is a reasonable proposition.

Mr. Rostow: General Westmoreland envisions doing this after an attack across the Cambodian border. I don't think Hanoi would break up the talks.

Justice Fortas: Vance's return will be big publicity.

The President: We've got to lay some predicates for resuming if we have to. We've got to prepare for the day of reckoning. We're not informing people of what they're doing. You wait till we have some military disaster--that'll be it. They'd rather negotiate with Kennedy, McCarthy or Humphrey.

General Taylor: I'd go back to the 20th right now.

The President: Let's set predicate--we can't pop it all at once.

Secretary Clifford: The bombing sorties in North Vietnam are up from 3200 in February to 9100 in May.

The President: I want Rusk and Clifford to get together and figure out how to get back to the 20th parallel with little bombast.

The President: Let's have Vance come back.

To review:

1. Clark and Dean lay out program to get back to the 20th parallel.

2. Tell Cy to come back.

3. Meet again Tuesday--I've made up my mind on the 20th.

The President: Dean, what is your prediction on Paris?

Secretary Rusk: Not going to change in Paris till they've carried out more attacks in South Vietnam. We've got to play these things out. I don't think there'll be anything until July at least--they may wait for the August convention. The Rumanian Foreign Minister expressed the same view.

Director Helms: We believe the objectives of fight and talk are to bring down the South Vietnam government. I don't see any give in the North Vietnam position for some time.

Secretary Clifford: You made a generous offer in San Antonio to stop all bombing, yet they took the tougher offer on March 31. What happened in between? The big event was disappointment with Tet. I think they decided they couldn't succeed militarily. I think they're in Paris to seek a political settlement.

I believe something will come out of Paris. There's hope now on the part of the American people. If we do anything to wreck Paris--Bobby shoots up--public opinion goes against us. We need to keep the talks going through August 26. We may get bits and scraps by then. We must maintain the talks.

The President: Bus, are we in good shape now as we were when talks began?

General Wheeler: Better. We haven't lost much. It could worsen. They'll try to drag talks out to keep bombing off their backs. You couldn't get them out of Paris with a team of oxen and bullwhips.

The President: What should we do?

General Wheeler: Fight--keep the pressure on. If we get an opportunity to hit them in Cambodia, do it./7/

General Taylor: They're combining political and military fronts.

Mr. Rostow: I'd go back to 20th after we talk to Cy--I'd begin to think about the way to settle the war by the end of the year. We ought to be thinking about the possibility of forcing this to a crisis. Get things rougher.

Secretary Rusk: I think bombing south of the 20th parallel more effective.

General Wheeler: I disagree.

Secretary Clifford: In concentrating attacks, we're doing a better job--In April 1967, 242 trucks; April 1968, 765 trucks knocked out. In Laos: April 1967, 138; April 1968, 1400.

General Wheeler: The 1967 figures do not reflect a better spotting and night vision this year.

Justice Fortas: The program you outlined seemed to be right. If it is important to move up to the 20th, move up. Should examine whether Paris platform is being used adequately for public education. For the moment, American people enraptured by the fact that talks are going on. I think both of us have to stay in Paris. But unless we react to the high casualty figures--in Paris, by Harriman--people will lose confidence.

Saigon, May 26, 1968.

FINAL ADVICE BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV

1. The most competent and honest officers should be installed as province and district chiefs. Your best fighters and disciplinarians should be placed in command of combat troops.

2. Insure that each commander takes a personal interest in the welfare of his troops and their dependents.

3. Continuously concentrate on timely intelligence and gear your organization to react immediately thereto, both with respect to enemy military elements and political infrastructure.

4. Take extraordinary steps to deny the enemy knowledge of your plans and operations.

5. Emphasize night operations to gain the initiative on the enemy and deny his freedom of movement.

6. Appreciate that the greatest gain that can be made with minimum resources is improvement in the performance and morale of the Regional and Popular Forces.

7. Give more emphasis to administrative and logistical support organizations that are essential to sustained combat operations.

8. Training must be a continuous process with more attention given to in-place classes and exercises when the tactical situation permits. Psy war and motivational training are essential parts of this program.

9. Pacification must be supported by all elements of the Government of Vietnam, of which the RVNAF is a major part. All soldiers must realize their important role and be required to assume always a proper, friendly and helpful attitude toward the people.

10. Maintain the offensive spirit!/2/

On May 27, 1968, the Special Subpanel of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) submitted a report to President Johnson entitled "The Effects of Air Strikes in North Vietnam and Laos." The PSAC report was based on an extensive review of government-wide studies of various aspects of the bombing campaign. The report noted that the bombing had not "significantly weakened the will of the North Vietnamese to carry on," interdiction had failed to prevent the enemy from increasing his capabilities, and the bombing in Laos had limited impact on the flow of men and materiel southward. "It is our judgment that with prudent planning the enemy should have been able to schedule and move supplies to South Vietnam at a rate which would accommodate the losses inflicted by the bombing campaign in North Vietnam," the authors of the report concluded. "We believe that factors other than our air campaign in North Vietnam will largely determine the scale of the war in South Vietnam in the future." None of the possible alternatives for continuing bombing appeared promising, as air attacks only in Laos and South Vietnam would likely be about as effective as more expanded attacks that included targets in North Vietnam. The authors recommended the development of integrated operational plans for air interdiction, procurement of better equipment, increased identification and analysis of the vulnerability of the North Vietnamese logistics system, a review of air-supported anti-infiltration operations, increased photographic reconnaissance of all of North Vietnam, and the continuation and improvement of electronic surveillance operations. (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968, 330 VIET 385.1 (Jan.-Dec.))

In CM-3402-68 to the President, June 17, General Wheeler noted the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the PSAC recommendations. (Ibid.) On June 21 Secretary of Defense Clifford transmitted Wheeler's memorandum to the President, as well as another memorandum containing the concurrence of himself and the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force. (Ibid.)

Paris, May 27, 1968, 1955Z.

14827/Delto 176. From Harriman.

1. I called on Zorin at 6 o'clock this evening for about an hour's talk./2/ We started by discussing the way the talks were going. In answer to his questions, I told him we were making no progress. I explained our position on basis for talks, and read him my statement at this morning's meeting on this subject./3/ I also pointed out my reference to no evidence of restraint which I had told him I would make clear to North Viet-Nam again.

2. This led to a discussion on the propriety of our asking restraints from the North Vietnamese, and I insisted again that North Vietnamese could not expect further restraints on our part, when in fact they were increasing their attacks on the northern provinces and pouring men and material to the South. Later I referred also to attacks on Saigon. I emphasized that the type of propaganda speeches by the North Vietnamese could not last indefinitely and again suggested that we might make progress if one or two from each side had informal private discussions. I expressed hope that he might find some way to put this thought into the North Vietnamese ear.

3. He defended the North Vietnamese position in the usual manner, and declined to make any suggestion to them. He did suggest, however, that we might propose private talks directly to them. He said they probably would not accept the proposal at first, but might later on, depending upon the progress of the official discussions.

4. I then recalled to him that in answer to his charge at our last meeting, I had denied any change in the pattern of US bombing./4/ I told him that the President had explained to Dobrynin on March 31st that the 20th parallel would be the limit of bombing, whereas in fact Zorin may have noticed that during the past month or more, there had been no attacks above the 19th parallel. Today, in order to keep him accurately informed, I had to tell him that the pattern might change because of the lack of restraint on the part of North Viet-Nam. Targets north of the 19th parallel might be hit to check the large flow of men and material to the South. I was not, however, suggesting any change from the position stated by the President to Dobrynin.

5. I told him I was disappointed in the exaggeration and falseness of the North Vietnamese statements. This was having a bad effect in the US and world wide because of their obvious fantasies. He commented that the North Vietnamese didn't think much of our position.

6. He was again cordial but dodged any responsibility. As he was so indefinite, I concluded by asking him to inform his government that I was worried by the arrogance and rigidity of the North Vietnamese attitude and to explain our concern./5/

Harriman

Washington, May 28, 1968, 8:30 a.m.

NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS

ATTENDING THE MEETING

The President
Secretary Clifford
General Taylor
Cyrus Vance
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Leonard Marks
George Christian
Walt Rostow
Robert McNamara
Justice Abe Fortas
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Tom Johnson

Prime Minister of Australia Gorton joined the meeting

Cyrus Vance: We believe the North Vietnamese are hurting, but they continue indefinitely. Here are our conclusions:

1. There should be no bombing north of the 20th parallel. Hanoi would break off talks.

2. We should consider bombing selectively north of the 19th parallel.

3. Ambassador Thompson should see Gromyko to back up Harriman's meeting with Zorin/2/ to tell the Soviets that unilateral restraint can go on only so long; that private talks are necessary.

/2/See Document 241.

4. We should keep all options open, specifically the option to go to the San Antonio formula.

More specifically:

5. They almost admitted the presence of troops in the South yesterday. We should continue to push them to admit this./3/

6. We should push hard on the North Vietnamese presence in Laos.

7. We should stay away from talks about Cambodia.

8. We must push them to admit the facts about civilian losses in Hue.

9. It is essential to probe for private conversations.

The President: Will they do anything until the convention?

Mr. Vance: That is most unlikely.

The President: Are they polite?

Mr. Vance: Polite, proper, but their words are very strong.

The President: Why do you think that we are getting the best of them in propaganda?

Mr. Vance: Based on the press, my talks, and reports.

Mr. Katzenbach: There may be a small degree of movement before the conventions that won't mean anything.

General Wheeler: We have identified 107,000 in infiltration groups--half of which are in location. Tonnages in May (1st 21 days): 4800 short tons, 8000 tons in April. The infiltration continues at an accelerating rate.

Mr. Katzenbach: Aren't most of these replacements?

Wheeler: Yes.

The President: They started 107,000 down. Westy estimates 106,000 killed.

General Taylor: These figures are well beyond replacement needs.

The President: 7,900 U.S., 400 Allies, 106,000 enemy.

Secretary Clifford: I doubt if the North Vietnam attach as much significance to our convention as we are. It is possible they will change position before three months. That's my guess.

We have a five-stage bombing campaign between the 19th and 20th. It is gradual. I have not favored going north of the 19th.

General Wheeler: Only stage 5 involves specific targets. We spotted 938 vehicles--almost a record high. Also, almost a record high waterborne craft.

The President: Why do JCS think we should be back between 19th and 20th?

General Wheeler: There are five points:

1. Organization of North Vietnamese supply network. From north to south, there are

general depots

forward depots

distribution points.

There are a number of supply areas between the 19th and 20th parallels.

2. People have to go through this area. Headquarters of rear services is in Than Hoa.

3. They have moved to the south a number of patrol boats. These could pose a threat to Naval forces.

4. Airfield north and west of Than Hoa. It was used the other day. It gives range well south of DaNang. Threatens B-52 missions.

General Taylor: I agree with Bus. From a political and psychological standpoint, these men won't be moved by eloquence and language.

The President: Do we gain a military advantage by going between the 19th and 20th?

General Taylor: Somewhat.

The President: What about the great propaganda advantage they will win--or breaking off negotiations?

General Taylor: We'll have to show what they are doing, too. They won't break off talks, as long as they want talks.

The President: I am not quite as optimistic as Clark and Cy about our position in the world opinion. We have such a good case. Look at what Ho is doing. Hitler in his prime day didn't do this.

Justice Fortas: The people in the U.S. infatuated with what is going on in Paris. They aren't reading what is going on in Saigon except casualty lists. We have two platforms:

1. Usual one

2. Paris platform.

The Paris platform is the best one. It is covered, here and abroad. We must show what North Vietnam is doing. For example, what we found at Hue./4/ Give them a detailed statement of what they have done in recent weeks. That type of groundwork is necessary.

Mr. McNamara: I am skeptical about North Vietnam planning their strategy around our conventions. They want to weaken us domestically. They want to weaken us militarily. We have never shown the world what they are doing. Let's push them on the ropes--use our intelligence data and release the data. Push the DMZ theme.

I have a different view of the military advantage to going back between the 19th and 20th. If we do it, tie it to psychological and political reasons. If it can help you at the conference table, do it.

Mr. Rostow: There is a limited military advantage to going back. We get more trucks. We tear up roads.

General Wheeler: We have better night vision devices. We have better forward air controllers.

Mr. Rostow: The major reason is political. It would show them in Paris we mean business.

General Wheeler: Westy says it would be useful to go back to the 19th and 20th area.

The President: Get up pros and cons of why we should go back.

Mr. Katzenbach: North Vietnam has an objective to destroy South Vietnamese government. Make South Vietnam government nervous.

I feel comfortable about this situation now. You have press on more pro-U.S. attitude. Country is not divided much on this. It is more united today than any time I can remember. I would not want to do anything to upset this situation.

The President: Two thirds of Congressmen will vote for $4 billion cut. All shudder at the thought of $6 billion. But it now looks like $6 [billion] is inevitable.

It will take $2 billion or $3 billion from DoD--non-Vietnam.

At 6 p.m. there will be a Joint Leadership meeting.

(At 9:45 a.m. Clifford and Wheeler departed.)

Mr. Katzenbach: You will have trouble going above the 19th in view of world opinion. It will be misinterpreted. It may hurt you on tax bill.

The President: We were foolish announcing we had restricted to the19th. On the tax increase, no Congressman wants to vote for taxes in a political year.

In summary, Cy, you have seen:

--No progress

--No give

--May not do anything before conventions.

Mr. Vance: We will proceed carefully and be patient.

(At 10 a.m. Prime Minister Gorton arrived at the meeting.)/5/

Mr. McNamara: There are three roles Australia can play:

1. Shows our people we are not alone. If U.S. is to play any role, Australia must stand alongside the U.S.

2. Economic role is important. States in area need economic assistance. Provides lever to get Japan to play greater economic role.

3. Military support to Malaysia. U.S. won't get support in Congress for unilateral role in Malaysia.

Mr. Katzenbach: Do people feel comfortable?

Prime Minister Gorton: Australia will stand with the United States in other areas. Australia will stand along in Malaysia and Singapore. We aren't large enough to stand there alone. Our presence would be small. It won't be backed up by England.

We have a couple of brigades. We lose what we've got if we don't get support. From public relations standpoint, it may be useful.

Mr. McNamara: Short of China moving, Australian support is important. U.S. will have mobility to move in.

General Taylor: Instability in Southeast Asia is great now. It will be greater when British aren't there.

Prime Minister Gorton: We don't know how much importance can be attached to a small force of this type.

The President: Vance says Australians are good allies in Paris. Your people have been first class.

Mr. Vance: The North Vietnamese have insisted there be no private talks.

Summary:

1. No tangible progress.

2. We have better press.

3. North Vietnamese credibility has been shaken.

--They claim no troops in South.

--They claim no troops in Laos.

--They deny they caused casualties in area.

We have made constructive proposals:

--DMZ re-established

--Laos accords

--Eventual withdrawal

--Private discussions

4. No give in North Vietnam position except one.

5. No sign of restraint on ground. Agree we would stop bombing first. Then go on to other matters before actually stopping.

6. The North Vietnamese have ability to continue fighting.

7. We should continue to push on North Vietnamese presence in the South.

8. We must probe for private conversations.

The President: All our people ought to be told what they are doing and what we are doing. We are going to reassess to see what we can do.

Our morale at home is not as good as morale out in the field.

Prime Minister Gorton: Will proposition be put forward for a ceasefire?

Mr. Vance: We do not believe this will be put forth in near future. We do not anticipate they will put forth this proposition.

Prime Minister Gorton: What does the near future indicate?

Mr. Vance: We do not know.

General Taylor: Cease-fire would take a great deal of negotiation.

Mr. McNamara: Before we can talk about a cease-fire we must get them to admit presence in the South.

Prime Minister Gorton: A cease-fire could be disastrous.

Justice Fortas: North Vietnam now takes the position they are not in South Vietnam at all. If you have a cease-fire, they would pretend only people affected would be Americans and Viet Cong. As long as they do not admit they are in the South, they don't have to move.

Prime Minister Gorton: We must have no partial conquest of South by permitting North Vietnam to stay in the South.

The President: We could find no worse situation than our pulling out with North Vietnamese remaining in the South. If they pull out, we pull out.

Director Marks: On world opinion, newspaper opinion since March 31 shows:

1. President removed self in interest of peace

2. U.S. restrained

3. U.S. wanted talks

4. Very skilled negotiating team

5. Reasonable U.S. negotiating terms

6. Hanoi's intransigence.

The President: Location of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia: There was a graphic presentation.

Prime Minister Gorton: I have no suggestions about Paris. I fear a cease-fire leaving South Vietnam under North Vietnamese control.

Cessation of the bombing bothers me. We must have an understanding along the lines of the San Antonio formula before it is further sealed down.

The President: What is the sentiment in your country?

Prime Minister Gorton: The morale is first class by men in the front lines. The support is good.

--The R&R program is excellent.

--We hope U.S. men will return and live in Australia.

--Families have taken R&R boys in. Kids will stay in homes rather than hotels.

Washington, May 28, 1968, 6:30 p.m.

NOTES OF BI-PARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP
MEETING WITH CYRUS VANCE

The President: Vance came in late last evening. He met with the Executive branch this morning./2/ I wanted you to get all the information he has. We want your advice and suggestions.

We are concerned about our situation in Vietnam. We have shown restraint. They have shown none. We lost 1,100 men in the last two weeks.

Mr. Vance: I have little to add to what you already know.

Procedural discussions took two days and amounted to four total hours.

Substantive sections now are all from printed documents. Their room to improvise is quite limited.

Thumb-nail sketches on each member of the North Vietnamese delegation. Outlined they have background in propaganda.

They are using talks as a propaganda device. It seems a fight-and-talk strategy. Broadening of government in South Vietnam has been a step forward.

No tangible progress at conference table.

In public opinion, North Vietnam credibility has been shaken by denial of having troops in South.

U.S. has made constructive proposals.

We have sought to have private talks without success.

We need to get into private discussions.

We are going to be patient.

Things have gone about as expected.

Road will be long and difficult.

Congressman Mahon: Are there reasons which would cause North Vietnam to engage in private talks or do they consider these talks merely a second front?

Mr. Vance: They may want to change their position. I do not know.

Congressman Ford: Do you discuss our military operations and theirs?

Mr. Vance: We have not been able to get into informal dialogue.

They charge us with being aggressors. They allege we violate 1954 accords.

They refuse to acknowledge they have troops in the South.

President: They have shown no restraint.

Mr. Vance: They say we should get first to the cessation of the bombing.

Bill Bates: What reason are they there?

Mr. Vance: They want to reach a solution on their terms. There will be compromise on down the road.

Senator Dirksen: Has instability in France affected talks?

Mr. Vance: Not yet.

Senator Young: Can they act without bowing to China or Russia?

Mr. Vance: Yes. They show that by fact they are talking. They went away from China's advice.

Senator Russell: What do you mean they have admitted they have troops in South?

Congressman Boggs: Any private contact?

Mr. Vance: No.

Congressman Laird: Withdrawal of troops--was this same as declared in Manila?

Mr. Vance: Yes.

Senator Fulbright: Do they think we should stop all bombing before going on to substantive matters?

Mr. Vance: Yes.

Senator Fulbright: Could you have private talks about substantive matters before bombing is halted?

Mr. Vance: Yes.

Senator Mansfield: I am not discouraged.

I am delighted with line with patience.

Secretary Clifford:

1. We are going through stage of negotiations you must go through with the Communists.

Lengthy conferences are not unusual.

I am hopeful about the meeting.

President made an exceedingly generous offer last September.

On March 31, President made a substantially tougher offer.

They accepted it. Why?

Something happened between September and March 31.

They concluded guerrilla war was a failure. They conducted Tet offensive. It was a dismal failure from their standpoint. They lost many men. They held no cities. They did not get government to fall.

They concluded they cannot win militarily in Vietnam.

So, they seek a political settlement in Paris.

We must stay with these negotiations as long as we can.

General Wheeler: Military activity in South has been substantial

--Just South of DMZ

--in Saigon area

--in Western highlands.

They have shown no signs of restraint in North.

107,000 men are being moved into Laos and South Vietnam.

28,000 May

37,000 April

20,000 May

The full number has not reached South Vietnam. There will be peak in June.

They have been rebuilding bridges north of 20th parallel on permanent basis. Rebuilt railroads. They have improved airfields.

There is no substantial movement of AA.

Senator Russell: What is policy in our forces on MiGs in South?

General Wheeler: If they penetrate south of 19° , we go after them. They could go south to 16°, near Danang. They may try to knock down a B-52.

Secretary Katzenbach: These have not been negotiations yet. Patience is important. So is firmness.

1. Destroy Saigon government.

2. Split us from allies.

3. Seek to win propaganda war.

Secretary Katzenbach: There will be further efforts in South to strengthen their position in the South.

Exposure of North Vietnamese delegation to Western press. They have been exposed for what they are.

President: We are grateful to Cy Vance.

Congressman Ford: From JCS point-of-view, are you in agreement with guidelines you have?

General Wheeler: Yes.

Support for war was low. In reducing bombing on March 31 to 20th, we lost very little because of bad weather.

We did take some psychological loss.

As weather gets better military costs get higher.

I thought we should limit ourselves to try to bring this miserable war to a close.

Senator Byrd: How long can we refrain from bombing north of 20th?

General Wheeler: It will depend on talks in Paris.

It will depend on political factors. We need to give diplomatic track a full chance of success.

Secretary Clifford: We have increased number of sorties south of 20th. We are concentrating now on Panhandle.

In March we knocked out--

180 trucks of 1967 March

680 trucks of 1968 March

242 April 67

765 April 68

Director Helms:

1. North Vietnam had political objective

--bring down South Vietnamese government.

--bring diviseness between U.S. and allies.

--cause dissent in U.S. over war.

40% of men coming down are for Saigon area.

2. World opinion has shifted since March 31.

Anti-Americanism has quieted.

The intelligence shows they intend to go all out.

President: Enemy wants to bring out division between Allies and show we were a country divided./3/

Washington, May 29, 1968.

SUBJECT
Military Action Between the 19th and 20th Parallels

1. Nature of Military Action. I believe--as does Cy Vance--that resumed action in this area should initially be on a selected basis and directed at specific targets such as the airfield and other installations where we have our strongest case of action by the other side. The weight of attack should be adequate, but not so that it would lead to sensational headlines. The question of route reconnaissance should be left to follow--on the theory that our initial impact will guide the public reaction, and that specific targets have a much more persuasive initial rationale.

2. Timing. While we have already laid a significant private base through the Harriman/Zorin conversation,/2/ and have built a general picture of major military action by the other side, there is still a question whether we would do better to act at once or to wait for visible offensive actions by the other side in the Highlands--which look like coming very shortly in any case. The latter would give us a much better public case and avoid the implication of any unilateral "re-escalation" on our part. This at least deserves discussion, although I would see no major adverse effect on the Paris talks or on public opinion if we were to go ahead very soon.

3. Thompson/Gromyko Gambit. My own inclination would be against saying anything more to the Soviets. Harriman's message was quite clear enough, and raising to the Gromyko level might even tend to engage Soviet prestige in strengthening the defense of the area.

4. Telling Thieu. Whenever we decide to act we should try to get word to Thieu in advance. We should not be asking him to highlight what we are doing in any way, but our telling him would be a useful indicator both of general consultation and of our taking the over-all problem seriously.

5. On a total view, I believe that this action--on a limited and selected scale initially--would be a useful signal at this point. However, we should not exaggerate its significance. Since our actions would still be within the scope of the March 31 speech, I doubt very much if Hanoi would draw any conclusion that we were thinking of going north of the 20th, or would significantly moderate its general military pattern. I attach George Carver's analysis, which deals with this option on pages 8-9./3/ (I understand that Clark Clifford also has Carver's memorandum.)

JCSM-343-68

Washington, May 29, 1968.

SUBJECT
Possible Courses of Action and Alternatives in Vietnam Under Certain Conditions (U)

1. (TS) Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 24 May 1968, subject: "Possible U.S. Courses of Action if Paris Talks Stall or Break Down,"/2/ which