Docs 258-277
June 1-July 15: Soviet Involvement and Possible North Vietnamese Restraint
258. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, June 3, 1968, 1257Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8 I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos--General. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 9:47 a.m. The President arrived in Texas on May 29 and returned to Washington on June 4. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
CAP 81231. As you know, Ellsworth Bunker has warned us rather solemnly of the effects on South Vietnamese morale of continued attacks on Saigon while we leave Hanoi-Haiphong unmolested./2/ Attached is:
/2/In telegram 28566 from Saigon, May 29, Bunker wrote: "It seems to me, therefore, that there is a strong argument for linking any cessation of bombing in the North to the cessation of terror attacks on the cities of the South and I believe that a failure to link these two factors could seriously impair our position in the type of negotiations on which we have entered where the enemy is apparently determined to maintain maximum military pressure." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
1. A passage from a personal letter to me from Bob Komer in the same vein;/3/ and
/3/In his May 28 letter to Rostow, Komer wrote: "Is there no way in which we could hold their cities hostage for ours? Why couldn't we tell Hanoi's negotiators privately that if the VC/NVA attack Saigon again we will attack Hanoi? Or that if they attack Danang, we will strike Haiphong? We wouldn't publicly insist on reciprocity, but simply say privately that we would exercise it. If they broke off the talks on this basis, our case would seem strong to me. Alternatively, if we go to a complete bombing cessation, it really ought to be tied to some such unilateral declaration that further attacks on our cities would lead to renewed bombing of theirs." (Ibid., Komer Files: Lot 69 D 303, Vietnam/Turkey) The portion of Komer's letter quoted in the telegram printed here is omitted.
2. A memorandum to you from General Taylor./4/
/4/In a May 31 memorandum to the President, Taylor advised the removal of geographical restrictions on the bombing campaign to allow for linking the bombing to enemy attacks. The targets bombed, their locations, the number of sorties flown, and the bombing tonnage could all be adjusted in accordance with the scale of the NVA/VC actions. The text of this memorandum was included in the telegram printed here but is omitted.
The issue is likely to become, at least temporarily, more acute with the bad accident with the U.S. rocket in Saigon yesterday.
The indications are, however, that the enemy feels he has struck paydirt in the harassment of Saigon; and intelligence suggests further attacks in the days ahead.
As I see them, our choices are:
--Do nothing;
--Go back to the 20th parallel which will help a little but not be a serious reply to the harassment of Saigon;
--After warning the enemy, establish a tit-for-tat policy towards Hanoi-Haiphong, conducting raids not on a regular basis but as direct response to attacks on Saigon;
--Go back to Hanoi-Haiphong on a regular basis.
No one can predict whether the enemy will break up the talks on this basis. He might suspend them while we were attacking Hanoi--or he might not. I have no recommendation at this time; but I do not think we should simply ignore the warnings coming to us from Saigon.
At the minimum, we may wish to have Westmoreland's assessment while he is here, including the possibility of measures which would cut down the possibility of enemy penetration of Saigon.
I have noted your message about Saigon in relation to tomorrow's Glassboro speech./5/ I doubt that we should publicly warn the enemy about Saigon attacks unless we have decided actually to move in retaliation; but I shall discuss the matter with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford today.
/5/The President delivered a speech at Glassboro State College in New Jersey in commemoration of the 1-year anniversary of his meeting there with Kosygin. In the speech, the President noted the lack of "some gestures on the other side toward peace" at Paris and stressed the need for Soviet cooperation in bringing about the peaceful resolution of Vietnam and other issues. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 679-684.
[Omitted here are excerpts from Komer's letter and Taylor's memorandum.]
259. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, June 3, 1968, 1712Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 80. Secret; Harvan. Received at 1:54 p.m. at the LBJ Ranch.
CAP 81241. Herewith Harriman recommends that we postpone consideration of bombing between 19th and 20th parallels until we see what the Hanoi Politburo man Le Duc Tho brings with him at Wednesday's meeting./2/
/2/June 5.
1. In light of Le Duc Tho's arrival in Paris today we recommend that considerations of bombing between 19 degrees and 20 degrees be deferred.
2. Although we, of course, do not know what instructions Tho may be bringing, there is possibility that because of his position, more flexibility may be introduced into our discussions, including possibility of private conversations./3/
/3/In Intelligence Note No. 418 to Rusk, May 31, Hughes noted INR's speculation that Tho was being sent to Paris for two reasons: to shore up the delegation (believed to have been handled poorly by Thuy) and to allow for "greater maneuvering" and thus a shift "either toward movement, or to stonewall for a long period of time with greater effectiveness than the delegation has shown to date." The assessment of Tho was that while he was "reported to be a hard-liner, a member of the pro-Chinese wing of the Party," he also "favored a less doctrinaire and violent policy than Le Duan in South Vietnam." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
3. In these circumstances, bombing between 19 and 20 degrees might thwart these possibilities and therefore it would be well to test the water.
Attachment
Paris 15436, June 3, 1968
1. In light of Le Duc Tho's arrival in Paris today we recommend that considerations of bombing between 19 degrees and 20 degrees be deferred.
2. Although we, of course, do not know what instructions Tho may be bringing, there is possibility that because of his position, more flexibility may be introduced into our discussions, including possibility of private conversations.
3. In these circumstances, bombing between 19 and 20 degrees might thwart these possibilities and therefore it would be well to test the water.
Harriman
260. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
JCSM-354-68
Washington, June 4, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 911/305 (24 May 68), IR 4055-4057. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
US Policy With Respect to Negotiations With North Vietnam (U)
1. (U) Reference is made to JCSM-343-68, dated 29 May 1968, subject: "Possible Courses of Action and Alternatives in Vietnam Under Certain Conditions (U)," which addressed specific courses of action rather than the broader problem of policy./2/ This memorandum provides additional comments and recommendations on the broader subject of US policy.
/2/Document 256.
2. (U) In a major policy statement in September 1967 and repeated in October of that year, General Giap stated that the North Vietnam (NVN) objectives were:
a. Protect NVN.
b. Overthrow the present Government of Vietnam (GVN) and seize its apparatus.
c. Unite all of Vietnam under communist control./3/
/3/Giap made this statement in the North Vietnamese newspaper Quang Doi Nhan Dan, September 14-16, 1967, and in the Soviet newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, October 21, 1967.
3. (C) North Vietnam has achieved a major portion of the first of these objectives by our action in partially halting the bombing. This has provided immunity to about 90 percent of the people and 70 percent of the territory of NVN. The current hard-line negotiating position of that Government in Paris is designed to attain the remainder of this objective.
4. (C) To attain the second objective (overthrow the GVN and seize its apparatus), NVN had engaged in overt military aggression in South Vietnam (SVN), is providing support and direction to the Viet Cong/National Liberation Front Insurgency, and has attempted to gain support of world opinion by a concerted propaganda attack against US actions in Southeast Asia and concurrently to demonstrate that the GVN with allied assistance is incapable of protecting its citizens. The following actions by NVN support the basic NVN objectives: assassination and kidnapping of public officials, random assaults on population centers, disruption of commerce, infliction of casualties on US and South Vietnamese forces--all designed to alter progressively public attitudes within the United States, SVN, and the world at large. Were NVN successful in achieving the first two objectives, they would likely take the view that time would take care of the third. Communist ideology disregards time as a major consideration in developing strategic and tactical objectives.
5. (TS) To date, military operations in Southeast Asia have been conducted within a framework of policy guidelines established to achieve US objectives. Principal among these policy guidelines are:
a. We seek to avoid widening the war into a conflict with Communist China or the USSR.
b. We have no present intention of invading NVN.
c. We do not seek the overthrow of the Government of NVN.
d. We are guided by the principles set forth in the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.
6. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that these guidelines are valid. However, although progress is being made within the above framework, it has not been commensurate with the military power available in Southeast Asia, largely because constraints on the employment of this power have resulted in a program of graduated application of military pressure. NVN has the advantage of the use of certain sanctuaries for retreat and regroupment without fear of attack. The enemy has the advantage of uninterrupted importation of war material. He knows that certain restrictions on US military operations will give him tactical advantage. He also has the advantage of being able to gauge his own military efforts against the announced US military force buildup. He knows that we will not destroy his country or his Government because we have publicly so stated. Because of these advantages, more than 3 years of gradually increasing pressures have not caused the enemy to cease his aggression. On the contrary, NVN has been able to maintain its capability to support an ever-increasing intensity of conflict, with the resulting greater expenditure of US resources and increase in US casualties.
7. (S) A continuation of the restraints associated with the current policies during protracted negotiations of the type experienced so far can result only in progressive deterioration of the allied capability to block attainment of the North Vietnamese objectives as they relate to SVN. It appears, therefore, that considerable intensification of direct pressure on NVN is needed.
8. (TS) In the event that current negotiations fail to produce early and substantial progress or break down, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the air and naval attacks on all of NVN should be resumed and that restraints in such attacks heretofore imposed within the current policies should be removed. At a suitable time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will make appropriate recommendations, dependent upon developments.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler/4/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates General Wheeler signed the original.
261. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, June 4, 1968, 1:45-3 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. Fortas and Taylor are listed as attending but their presence was not recorded in the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)
NOTES ON THE PRESIDENT'S TUESDAY LUNCHEON
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
Justice Fortas
General Taylor
George Christian
Tom Johnson
The President: The Trejos meeting was a good one. They have some population problems and are not too happy about all the conditions placed on World Bank loans./2/
/2/Prior to this luncheon, the President met with Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez, President of Costa Rica.
Are they still in Saigon, Clark?
Secretary Clifford: We are in some trouble. It does not appear to be too serious. Westy (General Westmoreland) said they always can infiltrate small groups in.
Westy said a linear defense system around Saigon is not practical. It would take two divisions and would not do much better.
General Wheeler: The Vietnamese appointed General [Nguyen Van] Minh to run the Saigon defense--ARVN, police, RF and PF.
The President: Would you brief us, Dick? (CIA Director Helms)
Director Helms: There are new elements around Khesanh. There were 83 defectors to ARVN last night. Heavy men and material flow continues into the South. There have been no MIG flights below 20th. We found 100 mm weapons around DMZ. Thieu disagrees on general mobilization in the House.
Walt Rostow: General Abrams and Ambassador Berger called on Ky. He was in a black mood. He talked of resigning over men shot up by our helicopter./3/ We have a potential problem with Ky and General Thang. Killing his allies has put him very down in the dumps. It is a very serious problem.
/3/On June 2 a rocket launched from a U.S. helicopter destroyed a school building that was being used as a command post during the fighting in Saigon. Killed in the explosion were seven high-ranking South Vietnamese officials. Most of those killed or injured were associates of Ky. Among the dead was Lieutenant Colonel Pho Quoc Chu, Ky's brother-in-law. In the immediate aftermath of the incident, Thieu was able to further consolidate his power at Ky's expense by relieving Ky allies Nguyen Ngoc Loan as National Police Chief and Van Van Cua as Mayor of Saigon. See The New York Times, June 3-9, 1968.
The President: What happened on that chopper, Bus?
General Wheeler: South Vietnam called for chopper support. One rocket of flight of three went erratic. It landed in the command post area and killed the men who directed the operation. This was an accident. It was unfortunate.
Secretary Clifford: The President may want to show great concern. One of the men killed was Ky's brother-in-law. It is something of a national tragedy. The President may want to send some Government official to the funeral. Real concern must be shown. Ky may not think it was an accident.
The President: How do you get through the Senate with only Senator Young against you?
General Wheeler: I have a simple recipe--stay out of politics.
The President: Where are we on Thieu's visit?
Secretary Rusk: A visit to Washington during June wouldn't be good with all these demonstrations.
Secretary Clifford: General Wheeler and I need to go to South Vietnam after General Abrams gets in. I want to get closer to the situation. We may go in July, depending on the President's wishes.
Walt Rostow: Warren Christopher/4/ says mid or late July would be best from Resurrection City standpoint (July 24-25 open) for Thieu visit. Your calendar has the above dates open.
/4/Deputy Attorney General.
Secretary Clifford: I was for Thieu coming before. Now with Paris going on I would be for indefinite postponement.
The President: What effect will the convention have on Thieu's visit?
Secretary Clifford: I don't know.
The President: Do you believe Ky may think we did that deliberately?
Secretary Clifford: Some indications are that he may feel that.
The President: Is it true that a man can buy his way out of the South Vietnamese draft?
General Wheeler: Not that I know of.
The President: I thought it was good that 83 men came over to our side.
I get long letters from my reporter out there--Chuck Robb./5/ He said all the peasants want is to be left alone.
/5/On June 3 intelligence information indicated that the Viet Cong were planning to kidnap Captain Charles Robb, President Johnson's son-in-law. By June 5 his unit was ordered to relocate and an effort was to be made to keep his location confidential. (Memoranda from Rostow to the President, June 3 and June 5, and memorandum from Carver to Rostow, June 5; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Report of VC Plan to Kidnap Capt. Robb) Johnson discussed this kidnapping effort in a June 3 telephone conversation with Russell. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Russell, June 3, 1968, 11:45 a.m., Tape F6806.01, PNO 3)
[Omitted here are brief discussions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Arab-Israeli dispute.]
The President: The President read Chuck Robb's letter to him about fighting in Vietnam, Lynda and hope that HHH would be next President.
[Omitted here is additional discussion of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the world financial situation.]
19th and 20th Parallel
The President: Ambassador Harriman recommends deferring this./6/
/6/In telegram 15453/Delto 231 from Paris, June 4, Harriman advised against bombing urban areas in the DRV in response to the attacks on Saigon because the North Vietnamese would break off the Paris talks. In addition, such an exchange represented "a modification of the March 31st offer." (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. III) Rusk transmitted this telegram to the President at 10:45 a.m.; the notation "ps" on the covering memorandum indicates that the President saw it. (Ibid.)
Secretary Rusk: I am for air to air action now. We can hold up 48 hours on ground action. Let's take gradual approach.
Secretary Clifford: Cy Vance went over reconnaissance approach. He said he would prefer specific targets. The Joint Chiefs have those targets.
Secretary Rusk: Let's hit them and not say anything about it.
General Wheeler: We reviewed targeting. We located two bridges on railroads and a railroad siding. The railroad is being used.
262. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 5, 1968, 10:32 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Kosygin [3]. Secret; Nodis. A notation on the memorandum reads: "Shown to Pres. 6/5/68."
The attached letter to you from Kosygin will require careful consideration tomorrow.
The key points appear to be:
1. Kosygin's statement that "we have grounds to believe" that a full cessation of bombing would "promote a breakthrough."
2. Such a U.S. act would not involve "a loss for the interests of their safety" or for U.S. prestige.
3. Soviet commitment that they have urged, in effect, "unofficial contacts" on Hanoi.
4. The final reference to the "decisive significance" of the "essence of the position" taken.
Obviously, we must come to grips with Moscow bilaterally to clarify these matters.
But it could be a breakthrough.
It may, incidentally, explain the one week delay in Paris./2/
/2/Reference is to Le Duc Tho's delayed arrival at the Paris talks.
Walt Rostow/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment
Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson/4/
Moscow, June 5, 1968.
/4/The message was transmitted by Dobrynin. This official translation of Kosygin's message, as undertaken by the Language Services Division of the Department of State and which does not differ in substance from this unofficial translation, is LS No. 2450, June 5. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin) Copies were sent to Secretary Rusk and Under Secretary Katzenbach.
Dear Mr. President:
There is hardly a necessity to speak in detail of how crucial is the present moment when, at last, direct official contacts between the representatives of the USA and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam have been established. In our firm opinion the beginning official talks between highranking representatives of the USA and DRV in Paris present a real possibility to find a way out of the situation which has developed in Viet-Nam with the aim of halting the many-years-old and bloody war being conducted there. I think you will agree that the peoples of the entire world expect positive results from the American-Vietnamese meetings in Paris since to a large extent not only the restoration of peace in the region of Indo-China but also the relaxation of international tension as a whole depend on the outcome of these meetings.
According to information which comes to us both from represent-atives of the DRV and from representatives of the USA thus far progress has not been attained at the talks in Paris. And is it possible seriously to expect such progress under conditions when the U.S.A. continues the bombardment of a significant part of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam? We have more than once already expressed to you personally and to your representatives our opinion that a full and unconditional cessation by the United States of bombardments and other acts of war against the DRV can open the path to peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. And if the Government of the DRV gave its agreement to the beginning of official talks with representatives of the U.S.A. even before a full cessation of bombings of the territory of the DRV, that does not signify at all that it is possible to hope for further progress of the talks without such a cessation. These bombardments and other acts of war by the U.S.A. against the DRV are now the main obstacle hindering movement forward at the meetings in Paris.
I and my colleagues believe--and we have grounds for this--that a full cessation by the United States of bombardments and other acts of war in relation to the DRV could promote a breakthrough in the situation that would open perspectives for peaceful settlement. Such a step cannot bring about any adverse consequences whatever for the United States neither in the sense of a loss for the interests of their safety nor even in the sense of a loss for their prestige. For a great world power the ultimate positive result of one or other act outweighs many times all other considerations to which an excessively exaggerated meaning is sometimes given. We decided, Mr. President, candidly to express to you these considerations, in view of the great significance that a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam problem and an end to the bloodshed would have. One would like to hope that opportunities that are presenting themselves will not be missed.
I would like to express one more thought. Mr. A. Harriman expressed the wish that on our part some assistance be given to the establishment of unofficial contacts between the delegations of the U.S.A. and DRV in Paris and that this point of view be brought to the cognizance of the Viet-Nam representative. I take this opportunity to advise you that we brought this to the cognizance of our Vietnamese friends since we for our part consider that all forms of contact between the sides must be used. It is important that this serve the success of the talks. But you, Mr. President, cannot but agree that the forms of contacts by themselves decide nothing. The decisive significance lies with the essence of the position which is taken by one side or the other.
Respectfully,
A. Kosygin
263. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/
SNIE 53-68
Washington, June 6, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 81. Secret; Limited Distribution. According to a note on the cover page, the SNIE was drafted by the CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. It was submitted by Helms and concurred in by the USIB. The cover page and a table of contents are not printed. In an attached covering memorandum transmitting the SNIE to Johnson, June 10, Rostow wrote: "This is a well-balanced CIA document on the Vietnam situation which you may wish to read."
THE VIETNAM SITUATION
The Problem
To estimate probable developments in the Vietnam situation over the next six months or so.
Assumptions
For the purpose of this estimate we make two assumptions: that the discussions between the US and Hanoi are not broken off completely in this period and that the US does not resume full-scale bombing of North Vietnam.
Conclusions
A. The Vietnamese Communists are striving through their current fight-talk strategy to produce a decisive result in the war this year. Hanoi will coordinate intensified military and political operations in the South with diplomatic moves, all designed to disintegrate the fabric of the GVN, intensify pressures for peace within the US, and bring about major concessions in the Paris talks.
B. Communist forces are suffering extraordinary military losses, but with massive replacements from the North, they will be able to maintain a high level of military pressures during the summer. We do not believe, however, that the Communist military effort by itself will be decisive. ARVN's fighting effectiveness will probably not be seriously weakened, and the Saigon government, despite continuing political and administrative weaknesses, will probably retain the capability to cope, at least minimally, with the problems of the war.
C. Nevertheless, developments in the Paris talks or in US politics could severely test the GVN's stability and even its survival. Saigon will press for a tough stand by the US and for major concessions from Hanoi. Moves toward compromises, whether at US initiative or Hanoi's, could touch off a severe crisis in Saigon, especially if a formal political role for the NLF appeared likely. In the end, Saigon's appraisal of US policy, in the context of the Presidential elections, could be decisive in the continuing viability of the GVN.
D. For its part, the regime in Hanoi is feeling the strains of the long and costly struggle. These will intensity if the war is protracted at the present high levels. While we expect no early shift in strategy, if, by year's end, the situation has not taken a turn in its favor Hanoi will probably be obliged once again to undertake a thorough review of its options.
Discussion
1. The beginning of formal diplomatic contacts in Paris has opened a new phase and added new complexity to the Vietnam problem. For the near term at least, the struggle within South Vietnam is still the predominant factor, but maneuvers at the negotiating table will become increasingly important, affecting Hanoi's calculations and especially the mood and outlook in Saigon.
I. The Communist Position
2. A number of factors have led the Vietnamese Communists into the present phase of fighting and talking. Ever since the US intervened in force, they have assumed that the war would have to culminate in some kind of negotiations, but they were determined to avoid such talks until their battlefield position permitted them to negotiate from a position of apparent strength. The 1968 winter-spring offensive, they believed, would achieve such a position. Having shifted the focal point of their operations to the urban areas and generally intensified their military pressures they anticipate that the confidence and authority of the GVN and the ARVN will be badly shaken if not demolished, that large parts of rural areas will pass from GVN control, that popular support for the GVN will fade, and that the US will be demoralized by these setbacks and by the prospect of a long, costly effort to regain lost ground. In a US election year they apparently expect the overall political/military results will cause the US to seek an end to the war on terms favorable to the Communists.
3. Fight-Talk Tactics. Thus, Hanoi expects that the present phase, lasting perhaps through a change in the US Administration, will prove decisive in its revolutionary struggle. Communist forces will try to maintain continuous military pressures, especially around cities and towns, erode the pacification program in the countryside, and, at times and places of their choosing, launch major offensive thrusts. Hanoi will coordinate these intensified military and political operations in the South with diplomatic moves, all designed to disintegrate the fabric of the GVN, intensify pressures for peace within the US, and bring about major concessions in the Paris talks.
Military Capabilities
4. In terms of capabilities to sustain this fight-talk strategy, the next few months are likely to be critical. Since last fall the Communist forces have made notable gains in firepower, and have expanded their force structure through an unprecedented level of infiltration from the North. From mid-February until early May there was a relative lull in large-scale Communist offensive operations, and Communist forces have been recruiting, refitting, and regrouping. As a result of these activities, plus the large number of replacements and new units now in the pipeline, and intensified recruiting in the countryside, Communist forces will be capable of undertaking a series of major attacks between now and the fall.
5. The main thrusts will probably be against targets of political and psychological importance. A special effort is already underway against Saigon, and similar tactics may be applied against other key provincial centers. These attempts to penetrate urban areas may be followed at some stage by heavier and more direct assaults. The present pattern of infiltration, current troop dispositions, and weather conditions also suggest a major effort in the Central Highlands fairly soon, a renewed effort in the Da Nang area, and perhaps the eastern DMZ during the summer./2/
/2/In its situation report on Vietnam for June 10, SC No. 01009/68, sent to the President by Helms the next day, CIA analysts characterized the current enemy offensive against Saigon as "a measured application of force which the enemy apparently hopes to sustain over a period of weeks and months" as opposed to the surprise attack at Tet. The analysts concluded: "Although the enemy tactics differ from those used in the attacks on Saigon during Tet, the maximum objectives of the current offensive are apparently similar. The Communists are now seeking to create tension in the capital, disrupt its economy and normal life, causing disorder and destruction. They appear to hope that they can establish conditions in which impatience, indignation, hardship, and fear will generate widespread and active popular discontent with the government. In effect, the Communists appear to be trying to create conditions in which a 'popular uprising' might be possible. Available intelligence does not permit an assessment as to how confident the Communists are of achieving this end. It does seem clear that they judge Saigon to be crucial and that, if they could break the will of the people in the city, the impact would be felt throughout the country." In addition, attacks that began in I CTZ and in Kontum Province on June 9 were viewed as portents of a major enemy offensive in those areas. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 266-Vietnam)
6. At the same time, the Communists will have to face problems of their own, which will limit the extent to which they can effectively carry out at least some of their plans. The problem of preparing and executing major offensives against urban areas has become more complex and difficult, and the possibility of achieving surprise has been reduced. Allied counteroperations and mobility continue to disrupt Communist plans and impose heavy costs on their forces. Casualties since 1 January have been extraordinary, and large concentrations of enemy forces, such as at Khe Sanh, have proved highly vulnerable to Allied firepower. The quality of Viet Cong forces, particularly the guerrillas, appears to have declined somewhat, and the increasing reliance on North Vietnamese replacements has allowed less and less time for combat training in the South, familiarization with terrain, and assimilation into existing units. There are also continuing problems of morale, though the Communist defection rate is still low, and these problems could be aggravated if costly military operations do not bring an early peace. Despite an increase in logistical capability from the North through Laos, as well as in-country, it will be a major problem for the Communists to supply large forces in forward positions over extended periods of combat. Additionally, the Communists have to calculate their intensified military operations could cause the US to resume full-scale or at least augmented bombing over the North, thus adding to their problems of repair and rehabilitation.
7. In sum, we do not believe that the Communists can succeed in inflicting a decisive defeat on US/ARVN forces on any large scale or across any broad front. Nor are Communist forces strong enough to seize and hold urban areas for an extended period. But they can create great disruption and turmoil and bring about the destruction of parts of the areas attacked. Moreover, their forces will probably be able to maintain a strong position in much of the countryside.
Political Factors
8. As for their political position, the North Vietnamese leaders are probably fairly confident that their position in South Vietnam and in Paris is a strong one; that they are better able to withstand pressures for peace than the US; that they can afford to wait for elections in the US without fear of serious deterioration in their combat effectiveness; that they cannot be defeated in the field; and that the US will be constrained from escalation and will eventually have to move toward a compromise settlement, which in itself will threaten the stability of the government in Saigon.
9. Nevertheless, in our view, there are good reasons for Hanoi to have doubts over the future. In North Vietnam there are the cumulative strains of the war resulting in part from the large combat losses of the past two years and accentuated by the current infiltration rate. Aside from this heavy drain on North Vietnamese manpower, there is no doubt that the bombing in the North severely tasked North Vietnam's recuperative capabilities and constant strain and pressure to work long hours on a modest diet produced some lowering of morale in the North. While Hanoi's control mechanism has coped adequately with these problems, the regime could hardly contemplate an indefinite prolongation of the war along with confidence and assurance.
10. To Hanoi the position of the GVN may appear precarious but the North Vietnamese cannot be sure that its collapse is inevitable by any early date. In particular Hanoi has reason to be concerned over its failure to develop any significant popular support let alone promote a "general uprising" in South Vietnam. Communist forces have not been able to sustain the "continuous attacks" called for after Tet, and the tactical initiative in some areas has passed to Allied forces. And the political atmosphere in the US probably seems more uncertain and ambiguous to Hanoi than in the period from the Tet attacks through President Johnson's address of 31 March.
11. On balance, it would appear that the Communists can and will carry out a vigorous military and political campaign at least through the summer. The military situation in South Vietnam is not likely to improve much, if at all, for Hanoi by the end of the summer, and it may be worse. In any case, we believe the military campaign will not by itself produce a decisive result. Thus, the outcome of the total Communist effort will depend on such political considerations as the viability of the GVN in face of the Communist onslaught and on the course of the talks in Paris.
II. The GVN Position
12. The Tet offensive, the continuing intense Communist military and political effort, and especially the Paris talks have added new dimensions to the general situation in South Vietnam. South Vietnamese doubts of the future have probably increased sharply, and there is considerable concern about the strength and depth of the US commitment. Despite some tightening of the ranks both inside and outside the government, the total response of the GVN has not yet taken shape, and the non-Communist political forces have still not developed the kind of political cohesion that would permit the leadership to act with sureness in the new situation. These factors tend to reinforce one another and could undo the government. On the other hand, the South Vietnamese leaders have shown no tendency toward panic or political extremism and thus far at least appear more inclined to look for ways to strengthen the government and improve the war effort.
National Leadership
13. We consider the chances for a significant increase in governmental cohesion and national political unity to be slight over the next six months. Longstanding divisive factors continue to be strong and the problems created by the transition to constitutional government have added new aspects to the rivalries between civilians and military, within the military, and among the numerous civilian political and social groupings. Meanwhile, neither the new constitutional institutions nor the three national "fronts" founded just after the Tet offensive appear to have mobilized any appreciable degree of mass popular support behind the government.
14. On the positive side, President Thieu has strengthened his image and support within the Assembly and among the civilian politicians. He appears increasingly committed to enlarging the role of civilians in the government, despite the conflict this raises with many of the senior generals. A new Prime Minister, Tran Van Huong, has been appointed, and his prospective Cabinet includes several civilians who, like Huong, command a measure of popular support. It is thus more broadly based than its predecessor and has more prestige. This, together with the President's apparent interest in asserting his own role more strongly, could lead, in time, to more vigorous and effective government performance.
15. Optimism on this score must be tempered, however, by the fact that the proposed Cabinet includes some potentially disruptive individuals, and still excludes representatives from a number of important political groups. Moreover the National Assembly, while it has generally supported the government, is nevertheless intent upon maintaining its independence of the executive, which will be unable to count on an assured majority in either House. Difficulties between the executive and legislature over the tough issues to be faced during the next few months may tempt the executive to circumvent the legislature on critical issues.
16. More importantly, however, the contest and maneuvering between President Thieu and many of the senior generals, including Vice President Ky, are continuing and indeed have been exacerbated by Thieu's efforts to expand his own personal power and consequently limit the influence of the generals. Moreover, Huong's penchant for independence and his announced intention to eradicate corruption wherever he finds it may aggravate rather than ease civil/military tensions. An attempt by Thieu and Huong to effect major changes in the military command over the objections of the senior generals would almost certainly precipitate a severe crises.
17. In general, however, it does not appear likely that constitutional government will be overturned by a military coup. Despite their unhappiness with Thieu, the senior generals have accepted the new situation, while making it clear that any reshuffling of the military structure must have their collective approval. Rumors of a coup will recur. However, the inclination of some of the senior generals to mount a coup is tempered by their realization that the probable US reaction would be extremely adverse and that such a move would, at present, play into Communist hands in the US-DRV conversations in Paris.
18. At this point, the Huong Cabinet and military appear to share strong opposition to any concession to Hanoi on a political settlement of the war. Indeed, it is possible that if issues arising in Paris seemed to threaten the future of the GVN, this in itself could become the basis for greater unity between the civilians and the military. It is also possible, though perhaps less likely, that the same trend of events in Paris--particularly if it appeared that elements within the GVN were prepared to go along--could prompt the generals to abandon their relatively cautious behavior, ignore the consequences in the US, and stage a coup precisely in order to sabotage those talks as a preparation for "going it alone" against the Communists.
19. On balance, however, we think it most likely that Thieu, Huong, and the generals will play their cards carefully and each will avoid drastic actions that would provoke drastic responses by the others. In the end, there may be a modest gain in the stability of the constitutional system and a slight enhancement of the domestic political standing of the GVN. At the same time, because of the hopes generated by Huong's appointment, the failure of his government could represent a costly setback.
20. Administrative Viability. In urban areas the government is still laboring to some extent under the problems of dislocations and disruptions created by the Tet offensive. Recovery in some areas has been painfully slow. Nevertheless, with US help, the government's administrative machinery has remained largely intact and has continued to function. Several Communist offensives on the scale of that at Tet could, of course, physically overwhelm the GVN's ability to cope. But more likely is the type of action which has occurred in the Saigon area since early May. Similar attacks in various areas will result in continuing pressure on the GVN's administrative ability, but in view of US assistance, we do not believe that the situation will reach unmanageable proportions for the GVN. Even so, as the burdens imposed by continued Communist pressure accumulate, the GVN's ability to provide administrative services to the people will probably suffer a further decline.
21. The Economy. The South Vietnamese economy was dealt a considerable blow by the Tet offensive. The present situation is one of near stagnation, and it could deepen into crisis unless the GVN acts decisively to bolster confidence and to stimulate a return to more normal levels of activity. Physical damage to communications, industry, and marketing facilities has continued during the recent attacks in and around Saigon. The industrial sector has made little effort to resume normal operations nor have manufacturers whose plants were undamaged expanded their activities to pick up the slack. Movement of basic food supplies into the capital area continues to be adequate, however, and there should be no prolonged shortages of rice or others foodstuffs in any part of the country. The mercantile community lacks confidence in security conditions and is uncertain of the future. Import activity appears to be at a standstill except for such items as foodstuffs, pharmaceutical and building materials. Consumers appear reluctant to spend for anything other than necessities, but, if the security situation improves, the threat of inflation will increase dramatically as the demand for goods outstrips the supply.
The Countryside
22. Since the Tet offensive, the GVN has been able to reestablish some of its previous control in terms of territorial security (outposts, logistic bases, and open roads). GVN military units are now better deployed and more active in rural areas than immediately after the Tet offensive. The GVN's 600-odd revolutionary development teams are functioning once again.
23. But the GVN's overall representation in the countryside remains significantly less than before Tet. ARVN's commitment to urban defense has increased in the face of the continuing threat to the cities posed by large NVA/VC units and this has further weakened peasant confidence in the GVN's ability to provide security in the countryside. In the face of increased rural insecurity and demands of urban recovery, the GVN's emphasis on civic action programs appears to have diminished. In response to the current challenge, President Thieu has ordered pacification to be "refocused" so that the program will concentrate on hamlets surrounding provincial and district capitals and LOCs. By the end of March, the GVN exercised a reasonable degree of control over 1.1 million fewer rural inhabitants than prior to Tet. In addition, some 7,200 hamlets were considered to have a functioning administration prior to Tet; by April, this figure stood at 4,400, though it does not necessarily follow that the VC now control a large proportion of the balance. Thus the GVN recovery effort has a long way to go, will most likely be slow, and, as in the past, will be subject to sudden reversals in the face of renewed Communist military action.
24. The Armed Forces. In addition to continuing US military support, the ability of the government to exercise its authority in South Vietnam depends heavily on the presence and the combat effectiveness of ARVN. The government is now undertaking measures to increase troop strength, to strengthen top level leadership, to raise morale, and to improve firepower. Some progress will be made in all these fields, and in general ARVN's performance since Tet has been more aggressive. Nevertheless, the GVN's Armed Forces face some long term problems. Overall leadership remains spotty, the quality of training is low, especially for technical personnel, and the efficiency of the selection and promotion system is questionable. Although improved, the basic motivation continues to be weak, making the armed forces susceptible to shifts in the prevailing political and psychological climate.
25. In sum, we believe that ARVN's fighting effectiveness will not be seriously weakened. But on the other hand, ARVN is unlikely to increase its overall effectiveness significantly during the next several months or to assume a larger burden of the combat during 1986.
Popular Attitudes
26. It is not possible to estimate popular attitudes with much confidence. There is no doubt that popular resentment of the Viet Cong has increased as a result of the Tet attacks, incursions in populated areas, and increasingly harsh pressures on the peasants. At the same time, there is also increased hostility toward the government and the ARVN for failing to provide protection against the Viet Cong, for looting, and for widespread destruction from air strikes and artillery. And the US is also blamed for destruction of urban areas.
27. The predominant sentiment, however, is probably one of increasing concern to avoid the hazards of the war. The Communists have failed to rally broad popular support, but thus far so has the GVN. The bulk of the people remain passive, though there is a strong desire for peace in rural areas; this desire may also strengthen in urban areas if they are subjected to continuous Communist harassment along the lines of the attacks in Saigon. Most of the people respond to power and authority, whether that of the Viet Cong or the GVN. Left to themselves they are likely to remain uncommitted and disengaged until a decisive break in the struggle becomes obvious.
28. The Communists hope to exploit and add to the growing popular desire for peace. In the cities, they are currently engaged in a major effort to establish a new front, the so-called "Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces," and to attract important leaders as well as the masses to it. So far, the success does not appear to be significant, but the Communists are probably looking to a longer term impact. Their basic aim is to advance the image of the Alliance as a credible "third force" which can bring peace to the nation and work out a coalition government with the Liberation Front; they may also attempt to develop it into a major political factor in the Paris talks. In the coming months, the alliance will almost certainly gain some adherents among lesser known and neutralist and leftist oriented politicians and may possibly attract some well known figures, particularly if the Huong government fails. However, the Alliance is unlikely to gain a large popular following during this period unless there is a major break in favor of the Communists in the military situation or in the negations.
III. External Factors
The Paris Talks
29. The diplomatic moves emanating from either side in the Paris talks will obviously have a profound impact on the psychological mood prevailing in Saigon and throughout the country. Hanoi will probably wish to keep the talks going for some time. It sees the discussions as an opportunity for propaganda on key issues as well as a means to divide Washington and Saigon and increase pressures on the US for concessions. At the same time, Hanoi does not want to risk the resumption of the bombing by breaking off the talks at any early date. In effect, Hanoi believes time is running against the Allied side. But if the North Vietnamese should conclude that this belief is unfounded they might moderate their negotiating position.
30. During the course of the Paris talks the GVN expects, and will continue to press for, the closest possible consultation and coordination with the US. It will be sensitive to nuances, rumors, and background noises in Paris and the US. In general, Saigon will oppose any concession to Hanoi without a major concession in return. From Saigon's point of view the bombing issue provides an early test of tendencies in US policy. If the bombing of the North were stopped without clearcut and credible restrictions being placed on North Vietnamese support to Communist forces in the South, Saigon's confidence in the US would be severely shaken.
31. At a later stage in the negotiations, it is almost certain that any serious discussion of a compromise settlement giving the Alliance or the NLF a formal political role in Saigon would touch off a severe crisis in the GVN. This would still be true even if these discussions resulted from a considerable scaling down of North Vietnamese demands. At this point, Saigon would fear that an "imposed" solution involving a political role for the Communists was imminent. The Communists would attempt to exploit the uncertainties in Saigon and these efforts would add to the confusion and demoralization throughout the GVN.
US Politics
32. Developments in Paris are but part of the larger question of how US policy will develop in an election period and after. Both Hanoi and Saigon consider that the US election casts a shadow of uncertainty over the future. For its part, Hanoi may not feel the need to make any significant changes in its position at least until after the Presidential nominations and until it has digested any differences in policy between the nominees. US developments, however, are of much more immediate importance to Saigon. Election rhetoric in the US is bound to be amplified and magnified in Saigon and perhaps badly distorted. In the end, Saigon's appraisal of US policy could be decisive in the continuing viability of the GVN.
264. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, June 6, 1968, 1810Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Received at 2:59 p.m.
29369. Ref: State 177491./2/
/2/The Department transmitted the text of Kosygin's letter in telegram 177491 to Saigon, June 6. (Ibid.) This letter is printed as an attachment to Document 262.
1. It is true as Mr. Kosygin states that progress has not been made in talks in Paris but it seems to me important to point out that talks have begun only because of a major concession on our part, namely the halting of bombing over a major part of North Vietnam. Rather than indicating any reciprocal measure of restraint or desire to reduce the level of violence, the DRV to the contrary has continued its attacks against the civilian population of Saigon and other cities of South Vietnam and has taken advantage of the bombing cessation to greatly step up its infiltration of men and materiel through Laos and the DMZ, both of which it is pledged to respect. Can Mr. Kosygin really think it reasonable to expect us to further expose our own forces and those of our allies to greater vulnerability without any indication of a desire for mutual accommodation from the other side other than the vague statement that all other matters could then be considered?
2. Mr. Kosygin mentions the fact that he has brought to the cognizance of the DRV in response to our request the desirability of establishing unofficial contacts between the delegations. It seems to me this is now where our main effort should be directed. It is hard for me to conceive that progress can be made while talks remain in the public arena in Paris where the give and take and flexibility necessary in any talks or negotiations, called by whatever term, is impossible. It has been my experience, limited though I recognize it to be, that progress is possible only if talks can be carried on privately and secretly between the parties. It seems to me that this is the direction in which Mr. Kosygin's influence can most helpfully be exerted in the interest of the progress he professes to want, indeed which all of us want. I believe that only in this way can a fruitful exchange of the limits of possibilities be had.
3. Finally, I believe that to go beyond the concessions we have already made would confirm in the minds of the GVN and the Vietnamese people the apprehension and suspicions of our intention they once held and which have now greatly subsided because of what they see as the firm yet reasonable position we have taken in Paris. Certainly we share with Mr. Kosygin a sincere desire for the restoration of peace in Southeast Asia, a relaxation of tensions, and an end to bloodshed but can he think it unreasonable that the DRV should also make some contribution to this end?
4. Comment: I have, as you know, believed that there must be some limit to the "taking advantage" of our bombing restriction by the other side, and that we should so indicate to them privately. Whether or not we should intimate to Mr. Kosygin that there is some limit to our patience you are certainly in a better position to judge than I. This question, however, is coming increasingly to the fore in the minds of the Vietnamese and I have contemplated making this the subject of a further message.
Bunker
265. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, June 9, 1968, 2:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting, which lasted until 6:40 p.m., was held in the Cabinet Room. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS
ATTENDING THE MEETING
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Ambassador Thompson
Cyrus Vance
Averell Harriman
Abe Fortas
Charles Bohlen
Walt Rostow
Richard Helms
Jim Jones
Tom Johnson
Secretary Rusk: We are here today to assess the importance of the Kosygin message/2/ and how we might deal with it.
/2/Attached to Document 262. Action relating to the Kosygin letter was delayed by news of the assassination of Robert Kennedy (word of which the President received early on the morning of June 5) and his June 8 funeral.
This is a very significant message. The fact that he sent it on his own initiative rather than in response to anything is significant.
This is important. We must determine what they mean by it. He also associates "his colleagues" with it.
He says a complete bombing cessation could lead to a breakthrough. He says this would lead to a peaceful settlement.
Kosygin says if we take such a step it will not result in any negative consequences for the United States--either its security or its prestige.
The message is hard to interpret. If we stopped all bombing and NVN continued to carry on war, there is nothing in this message which would condemn the Soviets. We need a clarification.
The degree to which we do anything without further clarification is what needs to be discussed here today. We need guarantees they would do something concrete in response to the bombing halt.
We also need to know what would be the effect on the morale of our own men if we stopped bombing and Hanoi continued their activities "flat out."
The Soviets think we should have unofficial contacts between our two delegations in Paris.
In summary:
1. It is an important message.
2. It lacks clarity.
3. We must seek clarification.
We need to tell Kosygin that most of North Vietnam's territory and population is free from bombing while none of South Vietnam is free of attacks.
We need to know what they specifically will do if we stop bombing.
The President: What do you think, Averell?
Averell Harriman: This is an extremely important letter. We think this is an extraordinarily definite statement for the Soviets to make. We do need clarification. We want them to know what is going on in South Vietnam.
Cy and I have a slightly different approach which is not as good as Clark Clifford's.
In any case, we should lead Kosygin on.
Cy Vance: I agree with that.
Averell Harriman. This could be a breakthrough.
The President: Dean thinks it lacks clarity and we need to seek clarification. Do you agree?
Averell Harriman: Yes, sir, I do. But I think, as Clark does, that we should assume the message means what we want it to mean.
(2:55--Message reviewed--see Clark Clifford's draft of Appendix A.)/3/
/3/Appendix A is not attached and has not been found. Rusk, Rostow, Clifford, Harriman, Vance, Rostow, Thompson, Bohlen, and Read met at 10 a.m. that morning and again at 1:20 p.m. to discuss a draft letter to Kosygin. (Johnson Library, Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968-1969) Notes of the meeting have not been found. Rusk's 5-page draft of the letter, his third revision of it, dated June 9, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET. In a memorandum to the President, June 9, 9:40 a.m., Rostow wrote: "At the 10:00 o'clock meeting I shall raise with my colleagues the possible wisdom of putting into this letter a reference to the position which we took at Paris before the formal exchanges began, when Cy Vance was talking to their No. 2, that we would insist on GVN participation when interests of the GVN were involved. My feeling is that it is important that we record this position with Moscow, so that there can be no ambiguity. We might even go further and suggest to the DRV, via Moscow, that it might be wise for them to undertake "informal contacts" with the GVN at a relatively early stage, as well as informal contacts with us." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Vol. 81) Harriman described both the morning and afternoon meetings of June 9 in a December 14 memorandum. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Trips and Missions, Paris Peace Talks, 1968-69, Chronological File, Dec. 1968-Jan. 1969) The memorandum is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume VII.
Cy Vance: We are at a central crossroad.
I agree with Dean. It is significant.
We do not know what it means.
It may mean the Soviets are willing to assist with resolution of the conflict.
We must answer right. If we don't, we may lose the chance and strengthen the hand of Peking in Hanoi.
The North Vietnamese have changed in Paris--
--in their attitude
--in admitting North Vietnam presence in South
--in sending Le Duc Tho
On the "con" side, they may be:
1. Testing our mettle. If we give, they will be tougher later on.
2. If we stop bombing, it will be tough to restart.
3. Time is on their side, they think.
The enemy can fight for 12-18 months. They can control the level of the war. Time is not on our side. Clark's draft is the best way to respond.
The President: What does Kosygin's letter say to you?
Secretary Rusk: At worst, he is trying to get us to stop bombing and all other acts of war against them without any commitments by Hanoi and by Soviets as to how they will respond to it.
It would be costly to stop bombing and restart it.
The President: Can we say for a few days we will stop it and go back if there is no restraint by them?
NVN are not unique. If they have a serious interest in peace, they can let us know that certain specific things will happen. They can do this without losing face.
The absence of this shows there is nothing yet they will do for sure.
I don't think the South Vietnamese will stand still without reason to believe there will be some de-escalation on the enemy side. We would have problems with South Koreans, and other allies as well.
The President: If we stopped bombing tomorrow, how long would we have to go before we could expect results?
Secretary Rusk: It could be several weeks and into the fall.
The President: Didn't they double shipments down into the South in May over March?
Secretary Rusk: Yes.
General Wheeler: Infiltration groups of 127,000 men were identified. May is the highest month so far. Also the shipment south of supplies are up double over March. Also, they have moved anti-aircraft batteries into the Panhandle and have shown no restraint.
The President: How long could we stand it without jeopardizing our position in I Corps ? What would we do?
General Wheeler: We could hold for about a month.
We suffer 7,500 U.S. casualties for every 100,000 they infiltrate in.
The President: How long could we take it?
General Wheeler: About 30 days. Morale may go to hell in a handbag.
The President: Couldn't you start bombing back?
General Wheeler: I don't know. This couldn't be stood very long.
The President: I would take the chance if I had a reasonable supposition of results and if I could get back in bombing when we need to.
General Wheeler: I don't see anything new and startling in the Kosygin letter.
This may not be on Kosygin's initiative. Averell talked to Zorin. It may be a response to that conversation. I agree with Dean that the matter should be pursued. We should probe to see if we can get assurances from the Soviets.
Also, we need private talks with North Vietnamese.
Secretary Rusk: The key difference is whether we go back with request for clarification or whether we are prepared to rely on what he has said so far. The private talks in Paris with Hanoi may be more important than those with Soviets.
Clark Clifford: We have a great opportunity here. We should take serious advantage of it. All of us want to bring the war to a conclusion. It is good for you to get the benefit of all of our views. We won't end the war by negotiations with the North Vietnamese. They control the level of the war. They can go on indefinitely from the manpower aspect. Soviets and Red China continue to supply them with all they need. The combat in South Vietnam has not forced them to end this war. Bombing in South or North won't stop war. What will stop it is an arrangement with the Soviets so they can use their leverage--which we don't have--to bring the Soviets to force Hanoi to stop it. The cost of the war for the Soviets is becoming heavier. The Kosygin letter has the same tone as the hot line message he made to us at the time of the Middle East crisis.
It is a very remarkable and promising letter. It is temperate and statesmanlike.
Key passages are
1. "My colleagues and I think--we have grounds to do so . . ."
2. Also the fact that they say our security interests will not be damaged.
He says he has information to lead him to that conclusion. He says it will lessen international tensions as a whole. I would take him at his word.
The President should accept it in good faith. It is in our own interests to do this.
We should accept his statement as assurance. We should take him up on it.
The President: We took him up on it at the time of the 37-day pause./4/
/4/The pause lasted from December 24, 1965, to January 30, 1966; see ibid., vol. IV, Document 57.
Clark Clifford: I favor this pause. Circumstances are different. I did not favor the 37-day pause, you will remember. He is asking us to give up the bombing. The price is not too great for us to take the chance.
Let's give it a test. The aid to North Vietnam was not great until we started bombing their sister Socialist state. Now we may be stopping 25% of their flow. They will be able to keep up the level of their fighting even if bombing continues.
We should accept his letter as assurances. He honestly wants war to end. If we stop bombing, the Soviets will turn pressure on North Vietnam to stop the fighting. The Soviets are sending 80% of supplies. They have the means to make them stop this war.
If there is no action on their part in two weeks we should get message to Kosygin saying we have to start bombing again.
We have better position to start again than we ever had before March 31 on this.
If it doesn't happen we would resume bombing.
As far as Saigon is concerned, we are the chief suppliers of men and material. We have lost 26,000 men and it is costing us $25 billion this year alone.
In summary, we should do the following:
1. We should accept his letter as assurances.
2. We will find out if they aren't assurances.
3. We have good record with Kosygin. We shouldn't affect it by an improper response to his letter.
Walt Rostow: We could state that we would give one week for him to state if these are not assurances.
We could follow on his reference to Ambassador Harriman's talks with Ambassador Zorin.
It would give:
1. Kosygin a chance to come back if he isn't giving assurances.
2. Restraint would be expected as we define it.
3. Resumption would be required if no response is forthcoming.
The President: Why not try to get clarification before burning our bridges?
We could say we know you are acting in good faith, but that we know what happened on the 37-day pause before. Say if we do it again, and we are all wrong again, we electrify the world with hope and get nothing.
Walt Rostow: I do not see how the President could take this act without some kind of assurances. Our relations with Soviets are hopeful outside of the Vietnam situation.
The President: We would have problems with our allies. Also with our own people.
How many boys will we gamble if we do this?
Abe Fortas: There isn't much difference of opinion, really. Clark Clifford wants to wait until Kosygin comes back with a reply before acting.
I read Kosygin's letter differently.
They are saying they may be able to get something underway, but only if North Vietnam doesn't have to lose face.
Clark Clifford is being very rigid and tough in asking for specific restraints, however.
We need to get an informal understanding.
It appears they want you to agree to stop bombing before they will agree to de-escalation. We must have an informal understanding beforehand.
We should say we appreciate this and will stop bombing provided informal talks are fruitful. I would leave out specific conditions.
Clark Clifford is not being easier in first full paragraph at top of page 2.
We will stop bombing if a mutually satisfactory set of terms is reached.
Secretary Rusk: We have said we will stop bombing first if we know then what will follow.
Walt Rostow: The important thing is that Le Duc Tho has gone to Paris. Rate of attrition is leading to a deterioration of the quality of the enemy forces. They can control the intensity of the violence, but if they scale down they know their position on the ground will rapidly deteriorate given the U.S.-South Vietnamese ground strength.
We need to force Kosygin to be explicit about his assumptions.
Ambassador Thompson: This does seem to be an opportunity to get the Soviets to bring pressure to bear on Hanoi.
The President: How does this differ from the 37-day pause? You thought then we would wait no longer than 12 days. This will raise hopes. There will be excuses to wait again. I got burned on it before.
Ambassador Thompson: If you took a step and they didn't react, you could go back to all bombing. They should consider that.
The President: I feel we should say we will stop all bombing when we are sure of restraint by them.
Ambassador Bohlen: Main interest of Soviets in Vietnam has been ideological. If you stop the bombing of all of North Vietnam, it would strengthen the hand of Soviet influence in Hanoi.
If you could live with this for two or three weeks militarily we should try the full pause.
This letter may have resulted from Harriman's talk with Zorin. I would go back to all bombing if they didn't respond.
Secretary Rusk: That would break up talks.
Ambassador Bohlen: So what. I would if they aren't going to do more than they have since the talks started.
The President: The bombing doesn't stop all their men and supplies. It stops some. It raises the price. Since March we haven't done much.
Richard Helms: I don't see anything new in this note. The Russians would like to see us call off bombing. I do think that NVN and VC can go on for a year.
I think we should see what specifically they have in mind.
Some Senators can't wait until you get out of this war.
Secretary Rusk: We should say:
Point 1--It is important to have informal talks with the Soviets in Paris.
Point 2--We will examine a halt to bombing.
Point 3--We will be prepared to discuss this matter further with you.
We should say we are prepared to accept his statement as assurances if they are that.
Abe Fortas: For my part, it looks as though we will institute a complete cessation without public knowledge of what the precise nature of private understanding may be.
You can't admit to "acts of war" against NVN, as is written in draft one.
Clark Clifford: We have an offer from Kosygin. We need to agree to his offer if these are assurances on his part. We say if you are really assuring us, we are willing to proceed and test it out.
I don't think we should reply in a way that could be interpreted as a rejection of his offer.
I think he has gone as far as he can go.
We come to the question about relative importance of our bombings. The restriction in bombing has not led to the step-up in our losses. They have done it by putting more intensity in their fighting in the South.
The President: All I know is what they were doing before March 31 and after March 31.
General Wheeler: Slackening off of the bombing has contributed to higher losses.
4:15--The President leaves the meeting./5/
/5/The President left the meeting at 4:13 p.m. to make a telephone call to the Situation Room. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
4:19--The President returns.
(During interval Secretary Rusk suggested changes in the first draft.)
The President: What do all of you think?
Ambassador Thompson: I like it (the new draft).
Clark Clifford: Dean's language brings into question our willingness to take him up on his offer.
We must remember a lot has happened since the bombing pauses before I would take whatever minor risk is involved.
The President: I am not willing to take their assurance and rely on it on face value.
We have softened. They have done nothing.
Clark Clifford: I think we are better off today because of the March 31 speech than if you hadn't have made it. It started us on the road toward the ultimate conclusion of war.
This could be the next step.
Abe Fortas: What is the difference between Rusk's last statement and Clark Clifford's?
(Rusk read his statement.)
Abe Fortas: You are close together. Clifford says:
"Unless you tell me our assumption is wrong we will be prepared to stop bombing."
Clark Clifford: Dean is saying private talks must produce agreement before we stop bombing.
Secretary Rusk: You can't determine the outcome of a war by manpower studies.
The President: I think we may have them beaten now. Only thing that will stop us from making a peace is ourselves.
I think Clark is unrealistic about attitude of how our men will react to this.
Secretary Rusk: We must be precise with the Soviets.
Ambassador Bohlen: We should follow up the Soviet hint. I would ask a straight, simple clarification.
Secretary Rusk: If Soviets are for informal contacts, isn't it worth exploring it with Harriman in Paris ?
Averell Harriman: We will never end this war without Soviet help. We should move forward with Kosygin.
(The President was then shown a draft by Harriman.)
Averell Harriman: We need to keep the Soviets involved.
Secretary Rusk: My draft was designed to meet your four points.
Averell Harriman: You put back a lot of propaganda in your letter.
Clark Clifford: When we have as much disagreement as we have today, we must look at things behind it.
You called my position unrealistic. I believe it is realistic.
We are not ending the War, even though we have massive firepower, huge B-52 flights, largest number of troops ever in Vietnam.
We can't bring war to a conclusion militarily.
We should go on with our 95% fighting--that in the South. I am willing to try for a political settlement, by taking this risk of stopping the bombing.
The President: I don't think being soft will get us peace.
Averell Harriman: Rusk's letter is to them propaganda.
(4:20 p.m.--no agreement on drafts)
The President: What importance do we attach to bombing of the North?
General Wheeler: Considerable importance.
Militarily, we are on the strategic defensive. We always have been. Nobody wins a war by being on the defensive. The only offensive pressure we have had was the bombing, which has been unduly restrictive.
They suffered from the restricted bombing.
They turned down your San Antonio formula, but accepted a tougher March 31 formula. There is much involved, but if we stop all our activities North of the 17th, they can take advantage of it.
They can:
1. Move forces to DMZ to support further action.
2. Load Panhandle with anti-aircraft equipment.
We lost more planes in lower route packages because of anti-aircraft inventory.
3. They could load SAM's up to DMZ. They will fire at B-52's without us being able to do anything about it.
The President: What about Clark's proposition of two weeks cessation of bombing?
General Wheeler:
1. The enemy can go all out.
2. He can mass forces North of the DMZ.
3. He can move aircraft South.
4. He can rehabilitate air bases.
5. You would suffer tactical setbacks.
6. Some units might be overrun.
7. You run a military risk.
8. You won't be run out of South Vietnam.
9. Our people could hold for a while.
On the negotiating situation:
I defer to the diplomats how to respond. It should be straight to him from the President. I believe it is in the best interest not to move to give up the one offensive action you have without some assurance--formal or informal--that you will get something in return. Don't buy it as unclear as it is now. It would weaken your position.
The President: Let's ask Bunker and our Ambassador in Korea for their reactions./6/
/6/The Department transmitted the text of the proposed letter to Kosygin in telegram 179514 to Saigon and Seoul, June 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) In telegram 29571 from Saigon, June 10, Bunker commented: "I agree that we should seek to stimulate a more specific discourse with both Hanoi and Moscow, but I believe that it must be on terms which will be clearly understood by both of them and which will not be misunderstood by our Vietnamese friends and allies. My feeling, in brief, is that the proposed reply, which suggests we are prepared to stop the bombing in return for Soviet assurances, is much in need of strengthening if it is to be convincing to Hanoi and Moscow, as well as to our allies. Our experience in dealing with Communists, whether European or Asian, over the past 20 odd years is that they understand firmness and clarity and are quick to take advantage of vague and uncertain actions which suggest to them that we are in a weak position. As I have said before, I do not believe that we are in a weak bargaining position and this fact should be reflected in our reply, while making quite evident our desire to move towards mutual de-escalation and a peaceful settlement." (Ibid.)
I fear there may be a blow up in South Vietnam. I do not look for any change of government without great grief. Whatever we agree on, let's get Bunker and Porter to agree on it.
Averell Harriman: Keep dialogue going with Kosygin. That will end this war. Our dialogue with North Vietnam won't.
Clark Clifford: All four of us recommend General Seignious to replace General Goodpaster as Military Adviser.
General Wheeler: We are for him from the JCS standpoint.
The President nodded approval.
5:09 p.m.--Rusk draft brought in.
5:10 p.m.--The President left for church service./7/
/7/The President had declared Sunday as a national day of mourning for Robert Kennedy.
6:12 p.m. The President returns--reads final draft--approves it. It is attached as Appendix B./8/
/8/Rusk's final draft, which was virtually the same as Document 269, except for minor semantic alterations, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Meeting with the President, 6/11/68.
The President: Is this agreeable to all of you?
Secretary Rusk: O.K.
Averell Harriman: It is all right.
Cy Vance: It is all right.
Clark Clifford: It is all right.
Walt Rostow: It is all right.
General Wheeler: O.K
266. Editorial Note
In meetings over several days, President Johnson briefed two of the Presidential candidates on battlefield conditions, the improvement in the South Vietnamese military, and apparent progress at the Paris negotiations. On June 10, 1968, the President met with New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller. According to a recording of the meeting, Johnson cited three points that demonstrated increasing moderation in North Vietnamese thinking: 1) they were essentially confirming the presence of their troops in the South, a charge always denied by them; 2) they claimed to have inflicted extensive casualties on U.S. forces and thus were insisting on immediate compromise, a call which belied their own desire for substantive negotiations; and 3) they believed that public opinion, both domestic and worldwide, would compel the United States to come to terms favorable to Hanoi. Rockefeller vowed to toe the line on Vietnam, expressly assuring the President: "Believe me, I'd like to get the nomination, but I'm not going to do it at the expense of this country." (Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room) The next day, the President briefed Senator Eugene McCarthy on the same topics. A full transcript of the recording of this meeting is ibid.
267. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 10, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Meetings with the President, 6/11/68. Secret; Nodis.
SUBJECT
Proposed Reply to the Kosygin Letter
Because of my absence from Washington yesterday, I have only just seen the Kosygin letter, our draft reply, and Bunker's reaction to that draft./2/ My thoughts on the subject follow:
/2/See Document 265.
A close reading of K's letter indicates that it offers nothing new of substance but retains the old ambiguities about the contribution which a total cessation of bombing "could contribute" to the "prospects of a peaceful settlement." As I read it, it is remarkable only by its moderate tone and its timing.
The moderate tone suggests that K would really like a favorable response from us and hopes that we will oblige him. It also indicates that he wants to place the American interest in the foreground of any discussion as the motivating force for any agreement.
As to the reason for the timing of the letter, one can speculate along several lines:
a. The arrival of Tho to head the North Vietnamese negotiating team probably marks the opening of a new phase in the Paris negotiations. K's letter is the opening gun of a new diplomatic offensive to accompany and exploit the military escalation in South Viet-Nam, with its initial target our will to continue the bombing.
b. Hanoi senses that we are probably considering a return to our former bombing pattern in North Viet-Nam and K has sent his letter to make that decision more difficult for us and at least to cause us to delay in taking it.
c. Hanoi is hurting badly even under the restricted bombing and has called for help from the USSR to obtain prompt relief.
Whatever the reason for the letter, it is clearly a bear trap to be approached with caution. Frankly, I do not find that caution in some of the passages of our proposed draft. It seems to limit our concern to the safety of our military forces and to accept the preeminence of the U.S. interest over that of our allies. There is no indignation expressed for the civilian losses in South Viet-Nam and for the continuing attacks on Saigon. There is a dangerous willingness to accept private assurances of unspecified content, either from Hanoi or from the USSR, in exchange for a cessation of our bombing.
For a variety of reasons. I advise against the dispatch of the letter as presently written. Generally speaking, I agree with the views of Ambassador Bunker and the changes of text which he recommends--if you decide to stay generally within the framework of the present text. I can think of at least two other approaches to our reply:
a. Confine the answer to amenities and queries about the meaning of the ambiguous language. This kind of exchange can go on for a long time while feeling out the adversary.
b. Stiffen the reply even beyond Bunker's suggestions, making perfectly clear that we are not going to give up our bombing without precise agreements covering reciprocal actions and hinting broadly that we are fed up with the present stalling and expect to relax our self-imposed constraints soon.
My objections to the present text are in general that the course of action implied therein will or may result in the following:
a. It can drive a wedge between us and the GVN and contribute to the collapse of that government--a major enemy objective.
b. It will encourage the Hanoi leaders and convince them that they are right in assuming we are defeated--at least in spirit.
c. Any cessation of bombing will make it almost impossible to resume, thus setting the stage for another Panmunjom.
d. It will further confuse and divide our people who have been assured in the past by their leaders that the bombing restrains infiltration and gives indirect protection to our troops. A cessation now at a time of increased enemy infiltration, of heightened levels of military and terrorist activities and of record-breaking U.S. casualties would defy explanation to any but the extreme left wing of American public opinion.
M.D.T.
268. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 11, 1968, 10:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. III. Secret; Sensitive. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that it is likely that, if we are to preserve the talks in Paris, we shall have to take the risk of breaking them up--and so demonstrating to Hanoi.
The judgment is premature, since we do not know how the Russians will treat our reply; and that comes first.
But here is my reasoning:
1. Hanoi, on balance, regards our move of March 31st as taken from weakness--domestic political weakness.
2. They probably calculate that, above all, we don't want to rock the boat in Paris. Our backing down to the 19th parallel has helped convince them.
3. Therefore, they can safely:
--take the fullest possible advantage of what we regard as an act of de-escalation by increasing rather than reducing their effort and attacking Saigon while Hanoi is a sanctuary;
--take their own sweet time in the Paris negotiations.
4. In short, I believe they are laughing at us and playing us for suckers on the diplomatic-military front, in the short run.
5. On the other hand, I am pretty sure that they regard their longer run, basic position as weak and requiring a negotiated settlement within, say, the next year:
--the evidence is now that they were about to take an initiative around March 31;
--as you know, I do not believe their intense military activity, with abnormally high casualties and North Vietnamese infiltration, is a stable military position;
--if Thieu-Huong keep coming forward, they may conclude time is not their friend in South Vietnamese politics;
--the Russians and Eastern Europeans may not be willing to keep them afloat at the cost of a billion dollars a year for long; and the Russians may even have exacted a commitment from them to wind up in 1968 in return for the billion dollar grubstake for the winter-spring offensive.
6. If this is so, Bus Wheeler may be right: we couldn't get them out of Paris with a team of mules.
7. What follows from these tentative judgments:
--Sect. Rusk should see Kuznetsov in New York, after we despatch the letter to Kosygin, and talk more somberly to him than the tone of your letter to Kosygin. Specifically: we can't live, in any case, with this level of infiltration; we can't live with Saigon a target and Hanoi a sanctuary; we can't live with this protracted telephone book strategy in Paris;/2/
/2/Rusk met with Vasily Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, in New York on June 14. (Memoranda of conversation, June 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-EX Files: Lot 79 D 247) Prior to this meeting, he met with U Thant to discuss Vietnam. Telegram 2244 from USUN, June 14, reported on this conversation. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, UN, Vol. 8) It is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXXIII.
--We should have some Senators speak to this theme: McGee, Brooke, Jackson, others;
--If Kosygin's reply is not satisfactory we should continue the dialogue and then:
--move back to the 20th parallel;
--have Averell tell the North Vietnamese that we shall have to match every rocket on Saigon with, at least, a bomb on Hanoi.
8. This may move the negotiations off dead center. It will, if para. 5 above is correct. If para 5. is wrong, they will withdraw from Paris.
9. That would be a most serious situation; but what would it mean? It would mean they are not prepared for an honorable negotiation nor for an honorable settlement. If so, we'd better face it.
10. I understand--and with sympathy--Clark Clifford's view that this could be a mortal blow to the Vice President's political position. But where Clark is wrong is in believing that we--or the Vice President--can continue to live with the undignified and humiliating situation where:
--they respond to March 31 with escalation, not de-escalation;
--they refuse to negotiate seriously in Paris;
--they shell Saigon and weaken the GVN, while Hanoi goes scot-free.
It is a long time from June to August and August to November.
11. If they do not respond to our communications and actions, and if they walk out of Paris because we exact reprisals on Hanoi for the shelling of Saigon, I do not believe we can or should return to a simple status quo ante . We should do more against both Hanoi and Haiphong.
12. I set these thoughts down reluctantly. I hope that Kosygin's reply will make them irrelevant. But, for what they may be worth, I thought you should have them.
Walt
269. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin/1/
Washington, June 11, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin. Secret; Nodis. The letter was delivered by Rusk to Dobrynin at 6:35 p.m. that evening. (Ibid., Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968-1969)
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I was very glad to receive your letter of June 5/2/ and have given it the most careful study. I think you and I agree as to the great importance of a peaceful resolution of the Vietnamese problem and of a halt to the bloodshed. I think you and I would also agree that the Soviet Union and the United States have a very special responsibility with respect to the reduction of tensions and the stabilization of peace in the world.
/2/Printed as an attachment to Document 262.
We are prepared to end the bombardment of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam if we know it will lead to the de-escalation of the war. In this connection, I have given special attention to your statement that a cessation of bombing and other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam cannot result in any kind of negative consequences for the United States in the sense of damaging the interests of its security.
Does this statement apply to the security interests of the United States with respect to our own and allied forces in Viet-Nam? Obviously, the military capability of the DRV would be further enhanced by the total cessation of bombing. A decision must be made by the DRV not to take advantage of this cessation; we and Hanoi must be clear on this point. Such a decision need not be made public. You will understand that I must be concerned about the position of our troops and allied forces in South Viet-Nam and the safety of the civilian population which depends upon them for security. Any light which you can throw upon this vital point would be appreciated.
As a result of my unilateral action, Hanoi and its civilian population are now free from military attack. At the same time Saigon and its civilian population have been subjected to the most vicious and indiscriminate attacks, attacks which continue even as I write this letter. I would be less than candid with you if I did not tell you that this is a situation which could easily become intolerable.
We shall make every effort to discuss these matters constructively with the representatives of the DRV in Paris. We are prepared to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a further step toward peace. But we do need to know the steps the DRV will take toward further de-escalation of the violence.
Of course, Mr. Chairman, we would be glad to pursue these matters directly with the government of the Soviet Union. If you are in a position to tell us privately and with precision that there would be no adverse military consequences to our own and allied forces as a result of a bombing cessation, we would be prepared to accept your statement and would issue the necessary orders.
We appreciate the fact that you have informed the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam of our interest in unofficial contacts between our respective delegations in Paris, as well as the fact that you believe that all forms of contact between the parties should be utilized. Our delegation in Paris is ready for such contacts and we would hope very much that the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam would be responsive. I do believe it important that we keep in close touch with each other on this matter.
Sincerely yours,
Lyndon B. Johnson/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
270. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Saigon, June 11, 1968.
/1/Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute, William C. Westmoreland Papers, History Files, #33, 1-30 Jun 68. Confidential. Prepared by General Westmoreland on June 20 on board the USS Wilson. That same day, Westmoreland arrived in the Philippines, and began a cruise to Hawaii where he arrived on June 26. Also on June 20, the President and Clifford discussed Abrams' request to abandon Khe Sanh. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Clifford, June 20, 1968, 3:34 p.m., Tape F6806.02, PNO 3)
SUBJECT
Final Day in Saigon, 11 June 1968
1. Having returned late from a dinner party given by the ambassador the previous evening, I found considerable administrative work in terms of efficiency reports and autographing of pictures to be done before leaving the command. I therefore set the alarm for 0500 and proceeded to work at the desk in my bedroom. At approximately 0615, the Viet Cong started a rocket attack and bracketed the quarters. I continued to work, appreciating that the probability of getting hit by such indiscriminate shelling was very remote. My first thought was that this was the greatest compliment extended to me yet--the VC were giving me a 22-gun salute upon departure. This was the largest bombardment thus far in the center of the city, and I do suspect it was planned for the occasion of my last day, since this was well known.
2. I assembled, as a first order of business, the domestic help at my quarters, along with the US Army MP guards and the Vietnamese MSS security personnel. I thanked them all for their loyal and efficient support and stated that I would never forget what they had contributed to my welfare and safety. I then gave to each of the Vietnamese members of my household--in particular Hai and Thuong; Vien, my most loyal and efficient driver; Sgt Tat and his MSS security guards--a letter which included an appropriate piaster gratuity.
3. I then proceeded to the hospital, where I called on MG Loan, who had been wounded during the communist attempt to attack Saigon on the 5th of May. Loan is apparently going to retain his limb but will probably be lame. He seemed to be in reasonable morale but disappointed that he is temporarily out of action, He did not comment on his recent replacement as Chief of Police by Col Hai/2/ but expressed appreciation for my assistance to his country, and we parted to the exchange of good wishes and the hope that we would meet again.
/2/Tran Van Hai.
4. I then went to the room of Col Cua,/3/ recently wounded by an accident caused by a rocket malfunction from a US Cobra helicopter. Cua had recently been replaced as mayor. He was not badly wounded, was cheerful and obviously pleased that I had stopped by to see him.
/3/Van Van Cua.
5. I then proceeded to the palace, where I had an appointment with Vice President Ky at 0930. He and I spent 45 minutes together, mostly reminiscing. Ky went out of his way to make the point that he was very disturbed by the way the press had treated him. He deplores their efforts to create friction between him and Thieu. Ky pointed out that he and Thieu had been working together since early 1965, that he had supported Thieu for the Presidency, and that it made no sense at all to assume that he was now going to turn against Thieu. Ky stated that I, of course, understood his attitude and patriotic support but the US mission personnel, who were completely new, did not understand this. Ky went on to explain that a coup was not only impossible now, it was senseless and the days of physical conflict within the senior circle was a thing of the past. It was essential that they talk through their problems and not resort to forceful means to bring about political change.
6. I then proceeded to the President's office, where I again spent 45 minutes, reminiscing with Thieu on our friendship and reviewing the current situation. Thieu agreed with my military assessment of the situation, but expressed great concern at the political advantage being gained by Hanoi in support of their talks in Paris. He implied that the cessation of bombing had been a political victory for Hanoi and this was now being capitalized on by the indiscriminate shelling of Saigon, which has resulted in no retaliation or reaction by our side. He feels, therefore, that this could be the beginning of a general deterioration in the relative political posture of the US and South Vietnamese governments in the eyes of the world and particularly to the Vietnamese people in the south. As we parted company, Thieu again thanked me for my contribution and stated that he and Mrs. Thieu were looking forward to seeing me and Mrs. Westmoreland during their forthcoming trip to Washington.
7. We then drove to the headquarters, where I paid my last call on MG Kerwin, and thence to the VIP lounge at Ton Son Nhut, where my friends were assembled. After a brief visit together, I shook hands all around; reviewed an honor guard staged by Gen Vien at plane-side; said good-bye to Gen Vien, who apologized for Mrs. Vien's not being present, stating that the emotional strain would be too much and she would break down in the process so asked to be excused; and bade farewell to Ambassador Bunker and Gen Abrams. I then boarded the T-39 and was on my way.
8. After getting airborne, I sadly remembered that I had not bade a final farewell to my trusted driver, Vien, Sgt Tat and his loyal MSS guards, and the Vietnamese motorcycle CanSat who had so efficiently guided me around the city. Of course, I had said good-bye to them earlier in the morning, but they were not conspicuous on my departure and I neglected to go out of my way to find these hard-working people who had done so much for me behind the scenes. I shall write them additional, special notes on assuming my new duties.
W C Westmoreland
General, United States Army
Commanding
271. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret. In an attached memorandum transmitting a copy of the paper to Rostow, June 12, Read wrote: "In response to your request, I attach a brief balance sheet on the Paris talks to date."
BALANCE SHEET ON PARIS TALKS
1. Gains.
a) In terms of US and world opinion, we have gained widespread approval for our unilateral action of de-escalation which brought about the talks. Our proposals for restraint and de-escalation (DMZ restoration, respect for 1962 Laos Agreement, respect for Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity) have generally been regarded as constructive, as has our proposal to limit polemical exchanges.
b) We have focussed on the fantasy of Hanoi's denial that they have troops in the South, and have made public an impressive body of detailed evidence of Hanoi's violation of the DMZ and direct North Vietnamese intervention in both South Viet-Nam and Laos. In turn, Hanoi has sought to develop a rationale justifying North Vietnamese presence in the South (the "right" of all Vietnamese to attack the enemy wherever he is), while still refusing to admit that this constitutes aggression. These new formulations, however, may lay the groundwork for eventual withdrawals.
c) In terms of making substantive progress on discussing matters related to the bombing cessation, we have made no visible headway. Our efforts to arrange private talks or at least limit polemics have been rebuffed. Nevertheless, the dialogue has begun, and may be developing more give and take./2/ We have set forth our position on matching restraints in specific, realistic terms, and have indicated readiness to accept flexible language on "acknowledging responsibility" for cessation of bombing if that would lead to prompt agreement on matters related to cessation. We have warned Hanoi that the attacks on Saigon are not conducive to progress in Paris.
/2/During the tea break at the eighth session on June 12, Harriman and Vance broached with Thuy and Tho the idea of secret talks outside of the formal venue. (Telegrams 16113/Delto 268 and 16137/Delto 271, June 12; ibid., IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.)
d) Hanoi's decision to send Politburo member Le Duc Tho to join the North Vietnamese Delegation cannot yet be assessed. At a minimum, it signifies Hanoi's interest in avoiding any early break-off, and at a maximum may portend some greater seriousness in Paris.
2. Losses
a) In terms of our relations with the GVN, our principal loss has been the unsettling effect of the talks in Saigon, at a time when the enemy is intensifying mortar and rocket attacks on the city and continuing heavy infiltration. Demands for retaliation, or for breaking off the talks, are being heard with greater urgency in responsible Government and legislative circles.
b) In terms of US public opinion, impatience with apparent deadlock in Paris and continued heavy US casualties in South Viet-Nam may reopen public debates and lead to demands for all-out action against the North.
272. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 12, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Bohlen.
SUBJECT
Kosygin Message and Reply
PARTICIPANTS
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of USSR
Charles E. Bohlen, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
During a conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin after dinner at the Italian Embassy last night (at which Dobrynin had arrived about an hour and a half late), I said to Dobrynin that he must have been writing quite a telegram following his interview with the Secretary. Dobrynin admitted that that was what he had been doing. I then asked how he evaluated our reply, to which Dobrynin replied that he was somewhat "disappointed" since we seemed to raise conditions, etc., and he did not feel we had made a very responsive answer to the Soviet suggestion./2/ I told Dobrynin that this Kosygin message had been the subject of a very intensive meeting on the part of the American Government virtually all day Sunday./3/ The chief subject of discussion was exactly what did the Soviet Government have in mind, and it was felt the necessity of obtaining somewhat more clarification. I told him that I personally felt that in matters of this kind big decisions could not be based on speculation or guess. I then went on to say that personally I had felt that one thing the Soviets were trying to tell us was that their commitment to North Vietnam is primarily due to attacks on it by the United States, and therefore logically if the attacks totally ceased then the obligation of the Soviet Union in this regard would be considerably less. Dobrynin laughed and said "I see you have had experience in Soviet affairs", without, however, committing himself to my analysis.
/2/According to a memorandum of conversation, June 13, Dobrynin also told Thompson that he was "disappointed" in President Johnson's reply. To counter Thompson's insistence that the response to Kosygin's letter would have been different "were it not for past history," Dobrynin "observed that in this case his statements had been made in writing by the head of the Soviet Government and moreover that he had spoken in the name of the Government." (Ibid.)
/3/June 9; see Document 265.
I then went on to say that I thought with his knowledge of the United States he should really be able to inform his government of the public affairs position that the President found himself in. On the 31st of March he had taken a considerable step in the direction of the cessation of the bombardment and there had been literally no response from the other side except to increase infiltration and raise the level of violence in South Vietnam. The President could not be expected on the basis of guesses to take action which would appear to the American public to have no counterpart at all. There was of course the question of the effect on the morale of our forces and our allies in South Vietnam, as well as the very important problem of the effect on the government in Saigon. Dobrynin appeared interested in this reference to the attitude of Saigon and the possible effect on the morale of troops in the field, and flatly stated that the Soviet Union had less interest in the developments in South Vietnam than they did in the attacks on North Vietnam.
The conversation ended with my saying that we hoped for a constructive and sensible reply.
273. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker) and the Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam (Berger)/1/
Washington, June 13, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 1 EE (6), 6/68, Post Tet Political Activity. Secret. Sent through back channels to Saigon. Five days earlier, Vietnamese Senator Tran Van Don had informed the Embassy that, at Thieu's request and with the support of Huong, he was to form a new front group that would include all political groups. (Telegram 29475 from Saigon, June 8; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 13 VIET S) A report on the evolution and development of the Lien Minh is in CIA Intelligence Information Cable TDCS DB-315/02565-68, August 1. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Substantive Political Files, Job 91-R0084R, DDI Files on Vietnam, Vietnam 1968 (General), Part IV)
CAP 81279. The cable (State 181155)/2/ in response to news of Thieu and Huong interest in a large national political party went out from Washington without high-level attention. But you should know that we are all interested in this development and regard its success as critical to the consolidation of all that we have been trying to achieve in Vietnam by military and political means.
/2/ln telegram 181155 to Saigon, June 12, the Department requested the Embassy's assessment of the viability of a national political organization and the problems that would encumber its formation and operation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 13 VIET S)
We look forward greatly to your own reflections on how best this new impulse in the GVN may be encouraged and backstopped by the U.S. and, in particular, what we can do from here to help you.
As you know, I have brooded about this problem for some years. Only you on the spot can assess how this initiative can be nursed along, but for what it may or may not be worth, here are a few thoughts which did not emerge clearly in the cable.
1. The operational objective of this party or coalition is, of course, to prepare itself to beat the inevitable Communist Popular Front, under whatever name, that will seek power politically in South Vietnam after the war. From the beginning, this election objective should be kept in mind in organizing the party and preparing the way for it to back a single Presidential and Vice Presidential slate.
2. Obviously the concept of this party is emerging because intelligent South Vietnamese fear the Communist capacity for organization, and fear equally their own history of and instinct for factional fragmentation. Fear is a pretty good beginning for men to group together; but, equally, the party requires a platform and a vision on which all non-Communist groups might agree. The headings will be clearer to you and the South Vietnamese than to me. But among them might well be:
--loyalty to the Constitution and the constitutional process;
--true independence of everyone, including the U.S.;
--equity with respect to rural and urban affairs;
--rapid economic development;
--ending of corruption;
--a commitment to cooperation with the New Asia and its institutions;
--a willingness to normalize relations with North Vietnam, but no unification unless the people of South Vietnam want it under conditions where there is no duress.
3. In my judgment, quite obviously, this should be, in a double sense, the government's political party. Under present constitutional circumstances I think we have to put aside the old Diem fixation in this matter. The South Vietnamese should be studying the experience of Mexico, India, Tunisia, Malaysia, and South Korea in particular with respect to this party or coalition. Specifically, the constitutional government should build the party for the good straightforward purpose of getting itself re-elected. On the other hand, this very wide-based party, like any other, should be one of the instruments which influence the content of the government's policy. Its broad and, if possible, almost universal non-Communist political base should ensure that the government is sensitive to the widest possible spectrum of interests in the country.
The ability to beat the Communists in national elections obviously must rest on the ability to beat them in both open and closed politics at the local level. This suggests to me that an effective party must have the means for exercising influence at the local and provincial levels, whether through elections or more informal mechanisms. The task is to help our friends find and institutionalize that blend of idealism and self-interest that makes an effective political party. Among other things, this is going to mean access to power by party members at both the national and local levels--for otherwise nobody is going to lose sleep politicking for an existing government.
You will forgive me for what is, almost certainly, an exercise in teaching the sucking of eggs; but I believe you both know my long-standing concern with the issue.
In any case, we all look forward greatly to getting your own reflections./3/
/3/Bunker reported his concurrence with Thieu's contention that such an umbrella group would be an effective means of eventually dealing with the NLF in terms of national reconciliation. (Telegrams 29880 from Saigon, June 13, 29981 from Saigon, June 14, and 30500 from Saigon, June 20; ibid., POL 27 VIET S) This idea was seconded in joint Embassy-CIA Station telegram 30859 from Saigon, June 24, in which the prospects for a national political movement were assessed. It concluded: "This view of the realities here demands that the American mission focus its energies on a few key objectives, in revolving around improved Government of Vietnam performance and effectiveness, not only technically but politically. If this can be accomplished, it will facilitate the formation of a political mechanism whereby the people will return this government to power or bring in another nationalist combination which is acceptable or at least reject any alternative offered by the political guerrillas who pick up where the 122 millimeter rockets leave off." (Ibid., POL 13 VIET S) Further operational issues were discussed in joint Embassy-CIA Station telegram 4461 from Saigon, June 26. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/ISS Files, Job 78-32, [word not declassified]/Chronological File, Vol. 2) Telegram Director 12439 to Saigon, June 28, transmitted approval for the Station and the Embassy "to proceed with actions on several different levels to stimulate the development of a political vehicle in preparation for an eventual free electoral contest with the NLF." (Ibid.)
274. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, June 14, 1968, 1858Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan. Received at 3:37 p.m.
16376/Delto 285. From Harriman and Vance.
1. We lunched with Zorin June 13. Oberemko present. Bogomolov interpreted with Perry's assistance.
2. Zorin first brought up Senator Kennedy's death and linked this to violence engendered by Viet-Nam war. We explained Palestinian/Arab background of assassin with no indications so far of any accomplices.
3. We commented on our recent trips to the US, pointing out the widespread public support the President has received since March 31 speech, and expressed concern over rising demands for retaliation on Hanoi for indiscriminate shelling of Saigon.
4. Zorin brought up his recent talk with Cyrus Eaton, who had told him American public most anxious for early end of war./2/ Harriman then asked Zorin whether Eaton had correctly reported Kosygin's willingness after bombing stopped totally to pitch in and help on question of Viet-Nam and SEA settlement. Zorin replied "If you make that assumption you will not be far wrong." When Harriman pressed him for specific statement, Zorin said it was "inconvenient" for him to find out precise details. Harriman said that if Kosygin was in fact interested in our ultimate objectives, Zorin could report to him. Harriman explained them by drawing on Manila Communiqu? and President's Johns Hopkins speech./3/
/2/In telegram 16058 from Paris, June 11, Harriman summarized the following message from Kosygin relayed by industrialist Cyrus Eaton: "That the Soviet Union wanted to see a peaceful solution in Viet Nam, that he would do 'everything in his power' to get a settlement on the broader issues but that the United States should show flexibility on the lesser matters that influenced public opinion but which were not in the long run significant. Under this latter heading it was clear that Kosygin included stopping of all bombing of North Viet Nam." (Ibid., A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-June)
/3/For the October 25, 1966, Manila Communiqu?, which stated that U.S. and allied withdrawal would occur 6 months after the complete withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from the South, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. IV, Document 281. In the President's April 7, 1965, speech at Johns Hopkins University, he offered a billion dollar redevelopment plan for the Mekong Delta; see ibid., vol. II, Document 245.
5. We then discussed negotiations in some detail, stating we thought the best way to end deadlock would be to encourage private talks. Zorin tried to argue Hanoi's contention that air attacks had in fact been increased and total cessation was essential. He stated that he had seen the North Vietnamese delegation on a number of occasions, including private talks with Tho. He summarized their position in four points:
(1) US was the aggressor in sending troops to Vietnam and bombing North and could not expect Hanoi to concede anything in return for total cessation of bombing.
(2) Hanoi could go no further in talks until US had stopped the bombing "or reached an understanding on cessation of bombing."
(3) Private talks could not begin under present circumstances.
(4) North Vietnamese would be prepared to talk freely about all other outstanding problems once bombing question was settled.
6. We both emphasized present impasse as a result of Hanoi's escalation, mentioning attacks on Saigon which posed serious dangers for success of talks.
7. Harriman then bluntly told Zorin that as we saw it, it was through Moscow's influence that these talks have started in Paris against Peking's wishes. If the talks broke up, Moscow's prestige would suffer to the advantage of Peking. Therefore, Moscow clearly had a stake and should use its influence now to jar situation off dead center. Harriman continued that there were certain points of US, Soviet and Hanoi common interest. One, for example, was a desire to have North Viet-Nam remain free of Chinese domination. Harriman expressed the belief that we could readily agree that North Viet-Nam remain a socialist state with South Viet-Nam neutral and non-aligned, leaving unification of the two for the future to be determined by both. Harriman suggested Soviet Union could play a crucial role in getting the two sides together in a private talk, after dark, in the Soviet Embassy, or elsewhere. Zorin was rigid: no private talks until total cessation of bombing.
8. In a brief personal talk with Oberemko over coffee, Vance answered his question by assuring him that the US was serious in desiring a peaceful settlement. Oberemko, however, stated frankly he could not say whether there would be any military restraint on Hanoi's part if we stopped the bombing completely.
9. The entire conversation, though friendly, was rigid. Zorin is quite obviously so cautious that he is not the most satisfactory man to deal through./4/
/4/In telegram 184205 to Saigon, June 15, Rusk discussed his unfruitful meeting with Kuznetsov the previous day. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Todel Chron.)
Harriman
275. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, June 17, 1968, 0159Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. IV, 6/16-30/68. Secret; Sensitive. Received at 9:35 a.m. at the LBJ Ranch, where the President stayed June 13-18.
CAP 81355. Herewith preliminary report of Bill Jorden's dinner. From this text and my conversation with Jorden I would agree with evaluation at the end; namely a serious exploratory probe. We should look for an early renewal./2/
/2/In a memorandum to the President, June 19, 8:15 a.m., Rostow wrote: "As you know, the North Vietnamese probed Bill Jorden at dinner on our view of the NLF and a political settlement in the South. There have been other indications that they want to know 'what the Americans really want' by way of a settlement. Some of us have long felt that mutual de-escalation in a war of this complex kind, without a fixed front, was very difficult to manage, unless a political settlement had been first achieved. Therefore, I have been considering the possibility of having Jorden (or whomever Harriman designates) lay informally before the North Vietnamese at the next informal session a scenario of how we could get from here to there; that is, all the way to a peace settlement." (Ibid.) Attached was a June 18 memorandum by Ginsburgh to Rostow, setting out a sequential approach at Paris for a phased mutual de-escalation. At the tea break during the June 19 session, Tho stated that a political settlement had to precede a military settlement. (Telegrams 16567/Delto 301 and 16587/Delto 304 from Paris, June 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.) In a memorandum to the President, June 19, 1 p.m., Rostow suggested that discussions over political issues needed to be encouraged in order for the talks to progress. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 82)
Paris 16457/Delto 290.
1. High points of Jorden-Thanh Le meeting were as follows:
(A) Absence of any give on mutual restraint at present stage.
(B) Their interest in our definition of "appropriate time and circumstance," timing of withdrawal of U.S. forces and circumstances of same, and questions by Le concerning movement on their part which might justify end of bombing.
(C) Total absence of any denial that North Vietnamese forces were in fact present in South Viet-Nam.
(D) North Vietnamese acknowledgment of willingness to discuss withdrawal of their forces from the South "at an appropriate time."
(E) Implication that this and "other matters of mutual interest" could be discussed after all bombing "and other acts of war" on territory of DRV ended.
(F) Effort to probe our attitude toward Liberation Front and its program.
2. Meeting lasted three hours. Atmosphere was cordial throughout. But argumentation was serious and intense on both sides. Jorden stressed desirability of keeping fact and content of talk confidential. Thanh Le agreed.
3. Present in addition to above were: Kaplan, Nguyen Van Sao, and interpreter Trong.
4. Jorden's and Kaplan's feeling that this was a serious exploratory session by North Vietnamese.
5. Full report follows in septel./3/ Harriman
/3/Telegram 16458/Delto 291 from Paris, June 17. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.)
276. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, June 19, 1968, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting, which lasted until 2:30 p.m., was held in the Mansion of the White House. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH HIS
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS
ATTENDING
The President
Secretary Clifford
Undersecretary Katzenbach
CIA Director Helms
General Wheeler
George Christian
Walt Rostow
Tom Johnson
President: Are you concerned about Jorden's conversation?/2/
/2/See Document 275.
Undersecretary Katzenbach: I am encouraged by it.
The President: Does he indicate we might change our position?
Walt Rostow: He did change our position. Our first position was for clean DMZ, no infiltration. He went back somewhat. On the whole, it was an appropriate time to change and show some flexibility. We would settle, I am sure, for a stop in the infiltration for a halt in the bombing.
General Wheeler: I am not disturbed by this small shift in our position.
The proposed reply to the Indian Ambassador did not say what we would settle for in return for bombing cessation./3/
/3/On June 15 Indian Ambassador B.K. Nehru informed Rusk that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi requested U.S. concurrence in her suggestion to the North Vietnamese leadership that, in return for the complete cessation of bombing by the United States, the DRV should give the Indian Government "a guarantee or assurance that infiltration through the DMZ would be immediately stopped and that Hanoi would agree to prompt and effective restoration of the DMZ." (Memorandum from Bundy to Katzenbach, June 18; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
Undersecretary Katzenbach: The question is--would you cease bombing for re-establishment of the DMZ with ICC inspection. The answer is either "yes" or "no" or "maybe."
Director Helms: Laos is not mentioned.
Undersecretary Katzenbach: It was put in by implication.
I would consider saying that restoration of DMZ might be worth it from our point.
Secretary Clifford: I thought Jorden's position was well within the President's statements. It was useful. It was a forward development.
On India, I do not want to take the "back-door" approach through India. I would prefer keeping it in Paris. It might come out.
Are Vance and Harriman for the Indian approach?
Undersecretary Katzenbach: Yes, they are for it.
The Indians are saying the U.S. has done something; now they (NVN) should do something.
Secretary Clifford: What can Mrs. Gandhi do that our negotiators cannot do?
I am concerned she will say this is it. She will be our negotiator not knowing or understanding the nuances.
Undersecretary Katzenbach: I think it is good for Hanoi to know that the Indians believe they should do something militarily. The Indians have a function in this.
Secretary Clifford: If Mrs. Gandhi could make her views known to Hanoi, that's good. This has to be worked out in Paris, I believe. I would welcome the Indian offer.
General Wheeler: Indians have been untrustworthy in the past. They could undercut the efforts in Paris.
Walt Rostow: Permit the Indians to say that it is our impression that DMZ would be a major concession for a cessation of bombing. We could also express our concerns over infiltration and Saigon. India would say it would assume operating responsibility for the policing of the DMZ.
Say this should be worked out between the parties directly.
We gave the Harriman-Vance mission examples of what we considered taking advantage of the pause. The Indians can't handle definition of what is meant by "demilitarization".
Secretary Clifford: That makes a lot of sense to me.
The President: I have sympathy with that (Rostow proposal).
I don't want another front from Paris. We should be cautious on this. All of you agree and come back to me on it.
Undersecretary Katzenbach: You could give very clear definition of what DMZ means.
1. Abrams' Plan
Undersecretary Katzenbach: We have no problem except public relations one.
[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the Berlin crisis and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.]
8. Korean Civilians and Korean Light Division to Vietnam
Secretary Clifford: Pak will send 5,000 civilians at an exorbitant price. Wheeler says we could use the civilians.
General Wheeler: The price for 5,000 civilians is too high. We still have no assurance Pak is willing to go ahead with a light division. We will get $100 million for Korea.
[Omitted here is a brief discussion of ratification of the anti-ballistic missile agreement.]
277. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 20, 1968, 11:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 83. Secret; Sensitive.
Mr. President:
You ask: where do I think we should go from here?
1. At tea-break, during the next talk, Harriman or Vance should pick up Tho's statement: "there can never be a settlement of military matters without prior agreement on a political solution." He should ask:
--Is Tho suggesting we proceed promptly in Paris to discussion of a political solution? If so, we should have to introduce the GVN into the talks.
--If Paris is inappropriate, perhaps informal contacts might be undertaken by their side with the GVN elsewhere.
If we get no rise from Tho at tea-time, we should try again at the next informal dinner meeting.
2. We should discuss Tho's statement and its implications with Thieu promptly and promptly inform him of the ambiguous NLF probe in Saigon of which I informed you yesterday. (Code name: Antwerp)/2/ We should urge Thieu to take the initiative in seeking contact with the Communists to explore a one-man-one-vote constitutional solution.
/2/In a memorandum to the President, June 19, 6 p.m., Rostow first transmitted to him news of the Antwerp contact. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, ANTWERP) Attached to this memorandum were memoranda from Lansdale to Bunker, June 10 and June 13, laying out the details of the episode. On June 10 and again on June 12, Ho Quang Phuoc, an associate of Lansdale's, had informed him of a message passed to him which had come indirectly from Southern Vietnamese within the NLF leadership. Due to dissatisfaction with the dominance of Northerners within the organization, these leaders were willing to disband openly the NLF if the United States would replace the current GVN regime with a "provisional government." The Southern leaders were even willing to allow Thieu to remain as President provided an acceptable Prime Minister with full powers to negotiate could be put in place. Lansdale believed that "we have probably heard fairly and accurately from the NLF leadership through this channel." (Ibid.) Lansdale's memorandum was originally attached to a June 13 memorandum from Bunker to Bundy. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-7 VIET S/BUTTERCUP)
3. Jointly with Thieu we should pursue the Antwerp contact./3/
/3/In a June 21 memorandum to the President, 12 p.m., Rostow argued that the Antwerp contact "could be serious" if, in light of the heavy casualties suffered, the Southerners in the NLF were "seeing a rapid erosion of their own strength and an increased dominance of their activities by Northerners." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Antwerp) Calhoun attended an additional meeting with the intermediaries on June 20. (Telegram 30600 from Saigon, June 21; ibid.) Further information on the Antwerp contacts is in an undated memorandum attached to a June 22 memorandum from Carver to Helms. (Ibid.) A critical assessment of the individuals reported to have been involved with Antwerp is in a memorandum to Bundy from Helms and telegram CAS 348 from Saigon, both dated June 20. (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 83) On June 26 Bunker and Berger briefed Thieu on Antwerp; Thieu noted that any approach originating from the NLF "must be given serious consideration." (Ibid.) In telegram 193726 to Saigon, June 29, the Department authorized the Embassy to proceed with the contacts. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/ANTWERP)
4. I doubt that Hanoi will accept Paris talks on this matter, with the GVN, so long as bombing continues. Therefore, private informal contacts in Viet Nam or elsewhere between the GVN and the NLF seem the logical route to progress. If such talks are undertaken, Paris could devote itself quietly to certain legitimately bilateral U.S.-Hanoi issues:
--contingent plans and schedule for withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from the South; U.S. forces to base areas, before departure on the Manila formula;
--plans to re-establish the DMZ;
--plans to re-establish the Laos Accords of 1962.
5. Behind all this, Mr. President, is a hunch, rather than a judgment, that Hanoi is having the same kind of problem with its generals we have with the JCS. For example, when the North Vietnamese are told we wish to re-establish the DMZ in return for a total cessation of bombing, they tell their diplomats: "Don't you realize that with the bad weather in Laos that means virtually cutting off our forces in the South? Impossible." In all conscience, well-balanced mutual de-escalation is very tough to negotiate in a war of this kind, without a fixed front. They may, therefore, be moving to the conclusion that a fight-and-talk strategy will have to persist on about present terms until a southern political solution is negotiated. Then the war could be rolled up briskly.
6. Of course, I could be wrong on one of two counts:
--Kosygin may come back with an acceptable mutual de-escalation formula;
--Hanoi may not be interested in coming to grips with serious negotiating problems until the next Administration is installed.
W. W. Rostow/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
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