Docs 278-298
278. Notes on Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of Defense Clifford and the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/
Washington, June 21, 1968, 7:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject File, Clifford, Clark, 1963-68. No classification marking.
C: First let me welcome you back. Second, I want to bring to your attention a situation that has been developing here because I have been informed that we are all to meet at the White House for breakfast tomorrow./2/
/2/See Document 279.
H: Yes Bill Bundy is here with me and we were discussing it.
C: Apparently is on two matters. You are to report to the President on the situation in Paris; the reason for its being so early is because Dean (Secy Rusk) is getting off for Iceland./3/ Another item to be discussed is one that Bill Bundy can fill you in on, the code name is Antwerp./4/
/3/Rusk was in Reykjavik June 22-26 to attend the NATO Ministerial meeting.
/4/See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 277.
H: He has just been telling me about it; it doesn't look as if there's much in it.
C: Yes. I wanted to give you a little bit of background. I was asked about the situation in Paris during my press conference and in a very guarded manner I indicated by expression that bits and straws are in the wind that could indicate some slight movement./5/ I was very guarded but I wanted to give you the background for indicating, even in that background manner, optimism. There is a great deal of pressure on the President at this time to relate Saigon and Hanoi. He gets it every day. He is informed that it's terrible with our position with SVN, our own troops and even our posture in the world for us to permit Saigon to be shelled while Hanoi is not touched. He is beginning to get restive. Tied up with this approach is, I think, an effort on the part of some to indicate that perhaps nothing at all will ever come out of Paris. And the tie-up between the 2 arguments is that when it is suggested, he might go ahead and order bombing of Hanoi or issue an ultimatum. The obvious answer is that that could break up the talks./6/
/5/At a Pentagon news conference on June 20, Clifford listed what he considered to be "bits and straws that indicate that there is some movement" at the Paris talks, including Tho's arrival and the informal chats during breaks at the Majestic. Harriman affirmed the signs of progress in a statement to the press the next day. See The New York Times, June 21 and 22, 1968. In a June 21 news conference, however, Rusk downplayed the significance of any progress at Paris by noting: "Of course, we are a long way from substance when we have to point to the fact that coffee breaks are becoming longer, that the atmosphere is somewhat more informal, that there may be opportunities for a little more give and take." See Department of State Bulletin, July 8, 1968, pp. 33-38.
/6/At a meeting earlier that day, Clifford briefed the President and the Cabinet on the enemy's shelling of Saigon and continuing infiltration. He concluded: "I think that they're making a very serious propaganda mistake to bomb and kill civilians in Saigon. It doesn't seem to make any sense. It's not contributing in any way to their military posture or military force. They think they're accomplishing something. I believe they're hurting themselves." (Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
H: It would break it up alright.
C: Then the attitude of some very militarist gentleman will, as a matter of fact say that talks will not amount to much so we are not giving up very much. What I think we must do is if there is ever any occasion in the most guarded manner to indicate that something is happening . . .
H: I supported what you said in Paris, in Boston and in Washington, but I also had to say that when the NVNamese said we made no progress, of course not since they are to blame. On this other thing--you saw what Huong said--unthinkable that they should recommend bombing Hanoi [and] killing innocent people . . .
C: I did see that. You will find at the breakfast tomorrow that this is going to come up for discussion.
H. I was very strong for sending somebody to Moscow--somebody of authority; I don't know whether you saw my letter to Zorthian (?) [Zorin]./7/ We must give it to them before we go in. Dobrynin said they were told they were going to talk to us. I'm going to see him tomorrow,/8/ but I think we ought to bring these fellows in. I'll be here until the middle of next week and hope you'll give me a half hour or so, and as you know I agreed fully with that letter.
/7/Not found.
/8/See Document 280.
C: I continue to feel that we missed the opportunity.
H: The opportunity is still there.
C: Well, I just wanted you to know the background.
H: One thing we got them to do is they're fighting down there.
C: Yes, I consider that to be a straw--obviously we can't make much of it but we have to keep up encouragement.
H: One thing Cy and I fully agree on--he is a very good partner, we agree--I look forward to seeing you, Clark, thanks for calling. I think you said exactly the right thing and I supported it.
279. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, June 22, 1968, 8:45-9:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The notes are incorrectly dated June 21.
NOTES ON PRESIDENT'S MEETING OF FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Ambassador Harriman
CIA Director Helms
Justice Fortas
General Taylor
General Wheeler
Under Secretary Katzenbach
William Bundy
William Jorden
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
The President: There are several points I'd like to cover.
1. All of us in the government should give thought to doing everything we should on the psychological front. Things seem to be getting better for them since the bombing stopped.
2. I want every proposal from the best brains in the government for something additional to do that we are not doing.
3. Before Dean (Secretary Rusk) leaves today I wanted to hear from all of you. Give him your views and advice.
4. We were helped by Secretary Clifford's and Secretary Rusk's news conferences this week./2/
/2/See footnote 5, Document 278.
5. I am worried about the situation in Saigon.
Secretary Rusk: The situation in Saigon is more fragile than Bunker thinks it is.
The President: Maybe you or Clark (Secretary Clifford) should go out.
Secretary Clifford: Tentatively plan for General Wheeler and I to go out on July 13.
Ambassador Harriman: We are interested in what Secretary Rusk has to say. Why are you so worried about Saigon?
The President: There is instability between Ky and Thieu. He doesn't like sitting in the back row after all of the command positions he has held.
CIA Director Helms: He says too many times a week to too many people that he isn't going to mount a coup. That shows it is on his mind.
Secretary Rusk: Ambassador Dobrynin told Ambassador Bohlen that Hanoi told Moscow they would be meeting with us privately./3/
/3/A possible reference to a meeting between Bohlen and Dobrynin on May 31. The memorandum of conversation of this meeting is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-EX Files: Lot 76 D 435, US/USSR Conversations on Vietnam and Southeast Asia.
We should lay it on the line about these attacks on Saigon. We should use our propaganda line to the fullest.
Secretary Rusk: Indians propose a plan to get Hanoi to re-establish the DMZ in return for a halt in the bombing. They want to send a man to Hanoi. I think we should encourage them to do that.
We need to sort out the political problems at the top in Saigon. We need to get Ky back into the main business.
Key Southern leaders in the Viet Cong should be subject to defection. Each one is worth a squadron of aircraft. Group defections are very important. Let's try to get more. These are contagious.
Assistant Secretary Bundy: We must do some hard thinking about what we say in private conversation.
Walt Rostow: We must probe the proposal that a political solution must precede a military settlement.
We must proceed to get with Thieu on proposals for informal political exchanges, defections and contact with the NLF.
Secretary Rusk: We must talk with Thieu soon so he knows all that is going on.
The President: Should Ambassador Bunker do more to encourage Thieu?
Assistant Secretary Bundy: It is a political hot potato--a question of dealing with the NLF. They say they can't do this as long as the NLF is doing this or that. There are Southerners in the NLF who dislike how North Vietnamese are taking over Viet Cong units. I doubt that this is a real NLF contact.
Secretary Rusk: We need to separate the Viet Cong from North Vietnam.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: Total absence of NLF representation in Paris must be troublesome to Southern Communists.
Walt Rostow: Look at the situation on the ground. The Southern NLF is being ground to bits and taken over by North Vietnam. In July and August we could take political and military leadership.
The President: Will they hit Hue and DaNang?
General Wheeler: They may. They have the capability after they put the 320th [NVA Division] together to make a good push.
General Abrams is not in any trouble.
Secretary Rusk: Wouldn't they pull units back if they are getting ready for a big offensive?
Under Secretary Katzenbach: Thieu is not expendable under the Constitution. Huong is. He could be a better link.
General Taylor: We are dealing with Southern wing of the Viet Cong in the Antwerp thing.
The President: (Ambassador Harriman) Would you give us a summary of your talks?
Ambassador Harriman: Nothing concrete has been done. The most interesting thing was putting the political settlement before a military settlement.
I don't know if you should attach the importance which Washington analysis did to Bill Jorden's private contact.
They are paying attention to what is being said.
We should try to draw a wedge between Hanoi and the NLF. Only citizens of North Vietnam have been allowed to sit at the conference table.
I told Zorin the Russians have a stake in this. We must get Russians engaged in this.
You have got to go to the top, to members of the Politburo. Top Soviets are involved. Zorin came to see us. He said they don't know what would happen if the bombing stopped.
Ambassador Harriman: The President's position has improved internationally since March 31.
Bill Jorden did a good analysis of editorials. World showed you took initiative. Now they are stepping up attacks on Saigon.
The American people are solidly behind you.
Cyrus Vance ought to go to Saigon. They haven't faced up to the fact they have to negotiate. We must get Saigon to recognize that we aren't their satellite. Behavior of the South Vietnamese Generals must be required.
The President: How do we stand vs. March 31?
General Wheeler: We are stronger militarily. Khe Sanh is relieved. Ashau Valley is cleaned out once more. The enemy lost heavily in two sizable defections. One high-ranking officer defected.
Secretary Rusk: There is some advantage to Cy Vance and Ambassador Bunker talking. Also in keeping South Vietnamese in touch with the situation.
Ambassador Harriman: That's right. We must show that we aren't selling them down the river.
Secretary Rusk: A trip by Cy would be good.
William Jorden: Re the Press in Europe and Asia, our position has never been better. The enemy has lost ground with propaganda movies and brochures.
Ambassador Harriman: The Press has confidence in Bill.
280. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 22, 1968.
/1/National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Harriman. The meeting took place at Harriman's house in Georgetown. Rostow sent Harriman's memorandum of conversation to the President on June 25. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 83)
PARTICIPANTS
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large
Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin had dinner with my wife and myself. We talked informally before dinner and during dinner, and Dobrynin and I alone after dinner. They came about 7:30 and left about 10:30.
The following points were covered:
Dobrynin repeated what he told the Secretary and myself, that he had received word that the North Vietnamese delegates would talk privately with Vance and myself but had not specified when. In questioning him, he indicated that this had resulted from my talks with Zorin./2/ Zorin is evidently reporting our conversations in detail. For instance, he knew that I had suggested to Zorin that we meet at night at the Soviet Embassy or any place else so that the meeting could be assured secrecy.
/2/See Document 274.
Because of Dobrynin's query, I had to explain in some detail why the President could not stop bombing North Vietnam completely without restraint by Hanoi. I explained the increased North Vietnamese infiltration; the massing of troops around the DMZ, the shelling of Saigon, and ways in which Hanoi had arrogantly escalated its military action while the President had taken a major step in de-escalation. He kept saying, "but you have 500,000 troops in Vietnam, why should you be afraid?" I reiterated, of course, the President's March 31st speech and expressed my personal opinion that it would be a mistake for us to end all the bombing unless there were some reasonable indication of good will on the other side, as I feared Hanoi would not take any action of restraint even after full cessation. I said I thought that if we could get together privately with the Hanoi delegates, we might find a way. He then said he thought that the two-phase proposal was a good one. I agreed and indicated that that was the sort of thing we could explore privately but not in public.
I urged him to ask his Government to follow-up with the North Vietnamese representatives the necessity of private talks promptly. He agreed to do so. He firmly reiterated that the Soviets wanted to see the war ended in Vietnam in order that we could get on to other matters. I underlined again, as I had with Zorin, that if these talks in Paris broke up Moscow would lose prestige and Peking would gain. This he did not dispute. He expressed the belief that the Soviet Government would be freer to express its opinions to the North Vietnamese after the bombing had stopped completely. He indicated that Moscow would feel released when a "sister socialist State" was no longer being hit. He said he regretted that the Kosygin letter to the President/3/ did not receive a more responsive reply. He told me that since Kosygin had stated, "I and my colleagues . . . have reason to believe there would be a breakthrough", he had expected the reply would have accepted Kosygin's assurances, acted upon them and then insisted that the Soviet Government produce. Dobrynin said he thought we had missed an opportunity. I commented that the stakes were too serious to take such a risk and felt that the President had made a responsive reply and regretted no further word had been received.
/3/Printed as an attachment to Document 262.
He then spoke about Kosygin's new letter expressing willingness to discuss mutual nuclear restraints and said he felt the reply was good, although he did not know whether his Government would agree to a public statement by July 1st.
I asked him about Cyrus Eaton's visit, as I understood Kosygin had seen him./4/ He replied that no doubt Eaton was received by Kosygin, Brezhnev and others--they liked him--but he doubted that Kosygin would send me a specific message through him. I told him that when Zorin had raised the subject of Eaton's visit I explained to him Kosygin's alleged request for information on our ultimate objectives. I asked if Zorin had passed on my statement giving an outline of those objectives. Dobrynin answered in the affirmative.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 274.
We discussed the possible desirability of a senior U.S. official visiting Moscow during the course of the summer to talk directly with Soviet leaders about Vietnam and possibly other subjects. He commented that no official of the Government other than myself had been to the Soviet Union since the Secretary's visit to sign the Test Ban Agreement in the summer of 1963 and that a visit could help clarify our mutual positions. I said that we would have to negotiate directly with the NVN their restraints during private talks; that if those could be agreed upon, a number of other subjects would be opened up regarding which the Soviet Government could undoubtedly play a useful role. I pointed out one of the subjects of importance was how the Vietnamese could be induced to talk together their own future problems--the Saigon Government with both Hanoi and the NLF. I told him that information we had received through third parties indicated the Hanoi representatives in Paris took the Saigon Government more seriously since Huong had become Prime Minister. I filled him in on the details of the strengthening of the Government and its broadened appeal.
He admitted that Zorin was one of the "old school" diplomats but believed he reported accurately. However, he appeared to acquiesce when I asked him to discuss with his colleagues in Moscow the possibility of sending a man from the Foreign Office, familiar with Far Eastern affairs, to talk to us in Paris. Of course he knew Oberemko, Zorin's Minister Counselor, well, and I told him that Vance had had a couple of talks with him which were frank and useful./5/ When I asked him why the Soviet Government did not have a more alert man than Zorin in Paris, he assured me it was one of those administrative questions involved in giving to Zorin a responsible position because of his long status in the Foreign Office. He said he obviously wasn't the best of choices since he did not speak French or, in fact, English, and was rigid. I told him I regretted that someone more "modern" than Zorin was not in Paris but that Zorin had behaved "correctly" towards me. I thought he was slowly becoming more relaxed, particularly since I'd seen him four times and there had been no mention of it in the press. I explained that not only contact with me, but also contact with Hanoi representatives was involved. Zorin had admitted to me that he had seen the North Vietnamese on a number of occasions.
/5/The most recent meeting between Vance and Oberemko was a luncheon on June 17. A report on this meeting was transmitted in telegram 16519 from Paris, June 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-June 1968)
Dobrynin was non-committal on other subjects, such as Berlin and Czechoslovak developments. He agreed when I said that Moscow, Hanoi and Washington had one thing in common--the desirability of Hanoi's being free from Peking's domination. I suggested this should mean Hanoi's and Moscow's willingness to cooperate with Southeast Asian development in accordance with the President's Johns Hopkins speech. To achieve the primary objective of independence from Peking, Hanoi would have to learn to live peacefully with its neighbors. He did not demur.
Sunday, June 23, 1968
Soviet Embassy
I stopped in to see Dobrynin for a few minutes Sunday morning. After thinking over my conversation, I wanted to be sure that I had been firm enough in stating that we could not stop all the bombing without an understanding with Hanoi on restraints on their part and that he would report this to his Government. He argued a bit, but I'm satisfied he has accepted my statement. We touched on PanAm's first flight to Moscow as an occasion for a possible visit to Moscow, and he suggested that perhaps I might come.
Dobrynin concluded by telling me he did not know how long he would remain in Moscow. His wife and daughter are, of course, staying in Washington.
281. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, June 24, 1968, 2150Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-June 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. In a memorandum transmitting a copy of this telegram to the President, June 24, Rostow wrote: "Herewith Zorin--hitherto silent and frozen--suggests the A-B-C formula for private exploration by Vance on Wednesday to Shriver, in the course of a courtesy call. This is probably Kosygin's reply to you. I have arranged that Shriver's cable be flashed for comment to Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Bunker. The sequence is clearly: A. We name to Hanoi a 'date certain' for cessation of bombing, i.e., a date to come into effect when B is agreed. B. We negotiate what they would do when bombing has stopped. C. We stop; and they stop doing what we negotiate after a pre-negotiated interval. This could be the turning point, notably if shipments are not coming through China." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, M-Q, Vol. II, Paris Talks--Messages from Other Posts)
16928. Summary:
Soviet Ambassador Zorin today recommended to me that U.S. delegation should utilize "coffee break this Wednesday" to propose to Xuan Thuy directly Phase A-Phase B plan. He stated his belief that U.S. agreement in principle to stop bombing on a date certain would be followed by willingness NVN to enter into unofficial, by which he meant non-public, talks looking toward deciding on circumstances which would follow in Phase B. Upon deciding Phase B circumstances Phase A would be executed. Thereafter at an interval Phase B actions would be carried out. Though Zorin emphasized he could not guarantee results he unequivocally reiterated three times his belief that North Vietnamese would respond. And he said we should not be put off from pursuing this approach even if NVN's first response was "nyet." (End Summary)
Having scheduled routine protocol visit with wife to Soviet Embassy I was advised that Zorin preferred to see me alone on business. He opened discussion by requesting my views on U.S. political situation to which I responded fully. I outlined candidly my views on possibilities Humphrey, Nixon, McCarthy, Rockefeller. I emphasized President Johnson much freer, more knowledgeable on details and thus in better position than any successor to reach understandings with Soviet Union on subject V-N. I recalled Glassboro speech, new consular treaty ceremony and President's remarks at White House. Although Zorin started our conversation professing little knowledge of domestic U.S. political picture, he responded to my analysis by saying he agreed with me completely, that precious time should not be wasted, and that U.S. should take first big step by stopping the bombing. After I repeated our well-known position, he repeated their litany.
Having unloaded himself of their regular incantations, he proceeded to add his opinion that if we would set a specific date for stopping the bombing the North Vietnamese would respond immediately by entering into unofficial talks to achieve complete peace. I said talk was cheap, that President could not stop bombing for an agreement to talk, that even if President wanted to do so he would lose support of the country and lose any chance of obtaining Congressional approval of his actions, that such an action might well elect Nixon and thus make peace negotiations even more difficult for North Vietnamese.
He appeared to accept these arguments and responded by introducing Phase A-Phase B plan. (He did not use this phrase name for plan but was obviously referring to Phase A-B concept.) I pointed out my belief this plan had been brought to attention North Vietnamese with no results. He asked if plan had actually been discussed with North Vietnamese, directly. When I could neither affirm or deny exact details, he recommended that plan be brought up directly by Vance with Xuan Thuy./2/ To assure myself Zorin's exact intention I repeated to him my understanding his recommendation as set forth in Summary above. He responded yes "Vance should say that" and he thereupon lifted a heretofore untouched glass of wine and said "a votre sante."
/2/In telegram 189086/Todel 521 to Paris, June 24, Harriman sent the following message to Vance: "Dobrynin told Secretary and myself that Hanoi representatives in Paris had informed the Soviet Government they would talk to us in private but had not specified how soon. You may find opportunity at tea break Wednesday to raise this subject again without, of course, involving the Soviets." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Todel Chron.)
Zorin's manner today totally different than on occasion of embassy lunch with Harriman, Perry and me. Zorin was full of smiles, laughed out loud 2 or 3 times, and upon my departure said he hoped Mrs. Shriver would soon call upon Mrs. Zorin. Zorin mentioned Vance's talk with Oberemko and was apparently aware that Vance had gotten nowhere with Phase A-Phase B idea on that occasion./3/ Zorin also completely frank and expansive on French elections which is subject of separate message./4/
/3/See footnote 5, Document 280.
/4/Telegram 16929 from Paris, June 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Todel Chron.)
Ambassador Vance has read this cable.
Shriver
282. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, June 25, 1968, 1:20-2:35 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH TUESDAY
LUNCHEON GROUP
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Secretary Clifford
Ambassador Ball
CIA Director Helms
General Wheeler
General Taylor
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Walt Rostow: The first item is the cable to Vance following up on Zorin-Shriver talk.
Under Secretary Katzenbach provided a copy of the cable (Appendix A)./2/
/2/The telegram to Vance is printed as Document 283.
The President: Have they let up on civilian attacks on Saigon?
General Wheeler: It has been about four days since they have attacked Saigon with rockets.
The President: Is that significant?
General Wheeler: No, I do not think so.
Secretary Clifford: Could it be the lull before the storm?
General Wheeler: It sure could.
The President: I think it may be.
CIA Director Helms: I agree.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: The response time of Abrams to mortars is fantastic. It takes only 90 seconds.
General Wheeler: The 122 mm mortars have a range of seven miles.
Secretary Clifford: We hope the Russians won't give them longer rockets.
General Wheeler: Saigon is 28 miles in size. It isn't hard to hit.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: Ambassador Harriman has a theory about the Soviets which has merit. There is no use in dealing with them anywhere except at the top./3/
/3/According to the Daily Diary, the President met with Harriman from 12:53 to 1:18 p.m. A notation in the Diary reads: "Amb. Harriman said he wanted to discuss the following items with the President: 1. The 'Straws in the Wind,' and the general outlook in Paris. 2. The need for Soviet help in getting private talks going and later to obtain their future involvement in the situation. He asked for the President's guidance on these two subjects." (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
Walt Rostow: Proposal of language to India.
Ambassador Ball: We agree on the language.
General Taylor: Yes, I agree although all we are getting is old stuff about stopping the bombing.
The President: Does this sign us on to stop bombing if they do this?
Under Secretary Katzenbach: It comes close to it, but we have a way out.
If they agree to the DMZ, we will stop bombing. This is a complete demilitarization.
The President: Are you for this, Bus?
General Wheeler: Yes sir.
The President: Are we adequately protected?
General Wheeler: Yes sir. I believe so.
General Taylor: I would have difficulty with stopping the bombing in exchange for the DMZ. I don't think we should equate bombing to re-establishment of the DMZ./4/
/4/In a June 24 memorandum to the President, Taylor suggested making a formal proposal for dividing the peace talks into negotiations on political issues at Paris and those on military issues at a location in the DMZ. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8 I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos-General) According to a notation on an attached covering note from Rostow, the President directed that Taylor's memorandum be circulated to both the State and Defense Departments.
Also, who will verify demilitarization of DMZ.
Walt Rostow: I have some uneasiness. It looks like a softer position than the one we gave Vance.
CIA Director Helms: I do not think a third party should decide what the Democratic Republic of Vietnam should assure us.
The President: Let them wait. Let's see what Vance gets out of the other one.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: We can do that.
Secretary Clifford: India as Chairman of the International Control Commission (ICC) will have some role to play in the final analysis. Maybe we should get them in on it now.
Walt Rostow: If the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) will talk to us about conditions--as the Soviets tell us--we won't need this section on conditions.
The President: I do not want to make a proposal to stop the bombing through India.
Walt Rostow: We now have language agreed to by all bureaucracy on Seabed project. (Appendix B)/5/
/5/Not found. Reference is presumably to the U.S. position on an arms limitation initiative on the peaceful uses of the seabed and the ocean floor.
Ambassador Ball: We can live with this.
The President: What about the Pope's appeal for a ceasefire?
Under Secretary Katzenbach: This thing has taken us off the hook here.
The President: Draft him (the Pope) a letter saying we have gone along with a ceasefire in fourteen points--in U Thant proposal, and in the State of the Union Message./6/
/6/No letter has been found. For documentation on correspondence between President Johnson and Pope Paul about Southeast Asia, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XII, Documents 301 ff.
[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.]
283. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, June 25, 1968, 1944Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel--Paris Delto VI. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan. Drafted by Bundy; cleared by Rostow, Clifford, Harriman, and Read; and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Reykjavik for Rusk who was attending the NATO Ministerial meeting, Moscow, and Saigon.
190068/Todel 529. Paris 16928 and 16929./2/
/2/See Document 281 and footnote 4 thereto.
1. We agree that at a tea break you should act on Zorin's suggestion and probe possibilities of private discussion of two-phase approach to bombing and military de-escalation. You should inquire whether they would be interested in private discussions whereby the US would agree to cease all bombing of the DRV on a day certain to be communicated to them. Before that day, an understanding would be reached on the "circumstances," i.e., actions on Hanoi's part toward de-escalation, which would be carried out following upon the cessation.
2. The main purpose of approach should be to find out whether they are willing to talk in these terms. In this approach, we believe you should avoid specifying the precise "circumstances" we would regard as satisfactory. However, if they show interest and inquire as to what you have in mind, you could indicate that we have already noted the importance of restoration of the DMZ and have expressed our concern (in the terms used by Harriman on June 12) concerning: firing of artillery and other weapons from and across the DMZ into SVN; ground attacks launched in the area of the DMZ; and the massive increase in infiltration that has taken place and continues. Finally we have made clear our concern about the continuing attacks on the civilian population of Saigon. All these points should be mentioned, but in the sense that these are the kind of topics we would visualize discussing in private talks, avoiding the implication that these are our final and irrevocable "circumstances" but simply saying that these are the kind of topics we have in mind.
3. In your approach, you should avoid the label "Phase A-Phase B." There have been many formulations in the past to which this label has been attached, and which have been communicated to Hanoi. Some of these have included the possibility of additional US actions--over and above stopping the bombing--at "Phase B." You should, at least initially, deal with the actions on which understanding would be reached through private talks as wholly those of Hanoi. If they raise the possibility that the US might take additional actions in a second phase, you should state that this is a matter that could be discussed.
4. Further, you will note that we do not believe that you should, in you initial approach, specify that the "second phase actions" would follow "at an interval"--the phrase used between Zorin and Shriver. We wish to stay fluid on this point as well, while not excluding the possibility. Accordingly, if they should ask whether we envisage a time gap between the stopping of the bombing and the going into effect of the understood actions, you should state that this is another matter that could be considered in the private discussions.
5. For your own background, we will send you a history of the past formulations to which the label "Phase A-Phase B" has been attached and which have been communicated to Hanoi./3/ However, we repeat, it seems to us important to avoid this label so that there will be no confusion as to what we are now proposing./4/
/3/A list of the various U.S. formulations of the Phase A-Phase B proposal was transmitted in telegram 190161 to Paris, June 25. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Todel Chron.)
/4/Harriman telephoned Vance and informed him that this telegram was on its way. "I feel rather strongly you ought to make engagement yourself and establish your contact; it should have started with you, though I appreciate your man," Harriman noted. Vance stated that he did not need further guidance. (Notes on Telcon, June 26; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Chronological File, May-June 1968)
Katzenbach
284. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 26, 1968, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 84. Secret.
Mr. President:
Herewith a summary of Phil Habib's telephone call about today's Paris meeting, which ended at 9:30 a.m. our time./2/
/2/Full reports on the session are in telegrams 17021/Delto 343 and 17060/Delto 347 from Paris, June 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.)
1. It ran four hours.
2. The formal statement from the other side was pure boilerplate.
3. The coffee break was "extremely interesting":
--for the first time, Thuy suggested the coffee break;
--Vance and Habib were at the table with Thuy and Lau, their No. 3 man. (Tho was not there. The thought crossed my mind that he might be in Moscow.)
--Cy covered the two points that we wished to probe. First, the follow-up on Tho's remark of last week that a political settlement should precede military action. Thuy responded that there could of course be talks of a political settlement after a total bombing cessation. Second, the A-B formula.
4. Habib says that it was clear that Thuy was anticipating Vance's raising of this formula. Vance did so in line with the instruction which you cleared yesterday, in general terms. Thuy was obviously much interested but confined himself to stating that they would give it "most careful study."
5. Thuy then made a procedural suggestion. At the next meeting, scheduled for next Wednesday,/3/ he urged that he and Harriman carry on the formal discussion, but that Lau and Vance meet separately but concurrently for the whole duration of the meeting rather than merely for a coffee break. This would, of course, substantially expand the opportunities for private exchanges. Cy said we would consider their proposal.
/3/July 3.
Cy then raised the desirability of more frequent private meetings rather than merely the Wednesday sessions. Thuy was not directly responsive but said this proposal "could be considered."/4/
/4/In a memorandum to the President, June 26, 7:10 p.m., Rostow noted: "You will wish to know that after today's meeting, a representative from the North Vietnam delegation approached a junior member of our delegation and asked if Cy Vance were willing to meet their man Lau at some mutually agreed place for discussion tomorrow of the proposition we put to them today. He said that if that was an impossible situation an informal contact would have to wait until the next formal meeting on Wednesday. Katzenbach and Vance are inclined to proceed. We believe that Vance's standing instructions are sufficient to handle this contact." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. IV, 6/16-30/68)
6. In short, we are apparently launched on an exploration directly of the A-B formula.
7. We shall be getting Cy's own report of all this shortly, as well as his recommendations including, apparently, recommendation on how we approach the Russians during the coming week, perhaps via Zorin.
W. W. Rostow/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
285. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, June 28, 1968, 0448Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-June 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan/Plus. Received at 11:42 a.m. The "Plus" slug was added to limit further the distribution of telegrams relating to these private talks. (Telegram 191904 to Paris, Saigon, and Moscow, June 27; ibid.) Tho left for Hanoi the next day, stopping off in Moscow for consultations with the Soviets. In telegram 17256 from Paris, June 30, Vance suggested that Tho's departure was related to the recent talks with Lau and Zorin. (Ibid.)
17153/Delto 355. From Vance.
1. I met with Ha Van Lau from 10:30 to 12:40 night of June 27/28 at house in Vitry sur Seine not far from DRV delegation headquarters. The location was proposed by the DRV and apparently once served as a communications center for them. Also attending the meeting were Habib and Negroponte on our side, and on DRV side, Nguyen Minh Vy, interpreter Nguyen Dinh Phuong and Tran Quang Co, who took notes.
2. I opened by asking Lau if he had had chance to think over the suggestion I had put to him and Xuan Thuy at Wednesday's coffee break. Lau said that it had been put in rather simple terms and thus he as yet had no basis on which to form a judgment.
3. We repeated the proposal saying that the US would agree to cease all bombardment of North Vietnam on a day to be communicated to the DRV. Before that day, an understanding would be reached on the circumstances to be carried out following upon the cessation.
I repeated the proposal to be sure that it was understood. I commented that this seemed to me a way to make progress and overcome the obstacles to our discussions. I said it would meet the suggestions made by the DRV and not jeopardize our forces in Vietnam. I then emphasized the value of discussing these matters privately and stressed the importance we attached to maintaining the utmost secrecy.
4. Lau then said he had some questions. He reminded us that the DRV demands the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other acts of war against all of its territory and that this has been formulated in a 3-point proposal by Xuan Thuy. Lau wondered whether other acts of war were included in our proposal or not. I replied that one of the questions we would have to discuss was what constituted other acts of war.
5. Lau asked for examples of the circumstances we had in mind. I said that we had spoken often of the importance of the reestablishment of the DMZ, and added that we had indicated our concern regarding such matters as: artillery fire from and across the DMZ; the launching of attacks across or in the area of the DMZ; increased infiltration of troops into the South; and continuing attacks on the civilian population in the cities in the South. I said these would be the kinds of things we should talk about in discussing the circumstances which would follow the cessation of bombing.
6. Lau asked if the discussion of circumstances would come before or after the cessation of bombing. I replied before. I then reiterated that this proposal would meet the DRV demands, yet at the same time provide the protection for our forces and those of our allies--a matter which concerns us greatly.
7. Lau then said that he would think it over but commented by way of preliminary observation, that he saw nothing new in what we were saying when compared with what we had said in previous meetings between the full delegations or in the meeting between Jorden and Le.
8. I pointed out that our proposal contained something very new. Lau remarked that there was indeed something new, the date of cessation of bombing would be fixed beforehand. Habib then added that there was something else, the implementation of conditions follow rather than precede the cessation, thus they are not conditions in the true sense of the word. In fact, the proposal allows the DRV to meet their request of no prior conditions and at the same time allows us to meet our requirements for what will follow. Moreover what follows will not be linked with the cessation of bombing as far as the public is concerned.
9. Lau replied that these ideas were only slightly different from ones we had advanced previously--different in terms of sequence but as far as the substance of the matter was concerned he said there was nothing new, and what we were asking is still tantamount to reciprocity. Lau said suppose the discussion of circumstances to follow the cessation of bombing does not achieve any results--then what will happen? He said our proposal still involved the element of reciprocity, and he was sure we recalled that Xuan Thuy had already rejected this on numerous occasions.
10. I said I was aware of this and that I had read and reread Xuan Thuy's statements many times. I said that I had tried to find a way to overcome the obstacle to progress in these discussions--a way in which we could meet the DRV demands and at the same time provide the necessary protection of our forces. I said that by talking of time sequence the question of time develops into one of substance. At this point I emphasized that I did not want to mislead Lau. I said that before the bombing was stopped, we would have to reach an understanding on the circumstances that would follow the cessation of bombing. I said I did not want any misunderstanding on this point.
11. Habib then commented that the question of prior conditions is not apparent in our proposal because we are taking a step first and what the DRV does will follow upon the cessation of bombing. I then pointed out that some of the circumstances which would follow upon the cessation of bombing would be acts of mutual restraint such as the reestablishment of the DMZ and as such would appear related to each other and not the cessation of bombing which had taken place before.
12. Lau responded by saying that in substance there is still a demand for reciprocity. He then reiterated the DRV position that we must cease all bombing and other acts of war unconditionally, and whether the conditions are imposed before, at the same time, or after the cessation of bombing, it was tantamount to reciprocity. Lau said that if the DRV discusses these proposals before the cessation of bombing or simultaneously it would be contradicting its previous position. Lau said he wanted to think that the U.S. is interested in seeking a solution but he regretted that our suggestions offered nothing new and suggested we speak of substance rather than appearances.
13. Lau then said we had not answered his question. What would happen if we disagree on circumstances which should follow the cessation of bombing? I replied that unless we agree to the circumstances the bombing will not stop. I also said that our proposal would meet the basic need of the DRV since the bombing would be stopped, the circumstances would be reasonable, and they would lead to a lessening of the conflict permitting us to go on to the discussion of other matters leading to peace. I said that I believed that our objective as well as that of the DRV was to find an honorable solution which would permit peace to return to Viet-Nam and permit it to develop along lines of its own choosing.
14. Lau then plunged into a long and somewhat emotional monologue. He said that his people would progress, it was just a question of time and as long as the people were determined to go forward no one could hinder this progress. The North Vietnamese people are attached to peace, which in their view must be in independence and in freedom. The DRV is an independent and sovereign country and yet the U.S. sends planes to bomb it. The U.S. repeatedly changes its reasons for bombing North Vietnam and has also repeatedly admitted that such bombings have not been effective and perhaps even had the results opposite to those intended. The longer the U.S. prolongs these bombardments the greater the resistance from the people of Vietnam. The DRV demands that the U.S. unconditionally cease the bombing of its territory. This is a very legitimate demand and if it cannot be met then our talks will not progress. The DRV believes its demand is motivated by the principle of sovereignty and independence of its country. As for the U.S. reasons for bombing, one day they are this, one day they are that, and none of the reasons stand up to scrutiny. The U.S. has no reason to bomb Vietnam and no right to destroy it.
15. The U.S., Lau continued, has raised the question of restraint and the circumstances which we have raised are actually demands for reciprocity--demands which the DRV has repeatedly rejected. The DRV cannot accept the principle of restraint and if the U.S. wants to find a solution it must manifest this desire by some act of good will--that is the cessation of bombing. After that we can discuss other matters. The Vietnamese do not want to destroy the prestige of other people--they want friendship on the basis of mutual respect but they cannot accept an infringement on their independence and sovereignty. We have said the conflict should end in order to stop the suffering of our two peoples. How? To end the conflict we must go back to the origin of the situation which in substance is aggression by a country which has come from far across the sea. The U.S. argument that North Vietnam is aggressing against South Vietnam is wrong and Lau said he was sure that even in the U.S. many people did not believe this to be the case
16. I replied that I did not think we could make progress by talking about who is the aggressor. I then emphasized that bombing of North Vietnam is purely for military reasons and that as a military man Lau should understand this. I said the bombing is absolutely necessary to protect our troops and those of our allies. I said, moreover, we have already taken certain actions unilaterally; we have stopped bombing over a great part of the DRV and since early April have up to now--not bombed beyond the 19th parallel although this has not been publicly announced; and that since early April there have been no allied troops operating in the DMZ, while at the same time North Vietnamese troops have used the DMZ as a base to move troops into South Vietnam and to conduct attacks against allied forces in South Vietnam.
17. I said as far as Vietnamese independence was concerned we respect it and have said we have no intention of overthrowing or harming the Government of North Vietnam. I stated what we want to assure is the right of the South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese to decide their own future without force or outside interference. I reminded Lau that we were prepared to withdraw our troops from South Vietnam as stated in the Manila Communique if North Vietnam removed theirs.
18. At this point Vy interjected that if we kept restating our position it would compel Lau to further restate his. Habib replied that each side knew the other's general position but we were addressing ourselves to a very specific question and the best thing that Lau could do is to think about our proposal with great care. I again said I thought our suggestion met the requirements of both sides and without loss of face for either side.
19. Lau said that was a matter of opinion. He repeated his view that we were just talking about appearances and not substance. He again asked what will happen if we could not agree on the circumstance to follow the bombing cessation, stating that if agreement could not be reached then there would be no cessation, bringing us back full circle to the old question of reciprocity.
20. We then went over the same points several more times. I emphasized again the need for protecting the security of our forces in I Corps. Lau referred me to Thuy's comments on this subject; Vy then said complete cessation of bombing is the most logical first step, and then there would be discussion of other matters.
21. Lau then referred to Thuy's arguments at the 9th session to the effect that rather than showing restraint we had intensified the war in North and South since March 31./2/ Lau said we had not answered this charge: I replied that we had. He then said that, frankly speaking, he could not stomach our claim that we had ceased bombing over DRV territory containing 90 percent of population. This not true, he said, maintaining that there are 4-1/2 million in area we are bombing.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 275.
22. As for the bombing, it has intensified at very same time U.S. speaks of restraint. What DRV demands is that all bombing stop. As for South Vietnam, Lau continued, he had just read in newspapers that all areas around Saigon had been declared free bomb zones; but these are densely populated areas with countless hamlets and villages. What right does U.S. have to declare these areas free bomb zones? Never have B-52s bombed so heavily, so indiscriminately. The indignation of the Vietnamese people is aroused.
23. While the US talks of safety of its troops, Lau continued, it is massacring Vietnamese people daily, not to mention the activities of puppet troops, now US intends to raise their number to one million; US plans to bring troops from Thailand; and it has just added billions to its war budget. Lau said he was citing these figures not for propaganda purposes but because they were the facts. US must match its words with its deeds, if not, words are meaningless.
24. I replied that as far as the DRV population living south of 20th parallel is concerned, the figures we had used were based on the best information available to us and there has been no intent to falsify or deceive. As for the bombing, I said that compared to first three months of year it had in fact increased but this was in large measure due to weather and the increase in military movement by the DRV southwards since March. I said that as he well knew, the infiltration rate in May was the highest ever and it was continuing at an abnormally high rate in June.
25. As for our actions in South Vietnam, there have been indiscriminate rocket attacks by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army troops against Saigon. We have responded to them. We will defend Saigon. Regarding the number of our troops in South Vietnam, we don't keep it secret. As for number of GVN troops, that's for the GVN to decide. The DRV refers to them as puppets. Here we have difference of view. We believe South Vietnamese people have right to determine their future. If they weren't being attacked they would not need to increase their troop strength or seek allied help. No one has right to impose another's future by force. These aren't words, this is something we believe deeply.
26. Habib then asked if we stopped bombing what military action will the DRV take? Vy replied that DRV would then talk about related matters.
27. Lau then remarked that he agreed with my statement that South Vietnam people should have right to defend themselves against use of force, but this did not apply to US puppets who do not represent the people. US puppet and satellite troops number more than 1 million; they are equipped with best of weapons; and yet what have they been able to achieve? The truth is that the South Vietnamese have the right to self-determination by uniting behind the NLD.
28. Again displaying some emotion, Lau asked, "Remember Ben Suc? You razed it. Remember Cu Chi district? You razed it." These were only examples he said. Vietnamese people in the South would rather die than live in slavery. As long as US aggression continues, the Vietnamese people will struggle until fundamental national objectives are attained. These words are not propaganda, Lau said; they are spoken from the heart.
29. As for US continuation of bombing to protect its troops, Lau went on, it is absurd and not new. The US has advanced these ideas at previous meetings. The US proposes fixing a date for bombing cessation beforehand but only after an exchange of views. This is nothing new.
30. I said that I rejected his statement that continuation of bombing to protect our troops was absurd. I said it was necessary for their protection. As for self determination, I said we had different points of view. I then said that while we may have covered much of same old ground this evening, I did not agree that there had been nothing new in our suggestion and asked him to reflect seriously on it.
31. Habib then said we differ on what great majority want in South Vietnam. We are prepared to leave South Vietnam. Is DRV? They spoke of weapons we had brought to Vietnam but what of weapons DRV had brought there? Nationalists in Saigon are not puppets. They wished to determine their own future. They want North Vietnamese out. They want our forces out eventually. We agree complete cessation of bombing in DRV is a possible first step in these negotiations. What will DRV do if we the stop bombing? Neither they nor anyone else has been able to tell us what military actions they would take following a cessation.
32. Lau replied that the people in Saigon we call nationalists are more American than we are. In the U.S. there are people who call for a complete cessation of bombing while the nationalists in Saigon want to resume the bombing of North Vietnam and bomb Hanoi. "We know them very well," Lau said, "and if you continue to rely on them you will never find your way out of Vietnam."
33. As for our proposal, Lau said he would think about it. He said he did not want to deal in recriminations but a Vietnamese solution must be based on an assessment of the past and present. If we don't agree on at least essential points of the past, it will be difficult to find a solution for the future. This was the first talk between us. Lau said he had paid serious attention to my remarks and hoped that I would reflect further on his.
34. I said I thought that through frank discussion we might solve our problems and suggested that we might meet again.
35. Lau concluded by saying that DRV was convinced its point of view is correct and true. We may be convinced of our position. That is our privilege, but there's only one truth. DRV cannot accept anything contrary to truth or aspirations of the people.
36. I asked Lau whether we should fix a date for another meeting or whether we should leave it open. Lau replied that they would need some time to think things over. I said perhaps we could have further discussion at the formal Wednesday meeting. Lau nodded.
Comment:
37. I gave my preliminary comments on this meeting in the telecon with Walsh of S/S./3/
/3/Not found.
38. The meeting did not produce any progress. The North Vietnamese did, however, get a precise exposition of our proposal. They understand its content and they are fully aware of its implication. They only agreed to study it. They said they found nothing new in it. We pointed out there was something new and emphasized the constructive nature of the proposal which could open the way to progress in these negotiations. Lau said they would sleep on it to see if there was anything new.
39. Notwithstanding the foregoing the meeting was useful. It was a necessary first step in this dialogue and it proceeded about as we could expect. They are deliberate and persistent and there was more of the standard party line than we anticipated. We limited our response in this regard to the minimum possible, and we sought to keep their attention on the specific proposal. In the next episode we will hopefully find it possible to keep their attention concentrated on the specific problem, now that we have worked our way through a good deal of the polemics they seem to require./4/
/4/In a June 29 memorandum to the President, Taylor noted: "The report of this meeting is very interesting and, although inconclusive, is moderately encouraging in offering the possibilities of further substantive talks in private." He believed that the North Vietnamese would relent on the issue of reciprocity, and thus the "circumstances" for cessation and the scenario for future negotiations needed to be more fully developed before further exploration in this channel. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8 I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos--General)
40. I will be seeing Zorin the morning of June 28 to inform him of what we have done subsequent to his suggestion. We will wish to consider what should be done in the Russian channel to follow on./5/
/5/See Document 286.
Vance
286. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, June 28, 1968, 1735Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-June 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan/Plus. Received at 2:17 p.m. In the covering note transmitting a copy of this telegram to the President, June 28, 6 p.m., Rostow wrote: "You will wish to have this account of Cy Vance's meeting with Zorin, for the 6:15 p.m. meeting with Sec. Rusk. Zorin, essentially, proposes this: 1. We stop bombing. 2. They take de-escalatory steps in the next phase; but we also take further steps. The key issues are: Firmly to negotiate phase 2 before the bombing stops; Whether what they do in phase 2 compensates us for the bombing cessation plus the additional actions that Zorin suggests." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 84) According to his diary, the President met that evening with both Rusk and Rostow "to discuss the Middle East paper and Paris talks." (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Notes of the meeting have not been found.
17226/Delto 361. 1. I called at Soviet Emb today and talked with Amb Zorin for hour and half. Bogomolov interpreted. Zorin was quite cordial, and proceeded in businesslike manner with minimum propaganda and few wasted words.
2. I began by telling Zorin we wanted to keep him fully informed about progress of talks, and said that after his talk with Amb Shriver I had spoken with Xuan Thuy during Wednesday's tea break and put suggestion to him in exact form discussed between Zorin and Shriver. I then recounted arrangements for my meeting with Ha Van Lau, told Zorin meeting lasted two hours, and described in general terms course of meeting./2/ I summarized by saying I believed Ha Van Lau understood our suggestion and its implications clearly, that Lau's response was negative but that he said he would think about it. I told Zorin I assumed North Vietnamese would discuss this matter with him and I hoped he would see it got the serious attention it deserved, since I felt it provided a realistic way to overcome obstacle to progress in talks.
/2/See Document 285.
3. Zorin said this proposal had been presented to various persons in various languages, and he wanted to ask exactly how I put it to Ha Van Lau. I said: "The US would agree to stop all bombing and bombardments of the DRV on a day certain to be communicated to you (DRV). Before that day an understanding would be reached on the circumstances which would be carried out following upon the cessation." I added that in response to questions I told Ha Van Lau that an understanding concerning the "circumstances" had to be reached before bombing stopped, but this would be private understanding; and that if we could not agree on "circumstances," then bombing would not be stopped.
4. Zorin replied that I had put proposition in form hard for Hanoi to accept, for I was still posing conditions and demanding reciprocity, which he wished to emphasize DRV could not accept. Here he thumped table to emphasize his statement that DRV would never accept demand for reciprocity, "no matter how it was dressed up." Zorin then said he had envisaged a two phase proposal with a time interval between the two phases. The first phase would involve a cessation of bombing and the second phase would involve carrying out reciprocal actions on both sides. He asked whether our suggestion involved two phases with a time interval between. I said we envisaged, as far as public was concerned, two phases, with time interval between, which must be as short as possible, but between US and DRV, in private, we had to have a clear understanding of what would happen in the second phase before we ceased bombing. I said we could not jeopardize the safety of our troops and other allied forces and therefore we must know with absolute clarity what would happen in the second phase. I mentioned the reestablishment of the DMZ, and said it would appear to world US and DRV actions in DMZ were reciprocal steps and not connected with bombing cessation. I said I had mentioned other specific "circumstances" to Ha Van Lau which would also have to be thrashed out between us. Key point, I repeated, was that we had to know what would happen if we stopped bombing, and no one had told us this yet.
5. After proposing toast Zorin had more to say. He stated that we had fewer troops in Viet-Nam before we started to bomb than we did now so why was it necessary to bomb when we had 500,000 troops there. I pointed out his non sequitur and stressed the fact that DRV had escalated the fighting and infiltration and thus the danger to our troops since March 31st. I said we could only assume unless we got some assurance to the contrary that they would take further advantage if we stopped all the bombing. Zorin then said what difference does it make when the measures of restraint are taken by them. He said if there were a time interval the measures could be agreed to then. I repeated that was unacceptable, and that we had to know in advance what measures of restraint they would take if the bombing were to be stopped. I repeated again that we could not jeopardize our forces and those of our allies.
6. Zorin now began to warm to his subject, and referred to a conversation between a member US delegation and DRV delegation about possible steps in reducing troops, retiring certain divisions, etc. He said this was already second phase talk. Zorin then tried to explain very specifically what he meant by the two phases. When he encountered difficulty in making himself as clear as he wished, he went over to his desk, got paper and pencil, and spent some five minutes writing out diagram on single sheet of paper. At top was Phase I, cessation of bombing, with heavy black line separating it from Phase II. Phase II was composed of parallel columns with several points in each column. One column was US and the other DRV.
7. Zorin said with elaborate emphasis that he was not proposing anything, but merely giving his "personal" thoughts--as a result of listening to both sides--as to what might give best results for the negotiations. (He repeated this caution at end of meeting.) He then explained his diagram with great earnestness, getting ahead of interpretation in his eagerness to get his ideas across. First phase was bombing cessation, with no reciprocity "formally," emphasis on "formally." Second phase, US and DRV would undertake two or three measures each. (1) US would suggest pull-back of certain troops or divisions or closing of certain bases (he cited closing of Khe Sanh as example) by US, at same time suggesting certain parallel measures to be taken by DRV. (2) Second point, to suggest certain measures that would help guarantee security of US and allied troops ("since this was purpose of our asking reciprocal measures for bombing cessation"). E.g., he said reducing military activity in various areas, and when I asked if he had in mind DMZ as a possibility he replied it was good possibility. (3) Third point (he stressed this and it was obvious he attached considerable importance to it), discuss some political step that could be taken simultaneously, so that US proposals would include both military and political steps. His description of possible political steps was vague. (Later I questioned him specifically on this and asked whether he was suggesting that a topic for discussion be listed or did he mean that action to be taken should be listed. He smiled and said he recognized US problem, that we had Saigon standing at our backs, but he had in mind something vague, some suggested step "on principle" that would not touch directly on interests of Saigon or FLN.) Finally, Zorin said this list of steps to be taken would be open-ended, that is we would make it clear to DRV that further concrete steps would also be negotiated. He did not make it clear whether he was suggesting a fourth point on each side of his list saying just that.
8. Picking up his sheet of paper, Zorin said we should draw up "this list," including specific steps for each side. He said he was unable to advise us on concrete steps we might wish include. US should "propose this now." US would agree to stop bombings on certain date, and both sides would "agree to discuss" specific points listed, which would constitute beginning of second phase--to start say two or three weeks after bombing cessation. Thus US would avoid asking direct reciprocity (pointing to diagram to show that reciprocity came only in Phase II) but would achieve what US wanted, namely measures to protect US and allied troops. Then he stressed that if US wanted it made clear what would happen in Phase II, then it must propose concrete measures for both sides; otherwise Hanoi would not provide clear picture of what it would do. Zorin said he could not guarantee DRV would accept concrete steps US proposed, but he had reason to believe they would agree to talk on this basis, if it was presented as reasonable minimum measure, and if DRV saw us willing to reduce level of military activity and simultaneously include something from political sphere.
9. I asked several questions to clarify his position, including what would happen during interval between Phase I and Phase II--that is how did we know DRV would not take advantage. Zorin replied his idea was that "now, at this stage," we would already agree on one or two of points in Phase II. I asked if he thought points in Phase II would be carried out by DRV. Zorin said if DRV agreed, they would abide by agreement, they were as responsible as US. I asked why his diagram did not constitute "reciprocity" in DRV eyes. He pointed to heavy line between Phase I and II and said reciprocity was below line but not above it. I again tried to get a clear answer by asking whether DRV would agree to this plan before bombing ceased. Zorin replied he thought there were grounds for concrete conversations and this plan would not be rejected.
10. At this stage we had to close hurriedly since Zorin said he was overdue for appointment. I promised to study what he had said.
11. Comment--I had the impression from two remarks of Zorin that Zorin or a member of his staff had talked to the North Vietnamese since our meeting of last night. Zorin had obviously thought about the proposal he advanced and when he had trouble finding the right word, sketched out his plan on paper without undue hesitation. Unfortunately, I could not get a clear statement from him on whether the proposed reciprocal actions in Phase II of his proposal would be agreed to before the bombing was stopped. His emphasis on the word "formally" in paragraph 7 above suggests he was saying that. However, in paragraph 5 he implied the measures would be agreed upon in the interval following the bombing cessation. At the end of our talk when I tried to get a clear answer (paragraph 9), he fuzzed the issue./3/
/3/Taylor analyzed Zorin's proposals in a June 29 memorandum to the President, highlighting Zorin's call for "concrete proposals covering actions to be taken in Phase II" and his definition of the DRV's insistence against reciprocity as implying no public connection between the halt and de-escalatory acts. The separation would be reinforced by a "lapse" of several weeks. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8 I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos--General) In a June 29 memorandum concerning Zorin's proposals, Bundy suggested actions to be taken either solely by each side or jointly that the U.S. delegation could propose at Paris. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) In a July 1 memorandum to Clifford, Warnke noted: "The Zorin formula seems to involve a requirement that we agree unconditionally to stop the bombing while, at the same time but not semantically related, both sides would agree on a list of certain restrictions on military activity to be discussed sometime after the bombing cessation. The key factor is that the reduction in military activity to be discussed would be reciprocal, with each side agreeing on certain de-escalatory measures. The reciprocity would occur after, not before, the bombing halt." He recommended working out a formula for cessation within the framework of the Zorin proposal. (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, VIET 092.2)
12. I will be considering this conversation in light of our talk with Lau and will submit my suggestions for follow up./4/
/4/In telegram 17248/Delto 362 from Paris, June 29, Vance recommended that he and Habib not "seek further clarification" with Zorin at the present time. Instead, they would ask the North Vietnamese whether or not they wanted to continue with the private exchanges. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-June 1968) In telegram 4443 from Moscow, June 29, Thompson noted: "I informed Dobrynin last night of our action on Zorin suggestion. In reply my question he said he did not think there would be further communication from Kosygin at this time." (Ibid.)
Vance
287. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, June 30, 1968, 0600Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 3:19 a.m. In telegram 193328 to Saigon, June 28, Katzenbach had discussed his ideas on the inter-relationship between the Paris talks and the political situation in Saigon. (Ibid., A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-June 1968)
31393. Dept pass to Paris for Vietnam Mission. Ref: A. State 191958; B. State 193995./2/
/2/In telegram 191958 to Saigon, June 27, the Department notified Bunker of its decision to postpone a visit by Thieu to the U.S. mainland primarily due to "the specific chance of hostile demonstrations" likely to arise and instead suggested either "high-level visits from here or Paris" or a trip by Thieu to Honolulu in mid-July, preceded or followed by a visit by Clifford and Wheeler to South Vietnam. In telegram 193995 to Saigon, June 29, the Department made the following request: "Highest levels would now like your urgent judgment on the advisability of proposing to Thieu a meeting with the President in Honolulu in the general time period July 10-13--with the Clifford visit to follow--or conceivably at the other end of the Clifford visit, with Clifford returning to Honolulu at the same time the President came." (Both ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 VIET S)
1. I have been considering the questions raised in reftel A which pose extremely difficult and delicate problems for Thieu. He is now publicly committed to an official visit to the United States in the near future and hardly a day passes without some reference to it. For example, during his public meeting with the representatives of the "Front of Fronts" June 29 several of the questions raised with him were centered on this fact. I believe that major considerations of "face" are involved and that our handling of this issue must reflect this fact. Thieu has recently been increasingly subjected to private criticism as being too much in the Americans' pocket, in contrast to some of the more nationalistic and particularly northern leaders. In our handling of the visit we must be sure that we do not make it appear as if Thieu were a puppet and subject to American whims.
2. I do not know how strongly Thieu will feel about letting the visit slip and I would hope that I could be given considerable flexibility in handling it with him. If Thieu amenable to Honolulu talks I think we should suggest to him that simultaneous announcement make clear that proposal to meet in Honolulu was originated by Thieu; that he made this proposal in lieu of State visit because he decided in view threats of new Communist offensive attacks he could not be away from Viet-Nam for length of time customary for a State visit; that both sides felt need for summit consultations at this time to review military situation and Paris talks; and, finally, that State visit not abandoned but deferred.
3. It would seem most useful to me to have a Honolulu meeting immediately after the Clifford visit here, as some of the preparatory discussions could in fact take place during that visit. I would therefore urge that if this change in plans is ultimately considered necessary, the Honolulu meeting be scheduled for about July 19 or 20.
4. With reference to para three of reftel B, I agree that we must in the last analysis leave the decision as to who would accompany him up to Thieu. I think it would be most useful to have Ky along, since this conforms to past practice and would also involve Ky in whatever decisions and public statements emerge from the meeting. While we can see advantage in having Huong present, a case can be made that it would be more appropriate as well as necessary for the head of government to remain in Saigon in the absence of the President. Moreover, there would be some language difficulties since Huong speaks no English, although interpreting arrangements could undoubtedly be worked out.
5. In sum, I hope that we can hold off on the final decision on Thieu's official visit until after I discuss the matter with him. If he should feel that it is politically essential to him despite all the factors outlined in reftels, I would like to report his views and my recommendations before a final decision is made. Request urgent instructions so that I can take this matter up with Thieu when I next see him./3/ I have an appointment with him Monday/4/ afternoon.
/3/In telegram 194062 to Saigon, June 30, the Department provided additional reasons for Thieu's concurrence in a meeting in Honolulu instead of the U.S. mainland. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel--Paris Delto VI--6/16-30/68)
/4/July 1.
Bunker
288. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 1, 1968, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 86. Secret; Harvan.
Mr. President:
We have just completed a meeting of almost two hours on Viet Nam negotiations of just the kind you wished us to have; General Taylor, as well as Secretary Rusk, Clark Clifford, Bill Bundy, etc., were present./2/
/2/Notes of this meeting taken by Helms are in Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (Helms) Chrono, 01 Jan-31 July 1968.
We:
--reviewed where we are in the negotiation, looking back to the beginning;
--considered what Averell and Cy should do on Wednesday;/3/
/3/July 3.
--and looked further down the road.
The consensus was that our negotiators limit themselves on Wednesday to asking, essentially, this question: Are you willing to sit down and discuss in private with us a proposition in which:
--we would stop bombing; but before the bombing actually stops we achieved a clear understanding on actions that would follow;
--in the actions that would follow we can envisage some that would be applicable to both sides; some to one side; and some to the other;
--any time interval between the stopping of the bombing and the package of actions would have to be short;
--they would have to understand that aerial reconnaissance must continue after cessation of bombing.
We would tell them that if they were prepared to sit down on this basis we would be prepared at that time to put in concrete proposals.
In short, it was agreed that on Wednesday we would not actually put in concrete proposals, but simply ask them if they are prepared to talk on the basis of this structure which Zorin commended to us.
While we were talking, the attached cable came in to the Secretary from Vance. The general view was that paras. 1-10.A. were on the right track except that we must try to negotiate a delay of less than seven days. Something like 48 hours would be nearer right. There was strong resistance to an early implementation of paras. 10.B. and C. at this time./4/ There was considerable discussion of the attacks on urban areas. Secretary Rusk wants them firmly brought into the conditions; Secretary Clifford feels that we can probably do without that assurance, relying on our own military capabilities to keep them from bombing Saigon too heavily.
/4/In the attached telegram 17321 from Paris, July 1, Vance characterized the two phase proposal based upon Zorin's formula: "In sum, we would propose to present to the North Vietnamese an elaboration of our first suggestion so as to relate North Vietnamese restraints to mutual actions taken in Phase 2, rather than to our bombing cessation in Phase 1." In order to enact the halt under Phase 1, an understanding on certain actions required in Phase 2 needed to be reached. In paragraph 10 (A), Vance outlined the military actions relating to the DMZ which both sides would take. In paragraph 10 (B), he noted required actions relating to current force levels. In paragraph 10 (C), he noted the actions relating to the withdrawal of troops on both sides.
We are putting our proposition on a quick turnaround to Paris tonight. In the light of what Cy says, we shall present a fairly unified view at lunch tomorrow for your final decision.
W. W. Rostow/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
289. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 2, 1968, 10:40 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Meetings with the President, July-December 1968 [2]. Secret; Harvan; Plus. A notation on the memorandum reads: "Lunch item."
Mr. President:
Herewith outgoing to Vance, as a result of yesterday's meeting,/2/ and Vance's response (Tab A)./3/
/2/See Document 288. According to notes of the President's luncheon with Rusk, Clifford, Ball, Wheeler, Taylor, Helms, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson on July 2, Rusk stated: "We had a good meeting yesterday. We should not put forth what Phase II should be yet. Vance and Harriman should press for a private meeting on the subject. Hanoi is up against a major obstacle. Something is stirring on the other side. Still we must know what they would do if we stop bombing. If you approve, we will seek a private meeting on Phase II." The President replied: "That is fine." (Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings)
/3/In the attached telegram 194772/Todel 587 to Paris, July 2, the Department informed the delegation that "it would be premature to table a possible second phase package at this point" until a basis of understanding was developed with the DRV. It instructed Vance to state to his counterpart: "We do insist that, before the bombing actually stops, we must have a clear understanding on actions that would follow the second phase." The telegram added the following sentence: "In the actions to be clearly understood, we can envisage actions on the U.S. side and measures that would be equally applicable to both sides." Rostow rewrote the sentence as: "In the actions clearly understood, we can envisage actions on the U.S. side, actions on the DRV side, and measures that would involve appropriate actions on both sides." In telegram 17324/Delto 366 from Paris, July 2, Harriman noted that he and Vance would carry out this instruction at the next tea break. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968)
Also attached is a Harriman-Zorin conversation, instigated by the latter (Tab B)./4/
/4/In the attached telegram 17332/Delto 369 from Paris, July 2, Harriman and Vance reported on a meeting with Zorin in which the Soviet Ambassador inquired about reaction to his previous suggestion. They replied that while the suggestion remained under study, it was viewed as "a constructive suggestion so long as agreement was reached on both stages beforehand." The full report of the conversation was transmitted in telegram 17425/Delto 381 from Paris, July 3. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel--Paris Delto VII)
Sect. Rusk will have a draft outgoing cable for you at lunch--if not earlier.
I have told State I believe it should contain the addition I have inserted on page 2.
But there is a larger issue which we debated amiably yesterday and on which Zorin's cable bears. The issue is this: on the next occasion, should we merely ask the North Vietnamese if they are prepared to sit down with us to work within the Zorin framework, or should we fill in what we want and are prepared to do in Phase 2?
Yesterday I had suggested the latter; Sect. Rusk suggested that we move more cautiously and simply raise the structure in principle--then proceeding in a private session, if they showed interest, to fill in Phase 2. He argued persuasively that they were probably making critical decisions in Hanoi right now and we should not put in a proposal which might scare them off by being too tough.
Now Zorin tells us: "It was critical that the columns in Phase 2 be filled out in detail. He said without the specific points in Phase 2 the proposal would mean nothing."
The question that you may wish to decide at lunch is, therefore, whether we proceed promptly to lay before them a Phase 1-Phase 2 proposal of substance.
We should recall that they have already had in the Jorden dinner,/5/ as well as by way of example in other conversations, what we have in mind: the DMZ; reduced infiltration; no shelling of Saigon; continued reconnaissance. It is just barely possible if we frame the proposal in this way, with familiar items but Phase 2 filled in, we could advance the pace of movement.
/5/See Document 275.
At the base of the matter is this judgment: since the biggest development in Paris has been the Soviet willingness to get into the middle of this--beginning with Kosygin's letter--should we be prepared to take their advice, so long as we could live with the proposal if it is accepted?/6/
/6/In telegram 31593 from Saigon, July 2, the Embassy relayed its own ideas of the minimum requirements Hanoi had to meet in order for a full cessation to occur. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968) In telegram 196665 to Paris and Saigon, July 4, the Department transmitted a tentative proposal to be made to the North Vietnamese in private talks. (Ibid.) In telegram 197553 to Paris and Saigon, July 6, Katzenbach analyzed the similarities and differences in the positions put forth by both the Paris delegation and the Embassy in Saigon. (Ibid.)
Walt
290. Memorandum From the President's Special Counsel (McPherson) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 3, 1968, 11:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of Harry McPherson, Memoranda for the President (1968) [2 of 2]. No classification marking.
Yesterday a very able man whom I got to know in Vietnam last summer, John Paul Vann, called from Denver. He is on home leave from his job as the top civilian in the pacification program in III Corps. He is something of a legend out there, and has always been pretty skeptical of our efforts, while certain that we could do much better if we tried.
Vann says two things are clear about the enemy in III Corps today: first, he has incurred the terrific animosity of the civilian population through his rocket attacks; second, he has almost committed suicide militarily. Vann is convinced that the enemy determined to shoot everything he had, with a "termination" date--an exhaustion date--of November.
His information sources are 3 Vietnamese cadre in each province--men who used to be political advisors with the RF and PF. Ironically, he says Vietnamese Government officials cannot believe his sources because they are not paid agents of the GVN. Partly as a consequence of this, the GVN has been slow to exploit what he calls "a new willingness on the part of the civilian population in III Corps to line up with the Government."
The ARVN is improving somewhat in III Corps, but the real change is in RF-PF performance--the first improvement he has seen in 7 years in Vietnam. He says the RF and PF can put a much higher percentage of riflemen in the field out of total strength than either the ARVN or U.S. military forces. And "men on the ground with rifles are more important in this war than artillery and air." RF and PF units in III Corps have just received their first shipment of M-16s, and he expects modern weapons to make a real difference in their performance.
Vann says General Abrams has started to master the "chief security problem in the area around Saigon--the chaotic organizational situation. Until now there have been a dozen separate commands, US and GVN, and cooperation between them has frequently been miserable. This is beginning to change." He is extremely high on Abrams, whom he says "is the first senior commander to cope with the GVN military situation."
Vann says the enemy exploited the two principal weaknesses in U.S. military tactics during the Tet offensive: our unwillingness to fight at night, and our reliance on air and artillery.
As to the first, he says almost all our night actions are close-in ambushes designed to protect our positions. Therefore the enemy has 12 hours every day to change his position, re-supply, and rest.
As to the second, he says our reluctance to use infantry has permitted the enemy to dig in and hold almost any position, since only direct hits by artillery or air can destroy him. The absence of infantry harassment has enabled him to move whole regiments into position to attack populated areas.
The one thing the enemy did not count on, says Vann, was that we would use air and artillery in populated areas. He has taken heavy losses in the cities, much heavier than he expected. We have also suffered psychological losses among the urban population through the use of air and artillery, but "to be ruthlessly candid about that, the people in the urban centers have no place to go; many are bitter, but they do not become assets for the enemy because the government controls the urban areas."
Vann believes we can start to withdraw some U.S. forces in the reasonably near future "without loss of over-all military effectiveness--indeed, with some gain. The size of our non-combat element is far too great. We ought to start rotating units through central base camps, instead of giving each unit a base of its own. The Vietnamese are getting much better, and they will get better still if we start to reduce the size of our presence in Vietnam."
The main purpose of his call was to say that "while we were ridiculously optimistic in the past, we may be dangerously pessimistic now. There has been a major decline in enemy fortunes in III Corps, at least, and the opportunity exists now for exploiting that decline and substantially improving our prospects."
Since Vann is a former Army Colonel who resigned in Vietnam back in the early 60's because he thought General Harkins was lying about the war, his present views are worth considering.
Harry C. McPherson, Jr./2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
291. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, July 3, 1968, 1411Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel--Paris Delto VII. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Received at 10:52 a.m. In an undated covering note to the President, Smith noted: "Harriman and Vance report on today's Tea Break exchange. Hanoi is linking halt in shelling of Saigon and release of three U.S. prisoners to our B-52 strikes north of the DMZ. North Vietnamese agreed to another private talk, possibly Friday." Additional discussion of the tea break is in telegram 17455/Delto 392 from Paris, July 3. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.) Reports on the July 3 formal session are in telegrams 17406/Delto 346 and 17408/Delto 376, both July 3. (Ibid.) Jorden's notes of this session are in the Johnson Library, William Jorden Papers, WJJ Notes.
17409/Delto 377. From Harriman and Vance. Subj: Tea break--11th session, July 3.
1. Tea break lasted for about 45 minutes.
2. Xuan Thuy and Lau met with us in a new room. Vy sat with Habib and Seignious. Bo and Le sat with Jorden and Kaplan. Hieu and two others sat with Holbrooke.
3. After Thuy's polite inquiry about wedding, I said I understood some talks took place while I was gone, and asked Thuy how he felt about them. Thuy said he had heard what took place at the meetings between Le and Jorden and Lau and Vance. He said he felt there was nothing new in these conversations. I said I felt there had been something new and that this should be explored in depth. I added that we do have certain new ideas which we would like to talk over. Thuy said he didn't think there was anything new--if it was new it was new in form and not in substance. Vance said he felt what we said the other night was new and the variation to which Governor Harriman had referred was new, but Thuy and Lau would have to judge for themselves after further discussion. We said we felt it best to arrange a second meeting between Vance and Lau outside Majestic. Thuy nodded affirmatively and Vance suggested that he and Lau arrange a mutually convenient date--perhaps Friday. We said the place we used last time was satisfactory and suitable for future conversations. Lau replied "Let us consider the date."
4. I then remarked that I had heard that Le Duc Tho had gone to Hanoi, stopping for talks in Moscow and Peking. I asked when he would return to Paris. Thuy said he would be in Hanoi for some time.
5. Thuy then said he felt meeting the other day was just a meeting for meeting's sake. Vance said he did not agree and that constructive proposals were put forward by us in an attempt to make progress. Thuy said "How? I am afraid they will lead us into deeper impasse." Vance said, "I hope not."
6. I then asked whether there was any significance to the fact that Saigon had not been shelled in past two weeks./2/ Thuy replied "It must have as now we have released prisoners. I think this is understandable to you." I asked if the two actions had the same significance and whether no shelling of Saigon would continue. Thuy replied "The rockets have stopped. What is your attitude?" I asked whether this was for political or military reasons. Thuy replied that it was hard to answer. He then said he must point out B-52 bombing around DMZ and Saigon. He said bombing around DMZ was of unprecedented intensity. Lau interjected "75 planes in and just north of DMZ." I stated bombing at DMZ was to counter NVA build-up. I then said if DRV intended to reduce military action around Saigon and DMZ that they should say so clearly.
/2/The VC had not shelled Saigon since June 18 and no South Vietnamese city had been shelled since June 21. However, B-52 bombardment of the area north of the DMZ and south of the 19th parallel, halted since May 9, had resumed on July 1.
7. Thuy said that means we can't settle this question because it returns to the principle of reciprocity. He said if we linger in this spot we will never solve this problem./3/
/3/Norwegian Ambassador to the PRC Ole Algard reported DRV Ambassador to the PRC Ngo Minh Loan's statement during a meeting in Peking that the DRV was prepared to enact measures of restraint in return for a complete bombing cessation and that "several of proposals which were set forth by Harriman in this connection will be further considered." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO)
8. Thuy said he agreed Vance and Lau should meet, but that they should think over carefully what they are going to say. Thuy said we know each other's position and now should go into ways of settling unconditional cessation of bombing.
9. I then said I wanted to express thanks for release of three pilots. I said the last time we released three North Vietnamese seamen and asked whether they would rather have more seamen released or some North Vietnamese officers. Thuy repeated in several different forms that release of pilots was not an exchange of POWs, and that DRV demanded return of their seamen who were illegally seized in DRV territorial waters. I replied I was not suggesting a POW exchange but was thinking about a reciprocal gesture that might be made by the U.S. Thuy declined further comment.
10. In conversation with Habib and Seignious, Vy said the North Vietnamese wanted very much to have peace. War was of no value to either side. Habib remarked that the private meeting between Ambassadors Vance and Lau, at which Vy was present, was a successful beginning for the kind of private discussion which we found useful. Vy said that they had found the Lau-Vance talks "very interesting." He agreed that it was desirable to continue the private talks. They were, however, looking for "something new" from us.
11. Vy said they would be interested in hearing more of the "contents" of what we propose. Habib said there was a good deal more to discuss and in a continuation of the private talks greater precision and presentation of details would be possible. Vy asked Habib to tell him what this would involve. Habib replied that such matters were worthy of discussion and precise presentation and that under the proper conditions of private talks this could be done. Vy said "we are waiting to hear from you" and added that they would honor the secret nature of the private talks. Habib replied that we were ready to talk further at any time and that he presumed that Governor Harriman was making this clear to Minister Thuy. The rest of this conversation was of a nonsubstantive nature.
Harriman
292. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
San Salvador, July 7, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. V(a), 7/68. Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum was transmitted as telegram SSWH 0007 from Rostow to Bromley Smith, July 7, with the request to forward it to both Paris and Saigon. (Ibid.) It was sent to Saigon as CAP 81557 to Bunker and to Paris as CAP 81558 to Harriman and Vance, both July 7. (Ibid.)
TEXT OF MEMORANDUM SENT PERSONAL
FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO
Under-Secretary Nicholas Katzenbach
Ambassador Harriman (Paris)
Ambassador Bunker (Saigon)
I have been following with attention and fascination the exchanges on the appropriate no-bombing formula.
May I offer a wholly personal commentary, as viewed from a San Antonio motel, Air Force One, and the Salvadorian Fraternity House from which I am now operating./2/
/2/Rostow stopped in Texas en route to the Organization of Central American States meeting at San Salvador, El Salvador, which began on July 5. The President left for El Salvador from the LBJ Ranch on July 6 and returned on July 8. He arrived back in Washington on July 10. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
At the risk of caricature it looks like this.
1. Saigon draws a wholly persuasive picture of political and psychological catastrophe brought on by a talk-and-fight strategy in which we permit attacks on Saigon-Danang-Hue at a time when there are no attacks on North Vietnam. Presumably VC-NVA personnel in South Vietnam plus infiltrators through Laos would permit this.
2. Washington and Paris--with somewhat different emphasis--appear to believe that a version of the Zorin formula involving a closing down of the DMZ would have political-psychological-military effects strongly to our (U.S.-GVN) net advantage.
3. In part the correct judgment depends on a military assessment of:
--infiltration capabilities through Laos under weather likely over next several months;
--our capability to defend Hue, Danang, and Saigon.
4. I suspect it is precisely this obviously delicate political-psychological-military equation Hanoi is now assessing.
5. It may be clarifying, therefore, to pose the issue to which the equation on both sides is addressed:
--can the constitutional Thieu government survive?
--can it be destroyed by a combination of enemy action and U.S. diplomacy?
All the serious evidence outside the formal Paris changes is addressed, after all, to the question of the future political structure of South Vietnam of which the latest Kapitsa-French conversations are only the latest example.
6. Therefore, I draw this tentative conclusion: The critical issue in judging whether an honorable peace is now possible is not the exact terms for a bombing cessation but whether Hanoi has come to the point where it will accept the Thieu Government as interlocutor on both a southern political settlement and such issues as DMZ, future of Vietnam, etc.
7. If this judgment is correct the key issue for discussion is the issue raised by the Paris interpretation of Zorin; that is, Hanoi's willingness to accept a your-side-our-side formula. I could easily be wrong at this distance, but my interpretation of Saigon's anxiety is much less Hanoi's military strength than it is U.S. and Hanoi negotiating the fate of South Vietnam and Southeast Asia.
8. This line of argument is obviously open to debate; but if it is right, it means that the GVN view of a no-bombing-for-DMZ deal would be one thing if the issue of GVN negotiating participation were settled satisfactorily: a quite different matter if the latter issue were still in contention--as it obviously now is.
9. I raise for your consideration then, the question of making central rather than peripheral Hanoi's willingness to discuss a settlement with the GVN, either directly or through a cut-out. If they say: "Yes," then the basis for peace may exist. If "No," then peace is still far off.
10. In short I believe, tentatively:
--we should probe the Paris negotiators and Moscow hard on the structure of future southern politics.
--we should elevate the relative priority we are establishing for your-side-our-side.
11. The question for Saigon is: How much is the problem military; how much solved if the GVN is in the middle of a negotiation.
12. The question for Washington and Paris is whether it would not be wiser to try to settle the future negotiating structure before or concurrently with the negotiation of a Stage I-Stage II package.
13. Seen from a distance this emphasis makes sense since the point of the enterprise is not to find a way to stop bombing but to find a way to an honorable peace.
14. I repeat: This is in no sense a formal White House message.
293. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 8, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Vietnam--W.W. Rostow. Top Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only for the President. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
As you know, there has been an extensive exchange of views between Washington-Paris-Saigon on our terms for a total bombing cessation. ("Washington", for these purposes, includes Nick Katzenbach, Bundy, Clifford, but not Rusk, and no definitive JCS position. Rusk has encouraged the exchange, but kept his freedom of action.)
Paris is pressing for us to respond to Soviet advice and table a proposal at the earliest private session. (Brom indicated this morning it could come this Friday.)/2/ And, in any case, the Delegation wishes to be equipped with definitive instructions on this key matter.
/2/July 12. Reference is to Bromley Smith.
(You should know Secretary Rusk is more reserved. He believes Hanoi is now considering where it goes from here; the other side has not yet accepted in principle the Zorin proposal as a framework for negotiation. Therefore, we should not hurry to lay out a detailed proposition.)
The purpose of this memo is to summarize the elements in the proposal that has been examined in these exchanges; and the areas of agreement and of debate. (I ordered all the exchanges typed up in a book for you, so that when you get to Washington the material will be available.) Secretary Rusk, General Taylor, and I may have views which differ even on some points otherwise agreed. I don't know the precise nature of Secretary Rusk's reservations; but I shall indicate General Taylor's views and mine, point-by-point.
I. Phase I
--U.S. agrees to cease bombing North Vietnam and "other activities" that involve the "use of force;" that is, excluding reconnaissance. (Agreed.)
--Prior to execution of above a clear mutual understanding will be reached on substance of Phase II. (Agreed.)
--A time interval would be accepted by U.S. between bombing execution of Phase II. (Washington proposed 3-4 days; Paris a week; when queried, Paris said Phase II actions might vary in time with respect to bombing cessation, within a week; Saigon not yet heard from on this point. Walt Rostow thinks 48 hours is sufficient to save Hanoi's face and the deal will be difficult to hold for longer than two days after total bombing cessation.)
--After some exchange, it now appears agreed that it will be difficult to deliver on a promise of "secrecy" on the deal. Therefore, while formally respecting the separation of the two stages in public statements, we should not make excessive promises to Hanoi on this point.
II. Phase II
--Restoration of the DMZ. No personnel or equipment in or moved through DMZ. (Agreed)
--Military Action near DMZ. No fire across DMZ or "massing of forces" on either side. (Agreed); but Abrams being asked what is operational meaning for our forces of "no massing".
--Military Restraints in the South. Washington proposes no "rocket, mortar, or sabotage" attacks on Saigon. Bunker wants no attacks of any kind on Saigon, Hue, Danang, arguing most dangerous psychological effects on GVN and ARVN of such attacks, with no bombing of the North. Taylor strongly agrees. Paris wants restraint on Saigon treated as "an assumption" and does not want to go beyond Saigon./3/
/3/According to notes of a July 8 telephone conversation with Vance, Katzenbach noted the following position of the Paris delegation: "They felt it was possible to try to get a commitment against indiscriminate acts against Saigon (not including major forces) although they thought it doubtful they could succeed. They did not think it feasible to raise the question of attacks against Hue and Danang." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-I Files: Lot 74 D 271, NK Chron 1968)
Washington also initially raised issue of whether, for purpose of symmetry (and to meet Zorin's proposal) we should undertake some symbolic restraint in the South to give the appearance of paying something (other than bombing cessation in North) for enemy's laying off Saigon. I believe consensus is now that each action, on each side, need not be matched: We are trying to negotiate a package as a whole.
--Infiltration Rate and Force Levels. Washington initially proposed that the U.S. and DRV keep forces at present levels and agree "not to increase military personnel in SVN" above level at time of bombing cessation. Also proposed: an initial "token withdrawal" on both sides, equal in size (about 5000 men); plus subsequent weekly withdrawals. Paris agreed, but said weekly withdrawals could be held for a later stage. Saigon said no withdrawals whatsoever in early stage of Phase II negotiations.
(As you see, we have shifted from infiltration rate to force levels. I'm sceptical that this is to our advantage because:
--Our force levels obvious; enemy's not. Enemy could cheat.
--Our infiltration intelligence has been recently better than order of battle.
--Infiltration rate determines the intensity with which enemy can sustain fighting; if we leave order of battle fixed, and no limit on infiltration, he could run an intense fight-and-talk strategy. If infiltration limited, his fighting capacity limited. But this is a military matter and you will wish to know JCS and Abrams' views.
--Laos. After initially considering an interim proposal to freeze Laos activities on both sides at present levels, consensus appears emerging that we should insist strongly that a Laos settlement, on basis Geneva Accords of 1962, is essential to a final agreement but we do not overload Phase II negotiations, at early stage, with Laos issue; that is, infiltration and bombing of Laos would continue.
--Prisoners of War. After some thought it is pretty generally agreed we should not introduce the question of U.S. prisoners of war into the actions that accompany bombing cessation and opening of Phase II.
--Agreements in Principle on Elements in an Ultimate Settlement. There is an interesting difference between Paris and Washington on Zorin's rather fuzzy suggestion that we should negotiate something about subsequent talks before the bombing stops.
A. Washington thought he referred to the items that should comprise the substance of a settlement.
B. Paris thought he referred to the structure of talks and how Saigon and the NLF could be introduced into the talks.
There is no great problem about A, although Saigon has sought to assure that post-war supervision of agreements and post-war rehabilitation be included.
B, in my judgment, may turn out to be the critical issue; that is, whether and when Hanoi agrees to GVN participation in the talks--on a your-side-our-side basis or some other basis, for example, secret bilaterals. We're in a precarious position up to that point, especially if bombing of the North has totally stopped. Once Hanoi recognizes the GVN as a legitimate interlocutor, things could move fast.
In any case, it is agreed the key elements in a final settlement, which we could lay on the table before bombing stops, look something like this:
--Mutual withdrawal of NVN and Allied forces (Manila);
--Internal political structure of South Vietnam decided by South Vietnamese in free choice;
--Full compliance 1962 Laos Accords;
--Both sides respect neutrality of Cambodia;
--Effective international supervision of agreements;
--Post-war rehabilitation.
III. The Paris-Saigon Compromise
After one round of detailed exchanges, Paris and Saigon came in with hard-core proposals that were pretty close.
Paris said it should try to negotiate for Phase II.
--DMZ;
--No attacks on Saigon;
--Fix force levels;
--Your-side-our-side for negotiations in Phase II.
Saigon wanted:
--DMZ;
--No attacks on Hue, Danang, and Saigon;
--Reduced level of infiltration.
Saigon has not yet indicated the priority it places on negotiating your-side-our-side before the bombing ceases; but wishes us to "probe" Hanoi on this point.
Right now the issues appear to be:
--Saigon OR Saigon, Hue, and Danang.
--The priority we attach to prior agreement on GVN role in Phase II talks, before bombing stops.
IV. The Taylor Warning
General Taylor feels strongly that there should be a general statement made to the Hanoi negotiators in working out Phase I and Phase II that our no-bombing position is generally contingent on their not improving their military position. He says: "They must never think that we will never again resort to the sanction of bombing."
(I would add an observation to Hanoi and the Soviets along the lines of my comment to Kopytin, the TASS-KGB man who came in for a chat;/4/ namely, that once bombing totally stops, it is extremely important that there be prompt forward movement on substantive issues. An intense talk-and-fight strategy, with no substantive progress, and no bombing of the North could create very serious problems for Saigon and for us in the United States. The San Antonio phrase "productive" still matters.)
/4/Aleksandr Kopytin.
V. A General Observation
Thus far Hanoi has conducted itself:
--with no commitment to the Zorin framework for negotiation;
--no willingness to recognize the GVN as a legitimate interlocutor;
--no commitment to honor the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.
In trying to negotiate a measure of mutual military de-escalation, we are, therefore, flying blind.
We have no real knowledge of Hanoi's basic intention:
--To seek military and political advantage, by embarrassing our relations with Saigon;
--Or to save face on the bombing of the North and try to negotiate an early peace.
Until we have a better sense of Hanoi's intentions, we should proceed cautiously, paying great attention to Bunker's anxieties about Thieu's position. That is why I regard Hanoi's acceptance of the GVN into the negotiation as so critical.
VI. Schedule
As I understand a double-talked conversation with Brom Smith this morning the schedule is as follows:
Tuesday: A meeting chaired by Secretary Rusk to prepare for the President a statement of the consensus plus a statement of key differences, if any, and issues for the President's decision./5/
/5/The meeting chaired by Rusk was held in the Secretary's Conference Room from 4:32 to 6:18 p.m. the next day. Those in attendance were Rusk, Rostow, Helms, Clifford, Nitze, Warnke, Wheeler, Taylor, Ball, Katzenbach, Bundy, and Read. (Johnson Library, Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968-1969) Notes of this meeting have not been found, but it is summarized in a memorandum to the President from Rostow, July 9, 7 p.m. In this memorandum, Rostow noted that Rusk and the assembled group had decided to instruct Harriman and Vance to determine whether the North Vietnamese would set a date for the next private session at which examples inherent to the two-phase proposal would be presented. (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, Vol. 87)
Wednesday: Meeting with the President and dispatch of instructions to Paris./6/
/6/From 1:32 to 3 p.m., the President met with Rostow, Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Taylor, Helms, Christian, and Tom Johnson. The agenda items were "NATO, Vietnam and Paris Talks." (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Notes of the meeting have not been found. Prior to this meeting, the President met from 12:10 p.m. to 1:15 p.m. with the full Cabinet and several staff assistants in order to review a number of issues, including a "report on military situation in Vietnam." (Ibid.) In his briefing, Clifford noted that the NVA had pulled back to regroup north of I Corps and rendered the following assessment: "We believe that the reason that they are not engaging in combat now is that conditions do not suit them and they are preparing for a summer offensive." The full transcript of this meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
Friday: An informal Paris meeting, I think./7/
/7/Vance and Lau did not meet privately on July 12. During the tea break at the formal session on July 10, the primary topics of conversation were the U.S. elections and the intensified bombing ongoing since July 1. Reports of the formal session are in telegrams 17730/Delto 418 and 17748/Delto 425 from Paris, both July 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.)
Walt Rostow
294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, July 10, 1968, 2327Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Todel Chron. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Rostow and Jeanne Davis of S/S, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance.
199837. Saigon deliver by hand to Ambassador from Secretary.
1. Highest levels wish you to convey to Thieu following thoughts concerning Honolulu meeting:
a. President hopes that entire focus of meeting will be on direct personal encounters between himself and Thieu. He would like to have Thieu explain frankly what he sees as key problems now and into the future. Then, if staff work is required to move toward best answers on these problems, matter would be referred to staffs. But entire emphasis would be on smallest possible groups at all times and on private and direct exchanges between President and Thieu.
b. It would help if you could elicit from Thieu kind of key problems he would hope frankly to discuss with President in this manner.
c. The President understands that Thieu has suggested Harriman or Vance come to Honolulu (this came to us today through Bui Diem). However, President's feeling is that this might create undesirable impressions (a) of US/GVN crisis about Paris talks, and/or (b) of impending breakpoint in Paris talks, and would therefore strongly prefer that I be prepared to handle all matters relating to details of Paris talks. (For Paris: President would entertain possibility of quick trip to Washington by Harriman or Vance prior to departure if developments made this desirable.)
d. In line with above concept, President expects to have absolute minimum staff accompanying--specifically, myself, Secretary Clifford, General Wheeler, Rostow, and Bundy. He would therefore suggest Thieu staff be on similar lines--i.e., unless economic problems are in fact among the key ones Thieu wishes to discuss, Economic Minister might be omitted, and the same for General Lac./2/ We leave it to you to judge how to make this point, and perhaps it would best follow your discussion of what the key topics would be.
/2/Economic Minister Au Ngoc Ho and Brigadier General Hoang Van Lac, Deputy Minister of Revolutionary Development.
2. From your own mission, President would appreciate your recommendations on the basis of the smallest number that can do the job. General Wheeler is cabling Abrams directly to express President's concern about his being absent from Saigon, plus the feeling that the Clifford visit should bring back a fairly clear picture of the military situation and problems in any case. We assume you would wish some appropriate member of your political staff and would appreciate your recommendation whether Bob Komer should come--which may take you right back to what the central problems will be. But this is the kind of minimum size the President has in mind.
3. On Thieu's transportation, President hopes that you can move him in the direction of a PanAm charter such as he previously contemplated. If he should suggest our providing an aircraft, please let us know.
Rusk
295. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 12, 1968, 4:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Kosygin [3]. Secret. A notation on the memorandum by the President reads: "Walt--Call me Monday about this. L."
Mr. President:
I set out the following idea not because I believe it to be correct nor because I recommend it; merely because I think you should have available all the options of which we can conceive.
1. I begin with the fact that both Tommy Thompson and Chip Bohlen feel a certain regret that we did not pick up Kosygin's message,/2/ institute a total bombing halt, and then lean very heavily on the Soviet Union to produce results, against the background of a threat to resume bombing if the results did not take place. As old Soviet hands they are impressed that Kosygin should have used the following language in addressing you: "My colleagues and I think--and we have grounds to do so--that complete cessation by the United States of bombing and other acts of war with respect to the DRV could contribute to a breakthrough in the situation and produce prospects for a peaceful settlement."
/2/Attachment to Document 262.
2. The fact is that since June 5 the over-all level of combat in South Vietnam has greatly diminished and the shelling of Saigon has ceased.
3. But also we have every reason to expect in August--if not earlier--a major offensive in I Corps and against Saigon.
4. The idea would be for Sect. Rusk to tell Dobrynin or Tommy to tell Kosygin that:
--We note the de-escalation in the actual fighting in South Vietnam in recent weeks;
--We note the cessation of shelling of Saigon;
--We are prepared to stop bombing on Day X;
--It is, of course, essential after the bombing cessation:
--that this low level continue;
--that Saigon not be attacked;
--that we move promptly to a reinstallation of the DMZ;
--that the U.S. and Soviet Union discuss the reinstallation of the Geneva Accords of 1962 (Dobrynin told Sect. Rusk flatly this would be possible after a bombing cessation);
--and, as Chairman Kosygin told the President, that he and his colleagues had grounds to believe that the DRV would move rapidly towards a "peaceful settlement."
5. Before actually instituting a bombing cessation, we would require from the Soviet Union some broad understanding along these lines.
6. This is pretty high-risk poker; and the case is good for waiting to see if in fact Hanoi responds directly to the Zorin suggestion. But the fact is that the Kosygin letter gives us an opening for this gambit if you should decide you would like to force the issue./3/
/3/Rostow attached this memorandum to a memorandum he sent to the President on June 14. In the June 14 memorandum, Rostow noted the risks inherent in the approach through Moscow: relations with the Soviets could be damaged if they failed to secure North Vietnamese compliance and bombing had to resume, a stoppage followed by a resumption would have severe domestic political ramifications, and the possibility that the United States might not respond if, regardless of a cessation, the North Vietnamese attacked Saigon anyway. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Kosygin [3]) Attached to this memorandum was the text of a draft message to Kosygin laying out the operative details of this proposal. There is no indication of its transmittal to Kosygin.
Walt
296. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 266--Vietnam. Secret. Sent to Rostow with copies to Katzenbach and Nitze. In the attached covering memorandum transmitting a copy of the paper to Helms, July 12, William Nelson, Chief of CIA's Far East Division, wrote: "This memorandum responds to a request from the Director of Central Intelligence to Chief, Far East Division for a briefing paper on the above subject for passage to the Secretary of State and other senior government officials." In a separate attached covering note transmitting a copy of the paper to Rusk, July 15, Helms wrote: "Here is the report on Agency efforts to induce defections in South Vietnam. This is in response to your request of me some days ago. It is clear from paragraph 11 that additional organizational work needs to be done in Saigon inside the American community. You might want to raise this as an item in Honolulu." In another attached covering note transmitting a copy of the paper to Rostow, July 15, Helms wrote: "Secretary Rusk asked me for the attached report and I have sent him the original. In my note covering this paper, I have suggested to Secretary Rusk that he may want to raise the organizational problem outlined in paragraph 11 with appropriate individuals in Honolulu later this week." A notation on this covering note reads: "Identical notes with Xerox to: Katzenbach and Nitze."
SUBJECT
CIA Programs to Induce Desertions and Defections in South Vietnam
1. CIA conducts unilaterally or in cooperation with other agencies in Vietnam a wide gamut of defector inducement programs which range from the pin-pointed approach to high-level VC cadre to broad propaganda appeals to enemy troops of all categories.
Inducement of Desertions
2. CIA and MACV jointly conduct a sizable program designed to induce desertion by VC and NVA soldiers. Through black radio and leaflets continuing efforts are made to lower the morale of the individual enemy soldier to the point where he realizes the futility of his situation and begins to seek an alternative to inevitable death. Radio and leaflet output emphasizes the endless sacrifice these soldiers are required to make the awesome fire power they must face and the heavy casualties their units endure. The privation caused by lack of sufficient food and medicine, the dissension between Northerner and Southerner, the failure of the people of South Vietnam to support them except when forced to do so, and the failures and inadequacies of their own command and support structure are additional themes. Publicity is given to defections, particularly those involving high ranking officers and groups, and defectors are used in a variety of ways to attempt to induce the defection of their comrades.
Rewards Program
3. The Station has also worked closely with MACV in the development of a program of awards utilized by both U.S. forces and the GVN to encourage defectors and to obtain information leading to the capture of VC/NVA leaders. Under the code name Born Free, a comprehensive program of rewards has been instituted to encourage defectors and stimulate the flow of voluntary information. Other programs providing related incentives include awards to ralliers for weapons turned in and monetary awards to RD cadre for capture of VC. The GVN Ministry of the Interior has a pacification fund separate from the Chieu Hoi Program which provides rewards for capturing or killing VC cadre.
Contributions of Phoenix
4. The Phoenix Program,/2/ formerly called ICEX (Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation), has now expanded sufficiently to permit its district centers scattered throughout South Vietnam to proceed with some effectiveness in the defection field. The following order of priority has been established: Defection in place, inducement to rally, capture, destruction of infrastructure elements. In some areas the Phoenix Program has progressed to the point where the province Phoenix representative [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] selects a province level VC political or military leader of significant stature for concentrated attention to achieve his neutralization according to the foregoing order of priorities. This is designed to supplement the day-to-day endeavor to capitalize on intelligence to eliminate the infrastructure. The recent capture of Col. Le Van Ngot in III Corps is an example of an effective PRU operation utilizing the intelligence resources available through Phoenix.
/2/"Phoenix" referred specifically to U.S. activities in support of the anti-Viet Cong infrastructure plan while comparable South Vietnamese activities were known as "Phung Hoang." The South Vietnamese program received Thieu's public endorsement in Decree No. 280-a/TT/SL, July 1, which established the Phung Hoang program as part of a general campaign to accelerate the pacification of the rural areas of South Vietnam. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/ISG Files, Job 77-186, Phoenix--GVN Decrees and Directives) Status reports by the CIA Station in Saigon are ibid., Phoenix--Progress Reports, 1967, 1968, 1969. Additional indications of progress in this program are in MACV's periodic reports in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 472, Records of the U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia, HQ MACV-CORDS, Phung Hoang Directorate, General Records, 1967-1971, 1601-9A, Phoenix Newsletters.
Operational Support
5. In addition to operational endeavors, the intelligence capabilities of the CIA Station provide a steady flow of useful information and analysis which is utilized by the various components involved in the inducement of deserters and defectors. For example, the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] National Interrogation Center (NIC) provides a considerable volume of comment from prisoners and ralliers concerning the effectiveness of radio and leaflet operations. This data provides insights useful for refining the content of these psychological operations to increase their effectiveness. The Station has provided a variety of papers on the character and life of the NVA soldier in South Vietnam and on his strengths and vulnerabilities which have been used in the planning of psychological operations.
Precise Targeting of Prospective Defectors
6. [10-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Exploitation of High Level Defectors
7. The intense military pressures on VC and NVA military units resulting in part from changed and more aggressive enemy military operations has created new operational opportunities and a somewhat increased flow of higher level military defectors. The use of a recent defector, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] provides insight into methods for exploiting successes to achieve further success. [5 lines of source text not declassified] around South Vietnam, and newsmen have been given access to him for in-depth interviews.
[heading and 1 paragraph (11 lines of source text) not declassified]
Intelligence Operations
9. In 1966, the CIA Station revamped its program to gain access for intelligence purposes to strategic level leadership in the VC and to encourage defections from that leadership. Since that time, our efforts have resulted in vastly expanding CIA knowledge of the top enemy leadership. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Enemy Response
10. The variety and extent of these various programs resulted in 1967 in counter-action by enemy forces to reduce the desertion rate through more stringent controls over their personnel and through intensified political indoctrination. One cause for the drop in Chieu Hoi rate in late 1967 appears to have been this enemy effort for greater indoctrination and tighter control.
Problems and Proposals
11. Although the various programs to induce defections and desertions are extensive, there remain many opportunities for improvement both in organization and tactics. The complexity of the problem creates difficulties in organization and coordination which are not currently adequately met by existing procedures. Two mission council committees have responsibilities relating to this problem. One group, the Psychological Operations Committee (chaired by the JUSPAO director) has not met for a year. The Prisoners and Detainees Committee confines itself almost exclusively to U.S. POW problems. An ad hoc psychological operations committee, consisting of representatives from the Embassy, MACV, JUSPAO and CIA has been useful in discussing the exploitation of specific opportunities [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. It would appear desirable to establish a Vietnamese-American working group to concentrate on defection inducement and to insure that appropriate techniques and procedures for handling high level ralliers are developed. There is a continuing problem in insuring that new techniques in this field are reported to all echelons for implementation (a problem complicated by the rapid turnover in personnel). Various opportunities for action in this field by the GVN have not been aggressively exploited. President Thieu, for example, could give personal publicity to recent ralliers and could increase public attention and GVN support for the National Reconciliation Program by establishing a "Council on National Reconciliation". Opportunities available to enemy cadres who rally need to be publicized more vigorously since, despite considerable effort, recent evidence indicates that enemy personnel are not well-informed concerning these programs. Enemy indoctrination to the effect that capture will result in torture and death is apparently effective and must be neutralized not only by counter-propaganda but by practical improvements in GVN structure and practices to eliminate excesses which substantiate this indoctrination. CIA has cooperated in an effort to develop more systematic procedures for processing and adjudicating prisoners as one effort to this end.
Summary
12. In summary, the CIA contribution to defector and deserter inducement falls into two broad areas: (1) a selective effort organized and implemented essentially by CIA to induce individual high level defectors, and (2) a broad variety of actions to support programs of other agencies in this field. Problems of coordination and management exist to some degree on the American side but there is a continuing and intensive search for new ideas and operational initiatives which is achieving some success. On the GVN side, at senior levels, there is a pattern of apathy and some opposition to programs which involve acceptance of enemy personnel back into the Vietnamese community without retribution. On lower levels there in a spotty but in general a cooperative attitude in pushing the various programs forward.
297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France and the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, July 13, 1968, 1807Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-July 1968. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Drafted by Katzenbach and Rusk, cleared by Rostow and John Walsh (S/S), and approved by Rusk. An analysis of this telegram is in a July 12 memorandum from Rostow to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. V(b) 7/68) At the end of Rostow's memorandum, the President wrote: "Vance is cleared for Tuesday return." Vance returned to Washington on July 16.
202032/Todel 676. Ref: Paris 17843; State 199838./2/ Personal for Harriman and Vance from the Secretary.
/2/In telegram 17843 from Paris, July 11, Harriman and Vance noted: "If we wish to determine whether the North Vietnamese are seriously interested in the formula, we should be prepared if necessary to lay it out for them in full. So that they understand its implications." They therefore recommended that their instructions "be modified to allow Vance to go as far circumstances warrant to expose Phase 1-Phase 2 proposals." They wanted to limit the term "indiscriminate attacks" to include only rocketing and shelling of cities but not the use of mines, explosives, and personnel to implement these attacks as the Department wanted. In addition, they proposed a proscription of any alteration of the composition of military units, suggested a "token withdrawal" of troops from each side, and recommended that no set agenda items be listed for the expanded talks. (Ibid.) In telegram 199838 to Paris, July 10, the Department transmitted to the delegation instructions for their private meeting with the North Vietnamese on July 15. (Ibid.)
1. The President and I believe that certain shades of difference which appear in reference cables could be reduced by a fuller exposition of what is really on our minds.
2. We see little evidence that the Hanoi delegation is prepared seriously to discuss other factors on which there must be an understanding before there is a complete cessation of the bombing. Their delegation may be awaiting the return of Le Duc Tho, they may be awaiting the results of the new offensive which they clearly seem to be preparing, they may be marking time for political developments in the United States, or they may feel that they are under no pressure to get going. Chairman Kosygin just recently wrote Prime Minister Gandhi pressing the point that we stop all of the bombing before anything else could be done and asked her to press this upon the United States. What the Soviets are doing behind the scenes, we just do not know clearly. There has been no further answer to the President's message to Kosygin on this subject.
3. Under these circumstances we are reluctant to make a full and detailed exposition of our views until it is quite clear that Hanoi is prepared to sit down and seriously discuss the problem on a two-way basis. Otherwise, there would be nothing more than a unilateral exposition to someone who is not really listening. It would put Hanoi in a position to make our views public at any time and in such a way as to inject questions of detail into public debate in this country and to stimulate fears and suspicions among the South Vietnamese and other Asian allies.
4. It seems to me that the question is basically one of timing. I would think that you have plenty to talk about in your Monday private meeting within the framework of State's 199838. You could begin with a discussion of the concept of the Phase One-Phase Two approach. If they reject this in principle at the outset, this could be pursued at some length on the basis that it is an attempt on our part to meet their problem--namely, to prepare the way for a stopping of the bombing by the United States as a first step. If they seem sufficiently interested as to want a sample of what you are talking about, you could go into the DMZ point in considerable detail. At the same time, you could mention the other topics as a sort of agenda for a further discussion of the Phase One-Phase Two concept. It would of course be of great value if you could elicit from them their thoughts on topics Phase Two would have to take into account.
5. It seems to me that State's 199838 gives you plenty of ammunition for your next private meeting, pending Vance's return on Tuesday/3/ for further detailed discussion here.
/3/July 16.
6. On your specific question as to whether you are authorized by State's 199838 to put down a complete package, you should not put down what purports to be a complete package until you and we have resolved such questions as the withdrawal of forces by both sides from South Viet-Nam and the broad questions referred to in Paragraph 13. As indicated above, you are authorized to explore the concept of Phase One-Phase Two fully, explore the DMZ in great detail, and indicate more generally the other topics that you would wish to explore further. It seems to me that this is in itself more than you can possibly cover in a single meeting.
7. "Indiscriminate attacks" certainly include rocketing and shelling of cities and should include other acts primarily designed for terroristic purposes. We think this should ordinarily include mines and explosive devices used for such purposes and certainly could include use of NVA/VC personnel on the ground in indiscriminate attacks primarily for political purposes. You should use above as illustrative in order to probe any DRV reactions. We would like to get as much as we can in this connection.
8. Military experts here are concerned that prohibition against alteration and composition of military units could raise technical problems for both sides. It appears to give a certainty and security which is more apparent than real since it is possible to attach large numbers of additional troops to existing units. In any event, it is scarcely necessary for you to make this an initial proposal. If they are interested, we can negotiate the details subsequently.
9. You need not include proposals with respect to complete withdrawal by each government of its forces from SVN. We think it may interest the other side and you may raise it if as a result of your discussions this appears to you useful. The principle is obviously an important one and should be of considerable interest to the North Vietnamese but we leave timing to your discretion. We continue to have under consideration your proposal with respect to token withdrawals and appreciate the argumentation you have provided. We are not, however, persuaded this should be an initial proposal on our part but are wont to believe it should await evidence of their seriousness with respect to Phase One-Phase Two proposal. If there is evidence of willingness to negotiate on this basis we will reconsider your recommendation.
10. You need not raise the broad matters contained in Paragraph 13 of our Reftel. These are discretionary with you and were intended to be responsive to a point in Zorin's original suggestions on which you reported he "attached considerable importance" (Paris 17226 7.13 Delto 361)./4/
/4/Document 286.
Rusk
298. Telegram From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Saigon, July 15, 1968, 1745Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 88. Secret. In a covering note transmitting a copy of the telegram to the President, July 15, 5:35 p.m., Rostow wrote: "This back channel message from Bunker on how Thieu is building a big national political party will interest you. He's learning; but the party has a long way to go." The notation "ps" on the covering note indicates that the President saw the telegram. It was re-transmitted as telegram 32844 from Saigon, July 17. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 13 VIET S)
CAS 5314. Pass following message "eyes only" from Amb Bunker to SecState and Mr. Walt Rostow. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] please pass to Harriman, Vance and Habib. Subject: Thieu on political party formation and financing.
1. Berger and I had a long and very satisfactory talk with Thieu after dinner at the residence on July 13 on how he visualized the problems of building political support for his government and what his plans were. I introduced the subject by referring to our previous conversation on this some months ago.
2. He said he had worked from behind the scenes to encourage the foundation of Lien Minh (National Alliance for Social Revolution), an alliance of nationalist elements. After it was surfaced he had addressed it on July 4 at the headquarters of the CVT, and he was continuing to work quietly with its leaders.
3. Its three main components were the Free Democratic Forces, headed by Nguyn Van Huong; the Farmer-Worker Association (a CVT-Hoa Hao amalgam) led by Tran Quoc Buu, head of the CVT,/2/ and the National Salvation Front, under Senator (ex-General) Tran Van Don. The first two had cadres in Saigon and in the country running into some thousands, allegedly 30,000 in the case of the CVT. Senator Don had no real organization, but he had many friends, and his extraordinary personality and energy, his capacity for leadership and his political sense made him an important influence. The Front of All Religions had not joined, but were not unfriendly and were watching how the Lien Minh developed.
/2/In telegram 32032 from Saigon, July 8, Bunker reported a discussion he had with Thieu 2 days before, in which Thieu noted the support of Tran Quoc Buu's CVT for the Lien Minh. (Ibid.)
4. It was not a real political party or organization at the present time, but a loose alliance of groups and people, all of them saw the need to develop a political party, once peace was established, when it was essential that there be a united political party to compete against the Communists when the struggle was transferred to the political arena. It was impossible to form such a party now; there were too many suspicions, jealousies and divisions./3/
/3/Cleavage between Thieu and Ky surfaced during the early part of the summer. In telegram 188955 to Saigon, June 22, the Department predicted: "If Thieu-Ky relationship continues in its present state, we foresee serious potential problems. Based on past experience with such crises, various elements within Vietnamese body politic will begin to choose sides and make open confrontation almost inevitable. Members of the National Assembly will probably react in this predictable way, as well as Buddhists and northern refugee Catholics. Situation could develop to the point where Thieu or Ky (or both) would have to go." (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S)
5. How, he asked rhetorically, can such a loose alliance be converted into a political party with support in the cities and in the countryside? If it was built now as an organization in support of him, or even his government, it would fail--the people were deeply suspicious of personal or government parties. Lien Minh was conceived as a organization to help save the nation. He had therefore decided that the component elements should be encouraged to develop actual projects and programs of help to the people. It could be done by the component elements in the name of Lien Minh, and he and the government would financially assist these projects and programs. He had asked the Lien Minh leaders to supply him with such a program by the time he returns from Honolulu.
6. The Farmer-Worker Association already had programs and projects and could easily expand them, especially in the cities. In addition there were many idealistic and patriotic individuals and small groups in the country who were doing something already, and these could be financed if they would come in under the umbrella of Lien Minh. He mentioned a pharmacist who had organized a large group of students for work among the refugees, but who was running out of money, as a sample of the kind of element that he expected might come into Lien Minh if he could find the finances for them.
7. All of this will require money, and a good deal of it, and obviously he could not supply funds on the scale required. Thieu therefore conceived of solving this problem in two ways. He needed a comparatively small amount of confidential funds to supply Lien Minh and its component leaders to help them develop cadres for Lien Minh. These would be the future national and local leadership. The very much larger funds for the projects would be openly available, publicly accountable, and come out of Revolutionary Development funds. The Lien Minh projects would be performed on behalf of the Revolutionary Development program./4/ He hoped we would be able to help in both ways.
/4/In a July 31 memorandum to Bunker, Komer noted that Thieu's call to apply Lien Minh political influence to RD projects would also help that organization. "By funneling support to worthwhile projects requested by public assemblies, the government could build up Lien Minh as an influential group which brings home the bacon." (U.S. Army Center for Military History, DepCORDS/MACV Files, 104--RD Planning: 1967-1968)
8. I asked if he was getting any private funds from business men. He said a little, but not enough. If Lien Minh got off the ground and began to show itself as a success he could get more from that source, but never enough for the needs.
9. Berger asked how he intended to avoid the charge of favoring one leader over another in Lien Minh, in the distribution of confidential funds, adding there was already a suspicion that he regarded the Free Democratic Forces and Nguyen Van Huong as his preferred instrument for political action. He said this was a real problem--he called it "the problem of maintaining an equilibrium"--and it would require his personal attention and effort, and also would involve him personally in the division of the confidential funds.
10. Thieu said he did not intend to supply large funds at the outset--it would only risk the danger that the fund would be pocketed by too many people. He would dole it out for say, three months, and then see how much had been done and who was producing results. He thought it would take six to nine months before one could tell whether Lien Minh would prove a viable and vital organization. If it showed it was going to be a success, he expected that the "satellite" organizations--Hoa Hao, Cao Dai and others--would want to join in order to get help for the Revolutionary Development projects. The Buddhists and Catholics were divided but he expected some of them too would want to associate themselves with Lien Minh.
11. In response to a query he said he thought the upper and lower houses would fall in line in support of Lien Minh if it proved a success. Already he had good support in both houses and new and more unified blocs were being formed in both houses in support of the government. At some stage, he hoped Lien Minh would evolve as a political party, or more accurately a political coalition, but it would be in support of his government, not of him personally. He referred to the mistake of Diem, who built Can Lao as a personal political party, and said he did not intend to repeat Diem's mistake.
12. Berger, who was as fascinated as I was by this exposition, asked where he learned his politics. "In the school of hard experience," he said with a smile.
13. I told Thieu that, as I had earlier indicated, we were ready to help, and we could talk further after Honolulu when the program for Lien Minh was further developed. He expressed his appreciation.
14. Comments: Thieu's conceptions and plans are, in many essential aspects, very close to our thinking. We had not thought of the concept of getting the component organizations of Lien Minh to work on proj-ects under the Revolutionary Development program, and I regard this as a very imaginative conception. He needs financial help, and we can supply it through confidential means, and/or arrange for it openly through the Revolutionary Development funds. He and I agreed that we must keep clear of Lien Minh and not suffocate it with our attention or caresses. There are obviously many problems. All we have at the moment is a conception and the mere skeleton of an organization. Thieu has a certain reserve about whether it will succeed. I regard that as healthy and agree that it is too early to have a solid judgment on its longer-run future, since this will depend on many factors that are largely unknown now./5/
/5/Bunker reported positive appraisals of Thieu's establishment of the Lien Minh in his weekly messages transmitted in telegrams 31757 from Saigon, July 4, and 32385 from Saigon, July 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
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