Docs 299-318
July 16-August 31: The Lull in Fighting, the U.S.-South Vietnamese Conference at Honolulu, and the Third Enemy Offensive
299. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, July 16, 1968, 0228Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Received at 12:13 a.m.
18012/Delto 458. From Vance.
1. I had my second meeting with Lau evening July 15. We met for two and one half hours at same location as first meeting./2/ The same persons participated on both sides.
/2/See Document 285.
2. We began by saying we were glad to meet again; it is through this type of private discussion we can explore our respective views and perhaps overcome the obstacles presently facing us, and thus make progress towards a peaceful settlement. We asked Lau for any observations he might wish to make. Lau replied that he had reexamined what we had told him at our first private meeting and had tried to find matters to which the DRV could give further consideration, but thus far he had found nothing new. Lau then recalled that at our tea session last Wednesday/3/ we had said we wanted to meet again, and had something to tell them. Thus, perhaps, we should be the first to speak.
/3/July 10. See footnote 7, Document 293.
3. We then said we had some new thoughts or variations of our prior proposal. We said it was important that there be no misunderstanding between us and it was essential that we both have clearly in mind the concept that we are now suggesting. We then outlined the concept: the US is prepared to stop the bombing of NVN on a specified date, without demanding reciprocal actions, if we can reach an understanding on the mutually-related actions which each of us would take after the cessation of bombing. In effect this means that we envisage two separate and distinct phases; the time interval between the two phases should be as short as possible. Before we actually cease the bombing we would need to have a clear understanding of what would happen in the second phase. The second phase actions would include appropriate measures by both sides.
4. We then described this suggestion graphically, drawing a sketch with two phases, a line between them, and two parallel columns--one headed US and the other DRV--for the actions to be taken by both sides in Phase 2. We wrote in four numbers under each column but did not put in any headings. We wrote in under Phase 1 of the outline that on a specified date the US would cease all air, naval and artillery bombardment and all other activities that involve the use of force on or within the territory of the DRV.
5. At this point we paused and asked him if he understood the proposal and if he found the formula acceptable in principle. He replied that he understood the proposal but wished to know what kind of actions we had in mind in Phase 2. We said that under Phase 2 there were the following headings: (A) Restore the DMZ; (B) No increase in US or DRV force levels in SVN after the cessation of bombing; (At this point Lau interjected asking what the word "level" means. We replied that it meant strength. Vy then gave an example which reflected clear understanding of the proposal.); (C) Substantive discussions to commence as soon as the bombing stops, with either side free to raise any topic relevant to a peaceful settlement; (D) In the discussions described in point (C) above, our side would include representatives of the GVN and the DRV side could include whomever they wished; (E) No indiscriminate attacks on population centers such as Saigon, Danang and Hue; (F) We would be willing to consider other actions of a similar nature which were relevant and which the DRV might want to raise.
6. We asked Lau's views with respect to our suggestion. Lau asked when the items listed in Phase 2 would be discussed. We replied right now. Lau then said that means before the cessation of bombing. Lau then asked if the items in Phase 2 were to be implemented after the completion of Phase 1. We replied yes and in the shortest time possible after the cessation of bombing, although the time interval might vary with the particular item under discussion. Lau then asked what we meant by the shortest possible time. We said this was a matter we would have to discuss. Some of the actions involved are possible to implement promptly. Others might take more time, but timing would be a matter for further discussion.
7. Vy asked for the specifics of what we had in mind with respect to restoration of the DMZ. We said it would involve (A) The restoration of the DMZ in the full sense of the Geneva Accords; i.e., no military personnel or equipment of any sort would be located in or moved through the DMZ; (B) Both sides would invite the ICC to reestablish an enlarged presence in the DMZ to inspect and verify compliance with its restoration; (C) Both sides would refrain from artillery or other fire from or across the DMZ and from any massing of forces on either side of the DMZ in such a way as to constitute a direct threat to the other. We said that this proposal would be a measure of mutual de-escalation without prejudice to any political settlement. We added that we are not proposing that the 17th parallel be made a permanent border excluding reunification.
8. Lau then said he had some preliminary remarks. At the previous meeting we had said that the US would fix the date for the cessation of bombing and prior to that both sides would discuss the circumstances leading to such cessation. Lau had asked what were the circumstances, and we had replied in a way similar to today. At our last private meeting Lau had also asked whether the US would cease the bombing in the event that no agreement could be reached on the circumstances, and we had said no. Lau had characterized this as tantamount to reciprocity, a concept which has been rejected on numerous occasions by the DRV. Today, Lau said, our proposal is more systematic and orderly, but presents nothing new in comparison with the last time. Today we mentioned Phases 1 and 2, and the shortest possible interval between the two phases, but it seemed to Lau that Phase 1 continues to depend on the discussion of what will happen in Phase 2. Lau then repeated his questions, asking what would happen if we do not agree on the circumstance leading to the cessation of bombing. We replied that reciprocity is not involved in Phase 1 actions, but an understanding must be reached first on Phase 2, and we would like to hear Lau's views on this subject.
9. Vy then said if the US ceases the bombing, we could then proceed to related matters, each side raising whatever subjects it wishes. DRV can't go into specifics of Phase 2 now. We then asked what their general comments were on Phase 2. Lau replied that DRV has had occasion to express views on them in both official sessions and in private talks. We replied that a number of these items had not been raised before, or were raised in a different context. Before they were raised in a context of a reciprocal act, directly connected to the cessation of bombing. Now they would follow from an understanding of what was to happen after we would cease the bombing. Lau's answer, on the other hand, was not new at all and in fact identical to that which has been given on numerous occasions in plenary sessions. Lau responded that he had not misunderstood our proposal, but the context is not really new. We then pointed out that the items listed in Phase 2 were reciprocal to each other, and not to the cessation of the bombing.
10. We then went over the same point several times, including a discussion of the meaning of the word "understanding." Lau came back to his question of what would happen if we could not reach agreement on the circumstances. We replied that the best approach would be to discuss these circumstances, explore them, and see if we could reach agreement. Vy interjected that in the meanwhile the bombing would continue. Lau added that what the DRV wants is the cessation of the bombing and other acts of war first. Then each side can raise whatever matters it wants to for discussion. We asked what the problem was in discussing the circumstances first. Lau replied "because we can't foresee agreement on all of the items."
11. We suggested that we might actually agree on the items in Phase 2, and even if we don't, what would be lost? Lau said that we wouldn't lose anything, but these proposals would not meet the DRV demand "for unconditional cessation of bombing and all other activities that involve the use of force on or within the territory of the DRV." For example, we raise questions such as the DMZ, and attacks against cities. These are items concerning the South and hence the NLF.
12. We pointed out that the restoration of the DMZ does not involve the NLF; it does involve the US and the DRV. What is involved is a series of mutual actions which are within both our capacities to carry out.
13. Lau then continued with his preliminary observations. He said there were a number of matters on which our views differ. For instance, with respect to the restoration of the DMZ, DRV has explained many times that it is the US and its "puppets" which have sabotaged the status of the DMZ. During the past few years, DMZ has been sabotaged by land, air and sea. Thus if we now speak of restoring the DMZ, it is the US which must do so unilaterally. If the US respects the DMZ, then automatically its status will be restored. Instead, the US wants to turn the DMZ into a no-man's-land, and not a genuine demilitarized zone as called by for by the Geneva agreements. US has placed artillery in Con Thien and Gio Linh, firing in and across the DMZ. Tens of thousands of men have been sent in the DMZ to burn the vegetation, destroy the villages, and dislocate the population. Toxic chemicals have been spread throughout the DMZ, affecting many local inhabitants. As for American air activities, they also constitute a violation of the DMZ. Planes from Danang use the DMZ air space when the conduct bombing raids in the DMZ, leaving virtually no communities in that area. Similarly, naval vessels and patrol boats have violated the territorial waters of the DMZ, and fishermen of these waters can no longer earn a living. Foregoing, said Lau, were his ideas on the DMZ. Who, then, is responsible for restoring its status? To suggest that responsibility for its restoration is reciprocal is to justify our actions, and that is why Xuan Thuy has spoken on this subject so extensively.
14. Vy then interjected that the question should be posed in a different manner, the question is one of the hundreds of thousands of troops that the US had sent to Viet-Nam in violation of the entire Geneva Accords. The DRV looks at things from this angle, and the fact that we are viewing the situation from different angles complicates these talks.
15. We said that while we hold different views on who first violated the DMZ, we are trying to find a solution to the problem facing us now. We are proposing the restoration of the DMZ to the status provided in the Geneva Accords. If such status is restored, then the acts described by Lau would stop. Would the DRV take equivalent steps? We said that the DMZ would not become a no-man's-land, but rather a truly demilitarized zone with effective international supervision. Vy then remarked that we were only speaking of one item--the DMZ. If discussions proceed at this rate, we will be going on for a long time.
16. Lau then said that we could be sure that the cessation of bombing is a condition which will lead to the settlement of other important questions. He emphasized "important questions." He said each side could raise whatever subjects it wanted to. Agreement would be reached on what questions would be discussed first, which ones to implement first, and in so doing "we shall abide by the aim of the Paris talks." Lau said that he had not commented on the substance of the items contained in our Phase 2 because they are the prerogative of the NLF, but he did not feel that our presentation of these conditions differed in any way from previous proposals, in that they are contrary to the DRV demand for an unconditional cessation of the bombing. He believed therefore that we should not prolong the bombing of NVN because it will not solve the problem either on the battlefield or at the conference table. It will, in fact, create additional obstacles. Moreover, world public opinion demands an immediate cessation of bombing so that these talks can progress.
17. We said that DRV misreads public opinion. We have taken certain steps and are prepared to stop the bombing but if we did so without an understanding of what would happen afterwards it is only reasonable to assume that the danger to US and allied troops would increase. Lau replied that our professed concern for the safety of allied troops was simply an argument to justify prolonged bombing. We have after all already evacuated Khe Sanh, which in effect cancels the validity of that argument. We said that it does not.
18. We then asked Lau whether DRV would stop firing artillery across the DMZ if we did. Lau replied that we should go ahead and stop the firing and the DRV will know what to do. We asked how we could do this without knowing what the DRV would do, and then asked whether DRV would not put its troops into the DMZ were we to agree to refrain from putting our troops into the DMZ.
19. Lau replied that we charged that we had brought our troops to SVN in response to aggression from NVN. We say we will withdraw our troops if NVN withdraws. That is the general question. As for the DMZ, the US asks if it stops artillery fire and withdraws its troops from the DMZ, will the DRV do the same? If we put the question this way, it means we do not seriously want to stop firing across the DMZ nor do we seriously want to withdraw our troops. The US insists that the DRV was the first to violate the DMZ and that the DRV is responsible. The DRV position is that the US has caused these violations and that it should stop them. It has first artillery into the DMZ. It should stop it. It should withdraw its troops from the DMZ. For its part, it is the consistent policy of the DRV to respect the Geneva Accords.
20. We said that our proposals were serious and that we meant what we said. We then asked what their response would be if we referred only to the future and not to what has happened in the past. We asked whether they would agree that in the future each side would refrain from the activities we had specified concerning the DMZ, without any reference to previous actions. This would be fully consistent with the original status of the DMZ, and also consistent with the DRV not wanting to admit what its present activities are in that zone.
21. Lau asked why we just didn't carry out these steps unilaterally and simply inform the DRV on what day the bombing would stop and what day the artillery would stop firing across the DMZ, and "you will see what will happen because our government has consistently respected the DMZ. Reality will give you the reply." These actions, Lau said, would create the favorable conditions for a settlement.
22. We advanced a hypothetical question--if we were to take the actions outlined regarding the DMZ without requesting any related action by DRV, and then certain actions would follow in the DMZ on the part of the DRV, would the DRV agree to the return of the ICC to verify the DMZ status as provided in the Geneva Accords? Lau avoided answering and said that the ICC had left the DMZ because of our military activity. We said that regardless of who first violated the DMZ, the ICC could nonetheless return and perform its function. Lau then observed that we had discussed this specific question in some detail, but his impression remained that our real intention in restoring the DMZ was to return to the situation prevailing in 1954 as part of our effort to seize SVN. We replied emphatically that this was not our purpose. Lau then said that his impression was strengthened by recent statements of high US administration officials, such as Clifford and Rusk, preparatory to the Honolulu conference. DRV feels that the US has not yet given up its claim to SVN, that it still wants to keep troops there, and that it still wants to maintain the Thieu/Ky administration in power. DRV considers the Thieu/Ky clique merely an instrument for the implementation of US neo-colonialist policy. If the US continues to support this clique, how can the DRV believe in US sincerity?
23. We replied that we stand by our commitment regarding troop withdrawals as formulated in the Manila Communique. We meant what we said in Manila, and we will carry out that commitment. As for the future of SVN, we want it to be free to determine its own future without coercion or outside interference. We assume the DRV agrees. Is that a correct assumption?
24. Lau said that the US concept of withdrawal of troops as stated by Secretary Clifford depends on the degree of modernization and reinforcement of the South Vietnamese Army. We replied that there is nothing in Secretary Clifford's statement which abrogates the Manila declaration.
25. We then pointed out that we have taken the DRV statement that the cessation of bombing must take place first seriously. We have proposed a formula for reaching that stage, and there will be many things to resolve afterwards, but this is a first step to which we can turn our very precise attention. Lau agreed, and said that not only was he giving the matter attention, but that he had asked for clarification of our overall objectives. Lau then repeated his point that our insistence on restoration of the DMZ suggests a desire to return to the situation prevailing in 1954 at the time of Diem, who violated the DMZ from the very beginning. It was the same Diem who said that the 17th parallel was a frontier of the United States. Thus the DMZ is among the specific items to be discussed between us, but there must also be a statement of general US policy.
26. We took strong exception to Lau's remarks about the GVN, and emphasized that it is the duly elected government. We said we had suggested a formula which could lead to the cessation of bombing, a pulling apart of forces, thus starting a de-escalation which could lead to peace. Our proposal was serious and constructive, and we hoped that DRV would give it serious thought.
27. Lau said that his remarks tonight were only preliminary in nature, and that he would consider our proposals. Lau concluded by assuring us that our "concrete" proposals would be considered carefully and DRV would try to see if there was anything new compared with our last meeting.
28. Comment: The meeting produced a more sober examination of our proposal than the prior meeting. Lau did not reject it. He said they would study it carefully to see whether it presented anything new. They sought details and explored in some depth the DMZ proposal in which they were quite interested. At one point it appeared that they were interested in finding out whether we were asking for all the items in Phase 2, but we refused to be drawn into such a discussion, leaving the implication that we were asking for all items. It is clear they understand the Phase 1/Phase 2 concept and its implications. The ball is now in their court and we will consider what steps to take next.
Harriman
300. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Paris, July 16, 1968, 12:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Trips and Missions, Paris Peace Talks, Calendar, May 9-July 1968. Secret. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. The conversation was also reported in telegram 18036/Delto 462 from Paris, July 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968)
PARTICIPANTS
Soviet Ambassador Zorin
Sergei Bogomolov, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
Governor Harriman
Jack Perry, Second Secretary, American Embassy
After thanking Ambassador Zorin for the message about a visit to Moscow/2/ (which was discussed later in the conversation), Governor Harriman said he wished to report that Ambassador Vance met Ha Van Lau July 15th during the evening and had a long talk./3/ He did not know if Zorin knew about this. Zorin said he did not, and the Governor said Zorin's "two phases" idea was brought out very clearly, and Vance and Ha Van Lau spent some two and a half hours discussing it in depth. Ha asked a number of questions, and expressed the usual skepticism saying "nothing new"--which, said the Governor, one would expect from an experienced negotiator, as Zorin would understand since he was one of the best. (Zorin laughed heartily at this reference to professional skepticism among negotiators.) Ha did not admit the proposal was new, but he did say these were "concrete proposals" and the North Vietnamese would examine them. The Governor added that Vance had gone to the US, or he would have asked him to come along to answer questions. Both Vance and Mr. Habib, who accompanied him, said last night's meeting was a serious discussion. We offered to meet with them again to hear propositions from the Vietnamese side regarding Phase II measures. The Governor said that since Zorin had discussed this matter with Ambassador Vance, he wished him to have a full report. The Governor hoped that if Zorin met with the North Vietnamese, he would tell them this was a serious offer and would encourage them to move forward.
/2/Oberemko delivered this message during a meeting with Harriman on July 13. (Telegram 17962/Delto 451 from Paris, July 15; ibid.)
/3/See Document 299.
Zorin replied with a smile that he would not be able to discuss our proposition very well with the Vietnamese because he did not know what we had proposed. The Governor said that Phase I was cessation of bombing, and Zorin said he knew that, but he would like to know what we said about Phase II.
The Governor said our first point in Phase II was to re-establish the DMZ on both sides. This was discussed in considerable detail. The second point was to hold to present force levels--that is, no further increases in number of troops by the North Vietnamese or by the US, and GVN Allies. Replacements would be allowed, but no increment in the number of troops. As for verification, this had not been discussed. Zorin asked specifically whether there would be some agreed verification body or this would be done by each side for itself, but the Governor replied that verification had not yet been examined. The third point, the Governor went on, was that substantive discussions would begin as soon as the bombing stopped. These would be "your side-our side" discussions (a phrase Zorin evidently had not heard and which had to be explained), namely that each side bring anyone it wished on its side of the table; the US would certainly have the GVN on its side, while the North Vietnamese would decide their side. Zorin showed considerable interest in this point, and asked if this would include the FLN. When the Governor replied that it had not been discussed, Zorin asked if "in principle" the US would be agreeable. The Governor replied affirmatively, and said if the North Vietnamese had asked, we would have said yes. The Governor continued that a further point on the Phase II list was that there would be no further indiscriminate shelling of Saigon and other cities (and he noted in passing that they seem to have abandoned this anyway as there had been no such shelling for three weeks). Zorin asked if the US had promised no indiscriminate shelling in return, or what. The Governor said we merely proposed to consider any action that they would put on the list.
The Governor went on that the only question explored in depth was that of the DMZ; the others were really only headings. The most optimistic word he could report was that Ha had said, "You have made concrete proposals, we can examine them." But he did not admit they were new. The Governor remarked that this was a favorite phrase from the days of the impossible Korean negotiations, "What you say is not new." He commented in passing that he was not comparing the Vietnamese with the North Koreans, for he had much more respect for the North Vietnamese; the North Koreans were truly "tough" whereas the North Vietnamese--who were also tough--nevertheless were educated in France and had a certain French veneer or French manners.
The Governor concluded that Ambassador Vance had gone to Washington to report to the President prior to the President's trip to Honolulu to meet with the GVN leaders. He did not think Vance would be going to Honolulu, so he should be back before the end of the week.
The Governor noted he had hoped Vance and Habib would get a chance to ask if the shelling of Saigon had stopped for good, but the North Vietnamese were so interested in Zorin's proposal that they did not get a chance. The Governor said he was very grateful to Zorin for receiving him on such short notice. He would be meeting with Xuan Thuy tomorrow, and would wish to discuss the shelling question. He would like to ask about the proposals made last night, but did not want to press too hard since he imagined the delegation would want to report to Hanoi./4/ The Governor said his impression was that Hanoi did not want to offend Peking right now, and anything smacking of "reciprocity" they feel would offend Peking. Ha Van Lau had told Vance that if the US stopped the bombing, they would agree to discuss the Phase II measures; but Vance had replied that there must be an understanding first, before the bombing was stopped. Vance's impression was that they were serious in making this statement, and were not merely trying to evade the issue. Vance did not get any impression of a favorable reaction, but he did believe they would seriously study the proposals. During the conversation Ha would say, for example, "If you observe the DMZ, we will know what to do (in return)." Ambassador Vance thought we were not so far apart now on substance as on form; he may be wrong, but that was his impression now.
/4/During the formal session at the Majestic on July 17 from which Thuy was absent, Lau described U.S. violations of the Geneva Accords. During the tea break, Lau provided the names of three U.S. pilots whom the DRV planned to release. Harriman did not broach the proposals made during the Vance-Lau meeting. (Telegrams from Paris 17730/Delto 418 and 17748/Delto 425, July 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.) The pilots were scheduled for release on July 19 but were held in Hanoi until August 2. Details of their release are in telegrams 203485 to Vientiane, July 16; 205574 to Moscow, July 19; 18442/Delto 498 from Paris, July 24; and 208587 to Paris, July 25. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-7 VIET) A reciprocal release of 14 North Vietnamese seamen captured in 1966 was planned subsequent to the release of the 3 American pilots. (Telegrams 206921 to Vientiane, Paris, and Saigon, July 22; 212693 to Vientiane, Paris, and Saigon, July 31; 18979 from Paris, August 3; and 19134 from Paris, August 7; ibid.) On October 21, at the request of their government, the 14 North Vietnamese seamen boarded a fishing boat and sailed northward. (Telegram 39093 from Saigon, October 22; ibid.) Reports of the discussion between the delegations relating to this reciprocal release, which occurred at the tea breaks during the formal sessions at the Majestic, are in telegrams 18096/Delto 465 and 18124/Delto 472 from Paris, both July 18; telegrams 18435/Delto 496 and 18457/Delto 499 from Paris, July 24; telegrams 19131/Delto 566, 19134/Delto 567, and 19137/Delto 568 from Paris, all August 7; and telegrams 19455/Delto 599 and 19460/Delto 601 from Paris, August 14. (Ibid., IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.) A scenario for the release of the seamen and talking points for the August 7 meeting are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnso, Trips and Missions, 1968-69 Paris Peace Talks, POW's: Release of North Vietnamese Seamen.
Zorin merely said, "We will see," and said he had no comment now. Turning to the Governor's trip to the USSR, he said that August would probably not be very good, because the responsible people would not be in Moscow. (The Governor had said at the beginning of the conversation that August would be all right with him, although he would have to talk to the President before doing anything.) The Governor said he would not want to go if Kosygin were not there. Zorin said he would not be there, but would be vacationing in the South. The Governor said he could not go now, since Vance was going away, and would prefer to go later, considering the stage at which the negotiations now were fixed; if progress were made, and the bombing could be stopped, it might be useful to go later. Zorin said of course that would be excellent. The Governor said obviously he could not go twice, and perhaps he would wait and see later when it would be best to go. Zorin said this was the Governor's initiative, so it depended on him. The Governor said he was grateful for the invitation; he hoped it would be more than a pleasure trip, and that something meaningful would come from it. Zorin said for that, the US must stop the bombings first.
The Governor said he wanted to be sure he did not give a wrong impression about what Vance had said to Ha. The US had to have an agreement on Phase II before the bombing stopped. But since Ha did not appear shocked at this two-phased proposal, we think the problem now is more form than substance.
Zorin said in his personal opinion, if the US made the bombing cessation conditional on other things, then everything would fall through, for this would look like "reciprocity," which the Vietnamese would not accept. He thought they could agree on these other steps; but the US could not make bombing cessation conditional on agreement on all of the Phase II steps. The Governor had used the phrase "mutual understanding" at one stage, and Zorin thought the North Vietnamese might consider this, but insistence on a firm agreement would be "reciprocity." The Governor said Zorin had stated the issue clearly. The President was firm, and Hanoi was firm. Nevertheless he thought Zorin's device of two phases was a possible way to end the impasse. The Governor said he knew Hanoi had said many times it would not agree to "reciprocity," but now the US was offering not "reciprocity" but rather "mutual steps" in Phase II. If there was good will on Hanoi's part, the Governor said he thought perhaps they could find this acceptable.
301. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, July 17, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War, Courses of Action--Post Paris Peace Talks 1968. Top Secret; Nodis; Harvan/Plus. In an attached note transmitting a copy of the memorandum to Clifford and Wheeler, Nitze wrote: "Cy Vance and I met for one hour and thirty minutes with J.P. McConnell, Tom Moorer, Westy, and Lew Walt in Executive session yesterday afternoon. Cy had previously obtained approval from highest authority to discuss with the Chiefs all aspects of his assignment in Paris. Herewith follows a Memorandum for the Record which I prepared following our meeting. J.P. has reviewed it and it has his full concurrence." The memorandum was transmitted to Clifford and Wheeler in telegram WDC 10622 to Honolulu, July 18.
SUBJECT
Mr. Vance's Meeting with The Chiefs, Wednesday, 17 July 1968
During the initial part of the meeting attended only by the Joint Chiefs, Mr. Vance and myself, Mr. Vance reviewed his private conversations with Van Lau and Vy. He went through an exposition of the Phase I, Phase II Proposal and the other side's reaction thereto using his reporting cable as a talking paper. He said that in a post mortem on these talks, Habib and he had come to the following conclusions:
1. The other side thoroughly understood our Phase I, Phase II Proposal.
2. They had not rejected the Proposal.
3. They wanted to find out what was our minimum position, but following his instructions, he had discussed only the DMZ part of the Proposal in detail.
4. The other side was interested in the DMZ, although they might find difficulty in formally agreeing to this in advance. After about two weeks, we might want to consider handling this through the "assumption" route.
5. They may be prepared to accept some of our other proposed actions in Phase II.
6. They understood our force level proposal and may be interested in it.
7. The portion of our Proposal dealing with the GVN presence in the further talks seemed to give them the most problem.
In the subsequent discussion with the Chiefs, Mr. Vance indicated that he thought the other side was prepared to accept the "no indiscriminate attacks on Saigon" point because they realized the serious propaganda loss to them from such attacks.
The Chiefs wanted to know Mr. Vance's views on the Soviet attitude and Mr. Vance described his discussions with Zorin and drew the conclusion that the Soviets were attempting to be helpful.
In the middle of the session, Admiral Jack McCain and Vice Admiral Nels Johnson joined us. During this portion, the discussion revolved around actions north of the DMZ. Mr. Vance said he thought that B-52 strikes north of 17? 10 could well be prejudicial to the negotiations, and recommended against them. He thought bombing north of the 19? would impinge negatively upon the chance for success in the talks and, in any case, he understood that the bombing south of 19? was being effective. He thought hot pursuit by fighter aircraft north of 19? to 20? would not present a problem in that one could argue it was connected with self defense. He thought the use of Talos between 19? and 20? would be less defensible because it could not be directly connected with self defense. Admiral McCain and Vice Admiral Johnson then left the meeting.
Mr. Vance asked the views of the Chiefs with respect to a 5,000 man troop reduction if tied to agreement on the DMZ. The Chiefs took the view that it might well be possible to pull out two battalions of the Marine Corps Special Landing Force and some support troops totaling 5,000 and move them to Okinawa. They would then be in a position for rapid re-entry if they were needed. The Chiefs indicated that they would not be opposed to this action if it were tied to agreement on the DMZ. General Westmoreland said that it was his view that such an action would be favorably received by the GVN Government--they would view this as a vote of confidence in the increasing strength of the ARVN.
The discussion then turned to the ICC. The Chiefs urged that planning and discussion with the Indians and the Canadians would be helpful in order to cut down the lead time for an ICC presence in the DMZ. They were also interested in assuring that the ICC would accept American helicopters. The Acting Chairman said he would put this problem to the Sea Cabin group in the Chairman's office./2/
/2/Sea Cabin was the code name for an ad hoc group consisting of representatives of the Joint Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs which examined the major military issues that would arise from the President's ordering of a bombing halt. See Historical Section, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vietnam War, 1960-1968, Part III (Washington: unpublished mss., 1 July 1970), pp. 47-8-47-10.
There was further discussion of the importance of having a strong GVN delegation if they were to hold their own in discussions with the DRV representatives.
Paul H. Nitze
302. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 18, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1250, VIET 337 1968. Top Secret. A notation on the memorandum reads: "Dep Sec. has seen." For his personal assessment of the trip, see Clifford, Counsel to the President, pp. 550-553.
SUBJECT
Trip to South Vietnam, July 13-18, 1968
My report will consist of three parts: My dominant impressions, a narrative which includes answers to the questions you have raised and a complete (but not verbatim) report of the meeting we had with President Thieu.
First, I will set forth the dominant impressions I have upon the completion of the trip.
1. Additional large-scale enemy attacks are anticipated in I Corps and in the Saigon area, perhaps in July but more probably in late August. The enemy is apparently now engaged in refitting and preparing for such attacks. It must be anticipated that his units will be up to strength, well-armed and that such attacks will be synchronized.
2. Our field commanders from General Abrams on down are confident that the enemy can be turned back and defeated.
3. Our commanders are satisfied with the resources at their command, both as to men and materiel. They are unanimous that they are in a stronger position today than they were at either Tet or the enemy May offensive.
4. I am most favorably impressed by General Abrams. He is intelligent, experienced and resourceful. He appears to have the quality of flexibility which will be so necessary in the days ahead. The other field commanders are outstanding, and in General Wheeler's opinion, are the best we have.
5. The major problem we face here is that of putting the ARVN and the other South Vietnamese forces in a position to take over more of the war. Despite all the talk over the years, they still are badly in need of better leadership, better training, additional equipment and an improvement of living conditions for themselves and their families. Present plans for equipping the South Vietnamese forces are, in my opinion, inadequate to enable them to assume as rapidly as possible the amount of the total burden which they should be carrying.
6. There is apparent an obvious shift in the emphasis on and importance of the pacification program. I believe that this shift results from the reaction of all to the change in the enemy tactics and the enemy's attempts to bring down the government of Vietnam by his attacks upon the cities. Both President Thieu and Ambassador Komer stressed the desirability of cutting down on the number of tasks required of the pacification people in order to place the major emphasis on territorial security./2/
/2/In a July 16 memorandum to Bunker and Abrams, Komer argued that all the pacification effort needed was additional time: "If we can only hold the negotiating line long enough to defeat the next enemy offensive effort and let the GVN/RVNAF grow in relative power, we can reasonably expect to be in a much greater position of strength than is visible at present." He added: "In sum, if we can buy another 3-6 months, we will be in a position either to prove that our whole Vietnam enterprise has at long last borne fruit or, at the worst, to begin disengaging gracefully from behind a GVN/RVNAF which is at least strong enough to have a fighting chance of holding up its end." (U.S. Army Center for Military History, DepCORDS/MACV Papers, Komer-Abrams File--1968)
Throughout my discussions during the trip, I endeavored to develop the facts in response to the various subjects which you have raised with me. In your letter of July 10, 1968, you wrote:
"I am greatly concerned about the next Communist offensive in South Vietnam. General Abrams now appears to believe that there will be a maximum effort in I Corps and against Saigon in August.
"I count on you to go into this matter deeply with Abrams and make the best assessment possible of the probable strength and timing of that offensive.
"In particular, I would like you to develop the best answers you can and to the following specific questions:
"Could more of the ARVN be brought into I Corps so that the burden of conflict there could be more evenly shared?
"How can the ARVN effort be better dramatized and their contribution to the war kept in the headlines?
"Does Abrams have enough men and materiel to cope with the military tasks that lie ahead?
"What, if anything, does he need urgently?"/3/
/3/The full text of the letter from Johnson to Clifford, July 10, is in the Johnson Library, Clark M. Clifford Papers, South Vietnam Trip, July 13-19, 1968, Memorandum to the President from Secretary Clifford. In responding to the President's letter in a July 11 memorandum, Clifford wrote: "I have received your memorandum outlining issues which you want me to pursue deeply with General Abrams. With General Wheeler's assistance, I will make the best assessment possible of the military situation and outlook. Also, following our discussions in South Vietnam, I will provide for you the best answers which can be developed to your specific questions on the ARVN and resources for General Abrams." (Ibid.)
In your White House message to me of July 15, you asked additionally for a careful review of any reductions in expenditures that we might make in South Vietnam which would contribute to the $3 billion defense cut we face. You asked also that we consider any additions we might have to make in next year's defense appropriation bill. Other points raised in that message are for action and discussions on my return to Washington, rather than being directly related to the trip./4/
/4/The message transmitted to Clifford from Rostow, July 15, is ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 88.
We discussed in detail, both in Saigon and in the field, the matter of timing and probable strength of the attacks that should be expected and the targets that will be involved.
Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams and the South Vietnamese and U.S. Field Commanders uniformly expect a renewal of the enemy attacks within the next few weeks. Because of the losses incurred by the enemy during both Tet and in the course of the May attacks, it is not anticipated generally that the enemy forces will be adequately reconstituted and resupplied for significant attacks until the latter part of August. President Thieu, in fact, suggests late August, September or even October as more likely dates. He and Vice President Ky also believe strongly that the enemy attacks cannot be sustained for more than 2 months once they are initiated.
All agreed that the objective of the attacks will be primarily psychological and political, rather than military.
Our Embassy and military officials in Saigon, our Field Commanders and South Vietnamese, all believe that the focal points of the anticipated attacks will be populated areas in I Corps and Saigon. President Thieu also lists the Pleiku/Kon Tum areas of II Corps as a likely target, but U.S. officials discount this latter threat.
I found unanimous agreement that we are in a position to meet anything that the enemy has to offer. General Abrams said in a written report to me:
"The present and programmed U.S./Free World Forces are adequate to cope with the enemy forces in South Vietnam and those known to be infiltrating."
He added in conversation that the situation is "entirely one that can be handled", and he believes that there is "at least a 50-50 chance that the attacks can be aborted by our own military operations." Lt. Gen. Rosson, our Troop Commander in I Corps, states that he feels "very comfortable" and has no need for additional forces. Major General Stillwell, our Commander in the Northern section of I Corps, states that he is not only comfortable, but completely confident and ready for any eventuality.
Similarly, General Abrams, Lt. Gen. Weyand, and Major General Hay are confident that they will be able to cope with any enemy military efforts in III Corps, including Saigon. In response to my question whether we are in a better position to withstand them than at Tet and in May, Lt. General Weyand replied: "By far."
In no quarter, at any level, did I find any suggestion that we would not be able to handle the anticipated attacks, that additional manpower should be rushed to Vietnam, or that there were equipment needs to be met in anticipation of the attacks.
General Abrams noted in his brief written report to me that he was expecting all units planned in the present deployment program of 549,500. He also assumes that the presently planned civilianization program will be implemented successfully./5/ This program, as you know, would free 12,500 military personnel by replacing them with civilians in Vietnam. The only suggestion of any possible need for additional troops came in this regard, General Abrams said: "In the event the civilianization program is not successful, some adjustments in military space ceilings may be required." General Abrams believes that we should maintain our B-52 and tactical air sorties at the currently planned levels in order to maintain our capacity to support friendly operations and preempt enemy thrusts.
/5/General Abrams' report was not found.
Here is a brief rundown of the numerical strength of friendly and enemy forces, first in I Corps and later in III Corps around Saigon.
In I Corps, 305,000 friendly forces face an enemy strength of 135,000. The friendly forces consist of 190,600 U.S. troops, 108,000 in the various categories of South Vietnamese armed forces and 7,500 Republic of South Korea Marines. Of the U.S. forces, 151,000 are III Marine Amphibious Forces. The 108,000 South Vietnamese include about 42,000 regular ARVN, 27,000 Regional Forces, 25,000 Popular Forces and 13,000 consisting of other irregulars, police and provincial reconnaissance units.
The 135,000 enemy forces include about 38 percent regular North Vietnamese. The total of 52,000 NVA are in combat maneuver units and combat support units. They constitute over 70 percent of the enemy maneuver battalions in the area.
In III Corps, the area which embraces Saigon, enemy forces total about 60,000 men. This compares with a total U.S./SVN/Allied troop strength of 218,000. The enemy Main Force units amount to approximately 36,000, with the balance consisting of local forces, guerrillas and Viet Cong Infrastructure. General Weyand believes that this force ratio is well within his capacity to withstand and defeat any attack. He said "General Khang (his South Vietnamese counterpart) and I agree we have the forces to do the job."
The friendly forces have recently been reorganized to provide a separate defense force for the Saigon/Gia Dinh area. The U.S. forces for this key region are under the direct command of Major General Hay, who reports to Lt. General Weyand. He has at his disposal a division equivalent, amounting to about 9,000 men. South Vietnamese forces assigned to the defense of the capital number around 30,000. The rest of the allied forces in III Corps are, of course, available to react quickly to any enemy attack on Saigon.
General Abrams cannot predict what the enemy will do if the anticipated attacks are aborted or defeated. He notes that the present level of infiltration would enable the enemy to sustain his existing force structure at a low rate of combat. He emphasizes that the enemy has lost many of his best assets, including a substantial number of guerrillas and many of his trained leaders. The depletion of guerrilla forces has come about through casualties and through their elevation into main force units. This has diminished the enemy's capability to continue a protracted war at a low level of hostilities.
In the wake of the enemy's defeat at Tet and in May, and in the light of the unanimous view of both United States and ARVN commanders that they are ready and able to meet whatever the enemy can present in the way of attacks, I inquired repeatedly why the Communists would go ahead with these attacks in the face of what should appear to be inevitable defeat. In his intelligence briefing at MACV, Brigadier General Davidson/6/ suggested that the enemy might be under-estimating our capability and might be failing to recognize the growing strength of the Vietnamese government. He also said they are in a position where they must seek political ends by military means. President Thieu and Vice President Ky gave somewhat the same answer./7/
/6/Lieutenant General Phillip B. Davidson, MACV G-2.
/7/Most of Clifford's conclusions in this report were derived from his and Wheeler's discussion with Thieu, Ky, Huong, and members of the GVN Cabinet on June 16. A record of the meeting is in Clifford's summary, "Meeting with President Thieu and His Colleagues," undated. (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1250, VIET 337 1968) Clifford also reported on the meeting in telegram 32822 from Saigon, July 17. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S) In a July 17 memorandum, Bunker reported on a conversation with Thieu, Ky, and Huong prior to the meeting with Clifford in which "Thieu told the others that once the South Vietnamese participate in the Paris negotiations an ultimatum should be presented to the North Vietnamese giving them the alternatives of 'an all-out attack or of leaving the conference table.'" (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 3 E (2), 1/68-8/68, Future Military Operations in Vietnam)
In addition to satisfying myself that General Abrams has the manpower and material needed to meet and defeat any enemy attacks, I placed special emphasis on determining the present status and performance of the South Vietnamese forces. As for force strength, the authorized increase of 84,000 will bring the total of South Vietnamese under regular ARVN, Regional Forces, and Popular Forces. However, adequate arrangements have not been made to provide these forces with the equipment and leadership necessary to enable them to take on a greater share of the burden. Except for M-16 rifles, no equipment has been ordered for the 84,000 new men. As presently programmed, equipment for RVNAF modernization and improvement will not be fully supplied until fiscal year 1970. Communication facilities, particularly for RF and PF, do not permit their optimum performance. We are currently studying ways in which this equipment schedule can be expedited.
Even more serious is the deficiency in RVNAF officers. The shortages are greatest in the captain-to-colonel ranks. Our figures show almost 4,000 too few captains, almost 1,000 too few majors and substantial shortages in lieutenant colonels and colonels. General Vien disputed the shortages other than captain, but admitted that he was not prepared to discuss this question. RF and PF similarly are seriously short of officers. I have asked General Abrams to present to General Vien our figures on these deficiencies. We also stressed in our meeting with President Thieu and his colleagues the importance we place on revising their promotion criteria to insure that an adequate number of officers of appropriate rank are generated to meet the present and expanding demand.
The ARVN divisional units are now deployed to provide the widest area coverage for territorial security. One airborne division operates throughout South Vietnam in reaction to strong enemy pressures. It is in III Corps, committed to defend the Saigon Capital Military District.
You asked about bringing more ARVN into I Corps. There are presently 42,000 ARVN fighting in I Corps along with 27,000 RF and 25,000 PF. The first ARVN Division is highly regarded by our commanders, largely because of its commander, General Truong.
This again highlights the importance of leadership.
General Abrams and I believe that it is impracticable to replace any U.S. forces now in I Corps with further ARVN forces. The ARVN strength in that Corps will increase in September when a new three battalion regiment becomes operational. The present deployment of U.S. and ARVN forces represents the best utilization now feasible. Rather than trying to shift the roles of the two forces, we should equip, train and man the RVNAF as priority items so that U.S. forces may be gradually withdrawn from Vietnam.
While this long range development takes place, certain transitional steps may be taken. For example, General Abrams thinks that some special units, such as artillery battalions and armor battalions, may gradually be transformed from U.S. to RVN by substituting individual RVN for U.S. personnel. He believes that such a transition might be made within three months or so.
In spite of the progress made by the ARVN, it is going to be difficult to dramatize its participation in the war. I attempted to emphasize this point while in South Vietnam, both at a press conference at Da Nang after our day in I Corps and at another session with reporters as we left the country. We emphasized that of the four divisions in Northern I Corps, three were U.S. divisions and one an ARVN division. I quoted our commanders that these four operated as one entity and that General Truong, the Commander of the First ARVN Division, could "wear stars in any army in the world."
Basically, however, the problem of dramatizing the ARVN will not be solved just by public affairs emphasis. In fact, General Abrams agrees with me that great care must be exercised in over-emphasizing ARVN improvements. He points out that claims of improvement have been made for several years, whereas actual discernible improvement did not begin until a year ago. Accordingly, the press will doubt statements of RVNAF improvements until actual results are visible.
The most dramatic evidence will come when ARVN units do, in fact, substitute for American troops. General Abrams is confident that this can be done. Until that time, the dramatization problem will be a difficult one.
In the interim, some public affairs steps can and should be taken. The MACV people are already working to influence the Vietnam Joint General Staff to increase and upgrade the RVNAF information personnel. MACV and the embassy are continuing to try to sell the ARVN story. U.S. advisers are encouraging senior RVNAF commanders to talk to news media following a successful action. U.S. commanders are attempting to defer interviews to RVNAF counterparts. All of these steps have, however, been taken in the past with little to show for them.
I have asked Phil Goulding to send one or two experts from his office to Vietnam to spend perhaps three weeks in Saigon and in the field, collecting information to prove that a portion of the RVNAF is, indeed, effective today. From that information, we should be able to assemble a series of speeches which point up the role of the ARVN and to write talking papers which can be used for backgrounders and press conferences in Washington.
Additionally, while in Saigon I discussed with Phil and with Brigadier General Sidle, the MACV Chief of Information, the absolute necessity of still greater efforts to tell the RVNAF story. But weighted down by fire fighting and day-to-day operational details as they are, I believe that our best hope for the short term lies in a pro-RVNAF sweep of Vietnam by one or two of Phil's people.
We should not delude ourselves into thinking that this will do the job. It will be only a small step compared to the first actual substitution of an RVNAF unit for a U.S. unit.
We have discussed with both General Abrams and General Goodpaster the possibility of a contribution here to the three billion dollar cut.
We discussed also whether there were additional expenditures which the General could predict at this time for the FY 1970 program.
The generals here have no ready suggestions on how to contribute to the three billion dollar cut and I have been unable to find any specific items which could be deleted or deferred at this time. Needless to say, their attention here is focused heavily on the anticipated offensives by the enemy of late August or so. I believe that little help can be expected in the near future from here on the reduction of planned expenditures.
As for FY 1970, General Abrams and General Goodpaster believe it is too early to consider these programs seriously at this time. The single program which will inevitably add to our spending here will be increased emphasis on supplying and equipping the ARVN and the popular and regional forces of South Vietnam. As you know, we have been working on this program in the Pentagon. General Wheeler's people have developed a plan which is now being worked over by Alain Enthoven and other civilian advisors.
303. Editorial Note
President Johnson and President Thieu arrived in Honolulu on July 18, 1968. Thieu had requested that his State visit to the mainland United States be postponed and instead that he and Johnson meet at Honolulu July 19-20. (Telegram 31871 from Saigon, July 5; Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Honolulu Cables [1 of 2]) Telegram 197463 to Saigon, July 6, transmitted Johnson's agreement. (Ibid., [2 of 2])
From 11:35 a.m. to 12:51 p.m. on July 19, the Vietnamese Ministers accompanying Thieu made presentations to both leaders, after which the delegations lunched together. A formal State dinner honoring Thieu was held that evening. From 8:03 to 8:43 a.m. on July 20, both delegations attended a working breakfast. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Background materials, talking papers on various topics, and an itinerary for the conference are ibid., National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, LBJ-Thieu, Honolulu Briefing Book. The exchange of telegrams setting up the conference is ibid. and National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S.
A joint communique was released upon the departure of both Presidents from Honolulu on July 20. The portion entitled "Paris Talks" reads: "The two Presidents considered the current status of the Paris talks--already fully reported to the South Vietnamese and Allied governments--and weighed at length the contingencies that might arise. The two Presidents deplored the use of the discussions for propaganda purposes on the North Vietnamese side, and such unrealistic positions as Hanoi's refusal to admit the presence of North Vietnamese forces in the South. They agreed that the basic objective in the Paris talks is to open the way to a stable and honorable peace. In the face of continued high infiltration and other military actions directed from Hanoi, however, they saw no alternative but to continue to press for realistic discussions on the appropriate actions by both sides. The two Presidents again affirmed that the Republic of Vietnam should be a full participant playing a leading role in discussions concerning the substance of a final settlement, and that their two governments would act in full consultation with each other, and with their allies, both in the present phase and throughout." For the full text, see Department of State Bulletin, August 12, 1968, pages 162-165. For Johnson's statement to the press at the close of the conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pages 828-830. Telegrams 32830 from Saigon, July 17; 203569 from Saigon, July 17; and 204340 to Saigon, July 18, report on bilateral discussions relating to the genesis of the communique. (All in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 EA)
304. Notes of Meeting/1/
Honolulu, July 19, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, George Christian Papers, Classified-George Christian (1 of 2). No classification marking. These notes were transmitted to Harriman and Vance in telegram 206919/Todel 725 to Paris, July 22. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
Notes for U.S. briefing on Honolulu meetings and Joint Communique
1. Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler reported to the President on the military situation in Viet Nam./2/
/2/Clifford and Wheeler reported to the President in a meeting on July 18, 2:45-4 p.m. Also present were Rusk, Rostow, Bundy (who had accompanied Clifford on the trip to South Vietnam), Helms, Bunker (who had left Saigon with Clifford's delegation), Temple, Jones, Christian, and McPherson. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) A record of the meeting by McPherson, "Notes from a Honolulu meeting before the Johnson-Thieu Conference," undated, is ibid., George Christian Papers, Classified-George Christian (1 of 2). Wheeler's briefing was based on his memorandum CM-3489-68 to the President, July 19, entitled "Military Situation in Vietnam," in the Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Secretary of Defense Files, VIET 385. Clifford's written report to the President is printed as Document 302.
--They noted the present lull, which is similar to that in the second half of April preceding the May attacks on Saigon.
--They found no evidence whatsoever that the enemy was engaged in an effort to match our de-escalation beginning on March 31, but a vast amount of evidence that he was absorbing infiltrators from the North to fill up his units and re-equipping for another major series of attacks.
--There is no firm evidence on the exact timing of such attacks which could come any time in the weeks ahead.
--They noted the remarkable success of the Vietnamese mobilization effort. In June the armed forces of South Viet Nam reached a level of 765,000, 48,000 more than the original goal for this date. It is expected the total will exceed 800,000 by the end of 1968.
--They reported to the President on the accelerated schedules of re-equipment of the ARVN with M-16 automatic rifles and schedules for equipping paramilitary forces down to hamlet level on a high priority basis.
--They reported U.S., Vietnamese, and allied forces were fully prepared for the enemy's forthcoming offensive and in high morale.
2. The President went over these matters with President Thieu who also reported at some length the progress of the new government, including its enlarged tax measures; the unified organization of the defenses of Saigon; the effective cooperation of the legislative and executive branches on the difficult issues of mobilization and increased taxes.
3. They also reviewed the talks in Paris. They noted that there had been no substantive progress and no response from the other side to the President's action on March 31 which lifted bombing from 90% of the population and 78% of the land area of North Viet Nam. (Contrary to rumors which appear to be circulating, there was no discussion of an unrequited total bombing cessation.)
With heavy fighting in prospect and no evidence that the other side was prepared to engage in serious substantive negotiation, there was no discussion of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet Nam. As the communique states, "as North Viet Nam takes its men home and ends its aggression against South Viet Nam, U.S. forces will be withdrawn"--a position agreed among all the allies at Manila. The communique also notes that "President Thieu stated his Government's determination to continue to assume all the responsibility that the scale of the forces of South Viet Nam and their equipment will permit, while preparing the Vietnamese nation and armed forces for the importance and decisive role that will be theirs in the coming stage of the struggle."
In general, the evident Communist preparations for another major attack, and the failure of the Paris talks to exhibit progress after more than 3-1/2 months required the two Presidents to focus primarily on the urgent tasks of continuing to deal with Communist aggression.
305. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, July 21, 1968, 1255Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan, Paris Todel--Paris Delto VIII, 7/11-22/68. Secret; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Received at 9:23 a.m. The following notation by Rostow appears on the telegram: "For the President From Walt Rostow--Herewith Zorin chats indecisively on last Vance-Lau talk. He suggests a Hanoi interest in cutting down a straight DMZ deal, dropping other items, plus a Hanoi desire to avoid anything explicit." Shriver's assessment of the Harriman-Zorin conversation is in telegram 18279 from Paris, July 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968)
18283/Delto 486. From Harriman and Vance.
1. Yesterday afternoon, July 19, we met with Ambassador Zorin for about 45 minutes. Highlights follow.
2. Vance described briefly his trip to the US. We noted we had observed the decline in military activity in South Viet Nam but were unable to determine its significance at this time. We said we noted from captured documents and prisoners that a build up for a new offensive was in progress; yet at the same time there had been a marked decline in military action. We said we would watch carefully to see what happens on the ground in South Viet Nam. We commented that we did not anticipate any major decisions coming out of the Honolulu meeting.
3. Zorin then said that he had had a very brief conversation with Lau at a Soviet concert. He said that he had talked to Lau over the noise of drums and dances, so his conversation had been very brief.
4. Zorin said that Lau indicated two things made the North Vietnamese resist our proposal: first, we were still insisting that agreement be reached on Phase 2 before Phase 1 took place; and second, that there were matters of substance in Phase 2 which gave them problems. Zorin added that Lau had definitely displayed interest in what Vance said.
5. Zorin went on to say that Lau commented that US was laying great emphasis on reestablishing the DMZ, but what the US had in mind was not acceptable in the form in which Vance outlined it. He said that Lau said his impression was the US attached most importance to the DMZ, since they had put this first in their plan.
6. Zorin then took his usual hard line that we should stop the bombing and that progress would immediately be made in the talks. We countered this with the usual arguments.
7. Zorin asked if a date had been set for the next meeting, and we replied no, that the ball was in the North Vietnamese court./2/ We said that we had presented concrete proposals which they said they would study. Zorin replied that he believed Lau would want to meet with Vance again; and that he (Zorin) would be seeing Lau and would discuss with him in detail Lau's views with respect to the proposal made at Vance's last meeting with Lau./3/
/2/The possibility of another Vance-Lau meeting was raised unsuccessfully during the tea break at the July 24 formal session. (Ibid.) A summary of this session is in telegram 18457/Delto 499 from Paris, July 24. (Ibid.)
/3/See Document 299.
Harriman
306. Editorial Note
Secretary of Defense Clifford held a regular morning meeting with his staff on July 22, 1968, to discuss Vietnam. The meeting started at 8:30 a.m., but neither the ending time of the meeting nor its participants is recorded. Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze took the following notes of Clifford's remarks during the meeting:
"Must get out of there.
"1. Use all influence on those in Washington.
"2. Persuade our negotiators of the rightness of our cause.
"3. Convey to our representatives in Saigon they seeing it too narrowly, from GVN pt. of view. Shld. look at it from interest of U.S.
"Convictions.
"1. No way can we terminate war militarily.
"2. GVN doesn't want war to stop now. Money flows. Compulsion to build up ARVN will be lessened. List includes 300/400 H's [helicopters], T-39 planes, artillery. Corruption runs through everything.
"3. What do we do? Candidates moving away." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Defense Department, Deputy Secretary of Defense Notes, 1968, 4 of 6)
307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, July 23, 1968, 0031Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Alan Parker of S/S.
206932. Eyes only for Harriman and Vance from the Secretary. Despite one or two elliptical efforts by Hanoi representatives to suggest that they have de-escalated the fighting on the ground, I believe that we should maintain the public position expressed in the Honolulu communique while continuing private explorations. In the first place, we would look and be silly if we proceeded on the theory that the other side had made a political decision to de-escalate the violence only to find ourselves confronted with new and major attacks which are now in prospect. Only yesterday there were serious bombing incidents in Saigon and the enemy forces in the Saigon area are only twenty-four hours away. Perhaps even more important, if we were to acknowledge, without any assurances from Hanoi, that the present somewhat lower scale of fighting results from Hanoi's "de-escalation," many soft-headed people would take that as a sufficient answer to the President's March 31 speech and call upon us to take another major step of unilateral de-escalation such as a non-reciprocal ending of the bombing.
The purpose of this message is not to foreclose any options whatever but simply to suggest that we not box ourselves in by accepting the present lull as a response to the March 31 speech. I would of course be glad to have any comments you wish to make./2/
/2/In replying, in telegram 18337 from Paris, Harriman and Vance wrote: "In short, we fully agree it is important not to box ourselves in by either accepting or rejecting the present lull as a response related to the March 31 speech. Consequently, we believe we must continue to examine carefully the pattern and meaning of actions in South Vietnam." (Ibid.)
Rusk
308. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, July 24, 1968, 1:30-3:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House. Helms, Wheeler, Rostow, and Taylor left the meeting at 3 p.m., and Christian and Tom Johnson left at 3:15 p.m. Rusk and Clifford remained until 3:54 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH
HIS FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS AT LUNCH
ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Maxwell Taylor
CIA Director Helms
General Earle Wheeler
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
The President: I want to sit down with Mr. Nixon to see what kind of world he really wants. When he gets the nomination he may be more responsible. He says he is for our position in Vietnam. He thinks Democrats will go the other way./2/
/2/See Document 310.
What should we do about the Democratic platform on Vietnam? Senator Mansfield rejects the "straws in the wind" statements./3/
/3/From 8:38 to 10 a.m. on July 15, both Mansfield and Dirksen met with the President in an off-the-record session. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Although notes of the meeting have not been found, in a July 17 memorandum to the President entitled "Viet Nam and the Paris Negotiations," Mansfield discussed the meeting and elaborated on the points he had made. He stated his support for the President's current peace initiative but emphasized that "the difficulty is that we do not have the cards" since most were held by the North Vietnamese and the rest by the Soviet Union and China. The talks would not move forward unless they were enlarged to include the NLF and GVN. Mansfield urged the President to enact a full cessation, and to pressure the GVN if necessary, in order to bring this about. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. V(a) 7/68) In a July 24 memorandum to the President, Rostow argued that Mansfield was unaware of several facts, including the private contacts among U.S., North Vietnamese, and Soviet diplomats in Paris, the burden placed on the NVA in maintaining hostilities, measures to arrange expanded representation in Paris, and efforts by Thieu and Huong to "create an atmosphere conducive to such talks" in spite of resistance from the lower house of the National Assembly. Rostow attached a draft letter for the President to send to Mansfield but, "in view of the sensitivity of some of these facts," advised against sending it and instead recommended using it as a talking paper for future contacts with Mansfield and Dirksen. (Ibid.) The President and Rusk discussed the situation in Paris with Dirksen in a meeting from 3 to 4:30 p.m. on July 27. A full transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
The GOP may be of more help to us than the Democrats in the last few months.
Secretary Clifford: Ike said he would be glad to see me.
The President: Eisenhower has helped me in every critical thing I have asked him to help on. You would be good to talk with him.
Secretary Clifford: On the '70 budget we have been examining our assumptions. We had assumed the war would continue at the same level. You can't cut down without it leaking.
The President: The situation seems like they are taking advantage of our restraint.
Secretary Clifford: Every B-52 flight costs $35,000 from Thailand. $42,000 from Okinawa and $48,000 from Guam.
The bombs cost $31,000. I hope the targets are worth it.
[Omitted here is discussion of the military budget and the situation in Czechoslovakia.]
The President: Any comment on Paris?
Secretary Rusk: Hanoi is considering it.
The President: How did we come out with Honolulu?
Secretary Rusk: Pluses in Saigon. I was pleased with the conference.
The President: Chal Roberts built up false hopes./4/
/4/Reference is to journalist Chalmers Roberts.
Secretary Rusk: Nobody in our department thought the conference was anything other than Walt Rostow's backgrounder over here said it was.
The President: Study Mansfield's letter and draft a reply.
[Omitted here is additional discussion of the situation in Czechoslovakia, printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XVII, Document 72.]
309. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 26, 1968, 11:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. V(a) 7/68. Secret. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
You asked me yesterday: Do you think they are serious in Paris?
My short answer was: Yes. But it may be helpful if I set down where I would guess Hanoi now stands with respect to peacemaking--emphasizing that this is only one man's guess and I could be wrong.
1. Military Situation
I do not believe Hanoi regards its military posture as stable for the long pull. If they mount major attacks they must count on taking very high casualties and increasingly North Vietnamese casualties. Although such attacks may have political and psychological effects in Saigon and in Washington they cannot count on even a maximum military effort being decisive. On the other hand, if they fall back to low levels of attritional warfare, as in 1967, they must count on a progressive extension of GVN control over the country. It was that fact which led them to abandon attritional warfare and go for broke starting at Tet 1968.
Therefore, I believe they are playing for the best end of the war they can bring about in the next 6-12 months. They regard their best hopes for a substantial achievement of their objectives to be in the politics of Saigon and Washington. They regard their military actions as a means of affecting the politics of Saigon and Washington.
2. Politics in Saigon
I do not believe they have abandoned hope that they can break the Thieu government, create a loose or chaotic political situation in Saigon and insert, somehow, men they control into key spots. But I believe they are somewhat discouraged by the relative success of Thieu in moving forward towards a stable government. The critical decision that they must make is whether they finally decide that the only way to end the war is to negotiate with Thieu's government. They have not made that decision. If they make it, they must accept the likelihood that they will not get better terms than those offered in the Honolulu communique/2/ and in your TV statement of December 19 just before you went to Canberra./3/ Arguing for an early decision are two possibilities:
/2/See Document 303.
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 441, footnote 5.
--if they delay, it is conceivable that the Thieu government will gather strength, legitimacy, and public support with the passage of time. It could be a substantially stronger government next spring than it is now.
--equally important is the likelihood that the ARVN will be bigger, better equipped, and more confident next spring than it is now. Armed forces of a million men in South Vietnam, with the possibility of further re-equipment with tanks, helicopters, aircraft, etc., is not attractive from a straight North Vietnamese point of view.
Arguing against a decision to accept the Honolulu communique terms and the legitimacy of the GVN are:
--the hope that the Thieu government will break either from the pressures of internal Vietnamese politics or because of strains in the US-GVN relationship.
--but most important of all in postponing a decision is the hope that U.S. political life will either yield a Mendes-France/4/ (e.g., McCarthy), or that fears of this trend in the United States will produce a hardline coup in Saigon which would open the way to political turmoil, etc.
/4/Pierre Mendes-France was elected French Premier in June 1954; he vowed to terminate the Franco-Viet Minh War within a month of coming to office and was successful in doing so.
Therefore, of the three key elements in Hanoi's equation (the military situation, the politics of Saigon, and the politics of Washington) I believe U.S. politics remains the ultimate focus of their thought and action.
3. U.S. Politics
With respect to U.S. politics, they are examining both trends in public opinion and the candidates. I am inclined to think that if McCarthy is not nominated by the Democrats, they will judge that time is running against them in terms of the military situation and developments in South Vietnam and that they had better negotiate seriously. That is why I am inclined to agree with Thieu and Ky that September could be the month in which negotiations get serious. If McCarthy is nominated, I would assume they would await the election in November. If they proceed with the mid-August third offensive it will be, on this view, primarily to try to shake American public opinion and influence the Democratic convention.
Therefore, preparing the American press and media for this mid-August offensive--and trying to assure that we do not get a reaction like that after Tet--could be critically important if (I repeat) if this chain of thought is correct.
4. I will do a memorandum during the day setting out my thoughts on how the press and the public might be prepared for the third offensive./5/
/5/In a memorandum sent to the President at 5:45 p.m. that evening, Rostow noted that the biggest public relations problems faced by the administration were how to prepare the public for the coming third enemy offensive and how to suggest that "the U.S. public reaction to the Tet attacks was excessively pessimistic" and thus "it would be helpful for all of us to be prepared to play it cool this time." He recommended a series of briefings by Abrams and other military men to carry out this task. (Johnson Library, Office Files of Harry McPherson, Vietnam 1968) In a memorandum to the President at 9:50 p.m. that evening, Rostow suggested that the President make a statement, backed up by statements by Abrams, Bunker, Rusk, and Clifford, informing the public of the coming offensive and urging that, "aside from this build up, the signs are favorable" that increasing strength and stability in South Vietnam and "a growing sense of realities" on the part of the North Vietnamese would lead to a successful outcome in the near future. (Ibid.) Asked to write a speech for the President along these lines, McPherson argued, in a July 29 memorandum to the President, that Johnson should not make the speech, since if the enemy did not launch the offensive until late August, "the McCarthy people would be given quite an argument: that the Administration had let six weeks of lull go by, and instead of using that as the basis for moving the talks forward, had continued (and even intensified) the bombing of North Vietnam." (Ibid.)
Walt
310. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, July 26, 1968, 6-7:35 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room. No classification marking. Tom Johnson joined the meeting at 6:33 p.m., and Rostow and Rusk at 6:40 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A full transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room. Tom Johnson's handwritten notes of the meeting are ibid., Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Beginning at 11:15 a.m., Rusk met with Wallace to brief him, first at the State Department then at 12:20 p.m. at the White House. (Ibid., Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1967-1969) The President joined Wallace's briefing from 12:45 to 1:05 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S NOTES ON MEETING IN CABINET ROOM
WITH RICHARD NIXON. JOINED LATER BY
SECRETARY RUSK, TOM JOHNSON AND WALT ROSTOW
In talking with Richard Nixon, the President said:
"We have said to very responsible people--first, we have got talks set off with the Soviets. It is a question of timing and date on both offensive and defensive weapons. Now when you do that, that would likely include a lot of other things--the Middle East, very well Vietnam, probably North Korea and things of that nature. We don't know what time or date that will be. We will get on it early. We have asked them to set a date and they have asked us to set a date. I would assume it will be sometime within the next few weeks.
"Second, they have said in effect to us, you ought to conduct a certain course in Vietnam, which we considered unreasonable. We have in effect said to them, we will be glad to consider your suggestions. Now if we did that, what would you theorize the other side would do? In other words, you being responsible, and being the power? Now they have two in their court right this moment. Now the Vice President indicating that he might stop the bombing would be a very bad thing right at this moment when you are stopping it for nothing. You are giving it away free right when they are responding to us and what they would be willing to give in Paris."
The President then asked Mr. Nixon if he followed what he was saying.
Mr. Nixon replied:
"Yes, the Vietnamese. In other words, your people Thompson-Harriman have informed the Soviets, look here it is really the ball on their side of the net. You have three proceedings to de-escalate."
The President said that was correct. He then asked Mr. Nixon if we did stop the bombing, what would he say that they would do?
Mr. Nixon said that in terms of stopping the bombing that would mean the bombing--everything North across the line on the South. In other words, that is what the President is prepared to do with a bombing pause.
The President then said:
"We don't say we will get it, but it's the Communist line of attack. You ask Edgar Hoover. You have seen these things come and go. One time it's a pause, the next time it is something else. The next time it is Nixon, the next time it is McCarthy, the next time it is the Texas Rangers. The line at the moment with them all is just stop the bombing--just stop the bombing altogether. First, it was stop the bombing in Hanoi and Haiphong. Now we stopped 90 percent of the population and 78 percent of the area. Now then they come in and say we'll do some more if you will react to it at all--March the 31st. Now I said we have taken the first step. Now if you will take a step we will take other steps. But they are not doing that."
Mr. Nixon asked if it were the North Vietnamese and the Soviets also.
The President answered that that was correct--the North Vietnam powers.
The President said:
"Now in these talks--the Russians come along and put on a campaign right now. We rather think they are behind the campaign. Yesterday it was written in the Record--Javits, Hatfield, Morse--all got up and just raised hell for Johnson to stop the bombing now./2/ What that meant was that my son-in-law down in the DMZ with the rifle company would have to take 30 percent more cuts than they have ever faced there before because we are stopping 30 percent of them that are coming through there."
/2/Javits and other Senators criticized the Honolulu Conference and called for an immediate halt to the bombing of North Vietnam. See The New York Times, July 26, 1968.
Mr. Nixon said that he had been informed he had a nephew out there too now, and the President told them that he conducted himself like he had someone out here.
Mr. Nixon told the President he did not want him to get involved in their fights because it was not necessary, as they would handle that on the Republican side, but the reason that he thought the Rockefeller proposal was rather silly actually was that we have proved our good faith and that is what he said in the answer./3/ He said that he did not know what more we could do and asked the President if this was his position basically that we have to do anything more to prove our good faith?
/3/At a news conference on July 13, Governor Nelson Rockefeller criticized the Johnson administration for not tabling a specific bargaining plan that would overcome the climate of mistrust on both sides at Paris. He proposed a four-phase plan beginning with a pullback by both sides and the insertion of an international peacekeeping force, followed by the withdrawal of most, but not all, foreign troops from South Vietnam and the cessation of military activity by the VC. Elections would follow, and U.S. troops would withdraw entirely. In the last phase, the DRV and the GVN would negotiate the process for reunification, at which point the buffering troops would depart. See ibid., July 14, 1968.
The President told Mr. Nixon that time and time again we have proved our good faith and in each instance it has been rejected. He said: "Bobby Kennedy come in this office and asked for two things--one, he recommended Bill Moyers to be appointed Secretary of State to succeed Dean Rusk. I turned that down forthwith. I never knew Dean Rusk until I came in this Administration. He has acted wisely and ably in my judgment every day."
Mr. Nixon said he concurred in that.
The President went on to say:
"Now the second thing is--would we have a pause and how long. Oh, two or three days and that would do it. I was convinced it would not do any good, but I called in the Joint Chiefs and they said it would not do any harm so we put on a pause for a week--eight days. They did not respond to it. Since that time we have had about six different pauses, unilateral, on our own, including one 37 days./4/ The 37 days was a Russian pause. They started it. They have more contacts back here than you do. We are meeting with folks every day, but we have been up on the Hill. We have seen everybody on down, these very able top flight men and, of course, we know who they see and who they talk to naturally."
/4/Reference is to the bombing pause during the winter of 1965-1966.
Mr. Nixon said that he hoped so. He added that he thought that was a rather silly suggestion of Bobby Kennedy and McCarthy to suggest that Hoover should resign. He said you just don't pull the rug out from under a man when he is doing a job.
The President said he would have been rather uncomfortable during the period of the last five years without Hoover in town. The President said that Mr. Rusk would visit with Mr. Nixon shortly. He added that the Russians sold the long pause and the first man he guessed they really sold it to was Mac Bundy. The President said he went out to lunch with them and they convinced him that if we would pause for twelve days they could deliver North Vietnam, that they would respond to that act. The Joint Chiefs did not think that twelve days would be dangerous, but felt psychologically it would injure our soldiers out there and some of our people here--that it would be just twelve days wasted. The President said:
"It is like picking cotton when it gets ready to be picked. Two or three days later they got hold of McNamara and they sold McNamara on it. I went to Texas and they all got to talking to Rusk and he would not buy it and finally this went on for several days and then Rusk called me and said that he thought in the light of things we ought to try it.
"I came back from Texas and met with General Wheeler and spent an hour and a half with him and he reviewed it all carefully with the Joint Chiefs. And he said that we could carry out their suggestion of not less than 12 and not more that 20 days advantage really to our side if I would pledge to him that I wouldn't go more than 30 or 40 days. He sure did not want to give up much more than that time. The rain was on up there and they had a few holidays as I remember, during Christmas or Tet or something that would use up some of them that we wouldn't actually lose much there, but we could get these planes and put them over there where we needed them and that he would go along although he wouldn't recommend it or instigate it because of the psychological effect in the Congress."
The President told Mr. Nixon that when he got it from the Joint Chiefs, he sent it out to General Taylor and he came in and reviewed the whole thing and he agreed that he would do the same thing. The President said neither of them would instigate it or recommend it or advise, but all of them would defend it. It was their feeling, however, that we could get back in business if we took that long a pause.
The President said he agreed to it and twelve days later it produced nothing, twenty days it produced nothing, thirty days it produced nothing and in thirty days the President said he started to try desperately to get back to the shore. He said by thirty-seven days he got back, but if it had been longer, he never would have got back because each day they would bring somebody in and keep them there and he could not bomb a Russian official or a Canadian official or anybody else in Hanoi so he had trouble. He said then finally one day they got it clear and got back in.
The President said the North Vietnamese were told that if they would show us that they were willing to stop anything, then the U.S. would take another move but did not say what that move would be. He said they had done nothing for three months. The President said:
"Now then we've got back and said this. If we would stop the bombing, to North Vietnam in private conversation, would you agree to the re-establishment of the DMZ, would you agree to stop your infiltration? Now if we do ours first, would you come along at a later time and agree to do that? We want to see if you are really sincere. Now let's assume that you want us to stop and suppose we do stop, would you go to phase two? Now here is what is in phase two. Now you let us know how you feel about that before we actually act on the other. They have not responded. The word we received yesterday said they have it under serious consideration."
Mr. Nixon asked if the President was talking about the North Vietnamese and he said that he was.
The President said:
"At the same time we said to the Russians you want us to stop the bombing. If we stop the bombing can you get them to stop this? You want a de-escalation. Now we are willing to de-escalate, but if we de-escalate, can you get them to de-escalate also? They are not giving us action on it. We assumed that if we had these discussions that they would respond to it, but they have never responded to it before."
The President said that he had received a letter the day before from Kosygin./5/ He said it was not on that, but it touched generally on the situation. The President said we were trying to arrange the time and the talks. He said he had not discussed this with any other candidate and wanted Mr. Nixon to keep it confidential. The President told him:
/5/Not further identified.
"So for this reason if you were the President and I was a Democratic nominee, I would do like I did when Eisenhower was President and that is about what you have said that I have read--'that I am not responsible for this country until I become President. I expect to be President on January the 20th, at which time I will take control of it and I will try to launch some initiatives and my judgments and do what I think is right. In the meantime, I don't have all the information. I don't have all the facts and I do not want to convey the impression that half a dozen people are speaking for this country or that we have got seven Commander-in-Chiefs trying to direct the affairs of this country. After I become President I plan to direct and assume my responsibility. Until then I do not plan to confuse and frustrate and make people wonder who is President of this country. 'And that is what I'd do if I were running against you and you were President. I told one of the Democrats yesterday--I said, some of these days you are going to find the people are going to rise up and say who in the hell are for our men, who's going to speak for our men, who's going to support our men and you are going to be wishing you had supported us instead of letting Nixon do it and I think that it's true."
Mr. Nixon said as the President knew he (Nixon) had supported the commitment in Vietnam. He said he did not agree on the basis that we got dragged into it. He said the President and he knew that the reason we were there is in order to try to have peace in the Pacific. He said if you don't stop aggression there you aren't going to have peace in the Pacific. He said the way it was conducted was the President's responsibility, but it was the commitment that is very, very important there.
Mr. Nixon said:
"There are terrible pressures regarding Vietnam. You see, I've been down there, my God--I was talking to the House members the other day, and I was talking to the Senate members and they said you know Ford stood very firm on that. You've just got to get a commitment. There is a whole group that believes we are losing the war, we've already lost. That's the line. Now the briefing I had, of course, put a different view on that. I think the problem that we have now is that really--to put it quite frankly here--like Henry Clay, who was probably one of the least principled men who ever ran for the Presidency, but he used to say that he'd rather be right than to be President. I think you have to realize, and I'm sure you do, that what may be the right thing may be politically wrong in this country. You know the country is running away from us. Frankly, the press, I don't say that in any mean and bitter sense, but they have begun finally to get through."
Mr. Nixon then asked the President if he felt that way also and the President said that he did. Mr. Nixon then said as a example he had talked with a newspaper man who said Jack Valenti/6/ had told him that the President was planning to have a bombing pause between the two conventions and he said people then start running to Nixon and saying that he had to play tough until after the election if he wanted to win.
/6/Special Assistant to the President, 1963-1966.
The President said that he had not seen Jack Valenti in months, that he would never discuss this kind of subject with him, and that he would have a bombing pause any time he could get anybody to underwrite the other side and he never would until he did.
Mr. Nixon went on to say:
"Let me say one thing. I would never put any credence in any of these stories but the only reason I raise it is to point out how serious it was and the real problem that we have. The problem that we have now and speaking as a party man, I want to do the right thing--is to be able, and I'm not here to write a statement for the platform today and I'll take on some of the Congress, but to be able to write a statement that doesn't run basically against Javits and now Morton, and a lot of guys up there don't know better. That's our problem. You hear for example, and I don't carry tales to you, but this is all around town too that I understand that Hubert is under tremendous pressure. He's got to fight McCarthy a political year is bad, but fighting this kind in a political year is the worst. So I suppose Hubert--and I respect him and admire him. He's a hell of a man. He looks here, here's McCarthy. He's a hard man. Hubert is a guy that really should be over there with those people because he's supporting them. I think he really believes it is right. And so he gets a bunch of guys in and says now what can he be for. I think he'll have to come up with a bombing pause." He asked the President if he agreed and the President said he did not believe that he would. He said he thought there would be pressure on him to. He said Humphrey asked the President the night before what he thought about it and the President said he thought it was absolutely ridiculous.
The President then reiterated that if the North Vietnamese would guarantee to us that they would establish a DMZ and would not infiltrate it, that he had already given them something for nothing and why give them any more.
Mr. Nixon said that eventually he would have to take a position on this and he hoped it would be a responsible one. He said, "If it is, it may be politically awfully hard to sell, but we have to do it. That's the real thing."
The President said:
"Well, now here is the basic mis-assumption that a good many people in this country are making and I may be wrong, but this is my best judgment. My best judgment is that we're not losing the war. We're winning it. Now my best judgment is we're very close to winning it. My best judgment is that they will make another all-out grasp sometime the latter part of July to the 15th of August. They expect it now any day. And if they do, our people think they are ready for it. They hope they do. Westmoreland said to me, I hope they do. I said--how can you hope? He said that I would rather get them by the thousands than run them one by one. They told me that in Honolulu and it shocked the whole group there."
Mr. Nixon said then we are pretty close to winning there?
The President said he wouldn't say that exactly, but he would say that we are very close to letting the world know that they are out of business almost. He told Mr. Nixon they had suffered over 120,000 losses since January and they just could not keep on suffering that. He said the reason--there were two things.
"In the first place, I am not an amateur in this office and I don't love this power that they all talk about a great deal. But I carefully calculated this thing from August of last year and I told McNamara in August that if he wanted to go to the World Bank he could. He said he'd stay over here as long as I wanted and I said you go on. And he said--'does that mean that you're not going to run.' I said no, but I had told John Connally. He had told me that he wouldn't run for Governor. If I thought I needed him and wanted that Delegation and wanted him to be out in front and I told him that if I were in his place I wouldn't run for Governor. Now you can take two things into your consideration. He came back in October. He asked me if there had been any change and I told him no. He was the only one I talked to."
Mr. Nixon said that Connally was a good man.
The President then told Mr. Nixon that he had a statement and decided to put it in his State of the Union but then he didn't. He said he figured March 31st was the last day he could--that Truman had done it he believed on March 30th and he felt it would be unfair to not go on and announce it, not waiting if he were going to run because he wanted everybody to have a chance. He said he did not care who it was.
He said:
"I thought I understood Bobby's reasoning pretty well, and so I concluded that I could not get a tax bill and I had to keep the country fiscally sound and save the dollar, that I couldn't get them to the Conference table and I had no chance for peace if I did not, that I could not clean up Vietnam during my time, doubtful if I ever could but certainly I couldn't between now and January as a candidate. Now the question was--was it more important for me to be a candidate and try to take another four years to do these things, or to drop the candidacy part and try to do them now. Well, I concluded the latter, rather long. I'm happy I did. I've got my tax bill. I'm getting along better with the other things. I don't think that you can get hurt by our continuing our present posture there as candidates. I'm talking about as long as you take the position that you support our men, and you certainly want to see them supported and do a good job that you are not responsible for all of these decisions we are making, but when you are--you will assume that responsibility. Now I told Humphrey that is the way I would play it. I said if you play it any other way you ought to say this: 'I have no authority to speak for the Administration.' This does not represent its policy at all and don't you leave the impression that Humphrey is saying things that means Johnson because what you're saying doesn't mean Johnson."
Mr. Nixon told the President:
"One thing that I want to assure you of, which I am sure you know, is we have come to the end of a line and we have got to look back and nobody at this time wants to make any decision to prolong this damn war a day longer or one that ended it and then have another one in four or five years. I have always put it in terms of winning the peace--not winning over North Vietnam. Winning the peace--so that is the thing I am particularly interested in."
The President told Mr. Nixon that his position on that he thought was a pretty sound one.
Mr. Nixon said:
"Another thing I want to say is strictly personal between us. As you well know, the campaigns are going to be rough, but you can be sure that there will be nothing personal. I've kept that out and intend to continue to in respect to what you've done. I have said many times that you are the hardest working President that we have ever had in this office. I believe this."
The President said that he had tried.
Mr. Nixon said beyond that on this issue that they had to do the right thing and the only thing that he would appreciate would be if the President would just keep him posted--that he'd be standing out there.
The President said:
"I think you have been very responsible. No person has been of more help to me as President than President Eisenhower, my fellow predecessor, and I hope that whoever is President that I can be of help to them."
Secretary Rusk joined the meeting and the President reviewed briefly the points that he had touched on with Mr. Nixon. He suggested Secretary Rusk might want to give Mr. Nixon his evaluation of the situation. He told Secretary Rusk that he thought Mr. Nixon's attitude in connection with what had been done in our relations with other nations had been a responsible one and that the President wanted to help him with any facts that we have that would be of value to him and the other candidates so that they don't get misled or so they don't mislead somebody else.
Mr. Nixon said that Bob Ellsworth, his advisor, might want to talk with the President about Mr. Nixon going to the Soviet Union between Conventions. He said he would only do it if he thought that he could be helpful and only for the purpose of listening so that he could know these people.
[Omitted here is discussion of the situation in Czechoslovakia.]
Mr. Nixon asked if there was any way that the Czechoslovakia situation could be put on the scales in the Vietnam situation--was there any way that we could "play the game or is that too dangerous?"
Secretary Rusk thought the sacrifice that we would make in either place would be unacceptable. He said there was not much room there so far as the physical construction is concerned.
Secretary Rusk said on the Paris talks just to sum it up very quickly--the two delegations are there without an agreed agenda, the U.S. is there on the basis of the President's March 31st speech, the Hanoi delegation is there on the basis of their April 3rd statement which said the only purpose is to get us to come to a decision if all of the bombing stopped./7/
/7/See Documents 169 and 175.
Secretary Rusk said to a certain degree we have been talking past each other. He said that he felt Hanoi had lost some ground in the world opinion and the propaganda side. Their claim that they had no troops in South Vietnam was just laughed at and their rocket attacks on Saigon while the talks in Paris were going on bounced back on them. There is no way to know why they let up on this--whether it was for propaganda reasons or what. He said that what we were really trying to find out was the answer to one simple question--what would happen if the bombing were stopped. He said nobody in the world--no human being is thus far able to tell us. Hanoi refuses to and no one else is able to.
Secretary Rusk said:
"I'll make one remark that ought to be very closely held and that is that Hanoi is saying, at the moment, that they are giving serious consideration to what we've said on this subject. They have not yet answered. They have apparently not had their own answer from Hanoi. We think they are at least thinking it over. We have no reason to be encouraged about it, or discouraged about it. It's the Hanoi delegation in Paris."
Secretary Rusk went on to say that there was no doubt but what was happening in North Vietnam was the principal interest of the Soviet Union and all across this country. On the other hand, the Soviets are unable to say what would happen if we stopped the bombing. He said they sort of leave general enticements that the atmosphere would be improved, what might happen and that sort of thing, but even with the capacity of the Soviet Union and the United States to have the most secret communications they are unable to tell us what would happen if we stopped the bombing. We do think the Soviets have been discussing these problems with Hanoi. We're inclined to believe--to the extent they have some influence to say to Hanoi--at least try to be serious about this. But we don't expect Moscow to go out in advance of Hanoi, and even in a somewhat public position because I think they are nervous about just pushing Hanoi, holding it in the arms of Peking among other things.
Mr. Nixon asked if they felt they could pull the plug on the supplies because of Peking and Secretary Rusk said that was right. He said he also thought that they were ideologically motivated and if Hanoi should get away with it in Southeast Asia, the leadership of the Communist world would be involved. Secretary Rusk said we were working that side of the street too.
The President said we have said in effect the same thing to the Soviets and said: "If we stop the bombing would you see that certain things are done? To neither of those questions do we have operational answers."
Mr. Nixon said:
"It's too bad we have an election at this time and they say why not stop the bombing and so on and so forth. I frankly didn't intend to go in that direction, but it does show you how far your own advisers can go, particularly on this point, and I think as I said to the President earlier that our problem here is American public opinion which really thinks, well, let's go the extra mile and that is, how far can you go without getting something in return. Now as far as you see it at the present time, this is just one bit of leverage, a very important bit of leverage that you have left in order to get them to do something. Is this an important military aspect?"
Secretary Rusk reported that it was because we were knocking out an awful lot of trucks. He said we had been knocking the dickens out of them, and units that have been moving down and things of that type.
Mr. Nixon said the thing he wanted to know was whether there was any indication that they would do something. He wanted to know if they were hurting so much that they might be willing to do something.
Secretary Rusk said he felt that in the last ten days they were more interested in the problem and were willing to listen, although they haven't said too much yet. They say they are seriously considering it. He said:
"The fact that the war has been prosecuted against them so effectively brings them to the point that they now might consider trying to find a way to de-escalate. Let me remind you of something--going back twenty years. There were no objective reasons why the communists had to stop the bringing in of guerrillas into Greece. There was no objective reason why they had to lift the Berlin blockade when they did. When the Korean War was highly [finally?] drawing to conclusion, heavens there were 600 million Chinese back there that they were not brought into the thing, you see. In other words, there is a physical capability to continue something of this sort, but long before you get to that there is a possibility that for reasons of their own, which we do not fully understand, they decided that they had better bring it to an end in some fashion."
Mr. Nixon spoke up and said "you never know."
The President said if we thought we were hurting because we had lost 10,000 men out of 200 million, imagine what must be happening to them when they have lost 100 odd thousand out of a much smaller population.
Mr. Nixon said he had felt that way for a long time but then you get this loud propaganda that we are confronted with. He expressed concern on the stand that some of the Republicans had taken and he said it might be a pretty hard decision on the part of the candidate not to run--to run away from it.
Secretary Rusk said he might make one frivolous remark on this--that there were about a dozen elements involved in this matter of peace settlement in Vietnam and his mathematicians tell him that you get 40 million different combinations out of those elements. He said that all sorts of people have come forward with all sorts of readjustments of various elements that we have been talking about for a long time. He said the trouble with all of them is that Hanoi says no to all of them. He pointed out that there were a lot of proposals made that do not involve Washington. He said, in fact they were not even in Hanoi, that Hanoi continues to say no to all of them.
Mr. Nixon said that it was the idea too--the Rockefeller proposal, like so many others very well intended, but this is done in order to do our good faith. He said what we had been doing was trying to prove our good faith. He said you would find out that 78% of the land there in North Vietnam is untouched.
The President said that was one of the seven or eight good faith news he pointed out. He said there had been five or six pauses and he did not know how many different propositions--25 or 30. Secretary Rusk said at least 30.
The President said:
"Thirty various proposals that were made by the United Nations or by India, or by Great Britain or by somebody else, by the Pope. We found that out that they said no to all of them. We made just five or six pauses and now we stopped the bombing over Hanoi and Haiphong and said--now you give us some little indication to show us that you're interested and we'll stop some more. But he said no, we're right at this stage where we have said we are going to continue as we are unless and until you can give us some indication that the next move we make will not endanger our own American boys' lives."
Mr. Nixon agreed that he had to say that.
The President said:
"I said to a man last night, as I told you. Do you think that I, as Commander-in-Chief, ought to look that boy in the eye and say to him, I'm going to stop the bombing and he said why and I say so 30 percent more trucks can hit you tomorrow. If it were South of the DMZ, I'd say okay, I'll tell you why I stopped so we wouldn't go across the DMZ. I'd tell you why I stopped because they quit shelling Saigon. But when I look at him and he says why did you stop and I would say so 30 percent more trucks can hit you, that's not a very good answer. That's the only answer I've got now. Now if any of these fellows give me another answer, if Reischauer or McCarthy or anybody can give me another answer, I am willing to consider it. Or North Vietnam, but it's apparent they don't."
Secretary Rusk said that those who say they are not going to do anything that would get in the way or complicate the Paris talks are in the strongest possible position because in fact, at this moment, almost anything can happen in Paris. In other words, if you make any comments later, it depends on how this thing moves.
Mr. Nixon said, "Well, it is the right position. As I have said several times, you can only have one President at a time and one Secretary of State and who else can negotiate." Secretary Rusk told him he would be surprised at how many Secretaries of State we have got in this country at the moment.
The President recounted the incident when Walt Rostow briefed President Eisenhower on Tet and he asked President Eisenhower: "What will come out of Tet. Do you predict that thing will hold up there and they will have a change of Government and we will have a lot more problems?"
President Eisenhower said "Well, here is what I say. I say that they did not have a military victory. They may have, speaking of the North Vietnamese, they may gain a psychological victory. We'll have to see what develops in the way of the press and the turn of events and so forth. But I think all of us agree that it was somewhat of a psychological victory but they paid in a kamikaze way. They paid a very heavy price for that victory." Rostow then gave President Eisenhower a rundown on the situation.
The President pointed out that they said two or three things at Honolulu that he thought Mr. Nixon ought to know for his peace people--namely, the one man, one vote, let them participate, form the Constitution.
Mr. Nixon asked how that could be defined in relation to the whole jazz about Coalition Government.
Mr. Rostow answered by saying that on the political side, everybody in South Vietnam is against a Coalition unless they have decided upon it, that Coalition can be either one in which Communists take over. He said there had been some Coalition Governments in Eastern Europe which were a way to take over the power and there had been some Cosmetic-Communist menaces that have to come out so that Hanoi understands this and they were after Tet certainly to get a Coalition Government in Eastern European type.
Mr. Rostow then discussed at length the types of governments. After the review, Mr. Nixon said:
"So in effect they would allow a Nationalist Marxist Party. There would be no objection to that?" Mr. Rostow said that was correct.
Mr. Nixon then asked if their constitution did not use the term communist and he was told that it did.
Mr. Rostow pointed out there were three things. The first, was the one man, one vote and the marginal shift in its position. The President spoke up and said this was what they agreed to. He said this ought to be a little palatable to "your" people. It ought to be to the peaceniks or to the group, the Javits.
Mr. Rostow said the second was that Thieu and President Johnson agreed that they will be prepared any time they are ready, even before a political settlement, to talk about the total cessation of hostilities. He pointed out that we have conducted with the South Vietnamese a series of bi-weekly meetings between Ambassador Bunker and the Vietnamese leaders on major issues involved in making peace. He said they had a very complex, interesting session of all of the changes to be on the 1953 courts, for example. He said without fixed concepts, it is a complicated and difficult question. The two Presidents were prepared to make the proposition to Hanoi that any time they were prepared to sit down and talk seriously about the problems of how to handle this kind of war, we were prepared to do it. He went on to say that this is not any sort of a simple-minded cease fire, but it is serious subjects in very complex circumstances and Thieu is quite prepared to go forward.
[Omitted here is discussion of the USS Pueblo.]
Mr. Nixon made this point:
"Here is the argument that is made. They say now if you can get that Vietnamese thing off the plate then the Soviets would be willing to help out on a lot of things. They would help you out with the Pueblo. They'd help you out with this and that. What is the answer to that? I don't believe it myself, but (interrupted)."
The President said he had said all along that if the Vietnamese problem was out of the way we could move along. He said he did not know of any period in the history when there had been more agreement with them than the Consular Agreement, had the Space Agreement, had the non-proliferation agreement and now are talking about offensive and defensive weapons. He said the U.S. feels that they are going to be guided by their own interests and we think it is to their interest as well as to our interest that North Korea turn these folks loose.
The President said:
"We think they are going to try to get them to do it, if they can. I thought that at Glassboro and I left Kosygin the proposition that we had made to him that he felt was not an unreasonable proposition./8/ Nothing came out of it. I don't know whether North Vietnam wouldn't follow his suggestions or whether his own people wouldn't follow them when he got back. We don't ever know about those things. I don't know whether if Vietnam was out of the way we would make any more progress with them or not. I seriously doubt that we would. I'm not able to prove it. The only answer I can give to it is that we have our responsibilities. We're going to have to live up to them out there. As long as I am President we are going to and I am going to try to turn this thing over to whoever does just like it was turned over to me, keep the commitments that we will make."
/8/For documentation of the summit between Johnson and Kosygin at Glassboro in June 1967, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIV, Documents 217 ff.
Mr. Nixon said:
"Let's suppose that we chickened out basically. Call it any way you want it. It is going to be interpreted that way if we agree to a Coalition Government or any of the others. Let's suppose that happens. I think we should all say that because I think it is true. The nations in that area are stronger today than they were three years ago because we have kept the cork in the bottle. But let's suppose it happened today. What's going to be the effect on Thailand and Malaysia and Japan, particularly Japan, or do they care any more?"
Secretary Rusk said privately they would rather have us stay in there. He said this is a very private part of the conversation about General Ne Win./9/ Secretary Rusk said privately General Ne Win is a real hawk on Vietnam--Morarji Desai of India is very strong; Panto de Panas has recently won an election in that anti-American opposition there, and his brother is even stronger. They haven't changed. He reported that the Philippinos are a little relaxed about it. They think they could be doing more than they are doing and we have been trying to get them to do it.
/9/Burmese Prime Minister Ne Win.
Mr. Nixon posed the following question:
"The fundamental point that I constantly try to bring up. I can only do it through the Republican side with these guys. I say well, look, let's forget all the other arguments. Let's forget the Domino Theory--the nations are now stronger, they can keep it, and after all we can withdraw and forget everything else. Let's suppose that this war is ended in a way that it is interpreted, doesn't make any difference what it is, interpreted as a defeat for us and a win for them. Doesn't this have a massive effect on the cost at Peking and the cost in Moscow?"
Secretary Rusk agreed that is right, but there is a danger in our own country--that's the real problem. He said the most important thing in the world for a candidate is that if he were to become President his credibility would be respected by the other side in a moment of crisis. Mr. Rostow agreed with Mr. Rusk's summation.
Mr. Nixon said he appreciated the time the President had given him. He said as he told the President earlier, the problem of the candidate is very complicated at the moment. He said he had always talked about the commitment. He said: "In other words, I could never see the argument that is made by some of my colleagues that say well, we shouldn't be there but now since we're there we are honor bound to stay. The main point is that we are there for a reason, as I understand it, and I think this is the fundamental point. I think your San Antonio speech was the one that laid it on the line so strong."
Secretary Rusk said we were there for a reason that was almost unanimously agreed to by both parties when the commitment was made.
Mr. Nixon said:
"And I do want to say too that apart from any differences that we naturally have to have politically at this time that I have really admired the way that all of you have stood up under great fire. The way you handled yourself before that miserable questioning you had. I know some of the things that you've gone through in your background."
Mr Nixon said what concerned him is what has happened to American public opinion, within a matter of six months starting with the Tet offensive. "It isn't just the Gallup and Harris reports. You know you can sense it--Congressmen coming back. Congressmen have stood up before--just like a bunch of jelly at the present time. And the reason is--and this is the fundamental thing they raise such a fuss about. I have just been on the Hill and the fellow who has stood very firmly with me in this issue said you've got to change your position. I said why? And he said the war is lost. Now if you put it that way, that is what we've got to be concerned about. If that's the case, then we've got to find a way to get out."
Secretary Rusk said nobody told that to our fellows in Vietnam. They don't feel that way out there. He said in the last few months they have captured 48 battalions worth of equipment from the other side.
The President asked Mr. Nixon if he wanted to address himself briefly that the war is lost and Mr. Nixon said he thought the President's people covered it very well.
The President suggested he clear it with General Wheeler and General Abrams and specifically what has actually happened in numbers so he could bear that in mind. Mr. Nixon replied that he did not think he needed any convincing on that. He said he did not buy the idea that the war was lost--that if the President thought that he would have told him.
The President said a lot of the information was public record but if there were things Mr. Nixon wanted to know in the weeks ahead, he hoped he would feel free to pick up the telephone and call him.
Mr. Nixon said the only thing he would need information on, for example, if the President was going to move in the direction of a bombing pause or something of that sort, he would like to know because he did not intend to advocate one. He said he told the President that because there is a little discussion, but on the other hand, if the President was going to move in such a direction, he thought he should know so that they won't be out there fighting a battle that has already been lost.
[Omitted here is discussion of impending foreign aid legislation.]
311. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, July 29, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (Helms) Chrono, Jan-Jul. 1968, 01 Jan-31 Jul 1968. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Clifford.
SUBJECT
Hanoi's Intentions and the Lull in Combat
1. You will recall that Ambassador Vance, in a message to you last week, asked for a paper dealing with Hanoi's intentions in the light of the current lull in the fighting in South Vietnam./2/ The attached is that paper.
/2/The request was transmitted in telegram 18337/Delto 491 from Paris, July 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968)
2. The completion of this paper was somewhat delayed because of important differences of view, among the highly restricted number of individuals in the Agency cleared to read the relevant materials, on the issues involved. All are agreed that Hanoi wants an early end to the conflict but there is disagreement on future tactics and on the price which Hanoi may be willing to pay for peace. There are those who feel that Hanoi may forgo further major military action, considering that its best prospects lay in opening political discussion which would expose a brittle situation in Saigon and in the United States. Others believe that Hanoi will be unwilling to rely on these means entirely and fully expect the Communists to again apply intensive military pressures.
3. On peace terms, some feel that whatever Hanoi's tactics, the Communists are still striving for an outcome clearly and decisively favorable to them in South Vietnam. In this view, Hanoi attaches great importance to securing a unilateral halt to the bombing, because it would greatly unsettle the GVN and open the path for further political exploitation. Others feel that Hanoi's moves, particularly since early June, indicate considerable flexibility with respect to the terms of a settlement and a willingness to move away from many of their long-standing positions.
4. While the attached paper does not go to either extreme, its tone with respect to the prospects of a negotiated settlement in the near term is, in my personal view, too sanguine.
Richard Helms/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/4/
Washington, July 29, 1968.
/4/Top Secret; Nodis; Harvan; Plus.
NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS
Summary
Recent Communist moves suggest more flexibility in North Vietnam's negotiating position than has been evident in the past. Hanoi may be preparing for a negotiated settlement which stops short of full Communist control, but which assures them opportunities to obtain a dominant role for the Communists in South Vietnam.
Nevertheless, in the absence of substantial US concessions, we do not believe that the Communists are yet prepared to agree to measures restricting their future military actions. The current military lull may have been designed in part for political effect, but it also is being used to prepare another round of Communist attacks.
If the Communists are prepared to scale down their demands for a settlement, they are unlikely to give any clear indication of this until the results of further military efforts are known.
[Omitted here are five pages comprising the body of the paper.]
312. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, July 29, 1968, 1925Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Received at 4:09 p.m. In a note transmitting a copy of the telegram to the President, July 29, 6:40 p.m., Bromley Smith wrote: "Ambassadors Harriman and Vance in the attached cable argue for a cessation of the bombing now based on certain assumptions. Secretary Rusk may raise this cable with you when he calls at 6:45 p.m. You may wish to consider the substance of the cable at tomorrow's luncheon meeting." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel--Paris Delto, IX--7/23-3l/68) The notation "ps" on the covering note indicates that the President saw the telegram.
18692/Delto 524. From Harriman and Vance.
1. We have reached a stage in the Paris talks which makes it desirable to take stock of where we are and to consider where we go from here.
Part I--Where We Are
2. The present position we have taken--as reflected in the Phase 1-Phase 2, proposal--is only in the early stages of exploration. Hanoi has had this proposal before it in general form since June 26, and in fairly detailed form since July 15. The North Vietnamese did not propose a new meeting last week, commenting that they were in the process of examining the Honolulu communique.
3. It is possible that, if we stick to our present course, we will in time be able to extract the understanding we are seeking from Hanoi. In addition to taking a good deal of time, any undertaking they will give us will probably not be explicit enough to enable us to know with confidence what they will do after we stop the bombing. We are likely to confront slowly paced, minor and ambiguous concessions as Hanoi tries to get a bombing cessation at the least price.
4. We may, of course, have a further reading at this Wednesday's session, but we so not believe anything sufficiently new will come out of this meeting, or of any discussion in the near future.
5. We believe Hanoi's thinking about the pace and content of the Paris talks is influenced to some extent by coming events in the US. These events--conventions, elections, change of administration--set a time frame which we need to take into account as we estimate what the other side is likely to do.
6. This forces us to look at what happens in the next two months without clear and visible progress here. If we do nothing new, we leave the initiative and timing to Hanoi. Two major factors then come to bear:
A. The possibility of our taking action which may deter the launching of the expected enemy attacks and thus save American and allied lives; and
B. The prospect that the month of August, and particularly the Democratic convention, will produce a further division of domestic US opinion which will severely weaken the base which is necessary for the long, hard negotiations required to achieve a just solution. It is possible that this division may become so deep that it will force the new administration to a precipitous withdrawal with the result that all our sacrifices to achieve US objectives will have been for naught.
7. If the enemy mounts his expected major offensive, the only way we gain is if the attacks are sharp and decisively defeated in short order. We note that General Abrams is confident that the attacks will be repelled, but we also note that estimates from Saigon are that the enemy may be able to sustain major attacks for up to two months. Thus it would appear that the odds for a quick, decisive outcome are not great. US casualties will have a bad effect at home and civilian destruction will create problems in South Viet-Nam.
Part II--A New Course
8. A major change in these prospects is possible during the month of August. It would necessarily involve a speed-up of our own timetable and, admittedly, some risks. On our part, it would require a return to the San Antonio formula in which we would make certain assumptions regarding Hanoi's actions after the cessation. On Hanoi's part, it would involve the one thing that Hanoi had been willing to commit itself to--that is a readiness to move into substantive negotiations immediately following a full cessation of bombing and all other activities involving the use of force on or within the territory of the DRV.
9. As we look back on March 31, we can see that our initiative forestalled Hanoi's plans and greatly lengthened our lease on US public opinion, while actually stimulating Saigon far more than it was upset. An August initiative by us would certainly repeat the first two effects. It would have risks in Saigon (and some with our allies), but Thieu has put himself in a much stronger position since April and our most sensitive allies--on Bundy's reading--trust this administration and probably would give us the benefit of the doubt.
10. To justify our moving in this direction, we could point to the lull in Communist military activity in Saigon and elsewhere in Viet-Nam. A case can be made that his has now continued long enough to serve as a plausible rationale for implementation of the San Antonio formula. It can be cited in such a way as to bring world opinion to bear as a constraint on the future actions of the North Vietnamese. Such a public position, combined with a cessation of bombing, may pre-empt a major NVA/VC offensive.
11. It would make no difference if Hanoi publicly claimed that we had stopped the bombing without reciprocal action on their part. This has always been implicit in the Phase 1-Phase 2 formula; what will count will be what they do rather than what they say. Moreover we can draw our own conclusions for the public.
12. The essence of this course of action would be that, after consultation with our allies, we would tell Hanoi privately that we are prepared to stop the bombing and all other activities involving the use of force on or within the territory of the DRV, and the President will announce this shortly. (We propose that this be done no more than two days before the President's announcement, so that Hanoi would have insufficient time to react.) When we tell them, we would state the assumptions on which we are proceeding. These assumptions would be:
A. Within a very few days following the cessation of bombing, we expect to begin serious, substantive talks (on an our side-your side basis) in which the GVN would participate and in which the DRV would be free to bring to the table any South Vietnamese elements they see fit.
B. The de-militarized status of the DMZ would be restored. No military personnel or equipment of any sort should be located in, or moved through the DMZ. There will be no artillery or other fire across the DMZ and no massing of forces in the area of the DMZ in such a way as to constitute a direct military threat.
C. There will be no indiscriminate attacks against major centers such as Saigon, Hue and Danang.
D. There will be no increase of North Vietnamese force levels in South Viet-Nam. (It is worth noting here that the good flying weather that will continue through October will provide us with a greater ability to verify this assumption between now and October than between November and April.)
13. We and our allies must be prepared to resume the bombing if Hanoi invalidates our assumptions. Obviously no threat would be made to Hanoi in this regard.
14. In presenting this proposal to the GVN and ICC, we believe that three points should be made:
A. If assumptions are invalidated we will resume bombing;
B. We will not engage in any follow-on substantive talks without GVN presence on an our side-your side basis; and
C. This action may deter NVA/VC from mounting the major attacks that are expected.
15. Concurrent with the actual presentation to the North Vietnamese, a letter should be sent to Kosygin recalling his assurances in the earlier exchange, and informing him of precisely what we are telling Hanoi. It is suggested that the letter not require a Soviet answer, but leave it open to the Soviets whether they wish to reply. We should inform the Soviet Ambassadors in Washington and Paris. The Soviet Ambassadors in these capitals will undoubtedly be informed of the letter by their government, as they have been in the past.
Part III--Some Further Thoughts
16. We recognize that our short-term objectives in para 12 above do not address a basic long-term objective of securing NVN withdrawal from SVN. This is a subject for early consideration in the substantive talks with the ultimate objective of ending NVN movement of troops and supplies into SVN and the withdrawal of NVN military and paramilitary forces from SVN, Laos and Cambodia.
17. While we cannot be sure that the course of action presented in Part II will forestall a new NVN offensive, it may well do so. Thus, in addition to moving the negotiations forward, stopping the bombing could over the near future save the lives of many American troops who might otherwise be killed in defeating North Vietnamese attacks. Moreover, the pre-emption of a major North Vietnamese offensive would forestall Hanoi from achieving the psychological and political objectives which Secretary Clifford, General Wheeler and the US Mission believe to be the primary purpose of such attacks. If, indeed, Hanoi launched major attacks along lines of Tet or May offensives after a bombing cessation, it would clearly demonstrate its unwillingness to act in good faith to seek a negotiated peace. Its position throughout the world would be severely damaged. In the US, the public would close ranks behind the administration and a resumption of the bombing program would meet with general understanding
18. If we are to pursue this course, we must be assured that the GVN is prepared to participate in an appropriate and productive manner. The GVN must field a delegation with authority to negotiate and comprised of individuals with whom we can work. The procedures to be followed within "our side" should be agreed, including among other things, the expectation that GVN and US representatives would engage separately in private meetings with the other side (with close consultation, of course).
19. We have discussed this idea in general terms with Under Secretary Katzenbach and Assistant Secretary Bundy. We recommend that Ambassador Vance, circumstances in Paris permitting, leave for Washington after the meeting of Wednesday, July 31, in order to provide some further thoughts and additional elaboration on the course of action outlined in Part II above.
Harriman
313. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, July 30, 1968, 0134Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by William Shepard of S/S-S. A notation on a copy of the telegram sent to the White House reads: "Sent 9:34 p.m. July 29." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. V(a), 7/68)
211189/Todel 787. Eyes only for Harriman and Vance from the Secretary.
1. I have discussed your Delto 524 with the President and the Secretary of Defense./2/ This short message is to let you know as soon as possible, pending a more extensive comment, that we wish to stay firmly on our present course and press for a constructive Hanoi response to the proposals we have already made. They have told us they are "seriously considering" those proposals. We have not yet had a reply and believe that we are entitled to an answer. The proposals we have made, especially in the Phase 1-Phase 2 framework, are reasonable, fair and generous if there is any interest on the part of Hanoi in a tolerable peace in South East Asia. Such a tolerable peace is our central objective for which we have already made major concessions without significant response from Hanoi.
/2/Delto 524 is Document 312. Rusk met with the President and Clifford beginning at 6:45 p.m. Rusk left the meeting at 8:05 p.m., and Clifford apparently stayed until 8:30 p.m. (Ibid., Dean Rusk Appointment Book, 1968-1969) While complete notes of the meeting have not been found, Clifford's handwritten summary points from the meeting indicate that the principal topic of conversation was the planned summit between the President and Kosygin and its impact on the election and on the Vietnam negotiations. (Ibid., Clark Clifford Papers, Handwritten Notes, Memos, etc.)
2. We have reason to believe that Hanoi, Moscow and others are trying to mount a concerted campaign to force us to stop all of the bombing without any corresponding action at all from Hanoi. It may be that they are counting on the convention and electoral period to achieve this end. They must be disabused of this idea if there is to be peace. We will continue to give thought to all alternatives but we should not leave the impression that further delay by Hanoi will cause us to make further unilateral concessions.
3. In view of the above we believe that Vance should remain in Paris for the present to be available for Hanoi's response and further discussion along that line rather then return at this point and stimulate a lot of speculation that we are about to make new moves in the absence of such a response.
4. I will go over this in detail with Katzenbach upon his return and be in touch with you further. Warm regards.
Rusk
314. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, July 30, 1968, 9:57 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and McNamara, July 30, 1968, 9:57 a.m., Tape F6807.02, PNO 14. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
[Omitted here is discussion of U.S. foreign aid assistance on family planning and the Pope's opposition to it.]
President: Now, there are some very strange developments on this cable thing that concern me. They've been meeting over in Defense on stopping this thing, and I gather Clark looks with favor upon it. Do you know anything about this?/2/
/2/Reference is to Document 312.
Rusk: No, no.
President: Well, they're boxing us in on this.
Rusk: He didn't express that yesterday.
President: This is a little move going on around from overseas.
Rusk: Clark was the only one who was supposed to have that cable. Have others been meeting on it?
President: Yeah. I think he's the only one who has it, but I think he's kind of expressing the viewpoint that's contained in the cable. And I think we've a good, full-fledged, bone-up movement along this direction and I think we've got to meet, head-off, before they take it over. And I think we probably ought to do it by saying that our position is as stated in the President's speech, we made this move, and we're very anxious for them to show that they'll take some steps if we take some steps, if they won't use them to hurt us, and we're not going to stop the bombing until they agree to stop some, because if we don't, they're gonna make--the New York Times is kick-off these folks over here. Cy came over and had this view when he was here before. I think another thing we probably ought to tell Cy today is that we want to go into this with him but we think it could be gone into a little later.
Rusk: Did you see my telegram I sent you?/3/
/3/
Document 313.President: No, I hadn't seen either one of them.
Rusk: One of them I had to dig out of a deep safe this morning. But I couldn't get at it last night.
President: Did they just ignore it?
Rusk: No, I think--you can see what's in the telegram. It was taken over by hand and I think Brom Smith is bringing it up to you.
President: All right.
Rusk: But I--no--Cy did not talk to me along these lines except that he did say that looking down the road that we ought to give further thought to the assumptions under the San Antonio formula. But he recommended to me that we stay on our present track.
President: Well, that's what he did to me too. He recommended it for a few days while he was exploring this other, but he had this idea in his mind when he was here and made a pitch at me. But I told him no, we didn't want it. But he's bought it now. I think we have another Goldberg plan there in front of us, don't you?
Rusk: Well, if there's a ganging up on it, I think so.
President: Yes sir, no question about it. Well, why don't you hit it this morning? Why don't you just cut him off?
Rusk: Well, I'll see what I can do. I will do my best on that.
315. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, July 30, 1968, 11:54 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and McNamara, July 30, 1968, 11:54 a.m., Tape F6807.02, PNO 15. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
President: Yes, Dean?
Rusk: Was I too much of a hawk?
President: No, not at all. I didn't hear the prepared statement. I got in about six minutes late because the operator here couldn't get us connected. But when I got connected, I heard it, and it sounded like you had a bunch of Viet Cong questioners all day./2/
/2/At 11 a.m. that day, Rusk convened a press conference at which he read a statement noting that the enemy had moved significant numbers of its forces near South Vietnam's cities and continued large-scale movements through the DMZ. In response to reporters' questions, he insisted that the U.S. Government had not received an adequate reply from Hanoi regarding peace overtures. See Department of State Bulletin, August 19, 1968, pp. 185-192. In a telephone conversation with Governor Richard Hughes of New Jersey, Johnson criticized the activities of various antiwar Senators and made the following comment: "What they're asking me to do is be the biggest boob of our time. Just as the Communists get ready to hit us, they want me to do what I did at Tet--take a vacation, let our men accept a Tet holiday, and as I do it, and call off our bombing, let them hit me full length, and I just--I just--I just don't see it. Now, Rusk doesn't see it. He covered it fully in his press conference today. Although, God, I want to be a hero, and I want to get the war over, and I've got two boys in it, both of them in combat every day, and one of them has lost over half of his men, I just can't do any more than I'm doing that I know of." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Hughes, July 30, 1968, 8:46 p.m., Tape F6807.02, PNO 17; transcript prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian)
Rusk: Yes I did. I think that my press fellows tell me that there'll be some question from some of the boys like Chalmers Roberts and others as to whether this is a change. I would suggest that if George Christian gets that question, he simply say, "No, that the President's views are contained in the March 31st statement and in the Honolulu communique and that the Secretary's remarks were wholly within the four corners of those two things."
President: I told George Christian you ought to say there's been as near as we can tell no change in either side since March 31st; that we've taken the position that we will stop 90 percent of it if they'll take some action, and we do not interpret that they have taken any, and while they did not hit Saigon yesterday, they did hit Danang the day before--the 119 rockets, and infiltration is now the highest point it's ever been, and for us to say to our men that we're going to expose not only to the 70 percent that's coming in but to the other 30 percent that we're now destroying in return for we know not what, the answer is a loud, strong "no."
Rusk: Well, I'll try to get a transcript over so that you can see the first part of it as quickly as you can.
President: Fine. And I'd have your man tell them too that this is exactly March 31st and Chalmers Roberts as usual is just roaming around trying to read things into something that's not there.
Rusk: Right. Thank you.
316. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, July 30, 1968, 1-2:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Mansion of the White House. Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, and Smith left at 2:05 p.m. and Taylor and Helms at 2:20 p.m. Christian and Tom Johnson remained until 3:05 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS
ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Taylor
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
George Christian
Bromley Smith (in Walt Rostow's absence)
Tom Johnson
The President: I want a report from General Taylor on the whole situation regarding this new wave of demands to stop the bombing and all of the facts about enemy activities and the level of fighting./2/
/2/See Document 321. A July 30 memorandum for the record by Taylor summarizing the meeting reads: "At the outset, the President expressed the view that the Soviet Union, Hanoi and many political elements in the U.S. were bent upon forcing him to give up all bombing of North Viet-Nam, preferably prior to the Democratic convention. He noted an apparent divergence of views within CIA with regard to Hanoi's intentions in relation to the apparent lull in combat. I expressed feeling the need for a thorough paper analyzing all the evidence and suggesting courses of action to counter the campaign which the President had mentioned. He immediately charged me with the task and told me to get Bunker's views. After the luncheon, I followed him to his bedroom to get further guidance as it was not clear from the previous conversation whether he wanted me to pay a visit to Viet-Nam. He indicated that a trip was not necessary although I should go out whenever I felt it necessary. The immediate need is a paper by this weekend which will give him all the argumentation that can be used to frustrate the pressures to stop the bombing. He expressed dissatisfaction with his senior officials in not speaking out publicly in support of his position. He thinks that the JCS should do more public speaking. He is clearly distressed by evidence of division within his official family on matters relating to the war in Viet-Nam and the peace talks in Paris." (National Defense University, Maxwell Taylor Papers, Project Lull)
General Taylor: I will do that, sir.
The President: I believe the International Communists have a movement under way to get me to stop the bombing. What is the situation on infiltrators?
General Wheeler: As of July 24, there were:
28,400 infiltrators who started down in March
37,700 infiltrators who started down in April
30,600 infiltrators who started down in May
16,900 infiltrators who started down in June
44,200 infiltrators who started down in July
The President: What effect would a complete bombing halt have?
General Wheeler: It would permit 30% more troops and supplies to reach South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk: It would add 50% to what is getting through now.
The President: Let's say that. I would like General Wheeler to summarize the reasons we should not stop the bombing.
General Wheeler: We have 120 miles of attack zone to hit enemy supplies now. We have had good luck, getting 30% of the traffic. This increment would move into the DMZ and up to the DMZ if the bombing stopped.
General Wheeler: We have hit them hard in this area. There would be loss of morale in the U.S. forces in the DMZ area. It gives the military disadvantage.
The President: Give me a paper on it./3/
/3/See footnote 5, Document 319.
General Wheeler: The JCS does oppose a complete bombing pause.
[Omitted here is discussion of the Czech situation.]
[The President:] I would like to see Bill Bundy for a report on his talks with the Allies./4/
/4/The President received a half-hour briefing from Bundy regarding his consultations on Vietnam with allied nations and the Paris delegation that evening at 5:10 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Notes of the meeting have not been found.
Now, Bus, I read about all this offensive they plan for us. What are we doing?
General Wheeler: Abrams is trying to pre-empt their attacks. He is using B-52s to hit their staging areas. He wants U.S. commands to intercept these people.
Secretary Clifford: When we were in South Vietnam, we asked all U. S. field commanders if they have all the men, equipment, and supplies needed for any offensive. All field commanders said yes. Our men want them to go ahead with the offensive.
The President: I would like to see us knock the hell out of them.
General Taylor: Is it to our advantage to keep a third attack from coming out?
The President: Westmoreland said it is to our advantage for them to go ahead with the offensive.
Director Helms: It would permit us to concentrate against them in large numbers.
General Wheeler: I would open up the area between the 19th and 20th parallels. We could hit logistic targets, operate Sea Dragon, conduct air-to-air operations and hit their airfield.
The President: Let's review that Friday/5/ morning to see how we would react if they hit Saigon.
/5/August 2.
I want to get back up to the 20th parallel. Let's get ready for that if they hit us.
Dean, you go out to Vance and Harriman and tell them to hold on to their hats if attacks against our forces occur.
General Wheeler: Saigon, Danang and Quang Tri are possible targets of major attacks, Abrams says.
General Taylor: Should Vance and Harriman tell opposite members?
Secretary Rusk: It might be seen as a threat. They may see it as a dare.
The President: I would like for them to know they will be hit and hit hard if they attack us.
Secretary Rusk: They would see us telling them that we would hit them as a threat.
Secretary Clifford: On Cambodia, here are the bases in Cambodia--"Parrots Beak" area is of much concern. (Shows maps of the area.)
General Wheeler: Two years ago there were only 200 people there. Now there are 2,000 people there. The 9th Viet Cong division goes back in there to rehabilitate and rest. There may be prisoner of war camps in there.
Secretary Clifford: We will send reconnaissance flights in.
General Wheeler: We will have five low-level flights.
The President: Senator Mansfield says Sihanouk is a great statesman. I would show him these maps and photos of the enemy positions.
General Wheeler: It is 25 miles from Saigon. They can get in sampans and hit us easily in Saigon.
Secretary Clifford: It appears that diplomatic efforts will not get the release of our men the Cambodians are holding.
We could discourage the U. S. tourists to Cambodia as "dangerous under present conditions." We could not protest.
Secretary Rusk: U.S. tourist trade amounts to 1/4 of Cambodia's tourist trade ($1 million).
Secretary Clifford: We could supervise the Mekong traffic and make it difficult for Cambodian ships. We might apprehend a Cambodian ship if it violates GVN territorial waters.
We could increase surveillance and as the last alternative, we could attack the VC staging area.
The President: I look with favor on showing these pictures to Sihanouk. Give them a strong statement.
Director Helms: There is another staging area up north.
The President: Bring those photos in.
317. Information Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 31, 1968, 11:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. V(a), 7/68. Secret. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
SUBJECT
Report on Today's Paris Meeting by Secure Telephone From Paris
State Department was given the following summary of today's four hour Paris meeting on Vietnam:/2/
/2/The Paris delegation's reports on the 15th formal session are in telegrams 18798/Delto 531 and 18824/Delto 536 from Paris, both July 31. (Ibid., Harvan Chron., Vol. XVI, 7/26-31/68)
1. The meeting can be described as a "holding action" by the North Vietnamese.
2. During the Tea Break Colonel Lau, who spoke for the North Vietnamese in the absence of Chief Delegate Thuy, said:
--He would be in contact with our negotiators about a private meeting.
--Did not answer clearly in response to Ambassador Vance's direct question as to whether the North Vietnamese were seriously considering the private proposal we had made to them. He merely said that serious consideration had been given to the proposal but that then they had been confronted by the Honolulu communique.
--The North Vietnamese asked whether there had been a change in U. S. policy and whether Ambassadors Harriman and Vance spoke for the U.S. Government.
3. In the regular public session the usual exchange took place. The North Vietnamese attacked the Honolulu communique and described Secretary Rusk's press conference as bellicose. Ambassador Harriman rebutted charges with special emphasis on North Vietnamese troops in the south.
4. Ambassador Harriman stressed the Lao situation in the larger meeting.
Brom
318. Editorial Note
During a press conference from 4:37 to 5:24 p.m. on July 31, 1968, President Johnson fielded questions relating to Vietnam. The President denied an assertion that as a result of the Honolulu Conference his Vietnam policy had changed to where he now required a formal commitment from North Vietnam before ordering a bombing cessation. He countered that over 30,000 North Vietnamese troops had infiltrated southward during the month of July. "There is, therefore, evidence that a massive enemy effort is underway to re-equip--the President has this evidence where he can see it--and to retrain for massive attacks upon South Vietnam and particularly on certain specified major cities," he proclaimed. He noted his determination not to stop the bombing under such conditions. For full text of the statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pages 856-865.
319. Information Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, August 1, 1968, 7:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VI, 8/68-9/68. Top Secret. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it and the attachments.
SUBJECT
Responses to General Taylor's Memorandum on Bombing Policy
Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler have sent in the attached papers giving their views on General Taylor's memorandum to you concerning our bombing policy in North Vietnam.
You will recall that General Taylor discussed three alternatives--
1. Stop the bombing completely
2. Continue our present policy
3. Linking the level of our bombing to that of enemy violence in South Vietnam
General Taylor's memorandum is at Tab D./2/
/2/In his July 30 memorandum to the President, attached but not printed, Taylor argued that implementation of the third alternative required lifting "the geographical limitations on the bombing target system." He believed that if this policy was enacted, the following statement should be issued: "Available data indicate that in recent weeks enemy violence in South Viet-Nam, measured in attacks, terrorism, harassment, sabotage, and the resultant military and civilian loss of life on our side, has subsided slightly (or we could indicate an approximate percentage) under that of the period immediately following the President's March 31 speech. U.S. military authorities have been directed to make a comparable reduction in the sortie rates being flown against North Vietnamese military targets for the immediate future." Taylor concluded: "I think we should try the second alternative now but prepare to shift to this last one."
In brief, the two Secretaries and General Wheeler oppose linking the level of our bombing to that of enemy violence in South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk believes it is too complicated to administer and seems to use military resources in a way that does not achieve relatively simple objectives. He defers, however, to his military colleagues on the military aspects of the suggestion. (Tab A)/3/
/3/In his July 31 memorandum to the President, attached but not printed, Rusk noted: "My concern about General Taylor's ingenious third course of action is that it is too complicated to administer and seems to me to use military resources in a way that does not achieve relatively simple objectives. It would put any bombing of North Viet-Nam on an almost purely political basis and therefore expose us to political charges that it is an obstacle to peace and ought to be eliminated." In a July 30 letter to Rusk, Taylor requested that he prepare this memorandum. (National Defense University, Maxwell Taylor Papers, Project Lull) In a memorandum for the record, August 1, Taylor described his meeting with Rusk that day, during which Rusk noted that "we should stay on our present course in Paris and give nothing away at this time" and suggested that it was "preferable to maintain the low level of military and diplomatic activity throughout August in order to avoid introducing any disturbing factor into the domestic political scene." (Ibid.)
Secretary Clifford believes the suggestion is unworkable and would be unproductive. Our bombing is now tied to the security of our own forces and should not be tied to other variables. (Tab B)/4/
/4/In his August 1 memorandum to the President, attached but not printed, Clifford concluded: "In summary, I agree with General Taylor on his recommendation that we should not now deviate from our present course. I see no reason to let present or prospective public pressures dictate our course of action. We should not allow such pressures to force us to embark on an expansion of the bombing, to a premature cessation of the bombing or to abandonment of our search for a bombing halt under circumstances where such further restraint on our part promises to bring us closer to a satisfactory settlement." In a letter to Clifford, July 30, Taylor requested that he prepare this memorandum. (National Defense University, Maxwell Taylor Papers, Project Lull) In a memorandum for the record, July 31, Taylor described his meeting with Clifford and Nitze that day. Clifford proposed that the President announce that within a week bombing would end if the DMZ was not violated, infiltration did not increase, attacks on major cities subsided, and substantive talks including the GVN began. Bombing would resume if attacks occurred or if the enemy rejected the offer. "Clifford seemed to feel that a long drawn-out negotiation without bombing is more tolerable than the maintenance of military pressure on Hanoi at the cost of high casualties," Taylor noted. (Ibid.)
General Wheeler considers the suggestion not to be in our best interests. He says that the value of having an answer to a possible charge that we fail to deescalate when the enemy does is not worth the cost in reduced military effects of our bombing, a predictable increase in friendly casualties, and the loss of our allies' confidence in the U.S. policy of steadfastly awaiting meaningful deescalation by Hanoi. (Tab C)/5/
/5/In CM-3532-68 to the President, August 1, entitled "Alternative Bombing Proposals," attached but not printed, Wheeler noted: "With respect to the three alternatives, under the current circumstances I favor the second alternative; however, insofar as that part of it which includes a major public relations campaign is concerned, I am not confident that it would be successful." In CM-3531-68 to the President, July 31, entitled "Cessation of Bombardment of North Vietnam," Wheeler argued that the halt would give the Vietnamese Communists significant military advantages while endangering U.S. and GVN forces, a stoppage would be impossible to resume, and that "free of any degree of military pressure, I conjecture that the enemy will feel even less constrained to engage speedily in productive negotiations leading to a fair and just peace." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 90)
Both Secretaries and General Wheeler come out strongly in support of our remaining on our present course in Paris as well as in Vietnam. General Taylor's memorandum makes clear that he also shares this view. (I have not given to General Taylor copies of these papers.)/6/
/6/A passage in Nitze's notes of the August 1 meeting of the Secretary of Defense's "8:30 Group" consisting of his top advisers reads: "N[itze] suggested take that part of last part of T[aylor] proposal and adapt it to our purposes. Make criteria general. We interpret as second alternative C[lifford]'s modification of H[arriman]V[ance] proposal. 7 days before announce intention & assumptions. If no objection from other side go ahead. If rejection then resume." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense Notes, 1968, 5 of 6) On August 3 Clifford discussed with the "8:30 Group" his meeting with the President the previous day at the Ranch. In his notes of the meeting, Nitze wrote: "C[lifford] conversation with P[resident]. Now had done everything necessary to implement our commitment. 1. Turned enemy back. 2. Developed ARVN. 3. Because of success, shld. recognize and find reasonable basis for disposition." The U.S. offer was summarized in the following manner: "Week after R[epublican] convention. One week later wld. stop. Assume. Ample opportunities for them to say no. If Hanoi a) rejected or b) levelled major attacks no trouble in resuming." (Ibid.)
Brom
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