Washington, March 11, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Secret. Drafted on March 5 by Klebenov and cleared by McKillop, Getz (EUR/RPM), Trippe (G/PM), and Berlack (L/EUR).

Dear Paul:

Your letter of February 24 and the Danish note to the Secretary/2/ arrived here within a few hours of one another.

/2/Documents 10 and 11.

We have now prepared a response that reflects the note itself as well as your suggestions of February 24. I have enclosed a copy of our proposed reply,/3/ as well as of our negotiating points for the anticipated negotiations./4/

/3/Not attached, but see the attachment to Document 10.

/4/Not attached.

Since the Danes did not, in their note, request a USG public statement, but rather, chose to raise that matter orally, we do not plan to address this question in the note itself but as a separate but related issue.

Our first paragraph calls for a joint decision of the two Governments for both storage and overflights, rather than only storage, as you had proposed. The reasons for this change are: (a) The Danes have specifically asked for equal assurance on both points, and (b) we feel that the second paragraph of our reply provides the US with the flexibility necessary in the event of future emergencies.

The first paragraph of our response also takes into account Denmark's desire to supplement the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland. We see no objection to doing this in a classified note inasmuch as the practical effect of the assurances we propose will in fact be to modify rights which the Danes agree were accorded us by the 1951 Agreement.

Our statement on crisis consultation in regard to overflights is designed to place on record, as you do, the idea that conditions may make such consultation difficult.

I agree with your method of stating the need to avoid public comment on nuclear weapons deployment. We do, however, feel that we should, in such a statement, cite our mutual responsibilities to all of the Alliance members.

In regard to the public statement to be made by the Danes, we believe that the phrase "On the basis of recent discussions with the United States Government . . ." is necessary. Since we propose to tell the Danes that we will not publicly confirm their statement, we feel that we cannot expect them to limit a unilateral Danish Government statement in the way that you suggest. Indeed, there is little to prevent the Danes from issuing a much stronger unilateral statement than the one we propose. While it is true that the Danish Government made a statement on January 29 that did not cite discussions with the US Government,/5/ they were far from satisfied with that arrangement. We believe that if we had not been dealing with a recently defeated, caretaker Government, we would have encountered strong, continuous pressure for US confirmation of the Danish announcement. We consider a statement along the lines of that given in our negotiating points to be the minimum that the new Government could accept, especially in view of its publicly stated intention of seeking US agreement on nuclear matters.

/5/See footnote 5, Document 5.

In sum, we hope to work out with the Danes some sort of agreement and accompanying public statement that will remove this question from the public arena and that will insure our continued access to Greenland as a radar site and as an air route and/or deployment site in future emergencies. I believe that our proposed draft will accomplish this. I look forward to receiving your views as a matter of urgency.

Sincerely yours,

John M. Leddy/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

13. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark/1/

Washington, March 13, 1968, 2339Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 GREENLAND-US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Klebenov on March 12, cleared by Toon in substance, and approved by Leddy. Pouched to Moscow.

128993. Subj: Greenland.

1. Ambassador Ronne, at his request, called on Assistant Secretary Leddy at 5:00 pm March 8. He was accompanied by Fergo. Ambassador said he was leaving March 11 for lecture tour of 16 to 18 days duration. He asked if there had been any developments in regard to Danish note of February 26./2/ Mr. Leddy replied that we were working with DOD and hoped to have a reply soon. At Ambassador's request, Mr. Leddy agreed to April 1 meeting with Ambassador.

/2/Document 11.

2. Ambassador Ronne asked if we had any preference for manner of implementing proposed supplement to 1951 Agreement on Defense of Greenland. Mr. Leddy said that our preference would be for a confidential exchange of notes. We had not been thinking in terms of a formal agreement that would legally preclude nuclear storage and/or overflights (as distinct from undertakings providing for consultation) and we could not, of course, publish any agreement on this matter.

3. At this point the Ambassador presented the following two alternative drafts for a "Danish/American Agreement about nuclear policy in Greenland."

"Alternative 1. Activities under present agreement shall not include the storing in and introduction into Greenland territory including Greenland air space of nuclear weapons.

Alternative 2. Under the present agreement no nuclear weapons may be stored in or introduced into Greenland territory including Greenland air space."

4. Mr. Leddy again raised doubts about the wisdom of a formal amendment to the agreement that would legally and permanently preclude nuclear weapons in or overflights of Greenland.

5. Ambassador then raised question of public statement. He said public USG confirmation of absence nuclear weapons in and over Greenland necessary due to pressures in Parliament. He said that he saw USG statement as way to put an end to public and parliamentary discussion of matter. He added that such discussion could only raise new problems in regard to Greenland. He said that he understood our policy considerations but pointed out that Denmark, out of loyalty to US had gone against its own standing policy during recent Chicom representation problem in UN Security Council.

6. Mr. Leddy pointed out necessity of USG adhering to no comment practice re nuclear deployment and overflights. He said that departure from this practice would jeopardize US nuclear deterrent; that this was a security question that involves all of us. Mr. Leddy pointed out that issue was wider than Danish US question; that if we made exception for Danes we would then have this exception cited to us by every country with a current or future nuclear question. Mr. Leddy also asked why, if Danish Government said categorically that there was no nuclear storage in or overflights of Greenland, the Danish people would not believe their own Government. He also asked if Soviets were providing Denmark with assurances they were not overflying Danish territory with nuclear weapons (at this point Fergo pointed out that Danes never knew if Soviet ships transiting Danish home waters did or did not carry nukes). Ambassador said, with no great conviction, that Soviets had stated they did not operate nuclear overflights.

7. Mr. Leddy concluded Greenland discussion by stating that we were conscious of the extent of the problem and that we hoped, on the Ambassador's return, to have something to put on table and discuss.

8. Ronne then remarked that he had recently met Dobrynin at social function and that latter had asked if Ronne had seen recent newspaper articles on US overflight suspension and asked if the Danes had seen any confirmation of this decision. Ambassador Ronne had replied that he was only concerned with overflights of Danish territory, concerning which he had no misgivings on US policy.

9. Ronne then asked if we intended to reply to Soviet Aide-Mémoire of February 10./3/ Mr. Leddy said he felt that we probably should reply, that a reply was in preparation, but that we were in no hurry. He pointed out, however, that in the context of US-Soviet relations, it was not unheard of to let such a message go unanswered. (On leaving the building, Fergo expressed to SCAN officer the hope that Danes would be consulted in advance of any reply to the Soviet Aide-Mémoire.)/4/

/3/The aide-mémoire was transmitted in telegram 113631 to Moscow, February 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US)

/4/In telegram 131152 to Moscow and Copenhagen, March 15, the Department transmitted the text of a proposed reply to the Soviet aide-mémoire but specified that the Danes not be consulted. The text of the Department's March 21 reply to the Soviets was transmitted to Moscow and Copenhagen in airgram CA-6730. The text of a second Soviet aide-mémoire on the B-52 crash, dated April 9, was transmitted to Moscow and Copenhagen in airgram CA-7282, April 15, together with a covering note stating that the Department saw nothing to be gained by replying and did not plan to do so unless the Soviets publicized their aide-mémoire. Telegrams 113631 and 131152 and airgrams CA-6730 and CA-7282 are ibid.

Rusk

14. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/

Washington, March 28, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov on March 27 and cleared by Farley (G/PM) and Berlack (L/EUR). The memorandum was addressed to "The Secretary" when it was typed, but "Under" was then inserted by hand (presumably by Leddy) between "The" and "Secretary." 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov on March 27 and cleared by Farley (G/PM) and Berlack (L/EUR). The memorandum was addressed to "The Secretary" when it was typed, but "Under" was then inserted by hand (presumably by Leddy) between "The" and "Secretary."

SUBJECT
Agreement with the Government of Denmark on Nuclear Overflights and Storage in Greenland

Discussion:

In your reply (Tab B) to the Danish note of February 26 (Tab C)/2/ you stated that the United States Government was prepared to discuss with the Danes the matter of supplementing the Agreement of April 27, 1951 concerning the Defense of Greenland.

/2/See Document 11 and footnote 2 thereto.

We have, subsequently, told the Danish Ambassador that our preference was for a secret exchange of notes that would make nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland subject to consultation between our two Governments. The Danes have indicated that they are willing to accept this procedure.

We have drawn up a draft note (Tab A) which has been approved by the Department of Defense. I propose to present this draft to the Danish Ambassador when he calls on me on Monday April 1.

Our draft is designed to:

(a) assure the Danes that we are not now overflying Greenland with nuclear weapons or storing such weapons in Greenland;

(b) allow for nuclear overflights or storage in the future if both Governments deem such action advisable; and

(c) point out to the Danes that there may be conditions of extreme emergency under which consultations with respect to overflights would be difficult.

If you concur, I plan to give a draft copy of our note to the Danish Ambassador on April 1 and tell him that we would be prepared to present that text as a secret note in reply to their note of February 26.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached draft note./3/

/3/Katzenbach indicated his approval on March 31.

Attachment

PROPOSED RESPONSE TO CONFIDENTIAL DANISH NOTE
OF FEBRUARY 26

The United States Government assures the Government of Denmark that, notwithstanding the provisions of the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland, it will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons except as a result of a joint decision by our two Governments.

It must be recognized however, that in circumstances of extreme emergency, the situation may make advance consultation with respect to overflights difficult. The United States Government would, nonetheless, make every effort to consult the Government of Denmark in such circumstances.

15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark/1/

Washington, April 3, 1968, 1724Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 GREENLAND-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Klebenov, cleared by McKillop, and approved by Leddy.

140926. Subject: Greenland.

1. At April 1 meeting with Ronne and Fergo, Leddy presented draft of proposed US note/2/ (text pouched March 20 under cover McKillop-Blankinship letter). Leddy stated that USG was prepared to use text as secret note in response to Danish note of February 26.

/2/Attachment to Document 14.

2. Ronne said first paragraph, calling for joint decision, presented no problem. He questioned both need and feasibility for including second paragraph (which states that consultation may be difficult under emergency conditions). Both Ronne and Fergo felt that the Foreign Office would object to the language of the second paragraph. They suggested omitting the second paragraph on the ground that the situation it addresses does not appear to need any spelling out in advance.

3. Mr. Leddy pointed out that, following the Thule crash, a lack of awareness of certain agreements on the part of high Danish Government officials had caused a delay of a full week in clarifying the situation between our two Governments. He proposed however, that Dept consult with Defense again on point Ronne raised and that meanwhile Ronne not transmit text to his Foreign Office. Ambassador agreed readily and pointed out present text, if sent to Foreign Office, could create negative reaction unhelpful to our discussions.

4. In regard to Ronne's question about public statement, Leddy suggested that, for present, Government, if asked in Parliament, state that discussions with USG on matter are continuing.

Katzenbach

16. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke)/1/

Washington, April 17, 1968.

/1/Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash--Internal Memos. Secret. Drafted by Trippe and Klebenov and cleared in L, G, and EUR.

Dear Paul:

As you know from our reporting cable,/2/ Ambassador Ronne told us on April 1 that the second paragraph, the "escape clause" of our proposed note,/3/ would be unacceptable to the Danish Government.

/2/Document 15.

/3/Attachment to Document 14.

In his discussion with me, Ambassador Ronne indicated that he understood the problem that we were addressing in Paragraph 2 of our draft but stated that this situation need not be spelled out in advance. The implication of what Ronne said is that in a serious crisis it goes without saying that military requirements would be overriding. While a written escape clause might nevertheless be helpful in justifying an overflight of Greenland in an instance where time did not allow us to obtain the agreement of the Danish Government, I do not believe that the lack of such a written understanding would critically limit our freedom of action in circumstances of a grave and sudden threat. Therefore, I propose that we offer the Danes only the first paragraph in reply to their note of February 26./4/

/4/Document 11.

I shall, on presenting our reply, reiterate the possible requirement for U.S. overflights under the circumstances described above: i.e., those where a grave and sudden threat does not allow time to obtain the agreement of the Danish Government.

This solution of course, will not involve an outright prohibition of nuclear weapons flights over Greenland, as the Danes proposed in their February 26 note. Further, it should serve to prevent this issue from jeopardizing the 1951 Greenland Defense Agreement under which we operate electronic surveillance systems in that territory and maintain the air base at Thule.

I would appreciate your comments at an early date.

Sincerely,

John M. Leddy/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

17. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy)/1/

Washington, April 26, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17-1 US. Secret.

Dear John:

This is in reply to your letter of April 17, 1968,/2/ in which you propose a compromise classified reply to the Danish note of February 26 on nuclear storage in and overflights of Greenland./3/ We concur in your proposed reply if, as you suggest in your letter, you reiterate to the Danish Ambassador the possible requirement for US overflights with nuclear weapons in a serious crisis without advance notification or approval, and if you furnish him a memorandum of your conversation with him to this effect, which would serve as a record that this important point had been discussed with him. We hope that, in accordance with your own expressed expectation, this compromise reply will serve to prevent this nuclear weapons issue from jeopardizing the important 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement.

/2/Document 16.

/3/Document 11.

You make no mention in your April 17 letter of the earlier Danish request for the United States Government's association with a public statement on the subject of nuclear overflights of or storage of nuclear weapons in Greenland. Our position continues to be that no such statement should be made, that we hope the Danes will make no such statement, and that we could not confirm any such statement if they do choose to make one.

Sincerely,

Paul C. Warnke

18. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, May 9, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov on May 7 and cleared by Trippe (G/PM), Belman (L), and Berlack (L/EUR).

SUBJECT
Agreement with the Government of Denmark on Nuclear Overflights and Storage in Greenland

Discussion:

In your reply (Tab C) to the Danish note of February 26 (Tab D)/2/ you stated that the United States Government was prepared to discuss with the Danes the matter of supplementing the Agreement of April 27, 1951 concerning the Defense of Greenland.

/2/See Document 11 and footnote 2 thereto.

The Danish Ambassador has tentatively agreed that any such supplement should take the form of a secret exchange of notes. He has also agreed that future nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland should be subject to consultation between our two Governments. The latter provision is in contrast to the Danish request, stated in their February 26 note, for an unconditional ban on nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland.

On March 31 the Under Secretary authorized me to offer the Danish Ambassador a draft text (Tab B)/3/ for the consideration of his Government. The Ambassador, on April 1, read our draft and indicated that the first paragraph, which makes nuclear overflights and storage subject to consultation, would be acceptable to his Government. He felt, however, that the Danish Foreign Ministry would object to the second paragraph, in which we pointed out that there may be conditions of extreme emergency under which consultation with respect to overflights would be difficult. He suggested omitting the second paragraph since the situation it addresses does not need spelling out in advance.

/3/Attachment to Document 14.

After further consultation with the Department of Defense we are now prepared to offer the Danes, as a draft text, the first paragraph only of our April 1 text (Tab A),/4/ accompanied by an oral notation on my part, pointing out that there could be a requirement for U.S. overflights under conditions of a grave and sudden threat that did not allow time to obtain the agreement of the Danish Government.

/4/Printed below.

If you concur, I plan to give a draft copy of our note to the Danish Ambassador this week, and tell him that we would be prepared to use that text in a secret exchange of notes supplementing the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland. I would, at that time, point out again the possible need for U.S. overflights without consultation, under the conditions described above.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached draft note (Tab A)./5/

/5/Rusk indicated his approval on May 10.

Attachment

Draft Note to be Presented to Ambassador Ronne
for Consideration by Government of Denmark

The United States Government assures the Government of Denmark that, notwithstanding the provisions of the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland, it will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons except as a result of a joint decision by our two Governments.

19. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark/1/

Washington, May 13, 1968, 1709Z.

/1/Source: Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 GREENLAND-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Klebenov on May 11, cleared by McKillop, and approved by Leddy.

162867. Subject: Greenland-Nuclear Overflights and Storage.

1. Ambassador Ronne, accompanied by Counselor Per Fergo, met with Assistant Secretary Leddy on May 10 to consider US response to Danish note of February 26.

2. Leddy referred to Ronne's April 1 comments on text proposed that date/2/ (as pouched March 20 under cover McKillop/Blankinship letter); recalled that Ronne had said first paragraph presented no problems for Danes but had suggested omission of second paragraph on basis that situation it addresses did not need spelling out in advance.

/2/See Document 15.

3. Leddy gave Ronne draft text consisting of first paragraph only of April 1 text. He said that if Danish Fonoff approves text, USG prepared to incorporate same in formal exchange of notes in near future.

4. Leddy said that at time of exchange of notes he would reiterate possible requirement for US overflights under circumstances of a grave and sudden threat that does not allow time to obtain agreement of Danish Government. Leddy said that the USG will retain record of this statement.

5. Ronne asked if he would be obliged to report Leddy's oral statement to his Government. Leddy replied that was Ronne's decision. Ronne said that oral statement appeared to make the proposed agreement less than binding. Leddy pointed out that the written agreement would be governing instrument; that, as in case of any US agreement, we would abide by it to full extent of our ability to do so; but that circumstances beyond our control could make overflights without consultation necessary. He pointed out that we are not asking Danes to give written permission for such overflights, but that we must make clear the possible need for same in event of a grave and sudden threat that would not allow time for consultations.

6. Ronne asked why new draft was classified secret rather than confidential, as in the case of Danish February 26 note and US reply to that note. It was pointed out that Danish note had been request to initiate discussions on supplementing 1951 agreement in regard to nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland and that US in reply had agreed to enter into such discussions. Text under consideration was different matter since it embodied a specific limitation on deployment and movement of US nuclear weapons; hence must be secret.

7. In reply to Ambassador's question on public statement, Leddy said that we should first give Danish Government chance to consider text. He stressed that in any case, we cannot confirm or deny any statement concerning deployment or movement of nuclear weapons.

8. Ronne said pressure from press remained heavy and that Danish Government must be able to issue statement referring to negotiations and US agreement to exclude nuclear weapons from Greenland.

9. In reply Leddy said again that we will not join Danes in such a statement; nor could we confirm any statement on the negotiations. He said that Danish Government can say that there were no nuclear weapons in or over Greenland and that there would not be any without the Danish Government's approval. The Danish Government, he said, is free to give its people full assurances on any aspect of this question. We cannot, however, fracture our global policy on the US nuclear deterrent by publicly confirming such a statement. He added that no such USG participation should be required to validate statement by Danish Government to its own people.

10. At this point Ronne offered text, apparently for public statement, but which Leddy did not accept. Leddy noted it would amount to formal amendment to 1951 Agreement placing absolute ban on nuclear weapons in Greenland thus making it too inflexible. He pointed out that US proposal gave Danes the requested assurances on nuclear weapons but allowed both parties to act quickly if circumstances required nuclear overflights.

11. Ronne persisted in reiterating need for Danish public reference to negotiations, adding that if we cannot reach agreement here, it would be necessary to consult in Copenhagen under Article XIII (3) of the 1951 Agreement. In reply to repeated statements on need for public statement, Leddy again said that Danish Government free to say publicly that it is fully satisfied with current arrangements re Greenland nuclear matters. He pointed out that Danes do not, in practice, publish all of their international agreements and that no other nuclear power has given the sort of public assurances that Ronne was asking for. He again urged Danish Government to consider alternatives to their proposed method of assuring their public.

12. On leaving, Ronne said that US draft note appears acceptable but that need remained for public statement.

Rusk

20. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark/1/

Washington, May 18, 1968, 0235Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Klebenov on May 17, cleared by McKillop and in substance by Berlack (L/EUR), and approved by Leddy.

166783. Subj: Greenland--Nuclear Overflights and Storage. Ref: State 162867./2/

/2/Document 19.

1. Ambassador Ronne, accompanied by Counselor Fergo, called on Assistant Secretary Leddy May 16. Ronne said he had just received reply from Fonoff on text and discussion of May 10 meeting./3/

/3/Summarized in telegram 162867.

2. Ronne said Fonoff had noted the oral statement Leddy made May 10 re flight requirements in case of grave and sudden threat (para 4 State 162867).

3. Ronne repeated statement of May 10 that due to parliamentary and press pressures Danish Government will need to make a public statement. However, he said his Government accepts USG policy of not confirming or denying statements of this kind; that Danes would not request USG confirmation or mutual statement, but would rather issue unilateral one.

4. Ronne also confirmed Danish Government would treat exchange of notes as secret.

5. Ronne then presented following revised text prepared by Danish Fonoff: "The United States Government assures the Government of Denmark that in the exercise of its rights and duties in accordance with the provisions of the agreement of April 27, 1951 concerning the defense of Greenland it will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.

This note and your reply shall constitute an agreement between our two governments and shall be considered an integral part of the defense agreement."

Ronne described Danish proposal as being minor changes in text and procedures of final exchange of notes.

6. Leddy said that Danish proposal would amount to an amendment of treaty that would prohibit absolutely nuclear overflights and storage. It made no provision, he noted, for a joint decision to institute nuclear overflights or storage.

7. Ronne said that article XIII (3) allowed for such a decision. Leddy pointed out that that article merely allows both sides to amend treaty by mutual agreement. Our aim, he said, was an agreement that provided flexibility by allowing nuclear overflights quickly, if both sides agree. Leddy pointed out that our May 10 text/4/ had left full control on overflights and storage with GOD. He asked Ronne what problem was with wording that did not allow nuclear overflights or storage without consent GOD. Ronne did not defend this aspect Fonoff text, stating only Fonoff evidently did not feel reference to joint decision was needed; that article XIII (3) covered such a possibility. He added he had received text only two hours previously and so had no chance to discuss with Fonoff its rationale on this point.

/4/Attachment to Document 18.

8. Leddy said that he saw no problem in replacing phrase "Notwithstanding the provisions of the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland" with wording "in the exercise of its rights and duties in accordance with the provisions of the agreement of April 27, 1951 concerning the Defense of Greenland."

9. Leddy said that first para could be made acceptable by adding to last sentence words "without the consent of the Government of Denmark." He did not see this as substantive change from US reference to a joint decision and would so inform DOD.

10. Re final phrase "shall be considered an integral part of the defense agreement" Leddy said there may be technical problems and he would have to consult Legal Advisor. He noted in this respect that 1951 agreement was subject to approval of Danish Parliament although as an executive agreement it was not subject to US Senate approval.

11. Ambassador Ronne said he would report quickly to his government which is under pressure to settle problem soonest. Leddy agreed to desirability of moving fast. He saw no reason for delay in exchange of notes if GOD could agree to his suggested change in para 1 and if second half of last para posed no problem to Legal Advisor.

12. Leddy said that in regard to oral statement (see para 2) we consider it as having been made. Ronne concurred.

13. At noon May 17, Ronne informed us by telephone that Danish Foreign Office had agreed to addition of phrase "without the consent of the Government of Denmark."

Rusk

21. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/

Washington, May 29, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov.

SUBJECT
Negotiations with Denmark on Nuclear Overflights and Storage in Greenland

Danish Request

The Government of Denmark, shortly after the January 21, 1968 crash of a nuclear armed USAF B-52, requested an absolute ban on nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland. Ambassador Ronne requested such a ban in his discussions with me and in his February 26 note to the Secretary.

At that same time, the Danes made repeated requests for U.S. participation in, or endorsement of, a Danish Government announcement that would indicate that Greenland was, in effect, a nuclear free zone. We could not accede to the latter request, although did in confidence give oral assurances to the Danes that we were not overflying Greenland with nuclear weapons.

U.S. Objectives

In our negotiations we sought:

a) to retain the right to conduct such nuclear overflights of Greenland as might be required by security;

b) to avoid subjecting the entire 1951 Agreement to review and possible modification under terms of Article XIII (3). (It should be noted in this context, that we sought both to retain overflight rights, as noted above, and to maintain our access to Greenland as an important base for electronic surveillance, i.e., BMEWS (ballistic missile early warning system) installations);

c) to avoid as far as possible, public discussion of the deployment and movement of U.S. nuclear weapons.

Effect of the Proposed Settlement

We have, after lengthy negotiations with the Danes, reached agreement in principle on the issues noted above. The proposed secret exchange of notes/2/ accomplishes the following:

/2/Rusk approved of the proposed U.S. note and Danish reply (see Document 22) in response to a May 23 action memorandum from Leddy that reviewed the negotiations and recommended approval. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1) President Johnson gave his approval of the U.S. note at a May 29 luncheon meeting with his senior foreign policy advisers. (Record of decisions, May 29; ibid., Files of Walt W. Rostow, Meetings with the President, May-June 1968) No record of the luncheon discussion has been found. On May 27 Rostow had forwarded the text of the note to the President under cover of a memorandum that highlighted the negotiations and emphasized that "we will have the right to overfly or store nuclear weapons in Greenland subject to Danish approval (unilaterally in case of emergency); and we will avoid a full scale renegotiation of the 1951 agreement." (Ibid., Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1)

a) We retain the right to nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland, subject to the agreement of both Governments that such actions are necessary;

b) The Danes are on notice that the U.S. may conduct nuclear overflights under circumstances of a grave and sudden threat that does not allow us time to consult the Danish Government. (The Danish Foreign Office has formally noted my May 10 oral statement/3/ of this possible need);

/3/See Document 19.

c) We avoid reopening the 1951 Agreement for renegotiation, thus avoiding any new provisions that might hinder our activities in Greenland including the operation of the Thule Air Base and the maintenance of an extremely important segment of the BMEWS;

d) In conjunction with the proposed settlement the Danish Government agreed to drop its request for any U.S. participation in or endorsement of a public statement concerning nuclear weapons in Greenland.

Timing of Agreement

The Danish Government is extremely anxious to effect the proposed exchange of notes prior to the June 5 visit of Foreign Minister Hartling.

22. Note From the Danish Ambassador (Ronne) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

No. 93.USA.9

Washington, May 31, 1968.

/1/Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash--Internal Memos. Secret. Leddy and Ronne exchanged notes at a meeting on May 31. Leddy reported to Copenhagen on the meeting in telegram 174887, June 1. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1)

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to your note of this date on the subject of an agreement between Denmark and the U.S. on storage of U.S. nuclear weapons in Greenland and the overflight of Greenland by U.S. aircraft carrying nuclear weapons which reads in its entirety as follows:

"Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions between our two Governments regarding the request of your Government, made on February 26, 1968, that the U.S. and Denmark agree to supplement the Agreement of April 27, 1951 on the Defense of Greenland with respect to the storage of U.S. nuclear weapons in Greenland and the overflight of Greenland by U.S. aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.

As a result of these discussions, I have the honor to propose the following Agreement:

The United States Government assures the Government of Denmark that in the exercise of its rights and duties in accordance with the provisions of the agreement of April 27, 1951, concerning the defense of Greenland it will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons without the consent of the Government of Denmark.

If the foregoing proposal is acceptable to your Government, I have the honor to propose that this note and your reply to that effect shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments, effective on the date of your reply, which shall form an integral part of the Agreement of April 27, 1951.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration."

I have the honor to state that the proposal contained in your note is acceptable to my Government and that our two notes shall constitute an agreement, effective today, which shall form an integral part of the Agreement of April 27, 1951 on the Defense of Greenland.

Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Torben Ronne

23. Editorial Note

On May 31, 1968, the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs released the following statement: "As a result of the plane crash at Thule, the Government instructed its Ambassador in Washington to raise with the American Government the question of assurances that Danish atomic policy as specified in the Folketing Resolution of February 8, 1968 is upheld in Greenland. In the discussions the Ambassador has confirmed Danish atomic policy as expressed in the Folketing Resolution, in accordance with which nuclear arms may not be stocked in Greenland and the Greenland air territory may not be overflown with such weapons. As previously reported, nuclear arms are not stocked in Greenland and overflights with such weapons do not take place. The result of the discussions in Washington creates harmony between the Defense Agreement of 1951 and Danish atomic policy and therewith assurance under international law, that this policy is respected in Greenland." (Telegram 5076 from Copenhagen, June 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US) For the text of the Folketing Resolution of February 8, see the attachment to Document 8.

Prior to release of the statement, Ambassador Ronne told an officer of the Bureau of European Affairs that he believed that the U.S. Government would find the statement acceptable and that U.S. Government interests, as expressed during the recent negotiations, had been taken into account in its preparation. (Telegram 174887 to Copenhagen, June 1; ibid.)

24. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 6, 1968, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash--Internal Memos. Secret. Drafted by Ingram (EUR/SCAN). The memorandum is Part III of IV. Memoranda covering the other portions of the meeting are ibid. The conversation was held in the Madison Room at the State Department.

SUBJECT
Nuclear Storage, Nuclear Overflights and Chemical and Biological Warfare Testing in Greenland

PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister of Denmark, Poul Hartling
Permanent Under Secretary, Danish Foreign Office, Paul Fischer
Ambassador of Denmark, Torben Ronne

The Secretary
Under Secretary of the Treasury Frederick Deming
Export-Import Bank Vice Chairman Walter Sauer
USIA Director Leonard Marks
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy Affairs, Carl Walska
Assistant Secretary John M. Leddy
Ambassador William Leonhart
Country Director George Mason Ingram

The Foreign Minister expressed his and his Government's gratification at the exchange of notes precluding the storage of nuclear weapons in Greenland and the overflight of Greenland by planes carrying nuclear weapons without the Danish Government's consent. He welcomed the Secretary's assurance that the US has not conducted chemical/biological warfare tests in Greenland, and thanked him for his assurances that it would not do so in the future as well as for his understanding that any such move would require the consent of the Government of Denmark

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