France
25. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, February 12, 1964, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, STR 12-3 CUBA-FR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Brussels for the Embassy and USEC.
3857. We appear to be heading for a confrontation with French on Cuban trade. For Embassy to be effective in circumstances, we will need clear-cut instructions on real US objectives. Following are considerations bearing on such instructions:
1. Four Major Actual or Potential Issues Between US and French on Cuban Trade:
A. French Credit Guarantees for Exports to Cuba. $10 million has already been approved for trucks and tractors (Embtel 3832)/2/ and indications are there may be more. In particular we have no assurance credit guarantees would not be issued for locomotives should request again be made.
/2/Dated February 11. (Ibid., STR 12-3 CUBA FR)
B. Request for information specific firms involved in Cuban trade and their connections (based on Deptel 3780)/3/ now outstanding in FonOff. We understand from Wormser (Embtel 3818)/4/ we will get negative reply.
/3/Telegram 3780 to Paris, January 27, requested information on French firms selling to Cuba. (Ibid.)
/4/Dated February 10. (Ibid.)
C. On shipping, FonOff has forwarded forms transmitted CA-6359/5/ to companies, but none have been returned, either directly or through FonOff. Basis Deptel 4004 and Depcirtel 1227,/6/ we understand there is question whether French performance can be considered satisfactory under amendment to Foreign Assistance Act. Would appreciate information re application this amendment to British situation.
/5/Dated October 23, 1963. (Ibid., STR 10 CUBA)
/6/Neither printed. (Both ibid., AID (US))
D. If French performance on shipping or on general Cuban trade policy judged inadequate, US may have to inform French Govt of termination aid. While remaining US aid program is minimal (Embtel 3824),/7/ public announcement such action inevitable and certain create political storm, especially coming on top of press attention already given to US-French differences on Cuban trade.
/7/Telegram 3824 from Paris, February 11, outlined the U.S. military assistance program in France. (Ibid., STR 10 CUBA)
2. French Position on Credit Guarantees for Cuban Trade:
A. Despite our best efforts here and in NATO, GOF (even officials basically sympathetic to US position) not persuaded basic validity our position. As Alphand indicated (Deptel 4008),/8/ French believe effort isolate Cuba essentially governed by US domestic considerations; they tend to doubt desirability, as well as practicality, of economic warfare against Cuba. Hence their relatively cooperative attitude to date governed by desire accommodate US rather than by any conviction of their own.
/8/Not printed. (Ibid., STR 12-3 CUBA-FR)
B. Until recently FonOff (which has on whole tried restrain French participation in Cuban trade and shipping) has had upper hand. British bus deal, however, led to intensive industrial pressures reflected through Industry and Finance Ministries. In view British Govt action, and absence political conviction based on French national interests, FonOff has been unwilling (and probably unable) in truck case to veto credit guarantees on political grounds; same may apply to locomotives and other upcoming deals.
C. FonOff position until recently was strengthened by technical consideration that Finance Ministry considered Cuba bad debtor. It now appears (from Guindey, Embtel 3804 and DeLattre, Embtel 3833)/9/ that Cubans have taken some action which removes this technical block.
/9/Telegram 3804 from Paris, February 6, reported French Foreign Ministry views on the subject of trade with Cuba. Telegram 3833 from Paris, February 11, reported that the French Government no longer considered Cuba a debt risk. (Both ibid.)
D. Result is that GOF position has been shifting towards treating Cuba on same basis as any other country for credit purposes (although strategic exports as defined COCOM list apparently still apply), unless in any particular case FonOff exercises veto on political grounds. In present atmosphere, however, FonOff will have hard time using only argument they feel they have--i.e. that such deals would displease US.
3. Sovereignty Issue. Problems described para 1B, C, and D above all raise in different ways issue of French "sovereignty" in face alleged US efforts to enforce its own will on French Govt or private citizens by use of our greater power. This is issue on which French always sensitive, but particularly so in context Gaullist foreign policy.
A. French have already indicated (Embtel 3758)/10/ their objection to Embassy's dealing directly with firms under French jurisdiction on Cuban trade matters. In private conversations, several French officials have mentioned (without specifying) cases in which US officials have allegedly "threatened" French companies with retaliation if they engage in Cuban trade.
/10/Telegram 3758 from Paris reported that France would oppose as a matter of policy contacts between U.S. representatives and French companies trading with Cuba. (Ibid., STR 12-3 CUBA-FR)
B. In same line, we already know (Embtel 3818)/11/ French will give us negative answer to request for information on American connections of firms engaged in Cuban trade. Assume grounds will be professional secrecy, but reason will be to protect French firms from danger of American "sanctions."
/11/Not printed. (Ibid.)
C. While French have not recently objected to US efforts to force French shippers out of Cuban trade under Executive Order of Feb. 6, 1963,/12/ there is little doubt that they resent these efforts and are liable to make this point in any over-all approach they make to us. For same reason, we doubt they will go much farther than they have in cooperating with us on this subject. In particular, a written commitment such as suggested Deptel 4004 seems almost out of question.
/12/Reference is to a White House announcement that action would be taken to assure U.S. Government-financed cargoes would not be shipped on foreign flag vessels trading with Cuba. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 25, 1963, p. 283.
D. As already indicated, cut-off of US aid under amendment to FAA, though amounts involved are very small and effect on French policy nil, will provide easy basis for dramatization accusation US attempting to treat France as "colony;" Gaullist La Nation has already taken this line in commenting on US reaction to recent announcement credit guarantees to Cuba. Tiny nature of "stick" also likely be ridiculed by French and European press.
4. Courses of Action. In this situation, we cannot in Embassy's view expect to hold the line on French participation in Cuban trade and shipping, as we have relative successfully so far, by informal low-key, low-level dealings with essentially sympathetic officials. We seem have choice between two possible courses of action:
A. To pursue piecemeal effort to apply brakes on selective basis to French actions which might be of particular importance in terms of Cuban economy. This would require high-level approach to FonOff or FonMin, making clear we not attempting dictate policy to GOF but asking them exercise maximum restraint on Cuban matters in order avoid creating problem which could aggravate already unfortunate state Franco-American relations. To succeed in this approach, we would have to limit our objectives to questions of real importance (e.g. locomotives) and be prepared abandon any vigorous effort enforce our policy against private companies either in shipping or non-shipping business. Possibility of success would be much enhanced if we could persuade British to modify their position; another vigorous effort in NATO to obtain multilateral support for policy of restraint on Cuban trade would also contribute a great deal.
B. Alternatively, we can make a more formal approach to French Govt, asking for GOF refusal to grant credit guarantees for Cuba, and full GOF cooperation in preventing French shipping and other companies from participating in Cuban trade. Such approach would be backed up by straightforward implementation of amendment to FAA. In diplomatic terms, such approach would certainly be a failure, as GOF under present circumstances would not accept what they would interpret as US "dictation." We would, however, make a clear record that we had done our best to stop Franco-Cuban trade. The price would be a public issue on this subject between US and GOF, which will further exacerbate US-French relations with possible broader impact on relations with other EEC countries, who might well accept French lead on this particular issue.
5. Choice between these two courses of action depends essentially on whether we are more interested in making a record or in limited practical results on Cuban trade itself. In light considerations earlier part this telegram there is no guarantee at all that first course (para 4A) would succeed; we can only find out by trying. If, however, Dept judges it more essential we make record, or if mandatory legislative provisions leave us no choice, then we must choose course of action in 4B and do what we can to limit damage to Franco-American relations.
6. Would appreciate Dept's instructions soonest, as we expect FonOff to call Embassy in at high level in next few days on this subject even if we do not take initiative./13/
/13/Telegram 4096 to Paris, February 14, instructed that the handling of trade issues should follow the outline of paragraph 4B of telegram 3857 and that the Embassy should avoid public comment. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, STR 12-3 CUBA-FR)
Bohlen
26. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, February 19, 1964, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 1. Secret; Limdis.
3968. Ref: Deptel 4097./2/ I saw Couve de Murville this afternoon at about 5:45 and raised with him the questions concerning French policy and intentions in regard to Southeast Asia with particular reference to South Vietnam. I said that since Alphand had already discussed Laos and Cambodia with Harriman/3/ (Couve said he had seen the report of this) I would concentrate my remarks primarily on South Vietnam. I then made the points raised in reftel in regard to ChiCom aims and policies in Southeast Asia; their attitude towards neutralization and its relation to their policy of communization, and fact that Hanoi had rejected any neutralization for Viet Minh. I then asked Couve if he would give me frankly his own personal views on situation.
/2/Telegram 4097 to Paris, February 14, requested Embassy officials to sound out the French Government regarding its aims in Southeast Asia. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL VIET S)
/3/Reported in telegram 4139 to Paris, February 18. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Public Service Files, Memcons A)
Couve began by saying that he wished to assure me that there was no French plan whatsoever for Southeast Asia other than those in operation for Laos and the plans for Cambodia. He said he thought that the US was in full agreement with France in regard to the neutralization of Laos and also for that of Cambodia although he fully understood why we were not willing to join in a conference to achieve the latter. His remarks therefore would deal with Vietnam. He said he did not personally disagree with any remark that I had made in regard to Chinese attitude.
He said that he thought there was perhaps a great deal of misunderstanding between what he said was De Gaulle's vague generalized remarks in regard to neutralization which he said at best would take many years to come into being, and what could be considered current French policy. He repeated that there was no French plan to deal with the Vietnamese situation. Looking at it however personally he said that he thought the situation was very difficult insofar as the US was concerned. In his personal view the trouble was not military but political; that with the disappearance of Diem/4/ who had at least set up a government which although highly unpopular had operated in a relatively effective manner for the conduct of military operations, there was no effective political force in South Vietnam and he personally did not see much prospect for setting one up. He therefore thought that the US had essentially two courses of action which it could follow: (1) To continue along the present lines it was at present, which he frankly felt would not be very successful, or (2) to increase military operations in South Vietnam appreciably, coupled possibly at a certain point in the future with a willingness to attempt some form of negotiation.
/4/Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of South Vietnam, was killed in the aftermath of the military coup of November 1-2, 1963.
In reply to my statement that intensified military operations would only make sense if it involved a willingness to carry the war if necessary to Hanoi, Couve answered that he fully understood this and had it in mind when he spoke about the increased military involvement. He repeated that these were merely personal views but he felt that in order to have any prospect of any settlement we would have to confront the Communists with a more disagreeable alternative than negotiation. He said this was what in effect had been done in Laos and why the Communists had accepted it. I told him that this very much coincided with my view and understanding of how Communists reacted but I could not of course speak for my government as to whether large military operations would be feasible or not.
Couve said he was very glad to have this opportunity of discussing Vietnam with me and said he hoped it would be continued. I mentioned the discussion in NATO today to which he replied that it would have been quite impossible to have had a discussion such as ours in NAC. I inquired whether it might not be a good idea for Koren to stay over a day or so and discuss in more detail the matter at the Quai d'Orsay, to which Couve replied that he thought that was an excellent idea. Koren had planned to stay over one day in any event and I would judge after tomorrow whether or not it would be necessary for him to stay longer.
Comment: This was undoubtedly one of the more frank conversations I have had with Couve, particularly on Vietnam, but it should be emphasized that as he stated it was only his "personal" view and not an official French policy. I believe therefore that this conversation should be handled with discretion as representing only his view.
Department pass to other posts as desired.
Bohlen
27. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to France (Bohlen)/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Mc George Bundy, Vol. 2. Confidential. In an attached March 11 memorandum to President Johnson, Rusk noted that Bohlen's paper contained "a number of recommendations which I believe you will find of interest." Bohlen was in Washington for consultations.
REFLECTIONS ON CURRENT FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper does not deal with domestic problems since de Gaulle has this situation very well in hand and pending his decisions on elections, there should be no change.
Fundamental and basic element in de Gaulle's foreign policy is his strongly held and unchangeable conviction that the nation (the state and not the people) represents the permanent unit in international affairs. Its authority and sovereignty must under no conditions be watered down or weakened in any way. The conception of France as a nation is embued with almost mystical quality and de Gaulle is embodiment of this national spirit (see first page of his War Memoires).
If this concept is fully understood almost all de Gaulle's actions in foreign affairs in last five years are logical, deductible, and quite consistent. It explains de Gaulle's antagonism to the organization of NATO, his aversion to anything that smacks of integration. It is the reason why he has withdrawn French fleet from NATO control and Air Force and two French divisions. It is also national concept which has caused him to refuse permission for storage of American atomic weapons on French soil.
De Gaulle's conception of nation in defense matters was well expressed in 1959 talk at French Military Institute. His concept of alliance is old-fashioned 1914 type, i.e., alliance operates only in times of crisis (war danger) but not in interim periods. This explains his solidarity with United States and Alliance at time of Berlin crisis and his support of United States in Cuba. It should, however, be emphasized that support in time of crisis when issue of war is present does not (repeat not) obtain in a non-crisis period. De Gaulle has in effect withdrawn France from Alliance in political or diplomatic sense and, to a large extent, in military matters.
No actions of any importance that he has taken in diplomatic field have been in consultation or even after discussion with any of his allies: Veto of Britain in Common Market, recognition of Communist China, attitude on Cyprus, actions in Africa,/2/ are cases in point.
/2/The phrase "and trip to South America" is crossed out.
De Gaulle's conception of the nation is particularly relevant when it applies to relations of a middle-sized power (France) and a great power (United States). This conception conditions all of de Gaulle's attitudes towards United States and forces him by its logic to take opposite position as matter of principle because of his belief that too close association would cause France automatically to become satellite. It is also explanation of force de frappe which, in turn, logically requires distortion of postwar history in order to justify current policy; for example, doubt as to United States intentions in event of war must be spread by French propaganda in order to justify heavy expenditures for force de frappe.
Communist Chinese Recognition: Recognition is primarily act demonstrating French independence of American control in foreign affairs./3/ It is noteworthy that no consultation of any kind with any other country was involved. Evidence would indicate that actual discussions took place in Switzerland and that Edgar Faure's role in this matter has been considerably exaggerated. It appears that Chinese asked two conditions: a) French support in UN, and b) breach with Formosa. France refused accept these conditions as formal conditions for recognition, but it is very probable that Chinese were told sub rosa that they would be met since French actions subsequent in both fields would appear to bear this out. In addition, France possibly foresaw crisis in Vietnam and wished France to be installed in Peking in order to take advantage of crisis when it comes.
/3/France announced its recognition of the People's Republic of China on January 27, 1964.
Four levels of opinion can be discerned in France:
1. De Gaulle.
2. Government, Ministers, Civil Servants, etc., of which I would say ninety percent do not agree with de Gaulle's conduct of foreign affairs and, on the whole, are basically friendly to the United States.
3. Young Gaullists, UNR. These are irresponsible, unintelligent, authoritarian-minded, and go farther than de Gaulle in anti-American attitudes. Peyrefitte belongs to this group and his conduct of French propaganda is clearly marked by strong anti-American trend.
4. French people as a whole. Up to the present time, French people, on balance, seem to have little anti-Americanism, but this is situation that can, of course, change if current propaganda continues.
There would seem to be little chance of any change occurring for the better as long as de Gaulle is in power. It is very doubtful if he wants anything from the United States and more likely that he prefers a certain amount of friction. He is, however, well aware of the fact that French survival is dependent on American military protection. At the present time, he seems to have forgotten about Europe and his major attention seems to be to so-called "third world," particularly South America. The danger here is that he will start currents which will be stronger than he anticipates. It is not clear whether he recognized the hard core anti-American feeling in Latin America is Communist inspired, which since 1944, has treated United States as public enemy number one.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is always easier to say what should not be done in regard to de Gaulle than what should be done. For the purposes of elimination, I shall start with attitudes or actions which I am convinced would be unwise to take in regard to General de Gaulle.
1. At the present moment, there seems to be no question of any meeting with de Gaulle. There would appear to be no subjects that could be profitably discussed, and since de Gaulle will not come to the United States and the President will not leave the country before the elections, there is no possibility at least until the elections.
2. No concession or bribe of any kind will affect de Gaulle's attitude or policies. He would regard any such gesture on our part as confirmation of the correctness of his views and his just due without seeing any necessity to change his position at all.
3. The only type of action which would affect de Gaulle's policy would be a fairly basic change in circumstances in which these policies operate. However, it appears obvious that any change in our European policy would affect other Europeans equally if not more than France. For example, a shift in our strategy which would threaten an important cutback in our troops in Europe would be quite unacceptable to the Germans and even if threatened for the sake of influencing France, would be most upsetting to the Germans and plant suspicions which would continue. The same effect would be produced on Italy and other European Allies who have, on the whole, remained faithful to the United States. We should avoid pinpricks and small actions which look as though they are based upon irritation or ill temper. These could only help de Gaulle without producing any change whatsoever in his attitude or policies.
4. In any bilateral relationship with France, whether military or scientific, we should make sure that the United States receives an adequate quid pro quo for anything that it gives. In the psychological and publicity field, we should avoid giving the appearance that all is well with our relations and that the differences are merely superficial. I would certainly not recommend we say the opposite, but I think that whenever we apply soothing words (which however occasionally may be necessary for United States public opinion) we should realize that these are seized upon by de Gaullist publicity machines to support the contention that de Gaulle is on the right track. My recommendation, wherever possible, is that there should be no statement from leading officials--i.e., the President or Secretary of State, dealing directly with our relations with France. We should avoid taking the initiative in any statements, and if reply to questions is necessary, it should, on the whole, be confined to generalities which say very little one way or another.
5. We should keep under constant review the possibility of halting the delivery of tanker aircraft in the event that French policies become more blatantly hostile to our purposes or there is some single issue which is given great publicity.
6. In regard to Europe, we should continue our advocacy, although not stated too often, of our belief in and support for European unification and for partnership with the United States.
7. In the economic field, we should continue to work for the Kennedy Round, but we must be cognizant of the fact that in direct bilateral economic relations, the United States is heavily favored. (United States exports to France were up sixteen percent for a total of over nine hundred million dollars. Imports in 1963 were down a few percentage.) Since we enjoy a very profitable trade with France, this is not the subject on which we can initiate any retaliation. The same, I would say, goes for the financial questions.
8. We should, if asked, say we welcome French interest and involvement in Latin America. At the same time, we should observe most carefully the tone and substance of General de Gaulle's statement on his two visits insofar as they deal with the United States and adjust our attitude accordingly.
In short, there would appear to be very little that we can do to make plain our displeasure with current French attitude; I think calmness and attention to detail so that we do not go too far in the direction of polite soothing remarks, avoiding the other extreme of petulant and ill-tempered criticism. It should always be borne in mind that de Gaulle cannot have very many more years of being in power, and the present indications are that a very large portion of the objectionable features of current French policy would disappear with his departure from power.
28. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, April 8, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 2. Secret.
SUBJECT
General Billotte's Mission
General Billotte was brought in to see the President on Monday afternoon by Mr. Robert Anderson. General Billotte had sought this appointment on the ground that he had a personal message from General de Gaulle, and while the French Ambassador initially tried to insert himself into the meeting, he withdrew after a conversation with General Billotte, an episode which suggests that General de Gaulle did indeed authorize this private visit to the President by Billotte.
General Billotte's assertion is that General de Gaulle believes that the U.S. and France should cooperate on smaller matters where cooperation is possible, in the hope that this may lead onward toward understanding on larger matters. General Billotte reported that he had told de Gaulle that French Defense officials had been uncooperative in responding to American proposals for cooperation in the manufacture of tanks. He said that he had General de Gaulle's authorization to make a specific proposal and could give us assurance that if the U.S. could accept it in principle, there would be no obstacle at other levels of the French Government.
General Billotte's specific proposal is that the French AMX 13 and AMX 30 tanks should be licensed for production in the U.S. He believed that U.S. production could be cheaper by about 25%, that U.S. producers--specifically Chrysler--could shift very promptly from their present line to the French tanks, and that the French tanks are superior to our current line. General Billotte proposed that about 80% of the full run of the production of these two tanks should be American.
The second element in General Billotte's proposal is that France should join the Un. S. and Germany in the production of the battle tanks of the next generation. He recognized that France had been asked to participate in this operation before, and said that it had been a mistake for France to abandon this field to the Americans and the Germans.
It was not wholly clear from this conversation whether these two proposals were linked in General Billotte's mind or whether they are separable.
We told General Billotte that we would be back in touch with France promptly, and while he himself proposed that the discussion should be pursued first with Ambassador Alphand, the President has now decided that it is better for you and the General to have a talk first./2/
/2/In an April 9 memorandum to Bundy, McNamara reported that he had met with Billotte the previous afternoon and listened to his proposals. "I told him we would be happy to discuss in detail how France might join with the United States and Germany in the development of the next main battle tank, and how a U.S. firm or firms might join with French firms in the production and sale to foreign governments of French armored vehicles." Billotte responded he would favorably report this proposal to de Gaulle. (Ibid.)
McGeorge Bundy/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
29. Memorandum From Robert Manning of the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/
Washington, April 10, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 FR. Secret; Personal.
In view of the possibility that Couve de Murville will upset the apple cart at the SEATO meeting with a strong public or semi-public push for neutralization, I think it most important that we carefully coordinate any public reaction between the Department and Manila while the Secretary and the SEATO delegation are there (or between the Department and Taipei if the news breaks after we have left from Manila)./2/
/2/The SEATO meeting was held April 13-15. For text of Rusk's statement and the conference communiqu?, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 835-839.
There is always the possibility that Couve de Murville's actual utterances might be relatively harmless, but that background briefing by the French could produce distortions that present us with problems of U.S. governmental response. I am sure you will want to make sure that FE and the Vietnamese specialists here do not try to tackle such a problem without first allowing you to coordinate with the Secretary and Bill Bundy.
Bob
30. National Security Action Memorandum No. 294/1/
Washington, April 20, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 294. Top Secret.
TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, Office of Science and Technology
SUBJECT
U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance to France
It is the policy of this government to oppose the development of nuclear forces by additional states, other than those whose forces would be assigned as part of a NATO nuclear force, targeted in accordance with NATO plans and, except when supreme national interests were at stake, used only for the defense purposes of the Alliance.
Given current French policy, it continues to be in this government's interest not to contribute to or assist in the development of a French nuclear warhead capability or a French national strategic nuclear delivery capacity. This includes exchanges of information and technology between the governments, sale of equipment, joint research and development activities, and exchanges between industrial and commercial organizations, either directly or through third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate these efforts by significantly affecting timing, quality or costs or would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator. However, this directive is not intended to restrict unduly full and useful cooperation in non-strategic programs and activities.
Therefore, the President has directed that effective controls be established immediately to assure that, to the extent feasible, the assistance referred to above is not extended either intentionally or unintentionally.
To this end, specific technical guidance is to be developed and issued at the earliest possible time for the use of the agencies that control the export of equipment and technology, including data exchange arrangements. Responsibility for the development of such guidance, and when necessary the revision of these guidances, will be vested in the Departments of State and Defense, in consultation as appropriate with the Department of Commerce, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Office of Science and Technology, and under the leadership of the Department of State. The approved guidance documents will be cleared at the White House and issued as technical appendices to this National Security Action Memorandum. Necessary guidance will be requested before specific commitments are made by any agency.
McGeorge Bundy
31. Informal Notes of Secretary of State Rusk's Special Staff Meeting/1/
Washington, April 24, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147. Confidential. The notes, which bear the notation "for use of S/P," were prepared on April 27.
Mr. Tyler
Following the questions distributed in advance of the meeting,/2/ Mr. Tyler made the following points:
/2/Not found.
1. De Gaulle is trying to increase his influence in world affairs. If one recognizes the assumptions behind this statement, he is only implicitly intent on reducing our influence.
(a) De Gaulle's view of Europe is incompatible with partnership with the U.S. as we understand it, i.e., involving European integration and European dependence on the U.S. His definition of Atlantic partnership is narrower than ours.
(b) De Gaulle's view of the world and France's role in it is based on this estimate of a decline in the relevant power of the superpowers (U.S. and USSR). The Sino-Soviet conflict does favor his objectives, e.g., intra-European political maneuvering because it increases the options open to France in world politics.
2. These motivations are reflected as follows:
--In Europe by emphasis on European interests and an independence of the U.S.
--In Africa by "national" policies pursuing French advantages in cultural and economic fields.
--In the Far East in obvious ways such as recognition of the Chinese Communists.
--In Latin America somewhat similar to FE and by conceding that it is a natural U.S. sphere of interest while believing that France can play a larger role than at present.
3. It is difficult to distinguish between De Gaulle and France and, specifically, some of Deferre's objectives are shared with De Gaulle. There would be no question of reversing De Gaulle's actions if Deferre came to power.
4. It is not feasible to attempt to isolate De Gaulle and would not be in our interest except if he decided to go beyond the limits imposed by basic facts, e.g., in U.S.-European relations.
The Secretary
Looking at the events through which De Gaulle has lived, it is easy to understand his hopes for rebuilding France's prestige.
In the context of De Gaulle's thinking, opportunities for France to disagree with the U.S. are "positive pluses."
We should not get excited and show too much public concern over France's attempts at independence since this only helps achieve France's aims.
AF--Mr. Tasca
France's influence in Africa is on the whole favorable, yet the French position is constantly eroding and has significant gaps (as in Guinea).
ARA--Mr. Adams
If De Gaulle hopes to build up the French position in Latin America he was wrong to begin in Mexico because French influence there is greater than anywhere else in Latin America. He can only go downhill in his subsequent Latin American visits.
As an example of non-alignment France could have a damaging influence on members of the OAS.
Mr. Talbot
The significant fact about the Middle East at present is the normalization of French-Arab relations and how this will affect the relationship that has existed between France and Israel.
IO--Mr. Sisco
The French have not been activists; they could be much more troublesome if they were more active. For the near future the key issues which might reveal French behavior will be Article 19 and the Chinese representation question.
Grant G. Hilliker/3/
Deputy Executive Secretary
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
32. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 1, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 5. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
Bob Anderson's Call on General de Gaulle
Bob Anderson telephoned this morning to say that on Friday night, just as he was ready to leave Europe, he got a sudden invitation to call on General de Gaulle on Saturday at 10 A.M. He of course postponed his return and made the visit, which lasted about 45 minutes-one hour.
Anderson reports that General de Gaulle was most cordial. He said he knew there had been difficulty in communication between France and the United States, and would very much like to see this situation improved. There were only two great powers--the US and the USSR--but other countries had their own rights and interests, and he thought it important to have good communications. He said that he did not get on well with President Kennedy, who seemed to have a grand design of his own and was not in agreement with the views of General de Gaulle. On the other hand, while he had talked with you only 15 minutes in November,/2/ he had found it a most valuable conversation and hoped to have a better understanding with you.
/2/A memorandum of their conversation is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XII, Document 276.
The General then asked Anderson whether you would value communication by letter or by telephone, and Anderson said he particularly emphasized the telephone. Anderson said that while he could not speak for you, he could think of no reason why such communications would not be welcome. Anderson asked de Gaulle if there was any particular substantive matter which he would like to discuss, but the General replied that in frankness he was too tired and was not yet caught up with immediate issues after his illness./3/ Nevertheless he did value such connection, and while he expected to have differences with even the greatest of allies, France would always hope for good communication and understanding with her real friends like the United States.
/3/De Gaulle underwent surgery on April 17.
After the meeting and before he left France, Anderson received a further message from de Gaulle's office giving him the General's telephone number--Balzac 2000.
Bob's recommendation is that you should find a moment to make a personal phone call to the General in the next day or so. All that we need say is that we have had a report of this friendly talk, that we are grateful for the General's kindness to Mr. Anderson, that we certainly do welcome communication with him by letter and by telephone, and that this phone call is simply for the purpose of wishing him continued recovery and expressing the hope that we can indeed have such communications.
I support Bob's recommendation with one addition. George Ball is going to Paris this week end and has already asked if he may call on General de Gaulle, as he will be calling later on Prime Minister Home. I think you might wish to mention the Ball visit to General de Gaulle, and to say that if he is feeling ready for such communication, we would be very glad if he could have a frank talk with Secretary Ball about the great problems both our countries face in Southeast Asia./4/
/4/No record of a telephone conversation has been found. Johnson sent a letter to de Gaulle, dated June 4, which George Ball delivered during a June 5 meeting. Johnson's letter and de Gaulle's reply are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, France. Ball's report on his meeting with de Gaulle is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 202.
McG. B.
33. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, July 9, 1964, 6:35 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 3. Confidential. Drafted in AF, cleared in WE and AF, and approved by Harriman.
174. Department greatly interested in recent reports from Paris and certain African posts which appear confirm French intention make significant withdrawal its military forces in Sub-Sahara Africa. Previous reporting also indicates French may be rethinking and modifying their economic aid policies in Africa and elsewhere. Conceivably actions could create dangerous vacuum that could be exploited by Bloc to grave detriment whole Western position.
Modalities of troop withdrawals will have important bearing on effect they have on African countries concerned, i.e. numbers and types of units withdrawn, timing, and whether seconded officers and training units remain with local forces. Withdrawal French forces has serious political implications in terms of internal security and political stability of present regimes. It will also have a distinct economic impact quite apart from any possible changes in nature and level of economic aid.
FYI. View limited US resources available for overseas aid we naturally concerned by likely increase in appeals for US assistance from Francophone states if France makes drastic cuts. We have no desire replace France or undermine French relations with its former territories. We do think however clarification of French intentions necessary to permit consideration of ways in which impact of military withdrawal could be cushioned. End FYI.
Unless objection perceived you are requested discuss question proposed troop withdrawals with FonMin, eliciting clarification French plans in view of the common concern for the continued political and economic stability in important area affected./2/
/2/Telegram 282 from Paris, July 16, reported on French plans. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 AFR-FR)
Ball
34. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Paris, September 10, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Schaetzel.
SUBJECT
Franco-American Relations
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Bohlen
J. Robert Schaetzel
Ambassador Bohlen was convinced that de Gaulle would not take France out of NATO. De Gaulle's objections run to the organization of the alliance while of course the Treaty itself is entirely silent on this point. In one sense de Gaulle might find attractive NATO assuming worldwide responsibilities but of course the inclusion of Germany and Italy as major elements in the alliance would conversely diminish this attraction.
Bohlen doubted that de Gaulle would attempt to play the Russian card. The real problem in the area of Russian-Western relations is the apparent eagerness of the United States to reach accommodations with the USSR plus the fact that in de Gaulle's eyes we continue to see the confrontation between the East and West in ideological terms.
Bohlen stressed that the "Dumbbell" organization of the Atlantic is indispensable despite the fact that there is little prospect of early major movement forward. It was his view that both European and American public opinion should be made aware of the long term prospects implicit in the Atlantic partnership concept. He urged that we define more clearly what the United States really means by partnership. Bohlen wondered whether we had thought through the implications of such an arrangement and whether we were really ready to give up any U.S. sovereignty.
In speculating about the post-U.S. election period, Bohlen noted the degree to which President Kennedy had finally come to understand de Gaulle. He was fearful that President Johnson would not have the patience to undertake this task and would probably not reach the point of appreciating the complexity of the General. Bohlen was convinced that de Gaulle's obsession with French independence means that the General would be totally unable to compromise on any significant element of policy. On the other hand de Gaulle's personal and public politeness might very well mislead President Johnson into mistaking manners for substantial concessions. He felt that de Gaulle might be prepared to attempt a summit meeting but certainly not a NATO summit meeting. Bohlen also felt that the place in which the meeting was held could become important.
Bohlen referred to correspondence he had had from Mac Bundy/2/ in which the latter had asked what could be done in the context of our political campaign to meet criticism of the deterioration of French-American relations. Bohlen's short answer to this was "Nothing."
/2/Not further identified.
He referred to the letter I had written him about the Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly. He said he would be writing to us on Senator Fulbright's proposal. His only doubt was how it would fit into the concept of Atlantic partnership.
He said he was anxious to come to the United States shortly after November 3. He felt this important in view of the speculation in France about his own future.
35. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 294. Secret. Drafted by George (G/PM) on November 25 and cleared by Tyler and in G, L, and MC.
SUBJECT
Export Control to France Under NSAM 294: Test Cases
1. The letter at Tab A/2/ from AEC Chairman Seaborg to McGeorge Bundy, sent you and Secretary McNamara in copy, recommends approval in two cases involving exports to France. It invites your independent comment to the White House, because the issues involved are of concern to both State and Defense. The decision on these cases will be important in terms of clarifying the intent and future implementation of NSAM 294/3/ (Tab B).
/2/Tabs A, C, and D are not printed.
/3/Document 30.
2. One case involves a French request to purchase enriched U-235 in accordance with terms of our 1959 agreement, made to assist France in developing its own nuclear submarine propulsion plant, and under which we agreed to sell France up to 300 kilograms of U-235 for this purpose. We have already provided 171 kilograms, and the present request is for an additional 63. The AEC technical analysis (Tab C) leads them to the conclusion that the 63 kilograms is of no real significance to the program, and that to deny the request will cause the French no more than minor inconvenience. This conclusion seems to me unquestionably correct.
3. The other case involves a request to buy two computers, valued at about $12,000,000. One is intended for installation in a French weapons laboratory, the other in a civil establishment but with likely part-time military use. The AEC conclusion here also is that both computers will be of only marginal significance in terms of assisting the French strategic effort. This conclusion is less well supported and seems to me considerably more dubious than in the case of the U-235.
4. There has been a strong difference of view between Defense and AEC at staff level on the U-235 case, with Defense arguing against granting the French request (Tab D). There is no comparable Defense document in the computer case, but it is our understanding that the AEC itself (at Commission level) has been seriously divided over this one, with Chairman Seaborg and Commissioners Tape and Bunting favoring approval, the other two either opposed or reserved.
The device of the letter to Bundy was decided on by the AEC partly as a means simply of getting a high-level decision on two cases of considerable precedent value in terms of implementing NSAM 294, partly in the hope that Secretary McNamara in commenting would in effect rule against the line of thinking of those in Defense who produced the letter at Tab D. The AEC has hoped strongly that you will favor approval of the U-235 request. There is apparently less urgency and therefore less immediate concern about our position as regards the computers.
5. I have no hesitancy whatever in recommending that we support Dr. Seaborg's position on the U-235 request. The technical finding is well-supported, and the material would obviously be of little or no real consequence to the French program. I see no benefit and considerable potential harm in denying the request and thereby in French eyes failing to live up to a government-to-government agreement.
As regards the computers, I am not convinced by the arguments in the letter, and would like to know much more before recommending anything. I therefore suggest a holding position on this.
Recommendation: That you sign the letter at Tab E./4/
/4/Document 36.
36. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, December 1, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 294. Secret. Drafted by George and cleared by Tyler and in L and MC.
Dear Mac:
I have received a copy of Glenn Seaborg's letter to you of November 23, 1964, which invites my comment on two cases involving exports to France./2/ While the cases both require evaluation within the terms of NSAM 294, I will comment on them separately because somewhat different considerations are involved in the two.
/2/See Document 35.
Let me first however state my understanding of the policy embodied in NSAM 294, as that policy bears on France. For the purposes before us, I can perhaps best do this by recalling that the policy has always had positive as well as negative aspects. In negative terms, it was the intent of the NSAM that we take pains to deny to France (1) whatever will significantly assist her in acquiring an independent strategic nuclear capability, whether that capability be thought of in terms of nuclear weapons or the means to deliver them or (2) whatever will identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator in the French effort. In positive terms, it was the intent of the NSAM that we take equally great pains not to deny to France things which would not so assist her, and that to the extent possible we continue to cooperate with France as with any other friend and ally. Finally, when NSAM 294 was issued last April, it was not for the purpose of setting new policy, but instead to clarify and re-affirm existent policy, with the aim of furnishing the concerned Departments and agencies with an authoritative expression of that policy to be used as a guide in their implementation of it.
There have been numerous developments since last April in U.S.-French relations and the world scene generally, not all of them favorable, unfortunately. I do not however see in them anything to change the basic evaluation given above, or to cause us on our own initiative to adopt a more restrictive policy toward France in terms of implementing NSAM 294.
As regards the pending French request for 63 kilograms of U-235, made under the 1959 Agreement for Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes,/3/ I have carefully considered the available evidence. I accept the AEC conclusion as to the marginal importance to the French program of the requested amount, and it seems quite clear that U.S. denial of the request would cause the French only minor technical inconvenience.
/3/This agreement was signed with France July 20, 1959. The text is classified.
In political terms, on the other hand, the consequences of denial could be very serious. We do have an agreement, made in 1959 in good faith. We are already publicly associated with this particular program, by virtue of the agreement made in accordance with U.S. law and regulations, and by virtue of deliveries previously made under that agreement. To deny the pending request could and probably would be viewed by the French Government as reneging by the U.S. on a firm commitment, and in view of the determination that must necessarily be made in event of denial, as a deliberate U.S. intimation that France is no longer contributing to the common defense.
As is only too obvious, we have a sufficiency of serious problems with the French Government already. I do not believe it is in our basic interest to add to the list by denying this request, or by delaying further in deciding it. It has been pending since June, and to delay much longer would be tantamount to refusal, since the French must proceed within the next few weeks to take action of one kind or another. I therefore urge a quick affirmative decision.
As regards the computer cases, there is no comparable political aspect, of course, since no government-to-government agreement is involved, and the issue is largely that of deciding whether the inhibiting effect on the French program would be great enough to justify governmental intervention in U.S.-French trading relationships by blocking the two sales. This is not the sole issue, however, since an evaluation must be made also of the extent to which providing either or both these computers would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator in the French weapons program. The whole matter is a complex and difficult one, in which I would like to sort things out somewhat further before putting a recommendation of any kind to you.
Sincerely,
Dean Rusk/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
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