37. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, December 4, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 294. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of State and to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Dear Mac:
Glenn Seaborg's letter of November 23, 1964/2/ raises basic issues about that aspect of U.S. policy against proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems which is represented by NSAM 294.
/2/See Document 35.
I cannot agree with the position taken by AEC on the export of certain advanced computers and enriched U-235 to France. It suggests that NSAM 294 and over-all U.S. policy calls for the denial of assistance to France only if each denial action involves an item of equipment or technology that is in itself a controlling, critical or essential item in the French program. This position, in my judgment, is unrealistic and self-defeating if the U.S. seriously intends to follow the intent of NSAM 294 "not to contribute or assist" in the development of national nuclear capabilities.
We all recognize, of course, that France or any other technologically advanced nation has the capability to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and that the impact of U.S. denial of equipment and technology may in many cases not be determinative. Nevertheless, export controls, as one of several means of carrying out the anti-proliferation policy, will--by cumulative effect--retard, increase the cost of, or discourage French and other national efforts. In my judgment, therefore, the U.S. should be firm and consistent in denying whatever would measurably assist the program of any nation that aspires to a nuclear weapons capability, unless such assistance would be clearly insignificant. The approach taken by the AEC would, I suggest, unnecessarily weaken such an export control policy and make that policy inconsistent with the over-all U.S. anti-proliferation objective.
1. The Computer Cases. I disagree with the AEC recommendation that export be permitted. These computers are designed admirably for atomic research, and provide greatly enhanced ability for development of French nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems (although they of course have other uses). One computer, the IBM 360-92, will be the largest and most advanced model ever produced. Its acquisition by France in about two years certainly would be an important, though perhaps not an immediately decisive factor in the long-range French nuclear weapons effort. The CDC 3600, the second computer, is one of the most advanced currently in use. Its proposed delivery directly to a French nuclear weapons facility convinces me that export should be denied.
I recommend, therefore, that the U.S. deny the export of these computers under NSAM 294 and export of any others that would make a similar significant contribution to nuclear weapons or delivery systems development. The only condition under which I would agree to approve such items for export is a firm assurance by the French Government that they would not be so used.
I have the following additional comments on the AEC memorandum attached to Glenn Seaborg's letter:
a. Paragraph C (Memo, p. 1) suggests that the advanced computers are not absolutely required by the French, pointing to the fact that a U.S. thermonuclear device was developed without such a computer capability. This is true, but our first device was very awkward and heavy, weighing 42,000 lbs. The French can develop thermonuclear explosives of this type without the very large advanced computers involved here, but they cannot design a small deliverable warhead. We do not want to provide them the ability in the next few years to reduce, say, a 10,000 lb thermonuclear device to a missile warhead of 750 lbs. This difference is vital.
b. Paragraph C also highlights what most disturbs me about the AEC view of NSAM 294. The question is not whether the French are "dependent upon" the item sought to be exported (i.e., "but for" securing that item their program will founder), but rather whether the item will significantly assist their program. The AEC apparently does not dispute that the computers involved meet the latter standard. Indeed, both DOD and AEC today rely heavily upon comparable equipment in U.S. nuclear weapons and delivery system programs, the AEC military uses being interchangeable with peaceful uses.
c. The acknowledgment in paragraph D that these computers would assist the French program "after 1969" should in itself be sufficient to require denial under NSAM 294. Had the U.S. been foresighted enough to act more energetically only a few years ago along the lines NSAM 294 now calls for, we might today be confronted with far fewer problems stemming from French nuclear proliferation.
d. The statement is made at page 2 that the French would construe denial to mean that the U.S. is refusing "to cooperate with them in an area of fundamental and unclassified technology." Of course, the computers are "unclassified" but they will be used for highly classified nuclear weapons research programs, and can provide a significantly improved base for strategic delivery system development as well (submarine hull design, missile performance simulation, etc.). Admittedly, the French may be unhappy, and their reaction will be understandable. This is a risk, and a predictable result of applying NSAM 294. The real issue is whether or not the U.S. seriously intends to retard the French program, knowing that they will disapprove of our actions. Moreover, I question whether the French adverse reaction is not being stressed too much. They have known of our anti-proliferation policy for some time now.
e. At page 2, an inordinate stress is placed on the dollar value of the sales involved. The dollar value for export of the many, many types of computers (about 150) not falling within NSAM 294 is far greater than the value of the small number of types of advanced computers (about 12) comparable to those at issue here. Obviously I do not oppose the export of the 150 other types which have many research, industrial, and commercial applications (as well as substantial utility in nuclear weapons programs). As a rough estimate, these 150 other types comprise about 95% of the dollar value of the total market.
f. The reference at page 2 to the Ferranti capability is probably incorrect in part. Information from the CIA staff indicates that neither this U.K. firm, nor the company to which it apparently recently sold its large-computer production facilities (ICT), plans to produce a computer comparable to the IBM 360-92. As a result, the largest computer developed or known to be under development outside the U.S. has been estimated to have only 5%-15% of the capability of the 360-92. Even this limited capability may be important enough to call for discussion with the source country (U.K.) to influence it to withhold any such computers under an anti-proliferation policy akin to our own. The results of such efforts should not be prejudged.
g. I question the suggestion at page 2, third paragraph, that existing French computer capability devoted to non-weapons research could be harnessed to assist significantly their nuclear weapons effort, thereby obviating the need for the advanced computers at issue. Pooling a number of large computers does not provide a substitute for a single advanced machine such as the IBM 360-92. Certain sophisticated problems of extreme size and complexity do not lend themselves to piecemeal solution; in other instances the time required for solution makes pooling unrealistic. For the volume of work which could be processed, scheduling and central programming would be quite difficult; there would be inefficient fragmenting of many computing jobs; and the computer time required for much of the necessary work would be increased. Further, diverting existing French computers into the pool would starve other segments of their industry. Even with this pooling effort, the French nuclear weapons program would in all probability be held back; at least it would not be speeded up, as it would be with the advanced computers AEC would permit to be exported.
2. The Enriched U-235 Case. An initial DOD position was furnished on November 6, 1964 to AEC by Mr. W.J. Howard, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy). (A copy is attached.)/3/ The position is basically that the export license should be denied because the material is expressly for the French land-based prototype submarine nuclear propulsion plant, and the French intend that submarine to be part of a missile delivery system. The 1959 Agreement under which earlier shipments were made is relevant, but not determinative. Present conditions, especially the current U.S.-French-NATO nuclear controversies, are very different from those prevailing in 1959. Subsequent to Mr. Howard's letter, [6 lines of source text not declassified]/4/
/3/Not found.
/4/[Text not declassified]
For the above reasons, I reaffirm the stated DOD position in opposition to the export and would be most disinclined to certify, as the 1959 Agreement requires, that the transfer of enriched uranium to France at this time will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to U.S. defense and security. As Mr. Howard's letter of November 6 indicates, there are adequate grounds under the 1959 Agreement to support denial.
In connection with the U-235 export, I note that the AEC memorandum (page 4, paragraph D) cites as a reason for favorable action the fact that denial would have only a short-range ("limited to the next two years") effect. In the computer cases, the AEC spoke in favor of export because denial would have only a long-range (post-1969) effect. Somewhat questionably both grounds are urged concurrently in support of permitting the exports.
In conclusion, I am hopeful that the differences of interpretation which the AEC letter has usefully brought to your attention regarding the computer and U-235 transactions can be quickly resolved. This should eliminate a major obstacle to implementing the NSAM 294 policy effectively.
Sincerely,
Bob/5/
/5/ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
38. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Paris, December 17, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 5. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bohlen. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay. Rusk was in Paris for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting December 15-17.
PARTICIPANTS
M. Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
M. Charles Lucet
Secretary of State Rusk
Ambassador Bohlen
The Secretary began by extending his congratulations, which he said were belated, for the successful Common Market negotiations in which Couve had been involved, adding that they could now look forward to the Kennedy Round. He remarked that the U.S. had considered it would be helpful to urge the Germans on this matter and we had done so and it possibly had been helpful.
Couve de Murville made a suitable response.
The Secretary said that he had come to see Couve on the question of the intentions of Hanoi which had been mentioned by Couve the other day;/2/ French estimates of these intentions seemed to be somewhat different from those which we attributed to Hanoi.
/2/Rusk reported on this discussion in telegram Secto 15 from Paris, December 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US)
Couve replied that, in the last conversation, the Secretary had concentrated on North Vietnam. The French, however, felt that, rather like the European satellites and the Soviet Union, it was impossible to ignore China, although they recognize that North Vietnam did not have the same interests as China since the former wished to retain its independence. It was as if South Vietnam wished to negotiate without the U.S. He said he did not know what we wished to find out. He said their information was that there were considerable economic difficulties in North Vietnam although it constituted no threat to the stability of the Ho Chi Minh regime. This had been confirmed in a conversation between the Cambodian Foreign Minister and Seydoux in New York. The Foreign Minister had said that the regime was very solid and enjoyed the support of the people, but that from an economic point of view life was very drab. He also reported that there seemed to be general expectation of a U.S. attack and that there were machine guns, etc., on the roofs of the houses. It was the French impression that the government of North Vietnam had no intention of taking over South Vietnam for at least the next ten years and that its main objective at the present time was a return to the '54 agreements. He did not deny their belief in ultimate reunification.
The Cambodian Foreign Minister had remarked about the importance of helping South Vietnam, if the fighting could be brought to an end, in order to show a better system than Communism. Couve said that he felt the North Vietnamese were between two elements, the United States in the south and the Chinese in the north, and did not wish to give in to either.
The Secretary remarked that he did not believe that the North Vietnamese could think that the south wanted to take over the north and that all that was needed was for the north to stop the guerrilla action.
Couve replied there was no point of arguing as to who had begun the present situation. He said the U.S. now had some 22,000 men in there and the north was sending in guerrillas.
The Secretary replied that who began it and when was a point of considerable importance.
Couve answered that there was a question as to whether the Viet Cong had intervened because of U.S. takeover from the French in South Vietnam or whether the U.S. had begun it following intervention by the Viet Cong. He said he would not like to enter into this discussion. There were psychological and reciprocal fears to be considered. The fact, however, was that now a situation exists which could only be solved by simultaneous disengagement, which they felt could only be brought about by negotiation.
He said also the Chinese had no military combat forces in Vietnam, to which the Secretary agreed, saying they only had some training troops and forces along the border.
The Secretary, turning to Laos, remarked that in yesterday's conversation President de Gaulle had said that Souphanouvong had never questioned the status of Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister of Laos./3/ According to our information this was precisely what he had challenged for the purpose of going to a conference.
/3/Reported in telegram Secto 26 from Paris, December 16. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2534)
Couve said that according to the French understanding Souphanouvong accepted Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister but only in the sense that he was the chairman, as it were, of the three factions in Laos. He added that if Souvanna Phouma were able to be Prime Minister on his own, and if there were no three factions in Laos there would be no Laotian problem.
The Secretary remarked that it was one thing to say that the Prime Minister required the concurrence of the three factions. It was another thing when the writ of the Prime Minister does not run in Pathet Lao, as has been the case in Laos since the entry into force of the present government. Because of this there has been no possibility of controlling the 6,000 Viet Minh and the use of Laos as a corridor to Vietnam.
Couve said there were difficulties on both sides of this question.
The Secretary said he did not think that one could present the situation in South Vietnam as though it was an evenly balanced affair with wrong on both sides.
Couve said they did not pretend it was evenly balanced, but there were difficulties on both sides.
The Secretary then remarked that agreement in Laos had never been conditioned on the situation in Vietnam.
Couve agreed, but said the purpose of the agreement was to keep Laos as calm as possible. In fact, however, he recognized that Vietnam did have an effect on the Laotian situation. He said in a sense the '62 agreement had been successful, but now the war had begun again and the situation had returned to the pre-Geneva stage with Souvanna Phouma in the same situation as General Phoumi had been in 1961.
The Secretary pointed out that the position of the ICC was the result of direct fraud on the part of the Russians. In Geneva it had been understood that the ICC would, by two-thirds vote, have the right to investigate developments in any region of the country. The English wording implied that such a vote would be with the consent of the Laotian Government, that is, with the consent already granted by the Geneva Agreement. The French wording was somewhat less clear. This had been pointed out by Mr. Harriman to Pushkin, but Pushkin had confirmed the meaning of the English text. However, in practice the Polish member had invoked the Pathet Lao veto as a reason for not carrying out this agreement.
Couve then inquired what could be done in the circumstances.
The Secretary said that Gromyko had suggested that they should see what the three Laotian factions could do together, and he understood that Souvanna Phouma had proposed a meeting in Laos but that he had not heard whether there had been an answer.
Couve agreed and said he understood the meeting place suggested was Luang Prabang.
Lucet, in reply to a question, said that there were still lower representatives of the Laotian factions in Paris but there were no meetings.
Couve said he agreed that the best thing would be for them to meet and that he did not know about the prospects.
The Secretary then inquired whether or not they had had anything from Hanoi on the subject of Laos.
Couve replied they have not, but pointed out that they had no real representatives in Hanoi, and there was only a low-level trade delegation from Hanoi in Paris.
The Secretary said that we had had some indirect contacts with Hanoi but there had been nothing serious.
Couve remarked that the North Vietnamese would never tell us anything except to express their concern for future American intentions. They could not say anything constructive. They could only tell us to get out just the way we told them to get out.
The Secretary added that we have always said if they got out we would get out.
Couve said this is what they say, but suppose both sides get out--what would then happen?
The Secretary remarked that with the Viet Cong out it would be much easier for the South Vietnamese, and particularly the army, to organize the country.
Couve said the French did not agree and he did not think that ten or twelve generals squabbling among themselves could organize the country with the Buddhists, the sects, and the mountain people all in disagreement.
The Secretary said that the absence of the Viet Cong would make it a new and easier situation.
Couve said this was true but it would be impossible to foresee what would be the outcome. The present rulers were old men and they were not bad but it was obvious that they were not going to last. What was needed was time, with no fighting and no foreign intervention. A national movement was needed. He added that the French aim was to avoid a Communist regime.
The Secretary remarked that he had received that impression from his talk with General de Gaulle, who had said that despite the consequences, even Communism, he preferred peace in the Far East.
Couve said they should work to avoid a Communist regime. He then inquired specifically what the U.S. would like to find out from the North Vietnamese. Was it that we wished South Vietnam to be independent and to stop interference from the north?
The Secretary replied there were many complications, and that perhaps an important indicator of Communist intentions would be the Laos Agreement of 1962. It might be possible, for example, to inquire of Souphanouvong exactly what his attitude was in regard to Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister at the conference, to which Couve agreed. He also wondered whether it might not be possible to inquire as to the reaction of Souphanouvong in regard to the Polish proposal for a preliminary meeting attended by the two co-chairmen, the ICC, and the Government of Laos.
Couve said it was not easy now, but the Secretary said it might be possible to ascertain prospects of success before proceeding to a formal conference and it might give the Russians a chance to do something without the presence of the Chinese or the U.S.
Couve then asked if it would be possible to say that the U.S. would be satisfied if Souphanouvong agreed that Souvanna Phouma would be Prime Minister but, at the same time, on the basis of an agreement of the three parties.
The Secretary said this would depend on whether this meant that Souvanna Phouma could only act as the Pathet Lao wished at the conference.
Couve said this would seem to him to be a matter of procedure, which the Laotians could agree among themselves. He did recall how it had worked at the Geneva Conference in 1961-62./4/ He asked what would happen if the Russians or Chinese should refer to the U.S. or Thailand military personnel in Laos at a conference.
/4/Documentation on the Geneva Conference on Laos is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXIV.
The Secretary replied that this would be quite all right with us. The ICC could look at anything provided it is not one-sided. The original agreement in '62 had provided for elimination of all foreign troops except a certain number of French. This had been our objective, and Couve agreed that it still was.
Couve then said that under the agreement the ICC had the right to inspect, which the Secretary confirmed was by a two-thirds vote.
The Secretary then suggested that it might be useful for the French to make the contact with South Vietnam rather than Hanoi.
In conclusion, the Secretary suggested that the French might wish to make a check on a number of North Vietnamese statements in 1959-60, which he said had gone very far in calling for the conquest of South Vietnam.
Couve said he had always understood that the position of the north had been to return to '54 but that the statements referred to seemed to go further.
39. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, December 21, 1964, noon.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 FR-US. Confidential. Repeated to London and Bonn.
3642. Following Secretary's departure and extensive Franco-American conversations this week in which he participated, following are Embassy's preliminary comment on results this week's activities in Paris insofar as our relations with France are concerned:
1) Secretary's extensive program of talks with French leaders including two sessions with de Gaulle/2/ has effectively undercut Gaullist press argument to effect U.S. not maintaining dialogue with French. Press and public opinion has alleged U.S. policies as well. This argument has disappeared as of now, and we are in position take line with French publicly and privately that every effort being made explain in fullest detail our positions on outstanding issues to French. Couve visit to Washington next month would further strengthen this argument.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 38. A record of Rusk's first meeting with de Gaulle, which covered European defense and Germany, is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 64.
2) Press has also stressed that Secretary took position with de Gaulle that neither ANF nor any other U.S. policy directed against France or at French encirclement. This has likewise had helpful reaction.
3) Fact all talks were held in atmosphere cordiality likewise helpful in refuting argument that U.S.-French relations acrimonious. This position already refuted directly by Secretary and we will obviously continue maintain this line here. French in their briefings on these talks also apparently taking position that everything passed most cordially.
4) Positive results McNamara-Messmer talk/3/ also helpful and press has given considerable attention to conclusions that U.S. and France will coordinate their independent nuclear forces. Although there is some difference of opinion as to specifics of outcome of meeting, in general it is interpreted as promising sign U.S.-French cooperation for future even though it is realized this will not be immediate.
/3/No record of this meeting has been found.
5) While there is general understanding that Franco-American differences over NATO and MLF/ANF not resolved and indeed no negotiations as such occurred, there is, nevertheless, opinion that heat taken out of ANF problem for moment. Embassy has previously reported French apparent plan relax anti-ANF propaganda for time being. With de Gaulle press conference scheduled for late January, Embassy believes we probably have nearly month's respite in French attacks on this subject. Fundamental French attitudes have not changed (and some observers remain very pessimistic) but events of past week have certainly served to dampen down situation.
6) Parenthetically it should be noted that unfortunate event of week seems have been recrudescence Franco-German recriminations over four-power communiqu&#eacute;(on which Embassy reporting separately).
Bohlen
40. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Johnson/1/
Washington, December 23, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 5. Confidential. Drafted by Dillon. A copy was sent to Bundy.
SUBJECT
Report on my trip to Paris
1. After some very plain talk in the meeting of the Finance Ministers of the Group of Ten,/2/ the elements of a solution satisfactory to the United States appeared regarding the method of gold payment in connection with the forthcoming general increase of quotas in the International Monetary Fund. The next day a detailed agreement was reached by the Deputies of the Ministers which Mr. Roosa has reduced to writing and sent to his colleagues for confirmation of their agreement. The essence of the agreement is that arrangements will be made so that the United States will not suffer any gold loss as a result of the increase in quotas except for our own gold payment to the Fund. This payment is offset by equivalent automatic drawing rights in the Fund so it does not reduce our readily available reserves. If this agreement sticks, as it should, the whole matter of quota increases should be settled within a month or six weeks.
/2/Dillon reported on this meeting in telegram 3579 from Paris, December 16. (Ibid., Vol. 4)
2. My bilateral talks with the French Finance Minister were not as promising. After some delay he informed me, in a private meeting at my apartment, that the French government had turned down his suggestion to make a $342 million prepayment of debt to the United States accompanied by a $150 million purchase of gold. The government had decided it would make no prepayment and no exceptional purchase of gold. However, in order to reduce their excess holding of dollars, they would approximately double their regular monthly taking of gold from the United States, increasing the figure to about $65 million. The French Minister said that this matter could be reviewed again in about six months in light of the situation at that time, and that he would continue his efforts within the French government to achieve agreement on a debt prepayment.
It is most important that knowledge of this French decision be held in complete confidence in order to protect the French Finance Minister's position. He has been, and continues to be, helpful and friendly in all his dealings with the U.S.
Douglas Dillon/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Dillon signed the original.
41. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, December 29, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, Bundy. Secret. Drafted by George and cleared by Kitchen.
SUBJECT
Denials of U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Vehicle Assistance to France
This memorandum has been prepared in response to your recent request for detailed information on denials under our policy of not assisting France in her nuclear weapons effort, and on French probing of that policy.
In addressing the subject of U.S.-French nuclear relationships, it is important to recall that neither General de Gaulle nor any other high-level French official has ever specifically asked for U.S. Government cooperation with France in achieving a nuclear weapons capability. This is not to say that General de Gaulle is opposed to such cooperation and would reject it if offered; it is only to say that there has been no U.S.-French dialogue at any high political level which could reasonably be termed a French request for help met with U.S. denial.
Our policy vis-?-visthe French or any other independent nuclear weapons effort has been expressed principally in general statements made in the NATO context or elsewhere. The French have not overtly challenged or even discussed with us this policy as such; their probing has come principally in the form of requests to buy specific items of equipment or technology. The French approach has been a pragmatic and generally quite honest and above-board one, which could be described as follows: General de Gaulle has decided that France should press on with an independent program, getting whatever items of practical assistance may be needed and available, but persisting with the program irrespective of the availability of this assistance, and working toward self-sufficiency in all important aspects.
The French officials responsible for implementing the program have of course been well aware of the general U.S. policy and have not even approached us with requests for direct weapons assistance--warheads, design data, fissionable material for weapons, etc. There have been many requests for marginal or contributory assistance of various kinds, especially on the delivery vehicle as contrasted to the warhead side of a national nuclear weapons capability. In this connection, it should be noted that during the first few years of the French program, we were comparatively more concerned with controlling warhead assistance than delivery assistance, whereas we now give close attention to both.
The attached annexes compiled by State's Office of Munitions Control, and including contributions from the Department of Defense and the three Services, furnish details on specific denials since 1958 of items coming within the purview of the policy currently expressed by NSAM 294./They show that there have been denied to the French over the years in question a substantial variety of hardware, information, and technological data.
/2/The annexes are not printed. NSAM No. 294 is Document 30.
The Atomic Energy Commission played an important contributory role in many of these cases, and in others mentioned below which did not involve direct denials. The AEC has also denied access to its facilities by French CEA representatives upon occasion. Records available at this time show 21 such AEC denials since 1961. Commerce has played virtually no role in this area as yet, but is expected to do so increasingly in the future because of our Test Ban Treaty obligations./3/ As of the present, six license applications for export to France have been denied by Commerce. They were for boron trifluoride, lithium, gallium, synthetic rubber products, and high-speed camera parts. Both NSAM 294 and Test Ban Treaty considerations were involved.
/3/For text of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, signed at Moscow August 5, 1963, see 14 UST 1313.
Study of the annexes will give a good over-view of the practical results of our policy in terms of specific items the French sought and failed to obtain from the U.S. in the 1958-64 period. In addition, it is useful to summarize some key approach-response situations over the years, because they give a flavor of French "probing" and U.S. response, even though formal denials may not have been involved. It is also useful to sketch the relationship to the problem of the Test Ban Treaty, since it introduced a new factor into the situation.
Submarines
French interest in nuclear propulsion for submarines antedates de Gaulle's return to power and stems in part from a U.S. offer of general assistance in this field made in the context of the 1957 NATO Heads of Government meeting, and thereafter repeated specifically to France. Nothing came of this, for reasons of both a policy and security nature, and the 1959 agreement under which we undertook to furnish fuel for a land-based prototype reactor was a "consolation prize" to the French, inasmuch as no U.S. technology is involved, and the French are entirely on their own in developing the reactor.
In late 1961, the French indicated to AEC Chairman Dr. Seaborg an interest in acquiring fuel for an operating submarine. Preliminary consideration was given this matter within the U.S. Government and a decision was reached in early 1962 that while it would be necessary to know more of French plans before seriously addressing the subject, it would be undesirable to engage in any detailed discussion with the French unless and until we were prepared to imply that we might be willing to supply fuel under some circumstances. This we were not willing to do, and this particular French probe was therefore turned off with a "no-response" tantamount to denial.
In 1962 an Administration spokesman indicated to the French that it might be possible to sell them a nuclear submarine of the Skipjack (hunter-killer) class, indicating at the same time that it would be necessary to secure approval of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The French were definitely interested, and preliminary discussions with JCAE had been held when the de Gaulle press conference of January 14, 1963 took place,/4/ slamming the door on U.K. entry into EEC. This also slammed the door on the Skipjack sale, and in answer to a French inquiry a few months later, they were told that the events of January made it impracticable to pursue the matter.
/4/For extracts, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 378-380.
Gaseous Diffusion Plant
The French also expressed to Dr. Seaborg in 1961 an interest in acquiring unclassified conventional equipment for use in their gaseous diffusion plant. They were told that there would be no objection to their purchasing such equipment from commercial suppliers, provided the sale and transfer would not involve in any way the communication of Restricted Data.
The actual French shopping list when received called principally for compressors and regulators, items of very considerable importance to the operation of a gaseous diffusion plant. The final outcome was that while a flat "no" was never given the French, a response in early 1962 imposed conditions and qualifications of such a nature that the French dropped the subject.
Request for Information on Joint Task Force 8
In 1963, on a Navy-to-Navy basis, the French requested information on the detailed composition and methods of operation of Joint Task Force 8, which had provided the logistic and instrumentation support for our Pacific test operations in 1962. The French were candid in stating they wanted the information because it would be helpful to their Navy in participating in French nuclear tests.
The U.S. decision was that while complying with the request would probably not mean giving the French any information of significance, to comply fully would only encourage further and more difficult requests. The response was, therefore, confined to referring the French Navy to published information.
Observation of U.S. Underground Tests
In addition to routine requests for visits to AEC facilities which the French have made from time to time, and which, as indicated above, have resulted in 21 turndowns over the past few years, they asked to send observers to the 1962 weapons test series in Nevada. Since access to the test site during operations might have compromised weapons information, this request was not granted. In response to a related inquiry, however, the French were told that we did not propose to discontinue the practice of permitting sale to France of unclassified instruments useful in weapons tests. (See below for bearing on this position of Test Ban Treaty subsequently concluded.)
Lavaud Mission
In early 1962 a French military mission to Washington headed by General Lavaud submitted an extensive shopping list including items of importance in guidance, propulsion, and general design aspects of missile development. It was made known to the French that these could not be considered favorably and this request was not pushed. (The compressor-regulator order described above was also connected with the Lavaud Mission.)
Participation in Plutonium Effects Tests
In May, 1963 the French informally requested permission to participate in plutonium effects tests at our Nevada Test Site. No response was given and after the French learned that combined US-UK tests were in progress they did not raise the matter again.
Test Ban Treaty
The conclusion of the Test Ban Treaty introduced a new factor into U.S.-French nuclear relationships, particularly with respect to furnishing equipment which might be used in French tests. After consideration of our obligations under the Treaty, we provided the French Government last February with the attached Aide-M?moire, expressing a U.S. intention to deny to France any material, equipment or technology which would be used in the devising, carrying out, or evaluation of tests, as long as France contemplated conduct of tests in environments prohibited by the Treaty.
In October, 1964 an important test case was decided when Secretary Rusk approved a recommendation for denial of export of unclassified equipment intended for instrumentation of French underground testing. This equipment was of a type which the French had previously purchased with U.S. Government knowledge and approval. Steps are now under way which will enable us to bring our policy and intentions on export control under the Test Ban Treaty to the attention of American manufacturers and exporters generally, since some items may be involved which have not previously been controlled by either State or Commerce.
Summary Evaluation
The policy currently expressed by NSAM 294 has in large part been in effect for several years. While the French have never overtly challenged it, it is clear, from the cases sketched above and from the detailed annexes, that they have extensively and systematically probed U.S. implementation of that policy by attempting to secure from U.S. sources a variety of hardware, information and technological data that they presumably considered would be of value in achieving their program goals.
Our denials have undoubtedly been troublesome to those charged with carrying out the French program, and it is a reasonable assumption that the cumulative effect of our denial policy has been to delay attainment of program goals. It is also a reasonable assumption that another effect has been to force an increased degree of French self-sufficiency, given their intention, which has so far prevailed, of carrying out the program irrespective of the availability of outside assistance. These two offsetting factors require careful assessment against a background evaluation of just where the French stand in their program as of end-1964, in order to determine those areas in which a U.S. denial policy can operate effectively against French purposes in future.
Llewellyn E. Thompson/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Thompson signed the original.
42. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, January 5, 1965, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 FR. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to London, Bonn, Brussels, Luxembourg, and The Hague.
3798. It occurred to me it might be useful at this time to give a summary of available information concerning France's position on the related subjects of NATO, nuclear affairs, and the US position in Europe, which are of particular interest to the United States. Other aspects of French policy, i.e. Southeast Asia, Congo, and other questions not discussed here will be covered in a subsequent message./2/
/2/Telegram 3858 from Paris, January 8. (Ibid.)
In most cases the information and analysis have been already submitted on the separate subjects concerned, but it might help a general understanding of current French policy if they were placed together as a connected whole.
During 1964 certain aspects of French policy became more definite and moved from the realm of speculation into that of quasi-certainty. In cases where feasible I have endeavored to put down probable lines of French action in relation to any given subject.
1. French Attitude Towards NATO.
During 1964 it became increasingly apparent that de Gaulle's often repeated desire to bring about structural changes in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization--as distinct from the Alliance--really involved a destruction of the existing structural organization of the Treaty, including SHAPE and all its varied functions, the command structure, the assignment of forces, infrastructure, and in short any aspect of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which contained elements of integration. How and at what date this will be done remains unseen and it is always possible that the distinction will not be complete.
De Gaulle wants the Alliance relationships probably in bilateral form after 1969. He apparently has the old-fashioned idea that all that is required to make an alliance effective in time of peace is occasional conversations with reciprocal exchange of war plans between general staffs to go into effect in the event of hostilities. This impression, which may seem exaggerated, is based upon a number of conversations which I have had with de Gaulle, or at which I have been present when he has talked with the Secretary.
In part this view of de Gaulle is based upon his general historical analysis of the trends of events in the future. He unquestionably believes that the Soviet menace will progressively diminish, and that the sharp differences which exist in the ideological and organizational field between Communist states of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union on the one hand and the nations of Western Europe on the other, will tend to disappear. He believes the danger of general warfare, that is war between major powers, will not arise in Europe but will more likely occur in regard to Communist China in Asia, but not for at least fifty years or so, unless the US and China get out of hand in the Far East over Vietnam.
De Gaulle does not plan to move in this field in regard to NATO until close to the 1969 date when it is possible for any signatory to withdraw. His apparent present intention is to hold down France's participation in NATO to a minimum but in a formal sense to let things go on until 1969 unless, as he has stated on a number of occasions, there is a "crisis" or a "drama" which would force him to consider earlier action. In this connection, it should be noted that de Gaulle, in his talk with the Secretary this December, referred to his memorandum of September 1958/3/ as an attempt on his part to bring about necessary changes in NATO, which however met with no response. It can be deduced from this that de Gaulle's chief objection to the current structure of NATO is that it does not give ample place to France and is too dominated in his eyes by the US.
/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 81-83.
Therefore, for the immediate future there is not much ground for anticipating any sudden French move in regard to NATO short of what de Gaulle would call a crisis or a drama, terms which, when he used them, he obviously meant to indicate a particular development such as the MLF or even the ANF. Short of this he will undoubtedly wait until (A) the French nuclear force is really operational and (B) until close to 1969 North Atlantic Treaty date.
2. French Attitude Toward MLF, ANF, or any Comparable Collective Nuclear Project in NATO.
French attitude on the MLF when it was first broached some two years ago was very specific. The French said to us on a number of occasions, and told the same to other members of the Alliance, that France would not participate presumably because all of its resources in this regard were fully utilized by its own Force de Dissuasion, but it had no objection to the project as outlined nor any objection to any other member of the Alliance participating.
In October 1964 this attitude changed radically. While the exact cause is speculation, the French themselves tell us that initially they did not believe that the idea would ever approach reality, but it is probable that Erhard's press conference, and particularly his reference to the possibility of a German-American bilateral arrangement in this field, was what triggered off the new French opposition. The first overt manifestations of the current French position were the speech of Couve de Murville in the National Assembly and the speeches of Pompidou to the parliamentary journalists and to the Assembly. Pompidou gave considerable emphasis to the bilateral aspects of the MLF.
In any event, since about the end of October, French policy has hardened into outright and open opposition to the whole concept of the participation of any European allies with the US in a mixed-manned or other joint nuclear venture in which the US would hold the crucial control. At the moment of writing the exact future of the ANF, as it is now known, is not too clear. Despite the amicable nature of the conversations the Secretary had in Paris in December on the subject with General de Gaulle and with Couve de Murville,/4/ French opposition remains just as strong as it ever was and this opposition must be kept in mind in any future plans for the atomic force. It does not in any sense mean that it should be abandoned, but it merely means that French opposition cannot be dismissed or ignored or expect to change, at least as long as de Gaulle is in power.
/4/See Documents 38 and 39.
From the nature of the objections which the French have brought forward to the MLF it would appear to me that the real French objection is the recognition that any form of NATO (or outside NATO) nuclear force in which some continental Europeans would participate would inevitably do away with the French monopoly of European nuclear weapons and would, in de Gaulle's view, subject European defense to American veto and American control rather than French. The French undoubtedly feel that given the difficulties which the Germans would encounter (the WEU treaties, the lack of place of test, shortage of raw material), France could easily retain in the future under any circumstances the advance she has over Germany in this field. Parenthetically it is probable that de Gaulle overestimates the value in peace time of a monopoly of nuclear weapons.
This central aim of French policy has rarely been enunciated and does not figure among the public chief objections to the MLF, but it is what lies behind the charge that the MLF is divisive. It is of course not in reality divisive at all, since through the European clause the MLF could become a purely European force if and when Europe ever organized itself.
France will probably not take any action in this field unless the MLF once again becomes a reality. It is, however, extremely possible that the publicity attending the MLF may well force France to take further steps in the direction of European unification, or at least to make certain gestures in that direction for the sake of appearance. It is also probable that in any future discussion for the unification of Europe, France, in accordance with de Gaulle's Strasbourg speech, will insist upon putting unification in the defense field on the agenda for immediate discussion. It is not too difficult to imagine what use France would make of any such agenda item for European discussion in the event that any one of the members attempted to go in for the MLF.
3. US Presence in Europe.
Contrary to much opinion de Gaulle is not working to bring about any withdrawal of US forces from Europe in the relatively near future. He does hopefully envisage over a long period of time, according to his estimate of future international trends, the emergence of a situation in Europe when US forces will no longer be necessary for the defense of Europe. He is too realistic to wish for any withdrawal too soon or too abruptly which might imperil European security. What, however, he is trying to prevent is the political or military institutionalization of US presence in Europe after the military necessity has disappeared and consequently the forces themselves withdrawn. This is the real basis for his often asserted opposition in general to the present NATO structure and in part to his opposition to the MLF or any other integrated nuclear organization, including the US and some European countries.
But I repeat that at the present time, and for at least five years, there would seem to be no possibility that de Gaulle would deliberately make any move designed to force US withdrawal from Europe.
There is, particularly in the defense and NATO field, a characteristic, logical sequence in French policy quite independent of whether or not the premise is sound. For example, once the premise of the necessity of France having completely national nuclear deterrent is accepted any logical consequences become apparent. For example, it is necessary for de Gaulle periodically to voice doubts as to US intention to use nuclear weapons with the risk of its own cities in the defense of Europe. For if there were no question about American nuclear willingness to defend Europe there would be no need for the Force de Dissuasion and consequently no need for the financial burden on the French tax payers. Also, the French strategy of immediate nuclear response of the so-called trip wire theory is another logical consequence of the Force de Frappe. Since France does not have the resources to spend on nuclear armament and conventional forces, conventional forces have been and will be further starved for funds. It follows that France would not be in a position, even if it desired, to fight a conventional war on the soil of Europe.
While some of the foregoing considerations are obviously speculative in character and cannot be exactly proven, I believe on the other hand they provide a reasonably accurate account of current French policy.
I would like to close this message by stating that I see no possibility of any US diplomatic or political action directed specifically at France which would significantly change French attitudes or policy in any of these fields. Only external events, by changing basic circumstances, might be expected to bring about serious modification of current French attitude. While it is therefore unquestionably true that diplomacy has very little chance of success in modifying France's intransigent position, it is nevertheless in my opinion extremely important that we should always hold out to the public the impression that we believe that there is some hope in this regard since this would permit us to maintain, as we have endeavored to do virtually ever since de Gaulle came to power, friendly relations without entertaining any naive hope of changing any French basic positions. It is also very important to this to maintain the current dialogue.
An invitation to Couve to visit Washington in the latter part of this month in the event he would not be coming to the UN might be worth considering.
Department to repeat as desired.
Bohlen
43. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 19, 1965, 11:35 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2480. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on March 5 and in U on March 9. The meeting was held in the White House. Couve visited Washington February 18-20. Memoranda of his conversation with Secretary Rusk are in Department of State, French Desk Files: Lot 72 D 441, Visits--Couve. A memorandum of his conversation with Under Secretary Ball is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. A memorandum by Rusk of a lunchtime discussion with Couve regarding Germany is ibid., POL 32-4 GER.
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
Under Secretary Ball
Ambassador Bohlen
McGeorge Bundy
William R. Tyler
France
Couve de Murville, Foreign Minister
Ambassador Alphand
Charles Lucet, Foreign Office
After preliminary courtesies, during which the Foreign Minister conveyed General de Gaulle's best wishes to the President, President Johnson referred to this morning's events in Saigon. He had told some Senators only yesterday evening/2/ that you could never tell when there might be a new government in Saigon and this morning it had happened again./3/ There had been something like ten governments in South Vietnam in the last few years.
/2/According to the President's Daily Diary, he met with Senators Carl Mundt, Clifford Case, and Hugh Scott at 9:10 p.m. at the White House. (Johnson Library) No record of the meeting has been found.
/3/Reference is to the abortive coup of February 19 led by Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao.
Couve said this did not surprise people any more and that it illustrated the basic problem in South Vietnam, which is a political one.
The President said the Secretary of State had told him about the good talks he had had with General de Gaulle. He was glad the Foreign Minister had been able to come. He admired de Gaulle for being able to get away with few press conferences. He himself had held forty-six of them, whereas President Kennedy had held twenty-one, and yet he had been told that wasn't enough.
At Mr. Ball's suggestion, the Foreign Minister described his talk in Paris on Saturday, February 13, with the Communist Chinese Ambassador, who had just come back from Peiping. After the usual accusations against the United States, he had said that the thing to do in Southeast Asia was to go back to the Geneva Agreement of 1954/4/ as a basis for negotiations. Couve had told him this was the French position, too, but the negotiations would have to be without preconditions, because their objective was to achieve a cease fire and see what could then be developed. The Chinese Ambassador had not said exactly that he agreed, which would have been asking too much. However, as the Ambassador left, Couve had summarized their talk according to his own understanding, and had asked if the Ambassador objected to any part of it, to which the Ambassador had replied in the negative. Couve said that France had some commercial relations with North Vietnam but no political relations, since France had diplomatic relations with South Vietnam. He said the French government did not see any difference between the North Vietnamese and the Chinese, except that the former are more anxious to negotiate.
/4/For text of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, pp. 750-787.
The President said our information on what was happening in Southeast Asia was limited. He said we did not have the best sources available. We had always felt that in order to have useful negotiations, the other side must want to negotiate. We had not seen any sign of this, in fact our information reflected quite the contrary. (At this point the President read several passages from an intelligence report on the attitude of the North Vietnamese government which we had received through a private source.)/5/
/5/Not found.
Couve said it was normal that Hanoi should speak in this vein for propaganda purposes, but he did not think that this was the real position.
The President said that in the last fourteen months he had watched problems of concern to our allies very closely and very carefully, and that he had always been very cautious and had taken care not to throw our weight around. Illustrating his point with reference to an occasional bean ball thrown in a baseball game, he said that when these had come his way he had moved his head out of the line of fire and had refused to engage in quarrels with people. He had always told our own people that we didn't want to get into fights needlessly. The President pointed out that President Eisenhower and President Kennedy had told the people of South Vietnam that we wanted to help them help themselves. This had always been our position and he wasn't about to run out on our commitment. There were two or three thousand incidents a month in South Vietnam and he didn't have to tell the French what this meant as they had had plenty of experience out there themselves. As the character of these incidents gets more serious we respond in kind in order to make our purpose clear, e.g.: when the North Vietnamese PT boats had been sent out against our destroyers, we had bombed their bases on the North Vietnamese coast. We had also shelled the attacking craft with our ships. Then the Viet Cong had been sent into a US compound and had killed a number of our boys. The President was not going to write them a thank-you note for this. There had been up to 78 such incidents. The President wondered what de Gaulle or Erhard or Wilson would do in similar circumstances. What we had done was to bomb certain of their staging and assembly points. Then the following night they had come and blown up a hotel and killed some more of our soldiers. So our planes went back and "sprinkled them a little." The President said he didn't think we had killed many of them. In fact he thought that our action had probably caused more concern in certain other parts of the world than it had in North Vietnam. The President said that whenever de Gaulle says something on the Vietnamese problem, the President asks the Secretary of State or Ambassador Bohlen to go and find out exactly what de Gaulle said. Then he is told that the suggestion is that we ought to have a political solution. The President said that he was all in favor of this but the question was how to bring it about. The President said that the press would like him to talk more than he does but he didn't want to. He noticed that some of his colleagues talked to the press and he could tell which ones had done so from little lines here and there in the articles. The President repeated that our policy was to help the people of South Vietnam to help themselves. We would leave tomorrow if anyone would provide effective guarantees of the independence of South Vietnam. He said we would pull our men out tonight if we could achieve this. The President said that we were not going to give the other side a privileged sanctuary as in Korea, or tell them what weapons we would use or not use against them. We were going to keep them guessing and use appropriate means in response to their aggression. We don't want to move to escalation, but if the others do it, we will do whatever is required on the basis of the wisest military judgment. We would like to have everybody else's help in our efforts and we haven't had much help from others. The President said that he had greatly valued President de Gaulle's stand and help at the time of the Cuba crisis, and he had taken it into account in our relations with France. He said that until we get support we will never be able to explain our alliances satisfactorily to the American people. He said that we might have to leave South Vietnam for some reason but we hoped not. We welcomed the help and the counsel of everyone. If the North Vietnamese think that they hold all the trump cards and that they have the backing of world opinion, then they are misjudging the situation and us, just like Hitler and the Japanese misjudged us. We have no ambitions, but if we were to abandon Vietnam, we would be forced to give up Laos, Thailand, Burma, and would be back to Hawaii and San Francisco. He said that we ask for nothing for ourselves in Vietnam, we just want the Vietminh to leave South Vietnam alone. The President said we wanted a solution, and we would rather have a solution than the death of a single American or Vietnamese. The President said that when people talk about a political solution they always seem to come back to the thought that we haven't used our strength properly. The President said that we intended to stay out there as long as necessary and we didn't see what other courses we could follow. He said that we would continue to exercise prayer and caution, "waiting, praying and hoping that others more experienced than ourselves could come up with some good ideas." The President said that he had not been too sensitive to demands for stronger action from people in this country. In this connection he specifically mentioned Goldwater, Nixon, Scranton, Rockefeller and Lodge, who had all asked for greater military measures.
The Foreign Minister said he fully understood the feelings expressed by the President. The essential problem was: how to get out. He felt that there was a complete contradiction between our respective information on the thinking of the Chinese and North Vietnamese. The French Government's information differed from ours.
The President said he had heard that General de Gaulle says what we ought to do. He said de Gaulle is a great man, and that we are grateful that there are not as many changes of government in France as in SVN. The President said he would like to hear from him what he thinks we ought to do, with points a., b., c.
(At this point there was some comment by the President on what General de Gaulle really recommended with regard to the use of strength. Ambassador Bohlen explained this point to the President.)
The Foreign Minister said that the statement which the President had read was pure propaganda, and was too stupid.
The Foreign Minister said the French government believed in a political solution. According to its information, the other side wants to negotiate. On the other hand, US information is that they don't.
Mr. Bundy asked whether the position of the other side was that the United States should withdraw first and then negotiate.
The Foreign Minister replied in the negative. He said that US withdrawal was their ultimate objective, but they said that we should all go back to the 1954 Geneva agreements first, in order to negotiate. They did not ask for withdrawal as the first step. The Foreign Minister said that the role of the Chicoms was far more important than that of the DRV.
The President asked if it was the feeling of the Foreign Minister that if we got an agreement it would be worth anything.
The Foreign Minister answered that the most important factor was what kind of a government there would be in South Vietnam. He admitted that this was a risk which one would probably have to take. It was not possible to tell what the nature of a South Vietnamese government would be.
Mr. Ball asked whether France felt that any government likely to emerge would be dominated by Hanoi.
The Foreign Minister replied that nobody could say.
Ambassador Alphand interjected that Belgrade was not Moscow.
Mr. Ball referred to the problem of the other states in the general area of Southeast Asia: Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia.
The President said that success by the Chinese would be likely to increase their appetite.
The Foreign Minister said that the main issue was the question of relations between the United States and China. China could not fail to be impressed by the immense power of the United States.
Mr. Ball referred to his talk with General de Gaulle on June 5, 1964./6/ He thought that a major difference between our two governments was in our respective assessment of the intentions of Communist China. France thought that it was preoccupied with major internal problems and thus looked inward on itself, whereas we think that the Chinese are aggressive and land hungry.
/6/See footnote 4, Document 32.
Mr. Bundy said that another difference was that France seems to think that there can be no solution to the problem of stable government in South Vietnam while the United States remains there, while we think that there can be no solution if we leave.
The Foreign Minister said that government stability was impossible to achieve in a period of hostilities, but that if a cease fire could be achieved, then, with the US staying in South Vietnam, internal conditions could be expected to change.
Ambassador Bohlen commented that another difference was that France thinks that negotiations would last a very long time, whereas we thought that a conference would be likely to break up.
The Foreign Minister said that in estimating the probable course which the Communist Chinese government would take, it was useful to look at the Soviet example. He recalled that the Soviet Union had stayed quiet until World War II and had only started its expansionist policies at that time.
Mr. Ball said that Chinese expansionism had already been active in Africa. The Foreign Minister said this was different: before the war there had been activity in other countries by the Communist parties.
Ambassador Bohlen said that Communist China proclaimed its belief in militant support of indigenous movements, and that this raised the question of how it could be expected to retreat.
The Foreign Minister said that if the Chinese once agreed to come to the negotiating table, it would then be harder for them to resume fighting.
The President asked what was the French evaluation of the Soviet thinking on these matters.
The Foreign Minister answered that the Russians had the same evaluation as the French, and that they constituted a moderating element. The Russians didn't want to see the Communist Chinese expand, and would support North Vietnam against China.
Mr. Bundy said that unless the President had any special subject he wanted to raise, he thought there was nothing in particular to be discussed further except perhaps the question of gold. He said the Foreign Minister was one of the few friends gold has, to which the Foreign Minister rejoined: "Except for those who own gold."
There was some mention of the President's session yesterday with American businessmen/7/ and the question of whether moral suasion would succeed.
/7/See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 206-208. See also Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VIII, Document 44.
The Foreign Minister said that if the President succeeded, this would be a great achievement.
The President said that he personally had his own doubts about success.
The Foreign Minister said that after all the United States was a very wealthy country.
The President referred to the current dock strike which was still tying up some of our southern ports. He said that New York and Baltimore and Philadelphia were free again but that the Japanese were now buying grain from Red China while our own grain was lying on the piers in the South.
The Foreign Minister mentioned some sales to Japan by Australia and New Zealand, and some by France.
In conclusion, the question of press guidance was discussed, and it was agreed that the Foreign Minister would say that he had talked about various subjects with the President, including South Vietnam. The Foreign Minister said that in reply to any further questions he would refer the press to the White House.
The meeting ended at 12:30 p.m.
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