55. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All NATO Missions/1/
Washington, March 2, 1966, 8:27 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 FR-US. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Leddy; cleared by Ball, Llewellyn Thompson, and Bator (White House); and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Brussels for USEC.
1644. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. I transmit for your background and guidance the following commentary on US policy as it relates to France,/2/ and the distinction that should be made between the foreign policy of President de Gaulle and our continuing friendship, courtesy and respect for France and French officials:
/2/The commentary was a December 24, 1965, memorandum from former Ambassador to France and Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon to Secretary Rusk. In a January 11 memorandum to Rusk, Under Secretary Ball commented: "[It] is, in my judgment, an absolutely first class job" and suggested that Dillon discuss his views with President Johnson. The Ball and Dillon memoranda together with comments by Ambassadors Bohlen and Thompson are ibid., POL FR-US.
The election of President de Gaulle for another seven-year term/3/ is a suitable time to review US policy toward France. He is opposed to basic US objectives, such as a strong NATO, a unified Europe and US efforts to maintain freedom in South Vietnam. These strongly held, personal views of President de Gaulle are unlikely to change. They are largely based on his messianic belief in the glory and importance of France, and thus are not subject to reasoned argument. Attempts to propitiate President de Gaulle are unlikely to succeed and would probably only serve to increase the level of his demands.
/3/De Gaulle won re-election as President of France on the second ballot, December 19.
Policy toward President de Gaulle cannot be considered in isolation. It is and must remain an integral part of our over-all foreign policy. While it would be possible to devise a US policy which could bring about an accommodation with President de Gaulle, this would require abandonment or modification of major US objectives. Such a price is far too high to pay, particularly in view of the recent evidence that President de Gaulle does not presently have majority support in France for many of his policies. The US should make no substantial concessions to the policies of President de Gaulle, but should pursue whatever policies it finds appropriate, irrespective of his position.
In arriving at decisions on overall US policy, little weight should be given to Gaullist views. We should operate on the assumption that President de Gaulle's leadership of France is temporary, and that he will be succeeded by a government more responsive to public opinion, hence more favorable to NATO, to a United Europe and to the United States. However, in arriving at important policy decisions we should give due weight to basic French views and interests as opposed to President de Gaulle's personal predilections. It may be difficult to sort things out in this manner, but we should make the attempt.
While continuing firmly on our course in spite of President de Gaulle's views, we should lean over backward to be polite and friendly to France, to President de Gaulle personally, and to all French government officials. Backbiting, recriminations, attempts to downgrade the importance of France as a nation, or attempts at reprisals should be avoided no matter what the temptation. They cannot be effective, will only irritate President de Gaulle and make him more difficult to deal with, and are likely to cause French public opinion to rally to his side against the US.
If President de Gaulle insists on the removal of US forces from French soil, we should accede gracefully and should move promptly to consider repositioning our line of communications elsewhere. Attempts to dissuade President de Gaulle or to obtain various concessions would seem to be unwise, although it would be helpful if France would maintain the LOC in a caretaker status. If France should decide to pull out of any active role in NATO, we should not replace our NATO tie with France by any bilateral agreement. Any such agreement would make it much more difficult for France to return to the fold at a later date and might set a pattern that could undermine the whole NATO structure. In the event of a French withdrawal, we should support the continuation of the NATO organization without France.
We should maintain our support for the Common Market, taking care that we do not seem to take the lead in any effort to isolate France. If France is to be isolated, it should clearly be by her own doing and not as the result of American efforts.
In the event of French withdrawal from NATO, the Common Market or other international bodies, it should be made very clear to French public opinion that there is an empty chair always ready and waiting for France should she decide to return. This could be of major importance in maintaining the friendship and confidence of the French people as opposed to President de Gaulle and his personal followers. We should continually work to preserve this basic friendship despite any annoyance with President de Gaulle or his government.
Finally, President de Gaulle's growing fear of Germany, plus his desire to cast France in a leading world position, may induce him to go to unusual lengths to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union. This would be particularly likely if France should withdraw from NATO or substantially loosen her ties to the other Common Market countries. We should always bear this possibility in mind. If it comes about, we should react calmly and philosophically, based on circumstances at the time.
In summary, we should continue quietly and firmly on our course, ignoring Gaullist objections but always showing respect and friendship towards him and the French people, while awaiting the day when a more friendly and cooperative government comes to power in France.
Rusk
56. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, March 3, 1966, 1655Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 FR-US. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Oslo, Reykjavik, Rome, and The Hague.
5434. For Secretary from Ambassador. Ref: Dept Circular 1644./2/ I have most serious reservations in regard to the wisdom of the policy outlined in ref Depcirc in the light of probable French actions against NATO and presence of American forces on French soil. The views expressed in this circular accurately define the U.S. policy towards France as it has been since I have been in Paris and which I strongly supported. It is always dangerous to transfer intact one policy into a totally different set of circumstances and I believe the French actions as reported to us in regard to NATO will radically change the situation. I shall endeavor briefly to summarize these points:
/2/Document 55.
1. De Gaulle's intentions in regard to NATO and our forces in France are so radical as to amount to a complete destruction from the French point of view of the entire NATO organization and cooperative defense efforts. De Gaulle obviously wishes to have the appearance of the Alliance preserved so that he will be able to say to the French people that he has done no damage at all to French security interests. As I have already reported I do not think we should facilitate his achievement of this purpose.
2. It would seem to me that we should judge our reaction in the light of its effect on (A) French domestic opinion and specifically on the 1967 parliamentary elections (if not earlier), and (B) on the effect on our Allies and consequently on Alliance.
In regard to (A) I am convinced that if we should "accede gracefully" to de Gaulle's actions against NATO and against our forces in France this attitude would have a very chilling effect upon the opposition in France. As indicated in the message under reference less than 50 percent of the French people support de Gaulle. If we should turn the other cheek and accept these measures I feel that French public and electoral opinion will certainly come to the belief that de Gaulle is right, that he has made some unimportant organizational changes without affecting at all France's alliance with the U.S. and security interests. This is the opinion that we get from most of our friends in the French Government and in French political life. In fact a rather high official of de Gaulle's government, whose name I will not give, told me recently that in his opinion if the ordinary Frenchman came to the conclusion that de Gaulle's actions against the organization were seriously undermining the alliance with the U.S. and the consequent security for France, there would be "panic" in French public opinion. This may be an exaggeration but it is clear that de Gaulle's game is to convince the people that there is no damage to the Alliance.
On (B) I am not qualified from here to pass any judgment on the effect on our Allies (this could be done in various capitals where this message is sent), but certainly we cannot expect any of our Allies to get out ahead of the U.S. in regard to reaction to the French moves. If we should adopt as minimal a position as indicated in this message it would seem to me obvious that the Alliance would be very seriously shaken and possibly rendered ineffective--which incidentally is what de Gaulle expects.
3. I do not propose any polemics or name calling against France and I think we should avoid in any statements which we will make referring to General de Gaulle by name. We should preferably use the term "French Government." To pretend, however, that our relations were normal, after what de Gaulle is apparently planning to do, in the hope of avoiding "irritating" de Gaulle is illusory. In the first place, what is there left to preserve after he has in effect destroyed the French participation in NATO, which I had always assumed was a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy.
We obviously should make no final determination of our attitude until de Gaulle's actual moves against NATO and our presence in France have been fully conveyed to us, but I seriously fear that to follow the line of policy outlined in this message might easily lay our entire European policy in ruins./3/
/3/In telegram 6103 from Paris, March 22, Bohlen forwarded his recommendations for a program of assistance to "pro-NATO and pro-Atlantic groups in France." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 4 NATO)
Bohlen
57. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 31, 1966.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 FR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Van Dyk.
Meeting between Vice President Humphrey and Charles Lucet, French Ambassador, March 31, 1966. Also present: Jacque LePrette, Minister Counselor, French Embassy; John Rielly, Assistant to the Vice President; Ted Van Dyk, Assistant to the Vice President.
The Ambassador said that he would be going to Paris on Monday and would be seeing President deGaulle at that time. The Vice President asked the Ambassador to convey his good wishes to President deGaulle. The Vice President made reference to his frank and friendly discussion with the French President last June in Paris/2/ and said that he had reported fully to President Johnson on that discussion. The Vice President expressed hope that Presidents Johnson and deGaulle might at some future time be able to meet again directly.
/2/Humphrey and two U.S. astronauts visited Paris June 18-20, 1965, to attend the Paris Air Show. He met with de Gaulle for 80 minutes on June 20 to discuss U.S. policy in the Dominican Republic. The Embassy reported on the Humphrey-de Gaulle talks in telegram 7219 from Paris, June 21, 1965. (Ibid., POL 7 US/HUMPHREY)
The Ambassador then, on his initiative, went directly to President deGaulle's visit to the Soviet Union./3/ The Ambassador said that France expected no great result from President deGaulle's visit. He said: "We see no need for a French-Russian alliance or some kind of pact."
/3/June 20-July 1.
The Vice President said that such discussions were important. He said that the United States government, for its part, had no feeling of concern that such French-Russian contact should not be made. The Vice President then alluded to previous meetings he had held with Khrushchev and Kosygin, making the point that discussion was always useful.
Ambassador Lucet said that the French impression of the present Communist Party Congress/4/ was that the Soviet Union was deeply concerned with domestic matters. The French saw mildness in Brezhnev's opening statement to the Congress.
/4/The 23d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held March 29-April 8.
The Ambassador then said that "President deGaulle will speak to the Soviets regarding German reunification. We believe there can be no real peace in Europe with a divided Germany."
Ambassador Lucet indicated that he felt the road to reunification was a long one, but that the subject definitely needed opening.
The Vice President said that European initiatives in this regard were helpful. Certainly, he said, difficult territorial problems could not be solved easily. He agreed with the Ambassador that a divided Germany was a threat to peace. He had, he said, talked to Khrushchev regarding this during his visit to the Soviet Union, but the Chairman had refused to even discuss the subject.
An "environment" must be constructed, the Vice President said, in which discussion was possible, in which positive forces could be set in motion.
Ambassador Lucet said that, in France's opinion, Poland and Czechoslovakia were highly important factors in any discussion of German reunification. He repeated this twice.
The Vice President recalled that, during a visit to Germany in 1961, he had made barest mention of the Oder-Neisse question/5/ and public opinion in Germany had been deeply stirred. He indicated that any American discussion of the Oder-Neisse would likely be misinterpreted in Germany, but that "Europeans can talk about borders more easily than we."
/5/June 1961. On June 30 Humphrey made a statement backing Mayor Willy Brandt's comments on the terms of the German peace settlement.
The Vice President observed, as Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, that he was greatly impressed with French efforts thus far in space. He was particularly pleased with France's role in ESRO. The United States, he said, was particularly interested in ESRO as a multilateral organization which could bring the benefits of space exploration to all members of the European community. The Vice President emphasized that space efforts were quite costly for any one nation, and that a pooling of resources was certainly necessary. He hoped to discuss this further with French space officials. The Ambassador replied that France was highly pleased with French-NASA cooperation.
In closing, the Vice President complimented Ambassador Lucet on the good impression he had created during his short time in Washington. He mentioned that a group of French parliamentarians had recently visited Washington, without visiting the Senate. He had spoken to the State Department, he said, expressing his wish that all future parliamentary delegations be brought to the Senate.
tvd/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
58. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, May 27, 1966, 8:41 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Secret. Drafted by Spiers and approved by Rusk. Repeated to all other NATO capitals.
2352. NATUS. Following is cleared MemCon/2/ of Secretary's meeting with French Ambassador Lucet May 27, 5:30 p.m. Lucet called at Secretary's request.
/2/Not found.
Secretary noted that French Aide-M?moire of April 22/3/ proposed that US and France begin to discuss "practical measures" that should be taken concerning our bilateral agreements. US is prepared to discuss any matter raised by France, subject, of course, to consultation with our Allies, and finds Paris an entirely appropriate place for discussion. Secretary said that in order to prepare for discussions, however, we must have further info on precise proposals France wishes to discuss.
/3/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 336.
Secretary noted French have stated that their agreements with US are incompatible with its desire to resume full exercise of its sovereignty in French territory. He wished to make unmistakably clear that French sovereignty over French land and air has never been questioned by US. Indeed US has not failed in past and is now pledged to defend French sovereignty over French territory against armed attack. Very facilities in question, installed at express invitation and by permission of GOF, are an earnest of that pledge.
Secretary said US is willing to discuss any changes in bilateral agreements which France desires and arrangements for their termination, if necessary. We have expressed our willingness to evacuate French territory, if this is France's desire, as soon as this can be done without prejudice to Allied security. US is prepared to discuss use of facilities established in accordance with agreements in time of peace or conflict as French Aide-M?moire of March 29 suggests./4/
/4/For text, see ibid., pp. 324-326.
Secretary said, however, a proper respect for international agreements precludes our acceptance of a unilateral denunciation of them. US has proposed a way of terminating these agreements by mutual consent, to which GOF has not yet responded.
Secretary said that nevertheless certain specific questions arise under bilateral agreements, as follows:
1. US Military Headquarters Agreement of June 17, 1953,/5/ authorized installation and operation of headquarters of US European Command. Inasmuch as France has denounced protocol on status of International Military Headquarters, to take effect April 1, 1967, it is intention of US to move EUCOM as soon as a suitable location can be found and arrangements made. US will, therefore, be prepared to discuss "practical measures" for this move at an appropriate time. Meanwhile, we would like to know what "practical measures" France wishes to discuss. We are prepared to discuss any French proposals re US Military Headquarters Agreement and we would like to know if it is desire of France that we agree to its termination.
/5/For text, see 17 UST 1906.
2. Under Pipeline Agreement of June 30, 1953,/6/ an oil pipeline has been laid at US expense across French territory and operated by French company for both use by France and US in peacetime and by SACEUR in wartime. We would like to know what changes in Agreement are desired by France. Does France object to flow of oil in pipeline across France for use of US forces in Germany? Does France object to present operation of pipeline?
/6/For text, see 18 UST 352.
3. Chateauroux Agreement of February 27, 1951,/7/ establishes an air depot at Deols and La Martinerie for supply of US Air Forces in Europe. Air Bases Agreement of October 4, 1952,/8/ authorizes construction and use of certain airfields in France for US Air Force missions in furtherance of common defense plans. Both these Agreements require French approval before flights may be made from these bases which are not in furtherance of NATO missions or in support of US forces in Europe. It is intention of US in view of attitude of France to remove air squadrons and supporting forces from these bases as soon as practicable after consultation with its Allies. US will also be prepared to discuss Agreements themselves. Does France request US to agree to termination of these Agreements and evacuation of bases and depots? Are these facilities among those referred to in French Aide-M?moire of March 29 as facilities "on which the two governments could reach mutual agreement in the event of a conflict in which both countries would participate under the Atlantic Alliance." Does this preclude use of such facilities in event that France should not participate in a conflict arising from an armed attack against a NATO member?
/7/For text, see 17 UST 1865.
/8/For text, see 17 UST 1873.
4. System of Communications Agreement of December 8, 1958,/9/ authorizes a network of depots and other facilities for supply of US Army in Europe. Under this Agreement France may propose a review or modification and, if not satisfied with response, may give notice of termination in due course. US is prepared to discuss any proposals France may have for review or modification of Agreement and would put same questions as it has put re Chateauroux and Air Bases Agreements.
/9/For text, see 17 UST 1890.
Finally, Secretary said that since US is entirely willing to discuss our bilateral agreements and practical measures relating thereto, we hope that France will aid in preparation for early discussions by providing clarification requested. In meantime we ask that French Govt designate someone with whom we can be in contact on a number of working level problems incident to moving of US military facilities out of France.
For USRO: You may advise Fourteen of fact that we have made above points orally to the French.
Rusk
59. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Brussels and the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, June 6, 1966, 8:37 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 4 FR-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Anderson, cleared by Springsteen, and approved by Ball. Repeated to all other NATO capitals. Rusk was in Brussels for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting June 3-8.
2421. Tosec 100. NATUS. French Ambassador Lucet met at his request with Acting Secretary at 3:15 p.m. June 6. Minister Leprette, Springsteen and Anderson (WE) also present. Lucet called under instructions to deliver oral response to series of questions raised with him by Secretary on May 27 concerning the five US-French bilateral agreements covering US military facilities in France./2/
/2/See Document 58.
1. Lucet noted Secretary's desire avoid further written memoranda during current efforts to get discussions underway, and stated that GOF was fully agreed in desirability of continuing oral exchange at this stage.
2. With regard to arrangements for the termination of the five US-GOF bilateral agreements, Lucet said that his Government did not consider that it had "denounced" these agreements, and that the best way to solve the current juridical impasse was to have concrete US-French discussions with both sides eventually agreeing that "the agreements have lost their validity by mutual consent." The GOF, he said, could not agree to the US proposal of April 12/3/ to amend the duration provision of four of the agreements to bring them into line with the duration provisions of the System of Communications Agreement. The two-year provision of the last agreement is "too long" as it is in conflict, he said, with the April 1, 1967 deadline.
/3/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 328-330.
Acting Secretary said (1) that we cannot accept a unilateral repudiation of agreements to which we are a party, (2) that we had proposed one possible method of reaching mutual agreement on termination (two-year provision), (3) that we are not adopting a doctrinaire, dogmatic position on the conditions for terminating these agreements, and (4) that the U.S. is prepared to discuss the possibility of terminating the five agreements in question by mutual consent. However, in order to have a very clear understanding of the current French suggestion Ball, referring to the earlier GOF decision that the five agreements must terminate by April 1, 1967, asked: "May I take it then that this latest French suggestion is not a decision as it has appeared to us to be, but is now a proposal for terminating the agreements through mutual consent?" Lucet replied affirmatively. Continuing, Ball emphasized that we were prepared to try to arrive at a solution through mutual consent, but that we could not accept a solution by fiat. Lucet concurred.
3. Regarding the US Military Headquarters Agreement (1953), the Air Bases Agreement (1952), and the System of Communications Agreement (1958), Lucet stated that the GOF did not expect any particular negotiating problems with the US. Discussions on these three agreements would concern primarily the practical measures to be taken for the removal of US personnel and facilities between now and April 1, 1967.
Acting Secretary said that the USG was prepared to consider this proposal for the April 1, 1967, date in order to see if we could mutually agree on it.
4. Regarding the Chateauroux Depot Agreement (1951), Lucet said the GOF recognized that the problems involved in this agreement were more complex than those related to the three just mentioned, and was therefore fully prepared to discuss any US requirements for "further delays." Ball said it would be useful to discuss a practical termination date.
5. Concerning the Pipeline Agreement, Lucet said: "As for the Pipeline Agreement of June 30, 1953, it is a question of defining the new conditions under which it could continue to operate, once the American personnel have been evacuated between now and April 1, 1967." In commenting on this part of his instructions, Lucet said that there is no GOF intention to cut the pipeline now or after April 1, 1967, and that his Government welcomed discussions with the US on its future use. He mentioned continued use of it to supply US troops in Germany. Acting Secretary said that the US will be prepared to have discussions on this matter.
6. Concerning 1952 Air Bases Agreement, Lucet said that Secretary Rusk had mentioned our desire to move aircraft and material out of France and asked that GOF designate an individual with whom we could discuss this matter. He stated that if the US would name an official to carry on such discussions, the GOF would do likewise. Ball agreed to provide such a name.
7. In response to Secretary's question concerning the facilities, mentioned in French aide-m?moire of March 29, "on which the two Governments could reach mutual agreement in the event of a conflict in which both countries would participate under the Atlantic Alliance," Lucet said that these were logistical facilities that the USG may need in case of war, such as ports, transport facilities, stockage and air bases--i.e., "the same type that is now available to US in peacetime." The GOF, he said, is ready to discuss and to conclude an agreement on the use of these facilities in wartime.
8. Lucet continued: "As a counterpart, we French would like to discuss the question of putting tactical nuclear weapons at the disposal of French forces in wartime under the conditions which have existed up to now." Ball replied that the terms and conditions under which French forces would remain in Germany would first have to be determined. Depending on the achievement of a satisfactory agreement regarding those terms and conditions, the United States would then be prepared to discuss this subject with the GOF. Lucet interjected that his instructions were not limited to the provision of nuclear warheads for French forces in Germany. Ball replied that the French Government had never permitted United States nuclear warheads on French soil. Lucet seemed confused at this point and indicated that he would seek clarification of his instructions.
9. Lucet hoped that US-French discussions on the foregoing questions could be undertaken as soon as possible./4/
/4/Telegram 3766, July 8, transmitted instructions for negotiations on U.S.-French bilateral agreements. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 4 FR-US)
Ball
60. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, June 11, 1966, 1337Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 9. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bonn and London.
8672. De Gaulle received me today and we talked for approximately one-half an hour on the following subjects: (1) Soviet Union, Europe and Germany, (2) Vietnam very briefly, and (3) French forces in Germany.
De Gaulle seemed very relaxed and in excellent health and humor.
1. Soviet Union, Europe and Germany:
I asked General de Gaulle if he could give me his estimate of the current Soviet problem and its future evolution, particularly in regard to Europe and to Germany. De Gaulle said it was his feeling that the Soviet Union at the present state of its development was not bellicose, certainly did not wish any armed clash, and would avoid any action which might provoke a crisis with the West. He hastened to qualify his general remarks by saying that this could change and it was for this reason that France was remaining in the Alliance while leaving the organization. He said he thought that the Soviet leaders were generally seeking a d?tente, obviously for their own purposes, but that he personally felt it was to the advantage of the West to support this position. He realized the Western attitude toward France was to Russia's advantage, but he also felt that it was to a certain extent to French advantage.
In regard to Europe, he thought that the Soviet Union at the present time was interested in having a general d?tente with the West, but in reply to my question admitted that what the Soviets were after immediately was some recognition of the two Germanies, which, he continued, was actually in effect at the present time, although he hastened to add that he would not take any official action which would appear to confirm it. He also said in regard to unification that this was a very long process and the only thing that he might conceivably obtain in Russia was some indication of reunification as a very long range aim.
I replied that I thought we could all agree on the desirability of a d?tente with Russia but that, as he knew, this had been a constantly recurring theme in post-war relations. However, we recognized the danger of trying to create a d?tente when there were serious elements of instability caused by the Soviets on the European scene, namely the division of Germany and Berlin.
This led to a discussion of Germany and its reunification, which I found of some interest.
De Gaulle said that as matters now stood West Germany, although powerful economically, from a military and political point of view constituted no danger to anybody, that the reunification of Germany, for which the French stood in principle, if it came about suddenly would result first of all in the consolidation of Soviet hold over the countries of Eastern Europe (which he said would be a very bad thing) because those countries would seek protection from a more powerful Germany. In addition he said it would cause a considerable amount of apprehension in Western Europe. I pointed out that on the other hand a continued division of Germany would produce so strong a frustration in Germany as to raise all sorts of different dangers. De Gaulle shrugged his shoulders and said, "It is always necessary to choose between two evils in politics."
I told him that I thought his schedule was a very heavy one in Russia but that I thought he would receive a wonderful reception since the Soviet Govt was a past master in arranging such receptions. De Gaulle smiled and said the Soviet Govt could create anything that it wants among its people./2/
/2/The Embassy in the Soviet Union reported on de Gaulle's visit in telegram 31 from Moscow, July 2. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 FR)
2. Vietnam:
De Gaulle asked of any new thoughts on the subject of Vietnam and said he continued to think that only a clear indication of willingness of US forces to leave the country could conceivably bring about the possibility of a negotiation. I replied that I thought that this depended on what was meant by leaving the country. We had repeatedly said, and meant it, that we had no intention of leaving any troops in Vietnam after a settlement was made, but obviously they could not expect the US to withdraw the troops before such a settlement, and in any event we had never been able to obtain the slightest indication of any interest in negotiating from the other side.
De Gaulle did not reply, and I did not pursue the subject further.
3. French Forces in Germany:
I then mentioned to de Gaulle the French decision, which Couve de Murville had told the Secretary in Brussels, concerning the removal of the French air squadrons./3/ De Gaulle confirmed this and said that the reason was of course that since they were not to be integrated they could not stay on in Germany, which was not the case with the ground forces.
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Documents 174 and 175.
I asked him then if he did not think that this decision radically altered the whole problem of French ground forces since whatever troops remained there, assuming they did, would require some degree of air protection, presumably from the other allies.
De Gaulle denied this and said distances were so small that French air squadrons based in France could equally protect troops in Germany. He said in truth (en verit?) France did not really wish to keep her forces in Germany. It was for this reason she had phrased the last communication to the Germans which said they would only remain if there were a positive German desire for political or symbolic reasons for them to remain. De Gaulle said militarily the troops would be in approximately the same position if across the border in France.
In order to have complete clarity on this subject, I asked the General if he meant that France would have no desire to leave the troops in Germany but preferred to have them in France. De Gaulle said that perhaps "desire" was the wrong word, but that France would not have any interest in the sense of state interest, and that objectively it would be better if the French troops were back in France. However, he emphasized that if the Germans really wanted the troops, for whatever reason, France would be willing to see if this could be arranged.
Comment: It will be noted that there was nothing essentially new in de Gaulle's remarks to me, with the possible exception of the French attitude towards the French troops in Germany. What he said here was confirmation of what we had heard from another source, but it is perhaps the first time that he has stated it so specifically to a foreigner.
General de Gaulle's remarks on Germany indicated his fear of a reunified Germany and his description of the concentration, i.e., huddling, of Eastern European states under Moscow's wing and apprehension in Western Europe was of interest and perhaps not too far from the truth. It is however apparent that he apparently expects, and indeed desires, Germany to stay divided for a long period of time, and that even when reunification comes about it will be more a facade than a reality since at one point in the conversation he said there never can be another Reich.
I don't know how you wish to handle the statement to me about French troops in Germany, but I would perhaps wait a little before authorizing its repetition to any foreign source. I shall not mention this point in my conversation with any of my diplomatic colleagues here./4/
/4/In telegram 8683 from Paris, June 13, Bohlen added: "In making known so frankly his studied indifference to the retention or not of French troops in Germany de Gaulle was obviously acting with certainty that this information would be conveyed to the Germans. He probably felt that this could not hurt, and might indeed improve, his general negotiating stance." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 9)
Bohlen
61. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, June 23, 1966, 1724Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 9. Secret; Exdis.
9347. Ref: Embtel 8993./2/ Sensitive source known to you today gave us the following information at a luncheon with Beigel and myself.
/2/Telegram 8993 from Paris, June 22, reported de Gaulle's remarks regarding French strategy in the event of war. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 4 NATO)
Source confirmed information reported in reftel, with the following addition. De Gaulle at this meeting, in addition to saying that France would decide after the war started what her attitude would be, expressed the hope that it would be possible for France to stay out. Secondly, in regard to the loan of U.S. tactical nuclear warheads, source said this would only be in the event and after the French decision that France would be involved in the war. (Comment: Even so, this is a reasonably fantastic proposal.)
Source also said that Couve's decision in Brussels, which was not a compromise but merely a face saving device in order to avoid at this juncture a confrontation of France and the Fourteen, was in effect dictated by de Gaulle's views, emphasized at the June 2nd meeting, that there could be no automatic element in any French arrangements with her allies.
Source reminded us that, as we had known, de Gaulle's original impulse had been to denounce the treaty, but had been dissuaded by Pompidou and Couve from putting this into effect, in part on the grounds that it would send him to Moscow with absolutely no real backing.
Bohlen
62. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, July 28, 1966, 1507Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Secret; Exdis.
1393. 1. When I called on Lucet at his request at Foreign Office this morning, I found him tired and discouraged. (He hopes to get away on leave Tuesday morning after seeing Amb. Bohlen on Monday.) Lucet said he was forced to conclude that there existed very genuine resentment at French policies in US, and that there was a general distrust of France. He cited recent polls in this connection. He said US opinion did not seem to pinpoint its dissatisfaction with France but that there certainly was an increasingly unfortunate climate. I of course cited French policies on NATO and Vietnam as fundamental reasons for this unhappy attitude which he found in US.
McBride
63. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, July 29, 1966, 1215Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Confidential; Exdis.
1445. For Under Secretary from Ambassador. It looks very much as though, if we want it to be that way, the August 2 meeting with Couve de Murville could well wind up the discussions in regard to the use of bases and facilities in time of war. It seems clear that the chief sticking point, as I have previously mentioned, will be the event which will commence U.S. reentry into bases or re-takeover of certain facilities. The French will in all probability think that this kick-off point will be the French declaration of war whereas naturally we must insist that it be the request by SACEUR for an alert.
I am asking you to let me have your judgment as to whether Washington would prefer to break this off quickly and cleanly (with possible exception of the pipeline) or whether you would prefer to string it out and postpone it until September or even October. I could play it either way with great ease but I think some indication of the considerations which you might have in mind dictating either an early termination or playing it along would be most useful to me.
I would very much appreciate if you could give me your thought before Tuesday, August 2./2/
/2/In telegram 19145, August 1, the Department of State responded: "Your discussion will be ad referendum and talks should not be broken off Aug 2." It added that the "primary objective" of the talks was "seeking ironclad agreement for US reentry." (Ibid.) In telegram 1619 from Paris, August 2, Bohlen reported that he had presented U.S. views to Couve who had noted them but remained noncommittal. (Ibid.)
Bohlen
64. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, August 25, 1966, 1806Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 9. Secret; Nodis; Maria.
2592. August 25.
1. I was informed today that following decisions had been taken August 23 at interministerial meeting presided over by Pompidou with reference to US-French bilateral military problems and more especially with regard to French relationship to NATO:
2. French Government had been genuinely shocked to learn that French had failed to take over installations which US already ready to return (Paris 2515)/2/ and Prime Minister had instructed Messmer to have Army engineers instantly prepared to receive these facilities.
/2/Telegram 2515 from Paris, August 24, reported Bohlen's d?marche to the French regarding their uncooperative stance on pipeline maintenance. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US)
3. With regard to pipeline, it was decided refuse permission for 40 US technicians to assist in operation US pipeline. French position was identical for both US and NATO pipelines. US pipeline would not be closed nor would we be expelled from France but US would be given time to install pipeline elsewhere. If no US technicians were introduced and US accepted French position on re-entry, then pipeline could continue to operate for benefit US forces. However, there was no change in French position on re-entry which was that France would first have to decide Article V should be invoked. Ambassador is to be informed of this decision officially September 9.
4. With regard to NATO military budget, Deleusse would give French position to NAC September 7. France would not make any payments toward major NATO headquarters. However, France would contribute five million francs which had been earmarked for repairs on old SHAPE headquarters towards costs of transferring SHAPE and other headquarters.
5. France would not contribute towards costs of telecommunications projects. France would participate in leasing communications facilities such as PTT lines for long-range protection purposes and in connection with France's new role towards these organizations, i.e. France is now present in only a liaison capacity. With regard to Ace High (forward scatter system) France would contribute budgetarily so long as this system remained useful. In general on these projects France would contribute in accordance with the degree of agreement which was reached between France and her allies. France would continue in The Hague and La Spezia centers but would withdraw from AGARD and London Bureau and such similar organizations.
6. With regard to infrastructure, France would not participate in Slice XVIII or any subsequent slices. Insofar as Slice XVII and earlier slices were concerned, France would continue to contribute to projects for which money had already been allocated and on which work had already started.
7. Concerning Namso and Hawk projects, France was not particularly interested in principle but these could remain for some time, until such date as perhaps 1969, if other Allies wish. France would not oppose their remaining or leaving. If they left, France would withdraw. Otherwise France's attitude towards these agencies is similar to her view regarding NAC.
8. Comment: In general, we were told attitude underlying decisions was that France should be tough on withdrawal of all agencies which they had already asked to leave, including US installations, and deadlines were to be enforced insofar as possible. However, with regard to other agencies which had not been discussed so far, there was no particular urgency in getting them out. Attitude toward latter group was to be flexible and waiting for time to take care of them. In conclusion, I was told that Pompidou terminated meeting indicating he thought "everything" would eventually go except overflights.
McBride
65. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State/1/
Addis Ababa, August 27, 1966, 1915Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 FR. Secret; Exdis. Passed to the White House.
827. De Gaulle.
1. Following conversation with President de Gaulle being reported protectively although assume contents known to Dept.
2. At reception to present Dip Corps to de Gaulle/2/ this evening, General, after ascertaining I spoke French, asked to talk to me alone. I had deliberately not emulated my numerous colleagues who requested private conversations with him, but I was summoned immediately after Dean.
/2/De Gaulle visited French Somaliland August 25-26, Ethiopia August 27-29, Djibouti August 30, Cambodia August 30-September 2, and French Polynesia September 3-11. On this last stop, he witnessed a nuclear bomb test.
3. De Gaulle began by requesting I send his very warmest wishes to President Johnson. He added with a twinkle that the route to Cambodia did not go by Washington. I assured him I would transmit.
4. De Gaulle said he would talk about the Americans while in Cambodia. He added quickly that he admired and liked the Americans. There should be no question about that. But one must say what one thinks. And the Americans would thank him for it later. It was in their interest and in the interest of all that he would speak. I replied that US would thank him if his actions and words served both peace and justice.
5. De Gaulle said war must be ended. He asked me why the US did not just announce that it wanted peace, that it would stop fighting and that it would leave Vietnam. We did it, he said, why can't you. It was not difficult to do. I asked what [he] thought would happen afterward if we followed his advice. "Afterwards," he exclaimed throwing up his arms in well known gesture, "afterwards leave it to them." I commented with a smile that I always found it ironic to hear a European of his generation advocate peace at any price. I had just returned from an extended period in Washington, I could assure him that President Johnson was passionately interested in ending the war and in peace. Then end the war, de Gaulle interjected. I replied that perhaps it was an American peculiarity but we could not simply walk away from commitments and responsibilities, particularly when they had implications that appeared to me to be far greater than those involved in Algeria in 1958. De Gaulle commented that he did not want the US to leave Vietnam at once but to announce its determination to do so and to halt the hostilities, then gradually phase out. Thus the way to peace would be opened. I asked why he if he were so interested in peace, he did not seek to convince the Soviets to call a peace conference instead and to end the fighting in that manner. Oh, he laughed, that route was a complex impasse.
6. Since his aides appeared nervous about extended conversation, I broke if off by suggesting others might wish to talk to him. De Gaulle said he wanted to be certain that President Johnson knew he extended his warmest wishes.
7. De Gaulle in top form and went out of his way to compliment US on what had been achieved since his last visit in 1953 to Ethiopia where he had today remarked on development for which US could take much credit.
Korry
66. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, September 1, 1966.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis. No transmission time is on the telegram, which was received at 8:46 a.m.
2879. For Secretary from Ambassador. It seems to me that de Gaulle's speech in Phnom Penh/2/ is a further example of his ignoring facts in favor of his favorite position. We have already commented on historical errors contained in speech but it is extraordinary to me that an alleged ally of the U.S. would present right on the spot within a few kilometers of the battle line so erroneous a picture of cause and effect. De Gaulle appears to heap all the blame for the situation, its origin and development in Indochina, on the U.S. explicitly. I recall in this connection Paris 2075,/3/ paragraph 3, in regard to de Gaulle's ignorance of the text of the NATO agreements and it seems to me even more likely that he has not bothered or has been unwilling to really acquaint himself with the facts of the situation in Vietnam. He makes no mention of Communism as a factor and consequently his comparison with the French in Algeria is erroneous and misleading.
/2/In his September 1 speech in Phnom Penh, de Gaulle stated, in reference to Cambodian neutrality: "That is why, while your country succeeded in safeguarding its body and its soul because it remained its own master, the political and military authority of the United States was seen installed in its turn in South Vietnam and, simultaneously, the war gained new strength there in the form of national resistance." The full text of de Gaulle's speech is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 646-648. In telegram 5090 from Saigon, September 2, Ambassador Lodge commented: "If these words have any meaning, this means that the United States in effect committed an aggression in South Vietnam." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S)
/3/Not found.
I realize how unwise it is to answer de Gaulle publicly but I wonder in this case if some corrective measure should not be applied. Otherwise the de Gaulle version of events will have a high degree of acceptance not only here in France but in other countries of the world. I would suggest therefore that you consider very seriously the desirability of a statement by the President or you which would in no way mention de Gaulle's Phnom Penh speech but deal with the same material that he touches on in an accurate form. I do not refer to the actual suggestion as to what the U.S. should do in the future but merely to those parts dealing with the origin and history of the Vietnam question. There may be strong reasons against any such statement but I would like to suggest it as a possibility to you./4/
/4/Circular telegram 41051 to all posts, September 2, provided instructions to avoid public comments on the de Gaulle speech, but in talks with foreign government officials to stress the impracticability of a unilateral U.S. commitment to withdraw in the face of North Vietnamese behavior. (Ibid., POL 15-1 FR)
Bohlen
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