67. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, September 7, 1966, 1201Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15-4 FR-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
3124. Sept 7. In conducting these discussions on reentry or reutilization of facilities in France I have kept constantly in mind the phrase in my instruction which tells me that "the record should demonstrate that failure to reach agreement was not due to unreasonableness of U.S. Government." The more however I think on this subject the clearer it is to me that there is no formula that could possibly be devised which would really solve the problem of the timing of reentry once the French had decided to liquidate the existing peacetime bases and facilities. Our present position of insisting that the time of reentry would be fixed by the declaration of an alert (of any kind) really in substance may not much differ in point of time from a declaration of war. Of all of the formulas it seems to me "following consultation and agreement between the two governments" would be the most reasonable and practicable. There is no absolute guarantee that the French would agree, even when we sought it through diplomatic channels, but at least it would leave to us the timing of the effort in the light of existing situation at the time.
However, in regard to the pipeline I am concerned, as I set forth in Paris 1597,/2/ that if after end of pipeline talks we move over to NATO where question of wartime use may not be specifically raised, that our position will look somewhat arbitrary and unconvincing. Incidentally, I have had no reply to this message and would like to have some word on the subject prior to my meeting at 4 p.m. on Friday, September 9./3/
/2/In telegram 1597 from Paris, August 2, Bohlen requested clarification of details for his discussion with the French. (Ibid., POL FR-US)
/3/In telegram 3330 from Paris, September 9, Bohlen reported on what he described as the French "balance sheet" regarding a future reoccupation and reutilization of military facilities and inquired if he should seek a meeting with Couve on the issue. In telegram 46823, September 14, the Department of State responded that there was no need for such a meeting prior to Bohlen's return to the United States for consultations. (Both ibid., DEF 15-4 FR-US)
I shall use every effort to try and make the French position, i.e., of no action until declaration of war, as clear as possible and will discuss with Couve the possibility of an exchange of letters which would provide us with a solid record of these talks. However, all matters will still be ad referendum to Washington which will give us some more time to consider the various factors involved.
Bohlen
68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, October 26, 1966, 7:40 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 4 FR-US. Secret. Drafted by Anderson, cleared by Stoessel and Vest, and approved by Rostow.
73683. 1. During courtesy call today by Ambassador Lucet on Under Secretary Rostow, latter said that he was in process of reviewing files on French-US written and oral exchanges concerning the status of the five bilateral agreements. He noted George Ball's statement of June 6 to Lucet that USG could not accept unilateral repudiation of bilaterals but was prepared to discuss the possibility of terminating them by mutual consent./2/ In the interest of tying up loose ends, he wondered what the current French thinking was on this question.
/2/See Document 59.
2. Lucet said that he was unaware of any change in French position which he outlined to Ball on June 6, and that in light of Rostow's question he would communicate with Paris to see just where the matter stands.
3. FYI. Purpose of this exercise is to give GOF opportunity to reconsider its negative, non-negotiable position on this matter which Lucet presented to Ball on June 6. This in no way precludes sound suggestion in Paris tel 6113 calling for aide-memoire stating USG position on five bilaterals./3/ End FYI.
/3/Telegram 6113 from Paris, October 25, also reported that at a meeting with Couve, Rusk reiterated that the United States retained "complete reservation regarding the financial aspects of the relocation of its forces." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, NATO 17-1) In telegram 6263 from Paris, October 27, Bohlen reported that the Rostow approach had been interpreted in Paris "as a possible U.S. concession which would permit the whole matter to be smoothed over without any basis for claims by the U.S." He recommended consultations with the Embassy prior to any further approaches to the French. (Ibid., POL 4 FR-US)
Katzenbach
69. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, November 24, 1966, 1827Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 10. Secret; Exdis.
7884. The most interesting and I believe the most useful portion of my conversation with de Gaulle today dealt with Great Britain and the Common Market./2/ I began by saying that while the U.S. of course was not directly involved I would very much appreciate his letting me have his views on the British tentative bid for entry into the Common Market.
/2/Bohlen's report on de Gaulle's views regarding NATO is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 220. His report on the portion of the discussion dealing with Vietnam, telegram 7883 from Paris, November 24, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S.
De Gaulle said while of course he could not decide what others intended to do it was his impression that England was "not ready" to join the Common Market and would seek to obtain concessions from the other members. I told him that according to our information the British were very serious about joining the Common Market but on the supposition that Great Britain would join the Rome Treaty without concessions to her interest with merely a transitional period. What did he think then would be the possibility? I mentioned in this connection the problem of the pound sterling. De Gaulle immediately said that this would have to be settled; that it was not possible for a member of the Common Market to have the burden of sterling balances or the pound with its position as a reserve currency. I then asked him about the so-called political questions of which we occasionally heard here in France, referring to his statement in the press conference of the Nassau Agreements. De Gaulle then gave quite a long dissertation to the following effect:
He said if Europe was to be formed it would have to be European in outlook and in action; that if the Economic Community of Europe was to ever develop into any political direction all its members would have to have a European point of view, and in reply to my specific question he admitted that close relations with the U.S. such as England had, and, added parenthetically, Germany sought to have were incompatible with this European outlook. He was quick however to say that he was not speaking about the policy of the U.S. but of the attitude of countries, i.e., England and Germany towards it.
I said to him that since it was obvious that any question of the formation of Europe would take a long long time, to which he agreed, how did he expect the relations between an individual country and the U.S. to develop during this interim period. This question seemed to set him back a little since he said of course America could and should have excellent relations with all members of Europe, but he did not think they should be in any way privileged or special as was the case of England and as the Germans tried to achieve.
Comment: De Gaulle for him was quite specific in his attitude toward Great Britain joining the Common Market. He professed disbelief in their willingness to accept the conditions of the Common Market but even if that occurred he raised objections, particularly in regard to the position of sterling and in the larger and much vaguer field of relationships with the U.S.
I do not know how this should be handled with the British since we do not wish to have any responsibility for chilling the British effort. Perhaps the best thing to do would be to tell them in very general terms without being specific. I would appreciate Department's guidance for dealing with Ambassador here.
Bohlen
70. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Paris, December 14, 1966, 2139Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Secret; Nodis. Passed to the White House. Rusk was in Paris for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting December 15-16.
9131. Secto 66. Eyes Only for President from Secretary. Accompanied by Bohlen, I paid a call on General de Gaulle and we had approximately one hour's conversation. The only other person present was Andronikov, the interpreter.
After an exchange of amenities during which I conveyed to General de Gaulle your personal greetings and de Gaulle requested that I give to you his cordial personal wishes, de Gaulle said they had been following very closely reports of your operation/2/ and had been delighted at your complete recovery. We then discussed the following subjects: Soviet/Chinese relations; Vietnam; and East/West relations in Europe.
/2/The President had surgery November 16.
I mentioned that we thought the developments in China were of greatest importance although we did not know exactly what their meaning was. We had felt in our discussions with the Russians that China was always present in the background of their talks. De Gaulle replied that relations between the Soviet Union and China were not good and in his opinion would get worse. He said they had discussed this subject with Kosygin during his recent visit and that my observation had been quite correct, that China was always present in Soviet thoughts. China had not yet acquired the means of power but they were working hard to obtain them. He considered they were more fearful of the Soviets which surrounded China to the north than they were of the U.S. The Soviets see everything in Chinese terms, even including Vietnam.
I told the General that in recent conversations with the Russians, who had never been willing to discuss China, Gromyko had nonetheless said there was an element of irrationality in Chinese developments which made it difficult to draw correct conclusions. I said that if Vietnam were only a question with the Soviets, we were convinced that they would be prepared for settlement along the lines of the Geneva accords of 1954 and the 17th Parallel but that because of Peking and the limited Soviet interests in Hanoi there was not much that could be done.
De Gaulle remarked that the Russians were very much worked up against the U.S. over Vietnam and that Kosygin had said that were it not for Vietnam there could be a real d?tente in the world. Kosygin had stated that the Soviet Union was in fact making war against the U.S. in Vietnam, not with troops, but with material, construction, etc.
I mentioned to the General (and of course our entire conversation was confidential) that we had at the end of 1965 been told by the Soviets that if there could be a bombing pause for from fifteen to twenty days this would permit governments to explore with Hanoi the possibility of a peaceful settlement. We had ceased the bombing for almost double that period but nothing had come from Hanoi except the standard four points. Hanoi would not talk, possibly for fear of Peking, and the other governments cannot speak in their own name, but with the NLF and Hanoi it is difficult indeed to determine with whom to talk in the interest of peace. In the case of Cuba it had been procedurally simple since there the conversation was direct with Moscow. I said General de Gaulle would recall Hanoi's four points, three of which presented no problems, but point three, which insisted on the acceptance of the NLF program as a basis for future South Vietnam. Last spring, through contacts, we had attempted to propose a revision of point three, but received no reply.
De Gaulle said that he was of the opinion that the North Vietnamese will not negotiate under present conditions no matter how costly the war became. He said the North Vietnamese would persist even under bombardment, and would continue to fight rather than to yield or renounce their aims, and he repeated that they would never negotiate under the condition of the U.S. being present in the country.
I told him that the military problem of the twenty organized regular North Vietnamese regiments was not too difficult to deal with. The main problem was that of guerrilla infiltration and infrastructure in the villages. I mentioned that in addition to SEATO obligation the U.S. had security treaties with Japan, Formosa, Thailand, South Korea, the Philippines, New Zealand and Australia, and that obviously in any action we took in regard to Vietnam we would have to consider the effect on general security in the area. I agreed with the General that there would probably be no formal negotiations or any conference but that rather the problem might be settled de facto as had been done in Greece. We had even attempted indirectly with Hanoi to de-escalate the war to facilitate de facto settlement. I told the General that in our one hundred thirty talks with the Chinese Communists over ten years that they had always insisted that Formosa, with its thirteen or fourteen million population, must be given to China.
I asked General de Gaulle whether he had any impression from his talks with Kosygin in regard to Soviet policy towards Europe, and in particular whether the Soviets would respond to any possible German initiative.
De Gaulle replied that he thought the Russians were very anxious for a d?tente in Europe and, he said parenthetically, even with the U.S. in regard to Vietnam; that they were no longer aggressive or menacing, even in Berlin, which had receded to second place in their thoughts. They wished to develop economic and technical relations with France and not only with France. However, they continued to show themselves to be very suspicious and distrustful of Germany. Part of this may have some truth in it, but he is convinced the larger part is simply a politically motivated attitude. He said they wished to have a d?tente with the Federal Republic, but only on condition of the German acceptance of existing frontiers and renunciation of any pretensions to nuclear weapons, and acceptance of two Germanies.
De Gaulle said he told Kosygin there might be two German states but there was only one German people and sooner or later, although it will take a long time through the process of d?tente, the two Germanies will come together. Kosygin said perhaps one day this could occur, but the moment had not yet come, but he did say perhaps. It is conceivable that Kosygin meant that by the increasing of contacts between the two Germanies there might some day in the future be a sort of confederation, but at present he would not say this and kept reiterating the point about two Germanies.
I mentioned to de Gaulle the enormous cost the failure to solve the German problem had been to both sides. The cost to the U.S. for armaments in the post-war period had been in the neighborhood of nine hundred billion dollars and a large part of this had been due to failure to settle German problems. The Soviets had likewise incurred heavy expenses. The German question as it now stood was the only question I could conceive of which might lead to a war directly between the U.S. and USSR. If the German question could be settled and stability returned to Central Europe this would open very wide perspectives to the world in the form of trade, disarmament, and other fields.
De Gaulle answered that the French had been trying for some time to persuade the Germans to make some gesture to show that they did not have any evil design on Eastern Europe. It is possible that Brandt and Kiesinger will produce something of this nature. He said that it was ridiculous for the Germans to expect that they can by abrupt action recover the lost territory of Prussia and Saxony. He went on to say that he was convinced that the Soviet Union was interested only in China and their own development and had no intention of initiating any armed attack in Europe and that the Germans really should do something and not just say "America, America" and hope that this will solve all their problems.
I then mentioned to the General that time is getting short since we are on the threshold of new dimensions in defense problems, namely the ABM; the Soviets are beginning to deploy ABMs in the Moscow area and if both sides began to deploy them the cost would be phenomenal. This in turn would lead to an increase in offensive missiles to overcome the ABM and then armaments would have an indefinite expansion. He said he thought it was very important that we should find some ceiling or some method of controlling this armament race before it entered into a new phase. De Gaulle remarked that the only policy there was to make peace and he felt this was also true in Vietnam.
I remarked that in Laos in 1962 we thought we had achieved a real solution but unfortunately the North Vietnamese continued the guerrilla infiltration and the area controlled by the Pathet Lao was barred to others. I said personally I thought there was a good chance that the Soviet Government had wished to support that agreement but it was just about this time, around 1962, that the Soviets had lost influence in Hanoi. I said I was convinced if it was only up to Moscow and Washington, peace would soon be made in Vietnam but Chinese influence was too strong in Hanoi.
De Gaulle said the U.S. had its own policy and it was not up to him to give advice but he felt the U.S. was becoming bogged down in secondary and ridiculous considerations in Vietnam, particularly when we think of what could be done for world peace if this issue was settled.
I replied we could easily stop the half of the war we were responsible for, but what about the other half.
De Gaulle said if the U.S. was not in Vietnam there would be no war.
De Gaulle in conclusion said that he felt that despite our differences the Franco-American friendship remains strong, to which I replied that I thought the history of the post-war period would show that American and French interests in most cases had been identical.
As we left de Gaulle particularly asked that his cordial greetings be extended to you.
Rusk
71. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 9, 1967.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Anderson.
SUBJECT
Conversation with French Ambassador
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Charles Lucet, French Embassy
Mr. Robert Anderson, Director, France-Benelux Affairs
During a brief conversation at a French Embassy reception today, Ambassador Lucet said that he was very disturbed over the current state of Franco-American relations which, in his view, were at an all time low. He attributed this in large measure to General de Gaulle's unfortunate and inexplicable remarks on December 31 and January 1 on the United States' involvement in Viet-Nam./2/ He said that when he had read these remarks in Guadeloupe during a brief vacation, his desire for returning to Washington was, to put it mildly, less than enthusiastic.
/2/In a December 31 television address to the French people, de Gaulle characterized the war in Vietnam as "unjust . . . due to the armed intervention of the United States in territory of Vietnam." For text, see de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, Vol. 5, pp. 128-131. In a New Year's day address to the diplomatic corps, de Gaulle again blamed the United States for the war.
72. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Bonn, April 25, 1967, 11:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Adenauer Funeral. Secret; Exdis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which was approved in the White House on June 28. The meeting was held at the Villa Hammerschmidt.
SUBJECTS
Vice President Humphrey's Recent Visit;
Meeting between the Two Chiefs of State
PARTICIPANTS
President de Gaulle
Minister Burin des Rosiers
Mr. Andronikoff
President Johnson
E.S. Glenn
General
The conversation began before lunch. After replying to the President's greetings, President de Gaulle remarked that the late Chancellor Adenauer was a great man who had served his country faithfully and well. The President agreed and complimented President de Gaulle on the latter's fine appearance.
The conversation continued after lunch following a request from President de Gaulle carried by Minister Burin des Rosiers to the President.
Vice President Humphrey
The President expressed satisfaction with the reception extended for Vice President Humphrey./2/ He also said that he remembered with pleasure his own conversation with General de Gaulle at the time when he was Vice President of the United States./3/
/2/Humphrey visited Paris April 7 to address the OECD meeting.
/3/Johnson visited Paris twice: April 6-7, 1961, at the end of a trip to Senegal, and on September 30, 1961. No record of a meeting with de Gaulle during either trip has been found.
General de Gaulle said that the French Government was very happy to welcome the Vice President in Paris. It is regrettable, said he, that the two Presidents have had so few opportunities to exchange views personally in the last few years.
The President said that he shared this opinion.
Exchange of Visits
President de Gaulle said that there is a house near the Palace of Versailles, which was built by the kings of France and which is named the Trianon. The French Government would be delighted to place this house at President Johnson's disposal any time the President would find it convenient to use it.
The President said that this is an election year and that he does not think that he will do much travelling henceforth. However, President de Gaulle is coming to Canada and might perhaps find his presence in the Western Hemisphere a good opportunity to return the visit paid in Paris by President Kennedy./4/
/4/For documentation on President Kennedy's May 31-June 2, 1961, visit to Paris, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Documents 11, 107, and 230.
President de Gaulle said that his invitation stood also for after the elections. He added that he thinks often about President Johnson not only in connection with the business two chiefs of state may have together but also as one man about another. He is fully conscious of the heavy burden constituted by responsibility and full of respect for the manner in which the President carries this burden.
The President said that people in the United States are conscious of the manner in which President de Gaulle faced his own responsibilities. This has changed the face of France and greatly contributed to changing the face of the world.
President de Gaulle said that the United States has done much for the world.
The President said that the United States did what it could and what it considered to be its duty. It intends to continue to do its duty.
Pleasantries
President de Gaulle said that he was happy to have been able to exchange these few words with the President and hoped for another opportunity.
The President said that he also was happy with having been able to exchange these few words and that he also would like to have further conversations with President de Gaulle. It is his understanding that President de Gaulle would be leaving Bonn almost immediately after the ceremonies.
President de Gaulle affirmed that such was the case.
73. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, July 11, 1967, 1834Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 34. Secret; Nodis.
506. During my conversation with General de Gaulle today/2/ I asked him for his estimate of the correlation of forces in the world. He told me that he thought from the military point of view the Soviets could destroy the U.S. and the U.S. could destroy the Soviets and that therefore from a purely military standpoint we cancelled each other out. However, he said the U.S. was so much more powerful from the economic and financial point of view as well as in organization of its state that there was no comparison. I pointed out to de Gaulle that the Soviet Union, having a closed system, was in no way affected financially by the power of the U.S., to which de Gaulle replied that this may be so but that the U.S. weighed more heavily on the rest of the world.
/2/Telegram 507 from Paris, July 11, reported on the portion of the discussion dealing with Algeria. (Ibid.) Telegram 508 from Paris, July 11, reported on the portion of the discussion dealing with the Middle East. (Ibid.) Telegram 509 dealt with de Gaulle's views on Arab-Israeli issues. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23 ARAB-ISR) Telegram 510 dealt with de Gaulle's visits abroad. (Ibid., POL 7 FR)
I told him that I had been associated with the conduct of American foreign policy for well over twenty years and I could really think of no case where the U.S. had sought to use its power for its own selfish ends. De Gaulle said he did not accuse the U.S. of any belligerent attitude although he thought it was "inevitable" that so much power as that possessed by the U.S. sooner or later--perhaps not now he said--would begin to influence the policy and conduct of any country.
Comment: De Gaulle did not say it but implied that part of France's current policy was a recognition of the overwhelming power of the U.S. and the necessity of helping to redress the balance. This may be supposition on my part since this view attributed to de Gaulle has already appeared in the French press.
Bohlen
74. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, July 12, 1967, 1042Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 12. Secret; Nodis. In an attached July 12 memorandum to President Johnson, Walt Rostow commented: "There is little in this you don't know or guess; although de Gaulle's personal anger at Israel's failing to take his advice is an interesting but not complete explanation of French Middle East policy, you will wish to note the final paragraph."
523. Ref: Paris 508./2/ It is disconcerting to say the least to see the head of an important and traditionally friendly country conduct its foreign policy on such a series of subjective and relatively trivial prejudices as de Gaulle seems to be doing in France. It seems to me that his anger and bitterness in regard to Israel stems from two basic reasons: (1) His recognition that France did not and could not play any important role in the Middle East crisis--Russia's blunt refusal of a Four-Power gathering, the failure of French diplomacy with its former African colonies set the background for his current mood. (2) His anger at the Israelis daring to ignore his personal advice adds a note of subjective bitterness. To his present mood (3) it should of course be added that as is customary with him he finds some reason to blame the U.S. His supposition, and it is certainly no more than that, that if the U.S. had really given a flat warning to Israel we could have prevented the war is ridiculous on the face of it. What is a matter of concern however is the degree to which under de Gaulle's one-man rule personal and subjective prejudices have been translated into political action. As an illustration of the depth of his feeling against Israel he told me yesterday that "in this very room" five years ago Ben Gurion said that Israel had two and one-half million people, that some day it would be five million, and then asked the rhetorical question "Where will we put these people," the implication being that Israel had solid reasons for making plans of aggression. I told him that this may have been Ben Gurion's view five years ago, but I understood that recently the rate of immigration to Israel had gone down radically.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 73.
At another point in discussing the motivations of Israeli action I said to de Gaulle, "What would you have done if you had been an Israeli" to which he replied with some frostiness, "I am not an Israeli." (I might say that throughout de Gaulle was as usual polite and courteous.)
I am inclined to believe however that de Gaulle's statement that French abstention on Cuban and Albanian amendments was due to his feeling that the U.S. bore some share of responsibility for events in the Middle East is not completely accurate. I had learned yesterday from an officer of the Quai d'Orsay that these instructions were drafted on a general basis without any anticipation of either of these amendments, and that Seydoux had lacked the nerve to raise the question with the Quai. It was for this reason that I suggested we be particularly careful in handling what de Gaulle told me.
There would seem to be absolutely nothing that we can do to bring about any change in de Gaulle's attitude, and I believe that we can count on his continuing hostility to Israel, particularly in the field of the arms embargo, unless the Israelis should withdraw, which is in the highest degree unlikely.
It is difficult to convey from here to Washington the depth of the feeling in Parisian political and non-political circles at the current line of de Gaulle's policy. However, with the Assembly in recess until October there is no chance that any influence will be brought to bear on de Gaulle, or would have any possibility of success if it were. There seems to be no possibility of any ministerial resignation, but there is no doubt that de Gaulle's Middle East policy, particularly the anti-Israeli aspect, has dealt Gaullism a considerable blow.
Bohlen
75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, July 22, 1967, 10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Anderson, cleared by Stoessel, and approved by Rusk.
11595. For Ambassador Bohlen from Secretary.
1. Ambassador Lucet had a half-hour talk with me July 20 before his departure to France on vacation. Because you will probably be seeing him and he may mention it to you, I want you to have one particular part of our conversation that I am not reporting elsewhere.
2. Knowing that Lucet would be seeing de Gaulle at some point while back in France, I decided to speak quite frankly to him about the state of United States-French relations. I said that the United States did not seem to be popular with President de Gaulle these days. When asked by a somewhat flustered Lucet for specifics, I cited such issues as the Middle East, Viet-Nam, international monetary problems and even the "Anglo-Saxon" question of UK entry into Europe where French policy was directed against the United States. When I mentioned our sadness over the state of our relations, Lucet said that his visits to Rhode Island, Kentucky and Minnesota during the last few days had convinced him there was still some permanent friendship left. I agreed but commented that the unfortunate state of our relations gives some impetus to isolationism here in the United States. Lucet agreed with this, and concluded with the comment that "You're fed up with all of us, but you cannot get rid of us." I laughingly replied: "We can always try."
3. In a subsequent discussion of this part of the conversation with Anderson (FBX) Lucet said that he understood and personally shared my views, that he welcomed having them, and that he intended to use them in Paris to try to obtain some "clarification" of French policy towards the United States.
Rusk
76. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, July 27, 1967, 1552Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 FR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Ottawa.
1288. De Gaulle has always been known as a man of strong and definite views, which he has had no inhibitions in expressing. However, along with this, de Gaulle up until recently had always had a sense of measure, of timing, of place and appropriateness. It has now become increasingly apparent that de Gaulle has lost this sense of timing and of appropriateness and his public utterances and indeed actions have more and more taken on a purely willful and personal character. According to our information, de Gaulle conducts completely single-handedly French foreign policy and is more and more neglecting other aspects of government activities. His statements on Vietnam, which have tended more and more to free himself from the normal restraints, his action on the Common Market, and finally, the recent and most incredible of all, his behavior in Canada,/2/ have all reflected this tendency. It would seem that de Gaulle is suffering from two aspects of old age: (1) A progressive hardening of the prejudices--of which he had plenty, and (2) A growing indifference and even unconcern with the effect of his words on international and French public opinion. The fixation which he has always had in regard to the power and size of the United States has grown into a compulsive obsession.
/2/De Gaulle visited Montreal July 23-26. In the course of a speech at Montreal City Hall, July 24, de Gaulle repeated the rally cry of the Separatists, "Vive le Quebec Libre." In a statement issued after the second speech, the Government of Canada called de Gaulle's comments unacceptable outside interference in Canadian affairs.
I have always held the view, and still do, that basically and originally de Gaulle's antagonism to the United States was based upon his view of our size and power, coupled with the traditional friendliness of the United States towards France. These, in de Gaulle's view, constituted the chief elements of a power which was dangerous in regard to the independence of French action. However, as I recently reported (Paris 808),/3/ an attitude, whatever its original motivation, if consistently held and acted upon eventually becomes a subjective obsession. This is clear now in the case of de Gaulle's view of the United States. We have noted that along with his powerful intrusion into Canadian domestic affairs in favor of the French Canadians, de Gaulle found two occasions to make relatively mild cracks about the United States and its size. I feel, however, that now we must definitely recognize that one of the motivating forces of de Gaulle's conduct of foreign policy is his anti-American obsession and I believe that we can expect that almost anything he says in the future will contain some uncomplimentary references toward United States. His performance in Canada has come as a disturbing and unsettling shock to French public opinion. Virtually the entire press has been openly and severely critical of de Gaulle personally. Characteristic of this tone is an editorial in Figaro this morning which after criticizing de Gaulle very severely, ends up with "why"? The prevailing mood among such French as can be met in Paris at this season is one of incredulity and humiliation because de Gaulle has violated what the French regard as one of their chief attributes, namely that of good taste. Also, no one here can understand exactly what de Gaulle was driving at.
/3/Dated July 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US)
Naturally it is the effect on the French domestic political scene which will be of chief interest. In all probability there will be more reaction than action during August when everyone, including all members of the government, will be on vacation, and it is yet too soon to state exactly what effect the Canadian fiasco will eventually have on the domestic scene. However, together with de Gaulle's policy on the Middle East, the Canadian fiasco will be one more major error of de Gaulle in the general picture. It is to be assumed that even the most hardened Gaullists must be left with a sensation of frustration and bewilderment. It is perhaps too soon to state that de Gaulle is "becoming senile," but certainly the restraint which used to accompany his actions and characterize his words seems to be slipping very badly.
Bohlen
77. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, January 23, 1968, 1739Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Secret. Repeated to London.
9453. I went this afternoon to pay my farewell call on Pompidou/2/ and the following points emerged from our discussion:
/2/Bohlen left post on February 9. President Johnson appointed R. Sargent Shriver to succeed him on April 22. Shriver presented his credentials on May 25.
After my telling Pompidou how much I personally regretted leaving Paris and how appreciative I was of the many acts of kindness and consideration I had received from him and from other members of the French Govt, I told him that insofar as official matters were concerned I was very sorry to see the present state of Franco-American relations and that I honestly did not feel that it was due to anything that the U.S. Govt had done or not done, leaving aside Vietnam which of course did not touch any direct French interest.
Pompidou did not disagree with me but said that Vietnam, while not affecting French interests directly nevertheless was a larger question affecting almost every country in the world. I told him Vietnam was a widely complicated subject but he could be sure that no one wished to find a reasonable and decent solution more than the U.S. and I thought he would find more interest among the oriental countries in what the U.S. was trying to do there. I then went on to tell him that I couldn't honestly foresee any great improvement, even if Vietnam was settled, in the relations between the U.S. and France, and one of the reasons was that I felt the attitude of the French Govt, including that of de Gaulle, was obsessed with the power of the U.S., particularly economically and financially; that their attitude, particularly the General's, was that nothing could be done about it and that it was inevitable that sooner or later the U.S. would develop all the character and action of a country with too much power. In the circumstances I could not see--since obviously we could do nothing to diminish our power--how there could be any genuine improvement in our relationship.
Pompidou said that no one expected the U.S. to do anything to diminish its power but the manner in which the power was used might be important. I said there were certain limits in regard to the use of power which would apply in any nation and I frankly did not see--again leaving aside Vietnam--in what manner the U.S. could have applied its powers more benignly than it had. Pompidou replied that this might be true from the point of view of the govt but that speaking from his experience in private business he felt that the action of American companies was very calculated and assertive, mentioning particularly the aviation business in which he said that every time France or England attempted sales in other countries they ran into overriding competition from American firms. I pointed out to him as a general rule the U.S. Govt practically never got into these matters involving these companies, which I did not think was always the case in France.
I then told Pompidou that I had been very much disturbed at the state of public opinion in the U.S. in regard to France: that I thought this was in part due to the simple fact that the American public did not understand many of the foreign policy acts of the French Govt and I also said that the attitude of the General toward Israel and in his last press conference apparently toward the Jews in general/3/ had caused a certain reaction in the U.S. I mentioned that the French position in the Middle East was by no means clear to many people and that it was matters of this kind, including of course the departure from NATO, the establishment of which I personally recalled had been very much a French desire and even insistence back in the early 50's, was very easy to interpret as anti-American.
/3/"An elite people, sure of itself and dominating." For text of his November 27, 1967, press conference, see de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, Vol. 5, pp. 227-247.
Pompidou then asked me whether I really seriously thought that if President Johnson had wanted to use his full influence with Israel there would have been any war (in this he was parroting de Gaulle's attitude, Paris 3931)./4/ I told him from everything that I knew, both from personal conversations in Washington and from the documents in the case, it seemed entirely clear that President Johnson had gone just as far as it was conceivable to go in an attempt to dissuade the Israelis, pointing out that there was a limit beyond which you could not go in dealing with a smaller country. Pompidou made no reply.
/4/Not found.
In turning to the recent American balance of payment measures Pompidou said approaching this from an economic point of view it seemed perfectly clear to him that we were taking measures which would not be unpalatable to American public opinion in an election year but were perhaps somewhat more indifferent towards the interests of others. I said that I frankly didn't agree with this observation since many of the measures undertaken would not be a bit palatable to American business, American tourists, or other elements in American life. I pointed out to him that insofar as the interests of others was concerned there was no discrimination involving any other country despite what he, Pompidou, had said on television. Pompidou said he did not use the word discrimination and did not mean to imply it (sic), but had merely pointed out that since there was a difference of treatment towards Great Britain and the European countries it was obvious the U.S. did not consider England a European country. I told him I thought if England had been admitted to the Common Market and had really meshed its finances with other Common Market countries, the result might have been different, but in the circumstances there could hardly be any question since England was in balance of payments difficulties whereas Common Market countries were not.
After some more discussion of "hegemony" as applied to the modern world the conversation ended with mutual compliment.
Comment: I have always known that Pompidou was one of those who more strongly believed in the overwhelming power of the U.S. vis-?-visothers and the expressions along this line noted above were not a bit out of character, but I think are generally held by most of the French Govt. He did not disagree when I mentioned that de Gaulle's remarks on the Jews had created a reaction, possibly for the reason that they created an equally strong reaction in France. It was interesting to note that he did not disagree with my statement that in the circumstances I foresaw very little chance of any basic change in Franco-American relations.
Bohlen
78. Summary Notes of the 586th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, May 22, 1968, 12:15-1:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 5. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only.
Vietnam-France-Germany
The President: Before discussing current problems with West Germany, Under Secretary Katzenbach will comment on the current crisis in France./2/
/2/On May 2 French authorities closed the University of Paris complex at Nanterres, a Paris suburb, setting off a growing wave of student demonstrations that erupted into violence on May 6. The clashes between police and students continued until May 13 when French workers staged a massive general strike in support of the students. On May 14 the students occupied the Sorbonne. Other faculty occupations followed. By May 17 workers in many parts of France were occupying factories as part of a protest against government economic policies. By May 21 when the French National Assembly began debates on the uprising, an estimated 8 million workers were striking, paralyzing industry and transportation.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: DeGaulle can probably defeat a vote of censure in the French Assembly. His TV speech on Friday was tough, but it did offer a compromise to his opponents. He may well emerge as the leader who overcame current disturbances. If he has to use force to end disorder, he will encounter very serious problems. It is in our interest to have the situation in France calm down.
[Here follow 3 pages of discussion on the Paris peace talks, German affairs, and the situation in Vietnam.]
Bromley Smith
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