79. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, May 28, 1968, 1545Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15 FR. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, The Hague, Brussels, London, Moscow, Rome, and USNATO.
14914. Subject: Possible Effects of Present Crisis on French Foreign Policy.
1. Taking step back from immediate urgencies, some very preliminary observations are in order on possible effect of this crisis on Franco-American relations and on French foreign policy.
2. This Embassy has commented many times that de Gaulle's overriding concern was reasserting his country's independence and increasing its international standing. Many Frenchmen now recognize that his preoccupation with French prestige has been a basic cause of his neglect of domestic concerns that helped bring on present situation. We have also noted often that his aims overreached his means, and that such diplomatic successes as he enjoyed were result not of French power but of his unique personal authority and audacity, coupled with image of French prosperity and stability.
3. Whatever the outcome of present trials, it already is clear that de Gaulle's authority in France will be significantly reduced, and that his standing and France's leverage in the international area will be considerably diminished. Whoever governs, there will be turning inward toward domestic concerns, less temptation to attempt policies based on grandeur. Even on material level, economic implications of strikes and their settlement (see Paris 14553 for early estimation)/2/ will reduce material resources available for conduct of foreign policy.
/2/Telegram 14553 from Paris, May 22, commented on the economic impact of the French strikes. (Ibid., E 9 FR)
4. How all this will affect specific French policies is more difficult to say, for it depends on how firmly de Gaulle remains in saddle or, if he is unseated, who comes after. Since past French diplomatic adventures--whether shaking the Alliance, rapproching with the East, comforting our enemies in Vietnam, intervening in Canada, blocking Britain from Europe, or the rest--have issued directly from the General's personal initiative [and] prestige, it seems certain that no French leader--even de Gaulle--will enjoy same prestige after this crisis and act the same. Using working hypothesis that Gaullists will stay in power after June 16, some possibilities might be outlined:
(A) The old de Gaulle might well have taken France out of Atlantic Alliance in 1969; a post-crisis de Gaulle would not feel strong enough at home to risk such an unsettling move, at least in foreseeable future.
(B) France's political and economic relations with ITU partners in Common Market are open to question. With de Gaulle's domestic standing reduced and adverse effect of strike-settling reforms at work, France cannot be as arbitrary and carry same weight in EEC Councils as before. (See Paris 14173.)/3/ Conversely EEC partners might show more force and determination against French arbitrariness; Bonc may have less concern and respect for French leadership in the future.
/3/Not found.
(C) De Gaulle's rapprochement with Moscow has never caught imagination of most Frenchmen, and in view Communist role in present crisis, a weakened de Gaulle or successor "Gaullist" government might fear too much "opening to East" which may have brought more trouble than benefit to France.
(D) France's cherished image as hero of Third World and champion of Francophonie will suffer as base of de Gaulle's political and economic power erodes. It is doubtful France will devote the same high percentage of GNP to foreign aid as now. Accelerating French programs in Quebec, Cuba (Embtel 14747),/4/ Latin America and elsewhere are likely to be hurt; but French-speaking Africa would also suffer. (Effects may not be felt immediately, of course, since many projects already in pipeline.)
/4/Telegram 14747 from Paris, May 27, reported on economic relations between France and Cuba. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FN 6-1 CUBA)
(E) Even de Gaulle's firm pro-Arab stance in Middle East could conceivably be modified should he need more powerful anti-Communist friends in the West.
(F) As for Franco-American relations, it is evident that France's internal problems should encourage any tendencies already at work for de Gaulle to ease off on his anti-American posture. He is obviously flattered by Vietnam talks going on in Paris, and in any event has less reason to criticize US about Vietnam. Domestic economic repercussions should spoil French favorite game of criticizing US payments problem; and in general de Gaulle must have need for better relations with US to bolster his reputation at home. This is particularly true since most Frenchmen seem tired of bad relations with US and many of them are increasingly worried about policy of going it alone in a world which has suddenly become more dangerous. (We cite for sheer pleasure what one Embassy officer's concierge told him she was telling her friends: "I wish the US troops would come back; they gave us some security.")
5. We emphasize change not discontinuity (if Gaullists stay in). We must recognize, for example, that return to the old solidarity within Atlantic Alliance is probably impossible in absence of Soviet military threats and that a certain degree of mistrust and jealousy of the US is standard part of French outlook. France, however, may be returning to reality; important, as is her due, but not the false, inflated, imperious France that de Gaulle has sought. France is returning to France--which is a great deal, and is all her friends ask.
6. We believe the USG can take pride in consistent US policy of restraint and abstinence from controversy with de Gaulle. We have not replied in kind, we have not taken steps against French interests, we have kept the hand out. We are ready to work with her again, as before.
7. Embassy assessment of effect on US interests should Gaullists lose power entirely to center and/or left (including Popular Front with Communists) will follow in subsequent telegram. This is even tougher exercise since opposition leadership is full of holes and the future full of unknowns. However, it is even more important since what was almost inconceivable a month ago, i.e. de Gaulle's early departure, would now be an even bet if France were asked today.
Shriver
80. Intelligence Memorandum/1/
0591/68
Washington, May 31, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 13. Secret. A typewritten note on the memorandum reads: "This memorandum was prepared jointly by the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of National Estimates [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]."
THE FRENCH CRISIS
De Gaulle's Challenge
1. The events of the last 24 hours have placed France on the knife edge of disaster. By refusing to resign, De Gaulle has taken on the workers and students frontally. He has reverted to type, the powerful, challenging autocrat. He has promised elections for the Assembly, not for the presidency. He has vowed to retain his prime minister. He has threatened the use of his emergency powers. He has asked for the revival of Gaullist "civic action" committees--his private security system. He has raised the spectre of a Communist takeover. In short, he has come out of his corner swinging defiantly at opponents who thought that they had him on the ropes.
2. In his speech he made a simplistic division of France into those threatening dictatorship-his opponents, all lumped together as Communists or their dupes--and those in favor of "progress, independence, and peace"--the people. De Gaulle is attempting to achieve by words what his regime has failed to do politically, i.e., divide the country into two clear-cut camps: the Gaullists and their supporters on the one hand and the Communists and theirs on the other. This attempt poses basic problems of strategy and tactics for the leftist opposition and its electoral ally, the Communist Party.
3. The immediate reaction has been both angry, and enthusiastic. On the one hand, more workers have left their jobs, including some public service employees; on the other hand, thousands of Gaullists are jubilantly taking to the streets. When, how, and if a head-on collision between right and left will occur is not yet clear, but a spark could set it off.
The Opposition's Response
4. De Gaulle's challenge could evoke a wide range of responses from French workers, students, and the political parties of the left. Among the workers, a small but militant and youthful minority has led both the mass of workers and the opposition political parties in fomenting strikes and forcing the French economy to a standstill. These militants are unlikely to change their tactics now.
5. In an effort to force De Gaulle's resignation, workers could carry their activities to new levels by cutting off all electricity and gas service (they have done so for short periods already), and they could attempt large-scale industrial sabotage in installations that they now either occupy or have struck. In such circumstances De Gaulle would be obliged to restore the operation of these installations by force.
6. De Gaulle obviously hopes that the great majority of the ten million striking workers who follow but do not lead will get back on the job now that they are threatened with the full power of the government. If the labor force does begin returning to work in significant numbers, De Gaulle will have broken the back of the dissidence. If it does not, civil conflict of major proportions will almost certainly ensue.
7. If De Gaulle gets more workers back on the job and the economy moving again, he will have largely isolated the students. He can then deal with them at greater leisure and from a much stronger position. The students who instigated the early demonstrations and who are still in the revolutionary forefront must realize this, and probably see only one course open to them: to continue the resistance by all means and to persuade the workers over the heads of their own leaders that De Gaulle can be defeated. De Gaulle's arrogant speech could lead to a hardening of the student position and to more dramatic attempts to challenge authority.
8. For the political parties of the left--the Communist and Francois Mitterrand's Left Federation--De Gaulle's speech poses more starkly than ever the dilemma they have faced since the crisis began. Will they gain (or lose) more by trying to assume leadership of the revolution against De Gaulle, or by strengthening their own moderate image through support of order and peaceful change? The immediate reaction of both Mitterrand and the Communist leadership to De Gaulle's speech was to label it a call to civil war. They may have second thoughts, but apparently now believe that they would lose more by knuckling under to De Gaulle than by fully associating themselves with the dissidents. The left's political leaders themselves are dependent on the workers. If substantial numbers of workers respond to De Gaulle and begin returning to work in the next few days, the politicians of the left will also probably pull in their horns, seek to cut their losses, and begin again to espouse order and parliamentary processes.
De Gaulle's Assets
9. At this juncture De Gaulle has one asset that he almost certainly can count on--the army; one asset that he probably can rely on--the internal security forces; and one potential asset--the nonstriking, nonstudent French public which would like to avoid bloodshed and possible civil war. The position of the army is particularly critical if De Gaulle assumes emergency powers under Article 16 of the constitution, a move that he alone--and with only a pro forma parliamentary and judicial sanction--can initiate.
10. The army probably will obey any orders it receives from the legally constituted government. If an insurrection breaks out and the army is ordered to crush it, it probably will do so. Purges that have occurred since the Algerian imbroglio and the anti-Communist sentiment among army leaders should ensure the loyalty of the officer corps. The reaction of the conscripts if massive violence breaks out is less predictable, although most officers do not seem concerned about the loyalty of the draftees. Various reports indicate that on his way back to Colombey on the 29th, De Gaulle met in eastern France with General Jacques Massu, commanding general of the French forces in West Germany, and with a number of other army leaders, presumably to inquire about the loyalty of the troops. De Gaulle's implicit threat to use force to restore order indicates the generals probably reaffirmed their support for the regime in case of a showdown. There are numerous reports that additional troops are now moving toward the Paris area, but there has been no confirmation of this.
11. As of 29 May, two airborne regiments had been moved closer to Paris and three armored units near Paris had been placed on a six-hour alert. In addition, five gendarmerie companies from the French forces in Germany had been moved to Strasbourg and Paris and all major units of the First Military Region, which has its headquarters in Paris, were ordered to have 75 percent of their personnel present at all times.
12. The police, aided by the 60,000-man gendarmerie and the Republic Security Companies (CRS), have up to this point obeyed all orders issued by their superiors. Discontent among the Paris police has been growing, however, in part over the regime's handling of the crisis and in part because the government has not yet responded to demands for pay raises. Police unions have publicly proclaimed their sympathy with striking workers and might balk if ordered to oust strikers from occupied factories. De Gaulle thus might be forced to rely on the CRS and the army. He has studiously avoided calling on the army up to this point, possibly in part because few units have been trained to deal with civic disorder.
13. The public thus far has been highly critical of the "establishment" and surprisingly tolerant of lawbreakers, strikes, and massive inconveniences. Now that the possibility exists of an insurrection on the part of the protesters and the wholesale use of force by the government to restore order, that sector of the public which wants to avoid a civil war might rally to the legitimate government. De Gaulle's raising of the spectre of a Communist take-over probably was intended to arouse this up-to-now passive group. Some indications that he has considerable strength within this group in the Paris area have already been shown by the 300,000-400,000 demonstrators who gathered in Paris late today in support of De Gaulle.
Outlook
14. Developments over the next few hours and days will tell whether the momentum of the dissidents is sustained--or whether De Gaulle's opening for a return to order is seized by a tired and frightened public. Movement to chaos could be very fast indeed, particularly if some of the restraints observed so far by organized labor are abandoned. The critical areas are the public utilities, communications, and the police.
15. The leaders of the left may upon reflection recoil from attempting to come to power the same way De Gaulle did in 1958: through subversion and paralysis of the state. The events of the past three weeks, however, demonstrate that the titular leaders of both workers and students have only imperfect control over the rank and file in their organizations. It is highly questionable now whether they have the will or indeed the desire to rally their followers for a legal assault on the Gaullist regime at the ballot box.
16. Whether elections will be held, whether the results will be meaningful, and whether the losers will accept the results of the vote probably will not be apparent for a week or more. The immediate reaction of the leaders of the leftist opposition, the striking unions, and the demonstrating students indicates that they have chosen to regard De Gaulle's speech as a "call to civil war" rather than as an opportunity to prove that a majority of the French people desires the end of the Gaullist regime.
17. The immediate outlook for a return to some measure of calm is very poor. The government already has begun organizing counterdemonstrations and mobilizing the Committee for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) a group of World War II resistance veterans unconditionally faithful to De Gaulle. If students continue to demonstrate and workers to occupy plants, or if the Communist Party activates its own "action committees," then bloody clashes are likely with the CDR, other Gaullist supporters, the police, and the army. Over the short run, we believe that the government probably would succeed in restoring order and essential services, but only at the cost of poisoning political life for the indefinite future.
18. The longer term political outlook is therefore ominous. The Gaullists have repeatedly violated and perverted their own constitution. They have treated even the moderate opposition with disdain and indifference. In today's declaration, De Gaulle has reasserted his determination to maintain the dominance of the right in France. The opposition, in turn, has reacted in its political frustration with revolutionary language and calls for extraparliamentary means to redress its grievances. Long-term political stability in France probably has been undermined. Thus the stage has been set for a polarization of political forces in France, with neither extreme willing to accept the role of a "loyal" opposition. Whatever the short-term outcome, France faces a period of unrest and, eventually, even civil war.
81. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Department of State/1/
Paris, July 29, 1968, 2025Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 13. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Katzenbach visited Paris on his return from New Dehli where he led the U.S. delegation in talks with Indian leaders July 26-28.
18701. Secun 17. For the Secretary from the Under Secretary. Amb. Shriver and I saw Foreign Minister Debre for 1/2 hour meeting this evening.
Debre stated the French Economy Minister said he thought there would be serious difficulties for the remainder of this year, but that things would pick up around January and continue on an upward course. He said his technicians thought this view somewhat pessimistic and that the upturn would come sooner.
In response to my question on his view as to Czech, the Minister said that it was absolutely impossible for the Soviet Union to accept the course of liberalization in Czech because if this continued it would affect all other Eastern European countries and prove to be irreversible. He did not think that it would be possible to reverse this course in Czech, other than by force. He thought the Soviets were prepared to do this. He said it was conceivable, but unlikely, that Dubcek could avert the crisis by making major concessions to the Soviets. He would have to promise to exercise strict press censorship, etc.
At one point in the conversation he said that he did not think his view different from that expressed by Bohlen as reported by Lucet. I said I thought he took a more pessimistic view. Debre said that Soviet intervention would be tragic for Europe but there was nothing anybody could do about it.
Katzenbach
82. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, August 26, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 14. Confidential.
SUBJECT
U.S. Claims Against France
Attached is Secretary Rusk's memo requesting approval to initiate talks with the French on compensation for losses we incurred when we had to move our military installations out of France./2/ Secretaries Fowler and Clifford join in this recommendation.
/2/Not printed.
These claims cover:
--the estimated value of the remaining useful life of the facilities we left in France; plus
--certain moving costs involved in the relocation.
State estimates the total at $230-$250 million.
Our NATO allies may be willing to share certain of these relocation costs with us (up to a maximum of $96 million). They expect repayment in proportion to any compensation we might ultimately receive from France. They expect us to bring our bilateral claim to France before they begin negotiations with us to share in our costs.
In addition to our bilateral claims, we share in the combined NATO financial claims against France for similar costs on NATO-financed facilities. The Fourteen invited the French to begin discussions on this issue in February but so far received only a stalling response.
Asking the French to begin discussions on our bilateral claim may look like provoking a U.S.-French confrontation. The French response will probably amount to a stall or a brush-off. But we do have a legitimate claim and we will be subject to Congressional criticism if we delay presenting it. To take both factors into account, Secretary Rusk is recommending a low-key approach (along the lines of the attached draft note), with no public statement.
John Leddy will seek Ambassador Shriver's advice on a suitable time to make this approach.
I concur in Secretary Rusk's recommendation.
Approve approach to the French/3/
No
Call me
/3/The President checked this option.
Walt
83. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, September 2, 1968, 1827Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 FR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Rome, USNATO, and USUN.
20272. Subject: French Policy of East-West D?tente in Wake of Czech Crisis.
1. Many French officials have stated privately that this policy has received a severe setback, and that an agonizing reappraisal should be undertaken, but de Gaulle has made it clear that he will continue on same road.
2. In defending his policy, de Gaulle has fallen back on shopworn theme of attacking "both hegemonies" and has attributed events in Czechoslovakia to divisive policy of blocs. While French public opinion is far more condemnatory of Soviets than GOF statements, on issue like this de Gaulle is not susceptible to pressure from his countrymen. Similarly while there is considerable opinion within GOF favoring closer cooperation with United States, this sentiment will not any more than in past induce de Gaulle to change his position publicly or privately. Thus we should not be surprised to hear at his Sept 9 press conference further restatement of his philosophy, again balancing criticism of USSR with criticism of US.
3. What does de Gaulle now intend to do in East-West relations? He is obviously determined not to burn his bridges with Moscow and other occupying powers. We therefore do not believe GOF will sever economic, scientific and cultural relations it has built up. Rather, GOF will put brakes on more political and psychological projects with these countries--e.g., cancellation Gomulka visit. But there is no question of GOF withdrawing its support for Czech independence or its condemnation of Soviet actions.
4. Re actions in concert with US or within NATO framework, we believe de Gaulle considers NATO totally irrelevant to finding solution to situation, and doubt he would let France become enmeshed in any common action with US. In this connection, final two paragraphs of Aug 24 communiqu&#eacute;of Council of Ministers (COM) meeting should be read in this context. (Paris 19905)/2/
/2/Telegram 19905 from Paris, August 24, reported the text of a French statement regarding the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. (Ibid., POL 27-1 COMM BLOC-CZECH)
5. While many Frenchmen believe swift Soviet incursion into Czechoslovakia and presence of Soviet troops on Bavarian frontier reemphasizes importance of Atlantic Alliance, de Gaulle may think otherwise. One question is whether de Gaulle, during his Sept. 9th Delphic oration, might indicate France's intention to withdraw from Alliance. Opinion thus far indicates he will not. Foccart of Elysee and Quai State Secretary de Lipkowski told us subsequent to Aug. 24 COM session that in their view there is no question of France leaving Alliance. Case could be made for de Gaulle to take this action if he determines pressures may be underway to make Alliance focal point for dealing with EE situation. He has strongly condemned what he describes as two-bloc approach to foreign affairs: he favors disappearance of both blocs. On Sept 9 he could refer to his March 7, 1966 letter to President pointing out that events have now changed fundamental elements of relations between East and West, that cold war Alliance approach has been responsible for these tragic events, and that therefore, in the interest of promoting peace in Europe, France must free itself from "the servitudes" brought about by belonging to one of blocs./3/
/3/For text of the letter, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 318.
6. On balance, we believe it unlikely de Gaulle will make this move, when situation in Czechoslovakia is far from settled and there are apprehensions regarding further Soviet moves. We also recall that earlier he told Brosio and others that question would not arise in 1968. There is really little that France can do to deter the Soviets, and getting out of the Alliance at this time would only benefit Moscow; there is no internal threat to de Gaulle or his government's position by stand he has already taken; membership in Alliance has not prevented France from pursuing independent policy; to turn France neutralist when faced with serious domestic problems might be another headache General would prefer not to have. These arguments are conclusive to us, but we must add caveat that de Gaulle has done the unexpected more than once in past.
7. As for impact of Czechoslovak intervention on France-US relations, we remain encouraged by increased cooperation shown at all levels below Elysee. Debre's frank discussion with me immediately after return from Colombey on first day of crisis; statements from many French Ministers and civil servants about desire to work together; reports by both CAS and Defense Attach? that working level cooperation during Czech crisis has been remarkable--all these we take as hopeful signs. We should continue to consult with French whenever possible and cooperate more closely in those areas where Elysee is not set in concrete.
8. We believe that analysis in Paris telegrams 18471 and 18627/4/ remains sound, and that Czech crisis is reinforcing pressures towards greater cooperation among Western Allies and towards building warmer Franco-US atmosphere. Fact remains that GOF's position internally and externally was weakened by May-June French crisis. De-emphasis of rapprochement with USSR, already underway, is now likely to continue. This does not mean that de Gaulle will "re-enter NATO," alter his position on UK entry into Common Market, NPT or disarmament efforts in Geneva, or in any way alter his attempts to promote France's grandeur through actions which will be--as they have in past--more negative than positive because of France's power position in the world.
/4/Telegram 18471 from Paris, July 24, commented on the state of U.S.-French relations. (Ibid., POL FR-US) Telegram 18627 from Paris, July 26, analyzed the post-crisis outlook for French foreign policy. (Ibid., POL 1 FR)
Shriver
84. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, October 10, 1968, 0910Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels for the Embassy and BUSEC, The Hague, London, Rome, USNATO, and Moscow.
22164. Subj: Franco-American Relations on Eve of Debre Visit to Washington.
1. In mid-summer we reported several straws in the wind blowing in the direction of somewhat improved Franco-American relations. We observed (Paris 18471)/2/ that although there were no basic changes in French foreign policy, one result of the May events had been improved atmosphere of our bilateral relations. Since then, Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has intervened. Some thought this would lead de Gaulle to consider closer military and political cooperation for the sake of Western collective security; in contrast this demonstration of raw Soviet power apparently confirmed the General even more in his determination to work against Western political and military unity and "against blocs."
/2/See footnote 4, Document 83.
2. What then remains of the hopes of July in this Indian summer of political uncertainty? In our view, there remains something quite important, even if intangible and perhaps fragile--namely the improved atmosphere. This has two aspects, present and future. For the present, one principal reason for this improved atmosphere is that de Gaulle does not want acutely unpleasant relations with US. This attitude is not due to any change of heart, but rather, we believe, to his recognition that with Soviets on warpath this is not time to be feuding with US. In other words, this is implicit recognition of elements of weakness in his international posture, especially now with Soviets occupying Czechoslovakia.
3. How does the improved atmosphere still show? By: (A) The continuing absence of the former snarling anti-American quality of statements by French leaders--at least in public--and despite such vitriolic statements by the rather emotional Debre, as reported by Luns (The Hague's 7316)./3/ Part of this better tone is due to France's role as host to the Vietnam negotiations and part may be due to the evident unpopularity of "way out" anti-US rhetoric.
/3/Telegram 7316 from The Hague, September 25, reported on anti-American remarks by Debr?. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-NETH)
(B) The continuing desire of French Government officials below the top for closer communication with the USG and at the top for the first time in two years the visit of a French Foreign Minister to Washington. This should not be considered as too important in our view. At the working level at the Quai, the new friendliness, greater openness and cooperation has been continued and even developed somewhat.
(C) For the first time in years, the granting by ORTF of coverage in depth to the activities of our Ambassador. ORTF even ran his entire speech given at the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Battle of St. Mihiel and today ORTFs presentation of feature of Shriver family. This is a relatively minor although much noted gesture and again, this may in part be a personal gesture to the Ambassador.
(D) Closer cooperation and coordination in intelligence and security affairs has continued to develop in a satisfactory way. This is important to US and to the French.
4. The future aspect of improved atmosphere is that for some French politicians at least the "pre-post-de Gaulle" period has begun, despite the General's absolute hold on power right now. New leaders are preparing themselves for the re-ordering of French political life after de Gaulle, and while French independence remains a cardinal article of faith, we do not believe most of them share de Gaulle's distrust of US. What US does now will have important effect on these leaders who are waiting in wings. Improvement in atmosphere in recent months gives us elbow room to work towards a better future, and we do consider it vital to keep post-de Gaulle France in forefront of our European planning. While we probably cannot change the General's course, we hope to do far more with France in future, and we must continue to lay the groundwork for this now.
Shriver
85. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 11, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Secret. Drafted by Tanguy and approved in the White House on October 15.
SUBJECT
US-French Relations; Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia; the Middle East; and Viet Nam
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
Walt Rostow, Special Assistant to the President
Ernest Goldstein, Special Assistant to the President
Charles R. Tanguy, Country Director for France-Benelux Affairs
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter
French
Michel Debre, Minister of Foreign Affairs, France
Ambassador Charles Lucet, Ambassador of France
Franco-American Relations
Debre recalled with pleasure receiving the President several years ago in Paris when Debre was French Prime Minister./2/ The President replied that he would always be grateful for the opportunity that this meeting had afforded him. After saying how touched he was by the President's receiving him today, Debre stated that no matter what the difficulties that develop from time to time in our relations, the President could be assured that his actions would leave an important mark on the history of the United States and of the whole world. Mr. Johnson had been President, Debre continued, during one of the most difficult periods since the end of the last war. Those who are attached to political equilibrium in the world know how much they owe to the President. We are gong to continue to live in a difficult world. However, the coordinated action of the West will help us to prevent the worst from happening.
/2/Vice President Johnson visited Paris on April 6, 1961, to participate in ceremonies marking NATO's 10th Anniversary.
Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia
The whole of Europe was shaken by the Soviet intervention, Debre said, and peoples' minds are troubled by it. Debre referred to his discussion of the subject with the Secretary earlier in the week/3/ and noted with satisfaction that the French Government's analysis of the problem was similar to that of the United States.
/3/October 4. Their discussions were reported in telegram 6870 from USUN, October 4. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US)
The Middle East
Debre mentioned that he had also talked to the Secretary about the Middle East and expected to revert to the subject at the Secretary's luncheon for him tomorrow./4/ In some ways, Debre said, this area of the world will be the most pre-occupying for the coming year. It would appear indispensable for the big powers to have a common policy in this area to avoid any aggravation of the situation which might create dangerous tension.
/4/Their talks were summarized in telegram 259155 to Paris, October 21. (Ibid., POL 7 FR)
These are two areas (i.e., Europe and the Middle East), Debre commented, where it is most useful for us to compare notes and coordinate our views on a regular basis.
Viet-Nam
Debre said that he did not really need to speak of this problem. The President's "very fine and very great speech" of last March 31/5/ had opened the way for peace talks. Since then, Debre and others in his Ministry had been in regular contact with our representatives in Paris. The French followed their patient efforts with great interest.
/5/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 469-476.
US Domestic Policy
Debre observed that the French have always followed US domestic policy with great interest. The program of social renewal which the President had inaugurated and which has been largely successful, Debre said, would mark post-war American history. The President expressed a deep appreciation for these remarks.
The President's Views on US-French Relations
After recalling with pleasure and cordiality the time which Debre, as Prime Minister, had given him during his visit to Paris, the President said that he had come into office very much aware of the lack of agreement between our two governments on some of the basic questions confronting the peoples of the world. Despite this awareness, the President had proceeded in the belief that in any crisis that threatened the American people, France would always be with us. The President had tried, therefore, to minimize our differences and disagreements and to maintain the respect and affection for the French people in our country. The President could not forget the many times the United States and France had been shoulder to shoulder at the front, starting with the birth of our nation down to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. This awareness has helped him resist the temptation common to many leaders to air disagreements in public. The President hoped that his successor would find the bridge to traverse these differences so that our two great nations could come closer together. The President deeply regretted that he had not been able to do this.
The President fully realized that General de Gaulle had very strong views on some of these divisive subjects. The President thought, however, it was more important to have an understanding of the situation than to get into public arguments. General de Gaulle had some problems at home just as the President did in the United States. Regardless of these various disagreements, the President said, he had always recognized what France would be without General de Gaulle. In a troubled period calling for strong leadership, the General had provided it. The President appreciated this, even though our two governments had not always gone down the same road.
The President then referred to Ambassador Shriver's reports confirming the President's expectations that the Ambassador would have a warm reception in France. The President also noted favorably the Ambassador's hope that we could do more to improve our relations. The President expressed appreciation for the great efforts by the French people making it possible to conduct the Peace Talks in their country. The President regretted that we do not see the Viet-Nam problem in the same light but he had thought it best not to allow this disagreement to inflame our relations. We could not go to Cambodia or Poland for the talks, the President recalled, and recent events have made even clearer why Poland was not feasible. It is a tribute to the character of the French people, the President continued, that despite their views on the Viet-Nam war, they made it possible for us to hold the talks in their country. We have trusted in the fairness of the French people, the President added, and we are still hopeful about the talks.
Mr. Debre commented that there was no doubt that for the duration of the talks, the French Government would do what was necessary to assure a propitious material, political, and intellectual atmosphere for them.
Launching Apollo 7
It was almost 11 o'clock and the President invited Mr. Debre to watch the launching of Apollo 7 on the television. Debre said that it was a "very great date," and the President said that it was good to have our French friends with us on the occasion.
Debre's Concluding Remarks
When the official conversation resumed, Debre emphasized that there would never be the slightest difference between France and the United States regarding fundamental matters. In the face of attempts to establish dictatorship or other actions by forces hostile to liberty, France and the United States would always stand side by side. It is natural, Debre continued, that our interests and objectives do not always coincide, but the great advantage of friendship is that we can speak freely to each other. Debre reiterated that, during this visit to the United States, he was General de Gaulle's interpreter. He assured the President that his action had always been highly appreciated by the French Government. The latter regrets very much seeing him leave his huge responsibilities and deplores his departure. "But you leave," Debre said, "with our total admiration."
The President's Concluding Remarks
The President said he was grateful for these statements. He asked Mr. Debre to express his gratitude for General de Gaulle's help in connection with the Paris Peace Talks. The President hoped that the Foreign Minister would also convey to the General the gratitude of the American people for the way the General had treated the negotiations. The President also asked Mr. Debre to transmit to General de Gaulle the depth of the American people's feeling for France. The President was sorry that he had not done as much as he wanted to bring our two countries together, but he was convinced that he had done nothing to push us farther apart. The President mentioned his keen desire to revisit France after January 20. On his previous visits, he was obliged to be in a hurry, so he was looking forward to seeing France under less pressing circumstances. After January 20 he was never going to be in a hurry again. The President noted that the problems of youth and university turbulence are prominent in many countries, including ours, and that as President, he had tried his best to cope with them. He concluded that it would take a lot more than he has seen in his lifetime to convince him that France and the United States would not always be together.
86. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 25, 1968, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Drafted by Rostow. The meeting was held in Rostow's office.
SUBJECT
Franco-American Relations in the Aftermath of the Monetary Crisis
PARTICIPANTS
His Excellency Charles Lucet, Ambassador of France
Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Under Secretary Rostow called in Ambassador Lucet today to offer some personal and unofficial reflections on the trend of events in Europe, and particularly on the political meaning of the recent meetings in Bonn.
Rostow said he had never been able to understand one aspect of French European policy, namely the assumption that France could indefinitely control or manage the Germans. As the Ambassador knew, we strongly favored the Franco-German rapprochement, and tried never to do or say anything to weaken it. That relationship was fundamental to any hope of a European future. But to us the natural and prudent way to organize Europe was on the foundation of the Entente Cordiale, which we could support on the basis of parity from the background, within a strong NATO and OECD context. To Rostow, speaking personally, the political implication of the crisis was clear. Germany wished to assert its economic primacy.
We knew of course of French sensitivity to the thought that we treated Britain differently from France. The issue had been raised again recently in a discussion in Paris of our response to the German proposals for a commercial arrangement between the E.E.C. and the non-member countries of Europe. A French official had remarked that we hadn't reacted that way to EFTA. Rostow thought, speaking for himself, that in the right political setting, the issue of differential treatment of Britain and France, which was largely illusory, could be overcome, even in the nuclear field, without affecting NATO arrangements.
Lucet said he was returning to Paris today, and would discuss Rostow's reflections with M. Debre.
With regard to the monetary crisis, Lucet expressed great appreciation for American action and statements./2/ He said it had been a good week for Franco-American relations. Rostow said that M. Debr? could know that we had suggested last summer that the Germans consider revaluation,/3/ in order to safeguard the system, and head off pressure on the pound and the franc. We attached great importance to constructive action in response to paragraph 8 of the Bonn communiqu?./4/ If something positive could be done along those lines--a clearing account, perhaps--we could use the opportunity of this crisis as effectively as we had that of last March, when we liberated the banking system from the gold pool.
/2/A mounting German trade surplus created pressure on the French currency. On November 19 France cut its budget, and on November 23 President de Gaulle announced that France would not devalue the franc. In a national address the next day, de Gaulle blamed the budgetary problems on the spring unrest and announced further budget cuts. For text, see de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, Vol. 5, pp. 354-357. A November 24 message from President Johnson expressing confidence in the French currency helped stabilize international markets. For texts of messages exchanged between Presidents Johnson and de Gaulle, November 24, see Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1968, p. 628.
/3/Germany rejected proposals for a revaluation of its currency.
/4/For text of the communiqu?, November 22, see Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1968, pp. 627-628.
Rostow also suggested that this might be a good time for France to take a new look at the SDR proposals. Lucet said it was his impression that the French position on this question was not fixed. Rostow said that whatever happened, SDR's would be necessary because of the shortage of gold.
Lucet mentioned French interest in a new Bretton Woods monetary conference. Rostow said there was great interest in many places in such an idea. But what would such a conference accomplish? The Group of Ten could carry out the mandate of paragraph 8 of the Bonn communiqu&#eacute;and the IMF had already started an important study of the management of the new system, in which gold, SDR's and foreign exchange would all be used as reserves. We attached very great importance to the potentialities of that study. We were in favor of the continued reform of the system, but saw no need at the moment for a conference. We remain opposed to any consideration of changing the dollar price of gold. Lucet said he saw no reason for such a change.
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.