[document number not declassified]
Washington, June 26, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 1. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Sent to the State Department, ACSI, Navy Department, AFCIN, DIA, and NSA.
COUNTRY
Italy
DATE OF INFO
[date not declassified]
SUBJECT
Views of Senior Italian [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on the Present Political Situation
PLACE & DATE ACQ
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
REF
[1 document number not declassified] and AmEmbRome airgram A-1641, 26 May 1964/2/
/2/Documents 95 and 96.
SOURCE AND APPRAISAL
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] senior Italian [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] whose opinions, we believe, reflect fairly well the opinions generally prevailing within a wide segment of the Italian [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and whose views on occasions have been [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] given limited distribution at high levels of the Italian Government [1 line of source text not declassified] Appraisal--2, that the views of the Italian [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are accurately reported, and that these views reflect opinions probably generally prevailing in the Italian [1 line of source text not declassified]
[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]
1. The present economic and political situation is serious and whatever left-center formula is adopted, it will inevitably fail. The only solution will be an eventual overthrow of the present coalition government. There will be various attempts to form compromise governments (for example, Amintore Fanfani might be asked to form a new government), but these will be only temporizing measures and in fact will lead to further deterioration of the political situation.
2. Lamentably, the present political dilemma has been caused by the unwillingness in the past of the Christian Democratic Party (DC) to take effective action against the leftist forces and to resolve the social-economic problems which confronted Italy. An error commonly made by anti-Communist forces is to seek perfect solutions to counter the Communists in resolving political/economic problems. Greater progress will be achieved by countering or neutralizing the Italian Communist Party (PCI) on the specific issues which they project. Admittedly, however, it is now rather late in the game to adopt such measures; for this reason, the only lasting solution will come when the center forces decide to take bold action by reversing the present trend and returning to a center-liberal democratic government. Such eventuality would probably bring the battle to the piazza (into the streets) and result in some bloodshed. In the final analysis, however, such action may represent the only realistic means of extricating the Italians from the present creeping paralysis.
3. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] contended that the Italian populace is ripe for such a turn of events; the people are disenchanted and have little confidence in any of the present political leaders. What the people are looking for is the "white hope" who will lead them out of their present dilemma. In responding to a query as to who might qualify as such a leader, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that one would have to be created; as long as he represented a public image and was not compromised, the public would rally around him.
4. As for the role that would fall to the security forces which would have to maintain public order, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] indicated that General Giovanni de Lorenzo, Commandant of the Carabinieri Corps, represented the only force around whom the Italian security forces could rally. It was for this reason that General de Lorenzo had organized mobile task force battalions which could go into action in the event of a political emergency. The Italian officer said that General de Lorenzo did not intend to exceed his authority, but that he intended to control the military force which would neutralize any attempt at leftist pressure on the piazza, and that he would act as "king maker" in the event of a political overthrow. In this connection, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] noted that de Lorenzo has developed a direct relationship with President Antonio Segni and had won the latter's confidence. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] also commented that President Segni represents the only viable political figure in terms of public backing and constitutional authority, and that in a political emergency the current political personalities would fade rapidly.
5. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] iterated his view that the political situation would eventually be resolved in the piazza. He described the Italian public as bewitched by the leftist influences in Italy, and particularly by the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) which he branded as worse than the PCI because it projected the party as being "social-democratic" and was in a position to mislead non-Communist elements. Recognizing that individually there are well-intentioned PSI types, he said they had no important influence on major political or party issues. He termed Riccardo Lombardi as an effective leader of PSI forces and said it was quite clear where Lombardi's sympathies lay. The Italian officer felt it was time to break the spell on the Italian public--something which could be done only by eliminating all the forces and political personalities who have brought Italy to its present critical situation. This, he said, in turn could come about only by creating a fresh public image even at the risk of deciding the issue on the piazza--a public image which could return Italy to truly democratic ways and restore vitality and confidence in the country's faltering, financial/commercial structure.
6. Later on the same day [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the above views were discussed with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] who said that he concurred in them. In this connection this senior officer referred to an article in the 28 May 1964 issue of Il Borghese (a rightist periodical) written by Giani Preda entitled, "L'Ora Del 'Matto' " which promotes the idea that somewhere in Italy there is someone now unknown who will come to the fore and lead Italy out of its present dilemma. This senior officer suggested that for lack of other candidates for this part, it might still fall upon General de Lorenzo to fill this role, albeit temporarily, in a political crisis. This officer added that de Lorenzo probably did not harbor such ambitions, but was willing to play the role of "king maker", the "king" to be selected by responsible political forces. This [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] officer also said that de Lorenzo enjoyed the confidence of President Segni and that Segni represented the only political force who could rally the Italians beyond strictly political considerations. In addition, this officer also spoke highly of Treasury Minister Emilio Colombo saying that Colombo had the courage to challenge social pressures for concessions which could lead only to a further deterioration of the economic and political situation.
7. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] concluded by expressing hope that the present political situation may be resolved without going to the piazza, but doubted that it could be resolved by reforming it along center-left lines or by calling for new elections. Eventually, he said, a center type government would have to be instituted and leftist reaction on the piazza would have to be met with a show of force--something which General de Lorenzo was ready to provide if necessary.
8. Field dissem: none.
100. Telegram From the Commanding General, U.S. Army South European Task Force to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army in Europe/1/
Verona, June 26, 1964, 1810Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 1. Secret; Noforn. Repeated to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe in Paris and to DIA and the Department of State. Printed from the copy sent to the Department of State.
P-4-480. Warning sensitive sources and methods involved.
1. (S-NoForn) Source 916 reported 430th MI DET 23 Jun 64. Information received highly reliable informant, name not given due explosive nature information, that possible coup d'etat in Italy near future. Plan being drafted for national demonstration during next few months by rightist economists and politicians, i.e., liberals, monarchists and members Italian social movements (Movimento Social Italiano) (MSI). Desired result demonstration is to bring to Rome strong groups war veterans, war wounded, ex-prisoners war, etc. under pretext reawakening patriotic feelings Italian people create favorable atmosphere for ending current political trend in Italy and installing new order founded on traditional moral and political values of nation.
2. (S-NoForn) Individual selected coordinate plans for demonstration is Senator Randolfo Pacciardi, former leader Italian Republican Party, known to oppose current economic and political trend. Funds would be supplied by industrial and agricultural confederations. Appears Pacciardi could count on moral support and collaboration highly placed political rightists, armed forces, national police (Carabinieri) and leaders veterans associations.
3. (S-NoForn) The MSI agrees with planned demonstration but not in favor Pacciardi due past tenure office Defense Minister and could count on armed forces and Carabinieri. If demonstration should be opposed by counterdemonstration of extreme leftists, Carabinieri would be immediately called to action [garble] by armed forces. Armed forces would then assume law and order maintenance Italy. Local police cannot be counted on because politically controlled. President Segni aware this plan.
4. (S-NoForn) G2 comments:
A. Information pertaining to "rightist" plans for a coup d'etat in Italy was forwarded your headquarters by ltr dated 15 July 58 subject coup d'etat Italy (S) and SETAF message P0205 25 Feb 59.
B. On 14 Feb 59, info was received that an anti-Communist committee had allegedly been formed to ensure that the Communists would not succeed in gaining power in Italy. The committee is reportedly composed of Italian parliamentarians, predominantly Christian Democrat rightists, monarchists and Italian Liberal Party members, as well as Italian general staff officers. Financial backing for the organization is reportedly to come from several well known Italian industrialists.
C. Most recent information concerning subject is contained OARMA Rome report 2850034564 28 May 64, subject Lt Gen de Lorenzo's comments on security and political subject, as follows:
"Randolfo Pacciardi's Democratic Union for the Second Republic was not taken seriously by Italy's security and military leaders. Pacciardi had some good ideas and was honest and in earnest, but his [omission in the source text] attract all kinds of people and to draw everybody in his movement who had a grudge against the present Italian Republic, from the extreme left to the extreme right. This motley group of people had no political or ideological cohesion; their only common denominator was dissatisfaction with the status quo. Particularly weak and uninfluential were old ex-military officers who had flocked to Pacciardi's banner. Pacciardi's movement will end like Giannini's Qualunquismo of the late 1940's." Copy of above cited report is being mailed to your office attn: PDN-CI.
101. Airgram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State/1/
A-1828
Rome, June 30, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 IT. Confidential. Drafted by Barnsdale and cleared by Peters. Repeated to Moscow.
SUBJECT
The "Democratic" Italian Communist Party--New Bait for the Old Popular Front Trap
Summary
The Italian Communist Party (PCI) continues to create interest and some confusion with its claims to be democratic, and to be prepared to step down, once in power, if its popular mandate were lost. Most recently, this line has been taken up in a major pronouncement by PCI leftwing Pietro Ingrao. Careful study of Ingrao's statements, however, leads to the conclusion that there has been no meaningful change in the PCI's revolutionary, totalitarian ideology. But Ingrao does appear to be emerging as one of the hardest running potential successors of Togliatti, with the ability to appeal not only to a very broad range of views within the PCI, but also to left-wing non-Communists who favor working class unity. The Embassy concludes that Ingrao has talent in appearing to be "all things to all people" and that as such he is a potent weapon in the PCI arsenal. While most Italians do not accept Ingrao's or other Communist claims to be democratic and trustworthy, a few leaders of public opinion welcome the Communist line and interpret it to be significant, at least in part. To this extent the PCI line has enjoyed some success and is able to make difficult the progress of the non-Communist Italian left toward modern concepts of political democracy.
I. Introduction
Much interest has been shown recently in Italy, particularly by left-wing intellectuals and by the left and center-left political parties, in what is frequently taken to be a slow and laborious effort by the Italian Communist Party to seek a more democratic and "Italian" course of development for the Party. A careful reading of the many PCI statements on the subject of intra-Party and parliamentary democracy leads inevitably to the conclusion that the symptoms of change within the PCI relate to the continuing debate as to the merits of the alternative "hard" and "soft" lines of action open to the Party; the international dispute within the Communist world movement; the question of leadership and succession within the PCI; and even the question of taking different leadership views to the PCI cadres, i.e., the question of factionalism, by any other name. Unsurprisingly, Italian Communist statements do not reveal any tendency whatsoever toward democracy in any meaningful sense of the term, despite the fact that some success has been achieved by the PCI in its long term effort to present itself as a responsible, respectable and democratic party in Italy.
The Embassy has carefully reviewed the major developments in the ideological debate currently in progress among the various elements of the political left in Italy, and endeavors in this dispatch to focus upon those significant documents and pronouncements necessary to assess the PCI position, and upon the general effect and importance of the PCI efforts in this field. Part II of this report examines the PCI claim to be a democratic organization. Part III offers an interpretation of the relationship between the current propaganda line and Party needs. Part IV discusses aspects of the impact of the PCI line on the Italian political scene, and the Embassy's conclusions are included in Part V.
[Here follows Section II, a 4-page discussion of PCI public statements on the issue of democracy.]
III. An Interpretation of the Immediate Aim of Current PCI Efforts
The Problems Within the Party
As has been reported in detail elsewhere, much frustration has built up within the PCI as a result of the failure to prevent the formation of the present center-left government, the steady decline in Party membership over the last decade, and the reflected dissensions of the current dispute within the international Communist movement. (See A-1032 of February 14, and A-1385 of April 7, 1964.)/2/ These frustrations, and the continued existence of the center-left threat, increase the impatience of those Communists who favor a harder, more aggressive line. These "hard-liners" believe that if the Party is held on its current line it will ultimately incur the electoral losses augured by the unmistakable signs of impotence revealed in the PCI struggle to prevent the development of PSI autonomy and the center-left. The "hard-liners" oppose any tendency toward "right-reformism," and are generally categorized as being on the PCI left, although sympathy for left-wing (Chinese) views in the international movement is not necessarily implied by left-wing intra-Party positions.
/2/Neither printed. (Ibid., POL 12-3 IT)
On the other hand, the PCI rightwing recognizes the danger that an overly aggressive PCI program could alarm the protest voters who have supported the PCI in increasing numbers over the years, and could push the country as well as the government to the right. The PCI rightwing points out that the fate of the Greek Communist Party was avoided by the PCI due to the wise (and very cautious) middle-of-the-road leadership of Togliatti, and is convinced that further gains can be made by the PCI on the present course.
The natural result of the middle-of-the-road approach of Togliatti, however, has been the falling away of cadres on both the left and the right of the Party, and a disastrous 65% decline in the membership of the Italian Federation of Communist Youth (FGCI). It is generally accepted that the FGCI could regain some of its lost ground with a more militant, bluntly revolutionary line which would have a definite appeal among young radically militant left-wing intellectuals, or alternatively that gains could be made with an honestly democratic program which would have to be based on the junking of the authoritarian Leninist concept of democratic centralism. There is little the FGCI can do as long as it is denied either course, except to blame the Party (as Achille Occhetta did at the PCI Conference on Organization in March) and hope that the FGCI is not a bellwether for the PCI. In recent weeks there has been some evidence of a more aggressive and intransigent PCI stance, particularly in trade union activity, but as long as Togliatti remains firmly committed to what amounts to a popular front line, and at the same time to the principle of democratic-centralism, changes in PCI tactics and changes in PCI propaganda lines must be limited accordingly. In fact, on the eve of the PCI Conference on Organization in March, the Party seemed to be on dead center, in a situation which clearly called for vigorous leadership to give the Party spirit, conviction and direction.
Ingrao's Solution
At the Party Conference (see A-1385 of April 7), signs of discontent and impatience were much in evidence. Several speakers vigorously criticized Party shortcomings and leadership methods, calling for more aggressive PCI opposition to the center-left government, and for more freedom of discussion within the Party. The most important of these speakers was Ingrao, the acknowledged leader of the leftwing PCI hardliners. Although Togliatti rejected the demands for change, the impatient comrades (all on the left of the PCI spectrum) established an image as innovators, struggling to modernize the standpat Togliatti line. Since the Conference, much has been heard from Ingrao, whose activities seem directed toward creating an image of a vigorous young reformer, who offers the Party more action and more internal democracy, and who sincerely assures the other Italian parties that the PCI is a democratic and reliable potential working partner.
Ingrao is one of the likely successors to Togliatti, and he is a hard-running candidate. He is relatively young (49), he is a reformer, and he does offer the Party more action. Beyond this, the image he and the Party seek for him is credible only to the careless. As is set forth above, even Ingrao's own words, if accepted without question, do not make him out to be a democrat in any meaningful sense. Sources acquainted with Ingrao have also indicated doubt to the Embassy, based on estimates of his personality, that Ingrao would espouse the concept of greater freedom of discussion within the Party once his own views and his own leadership were established.
On the subject of internal Party democracy, Ingrao avoids talking about democratic centralism by name, but is bluntly opposed to intra-Party factions, thus agreeing with other Party spokesmen who maintain that "factionalism" would be the inevitable and undesirable result of abandoning democratic-centralism. Moreover, his Conference position in favor of the need for "a way in which the [Party]/3/ militants can make decisions, and not just participate in a debate," (as quoted in Il Giorno, March 14, 1964) has turned out to be as circumscribed as his support for political rights in the socialist state. In his April 25 Rinascita article he commented: "I find that often discussion is not efficacious and the political organization doesn't really decide because [the discussion] is based on reports that present again, without change, the entire situation, the entire judgment, the entire political position of the party (underscoring by Ingrao),/4/ when instead it would be more appropriate to highlight and put in discussion those developments, innovations, and corrections that really add or take away or modify some part of the analysis, line, or tactic of the party, rendering more evident and explicit the modifications and the developments and in this way asking the political organization to really decide . . ." In other words, discussion within the Party should be ample, but it should be focused on the improvement of the Party analysis, line, or tactic, and not sufficiently wide ranging to question basic Party positions.
/3/All brackets are in the source text.
/4/Printed here in italics.
Nonetheless, through Ingrao the Party appears to be taking a stand which is intended to be all things to all people. To the impatient left the PCI offers a young, vigorous and hard-boiled left-wing leader. To non-Communist intellectuals and left-wing political leaders, Ingrao offers a PCI position that includes "full recognition" of "the essence of democracy." To the PCI right and Togliatti possibilismo elements, Ingrao offers capable leadership in the Party drive for a popular front which, without Ingrao, would have less and less appeal to the PCI left. There is no room for non-Communist illusions, either with regard to the things Ingrao really stands for, or with regard to the real political potential of the formula he is developing for a PCI panacea.
IV. The Impact of the PCI "Democratic" Line
The General View
A large percentage of politically conscious Italians probably reject, unread, the long and involved PCI tracts in the Party theoretical journals, and perhaps seldom read any representative cross section of the newspaper and periodical comment on discussions as esoteric as the PCI view of the relationship between democracy and socialism. To many, the voice of the PCI is known to be unreliable anyway, and there seems little point in laboring through the dialectic to come once again to that conclusion. To others, particularly left-wing non-Communist politicians and professional political analysts, the PCI line on democracy and socialism is interesting, even encouraging and welcome as a debate with the comrades, but hardly convincing. Many of these important molders of Italian political opinion are sound and unequivocal in their assessments. On the question of political liberties, Avanti (January 16, 1964) noted that the Communists have long been prepared to grant, once in power, all the political liberties except the possibility to remove them from power. Concerning the PCI claim to believe in a multiparty system, the moderate left-wing Critica Sociale (February 5, 1964) cited Khrushchev's recent discussions with Guy Mollet, in which Khrushchev asserted the other parties could co-exist in a socialist state where the Communists are in power. Khrushchev's illustrations--Agrarian Istvan Kobi, Socialdemocrats Cyrankiewicz, Grotewohl, Fierlinger, Szakistas, etc.--were judged by Critica Sociale to be illustrative of Khrushchev's well known sense of humor, and of the inanity of the PCI claim. On the subject of a minority becoming the majority, in a Communist state, Vita (February 5, 1964) also cited Khrushchev speaking to Mollet, when the question of an opposition was brushed aside by Khrushchev, saying "We will not go backwards"--language remarkably similar to that of Togliatti on the same subject.
By and large, non-Communist politically conscious elements in Italy are not confused by the Communist claim to democracy, whether they reject it out of hand, as do the Italian conservatives and extreme right, or whether they welcome the debate and give the devil his due, as is the case among the non-Communist left.
Wishful Thinkers, Dupes, and Politicians too Clever by Half
Unfortunately, the seeds cast by the PCI do not all fall on barren ground. For various reasons, the Communist claims to democracy and their efforts toward working class unity in a popular front are appealing to some political and intellectual leaders whose opinions in Italy carry weight. These include intellectuals of the stripe of Ernesto Rossi whose experiences seem to teach them that fascism is the real and enduring threat to liberty, and who hopefully see among the Communists democratic tendencies quite unapparent to other observers (see A-1435 of April 17, 1964)./5/ They include Marxists who are not alarmed by the dialectic of the PCI and the sophistry of Ingrao; who may be inclined, after all, to recognize "the profound difference in quality" between progressive and conservative forces. And they include PSI personalities who cherish the understandable conceit that the principal difference between the PSI and the PCI is that the PSI is several years ahead of the Communists in coming to terms with modern political realities, and that the PCI must follow along and therefore is following along on the path of democracy.
/5/Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 IT)
These troublesome traces of political or ideological confusion are always at hand for the Communists to attempt to form into unwittingly helpful political opinion, and the PCI all too frequently is assisted in their effort by politicians with a particular axe to grind. The unconscious assistance from the extreme right and the assistance from dupes such as Christian Democrat Giorgio La Pira need no comment. The case of the PSI's Riccardo Lombardi, however, is more curious and more tragic. Opinions vary, with the interests of the observer, as to whether Lombardi's confusing use of the PSI organ Avanti represents an attempt to play a necessary role in holding on to that part of the PSI electoral base which is to the left of the present government, or whether Lombardi's game is to hold himself apart from Nenni's followers in case the fortunes of the center-left government fall and pull the Nenniani down also. Lombardi's desire to control the Socialist Party, and his reluctance or inability to adjust his attitudes to the Socialist shift from opposition to governmental responsibility, are other facets of his complicated personality. vis-á-visthe Communists, Lombardi is always willing to continue the dialogue, to hold out by implication the possibility of eventual cooperation with the PCI at some further stage in the Communist evolution as he sees it, and to ignore in large part his Party's judgement that the PCI is an undemocratic element to be isolated on the left. Rome's A-1628 of May 22, 1964/6/ sets forth the Lombardi view of the prospects for the unification of the whole working class in Italy, to be accomplished by working persistently and patiently for the type of evolution in the PCI that has already occurred in Lombardi's own party. Lombardi sees this taking place through a series of splits in the PCI and the gradual isolation of the old guard, beginning with Togliatti. In the place of his party's view, that the PCI should be isolated and its electorate captured by the democratic left, Lombardi apparently holds the view that PCI "dogmatists" should be isolated, but that truly "progressive" PCI elements could be absorbed by the democratic parties. Thus Lombardi envisions a Marxist party absorbing and digesting a Marxist-Leninist party; the sheep to devour the wolves. Lenin's comment "Who-Whom"? has not helped Lombardi. On the contrary, Lombardi's own contribution to Socialist confusion helps explain why the splits usually occur in the Socialist Party, rather than in the Marxist-Leninist PCI. Meanwhile, Lombardi and the "maximalist" group he brought with him to Avanti propagate the strange concept of the existence within the PCI of good "innovators" such as Pietro Ingrao, and bad "Stalinists" such as Togliatti--an assessment which sheds no light at all on the situation as it really exists today. Unfortunately, this kind of thinking demonstrates the state of ideological confusion that has predominated in the official Socialist organ, Avanti, since Lombardi assumed control of the paper last February.
/6/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 12 IT)
V. Conclusions
The situation within the Italian Communist Party is one of stress and is indicative of change. The indications are, however, that the changes underway reflect largely the imperative need of the PCI to adapt itself to the basically perilous situation in which it finds itself in Italy today, in confrontation with the center-left government. While pressures toward democratic reform without doubt exist at the base of the Party, the Party leaders publicly claim, and there is every reason to believe, that the Party is and will remain Leninist, internally authoritarian, and orthodox in its revolutionary intentions vis-á-visthe Italian state. Left-wing non-Communists thus hope in vain that the pressures from 1.7 million Italian Communists, who do not in any case understand Marxism-Leninism, can induce basic ideological changes among a leadership which is well trained, capable, and determined in its adherence to revolutionary and totalitarian doctrine. The Embassy also regards with reserve the view that the efforts of Ingrao and the "innovators" are the beginning of the end for democratic-centralism and authoritarian control within the PCI. On the contrary, Ingrao may have given the Party the solution to the knotty problem of how Party unity can be forged, after Togliatti goes, from the disparate elements in the right and the left wings of the Party.
The political blend of a left-wing reputation, a welcome call for grass roots participation in PCI decisions, and vigorous support of the PCI popular front tactic, make Ingrao a considerable threat to Italian democracy, and the threat is as yet unrecognized by some important democratic left-wing leaders. The majority of Italians, including the Italian leftwing, recognize that the Communist threat is unchanged. Nevertheless, a small but influential element on the left will continue hopefully to seek indications of PCI evolution toward democracy, and the wish will continue to be father to the thought. The new, different, democratic Italian Communism is a myth, but it will continue to impede the slow course of non-Communist left-wing Italian political thought toward democracy and away from the narrow class concepts which urge unity of the working class, i.e., unity with the Communists, and which therefore furnish grist to the Communist popular front mill.
[Here follows "A Short Bibliography of Significant Articles on the PCI Attitude Toward Democracy."]
For the Ambassador:
W. Fraleigh
Counselor of Embassy
102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy/1/
Washington, August 7, 1964, 11:13 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 IT. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Schaetzel; cleared in EUR, S/MF, and by Klein of the White House staff; and approved by Tyler.
333. Re Embtel 270./2/ In course two informal discussions Italian Ambassador somewhat confirmed information given you by Malfatti. (We agree about the delicacy this information and extreme importance that it be closely held.) Fenoaltea told Tyler Nenni has given "silent" consent. Malfatti report suggests stronger PSI position. Does Embassy have any idea as to how Italian decision will be reflected in government actions?
/2/Telegram 270 from Rome, July 30, reported that during negotiations for the formation of the second Moro government, the parties agreed that "Italy would subscribe and participate in MLF." (Ibid.)
In answer to our probes Fenoaltea seemed to say that now Moro government would not have to commit itself to the project prior to British elections. Previously Fenoaltea, as strong supporter MLF, expressed great concern that Labor victory in October would mean indefinite deferral Italian decision to participate while they awaited British action.
Fenoaltea will be in Rome for week's consultation prior holiday. He will presumably explore Italian position vis-à-vis MLF with particular reference to European clause and inner group. He raised both points with us and was given standard response. We particularly emphasized advantage not pressing these issues at this time in Paris Working Group.
Quite apart from leg up given MLF by Italian government decision, PSI support of this position seems to us of great significance. In your view does this mean irrevocable commitment PSI to center left government and acceptance defection Lombardi faction?
Rusk
103. Airgram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State/1/
A-176
Rome, August 14, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 IT. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Barnsdale. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels for the Embassy and BUSEC, London, Luxembourg, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, and The Hague.
SUBJECT
The July Rumors of an Italian Coup d'Etat
Summary
The spate of press comment following a gloom-and-doom article on the Italian political situation, published in Hamburg's Die Welt on June 23, together with the clamorous activity of the Italian extreme right and extreme left during the recent governmental crisis, were followed by rumors in early July that a coup d'etat was imminent. The background of these rumors, and the degree to which such speculation could be realistic, is discussed in this airgram.
The Die Welt article, apparently written by its resident Rome correspondent, Friedrich Meichsner, was first picked up in Italy by the Florence daily newspaper La Nazione (independent conservative) on June 24. From the La Nazione summary, it appeared that the Die Welt article foresaw the inevitable coming to power of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), if present trends in Italy continued. The German newspaper article apparently also discounted the feasibility of a sharp turn to the right, which would only result in a Communist victory in the end. The only solution, according to La Nazione's account of the Die Welt story, was a continuation of the center-left policy of social reform, but under the guidance of other, more competent hands than those of then-incumbent center-left government, and Die Welt urged that European encouragement and economic support be given any Italian effort in such a direction. The Die Welt article saw the Italian President, conservative Christian Democrat Antonio Segni, as the only man able to step into the breach, and called for "concrete and appropriate" steps, within and outside of Italy, to save the country.
This apparent call for a Gaullist solution to Italy's current difficulties was widely and very unfavorably reported in a broad range of the Italian press from the conservative to the Communist end of the political spectrum. Thus, while objecting to the exhortatory message in the Die Welt article, the Italian press gave it heavy play. Within three days of the publication of the Die Welt piece and the Nazione playback, quite sensational reflections of the original article and of the Italian interest therein were appearing in the local press. For example, on June 26, the Christian Democrat daily of Rome Il Popolo picked up the following from the Koelner Stadt-Anzieger:
"A state of alarm rule in Italy. Even in Government circles, there is a frightening pessimism with regard to domestic political developments. Inflation, corruption, and criminality in progressive increase erode the faith of Italians in their country. Extreme right-wing groups are already preparing for a coup d'etat, with the support of military officers in active service."
Similarly bleak assessments of Italy's current course were reproduced from the French press, together with an alleged comparison of the Italian situation with conditions in the Fourth Republic in 1958 attributed to De Gaulle himself. At the same time, while the four-party negotiations for a new coalition accord seemed to hang on dead center, it was made known that President Segni had received (on July 13) the President of the Senate, Cesare Merzagora, next in succession to the President of the Republic, for the second time during the crisis, and that the President had also received General Aldo Rossi, the Chief of Staff of the Italian Armed Forces (on July 14), and Prime Minister-designate Aldo Moro (on July 15). In the circumstances, these meetings encouraged further speculation in increasingly dramatic and even ominous overtones.
Finally, more contemplative articles as well as potboilers appeared in several weekly reviews (L'Espresso, Folla, Epoca), keeping the subject alive and playing upon the earlier rumors that a coup d'etat was imminent.
The Situation Behind the Rumors
Behind the recent crisis and the talk of a coup d'etat lies a postwar Italian history of tremendous efforts to raise a democratic seedling in the stony ground left by the Fascist era and the disillusionment and violence of the war. This postwar struggle to create a viable democratic political and economic system has been further complicated by the persistent efforts of the parties of the extreme right and left to discredit the democratic system and the men dedicated to its service. Despite the progress of the postwar years, and the Italian "economic miracle," the failure of the governing parties to come to grips with many remaining economic and social problems has led to a small but consistent increase in the electoral strength of the Communists, a steady attrition of Christian Democrat (DC) strength, and seemingly growing public impatience with shortcomings which have perhaps in part represented inherent national failures, but which have been understandably laid at the political door of the center parties so long in power in Italy.
The impatience of the public with the present government by party bureaucracies, or "partitocrazia," has found expression recently not only on the right and left extremes, but also by more respectable elements such as Randolfo Pacciardi (see Rome's A-1581 of May 14, 1964),/2/ erstwhile leader of the Republican Party (PRI) and well known anti-Fascist, who now rejects the present system and has called for the creation of a "Second Republic" in terms which could also describe a Gaullist solution.
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 12 IT)
Additionally, both ideological and political leadership problems have beset the democratic Italian parties in recent years, particularly the DC, due to differing political interpretations of the significance of the growing left-wing vote, and consequent steps necessary to recoup at least part of it into the democratic area. A major complication was added when the Socialists (PSI) led by Pietro Nenni after long and difficult efforts, moved far enough away from the influence of the Italian Communists to be accepted, after bitter factional leadership struggles within the DC, into the controversial Italian center-left government experiment of the past few years. The immediate significance, quickly made apparent, was that instead of just one major governing political party torn by internal strife, Italy became the proud owner of two. And, despite the encouraging note struck by the reform-oriented program of the first Moro Government, internal party problems and the pressure of the serious economic situation combined to saddle a most unimpressive record on the first center-left government, which fell on June 27.
Seldom was there a time like this one in postwar Italian history when so many diverse elements could agree, rightly or wrongly, that the record of democratic government in Italy had left much to be desired. Any external call for a Gaullist solution was certain to receive attention in view of the internal situation which set the stage for it. Against this kind of background, we can examine the coup rumors and try to evaluate them.
Factors Militating Against a Coup
The practical factors operating against a coup were more impressive, however, than the psychological factors which suggested the possibility of a coup to Die Welt.
As far as concerns a coup from the right, there is a long Italian military tradition of refraining from extra-legal action to influence or control the government. Additionally, there is a deeply rooted anti-Fascist sentiment in Italy which would make popular support extremely unlikely in the absence of careful preparation of public opinion by respectable leadership elements. Such preparation would have to take place in circumstances much more discouraging to democratic opinion than the situation existing at the end of June. And any attempt by rightist elements to seize power in Italy without the overwhelming support of public opinion could not be successful under present conditions without widespread violence and possibly outright civil war.
On the left, the leadership of the strong and well-organized Italian Communist Party (PCI) is well aware that a Communist coup de main would unify domestic and foreign opposition and thus probably turn the attempt into a disaster similar to the abortive Greek Communist postwar attempt under "General Markos"; which vicarious lesson Togliatti has publicly cited for the benefit of Party militants. The current status of readiness, the political reliability, and the heavier weapons made available in recent years to the Italian Carabinieri underline Togliatti's point. PCI caution would militate against taking the initiative for a coup d'etat unless reaction from Italy's allies were unlikely, and unless reaction at home could be quickly and quietly controlled.
However, Italian reaction to a coup from the right without overwhelming popular support would hand over to the PCI a broad range of democratic anti-Fascist elements of the public. The PCI would then either have to join hands with any spontaneous reaction, to meet force with force, or abandon a popular cause in circumstances which would destroy whatever image the PCI has in Italy as a defender of freedom, an inflexibly anti-Fascist force, vanguard and protector of the working class, etc. The bold action the PCI has mounted on previous occasions, when moving with the mainstream of public opinion, leaves little doubt as to the likely PCI decision in such a situation. While unlikely to resort to a coup which the public would oppose, the PCI would almost certainly take to the barricades, with popular support and approval, in reaction to any coup from the right.
In short, there is no power vacuum or dangerous imbalance of power in Italy. On the contrary, there is a relatively stable balance of forces. A coup from the left would have little chance of success, and it is all too clear that an attempted coup from the right would be likely to lead to violence or civil war which might present the unwelcome alternatives of Communism or, as a large segment of the population would see it, "Fascism". The situation in Italy does not favor adventure. On the contrary, democratic leadership elements know from past experience that they would have to react quickly to any ill-considered move on the political right, or be prepared to witness a popular reaction ready-made for Communist exploitation.
A Gaullist Formula
One possible course, toward a Gaullist solution which might avoid the instability almost certain to follow any coup de main, was outlined in an article by Livio Pesce, carried in the Epoca issue of July 12, following a line of thought generally attributed to Randolfo Pacciardi. This possible course would have to be initiated by the President (as suggested in fact by Die Welt), and would carefully exploit the framework of the Italian Constitution, thus presenting the natural opposition with the alternatives of acquiescence, or acceptance of the onus and consequent political isolation which would stem from resorting first to the threat of force.
At a point of "insoluble" crisis, as Epoca puts it, the President could appoint (under Article 92 of the Constitution) a Prime Minister and Cabinet without reference to the party politicians; a Government of "national unity" composed of "personalities of authority, sensible and patriotic, ready to work with the President . . . for the good of the nation." This of course would be entirely constitutional. But Article 94 says that "the Government must have the confidence of both Chambers [of the Parliament]."/3/ As Epoca resolved the problem, the President would have to carry Parliament with him by "a solemn and dramatic appeal to the parties and to the nation; an appeal to the people for the salvation of the country." A combination of an appeal from the President, the image projected by his Prime Minister-designate, and the lack of acceptable non-violent alternatives would then have to carry the day and also provide the political consensus for an orderly transition to whatever new forms were envisaged as the next step.
/3/Brackets in the source text.
All this is familiar and required little imagination in view of recent French history. However, it does not fit present circumstances in Italy.
Second Thoughts After the Crisis
A new look at the alarmist speculation was taken by several commentators after the crisis had passed, once the new four-party accords were achieved on July 18, on the basis of which the second Moro government was subsequently formed. Pietro Nenni, in an Avanti editorial, maintained that the alternative to the new center-left government would have been an emergency government, of "disinterested servants of the state," which in reality would have been a government of the right, with a Fascist-agrarian-industrialist content. Ugo La Malfa in La Voce Repubblicana noted (on July 27) that after the center-left had been re-constituted, it became easy to read assessments which dismissed lightly the earlier talk of a coup. But, La Malfa observed, the maneuvers and counter-maneuvers in the dramatic atmosphere of the crisis were well designed to draw the DC to the right, toward a reactionary adventure. The extreme right-wing satirical weekly Il Borghese apparently felt that a Gaullist formula had been within reach, and the July 23 issue strongly criticized President Segni for "betraying" the country's faith in him by re-designating Aldo Moro to form a (second) center-left government, and for failing to remove the Communist threat in Italy as De Gaulle did in France in 1958.
Other heads saw the matter differently, once the crisis was resolved. Giovanni Spadolini, of Bologna's conservative Resto del Carlino, owned by the same financial group that controls La Nazione, which started the original flurry of articles, criticized Nenni for his statement that the alternative to a new center-left government had been an authoritarian reactionary government which was ready to be launched. According to Spadolini, there had been too much talk of authoritarian solutions. Italy "is neither Bolivia nor Santo Domingo." President Segni had no choice but to call on Moro to form a government, and in the event of failure by Moro Segni would have had to explore alternate democratic solutions before, as a last resort, calling elections. Spadolini expressed full confidence in President Segni as "the supreme guarantee of constitutional and democratic legality," and dismissed the criticisms from the right and left as "absurd and senseless." From the other side of the political spectrum, moderately left-wing (left-Radical) l'Espresso joined Spadolini in rejecting Nenni's pessimistic view and the rumors of a possible coup, saying flatly (on August 2) that "the hypothesis of a coup d'etat had no possibility of realization;" that the far right continues to hopefully cultivate the idea, but that their hopes are not soundly based in the realities of Italian circumstances.
Summary and Conclusions
The Embassy believes that Spadolini and l'Espresso are clearly the better Monday morning quarterbacks in their assessments of the situation as it was and is, and we agree that there is little likelihood of a coup d'etat in Italy at this stage of its post-war history. This is not to deny that cries of dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the system in Italy have become louder in recent years as a result of the failure of a succession of post-war governments to move quickly towards reducing inefficiency and corruption in government, to meet the pace of increasing Italian expectations, and to contain the increasing electoral voting threat on the left. Talk of a "Second Republic" has been stimulated mildly by the Pacciardi movement, but the situation is not as yet such as to create a consensus prepared to reject a system which has served many diverse elements well during the post-war years. In these circumstances, the tradition and reliability of the armed forces, the strong anti-Fascist popular sentiment, the balance of forces of political elements with the country, the caution and lack of capability of the PCI to mount a quick and clean-cut coup, and the absence of a "strong man" to attract the popular imagination constitute formidable obstacles to any illegal seizure of power. If public disillusionment continues to grow, as it will in the long run if the ability of democratic parties to govern and improve economic conditions is not firmly asserted, conditions favorable to a Gaullist solution could develop. In the absence of the necessary conditioning of broad segments of the public which would be essential not only to a Gaullist solution, but also to a coup from the left or the right, there remains only the more remote possibility of an ill-conceived attempt, without the elements of success, but which could lead to violence with political consequences. There has been no evidence of any militant dissatisfaction from any quarter both strong enough and rash enough to stake all on such a forlorn hope.
For the Chargé d'Affaires Ad Interim:
Alan W. Ford
First Secretary
104. Letter From the Ambassador to Italy (Reinhardt) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler)/1/
Rome, November 12, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Italian Desk Files: Lot 68 D 436, Ambassador Reinhardt. Secret; Official-Informal.
Dear Bill:
I want to write a word to you regarding the way we see developments moving in Italian policy toward Communist China.
As you know, and as we have reported repeatedly, Saragat has assured me that in the forthcoming UN General Assembly Italy will support the United States view that the Chinese representation issue is an "important question" and that Italy will not vote for seating Communist China at this session of the General Assembly. I have no doubt that this will remain the Italian position--for this coming session.
It is important to bear in mind that these assurances have carefully been limited to the forthcoming session and it has been pointed out that they do not necessarily apply to the future beyond that time. These assurances have also been given against a background of repeated reminders that Italy is convinced the time is rapidly approaching when a new look must be taken at its policy regarding Chinese recognition. In our conversations with responsible Italian officials here there are also constant allusions to alleged rising internal economic and political pressures calling for a recognition of Communist China. Although we can and have demonstrated repeatedly by statistics that the economic advantages to Chinese Communist recognition are largely illusory, it must be admitted that there are still some pressures nonetheless from Italian business and industrial concerns favoring Chinese Communist recognition. The main issue-and here the matter is much more complex and much less susceptible to statistical refutation, is the internal political pressure from many quarters, particularly from the PSI, for recognition, as well as a general and growing feeling that Italy, by continuing to support the United States position, is on a slippery slope and is backing, without conviction, a losing proposition.
We have come into possession of information in strictest confidence from a source which I consider to be completely reliable concerning Saragat's conversation with Spaak during Spaak's last visit here. Reportedly there were the following significant elements in the conversation:
(1) Both Saragat and Spaak referred to growing strong internal pressures favoring Communist Chinese recognition. Spaak is said to have told Saragat that in Belgium only he, Spaak, is keeping Belgium on its present course.
(2) Both Saragat and Spaak agreed that, although Italy and Belgium will support the United States position at the forthcoming UN General Assembly, both countries have "decided" that they will recognize Communist China in the not too distant future. It was not excluded that one or both countries might make explanatory statements to this general effect in connection with the positions they might be called upon to take in the General Assembly this year. It was noted that Canada might be in a similar position and should be consulted privately.
(3) Both Saragat and Spaak agreed that the changes in Italian and Belgian policy would not be taken without full and frank prior conversations with the United States. Both agreed they wished to avoid acting in the manner in which de Gaulle had carried out his change of policy.
(4) The way in which the conversation flowed from a discussion by Saragat of Italy's intention to support and participate in the MLF to a discussion immediately thereafter of the attitude of Nenni and the Italian Socialists favoring recognition of Communist China led some among the Belgians to conclude that Saragat may have been thinking that Italian government agreement to recognize Communist China would be the price for Italian Socialist acceptance of MLF.
(5) Spaak urged that the United States should be informed privately at once of the Italian and Belgian "decision" to recognize Communist China. Saragat, on the other hand, argued that, while, of course, the United States must be informed as soon as possible and full discussions should be held with the United States before any action were taken, the matter should not be broached even privately with the United States until after the United States presidential elections.
I have noted from a number of reporting cables various straws in the wind which point in the direction of the information I have just set forth. Now, Malfatti has told us directly that Italy is rethinking its position as we have reported in our telegram 1291./2/ My purpose in writing to you is to bring to your attention--and through you to the attention of others whom you may consider appropriate--what I consider to be authentic information indicating the lines along which I believe Italian policy is developing. I doubt that the Italians will be responsive much longer to United States exhortations and arguments on this subject. While wishing to take their contemplated action in such a manner so as to minimize the damage to the United States and the strain on US-Italian relations, I believe that the Italians have taken a decision in principle to move on this matter. To the extent that they are able to do so in coordination with Belgium and possibly Canada, they will be strengthened in their resolve to move forward with this change in policy./3/
/2/Dated November 11. (Ibid., Central Files 1964-66, POL CHICOM IT)
/3/In a November 26 letter to Reinhardt, Tyler commented: "I think your analysis leaves little doubt but that in the longer run, the Italian Government intends to modify its policy. . . . We would hope to be consulted, not merely informed, on this matter." (Ibid.)
I believe that Saragat is sincere about this; but I know that he also expects us not to make any changes in United States policy with regard to Chinese recognition or UN admission without informing the Italian government about it at the very earliest possible time. He is particularly sensitive about this possibility, however remote, since he fears that if Italy were to be taken by surprise by any such US policy shift, the Italian government would be laid open to criticism from the Italian Left of lagging behind "even the United States" on this issue.
With best wishes,
Sincerely yours,
Fred
105. Letter From Livingston T. Merchant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler)/1/
Washington, January 14, 1965.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 IT-US. No classification marking. Tyler wrote the following note on the letter on January 19: "I called Livie and thanked him for his thoughtful note."
Dear Bill:
This is a brief report of a lunch I had alone on January 12 with my old friend Sergio Fenoaltea, the Italian Ambassador, on his invitation. He wanted to talk about the MLF. I told him I had been completely out of touch with developments for over two months. Nevertheless, he pursued the topic with pertinacity and dolor. He said he was most unhappy over the shift in the US position which he had first learned of through Scotty Reston's column some weeks ago on the President's injunction./2/ I said I had read the article and other news stories but had not seen the memo if indeed it existed. Sergio went on to say that "The US had pulled the rug out from under the Germans (particularly Schroeder) and also members of the Italian government favoring it. The Germans were very unhappy. Even if the MLF was a poor idea (and he himself thought it a very good one) the US should have pursued it with constancy once we had committed ourselves to it. To shift gears cost us confidence in many ways. Moreover, it appeared we were appeasing deGaulle-even giving him a veto," etc. I replied that our basic position on the problem and on the MLF--to my knowledge--had not changed. No one should doubt our constancy. The MLF had always been an attempt to meet an asserted European problem. Moreover, I said that there had been two major new elements in the situation in recent weeks. First, the new Labor Government had been elected in the UK and was striving to abandon its national nuclear deterrent. Surely it was only sensible to consider most carefully British proposals to this end which could result in UK participation in an MLF. If the Germans and Italians disliked certain of the British ideas it was far more effective for them to tell the British so directly rather than for us to object on the basis that the Germans or Italians would not like this or that. Secondly, de Gaulle's attitude had shifted from indifference to open hostility toward the MLF with the veiled threat that he'd pull the pillars of the Temple down if it became a fact. Surely time should be allotted to ensure that he understood the basic concept and the intention to leave it open for later French adherence. I added I knew of no willingness to accord the French a veto over any or all actions in NATO.
/2/Reston's column appeared in The New York Times, December 21, 1964. For documentation on U.S. policy decisions, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Documents 49-67.
Sergio then referred to a statement in President Johnson's speech/3/ to the effect our policy was not based on an "abstract design" and asked if he should attach great significance to this as portending a basic change in US policy toward Europe. I said "certainly not--that this was language reflecting Mr. Johnson's pragmatic approach to problems." He agreed.
/3/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 1-9.
Sergio then shifted to East-West relations and talked interestingly on the dangers to Italy (& France) which had large Communist parties of overemphasizing polycentrism in the European satellites and deemphasizing the inherent evils of communism as an ideology.
Finally, he reverted to one of his chronic themes that the US cannot and must not leave the Europeans to make important decisions alone. US influence and leadership is needed.
It was a long and interesting lunch. Despite all my efforts he was still in a melancholy mood when I left, for he has stuck his own professional neck out very far on the MLF.
I leave it to you to give this note such distribution as you think it should have.
All the best,
Sincerely,
Livie
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.