116. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, August 4, 1965, 5:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Mc-George Bundy, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Italian covert political assistance
Some weeks ago you asked me to review this problem and bring you up to date on it more specifically. I have now done so, and the situation is as follows:
Over the years the US has assisted the democratic Italian political parties and trade unions at a very high rate. Over the period 1955-1965, the total amount of assistance is just under [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. In recent years we have been cutting this assistance back, primarily because the professionals closely related to the operation have concluded that we have not been getting our full money's worth and what the Italian political parties need is not so much U.S. money as energetic administrative leadership. President Kennedy had a personal feeling that political subsidies at this level were excessive, and they were scaled down.
In the last two or three years, assistance has been running at a rate of about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], except in the election year of 1963. The recommendation for next year runs to a total of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The interdepartmental review committee for covert operations--Vance, Thompson, Raborn and myself--has approved this recommendation subject to your concurrence.
Meanwhile, by separate and somewhat unusual channels, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] have let us know that they would like a lot more money. They have given no practical justification, and indeed have been at pains to suggest that our orthodox channels are stuffy and uncooperative. I have had a long interview with the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] man most familiar with this subject (he was in Rome for 8 years), and he persuades me that this end run is as unjustified in fact as it appears to be on the surface. Having begun with a sympathetic view that money might beat the Communists, I have been entirely converted by his detailed account of the efforts we have made to get the Italian parties to do better with the money we have already given them.
In this situation, I believe that we should approve the recommended budget for this year and go back to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] by appropriate quiet channels to say that we cannot do more unless and until there is evidence that additional money is what is really needed, and that such money can be used really effectively. This would put the responsibility with them, where it belongs, while leaving us free to do more if and when a really good opportunity presents itself. It remains true that the anti-Communist battle in Italy is one of politics and resources; but simple hand-outs and intelligently applied resources are two entirely different things.
McG. B.
Go ahead as you suggest
Speak to me/2/
/2/Neither option is checked.
117. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC/24
New York, September 26, 1965, 7 p.m.
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September-October 1965
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 3. Secret; Exdis. The memorandum bears no indication of the drafting officer; it was approved in S on October 15. It is Part I of IV; Parts II-IV are ibid. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
PARTICIPANTS
US
Secretary Rusk
Mr. Emmett B. Ford, Jr.
Italy
Foreign Minister Fanfani
Italian Ambassador to the US Fenoaltea
Italian Ambassador to the United Nations Vinci
The Secretary remarked that we have been in frequent contact with the other side about Vietnam but there had been no indication of interest in negotiations. We believe that, while Moscow would like to see the matter come to the conference table, Peiping is 1,000 percent opposed. Hanoi is somewhere in between, but unwilling to act independently.
Fanfani advised the Secretary that the Italians had recently received reports that Hanoi was somewhat more disposed to negotiate, possibly without the expressed approval of Peiping. The Italians had gathered that Hanoi was troubled by the degree of their subordination to Peiping. As an example, a new Foreign Minister, believed to be a close friend of the Chinese Communists, has been appointed in Hanoi. Although this move might be a concession to Peiping, it might work also out the other way around. It is just possible that Ho Chi Minh might be trying to put this man in a difficult position and thereby achieve somewhat more autonomy for North Vietnam. Certainly some observers have commented that the North Vietnamese might now be much less adamant on negotiations than before.
The Secretary remarked in this connection, that he would be interested to know if Gromyko would even be willing to discuss such negotiations in the UN. Gromyko would not even discuss the subject with him in Vienna.
Fanfani explained that the information to which he had referred was from Hanoi rather than from Moscow. Before leaving Rome he had requested that the information and sources be checked out. He said that he mentioned it only as one slight indication of the desire of Hanoi for more autonomy.
The Secretary said that the North Vietnamese should be very careful on this point. If the fighting goes on, regardless of what transpires between China and the United States, North Vietnam will be destroyed.
Fanfani wondered whether the present slowing down of military operations in Vietnam might be the only way open to the North Vietnamese to indicate their desire for conciliation without the approval of Peiping.
The Secretary said that this may come, but that we have not ourselves noticed any such indication. The Secretary expressed interest in any information which the Italians might develop along this line.
Fanfani admitted that the Italians have no direct contact with the North Vietnamese. He said they are keeping their eyes and ears open and that they would pass along to the United States any information which they could obtain.
The Secretary told Fanfani that President Johnson had recently issued two very important instructions: 1) Secretary McNamara was to take all steps necessary to insure that the other side would experience no military success in South Vietnam between now and January, 2) Secretary Rusk was to take any political steps necessary to reach a peaceful settlement between now and January.
The Secretary said he interprets this to mean the following: When Congress convenes in January, we shall be at the end of a small war. Either we shall have peace or we shall have to do a great deal more than we are doing now.
Fanfani remarked that the period from now until December is considered decisive even by Hanoi. This may be because of the events in Hanoi which have already been mentioned.
Fanfani said that he would like to inquire, with the utmost tact and with no intention of compromising the United States, or Italy, whether he could pursue further any reports of an inclination on the part of Hanoi to negotiate.
The Secretary said that he would give Fanfani the text of a recent statement which he had made on television./2/ A statement which was aimed at Hanoi. In this statement he had attempted to deal with the issues raised by Hanoi under the Four Points./3/ The Secretary pointed out that there had been numerous contacts with Hanoi but that it is impossible to know through which channel they will ultimately respond. The Secretary felt that this statement would give Fanfani a clear indication of our attitude on negotiations.
/2/For text of Rusk's September 7 interview with Belgian television, see Department of State Bulletin, September 27, 1965, pp. 512-514.
/3/Reference is to the North Vietnamese Four-Point formula presented April 8.
Fanfani assured the Secretary that until the present the Italians have hesitated to take any step which might weaken the position of the United States. The worst mistake which could be made, in his opinion, would be to give the impression of negotiating from an appearance of weakness. He believed this was especially true during the monsoon season.
The Secretary said that this was not so important now. With all our troops and firepower in the field, we are not so worried.
Fanfani replied that since we could now negotiate from a position of strength it affords us a better opportunity to see what can be done through diplomacy. He wished to make clear, however, that: 1) the Italians don't wish to compromise the United States or themselves in any way; 2) they will pursue their inquiries on a discreet basis and only in an exploratory way; and 3) they don't wish to participate in negotiations, but only to act as a friend and an ally./4/
/4/[text not declassified] (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 3)
The Secretary said that the big question is whether Hanoi is prepared to come to the conference table without the consent of Peiping. Will Hanoi have the courage to come to the conference table with Chinese troops on the ground? If they have, the Secretary stated that he would be willing to leave for Geneva tomorrow to meet with them.
118. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State/1/
Rome, October, 14, 1965.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 IT. Secret; Roger Channel. No time of transmission appears on the telegram, which was received at 12:58 p.m.
532. Dept pass Ambassador Reinhardt. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] briefed me this morning (Oct 14) on reports of alleged US intervention in consideration of Generals Vedovato and de Lorenzo to succeed General Aloia as Chief of Staff Italian Army. These reports fitted in with recent private conversation with Malfatti who had told me it was being said US opposed de Lorenzo. Malfatti said de Lorenzo was Saragat's candidate and anything we could do to refute reports of American opposition would be helpful.
I have been to see Cottafavi in Moro's office later this morning on other matters and have taken occasion to make clear to him for private information of PriMin that US is not intervening or taking sides in this internal Italian matter and that we have an equally high regard for all possible candidates.
Cottafavi said matter would probably not be decided much before the end of the year although earlier decision had at one point appeared likely. He appreciated US position and said main obstacle to appointment de Lorenzo was fact such appointment would open question of his successor as Commander of Carabinieri which was of great importance on Italian scene. This would not be case should Vedovato be made Army Chief of Staff and de Lorenzo remain in command of Carabinieri.
Meloy
119. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, November 22, 1965, 1735Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 IT. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Saigon and Rome.
1691. 1. Highly reliable source has given me following information about recent visit paid to Hanoi by Mayor of Florence, La Pira, with request that it be treated with great discretion. La Pira had given it to source when he stopped off in Moscow last week en route home from four or five day visit in Hanoi, where he had gone to promote North Vietnamese attendance at a conference hopefully to be held in Florence to which representatives of all faiths and ideologies will be invited.
2. During his visit, La Pira saw Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong and other NVN leaders, and got impression that there had been distinct evolution in their attitudes toward the war. La Pira believes NVN leaders are now willing to stop all fighting if bombing of North Vietnam were to cease, giving rise to de facto cease-fire with all soldiers remaining in place a la Kashmir.
3. Re inter-faith conference, La Pira said North Vietnam had agreed to send representatives to conference and they would be willing to sit down with anyone there, including U.S. representatives.
4. Source described La Pira as a humanitarian and democrat. While not questioning sincerity of his belief about NVN readiness for cease-fire, he pointed out that he was not diplomat or trained reporter and consequently did not know how much weight to give his report which, I gather, will be conveyed directly to Italian FonMin by La Pira on his return.
Guthrie
120. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, November 28, 1965, 8:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, United Nations. Secret. A notation on the memorandum reads: "Recd Ranch 11-28-65, 8:15 p."
On November 20, Arthur Goldberg reported (Tab A)/2/ an urgent phone call from Fanfani, and when he called on him he received a handwritten letter reporting certain conversations of Italians in Hanoi. Fanfani's letter is at Tab B./3/
/2/Not printed.
/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, Document 205.
We have spent a week studying Fanfani's letter and watching the other reports from Hanoi. It is now clear that the conversations there were held by the Mayor of Florence, La Pira, a rather fuzzy-minded non-Communist leftist who has been critical of our position in Vietnam. Moreover, it is quite clear that Ho Chi Minh managed to fold in his unacceptable conditions, while giving an appearance of interest in peaceful negotiations. This is not at all a real feeler for negotiations.
At the same time, conscious of the Sevareid affair,/4/ State Department is determined to make it clear that we remain ready for unconditional discussions. Dean Rusk has prepared the attached letter to Fanfani (Tab C)/5/ which makes that point clear, while at the same time giving a patient but careful analysis of what La Pira heard. The letter leaves the door open for further discussions between Goldberg and Fanfani. It represents a compromise between the somewhat hard-boiled view of George Ball and my brother Bill, on the one hand, and the desire to be fully forthcoming which Arthur Goldberg and I have shared. We all support it in its present form.
/4/Reference is to Sevareid's article "The Final Troubled Hours of Adlai Stevenson," which appeared in the November 30 issue of Look on newstands beginning on November 15. See ibid., Document 203.
/5/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 918-919.
Goldberg would like to be able to deliver the letter to Fanfani tomorrow--Monday--so as usual we have spent the week in staff work, and now ask for a prompt approval. In this case we do have the excuse that we had to wait for Dean Rusk's return. Moreover, the world will not come to an end if Arthur has to wait another day or two.
McG. B.
Letter Approved/6/
Disapproved
/6/This option is checked and a notation indicates that the Department of State (Sisco) and McGeorge Bundy were informed by telephone.
121. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, December 22, 1965, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 4. Secret. Drafted by Meloy and approved in S on January 4. The memorandum is Part IV of IV. The meeting was held in the Secretary's private dining room.
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary John M. Leddy, EUR
Minister Francis E. Meloy, Jr., American Embassy, Rome
Italy
Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani
Minister Vincenzo Tornetta, United Nations
Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Embassy
The Secretary said the United States will be faced with a major political problem in the first months of 1966. The Administration will be going to the Congress with important proposals regarding Viet-Nam which will have major significance with regard to manpower and finances. He pointed out the recent Soviet announcement of an increase of the U.S.S.R. military budget. The United States will announce an increase in its military budget. The Administration proposals will place major demands on the American people.
Against the loss of lives and the expenditures to date by the United States in defense of the Free World, the American people will ask what other members of the Free World are doing. The American public will ask, for example, how many U.S. soldiers are in West Germany? The answer is 230,000. They will then ask how many West Germans are in Viet-Nam? The answer is 50. Questions will be asked about Free World shipping to Haiphong and West Germans building a steel mill in China, among others. All of these questions will be very delicate for us in the next few months.
The Secretary said we do not know whether or not we will be at general war in the Pacific in the next few months. This depends on Peiping and Hanoi. We have two choices: we can quit or we can meet them. We will meet them.
The Secretary continued that he had said to NATO that the United States cannot abandon its commitment in the Pacific and honor its commitment in the Atlantic. This is not possible morally, legally or psychologically. NATO, therefore, has a fundamental stake in what happens in Viet-Nam.
Ambassador Fenoaltea pointed out that the internal problem in Italy is made more difficult because other Atlantic allies do not do what the United States wants. The Italian opposition says you cannot tell us what to do. Other friends of the United States won't do what the United States wants. The Ambassador said that he was offering this not as a justification but as an explanation of Italian difficulties.
The Secretary continued that it is the integrity of the United States that is a matter of national interest for each country.
Fanfani said that what the Secretary had said did not surprise him at all. He had long seen that we would some day reach this point. He had a profound conviction that verbal solidarity is much more difficult to apply in days of difficulty. He had always said it was necessary to be careful lest the consensus in a crisis be less than in days of prosperity. He had always said let us be careful of France lest the example of French dissension weaken the solidarity in other countries. In Italy, there is an important segment of opinion which is not confined only to the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) but also extends to the Democratic Socialists (PSDI) which takes the position that Italy should not show more solidarity with the United States than does the United Kingdom Labor Party. Policy toward China is an example. It is not easy for the Italian Government, which must take into account the resources and reactions of other countries and not only those of the United States.
Fanfani pointed out that Italian policies in Latin America had been aimed at maintaining the greatest possible support for the United States, which is Italy's greatest ally. Italy does not seek thanks for this activity but considers it a matter of its own national interest to support the United States in this area--to fend off the mosquitoes around the legs of the United States.
The Secretary said he was not being critical but some of the problems have been falsely stated. The proposition is usually put "shall we support the United States?". In fact, the matter should be looked at in the light of the national interest of each country. The proposition should be stated "is it to Italy's interest that Hanoi succeed in aggression?" The Secretary said he would not fear the results of a careful and dispassionate Italian examination of this proposal. He was sure our interests would come out the same.
Fanfani rejoined that as he had said, Italy's Latin American policy is not altruistic. It is in Italy's interest to support the United States. It is a favor Italy does itself.
The fact exists, however, that while being a faithful ally of the United States, Italy cherishes the liberty to disagree. The United States should not overlook a repetitive historical cycle which happens to the most powerful country. At this point in history, it is the turn of the United States. The rest of the world contains those, even your friends, who want to retain the freedom to disagree with you. Even now the Italian Government may be considered as selling itself to the United States by a large segment of its own public opinion. It can be accused of being too conservative. The trend in the world is to change, not to conserve. It is possible that in two or three months the United States may find itself in the position of bearing great burdens and of not having the full support of its friends and allies. This is a tragedy but it is also a fact.
The Secretary said that to the U.S. the defense of liberty is indivisible. America has some forty allies around the world, and they should be aware of this. If you scratch an American you find an isolationist under the surface. If the American people are once disappointed in the support of their allies, you will find an isolationist United States. This is a fact. The President does not want this to happen but it will happen. Is this in the interest of Italy or that of our allies? This is as much a problem for you as it is for us.
The Secretary said that he had told NATO that our friends never worry about the morale of the American people. They should be aware that anyone who relies on the United States has a political constituency in the United States that needs attention just as much as a constituency at home.
Fanfani said that what the Secretary had told him confirms his own thoughts that it could be a big temptation for the United States to want to stay at home. This does not shock him. Many people, in spite of the power of the United States, wonder whether the Communist danger may not be too much even for the United States alone. The United States did not seek this responsibility. History bids the United States to carry the load in the interest of all. The problem is to come out successfully, not just to depend on your own resources and resourcefulness.
Fanfani said it would give him the greatest of pleasure to join a chorus praising the United States and urging it on. There is one caveat, however. He would like to point out to the Secretary that it is very important to have not only good words but good acts from other countries. To obtain this the United States needs not only the solidarity of other Governments but also the solidarity of other peoples. Based on this solidarity of the people of other nations, the United States has twice been successful in world conflicts in this century. He would say to the Secretary, however, that before undertaking great acts, the United States should be sure that in fact it has this solidarity.
Mr. Leddy asked how it would be possible to obtain the support of the people of Europe.
Fanfani said he had been away from Italy for three months but he has kept in touch and has read telegrams. He felt he had made some small contribution to the United States by winning the battle of the United States bases in the Pacific in the General Assembly.
Fanfani said he had been tremendously impressed by public and press attitudes in Italy regarding Viet-Nam. Nenni has abstained but how about his party? Fanfani said as the Secretary knows he has always tried to split the Socialists from the Communists but the Viet-Nam problem is working against this trend.
The United States should imagine itself in a situation where it might take an extreme decision regarding Viet-Nam which might cause the Italian Government to fall and precipitate a Government crisis in Italy. The United States would be faced not only with its extreme burden in the Pacific but also with confusion in the Mediterranean area.
Fanfani said he had a serious thing to say. It was his duty to say it. The Secretary spoke of the danger of isolationism in the United States. He felt it his duty to tell the Secretary that the majority of the members of the United Nations, no matter what their color, will not support the United States. This is a statement which applies in general and not only to Viet-Nam. Look at the voting record. Many of the votes are on an equivocal basis. Look at the scanty majorities. The Secretary could have no idea of the cost at which these scanty majorities had been garnered nor of the effort required on the part of the U.S. Delegation. How many times have we had to say "let's hold off a vote for a few days." The Secretary could have no idea how displeased Fanfani was to be obliged to tell him this. Fanfani said it should be remembered that he is of a naturally optimistic nature. The United States has need of the most sensitive thermometers to understand better the climate in which it is operating.
Fanfani said that he was grateful that the Secretary told him that in the next few months the United States will have rough weather. It is true that there are forces at home which the United States must watch. There are also forces abroad which must be watched. The United States should look not only at Governments but at peoples. Otherwise, it will lose battles to the Communists.
The Secretary said that for each nation it is a question of priorities. Each should begin where it is and work from there. Looking at our Western European friends it seemed to the Secretary that their first problem is the prosperity of Western Europe and he was thinking of the Common Market in this connection. The second interest of Western Europe is the soundness of NATO. Here, the Secretary said, he would like to pay tribute to Italy's contribution to both of these interests.
Another priority for Western Europe, the Secretary continued, is relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. We regard ourselves only as partners. We believe we should work as a group and, through a process of full cooperation, we should move together.
The Secretary said that speaking personally, since some of his colleagues do not agree, he believes Western Europe should place a high priority on developments in Africa. This is a vast continent, ten minutes flying time from the small peninsula of land called Europe. Events in Africa should have a high priority for Europe.
Beyond that, there are the problems that arise in the Pacific area and Asia. The Secretary said he could understand why Western European countries so distant from the Pacific and Asia wish that the problems there could simply go away and disappear. Fanfani interrupted to say that Europeans do not consider these problems distant, far away, or abstract. It is only Governments that do not want problems with their own public opinion that say these matters are abstract or distant.
Two elements force these problems on European countries, said the Secretary. One, the Communists are active all over the world. It is a question of whether militant aggression or peaceful coexistence is to be successful. The second element he had already discussed. This was the attitude of the United States toward its commitments to other nations. The Secretary said he understood that NATO countries have problems arising out of domestic difficulties. Canada, the United Kingdom and Norway are governed by thin majorities. Denmark is facing new elections. The Netherlands has a minority Government. Belgium has a fragile political situation. France has a 75 year old leader. Italy has a not always easy coalition Government. Greece has been without a government for some time. In fact, only Luxembourg is stable. We understand these problems but they cause problems for us. The representative of a NATO Government came recently to the Secretary and said, "if the United States does not do thus and so, my Government will fall." To whom can the United States say this sort of thing?
Fanfani said he much appreciated this score card. The United States must understand the absolute necessity, however, for it to have friendly peoples as well as friendly governments in order to obtain support.
Fanfani said things are not going well in the Communist world. The Secretary responded that it is a great tragedy that at this time we also present a picture of disarray in the Free World. It is the great tragedy of this period in history that while the Communist world is in disorder, we also are in disarray and unable to present a contrast of unity which would make it possible to take a great step forward.
Fanfani said there are two problems: one is the lack of unity in the West. The second is that we have no Communist dictators to deal with. The Communist world is divided and redivided among themselves. We cannot go to a dictator and say: "which is it, peace or war?" It takes two to talk. Four are too many.
The Secretary said there is the same problem with regard to Viet-Nam. There are differences between Hanoi and Peiping but who can we deal with? Looking at each section of the world it seemed to the Secretary that general trends are favorable if we can just solve the Viet-Nam problem. We should keep in mind that Communists are not ten feet tall. Fanfani said this was lucky in view of his own short stature.
Ambassador Fenoaltea said he had seen Nenni in Rome. Nenni was impressed by the fact that any Chinese Communist triumph would have an effect on the Soviets and would bring back the hard line.
The Secretary referred to a conversation he had had with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland who had said the number one problem is to turn the Chinese Communists toward peaceful coexistence. The Secretary said he agreed with the observation of the Deputy Foreign Minister, but that if he had made the statement it would be called capitalistic propaganda. If we cannot turn the Chinese Communists from the hard line and this line is successful, the hard line will triumph everywhere.
Fanfani said the United States must preserve the success of the policies it has been following for the last twenty years.
122. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, May 18, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 4. Secret. Prepared by Walt Rostow.
Ambassador Fenoaltea called on me today to ask our views on the NATO crisis before he returned to Rome.
I marched him through the essential elements of the President's Polish-American speech./2/
/2/Reference is to Johnson's May 3 statement commemorating Poland's millennium of Christianity and national identity. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 475-478.
He then raised the following matters:
1. Speaking as a partisan of NATO and the United States and a partisan of moderate political forces in Italy, he urged very strongly that we not slide into a tripartite directorate of U.S., UK and Bonn. Leaving Italy out is dangerous to our common interests. It strengthens both the extreme right in Italy and the extreme left, undercutting the bases for moderate politics. We must never forget that Italy is there and should be treated as a senior partner along with Britain and Germany.
2. His second point was that if and when the U.S. changes course on a major issue, it is extremely important that the Italian Government be informed in advance. When a change is made (for example the MLF) the best friends of the United States are left out on a limb, having fought a tough political battle at home.
He cited as another example a possible change on China policy.
He then zeroed in on newspaper stories that the President was taking a different position than the State Department in dealing with DeGaulle. He wanted to know if the President was softer on DeGaulle than the State Department and possibly interested in going the route of Senator Church and Senator Fulbright.
I replied that the President was deeply and personally engaged in NATO problems; we are a united Government under a strong President; and Secretary Rusk and the Department of State were the authentic voices of the President's policies.
He remarked wistfully that it is impossible in Italy to be left of The New York Times; for example, on Viet Nam.
3. He ended by stating his appreciation for the Polish-American speech which he felt was a lucid and constructive framework for dealing with East-West relations.
WR
123. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Brussels, June 6, 1966, 0015Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 IT-US. Secret; Priority. Repeated to all NATO capitals. Secretary Rusk visited Belgium June 3-8 for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting.
Secto 43. NATUS.
1. Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani called on Secretary June 5, accompanied by Foreign Office Secretary General Catalano, DirGen Political Affairs Gaja, and interpreter.
Following is uncleared summary, Noforn, subject revision on review.
A. France-NATO. Fanfani said Gromyko's reaction to France-NATO situation during recent Italian visit cautious. Fanfani said he had told Khrushchev in 1961 that Soviet Union should appreciate NATO's role vis-?-visGermany./2/ Khrushchev had disagreed, whereas Gromyko, when same point made to him, had not replied. Fanfani thought Sov initiative on European Security Conference stemmed from concern over effects of NATO crisis on Germany's place in Europe.
/2/August 3-5, 1961; for Fanfani's summary of these talks, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 290.
Secretary summarized U.S. public attitude toward NATO crisis, emphasizing that while public and Congress prepared support U.S. sharing of all burdens on Fourteen arising from position of France, major political problem would arise if Fourteen themselves fell into confusion or paralysis. This would generate disillusion with NATO and would arouse concern lest it cause miscalculation in Moscow. This unity of Fourteen at Brussels meeting highly important to future U.S. support of NATO.
Fanfani said Italian contacts with others of Fourteen showed little divergencies of attitude among them. Italian public opinion not worried. In recent appearances before committees of Italian Chamber of Deputies and Senate, Fanfani had found larger majority supporting Italian sharing in material burdens arising from France-NATO crisis than usually supported government on other issues. As examples, he said no members of committees had objected when informed Italy prepared accept NATO Defense College in Rome if asked. As second example, he said that at Cabinet meeting just before his departure for Brussels, he had estimated possible cost to Italy of France-NATO problems at 60 billion lire. This had aroused no serious opposition. His statement that Vicenza depots might have to be enlarged evoked no protest. Only difficulty was minor: some had opposed choice of Rome as site when sections of NAMSA moved to Italy.
As by-product of France-NATO crisis, Fanfani said Italian Socialist Party now aware of positive benefits of NATO integration. Socialists had problem of presenting their acceptance of NATO to public opinion. They would take approach of emphasizing that NATO political as well as military reform could now be studied. Fanfani thought stress on role of NATO in East-West dialogue would be helpful to Socialists.
On political right, within Christian-Democratic, Social-Democratic and Liberal Parties, Fanfani said there was preoccupation with strategic isolation of Italy as result France-NATO crisis. These elements felt maximum links with France had to be maintained to facilitate France's future reassociation.
Fanfani himself thought France had substantial interests binding it to other allies, such as desire maintain troops in Germany and general question of relations with neighbors. This meant that negotiations, though difficult, might be successful.
Replying, Secretary said U.S. also concerned with geographic effect of French actions on Italy. He expressed hope France-NATO agreement on use of air space could be reached and pointed out use of NATO country air space by France was vital for French atomic force.
Fanfani doubted de Gaulle's present policy was designed to produce complete break with Alliance. He saw large tactical elements in French position, as he said had been case in EEC crisis.
Secretary suggested Fanfani and Schroeder might find occasion talk with Couve as neighbors, probing why France was taking actions ostensibly so damaging to neighbors' interests.
Fanfani felt de Gaulle already had in mind resumption of dialogue with EEC partners. He said de Gaulle had casually remarked to Italian diplomat on June 2 that it was time to terminate EEC and NATO affairs "on the side, then resume discussion among Six." Fanfani said opportunity for talks of kind Secretary had in mind might arise on June 13 when EEC Council would meet to discuss whether to confirm presidency of Hallstein. French were opposed. If they yielded, this could be starting point for wider talks. If they held out, this could provide even better opportunity.
B. Science and Technology. Fanfani mentioned UK decision withdraw from ELDO. He thought that while substantive reasons might be sound, UK handling and timing were poor. ELDO itself represented waste of money since members merely rediscovered what U.S. had already learned. It made no sense when ELDO was launching Europe I in Australia simultaneously with U.S.
Secretary expressed concern about UK decision, which had strongly disappointed U.S. He said he intended discuss it with UK Foreign Minister Stewart, who would be calling later in evening. If UK withdrawal stood firm, Secretary would want Fanfani's judgment as to what might be done. U.S. felt it important that Western European technology advance, and sought means make U.S. technology available. President Johnson had recently sent Mr. Frutkin to Europe in this connection. Frutkin had found much interest in Germany, almost none in UK, with Italy somewhere between.
U.S. spent 30 billion dollars on research and development for all purposes, Secretary continued. Although we recognized differences in industrial capacity, and difficulties of starting "Marshall Plan for Technology", way had to be found.
Fanfani welcomed Secretary's statement. He thought Marshall Plan for Technology would show possibilities inherent in Atlantic Community concept. Italians were impressed by almost unbridgeable gap between U.S. and European technology. They favored identifying specific areas for cooperation to integrate U.S. and European efforts. If UK indeed dropped out of ELDO, Italian Cabinet had agreed that Italy would do same, and would devote resources instead to national research. Most of shifted funds would go to send people to U.S. for study. Fanfani thought Marshall Plan for Technology would have great attraction also in France, even if not with de Gaulle. It would also find receptivity in Eastern Europe and thus promote coexistence.
C. U Thant. Secretary said U Thant would decide in June whether to serve as UN SecGen beyond present term. Although President Johnson in letter had urged him stay on, appeared strong possibility he would leave. Secretary foresaw great problems in finding successor in view Soviet veto power. He requested Fanfani as General Assembly President write U Thant urging him to stay on.
Fanfani said he had touched on subject with U Thant in Strasbourg but had learned little. He agreed to send letter now urging SecGen keep post.
Secretary thought U Thant motivated to leave UN by pressure from Ne Win, by family problems and by behind scenes Soviet pressure to exact concessions actions as price for supporting Thant's continuation in office. Fanfani added as motive burden of UN financing question.
Fanfani thought family reasons might be overriding; suggested further exploration this motive. He thought former UN Deputy SecGen, Soviet national Milanya, who just ordained as Anglican priest, had spiritual ties with U Thant, and suggested Ralph Bunche could sound Milanya.
Fanfani added rumor was circulating that U.S. was opposed to U Thant's continuation in office while Soviets supported it.
Secretary concluded by expressing hope for another talk with Fanfani before both left Brussels, to discuss Communist China and other matters.
As meeting broke up, Fanfani handed over aide-m?moire on Italian approach to EximBank concerning 45 billion lire purchase of supplies in U.S. for Fiat factories. Secretary observed problem was essentially technical, with no top-level political aspects. Text of aide-m?moire will follow septel./3/
/3/Not found.
Rusk
124. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 29, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 4. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
Ex-Im Financing of U.S. Equipment for an Italian Built Fiat Plant in the USSR
At Tab A,/2/ Secretary Rusk recommends that we grant an Italian request for a 5-year Ex-Im Bank loan of up to $50 million to finance export of U.S. equipment which would be used in a new Fiat automobile plant in the Soviet Union. This does not require formal Presidential action; the Bank has the authority and the money. The Secretary wants to (1) direct Linder to go ahead and (2) informally notify key people on the Hill.
/2/Not printed.
The loan makes good sense in terms of bridge-building and our interest in having the Soviets go in for "middle class" consumer goods. In terms of exports, if Ex-Im turns the Italians down we would probably lose the sale. The terms (5-years) would be standard for an export credit.
Tony Solomon tells me that, despite wide publicity, there has been no noise on the Hill about the Fiat deal, and nobody in either House is a sure bet to complain. He thinks--and I agree--that prior soundings would only stir up opposition. If you approve, we would propose to notify the relevant people before Harold Linder makes any public announcement: Senators Mansfield, Long, Dirksen, Kuchel, Fulbright, Magnuson, Robertson, Hickenlooper, Cotton and Bennett; the Speaker, Messrs. Albert, Boggs, Ford, Arends, Morgan, Stagger, Patman, Adair, Frelinghuysen, Springer, Widnall, and Mrs. Bolton.
All the relevant agencies are on board (DOD, CIA, Commerce, Treasury, Ex-Im Bank).
I would vote yes--but you know my prejudice in favor of bridge-building (in terms of foreign policy, and in terms of a balanced Presidential posture against the background of Vietnam).
FMB
Approve Rusk recommendation
Take soundings on Hill, then come back
Disapprove
Speak to me/3/
/3/None of these options is checked. A notation reads: "Sec. Fowler to call LJ @ Ranch. May want to talk to Clark Clifford also."
125. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Italy (Reinhardt) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/
Washington, September 12, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, 303 Committee Files. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Reinhardt and Dozier.
SUBJECT
303 Committee Consideration of the Italian Covert Action Program
I want to elaborate further on our discussion on Tuesday about the Italian covert program./2/ The coming months may represent a critical period for political stability in Italy. Decisive steps to reunify the Socialist and Social Democratic parties are anticipated this fall. This prospect, in conjunction with the strong rivalries within the Christian Democratic party, could put new strains on Moro's center-left coalition. An additional unsettling factor is the approaching general elections. They must take place not later than April 1968.
/2/No record of this discussion has been found.
Since my assignment to Rome I have consistently recommended the gradual reduction of covert activities in Italy. The record in fact shows sharp year-to-year cuts in expenditures. The level of funds has dropped from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in FY 1964 to a recommended [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in FY 1967. The latter figure represents a cut of 35% from FY 1966. It is also significant that in recent years we have progressively discontinued direct subsidies to political parties--the last was the small program in FY 1966 for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. All other support to political parties has been contingent on approved action programs in support of U.S. policy objectives, in the absence of which no funds have been made available. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is now on notice that any support for FY 1967 would be on such a basis. Accordingly the proposed program contains no unstructured contributions to any political party's finances.
In the circumstances, I recommend that the program proposed for FY 1967 be approved. An abrupt discontinuance of the program at this time would be interpreted by some of our friends, on whom we must depend for achievement of our policy objectives in Italy, as a change in our long-standing support for them and for what they are attempting to achieve. I am particularly concerned that we avoid any action which might disturb the Moro-Nenni-Saragat leadership, which is relatively strong by post-war Italian standards and which seems to offer the best chance of strengthening political stability and democracy in Italy. At the same time, I feel that we should continue the gradual reduction of the covert program in Italy with the general objective of a final phase-out in connection with the 1968 elections.
126. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 13, 1966, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 4. Secret. Copies were sent to Bator, Rusk, Leddy, and McNamara.
Mr. President:
You should know that Sergio Fenoaltea came in to make the strongest and most emotional representations that I have received from a diplomat in a long time.
His theme was that if, in addition to the tripartite talks, we were to accept a formula for the NATO nuclear committee which did not grant Italy permanent status, the whole relation of Italy to NATO and, indeed, the stability of Italian domestic politics would be endangered.
He pointed out that Italian support for NATO hinged on its being treated as an equal to the other three European countries of similar size: Britain, France, and Germany. If we built into NATO any arrangement which put the Italians alongside, say, Belgium or The Netherlands, the Italians, a proud people, would go into a violent emotional reaction--whether neutralist or Fascist, no one could say. He had heard that we had given Harlan Cleveland instructions, as a fallback position, to shift in the NATO nuclear committee from 4 permanent and 2 rotating members to a 3-3 formula. In the end, this could only mean that Italy would be odd-man-out.
Basically, Fenoaltea is correct in his judgment of the danger here.
We got with State and received assurances:
--that they would stick with the 4-2 formula; and
--that there would be no change without the issue coming to your personal attention.
I wanted you to know of this because the matter could conceivably arise in your discussions tomorrow with George Brown./2/
/2/The issue was not discussed in the President's October 14 meeting with Brown. A memorandum of conversation is ibid., United Kingdom, Vol. 9. Leddy raised the question during Brown's subsequent meeting with Secretary Rusk. According to the October 14 memorandum of conversation: "The Foreign Secretary agreed that it would be necessary to include Italy as a permanent member." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-UK)
Walt
127. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Rome, March 15, 1967.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 6-1 IT. Confidential. Drafted by Fraleigh. Transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to airgram A-854, March 20.
PARTICIPANTS
Gen. Giovanni De Lorenzo, Chief of Staff, Italian Army
William N. Fraleigh, Counselor of Embassy
SUBJECT
General's Views on Italian internal and foreign affairs
At a small dinner on March 15 I had an opportunity to talk at some length with General De Lorenzo, whom I have met a number of times before. The following were his main comments on Italian internal and foreign affairs.
Internal Affairs
The General was outspokenly critical of the Italian Socialist Party and of the Minister of Defense, Tremelloni. He was less directly critical of President Saragat, perhaps out of respect for the President's high office, but it was obvious that he was also not very happy about the President's attitude towards the Italian Army.
(It should be recalled that the General, who has a strong personality and has played a leading role in organizing such key anti-subversive elements in Italy's armed forces as the Carabinieri and the Armed Forces Intelligence Service (formerly called SIFAR, now SID) has a Monarchist background and, while not politically active in recent years, supported the Monarchy as an institution in 1945/46, and in early Fascist years. This undoubtedly profoundly affects his attitude towards Socialists, including the present Socialist President of the Republic. But the main burden of his remarks were directed at an alleged lack of understanding of the Army and its problems by Tremelloni, in particular, and the allegedly poor effects of Tremelloni's leadership at the Ministry of Defense upon the morale of the Armed Forces. This view is apparently widely shared in the Armed Forces.)
The General said that Tremelloni, having no experience in such matters, simply does not understand the job of running the Defense Ministry. Tremelloni approaches it primarily as an economist. His emphasis is constantly upon reducing expenses, without due regard for morale and quality. For example, army salaries are not high enough, and nothing is being done about raising them. As a consequence the quality of younger officers is rapidly going down. The ablest no longer desire to make the Army their permanent career. (Throughout the conversation the General referred specifically only to the Army, but by implication he was also thinking of the Air Force and Navy.) To add to the feeling of frustration in the forces, while Tremelloni turned a deaf ear to complaints about inappropriate economies in the Armed Forces, the government continued to increase the expenditures and allotments of many other Ministries.
The General said that while Saragat takes some direct interest in the Armed Forces, his interest is limited to "special areas" (undefined) and not in the Armed Forces as a whole. The General did not elaborate upon this, but perhaps was referring here to the recent controversy over personal files allegedly missing from SID archives. As De Lorenzo formerly headed this organization, he has been involved in the controversy./2/ His only direct reference to this matter with me, however, was to say that this was a tempest in a teapot. In any case this led him to draw an invidious comparison between President Saragat and former President Segni. Segni, he said, took a much broader and more genuine anterest in the Armed Forces. (This led to a brief discussion of Segni's health which the General said was still stationary. Since his stroke, which resulted in his resignation from the Presidency, Segni has been living very quietly near Rome. He is still unable to talk and moves about very little because of his partial paralysis.)
/2/An internal probe of this issue, launched by Tremelloni, had become public, and on February 18 the Procurator General of Rome began a judicial inquiry. Subsequently, the Italian Parliament took up an investigation. In April the Moro government relieved De Lorenzo of command.
My net impression of the General's remarks was that he has reached the point of having little patience not only with Saragat and Tremelloni but with the Italian Government as a whole. I referred once to Moro's unusually long tenure as Prime Minister, by Italian standards, and to Giulio Andreotti's long service as Minister of Defense. But this brought forth only grunts, and no praise from the General for either of them. He did say, however, that while General de Gaulle had suffered a setback in the recent French elections, it was a noteworthy fact that despite this, Gaullism had retained an absolute majority in Parliament. This was, the General said, thanks to the fact that the French had succeeded in working out an electoral system which made such absolute majority governments possible, whereas Italy had not succeeded in doing this and therefore had to suffer constantly with unstable coalitions.
The General, who is not yet 60 and still apparently in vigorous health, strongly implied that he would not be adverse after retiring to giving his support to, and perhaps even participating in, a movement in Italy for a stronger form of central government, if conditions should occur that might give such a movement reasonable chances of success. I do not think the General would himself go so far as to try to become an Italian de Gaulle. He seems too realistic about himself and Italian politics to attempt that. But he might lend his support very vigorously to someone else who had aspirations and possibilities of becoming a strong President, if he believed him to be the right man for the job.
Foreign Affairs
On foreign affairs the General's main comments were on NPT and Germany.
As for NPT he said there was of course great merit in the idea of trying to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. But the proposed treaty, he said, seemed unfair to Italy and to other nuclear have-not nations. He used many of the same arguments to support this that Italian government leaders have voiced, and I sought to answer them in the usual way. He said he had been asked recently, but did not say by whom, what younger officers in the Italian Army thought about this subject. He said he had answered that he did not think they were much interested.
As for Germany he said he felt there was a very real danger of a strong revival of a Nazi-type Party. Many Germans remembered bitterly the bad treatment they received in 1945 and 1946, he said. This feeling was especially strong among the millions of German refugees from East Germany. This and the continued lack of progress towards reunification was in danger of stirring up the same stubborn and ruthless German spirit which had caused two world wars and could if we are not careful cause a third. He remarked that some Germans were involved in the constant acts of terrorism in Italy's Alto Adige and that the Italian Government had not been able to get the German Government to crack down on these people.
With particular reference to this last subject, but by inference also to other things he had been saying, General De Lorenzo remarked that the Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force, General Aldo Remondino, shares his views.
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.