138. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
REU-8
Washington, January 30, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 6 IT. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.
SUBJECT
The Imbroglio of the Italian Military Intelligence Service
The world press has recently focussed its attention on the "scandals" that have surfaced in the Italian Military Intelligence Service. This paper attempts to place the imbroglio in the proper perspective.
Abstract
Since the spring of 1967, the Italian Armed Forces Intelligence Service (SIFAR) and its former chief, General Giovanni De Lorenzo, have been publicly accused of having engaged in illegal activities ranging from the unauthorized compilation and pilfering of confidential personnel files to the plotting of a coup d'etat in mid-1964, during a government crisis. The first charge was proven correct by a government-appointed investigative committee and cost General De Lorenzo his job as Army Chief of Staff in April 1967. The authenticity of the second and much more serious charge of an attempted coup attributed to De Lorenzo by the Italian weekly magazine L'Espresso is presently being investigated by another government-appointed committee. It is also being debated in court, where De Lorenzo's libel suit against L'Espresso is now being tried. This situation gained new attention early in 1968 when De Lorenzo, or someone in his behalf, leaked so-called "documentary evidence" to various rightwing scandal sheets purporting to show that some key Socialists in Premier Moro's present center-left coalition took payoffs from the intelligence service in the early 1960's.
The furor over these charges and countercharges has added substantial acceleration to the normally turbulent pre-electoral atmosphere in Italy (national elections are to be held this spring). It has hardly improved harmony within Premier Moro's coalition government and some politicians and journalists have been predicting that a government crisis would result from the imbroglio. We do not believe that the revelations that have surfaced thus far are sufficiently damaging to cause a government crisis. If De Lorenzo were to publish the mass of confidential information (real or fabricated) that he has accumulated on practically every leading Italian personality, he could certainly destroy the reputations, if not the careers, of a number of politicians. It is unlikely that the government would survive such revelations. But in so doing De Lorenzo would also be exposing himself to prosecution. He will almost certainly not take this chance.
[Here follows a 4-page discussion of the issues outlined in the abstract.]
139. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State/1/
Rome, July 25, 1968, 2120Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 IT. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to the Department of Defense and repeated to USCINCEUR.
7330. Dept. pass Commerce and Treasury. Ref: Joint Commerce, Defense, State Message 205742./2/ Subject: Sale of P3B Aircraft to Italy.
/2/Telegram 205742 to Rome, July 19, reported on efforts to promote sales of Lockheed aircraft to Italy. (Ibid.)
1. Deputy Assistant Secretary Defense Henry Kuss and Lockheed officials have had series discussions with representatives Italian industry and Italian Government officials regarding proposed sale P3B "Orion" aircraft to Italy. Chief of Staff Italian Air Force Fanali and Chief of Staff Italian Navy Michelagnoli indicated to Kuss that Italian military had just about concluded that P3B clearly preferable to "Atlantique" from military point of view. They expect decision on this aspect by end of August. They also indicated to Kuss that political rather than military consideration would determine Italian decision as between P3B and "Atlantique."
2. Mr. Kuss' discussions with industry representatives (many of whom are also influential members of Christian Democratic Party) gave him impression that French began to mount campaign in Italy in favor of "Atlantique" immediately after Dutch decision to purchase this aircraft. However, at informal meeting between Kuss and Foreign Minister Medici latter did not indicate he yet aware of French campaign, and showed great interest in draft memorandum Kuss and Lockheed Vice President Wilder had prepared on this subject./3/
/3/Not found.
3. Embassy informed by reliable source that French Ambassador to Rome has instructions to approach GOI in effort convince GOI to join "Atlantique" consortium and to arrange for his Dutch, Belgian and German colleagues to do the same.
4. Draft memorandum prepared by Kuss and Wilder (copy left with Medici on informal basis) outlines following proposal:
(A) Expresses joint US-Italian interest in common equipment planning for anti-submarine warfare role;
(B) Expresses most favorable price, credit without reference to specific interest rate, training and logistics considerations for purchase of US aircraft;
(C) Expresses economic political willingness to allow equal competition with US industry toward target procurement goal of 25 percent program value US aircraft purchase. (FYI. Program value estimated at $100 million. End FYI.) Also expresses willingness Lockheed Aircraft Corporation participate in transfer through licensing arrangements of technology on compound helicopter for potential civil or military use in Europe.
5. Kuss and Wilder prepared to sign this memorandum including 90-day option on basis serious consideration by Italian Government of P3B aircraft. In his informal discussion with Kuss, Medici indicated he might be prepared to accept above memorandum on formal basis. Although Medici did not so indicate, Kuss was informed by industry representatives that Medici will probably coordinate views of Ministries of Defense, Industry and Foreign Affairs on "Atlantique" consortium proposal. Medici said he would let us know by July 27 whether GOI would wish memorandum to be presented formally. Memorandum could be presented either at Ministry Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Defense.
6. Regardless nature GOI decision regarding formal presentation of memorandum, we believe it most important and urgent that letter from Chief Naval Operations to Italian Chief Naval Staff and Chief of Staff Italian Air Force regarding P3B purchase (delivered morning July 25) be supplemented by letters to Italian Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers from Secretaries of State and Defense.
7. Following is suggested text: "The United States and Italian Armed Forces have been flying anti-submarine patrols over the waters surrounding Italy for many years with some of our aircraft based at the same facility in Sicily. To those of us who share the responsibility for defense of the Mediterranean waters your adoption of the P3B aircraft is of considerable importance. We would appreciate every attention you can give to this matter in the interest of our mutual security."
8. Request urgent approval of suggested letters in order that they may be delivered early next week since we believe communications at this level are now necessary to offset expected high-level approaches from French and others in favor of "Atlantique."/4/
/4/In a July 30 memorandum to Secretary Rusk, George Springsteen, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, recommended against adopting the Embassy's suggestion. He noted that the Department of Defense had also decided against sending a letter from Secretary Clifford. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 IT)
Ackley
140. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State/1/
Rome, August 1, 1968, 1734Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 IT. Confidential. Also sent to the Department of Defense and repeated to USCINCEUR.
7466. Subject: Sale of P3B Aircraft to Italy. Ref: State 212833./2/
/2/Telegram 212833 from Rome, August 1, reads: "Request Ambassador convey to Formin or Defmin as appropriate proposed message para 7 reftel 7330 as general position USG rather than as specific personal message from SecState or SecDef. Dept will take similar line with Ambassador Ortona when he returns to Washington this week." (Ibid.)
1. I discussed our P3B proposal this morning with Minister of Defense Gui and told him USG considered this matter important and hoped GOI would decide to purchase this aircraft. Gui told me P3B and "Atlantique" proposals still under study by GOI and that he had no idea when decision would be made.
2. During courtesy call on Minister of Industry and Commerce Andreotti yesterday, I also took occasion to mention our interest in this project. He seemed well aware of both our proposal and that of European consortium. He, like Gui, was noncommittal regarding GOI decision on matter.
3. We have taken steps to bring our interest informally to the attention of the Quirinale.
Ackley
141. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State/1/
Rome, September 10, 1968, 1810Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 IT. Confidential.
8209. Ref: Rome 8173./2/ Subject: P-3B Sale to Italy.
/2/Telegram 8173 from Rome, September 7, reported on Ambassador Ackley's presentation on the P-3B aircraft to Foreign Minister Medici. (Ibid.)
1. I called on Minister of Defense Gui afternoon September 10 and discussed P-3B aircraft sale along same general lines my talk with Foreign Minister Medici (reftel).
2. While a bit evasive on exact status of technical recommendations by service chiefs, Gui made it clear that Italian military considered P-3B and Atlantique roughly equal insofar as operational effectiveness concerned. (Later discussion brought out fact that Italians considered P-3B operationally superior in certain respects but it had distinct disadvantage of being too heavy to operate from many Italian airfields. Thus "advantages and disadvantages of P-3B more or less cancelled each other out.")
3. Gui said he had written letter to Prime Minister Leone requesting Leone to convene an early meeting of various Ministries concerned with this matter. In addition to Defense and Foreign Affairs, he mentioned Ministries of Industry and Commerce and State participation. He said he hoped decision would be reached soon and indicated that a principal consideration would be extent and nature of participation by Italian industry. Gui noted that there was not only the important matter of probably large participation by Italian industry in the Atlantique consortium, but of even more importance the possibility of continued participation by Italian industry in the construction of aircraft which might be developed and manufactured in the future.
4. Gui recognized the importance and relevance of the political aspects of the decision and the operational aspects involved in the use of the same equipment by Italy and U.S. He emphasized that my call had been most timely and assured me that due consideration would be given to all the arguments I put forth when interministerial meeting takes place.
Ackley
142. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 11, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL IT-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Fried.
PARTICIPANTS
The President, Italian Foreign Minister Giuseppe Medici, Ambassador Ortona, Walt Rostow, Ed Fried
Walt Rostow told the President that, while they were waiting, he had described to the Foreign Minister the President's statement on the NPT. Medici welcomed the statement and stressed his strong personal support of the NPT. He said the Italian Government before Czechoslovakia had authorized signature of the treaty on August 26. Czechoslovakia canceled this.
The President said he was happy to see the Foreign Minister and recalled with warmth the meetings he had had with the Pope, with President Saragat, and former Prime Minister Moro. He took satisfaction in the close relations between Italy and the U.S. Medici replied in kind.
The President asked whether the Italians were as concerned over Czechoslovakia as we were and what they planned to do about it.
Medici said they were very much concerned and were going to do all they had been asked to do. He said he was going over the details of prospective Italian actions to strengthen NATO with Secretary Rusk on Monday. He understood that the meetings in Brussels of the Permanent Representatives had gone well and that the U.S. Representative had been satisfied with Italian actions.
He added that after the explosion of Prague the Italian Government had made a strong statement of condemnation. When he met with Gromyko, he told him that the Czechoslovakian invasion contradicted the language in paragraph 12 of the preamble of the NPT. ("That states must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.") He told Gromyko that the Russian action had destroyed one of the foundations on which the treaty was based and therefore had called the treaty itself into question.
Continuing on the NPT, he said that the Italians were looking to see what happens in the U.S. Senate. If they see doubt arising about the treaty in the Senate, then they would have doubts about the U.S. interpretations of the treaty. These interpretations are essential to the support the Italian Parliament has given to the treaty.
The Foreign Minister asked about Rumania. He said that the situation there might get out of hand. The President said he believed it was serious and that was why he had made his statement of warning. Medici said the statement had been warmly welcomed in Italy as giving further assurance to their security.
Medici went on to say that the post-war situation represented an entire change in Western Europe. They were more and more becoming tied to an open system and their prosperity was dependent on trade and tourism and capital. The Italians liked peace--perhaps too much.
The President said we would all have to work harder to keep the peace. He felt that it was essential for U.S. troops to remain in Europe and that they could remain in Europe indefinitely if the American people came to believe that the Europeans were doing all they could do and should do in their own defense. That was why European action was so important now. Medici said he understood this and fully agreed.
The President asked how the Russians could have timed their move in Czechoslovakia as badly as they did.
Medici answered that he believed the timing was very bad and that the Russians were now worried. They were pushing hard, for example, on the NPT but they had endangered German, Italian, Japanese and other participation in the treaty, and without their participation the treaty would be too weak and have too little meaning.
In closing the conversation, the President expressed again his warm friendship for Italians and his hope, after he left public life, to have an unhurried visit to Italy.
143. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State/1/
Rome, October 17, 1968, 1156Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 IT. Confidential; Limdis.
8973. Subject: P3B.
1. In my conversation with Minister Medici on October 16, he raised with me the question of the P3B. I said that I assumed the matter had been taken up with him in Washington, and he told me that neither the President nor the Secretary had mentioned it, a fact which was somewhat surprising./2/ I told him I was surprised too. The Minister thought he knew the explanation. Foreign Minister Debre had told him he intended to protest vigorously to the United States Government the political pressure which had been exerted on the Italians on behalf of the "Orion", which he thought was quite improper. Debre had seen the President prior to Medici's call. He (Medici) assumes that the matter was not mentioned by the President or the Secretary in response to Debre's complaint.
/2/Ackley recommended in telegram 8742 from Rome, October 7, that the Secretary discuss the matter with Medici. (Ibid.)
2. He wanted to know, however, whether the United States Government's interest in this matter had changed in any way. I assured him that it had not. We still attached great importance to it for military, economic, and political reasons. Medici said he was very happy to have this assurance. He wanted to be able to say to the Prime Minister same afternoon that the American Ambassador had called on him and had again assured him of the American interest in this matter. Minister Medici was well aware of the second supplementary U.S. proposal, and had in his hand the English version of same.
3. As I left the office, Minister Medici expressed his hope for a favorable outcome on this matter./3/
/3/In telegram 258677, October 21, Secretary Rusk instructed Ackley to convey to Medici his interest in the P-3B question and to request Medici's support. (Ibid., POL 7 IT)
Ackley
144. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, October 25, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 5. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The sidebars and photographs included in the report are not printed.
ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY DRAWS
FURTHER AWAY FROM MOSCOW
By supporting the Prague leadership in defiance of Soviet sensibilities, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) has staked out for itself a new degree of autonomy. Italian Communist theory has been developing in this direction--with some deviations--since 1956, when party leader Togliatti first publicized his belief in "many roads to socialism." In previous crises in the international Communist movement, however--such as when the USSR invaded Hungary in 1956 and supported the Arabs in the Middle East crisis of 1967--the Italian Communists supported the Moscow line. In the present crisis, the Italian party has shown an unwonted degree of unity and has sought to develop a united front of Western European Communist support for the Prague government. Over the long term, Moscow may seek to oust unfriendly Italian Communist leaders or to split the party if it maintains its present position. In the shorter term, continuing tension between the Soviet and Italian parties seems inevitable. In domestic politics, the Italian party may seek to use evidence of Soviet disapproval to improve its image as an independent, democratic political force respectable enough to sit with the democratic parties in an Italian government.
Background to Divergence
The origins of the Italian-Soviet disagreement, which has now come to an open split over Czechoslovakia, go back more than a decade. The PCI, a principal heir of the resistance movement of World War II, has long been the political party in Italy with the largest number of votes after the Christian Democratic Party, the key member of every coalition government of the past 20 years. Having achieved such success and come so close to victory through the democratic political process, the PCI has been increasingly keen to win a part in national rule.
Particularly in recent years, the PCI has been struggling to escape from the isolation it has experienced since its longtime ally, the Socialist Party, became instead the ally and governmental partner of the Christian Democrats. The PCI has repeatedly sought to show that Italian Communism is compatible with the democratic process either because world-wide Communism is no longer antidemocratic or, if this thesis is not tenable, because Italian Communism is following a sufficiently different path from that of a Communist dictatorship.
Togliatti's Polycentrism
For over a decade, Italian Communist theory has been developing justification for a stance more independent from the Soviet Union. The Italian Communist leadership first advocated "polycentrism"--a degree of autonomy for each national party--in June 1956. In a published interview that year, Palmiro Togliatti pointed out that "there are many roads to socialism" and insisted on a system in which bilateral party relationships would replace complete dependence on the USSR. Under pressure, however, he subsequently modified these views by calling for "democratic centralism." Togliatti redefined this term to involve close contacts with the Soviet Union, but allowed for certain variations in policy to take account of national considerations in each country.
The Italian leadership in 1964 began to re-emphasize polycentrism, and on 5 September published a "memorandum" by Togliatti, who had just died./2/ In this document, Togliatti stressed full support for the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict but said that a formal split with China must be avoided. The PCI, he said, "would be against any proposal to create once again a centralized international organization"; unity must be achieved "in the diversity of our concrete political positions" in each individual country. Togliatti emphasized that the nonruling Communist parties should be more flexible and adapt to local conditions. He criticized the Soviet leaders for the reluctant pace of de-Stalinization and called for frequent contacts among Communist parties--based on equality and not on Moscow's traditional rule of "unanimity" imposed from above.
/2/For text of Togliatti's "Yalta" Memorandum, see William E. Griffith (ed.), Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965 (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 373-383.
The Mediterranean Conference Movement
In 1967 and early 1968, the Italian Communists attempted to develop a line separate from that of the Soviets by supporting a regional Mediterranean conference that was to include leftist as well as Communist parties. The proposal had been originated by the Yugoslav Communists and a left-wing Italian Socialist splinter group.
The PCI backed the idea of cooperating with the non-Communist "progressives" in order to help the party during Italy's elections in the spring of 1967. By establishing an identification not only with Tito but with the various leftist parties in the area, the PCI hoped to shed its old domestic image as a tool of Moscow and thereby increase its appeal to the electorate.
The idea of a Mediterranean gathering gained strength after the Israeli-Arab war of June 1967. The decisive Israeli victory had stunned the Arab governments and had heightened fears among local "progressive" parties that the US would become more involved in the area. This situation, in the words of these parties, created the threat of "aggressive Atlantic-American imperialism" and threatened to transform the Mediterranean into a potentially explosive new "front" or "scene of dangerous confrontation" between the US Sixth Fleet and the newly introduced Soviet naval units.
After preliminary meetings in Italy and Yugoslavia, some 17 leftist and Communist parties from 12 Mediterranean countries met in Rome from 9 to 11 April 1968, but little emerged from the secret discussions. The Mediterranean movement has had little impact, and now appears to have been dropped, at least temporarily.
The Soviet Union reportedly was consulted by the Yugoslavs on the project but, as a non-Mediterranean power, probably never received an invitation nor sought to send a delegation. The Soviet reaction was cool and Moscow was probably put off by the Yugoslav proposal to discuss the presence of Soviet naval units. In addition, the Soviets undoubtedly feared the development of ideas and positions that would strengthen trends toward autonomy and jeopardize their hegemony in international Communism.
The Developing Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis
The Italian Communists believed that the decentralization of the international Communist movement, as exemplified in Prague's experiment, was important to their domestic political success. The PCI, which expected to decline in the national elections in May 1968, actually went up from 25.3 to 26.9 percent of the total vote. This success may have resulted partly from the adoption by the Czechoslovak and French Communist parties of more nationalistic roles.
As the Czechoslovak crisis developed, the Italian Communist leaders sought both publicly and privately to dissuade the Soviets from violent action. A reliable source reports "dramatic clashes" during the Italian-Soviet talks in Moscow from 14 to 16 July. Carlo Galluzzi, the leader of the foreign affairs section of the Italian party, told the Soviets that his party backed the new Czechoslovak leaders. He warned that, should the Soviets intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia, the Italian party would formally and publicly dissociate itself from the act. After he returned, Galluzzi told the PCI directorate that French Communist leader Waldeck Rochet, who had gone to Moscow with the Italians, had taken a similar but less explicit position against Soviet intervention.
Publicly, too, the PCI sought to demonstrate its support for Dubcek. The official party organ L'Unita reported on 30 July that the PCI believed that "frank and fraternal debates and meetings" should be held in an attempt to end the divergence of views over Czechoslovakia. On 6 August, a PCI communiqu&#eacute;expressed satisfaction that the Bratislava meeting had reaffirmed Communist solidarity and collaboration "on the basis of the autonomy of each party and each country in the search for ways of development of Socialist society." On 14 August, party secretary general Luigi Longo flew to Moscow for a "brief period of repose" that presumably included talks with Soviet leaders about Czechoslovakia.
Intervention
The intervention shocked the PCI and came as a surprise, as far as timing was concerned, even to the leaders. They were widely scattered in Italy and abroad for the traditional Italian August holidays. Only two PCI politburo members could be found to work with lesser officials in drafting a pronouncement on party reaction. The leaders decided on immediate censure and issued a communiqu&#eacute;on 21 August after telephone clearance from Longo in Moscow, but without consultation with other top-ranking party members. Party leaders are reported to have commented that this situation was worse than the Hungarian intervention, that it upset everything the Italian Communists had done since 1945, that Brezhnev and Kosygin were American agents and should be shot, and that the Soviet Union was on the road to Nazism.
During the week after the intervention, all Communist federations throughout Italy ratified the leadership position, according to a reliable source. Below the federation level, however, local PCI leaders expressed doubt and disagreement on both sides of the issue. Particularly among older Communists, there was some tendency to trust the Soviets. Nevertheless, the old Stalinists still prominent in the party failed to defend the USSR, and the two most prominent leaders sided unequivocally with Longo's position. Middle-class Communists, intellectuals, and many younger members considered the PCI position too bland.
Italian Support for Czechoslovakia
After the intervention, the PCI made a strong effort to rally international Communist opposition to the Soviet action. The Italians wanted to protect the Dubcek government, if possible, but in any case to distinguish the Italian Communist position clearly and unmistakably from that of the Soviets. The PCI made a special point of working with its French colleagues. Longo stopped for consultation in Paris on his flight home from Moscow on 22 August, and both parties called for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. In early September, Italian Communist emissaries visited Sofia and Budapest as well as Bucharest and Belgrade. They held further consultations with the French and, according to several reports, with other West European parties, including the British, the Austrian, and the Spanish.
The Italian Communists were determined to block a world-wide Communist ratification of the Soviet intervention at the international meeting long scheduled to open on 25 November in Budapest. They sought to have the meeting postponed indefinitely, and evidently found much sympathy for this point of view at the preparatory meeting in Budapest on 30 September. A new preliminary session is now scheduled for 17 November and, according to one source, the Soviets have moved their target date for a general conference to May 1969.
Effect on Auxiliaries
The Italian reaction to the Soviet invasion has been reflected in Communist auxiliary organizations as well as in party affairs. The Communist-dominated Italian labor confederation, CGIL, endorsed the party's condemnation of the USSR in a commemorative issue of L'Unita one month after the intervention. CGIL leaders refused a request to go to Moscow for an immediate parley with the Soviets, and instead insisted on consulting with Yugoslav and French labor leaders--and with the Czechoslovaks--in a meeting on 30 September-1 October. In addition, the Prague-based World Federation of Trade Unions--apparently at the initiative of Italian and French officials--condemned the Soviet invasion.
In the World Peace Council, according to a usually reliable source, the French and Italian members requested a meeting of the leadership to discuss the situation. The two delegations succeeded in fomenting a reaction described by a Soviet official as "very confused" and "very bad."
The Italian Communist youth federation is also at odds with its Soviet control elements. The PCI and the youth federation reportedly have reached an agreement to avoid all encounters with Soviet functionaries except at the highest party levels. PCI leaders may well have feared that the Soviets would try, as they have in France, to persuade party elements to support the Soviet position. The top levels of the Italian party are also undoubtedly eager to keep lower levels of the party from making de facto policy until they themselves have set over-all direction.
The secretary general of the federation evidently tried to postpone a visit in late September of a Komsomol mission that the Soviets had already scheduled and announced. A Soviet Embassy official refused to discuss the question with the Italians, however, insisting that the Komsomol group was coming anyway.
Repercussions and Prospects
The Italian party's stand against Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia represents a new degree of autonomy from the Soviets. The party's position is, in fact, an outright rejection of Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement, even if the Italian comrades continue to say polite things about the importance of the USSR in that movement. The Italian party under its present leadership is unlikely to return to the relationship it had with the Soviet party before August. The PCI has been unequivocal and persistent in criticizing the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. It was in the forefront of efforts to strengthen opposition to the Soviets in Communist parties throughout the free world. Moreover, although some low-level Italian Communists still think the USSR is infallible, the Italian Communist leadership has given every sign of an unusual degree of cohesion, and Luigi Longo's position as top leader seems enhanced.
In trying to bring the Italian Communists into line, the Soviets have two principal weapons, a threat to cut off financial aid and a threat to read the Italian party out of the Communist brotherhood. Some sources have suggested that the Soviets will first choose to cut off the flow of funds.
After the PCI had disapproved of the Soviet march into Czechoslovakia, Amerigo Terenzi, director of the party press and apparently the agent for Soviet press subsidies, remarked to the director of the influential Paese Sera that in two or three months the paper might have to close, according to a reliable source. Terenzi added that, as things were going, it was practically certain there would be no more money. As yet, however, there is no evidence that Moscow has cut its financing.
Although the Soviets have long provided the Italian Communist Party with substantial financial support, it is not clear how essential Soviet aid is to maintaining the size and strength of the party. In 1956, the USSR contributed about $7.5 million to a party budget of just over $11 million, according to a reliable source. Since then, however, the Soviet subsidy has probably decreased markedly, but the Soviets undoubtedly continue to provide additional funds for special occasions such as election campaigns.
Soviet financial pressure on the Italian Communist Party may also take the form of curtailing trade through Communist-influenced Italian commercial operations, which have customarily given a substantial cut to the party. The party could perhaps make up part of any shortfall in Soviet funding by seeking increased contributions from private Italian industry. Italian industrialists have long opposed putting all their eggs in one basket and, as a matter of policy, contribute to all political groups with major potential. Italy's industry has thus contributed substantially to the PCI over many years to provide itself with a friend at court if the PCI achieves its ambition of entering a government coalition. The PCI's success on a local government level and in the labor movement has also provided industry with reasons to contribute.
If the split widens between the Soviet and Italian parties, the Soviets may seek to emphasize throughout the world Communist movement that the Italians have deviated from the true Marxist line. Such an indictment would be damaging to the Italian Communist sense of belonging to a world movement, a sense that has been part of their appeal. Even in this event, however, the Italian party is not likely to view itself as having taken a unique stand on Marxist doctrine.
Over the long term, if there were no alternative, the Soviets could undoubtedly split the Italian Communist Party and could then provide support to a faction accepting Moscow's dominance. Any such faction, however, probably would draw only a small percentage of present Italian Communist strength. In any case, the Soviets would probably make a strong effort first to secure more friendly Italian party leadership by bringing pressure for the ouster of some leaders and by attempting to show others--through fear or favor--the practicality of a pro-Soviet stance. The most likely immediate outlook therefore, is for continuing tension between the two parties.
In domestic politics, the Italian party will seek to use its disagreement with the Soviets to further its contention that it is not a "tool of Moscow." The party must avoid such a stigma if it is to make further progress toward its most ardently sought domestic objective--developing cooperation with left-wing Christian Democrats and Socialists to the point where the Communists will be accepted as partners in a government coalition.
145. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State/1/
Rome, November 19, 1968, 1541Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 TR. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn for Fowler, to Paris, and to the EC Mission in Brussels.
9552. Subject: Rome Visit of Secretary Fowler.
1. Secretary Fowler accompanied by Under Secretary Deming, Fried, Willis, Ambassador and TreasAtt met morning November 18 with Minister Colombo flanked by State Accountant General Stammati, Treasury DirGen Nuvolini and new Treasury member WP-3 and G-10 Deputies Palumbo.
2. Secretary Fowler mentioned his hope ratification SDR amendments could be achieved by early next year. Colombo said shared this hope. Indicated that in Italy, after inevitable interruption Parliamentary consideration due forthcoming government reorganization, both Parliamentary chambers would be pressed to complete ratification quickly.
3. Secretary noted Johnson administration together with liberal minded members of Congress had been able hold back strong protectionist tendencies, but liberals becoming discouraged by developments in EC and Japan. EC Common Agricultural Policy creating ever larger surpluses which cutting into U.S. export possibilities, European border tax adjustments growing in detriment to U.S. trade and talk preferential commercial arrangements between EC, UK and other countries further aggravating situation. Trade measures should be made integral part B/P adjustment process. While said did not know what views next U.S. administration would have in trade area, Secretary stated hope EC in next months could cooperate in measures which would improve atmosphere in which new Congress would consider trade measures. Specifically suggested EC go through with acceleration KR, without insistence removal ASP, and move constructively in border tax area such as by recognizing legitimacy relief for countries whose tax system depended mainly on direct taxes.
4. In reply Colombo expressed appreciation U.S. efforts in resisting protectionism. Stated ASP was linked with acceleration KR at French insistence. Italy's basic idea KR acceleration is good-will gesture which ought to be reciprocated by some motion on U.S. side toward ASP passage.
5. On proposed commercial arrangements with UK, Colombo stated personal opinion any arrangement for trade preferences should be tied with specific objective for achieving economic integration. Italy and Netherlands feel strongest about this. Germany not as staunch as before and Colombo hoped Secretary Fowler in visit to Bonn could help to firm up German position. Colombo said 1969 will be critical year for CAP. He personally feels CAP costs too much, creates agricultural surpluses and favors status quo rather than progress. In his opinion, export differential payments should be narrowed while expenditures for agricultural productivity improvement should be increased. Finance Minister Strauss agrees with this. But not clear that Italian or German Government as a whole does.
Colombo depressed general agreement trade policy was stagnant area in which all believing in liberal trade policies should seek resume constructive forward movement.
6. Secretary mentioned positive results of NATO meeting in Brussels./2/ This connection Under Secretary Deming explained to Minister Colombo proposal which he had made separately to Carli November 16 regarding Italian purchase of special U.S. Treasury securities to help neutralize U.S. military expenditures in Italy. Colombo promised consider this in concert with Carli.
/2/The NAC Ministerial meeting was held November 12-16.
7. Meeting closed with mutual expressions appreciation past collaboration and hope close working relationship would be continued by successors. (Colombo did not say what his future would be but remarked he speaking for government which would cease exist in 24 hours.)/3/
/3/The government offered its resignation November 19, and Mariano Rumor formed a center-left government on December 12.
8. This message not cleared with Secretary's party.
Ackley
146. Memorandum for the Files/1/
Washington, December 12, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of State, Italian Desk Files: Lot 72 D 509, Def 19-8. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Charles K. Johnson.
SUBJECT
Lockheed P3B Proposal to Italy
On December 12 Mr. Phil Sullivan and Mr. James Gannett of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation came in to discuss the possibility that there might still be hope that the GOI would reverse its field and buy the P3B. They had information from their representative in Rome that the GOI might not yet have formally committed itself in writing to the Breguet Atlantique; also there was a possibility that some members of the new government might be friendly to the P3B. They said they had called at the Pentagon and been informed that while DOD was not prepared to take the initiative in offering its proposal again, it would have no objection to informing the Embassy in Rome that the offer was still valid, in the event a question were asked from the Italian side. In response I told Messrs. Sullivan and Gannett that we did not know whether the GOI had signed a commitment on the Atlantique, but that it was not likely that we would be informed in any event; we would be prepared to ask the Embassy if it had any information on the general subject, but would check first with DOD.
I subsequently spoke to Olney in DOD/ILN who had seen Sullivan and Gannett several days earlier. He said he felt that there was no change whatsoever of an Italian switch and that the straws held out by the Lockheed representative in Rome were very thin indeed. DOD did not want to associate itself with a further offer on the basis of such flimsy evidence, and did not even want to send a contingency "if asked" message to the Embassy. On the other hand Olney told the Lockheed officials that if the Italians were to approach them on the P3B, the Pentagon would stand behind the P3B package.
During a conversation with Bob Gordon in Rome on December 13, I mentioned the Lockheed call the previous day. He said there had been a few rumors floating on the subject, but they all could be traced back to one source, the Lockheed man in Rome. If there were anything substantial, the Embassy would certainly report it, but this was definitely not the case. A month ago, MOD Gui had sent a letter of intent on the Atlantique to the NATO consortium group, but whether this constituted a binding commitment was not clear.
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.