Portugal
147. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State/1/
Lisbon, January 24, 1964, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 PORT. Secret.
591. I met with Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira this morning discussing with him current Portuguese-American problems exclusive of Azores and request for Consulate in Beira, both of which I felt were untimely. Foreign Minister in calm, relaxed mood listened attentively before talking.
First subject was desirability of unilateral Portuguese move on self-determination in which I presented all items mentioned Department telegram 444/2/ plus relation this matter to recent press statement by U Thant in which he excused himself for not visiting Portuguese Africa due to wide divergence interpretations "self-determination."/3/ Foreign Minister said he would give arguments serious consideration but reiterated his personal belief no dramatic move at this time would be helpful to Portugal. This I countered with forceful statement immediate future time for action more than any other of which I could conceive. Foreign Minister [said] SYG public announcement and reason for not accepting Portuguese invitation came as complete surprise, although they did not expect him to accept.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXIV, Document 414.
/3/Pursuant to a Security Council resolution of December 11, 1963, the Secretary-General was instructed to take steps to promote "self-determination" for Portugal's colonial territories. For text of UN document S/5481, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 161-162. The Secretary-General summarized this effort in SYG report S/5727, May 29, 1964.
Second subject, related to foregoing, was Portuguese image and necessity to project to world current progressive measures being taken in Portuguese Africa together with reforms which have been and are being made. This led to importance avoid antagonizing friendly elements by such actions as totally unjustified wave of critical editorials and anti-American attitude manifested in radio and TV. I mentioned harmful effect on Portuguese image by their actions re Protestant missionaries in Africa, pointing out that vast majority these people engaged in humane evangelical work and furtherance beliefs of millions Americans anxious to serve mankind. These missionaries should not be penalized nor their supporting groups alienated because of possible irritation Portuguese authorities with indiscreet actions of a few. No comment by Foreign Minister.
This led to discussion recognition of Communist China; hoped he would understand US concern over French actions and emphasized points set forth Department telegram 455./4/ I said I had read reports GOP considering recognition Communist China and hoped such consideration would not lead to affirmative decision on matter, which would only expose Portugal to Communist influence and subversion and would alienate large segment American people friendly to Portugal. Foreign Minister stated he did not know exact reasons French took actions they had re recognition of Communist China nor was he in any position to judge. However, he did say he fully understood American feelings. He stated Portugal had de facto arrangement on Macau but necessarily had to consider longer range problem Macau as well as long-range commercial interests. He stated matter under consideration as had been many times before. However, was not related to French decision nor was for purpose of irritating or alienating US. He stated quite frankly any decision, if made, would not be in near future. "You do not have to worry."
/4/Telegram 455, January 22, instructed the Embassy to sound out government officials on Portugal's policy regarding China. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 16 CHICOM)
Portugal greatly apprehensive effects of Chou-en-Lai visit to Africa./5/ Foreign Minister considers this master stroke of ChiCom diplomacy. Agreed with our concern Chinese ambitions. However, felt matter even more serious that we do as ChiCom approach type that appeals to Africans.
/5/January 11-February 4, 1964.
In response to my question about decision on Loran-C,/6/ Foreign Minister apologized delay in response but stated both Defense Minister and he had been out of country and said he would get me reply "next week."
/6/The request was made December 17 during the NATO Ministerial meeting in Paris. A memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Portuguese Desk Files: Lot 68 D 401, Pol Port-US.
Foreign Minister indicated information requested by Secretary Rusk on terrorist operations across frontiers in Africa was being typed by his office and would be delivered to Secretary through me within day or so./7/
/7/Not further identified.
I expressed appreciation for prospect forthcoming action PL-480/8/ matter and indicated there was good possibility early consummation agreement on cotton textiles. Foreign Minister grateful efforts of Department but said he was not personally familiar with details.
/8/For text of P.L. 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, see 68 Stat. 454.
I mentioned hope that I might visit African territories sometime near future provided no Portuguese objection. Foreign Minister stated not only no objection but visit would be most welcome. In fact, he was sending circulars to all diplomatic representatives here urging them to see for themselves what is going on in Portuguese Africa. I thanked him for his views as necessary preliminary to consultation with Department on such visit.
I stated I had been Portugal some months and felt it desirable to talk to Dr. Salazar. Foreign Minister indicated certain Dr. Salazar would be pleased to receive me at any time. Have initiated request for interview with him for early next week at which time will present again arguments made to Foreign Minister re statement on self-determination, improvement of Portuguese image, US views on recognition Communist China, and need for early affirmative action on Loran-C./9/
/9/Anderson reported on his January 30 meeting with Salazar in telegram 605 from Lisbon, January 31. Anderson pressed for Portuguese cooperation with UN self-determination issues. Salazar was preoccupied with the effect of Chou's African visit. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT)
Full memos of conversation being pouched./10/
/10/The memorandum of conversation was sent to the Department in airgram A-328, January 29. (Ibid., POL 1 PORT)
Anderson
148. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the Ambassador to Portugal (Anderson)/1/
Washington, February 6, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 PORT. Confidential; Personal. Cleared by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Tyler.
Dear George:
I greatly appreciated your letter of January 28, 1964, enclosing the report of your recent conversation with the Foreign Minister./2/
/2/See Document 147.
I am delighted to hear that you are contemplating a trip to the Portuguese areas of Africa. I definitely concur in such a visit and look forward to receiving from you a first-hand report of your impressions of these areas.
I note that you intend to take one of your Attach?s along with you on the trip. In the interest of broadening the knowledge within the Embassy of these territories, I believe it would be advantageous for you also to take along with you one of the officers from your political section. I believe that you would find such an officer of great value to you on your trip as well as after you return.
It is true that the days since the trip to Lisbon last August and September/3/ have been very full, but this does not mean that there is any lessening of my interest in Portugal's problems in Africa. I've read your telegrams with great interest and have been pleased not only by their high quality, but also by the success you've had with Franco Nogueira. Now, if you'll just get him to pull those F-86s out of Guinea, as he promised to do, we shall be impressed indeed!/4/
/3/For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Documents 357, 358, and 360.
/4/Telegram 493 from Lisbon, December 6, 1963, reported Noguiera's promise. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 30 ANG)
Sincerely,
George/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original.
149. Record of Actions/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Standing Group February 18, 1964. Secret.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STANDING GROUP
RECORD OF ACTIONS
Meeting No. 1/64, February 18, 1964--6:00 PM
1. Following discussion of a State Department paper on Portuguese African Territories,/2/ Under Secretary Harriman agreed that the State Department's short-term program for Portuguese Africa would include the following:
/2/A copy of this undated report is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Portugal, Vol. 1.
a. Initiating a new round of U.S.-Portuguese bilateral talks at high level, to evidence U.S. efforts to influence the Portuguese.
b. Expanding discussions with Portuguese officials to include conversations between U.S. and Portuguese representatives in various capitals, in international organization, etc.
c. Generating bilateral talks between Portuguese and moderate African leaders and exploring the renewal of UN-sponsored talks.
d. Continuing conversations with key reasonable Africans to demonstrate our own concern with the Angolan problem and to engage them in the effort to achieve peaceful evolution.
2. State, AID and CIA representatives agreed to coordinate a review of the adequacy of existing programs for Portuguese African Nationalists--particularly refugee relief, secondary education, educational programs specially tailored to potential political leaders, administrative and professional governmental cadres and other such specialized requirements; and other forms of assistance by appropriate means.
3. State and CIA representatives agreed to produce a concise information memo regarding progress, status and prospects--political and economic--of the people of the Portuguese African territories; e.g. what steps are the Portuguese taking on land reform, expanded education, broader participation in local elections and local government?
4. The Group agreed to schedule, during the next few weeks, consideration of the Congo, of Ghana and of South and Southwest Africa.
150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/
Washington, April 16, 1964, 6:04 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Barbour; cleared by Williams, Sisco, and Buffum; and approved by Burdett. Pouched to Luanda, Lourenco Marques, and USUN.
628. Embtel 778./2/ Salazar Guidance.
/2/Telegram 778 from Lisbon, April 10, reported that Anderson had requested a meeting with Salazar. (Ibid., POL 15-1 PORT)
Department supports line of thought you conveyed to Fonmin on your return from Africa (Embtel 764)/3/ and recommends similar presentation to Salazar.
/3/Telegram 764 from Lisbon, April 3, reported on Anderson's talks with Noguiera on Portuguese Africa. Anderson visited Angola February 29-March 10, and Mozambique March 10-19, 1964.
Believe you should also emphasize to him following two general points:
1. Basis for US policies: As shown by President's response to Garin at April 8 presentation ceremony (texts pouched),/4/ US believes change fact of life in our era. Changes in Portuguese Africa as inevitable as elsewhere in world, though Portugal still has power to decide whether they will take place with her or against her. We believe failure to respond now to self-determination aspirations of Portuguese Africans will result in changes detrimental to interests of United States and West as well as to Portugal. This is why US continually urges Portugal in its own interest become champion of political changes which will take place in her territories and, being based on pragmatic principles, it is why US policies in respect this situation have not changed and should not be expected to change.
/4/Not found.
2. Self-determination declaration: US continues believe best thing Portugal could do on own behalf would be forthright statement accepting principle self-determination as defined December 11 SC res./5/ Such statement, which would seem compatible with Portugal's announced aims and programs in Africa, would take advantage of uniquely favorable but probably perishable opportunity offered by SC 5481. It quite possible this opportunity may no longer exist after next SC meeting, presumably in June. (Deptel 444/6/ contains additional arguments for use in your discretion.)
/5/See footnote 3, Document 147.
/6/See footnote 2, Document 147.
3. You should also tell Salazar US gratified at indications certain African leaders interested in further talks with Portugal. We plan emphasize with FonMin importance these conversations and our concern that there be no prior conditions attached to them. We hope Portugal will adopt constructive attitude toward such meetings.
Ball
151. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State/1/
Lisbon, April 18, 1964, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PORT. Confidential.
813. Reference: Deptel 628./2/ I met yesterday with Salazar for one hour forty minutes. Found him mentally alert as ever but physically somewhat subdued (I had heard that he recently recovered from pneumonia). He admitted he was tired.
/2/Document 150.
After thanking for courtesies shown me throughout Portuguese Africa, I made 40-minute uninterrupted presentation which covered both observations on my trip and USG position with respect problem of Portuguese territories, along same lines as my talk with Franco Nogueira (Embtel 764)/3/ extended as per instructions set forth Deptel 628. Salazar listened intently and then engaged me in spirited one-hour discussion, memcon of which will be pouched soon as possible./4/ I can assure Department that points contained reference telegram were covered by me both forcefully and comprehensively. In strongest terms I urged Salazar produce public statement accepting reasonable concept of self-determination on basis of which extreme African pressures could be relieved, Portuguese image could be improved, and Portugal's friends could rally in support of orderly, phased, peaceful solution to problem of general concern to us all.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 150.
/4/Transmitted in airgram A-520, May 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PORT)
Regret I must report that Salazar remained adamantly opposed any public statement on self-determination. He adduced familiar case of Belgian Congo and said with entire weight of evidence against prospects any orderly transition he could not understand why USG insisted upon trying invent yet one more formula. I told him we did so precisely to avoid repeating errors of past. Salazar said that while Nationalist pressures of today are from outside Angola and Mozambique they would promptly develop internally if GOP were to make public utterance of type we sought press upon it.
To my suggestion that Angolan refugees with exception known criminals be welcomed back into that province, Salazar replied that GOP quite willing accept them and even Congo Leopoldville probably quite glad be relieved of them, but that armed forces of Holden Roberto physically prevented their return except for small groups which manage straggle across frontier and reach Portuguese reception stations.
Salazar readily agreed with my assertion need for massive investment to develop material and human resources Portuguese Africa. Cited drain imposed on Portuguese development funds and capabilities by present military situation as basis for view political solution must precede economic. As regards specifically private investment, I mentioned need for political stability as one essential ingredient in favorable investment climate. He responded by comparing stability offered by Portuguese administration in Africa with that offered by newly-independent African states. Enlarging upon this, Salazar said he did not know about US but that private investors from European countries seemed willing invest in Portuguese Africa and were still doing so at present time. To him this suggested that they found business conditions more promising there than in independent Africa and that they did not attach too great importance to terrorism in Northern Angola.
Only point upon which Salazar readily fell in with our thinking had to do with continued Luso-African conversations. He professed see these as unproductive due to fact participants operating on entirely different wave lengths but smilingly expressed his willingness carry them on if we felt this advisable.
On balance I could perceive no real give or hint of prospective change in Salazar's position. He made clear and explicit his belief that USG efforts are misdirected and that morally and realistically we should be pressing African states to withdraw support from terrorists who impede political, economic and social evolution of Portuguese Africa rather than pressuring Portugal to take steps which could only lead to instability and retrogression.
Salazar remained personally friendly throughout entire discussion and at its conclusion thanked me for report upon my African travels. Again I was amazed at the amount of detailed knowledge he has over an area which he has never visited.
Anderson
152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/
Washington, April 22, 1964, 11:55 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Barbour and approved by Burdett.
638. Request that in your next talk with Franco Nogueira you make clear our non-appreciation of remarks reported your A-454./2/ We find it singularly vexatious that he should engage in thinly-veiled public castigation of US and its policies before press representatives while simultaneously poring over every word or act of US officials in search of imagined grievances.
/2/Airgram A-454 from Lisbon, April 11, reported that Nogueira delivered a "tirade" against U.S. policy toward Africa to a group of American journalists. (Ibid.)
Leave manner of conveying this to your discretion, but it would be adverse US-Portuguese relations if Fonmin remained under delusion that his remarks went unnoticed.
Rusk
153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/
Washington, May 3, 1964, 5:33 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Portugal, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Barbour; cleared in DOD, G/PM, and EUR; and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Paris.
654. Lisbon's A-333, A-387./2/ Subj: FY 1963 MAP.
/2/Airgram A-333, February 1, contained Embassy recommendations regarding the delivery of MAP to Portugal. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-2 US-PORT) Airgram A-387, February 29, recommended the release to Portugal of MAP arms and equipment. (Ibid., DEF 19-3 US-PORT)
1. Dept sympathetic problems resulting from suspension FY 1963 MAP deliveries to Portugal, particularly difficulties caused Embassy with younger military officers. We also aware disadvantages from NATO standpoint. However, we unable consider lifting suspension FY 1963 MAP equipment unless following conditions are met: (a) withdrawal remaining F-86's from Guinea; (b) firm commitment that MAP equipment to be furnished would remain in North Atlantic Treaty area and (c) reasonably effective means of confirming compliance. (Agreement on Loran-C would also help but a-b-c required.)
2. Regardless MAP aspects, Dept considers new approach on F-86's necessary. Ambassador therefore requested see FonMin at early date to reassert importance we attach to withdrawal. You should refer categorical undertakings given personally by FonMin Dec 6 (Embtel 493)/3/ and inquire when these commitments will be fulfilled. (Would appreciate Embassy's estimate number F-86's still Guinea.)/4/
/3/See footnote 4, Document 148.
/4/Telegram 894 from Lisbon, May 19, reported Portuguese assurances that no F-86s were in Guinea. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 PORT-US)
3. Meanwhile, irrespective conditions paragraph one, and subject Embassy/MAAG views, Dept and DOD agreeable releasing some FY 63 MAP funds to offer small number Loran-C receivers to Navy (in addition those lent for civilian use mentioned Deptel 617)/5/ to improve Loran-C attractiveness. Offer of course conditional on favorable response Loran-C sites.
/5/Not printed. (Ibid.)
Copies pertinent memos pouched Lisbon./6/
/6/Not further identified.
Rusk
154. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State/1/
Lisbon, May 6, 1964, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Secret.
865. For the Secretary. Embtel 847./2/ In anticipation of your meeting with Foreign Minister Nogueira at The Hague, and in accordance Department circular telegram 1962/3/ following may be useful:
/2/Telegram 847 from Lisbon, May 2, reported that Anderson encouraged Noguiera to seek a luncheon meeting with Rusk. (Ibid., ORG 7 S)
/3/Not found.
Without knowing what Foreign Minister may have on his mind, I presume he will seek support Portuguese position in Africa and may advance thesis that recent provincial elections there evidence progress on part GOP along lines consistent with reasonable concept self-determination. Foreign Minister may also refer your request at last meeting with him for documented case of transborder aggression from Congo, may note that factual dossier submitted, and may inquire as to USG action contemplated on basis thereof.
For our part, I would like to suggest possible desirability raising following two subjects:
1. Loran-C: Without entering into technical details with Foreign Minister, I believe it might be very helpful were you personally to impress upon him importance which we attach to Loran-C not merely for US but for all of NATO and necessity we feel for early action this matter.
2. Self-determination: My most recent talks with Salazar (Embtel 813)/4/ and Foreign Minister (Embtel 848)/5/ convince me that neither is at this time willing consider any public statement on self-determination of type we have been recommending. I am personally highly dubious as to merit or net advantage to USG of continuing to hammer away at theme at once unacceptable and unpalatable to GOP. Apart from being unproductive, such continuing effort progressively erodes our good will credit and our ability influence Portuguese on other matters of importance to us. We are already, I believe, undesirably far out in front of practically all other countries in this regard. While we continue press and irritate Portuguese on matter of Africa and self-determination, other nations through more passive role are picking up points and advantages in other areas.
/4/Telegram 813 from Lisbon, April 18, reported Anderson's April 17 meeting with Salazar on colonial issues. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PORT)
/5/In telegram 848 from Lisbon, May 2, Anderson reported he had pressed Noguiera for a declaration on "self-determination" for the African colonies. (Ibid., POL 10 PORT)
I therefore suggest as means moving this problem off dead center and for purpose introducing new element flexibility that, in your conversation with Foreign Minister at The Hague, you probe GOP position in following manner. After making reference our continuing but as yet unfruitful effort elicit GOP public statement on self-determination and reasons why US believes such statement would be helpful to GOP position, inquire of Foreign Minister as to what if any action, assurances, or guarantee of support on part of USG would persuade GOP issue such statement. You could indicate our familiarity with standard GOP arguments but also make reference again to frequently expressed belief by GOP that we are in position materially influence course of events in Africa. While reiterating view that US influence significantly overrated, you could conclude that US willingness attempt find peaceful resolution of problems besetting our allies can stand, and has stood, severe tests and we quite prepared place our prestige along side Portuguese on a specific and defensible proposal if this will move issue forward. Foreign Minister would then specifically be asked whether any action or guarantee of support on our part could induce GOP come forth with desired statement. His answer, or Salazar's, should then either open up new and more fruitful avenue of discussion (which I doubt) or provide clear evidence no useful purpose served by continuing present tactics until circumstances have changed significantly to so warrant./6/
/6/Telegram Secto 18, May 12, reported that on the initiative of the Secretary, he and Nogueira discussed Cuba, Brazilian developments, the Congo, and Angola, and that "neither F-86's nor Loran-C nor question of self-determination" were raised. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Portugal, Vol. 1) Memoranda of the Rusk-Noguiera discussions are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2397.
Anderson
155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/
Washington, June 26, 1964, 7:30 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Confidential. Drafted by Barbour; cleared by Buffum, AFC, and ARA; and approved by Tyler. Repeated to Rio de Janiero, Leopoldville, USUN, Luanda, and Lourenco Marques.
773. USUN's 4596./2/ Unless you see objection, please convey following to Franco Nogueira at next meeting.
/2/Telegram 4596 from USUN, June 22, reported that during a conversation with Stevenson, Lacerda noted Salazar's claim that the United States was supplying the Angolan rebel forces. (Ibid.)
During talks in US Carlos Lacerda reported that Portuguese convinced US arms reaching Angolan rebels via Congo and that Salazar claimed have paper signed by AmEmbassy Leopoldville attach? proving US source.
We cannot ignore insinuation US providing arms to Angolan rebels, and we regret that Lacerda, for whom we have great esteem, should have been made party to this renewed innuendo against US.
Inform Fonmin you instructed state that allegations and insinuations such as those imparted to Lacerda in Lisbon wholly without foundation, as we have repeatedly told GOP. We very much regret GOP's refusal accept statements made to it in best of faith.
No question anyone can buy US arms on world market. These beyond our control. We satisfied no weapons delivered through official channels to African recipients have been diverted to Roberto. Commercial sales are not permitted.
Would be curious see paper referred to by Salazar. Could this be document first reported your 840 of Feb 21, 1962?/3/ Will be recalled Secretary personally informed Fonmin in Athens/4/ and Pereira in Washington/5/ that document obvious and complete forgery concocted to sow discord between us.
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 338, footnote 1.
/4/See ibid., Document 338.
/5/See ibid., Document 338, footnote 2.
If Portuguese have new paper, hope Fonmin will accord us courtesy of at least showing it to us, as he did on earlier occasion, or, even better, giving us copy for comment and study./6/
/6/Apparent reference to a paper given to U.S. officials in September 1963; a copy is an enclosure to airgram A-135, September 18, 1963. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1961-63, POL 19 PORT)
Rusk
156. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 30, 1964, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by McKillop and approved in S on July 21. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.
SUBJECT
Portuguese Ambassador's Call on the Secretary
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Ambassador Vasco Vieira Garin, Portuguese Embassy
Mr. William R. Tyler, EUR
Mr. David H. McKillop, WE
Calling at his request, the Ambassador first asked the Secretary whether there had been any developments stemming from the dossier that the Portuguese Foreign Minister had sent to us earlier as evidence of the dependency of the Angolan rebellion on Congolese support./2/ The Secretary replied that we have tried to get the Congolese to take a responsible and moderate approach to this problem and have cautioned against dangers inherent in lending aid and comfort to the movement. Now the Congolese political situation is in a state of flux, and it is difficult to predict what kind of government will emerge. The Secretary believed, however, that there are elements among the Congolese who wish to cooperate in finding a peaceful solution for problems involving Angola and the Congo. Until the political picture in the Congo is clarified, we can only remain on the watch to see how the situation evolves. The Secretary asked if the Ambassador had any new information.
/2/Not further identified.
The Ambassador launched upon familiar Portuguese themes. He said that although there has been a decrease in terrorist activities in Angola, where the situation is now relatively calm and peaceful, nevertheless, the Portuguese continue to receive reports of large shipments of arms coming from a variety of Communist countries and entering the Congo for the use of Holden Roberto rather than the Congolese themselves. Thus while the Portuguese are not worried by the present situation in Angola itself, they are very concerned for the future because of the gathering military strength of the Angolan rebels and the use of Congolese territory as a safehaven in launching attacks against Angola.
The Ambassador then proceeded to paint a very rosy picture of conditions in Angola, based on what he said was his firsthand observations made on his trip there in January. Describing Angola as an island of peace and contentment in a sea of African turmoil, he said that the entire population is benefitting from the many social and health benefits, that economic conditions are good, that racial integration is complete and that slow but steady progress is being made toward greater political freedom with elections now at a district level. The only threat to this favorable evolution is the non-nationalist, Communist-backed rebel movement. If the use of the Congo for this operation could be terminated, the Ambassador was convinced that all of Angola's troubles would be quickly over. The Ambassador, therefore, urged U.S. support for obtaining this objective, including some public acknowledgment on our part of the positive developments taking place in Angola, such as the role of Angolan transportation facilities in helping bolster the Congo economy.
The Secretary observed that perhaps the Ambassador was underestimating the importance of the political factor in the Angolan domestic scene. In this day and age, favorable social and economic conditions do not necessarily alone satisfy populations, which are now insisting upon the right of governing or even misgoverning themselves. The Secretary wondered, therefore, whether the Portuguese should not try to cope with the rebellion using political and negotiating methods rather than relying entirely upon force. Referring to the fact that he had told the Portuguese Foreign Minister on a previous occasion that the Spanish approach to their African problems seemed to have succeeded in muffling attacks by Afro-Asians against Spain, the Secretary thought that Portugal might profit from this example./3/
/3/Not further identified.
The Ambassador continued to insist that there would be no problem if the Congo ceased to be a base of operation against Angola, that the Afro-Asians refuse to accept evidence of the good conditions and contentment prevailing in Angola, as exemplified by the refusal of the UN Secretary General to visit Angola, and finally that Spaniards do not have the same large interests and investments in their African territories that the Portuguese have.
The Ambassador then asked the Secretary for his appraisal of recent political developments in the Congo, including the unexpected return of Tshombe to Leopoldville. He said that these events had generated all kinds of rumors, such as one that he had heard to the effect that the United States had backed Tshombe's return to the Congo on the condition that Tshombe would continue to support Holden Roberto. The Ambassador said that this no doubt was just a silly story, but he wished to cite it as an example of what people are talking about.
The Secretary dismissed the story as obviously without foundation, pointing out that the United States is not particularly in Tshombe's good graces because of past events and emphasizing that in any case, the United States had nothing to do with Tshombe's return to Leopoldville, a strictly Congolese affair. As for the general political situation in the Congo, it is presently so unsettled that neither we nor anybody else is in a position to predict the outcome. Perhaps a government of national reconciliation would emerge headed up by Adoula, or even Tshombe, but at this point, we just cannot say.
After expressing concern about trends in Algeria, the Ambassador said as a final point, he wished to ask how we regarded the current Zanzibar situation, which continues to worry the Portuguese because of reports that the Communist presence is still strong there. In this connection, he commented that while not a shot has been fired in Mozambique, nevertheless, the Portuguese know that so-called "freedom fighters" are being trained in Tanganyika to cause the same type of trouble and violence that has occurred in Angola as a result of Roberto's activities.
The Secretary replied that the Zanzibar situation seems now to be developing in a somewhat more favorable direction, that the former Embassies on the island, including the East German and ChiCom posts, have been reduced to Consulates, with the West Germans, however, retaining their Embassy in Tanganyika. Furthermore, the Tanganyikan police seem to have the internal security of the island well in hand.
The Ambassador thanked the Secretary for his kind reception and hoped that perhaps after the situation in the Congo had clarified, he could again seek our views on problems in the area.
157. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State/1/
Lisbon, July 7, 1964, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US. Confidential.
15. Had two-hour session with FonMin July 6. First briefed him on current US views on Congo and Algeria drawing on material furnished me by Department (Deptel Topol 2002 to Paris and CA-13499, both dated June 23, 1964)./2/ FonMin grateful for report. Second, commented on recent action by Committee of 24. FonMin indicated his pleasure over remarks and vote of US representative in contrast to that of Denmark.
/2/Telegram Topol 2002 to Paris, June 23, provided guidance regarding U.S. policy in the Congo. (Ibid., POL 23-7 THE CONGO) Circular airgram CA-13499, June 23, provided an assessment of the situation in Algeria. (Ibid., POL 1 ALG)
With foregoing as preamble stated substance of Department and personal indignation over allegations and insinuations by GOP officers to Carlos Lacerda following instructions Deptel 773/3/ point by point. I vigorously denied assertions US supplied any arms to terrorists and that US policy in any way based on economic imperialism or efforts displace Belgian or Portuguese business interests. FonMin denied insinuations stemmed from own conversation with Lacerda and stated would check with Doctor Salazar as to whether came from him.
/3/Document 155.
Then confronted FonMin with article in edition number 51964 of Aussen Politik by German editor (Handelsblatt, Dusseldorf) Hunck containing direct quotations from interview with FonMin. Statement was to effect he considered US real enemy of Portuguese in Africa. FonMin read carefully then categorically denied accuracy of either substance or tenor his attributed comment. Said he would investigate thoroughly and take appropriate action through his Ambassador in Bonn.
Next raised with FonMin question of F-86's in Portuguese Guinea, stating my concern and disillusionment GOP had not fulfilled firm commitment of past December and most recently of May 18 to withdraw aircraft. FonMin greatly embarrassed and stated all my points and arguments absolutely valid. However, he had had problems with MinDef who felt presence F-86's in Portuguese Guinea necessary as "deterrent" but who had agreed they would not be used for operational missions. I countered with long dissertation and FonMin said he would talk again with MinDef./4/
/4/In telegram 26 from Lisbon, July 10, Anderson reported that the Portuguese Secretary of State for Air stated that the F-86s would be removed from Guinea to the Cape Verde Islands and restricted from flying over Guinea. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Portugal, Vol. 1)
Then raised again subject continuing restriction against any further sale of tantalite from Mozambique to Soviet Union expressing necessity for this action to avoid conflict with Battle Act./5/ FonMin said he was under heavy pressure from Mozambique to authorize shipment and went into long legalistic monologue. Although he is fully aware US position, will raise problem including Battle Act requirement on reporting on earlier shipments, at next meeting (Embtel 2 to Lourenco Marques repeated Department 14)./6/
/5/For text of the Battle Act, the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, P.L. 218, approved October 26, 1951, see 65 Stat. 218.
/6/Telegram 14 from Lisbon, July 7, reported that the Ambassador raised the tantalite issue with Noguiera and requested instructions on African policy. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, STR 13-1 USSR-MOZ)
I referred to current editorial in Diario de Noticias which stated that in covering forthcoming trip of Portuguese President Thomaz hoped would not be victim of "conspiracy of silence in international press." I cautioned FonMin not to expect significant coverage in US press since if all went well visit would simply not be major item of news value to US papers, radio and TV. There existed no "conspiracy" or even suggestion of playing down story of trip. FonMin denied any insinuation against US press and said he hoped their own house was in better order than on occasion of last year's visit of President to Angola.
On Loran-C FonMin said he was awaiting list of things wanted by MinDef and hoped to be able to provide same by end of week for US study while concurrently a site survey might be conducted.
FonMin expressed gratitude for offer by US Navy of quonset huts for Azores/7/ and apologized for delay in reply due to necessity for consultation other Ministries (Embtel 7)./8/
/7/An earthquake struck the islands on February 19.
/8/Not printed.
Comment: In connection foregoing two items, we must recognize that in spite of all pressure things move frustratingly slowly in this "Federation of Ministries."
Meeting concluded with FonMin assessment things going very well in Angola, quiet in Mozambique and getting better in Portuguese Guinea where few months ago situation very bad due to "civil war" between Portuguese military and civil authorities.
Anderson
158. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Paris, December 14, 1964, noon.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PORT. Confidential. Also sent to Lisbon and USUN.
Secto 10. Following summary of Secretary's conversation with FonMin Nogueira is FYI, Noforn and subject to revision on review./2/
/2/Secretary Rusk was in Paris for the NATO Ministerial meeting. Memoranda of the Rusk-Nogueira conversations are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2462-2467.
FonMin Nogueira had hour's talk mainly on Africa with Secretary Sunday p.m. in cordial non-controversial atmosphere from which following emerged:
1. Conversation general in nature and did not touch upon specific issues such as US attitude toward Holden Roberto and other nationalists, Loran C, Azores etc. In addition to African discussion, in which FonMin showed greatest interest, Secretary gave brief rundown on inconclusive Gromyko talks, ChiCom problem, Article 19 and prospects for NATO meeting.
2. Although situation in Portuguese Africa now calm and no cause for special concern, nevertheless, FonMin said GOP much worried about deteriorating situation in Africa as whole where radical elements in Arab and Black Africa exerting increased influence and pushing continent in extreme leftist if not Communist direction.
3. African radicals wish subvert Congo as strategic heart of Africa and are now claiming right of intervention there, supported by arms shipments for rebels, on grounds legitimate GOC is unacceptable to them. Nogueira said he might talk of this danger at NATO meeting.
4. Portuguese fully approved US-Belgium para rescue in Congo/3/ but would have liked see operation extended and troops kept longer. Secretary explained military limitations curtailed further use of operation.
/3/November 24-29. U.S. military aircraft ferried 500 Belgian paratroops to Stanleyville where they rescued and evacuated about 1,400 European refugees held hostage by Congolese guerrilla fighters.
5. Nogueira claimed recent African developments offer further evidence of correctness of Portuguese African policies and GOP cannot understand US efforts to modify them which can only lead to new Congo situations.
6. Nogueira agreed with Secretary Western European countries such as UK and France seem to be taking decreased interest in African problems and should do more to help.
7. Nogueira not expecting much from NATO meeting and disappointed by past meetings where Portuguese views largely ignored. He thought more informal and substantive exchanges of views should be encouraged but was non-committal re Secretary's suggestion for added number of NATO sub-ministerial meetings.
Rusk
159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, March 5, 1965, 2:50 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 PORT. Confidential. Drafted by Creel; cleared in EUR, DOD, RPM, G, and AFC; and approved by Tyler. Repeated to Lisbon, Ottawa, Paris, and USCINCEUR.
2546. Ref: Bonn's 3281, Deptel 2507./2/ Joint State/Defense Message. Subject: FRG Plane Sale to Portugal. Fol are our views for use in reply to MOD:
/2/Telegram 3281 from Bonn, March 3, reported German assurances that no sales to Portugal would take place without prior guarantee that the aircraft would not be used in the colonies. Telegram 2507 to Bonn, March 1, requested information on the prospective sale. (Both ibid., DEF 12-5 GERM-PORT)
(1) Since proposed transaction involves political considerations of considerable sensitivity, it would appear MOD and FonOff should consult on issue in interest arriving at coordinated FRG position.
(2) It is our understanding that position of FonOff on matter is that, regardless of US position, FonOff approval of transaction would be given only if Portuguese provided assurances that use of aircraft would be restricted to NATO area as defined Article 6 NATO Treaty. MOD may wish ascertain directly from FonOff latter's view on this point.
(3) If FonOff gets meaningful assurances as described in point (2) above from Portuguese, we would have no objection to plane sale to Portugal. Under circumstances, we would give definitive opinion when satisfactory assurances are obtained.
Rusk
160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/
Washington, June 9, 1965, 5:26 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Secret. Drafted by Looram, High, and Beigel; cleared in EUR and AF and by Buffum and Harriman; and approved by Ball.
671. Greatly appreciate your 652/2/ as means break stalemate in this long-standing and grave issue. It has evoked wide interest here and in African posts whose views have been solicited and which you have seen.
/2/Dated April 13. (Ibid., AID PORT)
We are only too well aware of difficulties you would have in selling proposal to Portuguese and appreciate need for positive elements from their viewpoint if they are to give serious consideration to such proposal. At same time we are concerned about such aspects as extent of US involvement, length of transitional period, need for political activity prior to plebiscite, and role for UN and OAU. We have modified your proposal on these points and have elaborated several others and following is outline of our thinking for an approach to Portuguese.
1. We believe present juncture when Portuguese are in relatively strong position in both Angola and Mozambique presents opportunity for GOP and Africans to reach agreement for peaceful resolution their differences. Key elements of solution would have to be transition period leading to self-determination and cessation of nationalist-inspired violence and subversion, as well as inspiration and support for such actions by African governments concerned. Full range of choice would be left to people, and would include maintenance of present relationship with Portugal, autonomy within Commonwealth, or full independence. Aim of proposal would be peaceful transition and creation stable society no matter what political decisions are made by the people.
2. Specifically Portugal would propose eight-year transition period leading to free and open plebiscite observed by UN and OAU representatives. (FYI: We propose eight years, given comments from African posts that five may be realistic limit negotiable with Africans, but this of course is matter for negotiating parties to determine. End FYI.) In return neighboring African states would pledge assurances they would not allow subversive elements to organize or operate from their territories against Portuguese territories for purposes of infiltration, subversion or attack across international frontiers, and that they will not allow arms to flow across their territories to such elements. All training camps for nationalist military or para-military training would be disbanded.
3. US and other NATO allies would encourage Africans' acceptance and urge fulfillment terms of such an agreement, would publicly come out in full support of agreement once it is adopted and would publicly condemn any violation of terms should such occur subsequently from any quarter. We would sympathetically consider Portuguese request for support for Portuguese complaint in UN if we were satisfied deliberate and organized violations had taken place, and under same circumstances would be responsive to GOP requests for arms purchases. FYI. By same token if Portugal welched on plebiscite, we would consider sympathetically African requests for support. End FYI.
4. We recognize that Guinea and Congo (Brazzaville) are not likely to accept proposal and would probably continue support of violence against Portuguese Guinea and Cabinda. If agreement were reached and in force with others, we would in this event publicly condemn such actions. We would make other African governments aware of our position on this aspect from the outset.
5. During transition period US would itself provide and would encourage other NATO allies to provide, if Portugal so requests, economic and technical support for Portuguese efforts to develop African territories. UN and its specialized agencies would be allowed to observe and report on developments and provide assistance. OAU members would also be invited to provide economic and technical assistance.
6. Increasingly free political activity would obviously have to be permitted to make for meaningful plebiscite. Full amnesty and repatriation would also be allowed for refugees and, as time for plebiscite approached, for nationalist leaders, who must be permitted to campaign openly and freely for independence if they choose to do so.
7. We would hope that GOP, if interested in such proposal, would in time present it to African leaders and thereby initiate dialogue which might result in meaningful negotiations. Should Portugal desire, we would be quite willing to assist by sounding out such leaders and U Thant on a tentative basis and in manner designed to pave way for direct Portuguese-African discussions.
Would appreciate your comments on foregoing draft presentation and on timing of any approach./3/
/3/The Embassy commented in telegram 799 from Lisbon, June 18. (Ibid.)
Rusk
161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/
Washington, June 19, 1965, 2:40 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US. Confidential. Drafted by Funseth and McKillop and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Paris for USRO.
697. Following based on uncleared memcon, Noforn, FYI and subject to revision:/2/
/2/Memoranda of the Rusk-Nogueira conversation are ibid.
In three hour session June 18 with FonMin Franco Nogueira and Ambassador Garin, the Secretary, Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary Leddy patiently reviewed gamut of US-Portuguese problems. Nogueira reiterated all too familiar complaints about US policy in Africa well as NATO shortcomings in failing recognize defense problems all of Portuguese nation, i.e. Portuguese Africa. Referring to current satisfactory security conditions in Angola and Mozambique and increased willingness African moderates stand up to radicals, Nogueira said these gains offset by continuing Communist subversion and arms shipments to Africa.
FonMin then embarked upon recitation of bill of tendentious particulars as evidence US is "hostilizing" Portugal in Africa while requesting Portugal to grant base and other facilities in Atlantic area. Portuguese complaints, some of which new, centered around familiar themes--alleged US aid to nationalists, especially Holden Roberto; restrictions on US arms sales and discouragement of foreign suppliers, thus hampering Portuguese struggle against Communism in Africa; and unfriendly remarks allegedly made by American officials in running down Portuguese African policy and even criticizing Africans showing some understanding for it. Under such circumstances how, FonMin asked, would aroused Portuguese public opinion agree to GOP negotiations on Cape Verde tracking station, Loran C sites and Azores base? He thought some US clarification or explanation would be useful in smoothing off present rough edges in US-Portuguese relations.
Secretary said we would look into complaints but we would also like to send Nogueira list of occasions where we have stood by Portugal at UN and other international forums despite intense Afro-Asian criticism of US support of colonialism./3/ Fact US subject such accusations is evidence US not following hostile policy toward Portugal nor advocating Portuguese be forced out of Africa. Pointed out it would be unfortunate for Portugal link Loran C and Azores, which are facilities needed for defense of NATO including Portugal, with African question since this would be difficult for US public and Congress to understand. Our suggestion that Portugal, which admittedly had done much to build up African territories while rejecting racism, attempt to improve its public stance by indicating greater willingness be guided by will of the peoples of Portuguese territories, orbited Nogueira into familiar tirade on definition of self-determination and why it impossible for Portugal fix any time schedule without releasing torrent of uncontrollable events. Developments subsequent to 1961 Angolan rebellion have clearly demonstrated rightness of Portuguese policies, Nogueira insisted. End uncleared memcon.
/3/A July 14 memorandum from Buffum to McKillop with an attachment outlining U.S. actions in support of Portugal is in Department of State, Portuguese Desk Files: Lot 68 D 401, Visit of Foreign Minister.
Comment: Nogueira said he would remain in Washington for several days and be available if we had anything further to discuss. We see nothing to be gained from additional talks at this time. Meanwhile we will examine long list of complaints which, in Secretary's words, Portugal's "over sensitive antennae," have picked up. We will transmit results to Embassy at later date together with list of instances of US support for Portugal. Nogueira's views discouraging in that they show no forward movement in Portuguese thinking on African problem, and if anything, some retrogression based no doubt on current success in controlling situations in their African territories. In any event, Nogueira talk here does not augur well for favorable Portuguese receptivity to Anderson or other such plans.
Rusk
162. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State/1/
Lisbon, July 2, 1965.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US. Confidential. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 3:26 p.m.
4. Ref: Deptel 697, June 19./2/ I met with FonMin July 1 discuss his recent trip US. He was relaxed and extremely cordial and felt he had fine visit. He recognized Secretary's preoccupation Viet Nam and Dominican Republic and expressed regret not able see President, but said he understood. Salazar and Cabinet briefed on Brazilian portion his trip but not then on visit to US.
/2/Document 161.
FonMin described his three-hour conversation with Secretary as friendly and said he was obliged make complaints he did in order be sure brought to Secretary's attention. Grateful that complaints "will be investigated." He expressed regret he left impression Loran-C and Azores base negotiations are linked to solution Portuguese problem in Africa. He had considered asking for another brief period with Secretary to clarify this impression indicating to me that other "quid pro quo" perhaps feasible.
With respect Loran-C I told FonMin I disappointed they had not come to grips this important problem during conversations. FonMin said he could not say now how we should proceed on Loran-C and would talk to me after reporting to Prime Minister.
I pointed out to him that another question raised during conversation was not answered, the Secretary's request that Portugal give its friends "a flag to rally around." While Portuguese position in Africa relatively strong now, I suggested GOP consider best way cope with situation in terms of 15 or 20 years. If Portugal could show some flexibility we might be able help out. FonMin said he would keep these considerations in mind and talk about subject after seeing Prime Minister.
He repeated old complaints about United Nations, stressing unfriendly make-up of Secretariat which is dominated by Indians and Communist Bloc nationals.
After this discussion with FonMin I am somewhat less pessimistic possibilities our doing business with GOP on matters essential to US.
Anderson
163. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State/1/
Lisbon, September 3, 1965.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US. Secret. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 12:55 p.m.
93. Ref: CA-2167 August 23, 1965./2/ To best of my ability in long conversation with FonMin Franco Nogueira on Sept 2 during which I able to do most of talking, I conveyed information and proposal contained reference instruction.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXIV, Document 433.
FonMin received in silence my oral denials of specific charges he had brought to attention Secretary and Under Secretary June 18./3/ When he subsequently explained why he found certain answers difficult to accept, I stated my understanding Dept would be discussing in perhaps greater detail with Ambassador Garin.
/3/See Document 161.
FonMin accepted without substantive comment aide-m?moire I handed him covering recent record of US assistance and demonstrated friendship for Portugal in international forums./4/
/4/The text was adapted from instructions contained in circular airgram CA-2167. The Embassy reported on Nogueira's response and summarized the aide-m?moire in telegram 97 from Lisbon, September 7. (Both in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US)
FonMin's reply to my restatement of USG interest in Azores base agreement and Loran-C facilities is reported separately but essentially left status these matters unchanged for the present.
Finally and using approach suggested CA-2167, I broached proposal for peaceful solution Portuguese territories problem. I prefaced this by emphasizing to FonMin in highly personal manner that proposal being offered in spirit of friendship and sincerity and should not be misconstrued as attempt to "buy" Portuguese Africa or in fact to displace Portuguese interests, influence or presence there. We were in fact suggesting "flag which they themselves could raise and about which their friends and moderate Africans could rally."
FonMin listened attentively and with evident and increasing interest. He also took notes which I have never seen him do before. From his facial expression I gathered that most elements in package made considerable impression on him.
Upon conclusion my presentation FonMin said that he obviously could not comment immediately and officially upon proposal of such scope. Said that it would require personal consideration by Salazar and other members of govt. FonMin did single out as elements of difficulty the role of political parties during interim period, problem of political campaigns, coverage of amnesty and repatriation arrangements, and identity and character of what I had mentioned as "international observers" at plebiscite. I was encouraged, however, by fact he did not reject my suggestion these be considered implementation details to be worked out only after decision taken as to acceptability of proposal in principle and broad outline. FonMin promised bring proposal Salazar's attention and I indicated expectation I would subsequently request appointment discuss it further with both of them.
Believe time now appropriate for Dept call in and discuss with Garin. Strongly recommend, however, effort be concentrated on emphasizing broad outline and to de-emphasize features difficult for GOP until latter has had time absorb over-all concept and gain some appreciation potential advantages vis-?-vis continuation present course of action. If proposal conceivably can get away from starting wire I am confident prospects will thereafter be better for negotiating on specific identity of "observers" and other such sticky items. FonMin did state very positive belief GOP that "time on their side" and internal situations Angola and Mozambique "solid." I must also caution against any over-optimism that Dr. Salazar can be persuaded to alter the firm convictions which all available evidence points that he continues to hold. As final thought and one I consider essential safeguard, I strongly recommend absolutely no mention of proposal be made any other nation without our so informing GOP in advance.
Anderson
164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/
Washington, September 24, 1965, 7:53 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US. Secret. Drafted by Funseth and approved by Leddy.
121. Ref: CA-2167 and Deptel 96./2/ Leddy summarized ref airgram to Garin, September 23, including US responses to FonMin's complaints, reaffirmation US interest in Azores base and Loran-C negotiations and introduction new U.S. proposal for peaceful solution Portuguese African question.
/2/Regarding CA-2167, see footnotes 2 and 4, Document 163. Telegram 96 to Lisbon, September 14, is not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US)
A. On complaint list, Garin did not recall or had difficulty recalling FonMin's original points on tantalite, Italian mortars and armored cars. Garin only made more than cursory comments or rebuttals on questions of Roberto's passport, U.S. aid to refugees and F-84 engines.
1. Re issuance visa to Roberto, Garin repeated continuing GOP position that it cannot understand how USG could knowingly put visa in false passport.
2. Re aid to refugees, Garin stated GOP does not deny humanitarian principles which motivate US but GOP believes USG help discourages refugees from returning to Angola. Moreover, notwithstanding US statements to contrary, GOP believes most of aid goes into "Roberto's pockets." Said great desire GOP is for refugees return to Angola. Said Red Cross has inspected and praised their repatriation program. Said they would welcome great mass of refugees back and only small minority of hard-core terrorists would not be acceptable and that U.S. refugee program frustrates their efforts by creating "permanent" refugee situation. Leddy pointed out refugees are fed under program for only one year then dropped from rolls--that clothing is offered once only, except in event emergency--and that no food is going to Angolan exile military forces and no clothing to members their families. He concluded, difficult see how such humanitarian program could significantly contribute any prolongation refugee situation. Garin reaffirmed GOP point-of-view.
3. F-84 engines--Garin maintained procedure was "new thing" and could not see why presence F-84 aircraft in Africa and metropole should call for more detailed verification than if all aircraft located in metropole. In general discussion US arms policy, he injected that GOP has always believed US was behind arms restrictive paragraph of original UN resolution and recalled Ambassador Stevenson asking him during debate agree to "one tiny sanction" in resolution.
B. Leddy reaffirmed basic US policy objective maintaining friendly and constructive relations with Portugal, covering points Section II Paras A and B of CA-2167. He said as Ambassador Anderson had given FonMin memo of partial list of instances in which U.S. has acted to oppose or moderate action against Portugal, we would do same for Garin.
Garin restated GOP analysis of origin difficulties in U.S.-Portuguese relations. Said USG and GOP, aside from ideological differences, were until 1961, "friends without difficulties, now we are friends with difficulties." Garin recalled that in 1961 SC Angola debate,/3/ USG made 180-degree turn in policy and unlike UK and France, who abstained, voted against Portugal. This act regarded as great blow in Portugal and as giving radical Africans and terrorists green light. Said Portuguese, who at great risk had given US and UK Azores facilities during war, thus exposing themselves to German retaliations (bombing of Lisbon, for example), were stunned by US suddenly turning against them.
/3/Apparent reference to the December 19, 1961, U.S. vote on a UN Security Council resolution establishing a program for assistance to refugees from Angola.
C. Leddy reaffirmed US interest in Azores and Loran-C, stating we had done our best track down and investigate all of FonMin's complaints which FonMin said made it difficult for him reconcile with our requests. Garin replied seemed obvious that by granting these increased facilities Portugal increased its vulnerability to Soviet attack. Difficult for GOP justify to Portuguese public that it would agree greater defense facilities of its allies without improving Portuguese defense facilities and by this Garin said, must understand that defense of Portugal means all of Portugal, including Angola and Mozambique and other overseas territories. Without changing our countries' basic policies (i.e. for U.S.--policy on arms and self-determination), Garin said, some way must be found help Portugal improve defense its territories by offering Portugal "counterparts." Leddy observed this sounded like very difficult task and pointed out Loran-C may increase Portuguese vulnerability but at same time greatly improved defense posture of all NATO allies, including Portugal. Garin agreed but indicated GOP did not believe this was sufficient inducement for GOP agree and emphasized some ways and means must be found so that GOP can justify to Portuguese public opinion that Portuguese security would be additionally improved and this security must include territories.
D. Leddy outlined proposal made by Anderson to Foreign Minister, September 2,/4/ saying US advancing plan as possible constructive program in working out eventual peaceful solution Portuguese African problem. Leddy said Anderson asked FonMin consider Portugal publicly accepting principle self-determination for African territories on basis definite timetable. In exchange, Africans would agree suspension all anti-Portuguese activities. US and NATO allies would publicly support plan. US would be responsive Portuguese request for arms if we satisfied deliberate and organized violations had taken place and would be sympathetic Portuguese requests for support in UN. During transition period leading to plebiscite, US and NATO allies would be prepared, at Portuguese request, provide economic and technical assistance in support GOP efforts develop territories and prepare inhabitants exercise of self-determination. Leddy said aim US proposal is to ensure peaceful solution Portuguese African question and is based on belief that such solution can only come about through dialogue between Portuguese and Africans.
/4/See Document 163.
Garin said his reply not represent GOP response to proposal but reflected what he thought reaction in Lisbon would be as FonMin had probably already indicated to Anderson, to wit:
1. Based on GOP experience with Africans at aborted 1963 talks at New York,/5/ Africans only interested in self-determination which leads to independence. Africans rejected Portuguese offer of plebiscite--Africans would not accept plebiscite which resulted in anything but independence--difficult for Africans retreat from this position to open choice now proposed.
/5/Reference is to informal talks held during the 1963 UN General Assembly debate on Angola.
2. GOP concerned that once it agreed plebiscite, it would be confronted with difficult conditions under which it would be held, such as withdrawal Portuguese troops and entry all kinds of undesirables, "Ghanaians, etc." GOP fears that with such conditions imposed, Angola would go down the drain in eight days, like Congo.
3. GOP not against self-determination and, in fact, is practicing it in territories where all inhabitants have full rights of citizens. Admitted condition of one man, one vote not yet achieved but this also true elsewhere in world. However, GOP moving in that direction.
4. On whole, Portugal believes its position in Africa steadily growing stronger, therefore, it would hesitate voluntarily weaken its position through some political action such as contained in latest USG proposal.
Garin emphasized foregoing did not represent GOP reply.
Comment: Garin did not appear have received very complete report Anderson-FonMin meeting, although he seemed well-informed on proposal and FonMin's reaction. He did not take notes during conversation and was alone.
Rusk
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.