190. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State/1/
Madrid, January 19, 1966, 1630Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to London, Paris, and POLAD CINCEUR.
855. Ref Deptel 819./2/ Dept pass DOD and HQ SAC Omaha.
/2/Telegram 819 to Madrid, January 17, requested that the Embassy draft a statement on procedures being used to deal with radioactivity. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 17 US)
1. As anticipated Deptel Spanish acutely sensitive to any further public statements on B-52/KC-135 accident. FonOff (in name Ministers Foreign Affairs, Air and Navy who happened to be in conference at FonOff when Embassy took up consultation pursuant reftel) pointed out today story dying in Spanish press and local interest subsiding. FonOff even requested that any expression of gratitude on our part for Spanish help in rescue and search operations not be made publicly.
2. However, when informed story may assume added dimensions elsewhere in international press, FonOff agreed it could conceivably later become desirable to restrain speculation with another official statement. In this spirit, FonOff gave tentative approval to draft quoted below on condition final GOS clearance be obtained if US believed changed circumstances required further statement.
3. Following is text of draft statement given tentative and conditional clearance as described above:
"United States Ambassador to Spain Angier Biddle Duke today expressed deep appreciation for the wholehearted assistance provided by Spanish authorities and civilians in search and rescue operations following the mid-air collision of two American military planes on Monday.
The collision involved a B-52 inter-continental bomber and a KC-135 jet tanker engaged in a routine high altitude refueling operation. Four airmen were rescued, but seven lost their lives.
It has been announced by U.S. Air Force investigators that a small explosion of conventional materials had occurred on the ground as a sequel to the crash. The explosion occurred when wreckage fell near the tiny village of Palomares, near Vera, close to the spot where the damaged but virtually intact tail assembly of the B-52 bomber was found. No casualties among inhabitants of the area have been reported.
Radiation monitoring teams are operating in the area and will remain to complete their survey and confirm the safety of the spot.
An intensive search and recovery operation on land and off the coast in the accident area is being conducted jointly by Spanish and American forces. In order to determine the cause of the crash and to preclude a similar accident, it is desired to recover all pieces of the wreckage which will later be carefully studied by Air Force experts.
Major General Stanley Donovan, Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Group (JUSMG) and Major General Delmar E. Wilson, Commander Sixteenth Air Force, joined the Ambassador in praising the cooperation and assistance rendered by Spaniards. They commended the Spanish Navy for immediately locating and directing the rescue of three airmen who parachuted into the Mediterranean.
The United States officials also voiced gratification for the use of Spanish medical facilities in the accident area, the close assistance provided by the Guardia Civil, and the aid of the Spanish Air Force."
4. Spanish objected strongly to more forthright treatment of radiation contained in original draft, and Ambassador, on advice Chief JUSMG who just returned from scene of accident, believes wording as given above adequate. U.S. officials here would decline further comment on subject if questioned by press.
5. Must emphasize GOS very anxious that no further official statement be made under existing circumstances and are likely to relent only in face clear and urgent necessity./3/
/3/In telegram 857 from Madrid, January 19, the Embassy reported that the United Press correspondent filed a story relating that one nuclear device was missing. It added: "Since foregoing may lead to escalation of media treatment and rapid change in present circumstances request Washington clearance soonest of draft statement." (Department of State, Madrid Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, Def 17 B 52/KC 135 Collision)
Duke
191. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State/1/
Madrid, January 22, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 9:26 a.m. Passed to the White House and DOD.
871. Dept pass DOD. Ref Embtels 867 and 869; Deptel 834./2/
/2/Telegram 867 from Madrid, January 21, forwarded the text of a Spanish Air Ministry statement on the Palomares crash. (Department of State, Madrid Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, Def 17 B52/KC 135 Collision) Telegram 869 from Madrid, January 21, reported on discussions between U.S. and Spanish officials regarding the crash. (Ibid.) In telegram 834, January 20, the Department of State reported the text of a UPI story on Spanish Government censorship of crash information. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 17 US)
1. Following is roundup developments related B-52/KC-135 accident since last reports (Embtels 867 and 869):
A. Shortly after noon January 21 FonMin telephoned Ambassador to convey "extreme concern" of Chief State upon reading UPI story cabled by Spanish Embassy Washington (text about same as that quoted Deptel 834). FonMin said he sending Sagaz to discuss question.
B. Sagaz arrived displaying considerable agitation. Using such terms as "deep concern," "emergency" and "crisis," he complained particularly about passages in UPI story concerning alleged attitude of "US diplomats" and purporting describe complaints of Spanish inhabitants of accident area against GOS for permitting overflight nuclear-armed USAF aircraft. Sagaz did not fail ring in potential blow to tourism of radiation scare. He ended presentation saying these revelations had effect liberating GOS to take independent action on its own and mentioned possibility convening press conference for full disclosure all facts and GOS position. Ambassador refuted UPI attribution to US diplomats, mentioned imminent return Chief JUSMG from scene accident with up-to-date account of circumstances there for our information and that of GOS, and referred to desirability remaining calm and continuing mutually advantageous US-Spanish collaboration in dealing with delicate situation of equal and common concern to both govts. In this manner, Ambassador succeeded in quieting Sagaz, who at end of conversation agreed await further reports from scene.
C. Upon return from Almeria, Chief JUSMG reported to Ambassador: Fourth bomb still missing and probability was it dropped into sea; USN mine sweepers about to begin sea search operations with help two local fishermen who reported having seen object with parachute drop into water; recovery of fragments wreckage on land continuing and all leads as to possible location fourth bomb being followed up; areas of radiation on land have been identified, are small and now closed off; water trucks being brought up to leach these spots; crops and livestock possibly affected being bought up; medical examinations being made of persons in area who could have been exposed; community leaders and general public being assured with effect that while there some natural fear and uncertainty among people there no evidence of mass fright or panic; Spanish in area, including civil authorities, Guardia Civil and Spanish nuclear scientific and medical teams, cooperating to full in these efforts. General Donovan also mentioned that numerous international press representatives are in area, including UPI, Paris Match, British press, CBS-TV and possibly French TV crews.
D. Ambassador called in local UPI bureau chief Stathos, firmly refuted attitude "US diplomats" as attributed by UPI file and challenged him on source his information this point. Stathos appeared shaken, stated he had obtained information on this point "at third hand" and repeatedly apologized for filing story without checking with Embassy (see F below).
E. Following discussions subparagraphs C and D above, Ambassador telephoned FonOff (about 1930). Gave Sagaz summary and offered send EmbOff to give full report, which Sagaz quickly accepted. Sagaz listened intently and showed keenest interest in account Stathos admission he had not received information re "US diplomats" attitude from Embassy, but from other source. We assured Sagaz we open to any Spanish suggestions on how best handle situation but reiterated belief we should continue work in close concert. Sagaz indicated concurrence, said he had no suggestions to make for time being and appeared calm, albeit obviously concerned. EmbOff had impression Sagaz wanted get Stathos incident particularly clear to report to superiors.
F. Morning January 22, Stathos UPI telephoned Ambassador to reiterate apologies, offer make retribution and disclaim any attempt "make trouble." He added that he now believed he "had been had" by his Spanish information sources (otherwise unidentified) for political reasons and expressed apprehension about his position in Spain.
G. [9 lines of source text not declassified]
H. [4 lines of source text not declassified]
2. Re foreign and local press coverage, Embassy hears:
A. Reuters reported rumor that in village near Vera yesterday about 50 people milled about, some shouting: "Yankees go home and take your bombs." Reuters correspondent did not witness and GOS InfoMin officially denied. AP carried denial last night.
B. AP correspondent Milks has just filed interview with unnamed Spanish official saying medical specialist found small area at site of main bomber wreckage initially radioactive and "only normal that people working over that spot have been contaminated." Official added: "But if so, this is very, very slight and offers no danger to anybody. All traces should have disappeared completely in two or three days."
C. Of three Madrid morning dailies, only Ya carried follow-up story today: brief but reassuring front page story headed: "Search and security measures proceeding in Almeria. No danger from air accident exists. Inhabitants of involved zones have not been evacuated." Story in same tone says: "Life goes on normally in affected zone since local measures which adopted in small degree represent only excess caution. Proof of this is that inhabitants of little rural settlements in zone have not been evacuated."
3. Understand one AEC representative from Albuquerque already in Spain and three more due arrive January 23.
4. Believe we must be prepared for continued and possibly increased media treatment of accident until fourth bomb located and removed. If much more time elapses without success in search, we may be faced with practical necessity admitting officially one bomb still missing. [4 lines of source text not declassified] It therefore clearly of utmost urgency that no effort be spared locate fourth bomb with minimum delay. Urge all necessary US resources be provided for search.
Duke
192. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 25, 1966, 2:15 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB. Confidential. Drafted by Judd and approved in U on January 28. The meeting was held in Ball's office.
SUBJECT
Spanish Government Position on Overflights of Spain by Military Aircraft of NATO Countries Bound for or Going to Gibraltar
PARTICIPANTS
The Under Secretary
Assistant Secretary Leddy
Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA
Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador
Kenneth B.A. Scott, First Secretary, British Embassy
Ambassador Dean referred to the Spanish Government note of January 22 to all NATO governments,/2/ except the UK, regarding the overflight of Spanish territory by military aircraft of NATO countries intending to land at or taking off from Gibraltar. The British representative intended to make a statement on this note at the NAC meeting on January 26. The statement would make three principal points:
/2/Transmitted to the Department of State in airgram A-464 from Madrid, January 22. (Ibid.)
1. Gibraltar was not a NATO base.
2. Gibraltar was, in fact, a British base. Use was made of it by Britain's NATO allies at the invitation of the British Government.
3. The British Government regretted any Spanish action which might curtail the use of facilities on Gibraltar which the UK offered to its NATO allies. The effect, however slight, would be to make more difficult the defense of the West.
The British Ambassador went on to say that HMG was particularly anxious to have U.S. support for this statement. HMG considered that the position taken by the U.S. would have an important effect on the attitude of other NATO members.
Mr. Ball replied that this was a difficult problem for us. Our position with Spain was a special one inasmuch as we had a bilateral agreement with the Spanish Government. An additional point was that this was not purely a State Department problem; other agencies were concerned. We would need some time to work out our position.
Mr. Leddy asked if there was any particular hurry. He noted that we had just received the text of the Spanish note and had not had time to study it. Also, the Spanish had included an additional point in the note they sent us. They had asked us not to have our planes operating from Spanish bases land at Gibraltar.
Mr. Scott said Shuckburgh had mentioned the possibility of getting the discussions on Gibraltar postponed. Mr. Ball said this would be the best course for us.
Ambassador Dean said that from the British point of view, it was more important to get the right answer than a quick answer. He said that Foreign Secretary Stewart was very interested in the Gibraltar question. He would probably want to raise it on Thursday during the discussions on the British defense review.
Ambassador Dean left the attached aide-m?moire setting forth the British position./3/
/3/Not printed.
193. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 28, 1966.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 18 GIB. Confidential. Drafted by Ortiz.
SUBJECT
Gibraltar
PARTICIPANTS
Spain
The Marques de Merry del Val, Spanish Ambassador
Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Spain
U.S.
Assistant Secretary Leddy
Frank V. Ortiz, EUR:WE
The Ambassador called to inquire about the Stewart-Rusk conversations and to discuss Spain's position on the Gibraltar dispute./2/
/2/A copy of the memorandum of Rusk's January 27 conversation with Stewart regarding Gibraltar is ibid.
Mr. Leddy said the Gibraltar dispute had been mentioned briefly during Mr. Stewart's visit. However the United States had made clear its desire not to become involved in this dispute. The Ambassador said he hoped the United States would comprehend Spain's point of view which, he said, was not one of hostility to the defense efforts of the West since Spain's contributions to that effort were well known.
Mr. Leddy said Spain's view of the matter was receiving very careful consideration by the Department. We would soon be in a position to reply. Mr. Leddy asked what purpose Spain had in mind in raising the Gibraltar problem in this form.
The Ambassador replied that Spain's purpose was to put the Gibraltar dispute in its proper context, namely as a bilateral dispute between Spain and the UK. Spain wished it to be clear that Gibraltar could not be considered by Spain as a NATO base.
194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain/1/
Washington, February 17, 1966, 7:14 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 17 US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Ortiz; cleared in SOV, P, and G/PM and by the Department of Defense; and approved by Stoessel. Also sent to Moscow and Geneva for the delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference.
981. Spanish Ambassador in call on Dept (Stoessel) discussed proposed joint U.S.-Spanish press statement on aftermath air accident near Palomares, Spain. We understand Ambassador will report to GOS his concern that issuance proposed joint statement at this time could be misinterpreted as reply or comments on allegations contained Soviet Aide-M?moire this subject./2/ Similar concern by GOS may explain reluctance GOS issue statement at this time. Unless addressees believe otherwise, Dept does not consider this possibility an overriding consideration. Although timing may be unfortunate on balance Dept continues believe proposed statement should be made but requests urgent comments./3/
/2/Dated February 16. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 911-912.
/3/In telegram 991 from Madrid, February 19, the Embassy transmitted the text of a Spanish statement rejecting the Soviet note. (Department of State, Madrid Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, Def 17) In telegram 1020 from Madrid, February 18, the Embassy repeated its endorsement of a joint statement but noted that Munoz Grandes still believed release of such a statement "unwise." (Ibid.)
Text proposed statement being sent Moscow and Geneva by septels./4/
/4/For text of the February 25 U.S. reply, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 916.
Ball
195. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State/1/
Madrid, February 21, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Madrid Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, Def 17. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Askew and cleared by JUSMG, Duke, and Walker. No time of transmission is on the telegram. Repeated to Paris for EUCOM and USAFE.
1031. Dept pass DOD. Aircraft Accident. Joint Embassy-JUSMG Message. Ref Deptels 980 and 993; Embtels 1025 and 1019./2/
/2/In telegram 980 to Madrid, February 17, the Department of State outlined requirements for claims submissions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, PS-8-4 SP-US) In telegram 993, February 17, the Department outlined the U.S. position on procedures to be followed by the joint U.S.-Spanish radioactivity inspection team. (Ibid., HLTH 10 SP) Telegram 1025 from Madrid reported on the delivery of a letter incorporating U.S. assurances and explanations on claims procedures. (Department of State, Madrid Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, Def 17) Telegram 1019, February 18, reported on discussions with Spanish officials regarding clean-up and disposal standards for the crash site. (Ibid.)
1. Meeting this morning at High General Staff between Chief JUSMG and Gen Prado (Sagaz, FonOff, and Gen Montel also present) resulted in following oral agreements:
A. Claims. After first reiterating desirability of changing release clause of claim and receipt forms, Spanish (with Prado and Sagaz leading way) eventually agreed Feb 18 letter from Chief JUSMG (Embtel 1025) satisfied essential Spanish position. They decided prepare extract of letter and have it distributed by Spanish authorities to individual claimants to help overcome present reluctance of claimants to submit claims for processing.
B. Clean-up. Following discussion claims problem, Chief JUSMG referred to message just received from Gen Wilson at Palomares (see 16AF AVON Spain Message to CSAF C-00281, Feb 19)/3/ to effect test (described Embtel 1019) had been conducted Feb 18-19 and Spanish JEN as well as USAF technicians agreed result was to bring readings down to less than "reasonable level." Results of test accepted by Montel and others as successful and they agreed that clean-up operation proceed on basis envisaged Feb 17 agreement (subpara 3C, Embtel 1019),/4/ adding merely that every effort be made ship out "contaminated" soil (i.e., that with 60,000 CPM or above already removed and in temporary storage) ASAP.
/3/Not found.
/4/It read: "Reading would then be taken; if reading is at a 'reasonable' level Spanish would agree this procedure be followed for entire affected area and would no longer press for removal of soil down to 7,000 CPM level."
2. In any written confirmation of new clean-up arrangement cautions mentioned para 3, Deptel 993, will be observed.
3. Have just learned Munoz Grandes personally has confirmed approval of agreements described paras 1A and B above./5/
/5/In telegram 1054 from Madrid, February 25, the Embassy reported on a compromise agreement based on 60,000 counts as the limit for soil removal. (Department of State, Madrid Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, Def 17)
Duke
196. Telegram 1240 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain
Washington, March 30, 1966, 7:34 p.m.
[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
197. Telegram 1444 From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State
Madrid, April 22, 1966, 1700Z.
[Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 6-3 US. Secret; Priority. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
198. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain/1/
Washington, May 6, 1966, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17-5 SP-US. Confidential. Drafted by Ortiz, cleared in EUR and RPM, and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to all NATO capitals.
1414. Ref Madrid tel 1489 repeated info addressees./2/
/2/Telegram 1489 from Madrid, April 29, reported on Spain's position on EEC membership and on Gibraltar. (Ibid., POL 1 SP)
1. During series farewell calls Minister Counselor Spanish Embassy Aguirre de Carcer, speaking from instructions he states were drafted following April 14 visit to Washington by FonMin Castiella,/3/ has made following points in somewhat emphatic manner:
/3/The meetings were summarized in telegram 1316 to Madrid, April 15. (Ibid., SP 15 SP-US)
a. GOS attaches greatest significance to forthcoming Gibraltar negotiations with UK. Successful outcome these negotiations will have significant influence on Spanish attitudes re contribution to defense of Europe. Without satisfactory solution this problem Spain will be forced review its policy of defense cooperation with countries other than those having bilateral defense agreements with Spain (U.S., Portugal, France and Morocco). Countries not enjoying such arrangements especially UK, Benelux, Germany and Italy, will secure Spanish cooperation only through such defense arrangements as Spain freely agrees to enter. Minister said UK aware that without Spain's acquiescence Gibraltar's military usefulness limited. He hinted same was true of German base in Portugal now under construction. In short third parties should be interested in favorable outcome Gibraltar talks.
b. Spain will press her "candidacy for Europe" with renewed vigor. Spain's vocation and avocation is Europe as glance at map will prove. When queried re desire for NATO membership he said Spain not specifically asking for such membership since it is granted by invitation only. Nonetheless Spain expects in near future to be fully taken into account in any organization for the collective defense of Europe whatever its form. Furthermore Spain is not prepared to wait forever for relationship with Common Market. Spain will expect its friends to push for favorable action on Spanish application to EEC. He noted approvingly public statements by Schroeder in this regard.
c. Above considerations will dominate Spanish negotiating posture for renewal defense agreement with US in 1968 as well as Spain's relations with European nations. He was instructed put US on notice that extension defense agreement will have to result in expanding present bilateral agreement and would call for active role by US in integration of Spain into Europe.
d. Minister said in other words Spain is no longer content to be sitting at small table for two in same dining room with US and other European countries.
2. As Aguirre de Carcer speaking under instructions and is returning to Madrid where among other duties he will serve as head US Section Ministry Foreign Affairs from which position he will undoubtedly play important role in negotiations for extension defense agreement, Department considers above authoritative statement current objectives Spanish policy.
Rusk
199. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State/1/
Madrid, June 18, 1966, 1622Z.
/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and Moscow.
1809. 1. Largely as a matter of courtesy Ambassador asked for an appointment to see FonMin Castiella June 16 following return from consultation in Washington. Castiella responded immediately with request Ambassador see him same day and took occasion launch into hard hitting bid for US support Spanish aspirations in Gibraltar dispute.
2. He began by lamenting reports to effect Ambassador "not sympathetic" to Spanish position. Asserting Gibraltar problem over-riding in Spanish relations with West, Castiella urged us recognize potentially serious repercussions on US and Western defense interests (he mentioned overflights and base agreement extension) if Spain rebuffed and forced seek other foreign policy options. He claimed Spain had already been approached to join new partnership along what he called "French and Soviet line" adding that for present Spain of course not taking such overtures seriously. FonMin then stressed great importance of military base in Western Mediterranean and traced out concept of vast military base complex involving Rota, Gibraltar, Ceuta and Melilla which could become available to West if Gibraltar problem settled, since Spain prepared accept same conditions from Morocco on Ceuta and Melilla as it offering UK on Gibraltar.
3. Ambassador countered by reiterating US position as clearly stated by Secretary to Castiella last year/2/ and added observations on importance welfare of Gibraltar population.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 181.
4. Of interest in this connection is remark made to Ambassador earlier in day by Vice President and Chief High General Staff Munoz-Grandes to effect French had been acting in most friendly manner toward Spain. FonOff official (Aguirre de Carcer) mentioned to Ambassador just before call on FonMin that it French policy to eliminate US influence Spain. Same official later told DCM that report of Ambassadors alleged lack sympathy for Spanish position on Gibraltar had come from French sources.
5. Comment: Reports of active and increasing machinations by French are in marked contrast to assurances given Ambassador and DCM personally by French Ambassador in recent months to effect that despite divergencies on military matters France intent on retaining most friendly ties with US and anxious cooperate with US in Spain. Must also be noted that ready provision these reports by Spanish sources could reflect desire foster atmosphere US-French competition in Spain which GOS could hope exploit. Allusions to alleged invitations join France and USSR in "new partnership" as alternative to present Spanish ties with US seem represent rather forced attempt to show that Spain has "somewhere else to go" if its aspirations not satisfied in present context.
6. However, suspect Castiella's outburst stems more from his impatience and frustration over poor outlook early solution Gibraltar problem on terms offered London last month. Castiella's hope for smashing diplomatic victory partly to boost his prospects in transition and post-Franco stages could be waning and he seeking means retrieve situation. (Castiella of course not only high GOS official now preoccupied with personal future.)
7. Although exaggerated terms of Castiella's performance detract from credibility, we must be prepared for further demands on Gibraltar problem and intensified Spanish attempts to apply pressure on US in any manner available to them, including overflight question.
8. We shall submit further comments next week./3/
/3/In telegram 1817 from Madrid, June 21, the Embassy reported on other Spanish approaches designed to elicit U.S. involvement in the Gibraltar issue. The Embassy judged the Spanish approaches "clumsy and tactless effort at coercion," but added that the United States had an interest in heading off a clash between Spain and the United Kingdom. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB) Telegram 1684, June 23, instructed the Embassy that U.S. policy would be one of strict neutrality in the Gibralta issue. (Ibid.)
Duke
200. Letter From the Ambassador to Spain (Duke) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Madrid, July 7, 1966.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US. Secret.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
On my visit to Washington last month I unfortunately missed seeing you, but had the opportunity to explain, first to George Ball and Alex Johnson, and then to the President/2/ my views in some detail on the desirability of drawing Spain into the Western Alliance. The President did not express himself one way or the other, but I was very encouraged by the attention he gave to what I had to say.
/2/No record of these meetings was found.
Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Castiella has received your reply of June 23 to his earlier letter on the Gibraltar problem/3/ and has gone out of his way to impress on me how grateful he was for the friendly and understanding tone of your letter. His enthusiasm reflects his intense preoccupation with Gibraltar, and, I believe, underlines the importance of some progress on that thorny problem so that it will not stand in the way of considering a place for Spain in the Alliance.
/3/Copies of Castiella's May 26 letter and Rusk's June 23 reply are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB.
In the light of my conversation with the President, I have hopes that both these matters can be reviewed with Prime Minister Wilson on his visit to Washington later this month./4/ While I fully realize the desirability--even the necessity--of non-intervention in the Gibraltar matter, it may well be that a word from the President to the Prime Minister expressing our hope for a reasonable solution might be helpful in avoiding the consequences of a bitter stalemate.
/4/See Document 266.
As you know, the Spanish have told us that they will use all possible leverage to achieve some advance on the Gibraltar problem and toward their other pressing foreign policy objectives. We are beginning to feel the effects of their efforts, particularly in our military relations. In a broader sense, however, I believe the moment has arrived for us and our European friends to take action if we are not to forfeit the chance of helping Spain emerge from the approaching crisis of succession with a reasonably liberal government and an anchor to westward.
An understanding on this subject with the British would make it possible for us to move ahead on approaches to our other friends in Europe on Spanish membership in the Alliance./5/
/5/In a July 22 reply to Duke, Rusk commented that Gibraltar would only be discussed if raised by the British and reiterated the need for Spain and the United Kingdom to work out an arrangement for the future of Gibraltar. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US)
Internal changes in Spain as reflected in the new press law and the pending religious freedom legislation as well as other signs of progress should give us talking points in Spain's favor when the moment is opportune.
I do appreciate the complexity of the problems we have in NATO at this time, but I would hope that by the end of the year we would have begun high-level consultations on this subject. Any evidence of progress would, I believe, be of the greatest significance in keeping Spain to the course which serves our broad interests in this part of the world.
With cordial regards.
Sincerely,
Angie Duke
201. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, July 12, 1966.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US. Confidential. Drafted by Ortiz and approved in G on July 21. The memorandum is Part 2 of 2 Parts. A memorandum of conversation of the portion of the discussion dealing with Gibraltar is ibid., POL 19 GIB.
SUBJECT
Spain and Europe
PARTICIPANTS
Spain
The Marques de Merry del Val, Ambassador of Spain
Juan Perez-Urruti, First Secretary, Embassy of Spain
Jaime de Ojeda, Second Secretary, Embassy of Spain
U.S.
Deputy Under Secretary Johnson
Frank V. Ortiz, EUR/SPP
During the Ambassador's call he referred to Spain's strong interest in some form of association with the EEC. He said by September Spain expected to know what form this association might take. He noted the French and Germans had been particularly helpful in supporting Spain's petition. He believed the Belgian position had altered but that Italy and the Netherlands were still to some degree opposed to Spanish association.
The Ambassador said Spain also desired to be integrated into whatever European defense structure emerged from the current discussions. Spain hoped the U.S. could do a little more to help speed Spain's integration into Western defense. Mr. Johnson asked if the Gibraltar dispute would not complicate Spain's association with NATO. The Ambassador replied that a satisfactory Gibraltar solution could well facilitate Spanish participation in Western defense. He noted that already Spain was contributing more to Western defense than the Scandinavian countries opposing Spanish NATO membership. Mr. Johnson said NATO had a "lot on its platter" at the present time, and NATO was now caught up almost exclusively with the present stage of internal readjustments. He believed an Anglo-Spanish agreement on Gibraltar would be helpful in any consideration of Spain's role in Western defense. The Ambassador noted that aside from Gibraltar Anglo-Spanish relations had every reason to be good as British trade and tourism to Spain were assuming greater importance.
There followed a brief discussion of the present economic, social, and political changes in Spain which were facilitating closer Spanish relations with Europe.
202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain/1/
Washington, October 4, 1966, 5:57 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Landau, cleared by Stoessel and BMI, and approved by Landau. Repeated to London.
59417. Following based on uncleared memcon is FYI, uncleared, Noforn, and subject to revision upon review:/2/
/2/The memorandum of conversation is ibid.
1. Spanish Ambassador Merry Del Val made 15-minute call on Secretary October 3 on instructions from FonMin Castiella to present Secretary with background document covering Spanish-British negotiations on Gibraltar./3/
/3/Talks between the U.K. and Spanish Governments took place on May 18 and 20, July 12-13, September 6-7, and October 10-11, 1967. For documentation, including the text of the May 18 memorandum handed to the Government of the United Kingdom, see Great Britain, Foreign Office, Gibraltar Talks with Spain, May-October 1966, Command 3131 (London, 1966).
2. Spanish Ambassador also outlined contents of a Pro Memoria which he presented to Secretary re alleged violation of Spanish territory by British military aircraft. Ambassador stressed that British pilots apparently have instructions deliberately to violate air space over Spanish mainland and that Spain could no longer tolerate such intrusions. Secretary asked what purpose British would have in doing so. Merry Del Val lamely said he really didn't know.
3. Secretary said that Spanish and British diplomats have been at work long before US came into existence and he was confident that the two countries would eventually find a way to settle this problem.
4. Merry Del Val also handed Secretary a second Pro Memoria to which he did not refer during conversation./4/ It attacked US "neutrality" as not consonant with US anti-colonial stand and described US attitude as "inhibition" for fear that a clearer position might annoy either side. Pro Memoria stated this attitude, however, favored status quo and was "against interests of Spanish people."
/4/For text of the September 29 memorandum handed to the Government of the United Kingdom, see ibid., pp. 110-121. In telegram 59477, the Department of State commented that it believed this second memorandum was a "Spanish attempt to bail us into making statement on Gibraltar. We are not willing to do so." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB)
5. Air pouching copies of Pro Memoria.
Rusk
203. Editorial Note
Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman met with General Franco on December 13, 1966, in Madrid. Their discussion centered on the situation in Vietnam. The two men also discussed North Africa and the Middle East. A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN.
204. Letter From General Franco to President Johnson/1/
Madrid, January 30, 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, Spanish Desk Files: Lot 70 D 35, Pol 7. No classification marking. The letter, which is typed on Spanish Embassy stationery, is marked "Translation." In a memorandum transmitting the letter to the President, Walt Rostow commented: "This letter caps a prolonged Spanish diplomatic effort to make sure the Moroccans don't get an inside track with us on the argument with Spain over the phosphorus-rich Spanish Sahara." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. I)
My Dear President Johnson:
Please forgive me for retaining your attention for a few moments, but I trust that the importance of what I have to say will justify my writing directly--to Your Excellency.
The publicity which is being given in Morocco to the announced visit of His Majesty the King to the United States/2/ and the fact that among the Ministers accompanying him will be the Minister for Mauritanian and Saharan affairs, coincides with a campaign of expansionist claims on the territories of her neighbours--Algeria, Mauritania and Spain--and reveals Morocco's intentions to exploit the King's visit to the United States to attempt to present the United States as being implicated in her aspirations. I have therefore thought it best to forewarn you of this possibility; firstly, because none of the parties affected are ready to cede their rights, and in our case the Spanish right of sovereignty is clear as is the firm and repeatedly evidenced loyalty of the people of the Sahara--about 26.000 inhabitants; and secondly, because this sparsely populated territory has a very marked geo-strategic importance as it includes an extensive portion of the African coast immediately adjacent to the clearly Spanish Canary Islands, which are a center of world sea-routes, and which Spain has for centuries developed and defended.
/2/Documentation on King Hassan's February 4-12 visit is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXIV, Documents 130-133.
Among the objectives publicized in Morocco for this visit is that of asking the American Administration for a larger economic and military aid. While I find their economic interest legitimate and very convenient for the peace, development and internal stability of their country, in which we are truly interested, such is not the case with respect to military aid. The American Government is aware through our Representatives of the constant Spanish concern with respect to the increase of armaments taking place in North Africa with the general intention of threatening peace and attempting to satisfy imperialist ambitions in conflict with neighbouring countries. But no one is threatening the integrity of Morocco's frontiers; she already has sufficient weapons for her defence and for her internal peace and security; and Spain, who only a few years ago underwent the aggression of supposedly spontaneous bands which Morocco utilized to break the peace in the territories of Ifni and Sahara, now feels alarmed by Morocco's attempt to secure more arms at a time in which she is stirring up bellicose feelings in her inhabitants. It is really incongruous that when Morocco's economic need is at its greatest she should wish to devote to military expenses amounts far in excess of her means in the hope that another country will finance them.
I have wished Your Excellency to be acquainted with this concern, in order to avoid the possibility that, in the light of an apparent neutrality, and heeding a supposed need for self-defence which has been ably and artificially contrived, your Administration might err on the side of generosity in this military aspect.
Due to my great confidence in your judgement and fairness, I feel satisfied in having made this known to you.
At these moments, when the United States is going through a great sorrow at the loss of her heroic astronauts, I wish to express to you the solidarity and appreciation that this sacrifice has inspired throughout all the Spanish nation.
May I avail myself of this opportunity to reiterate to you my highest consideration and affection.
I remain, Your Excellency's good friend./3/
/3/The letter is unsigned. In a February 15 letter to Franco, President Johnson thanked him for his expressions of sympathy regarding the deaths of the three U.S. astronauts and commented on U.S. policy in Morocco. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Spain)
205. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State/1/
Madrid, March 1, 1967, 1830Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SP-US. Confidential; Priority; Exdis.
2225. Pass White House.
1. At a meeting with General Franco this morning Jack Valenti told Franco that he had come here at what might be construed as a difficult time because of the attention the press was drawing to the CIA issue in the US./2/ Valenti explained that this matter was causing President Johnson concern and that a very high level review and investigation were underway. He emphasized however that what has been said of CIA activities should not be interpreted as a change in American policy or of the President's attitude of friendship with Spain. Valenti said he was sure that the President was unaware of many details of the activities of CIA.
/2/A Ramparts story revealing CIA funding of the National Student Association was released to the press on February 14. The story was subsequently picked up by the European press. In its February 21 edition, the London Times reported on assistance furnished to Spanish student groups. President Johnson directed the CIA to cease its funding activities on February 15.
2. Franco reacted to Valenti's comments with good humor saying the current CIA issue is illustrative of the problems of leadership at the highest level. He said he sympathized with President Johnson in this situation and understood it well. He then pointed out that in the security field agents too often act on their own initiative.
Duke
206. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 13, 1967, 1 p.m.
/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Confidential. Drafted by Landau and Smith and approved in S on November 22. The memorandum is Part 10 of 10. The meeting was held in the James Madison Room in the Department of State.
SUBJECT
Base Negotiations
PARTICIPANTS
Foreign
His Excellency Fernando Castiella, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain
His Excellency the Marquis de Merry del Val, Ambassador of Spain
The Honorable Adolfo Martin-Gamero, Director General, Office of Diplomatic Information, Spanish Foreign Ministry
The Honorable Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Director General of North American, Middle and Far Eastern Affairs, Spanish Foreign Ministry
The Honorable Aurelio Valls, Minister Counselor, Embassy of Spain
Mr. Marcelino Oreja, Director, Technical Cabinet, Spanish Foreign Ministry
United States
The Secretary
Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Mr. Paul C. Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director for Spain and Portugal
Mr. Joseph L. Smith, Country Officer for Spain
1. At the conclusion of the discussion on Gibraltar,/2/ the Secretary inquired whether the Foreign Minister had discussed all the topics on his list which he had read to him at the beginning of the meeting. The Secretary added that the question of base negotiations had been on the Minister's list.
/2/The memorandum of conversation covering this part of the discussion is ibid., POL 19-GIB.
2. The Minister replied in the affirmative and said that the question of renewal of the base agreements had been the reason for his visit to Washington. He said that he had come here on an official mission on behalf of his Government to request that the 1963 base agreements, due for renewal in 1968, be revised. He added that by and large Spain was satisfied with the existing relationship, but that there had been many changes in the last four years. He said it was the position of Spain that the agreements of 1963 must be revised and adapted to the current world situation. He enumerated some of the changes which had occurred since the signing of the last agreement, such as French military withdrawal from NATO, the Soviet penetration into the Mediterranean, the increased Chinese thermonuclear potential, the development of the ABM systems by the United States and the U.S.S.R., and the pending NPT. He stated that serious consultations would be necessary before renewal of the bases agreements could be agreed on.
3. The Secretary asked how we should proceed on this subject, and the Foreign Minister replied that in order to avoid problems and a last minute rush similar to what had happened in 1963, talks should begin soon--as soon as possible. He expressed the opinion that diplomatic channels should be used, of course, without prejudice to advice and assistance from the military.
4. The Secretary suggested that it would be worth having such conversations through diplomatic channels, which might begin with a tour d'horizon to determine what needs to be done first.
5. Foreign Minister Castiella replied that he was in complete agreement, and added that these conversations should be on a friendly basis and should consider the question in depth and in detail. He stated that neither country should fall into the infantile pitfalls of saying such things as "the bases are no longer of any interest to the United States" or "Spain does not need the friendship of the United States". He suggested that the bases were useful and that our friendship was based on a solid foundation, even though no relations between two countries could ever be completely perfect.
6. The Secretary replied that our friendship with Spain was important to us and that we would be willing to brief the Spanish in great detail on matters of mutual interest, as, for example, the ABM and its full significance, the question of China's nuclear potential, and others.
7. Mr. Kohler in reply to the Secretary's inquiry stated that we could set up briefings on various subjects mentioned by the Secretary either in Washington or Madrid and that we would be in touch with Ambassador Merry del Val regarding the arrangements.
8. The Foreign Minister replied that it was fine to receive these briefings, but that he wanted to emphasize that we should not delay too long in getting to the negotiations. The important point at the moment was to go directly to the foundations of the agreements and begin discussions for their revision.
9. In conclusion, the Foreign Minister said that Spain considered itself a friend but not a satellite of the United States. The Secretary agreed with this statement, and the meeting ended with mutual assurances that the negotiations should be accomplished in the spirit of continued cooperation between the two countries.
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