207. Memorandum for the Files/1/
Washington, December 5, 1967.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Funseth and approved in draft by Ambassador Duke on December 8.
SUBJECT
Spanish Base Negotiations and Palomares
PARTICIPANTS
The Honorable Angier Biddle Duke, U.S. Ambassador to Spain
The Honorable Paul C. Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Mr. Frederick S. Wyle, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Captain William Golden, OASD/ISA
Mr. Robert Funseth, EUR/SPP
I. Palomares
Before the arrival of Mr. Warnke, the question of the proposed U.S. gift of a desalting plant to Palomares was discussed. Ambassador Duke stated that he had just come from a meeting with Mr. Herman Pollack, Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, in which Mr. Pollack had reported that a telegram had been received from Madrid forwarding the results of the water sample tests made at Palomares. Mr. Pollack said that a preliminary reading of these results indicated a desalting plant was technically feasible. (At this point, Mr. Warnke joined the meeting.)
The Ambassador said he hoped a public announcement of the U.S. gift could be made as soon as possible in order that the date of the announcement would be as far in advance of the January 17 anniversary of the accident. He believed it was important that our offer become part of the historical record during the current calendar year and in advance of the BBC special television program on the accident now scheduled for early 1968.
Referring to the BBC program, he said it was the Embassy's understanding that the BBC was favorably impressed on two counts: first--the work of the U.S. Claims Commission; secondly, the manner in which the nuclear contamination problem of both the residents and the area had been promptly examined and the happy results of these examinations. However, there was a third area, he said, in which the BBC apparently believed there was some legitimacy to complaints. He said this was the question of something being done about the problem of non-measurable damage--psychological as well as material. It was with this problem in mind that the Embassy had originally proposed a gift to the people of Palomares. He thought we could effectively meet this point by announcing the gift as soon as possible.
The Ambassador said the prompt announcement of the U.S. offer could not help but improve the atmosphere for the base negotiations. He said we must remember that the accident brought home to the Spanish, in a most dramatic way, that the American military presence in Spain was not without serious risks to Spain.
II. Spanish Base Negotiations
The Ambassador said that he had seen several estimates by the U.S. military services and they appeared persuasive of the U.S. need for continued use of the Spanish bases for an additional five years. He said he had not seen a specific Department of Defense position, but he assumed that Defense would sustain the services' estimate.
Mr. Wyle stated there were several studies or reports which all supported the strategic importance or need for the Spanish bases and indicated no real disagreement with the individual estimates of the services.
The Ambassador said that the problem we face as we enter into negotiations with the Spanish for a renewal of the Base Agreements hinges on the Spanish political objectives and their anticipated requests for military hardware. He said it was his view that to the extent we can meet their political requests, the military shopping list will be correspondingly reduced. However, the Ambassador said it is apparent that we cannot meet their objectives for membership in NATO and admission to the EEC, nor are we prepared to extend to Spain diplomatic support in their dispute with the British over Gibraltar. He noted that the Secretary had reaffirmed the U.S. policy of absolute neutrality on Gibraltar to the Spanish Foreign Minister on November 13, 1967./2/ He said there remains the Spanish request for an escalation of the present commitment (contained in the 1963 Joint Statement) to a U.S.-Spanish treaty.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 206.
The Ambassador said the State Department's Legal Advisor was examining the various forms of commitments which the U.S. might make, ranging from a simple executive agreement on the one hand to a legal treaty on the other. [4 lines of source text not declassified] The Ambassador said in negotiating with Spain he hoped he would be able to demonstrate to Spain that we are prepared to offer it the same type guarantee we have extended to others [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
With regard to the Spanish request for a treaty, he mentioned that Mr. Aguirre de Carcer, Director General for North American Affairs in the Spanish Foreign Ministry, had reported that in a conversation with Senator Fulbright in Geneva, Switzerland, the Senator had told Mr. Aguirre de Carcer there would be no difficulty in getting Senate approval of a U.S.-Spanish treaty./3/
/3/Not further identified.
In considering the kind of commitment we are prepared to offer Spain, the Ambassador said he thought it was important to bear in mind that the Spanish were more interested in the form than the actual substance of such a commitment. For this reason, he said, their first objective is a treaty which would be public and would demonstrate that Spain had obtained something of significance from the U.S. in exchange for the bases.
The Ambassador said that if we were unable to accommodate satisfactorily the Spanish on their request for an improved form of a mutual defense commitment and at the same time, because of the lack of U.S. military assistance funds, we could not satisfactorily meet their request for military equipment, then the Spanish might very well ask for our withdrawal from the bases because not even the Franco regime could justify to its citizens our continued use of the bases if there was no demonstrable benefit for Spain.
Mr. Warnke said that Defense recognizes the difficulty we will have in meeting Spain's political objectives and that we will have to consider offering them some form of military hardware. He said the problem in meeting either their political or military hardware requests originates in the same place: the Congress. He recalled that the Congress has indicated it is opposed to any new defense commitments by the U.S. and at the same time is cutting back on appropriations for U.S. military assistance. He said this latter action is, at least to some extent, inter-related to the first because the Congress believes that military assistance results in the U.S. becoming involved in increased commitments; hence by cutting back military assistance, the Congress puts a block on increased U.S. involvement.
Mr. Warnke said that part of the problem in obtaining military assistance funds for Spain is that all of the various types of military assistance are lumped into one appropriation. He explained there are two types of assistance in which there is not much Congressional opposition. These consist of the assistance to countries where we are helping improve the indigenous forces in order to replace American troops, such as South Korea, and assistance to countries as "rent" for essential bases, as in the case in Spain. These types of assistance are the easiest to justify but, unfortunately, they are included with the "conventional" form of military assistance against which the Congress is directing its objection. He said Defense was trying to find some way to sort out the various types of military assistance. Specifically, he said, we might have to separate out the "rent" in order to get the necessary funds, and he wondered what the Spanish reaction would be if U.S. military assistance to Spain was publicly described as "rent". He asked the Ambassador if he thought he could live with such a development.
On balance, the Ambassador said he thought we could. He said while there might be some rumblings in Spain--such as critical editorials in certain newspapers--he thought the Spanish Government would not strongly object. He said there was a tacit realization among Spaniards that the U.S. would not be giving Spain assistance if it were not for the bases.
The Ambassador said he would like to mention some positive factors as far as the base negotiations were concerned. While the difficulties that had been already discussed were valid, he said we also have certain "pluses" in our favor. He said that the Foreign Minister had told the Secretary on November 13 that Spain and the U.S. had successfully maintained a relationship for 15 years which had been of mutual interest and advantage to both countries. The Foreign Minister said Spain, for its part, was prepared to continue this relationship and it was the Foreign Minister's estimate that this was also the wish of the U.S. The Foreign Minister said that it was on this basis that the two countries should negotiate an extension of the agreement. He had concluded that as it was in the interests of both countries to continue the relationship, he believed that both countries had the same goal of achieving a successful completion of the negotiations. The Ambassador said he thought we could expand on this point by adopting the point-of-view in the negotiations that the U.S. and Spain shared what might be described as a community of interest in the continuation of our relationship.
The Ambassador said he was looking forward with keen interest to hearing the preview of the Briefing Team's presentation at the State Department, December 8. He hoped the Team members would very much have in mind that the Spanish would be listening attentively for anything that would support their contention that the bases are more valuable to us now than they were five years ago. They attribute this increased value to the new Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. The Ambassador said he recognized this was a very delicate and difficult task for the Team, but he thought they should place emphasis that the Soviet presence represented a real political threat to all the countries of the Mediterranean, including Spain.
Mr. Wyle said he was in agreement not only with the objectives as described by the Ambassador but also with his assessment of the difficulties of achieving these objectives because the fact of the matter was that the U.S. Navy, for example, is making the same point as the Spanish--the Soviet presence has increased the importance of the U.S. bases in Spain.
The Ambassador said we should also try to think of ways we can suggest to the Spanish that while the bases are important, their importance is lessened because of restrictions in their use. By restrictions he said he meant the suspension of nuclear overflights and that Spain's present policy in the Middle East restricted the use of the bases by the U.S. in support of possible U.S. actions in the Middle East.
208. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State/1/
Madrid, March 13, 1968, 1746Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17-5 US-SP. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
2951. 1. By prior appointment I today made protocol farewell call on Chief of State. He received me alone./2/
/2/Ambassador Duke left post March 30. President Johnson appointed Robert E. Wagner of New York as Ambassador to Spain on June 24. Wagner presented his credentials on July 4.
2. Main focus Franco's remarks was wish have me convey to President Spanish understanding of difficulties, particularly in political sphere, faced in Viet Nam and hope U.S. would persevere in maintaining present military policy SEA.
3. Franco also agreed to need maintain flexibility in US-Spanish special relationship; mentioned his preoccupation over proximity Torrejon Air Base to Spanish capital; and expressed understanding of need for measures support integrity of dollar. Conversation ran over few other subjects, including developments on U.S. political scene.
4. Comment: Although Franco's hands shook very noticeably during first part of discussion, trembling later subsided, and he looked generally fit. He sustained with interest and attention a half-hour's exchange on matters of substance when he could very well have limited occasion to mere formalities.
Duke
209. Letter From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, June 19, 1968.
Dear Dean:
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret; Noforn.
On the subject of the extension and revision of our Defense Agreement with Spain, which the Spanish have asked be negotiated, I believe it is useful and appropriate to provide State with a Department of Defense position, supplementing the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (as set forth in JCSM-35-68 of January 18, 1968, and JCSM-247-68 of April 17, 1968)./2/ The JCS papers have already been forwarded for your consideration.
/2/Both entitled "U.S. Bases and Facilities in Spain." They are in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Historical Office, Joint Master Files, Case File 967/470/8 June 68.
The Department of Defense considers that the availability of the Spanish base complex for the next five years will continue to be militarily of great importance to the United States. I therefore believe that we should make every effort to negotiate a full extension of all the base and operating rights which we now have in Spain, and that we should be willing to pay in return a quid pro quo approximately equal to that agreed in 1963. We should leave flexible, however, the particular level of our presence in Spain. As you know, studies are now under way in DOD aimed at improving our balance of payments vis-?-visEurope. It is possible that the results will involve changes in the nature and size of our presence. This possibility, however, should not affect our current negotiations with the Spanish.
Inherent in our judgment about the Spanish base complex are such general factors as the difficulty of establishing alternative bases, our limited access to other facilities on the northern shore of the Mediterranean and in North Africa, the limitations on use of French territory and airspace, and the Soviet build-up in the Mediterranean. The specific military contributions of the Spanish bases are the following.
1. The facility at Rota provides a naval operating base for nine ballistic missile submarines operating continuously in the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic. These boats form part of the alert element of our strategic retaliatory forces, and as such are essential to the nuclear deterrent. In our judgment, the only real alternative to Rota would be CONUS basing, but to provide the same number of boats on station from a CONUS base would require an additional two to four boats in the force, having a 10-year incremental cost of at least $500 million.
2. Rota also provides logistic support for surface naval elements transiting the area, including underway replenishment ships for the Sixth Fleet. Facilities at Rota have a capacity to provide 45% of the Sixth Fleet's ammunition requirements and 17% of the POL. While these stores might be relocated elsewhere on the northern shore of the Mediterranean, such a move would have the disadvantage of increasing our political dependence on Greece, Italy, and Portugal.
3. Rota also provides a staging base for airborne [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reconnaissance, a major communications relay, and [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
4. The air base at Torrejon provides the permanent station for three USAF fighter squadrons committed to missions at forward bases in Italy and Turkey and partly deployed in these forward areas. The forward bases have inadequate facilities for maintaining and housing the full squadrons, especially the personnel and their families. Availability of the Spanish complex has thus provided a feasible alternative to basing these squadrons in CONUS, which requires more aircraft to meet the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] mission in Italy and Turkey. Also, 400 MAC sorties per month are now handled at Torrejon, which represents 75% of the airlift load formerly handled at Chateauroux, France.
5. The air bases at Torrejon, Moron, and Zaragoza are required by fighter, tanker and bomber aircraft deploying from CONUS in execution of any one of several US contingency plans for the use of US forces in Europe and the Middle East. These bases are used to support tanker aircraft to refuel deploying fighters and bombers, and to receive the deploying aircraft for enroute stops including necessary refueling, maintenance, arming if required, and crew rest. The restricted availability of French airspace and the political uncertainty of US access to bases in the Azores and Greece and along the southern shore of the Mediterranean will make our access to Spanish bases of great military importance for these missions, until at least 1972; at that time, the advent of the C-5 aircraft may reduce our reliance on intermediate bases between CONUS and the ultimate point of destination in the Middle East.
6. The base at Zaragoza, now in stand-by condition, also offers an alternative to Wheelus AFB as a gunnery range and weapons training center, in the event we should leave Wheelus. All other range possibilities (in Turkey, Italy, Sicily, Portugal and Corsica) are now used by our NATO allies and are overcrowded. There is a generally acknowledged shortage of air training areas in Europe, as evidenced by the German construction program in Portugal and the extensive German training in the US. It is both cheaper and more effective to accomplish USAFE tactical air training in Europe than in CONUS, and the training is extremely important to the combat effectiveness of our European air forces. Training in CONUS would cost perhaps an added $25 million per year; moreover, the crews would be carried in transports, hence could not train in their own tactical aircraft; this factor would lower the value of the training.
7. The air bases in Spain were originally built for SAC operations, and SAC still has contingency plans for their use. These involve the prestrike forward deployment of some B-58 bombers and accompanying tankers, the post-strike recovery for a few B-52's [1 line of source text not declassified] in the Middle East.
8. Spain is now a nodal point for US military communications, carrying about 8.4% of the trans-Atlantic channels and 11.1% of the channels connecting the Mediterranean area with Germany and the UK. While communications satellites will gradually reduce our reliance on relay stations in Spain, the present facilities there will continue to constitute major components of the world-wide defense communications system until 1972.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, the Defense Department considers an extension of the Spanish Base Agreements for another five years to be of great importance to the military security of the United States. In addition, it would seem highly desirable to maintain meaningful political-military ties with Spain during a transitional period which could involve significant changes in Spanish political life and in Spain's relationships to Western Europe. A continued US presence could be a factor for moderation, and could facilitate the development of broader and more harmonious Spanish relations with Europe./3/
/3/In a July 9 response, Rusk noted that the defense agreement would be "one of the principal subjects" discussed with Castiella and that he would be in touch shortly after Castiella's visit. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 4 SP-US) In an August 8 letter, Rusk stated that Paul Nitze had been instructed to brief Clifford on these talks. (Ibid., SIG Files: Lot 74 D 355)
Sincerely,
Clark M. Clifford
210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain/1/
Washington, July 16, 1968, 1709Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SP-US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Landau and approved by Springsteen.
202916. Following based on uncleared memcon and subject to revision on review./2/
/2/A complete set of memoranda of conversation is in Department of State, Spanish Desk Files: Lot 71 D 32, Pol 7 Visits.
Summary:
1. During four-hour talks July 15 Secretary and Spanish FonMin Castiella discussed wide range of bilateral and international issues. Principal topics discussed were:
Effects of balance of payment program on Spain;
Renewal of the Bases Agreement;
Spanish desire for some form of mutual security guarantees;
Spain's abstention from Non-Proliferation Treaty;
Level of US military assistance as quid pro quo for base rights;
Question of possible reduction of US bases in Spain;
Revision of Technical Agreement;
Gibraltar;
Mauritanian feelers to resume relations with US;
Relations with North African states;
Status of Spanish Equatorial Guinea.
2. Secretary Rusk and the Foreign Minister also exchanged confidential diplomatic notes providing for the establishment of a Joint U.S.-Spanish Economic Committee to consult and examine financial and other economic matters of mutual interest./3/ End Summary.
/3/For text, see 20 UST 843.
3. Balance of Payment Program:
Castiella repeated previous Spanish complaints about classification of Spain as Schedule C country referring to highly unfavorable Spanish trade balance with US and Spanish status as deficit country. He claimed that US investment in Spain had declined drastically. Castiella said that US must find ways to redress injustice committed to Spain. He said he hoped Joint Economic Committee would be helpful in finding solution. Secretary did not hold out any hope for reclassification. He explained that stability of the dollar and the US balance of payments deficit were serious matters and of concern not only to the US but to Spain and the rest of the Free World. He requested factual information on the practical effect of US measures on Spanish economy.
Castiella inquired about status of his request for credit for military equipment purchases. Secretary replied that there were problems with Congress concerning military sales and the use of Ex-Im Bank credits and that no decision had been made yet on the Spanish request. He promised to let them know shortly.
4. Renewal of Bases Agreement:
Castiella acknowledged that with forthcoming elections and worldwide commitment, this was not most propitious time for US to negotiate. He said that Spanish also had problems and that bases were less popular in Spain than heretofore. He indicated that Spain wished a security agreement comparable to the one contained in the treaty with Japan, and that it could not sign the NPT until it had some security guarantees. Secretary replied that the Joint Declaration of 1963 was big step forward and emphasized that circumstances were not good at the present for a more formal type of guarantee and that we would have major difficulties with Congress. He pointed out that the sacrifices presently being made by the American people in life and material constituted a demonstration of US fidelity to our commitments throughout the world. With respect to the level of mutual assistance to Spain, both Secretary and Acting Secretary of Defense Nitze explained that the Spanish list for military equipment assistance delivered recently was far beyond our capabilities and that Congressional approval was required before any assistance could be granted.
Castiella said that Spanish request was reasonable and that Spain needed something tangible if US wanted to keep bases and renew agreement.
Mr. Nitze said that DOD would send shortly some people to Spain for on-the-spot survey of Spanish military needs. Castiella thanked him and emphasized again need to move quickly with program of negotiation.
Castiella asked whether US wanted to keep all bases or reduce some. He said that US base at Torrejon was alarming to the three million inhabitants of Madrid, and that US should give firm indication on future need for all bases quickly.
Secretary replied we would inform the GOS as soon as possible when a determination had been made and that we would take GOS views on this question into consideration. He said that the administration contemplated no significant reductions in Spain.
5. Revision of Technical Agreement:
Castiella stated that the GOS was not happy with the US draft. He specifically referred: 1. provisions concerning jurisdiction over military tourists; 2. providing land on cost-free basis; and 3. question of payment for residual value of permanent facilities at the bases.
6. Gibraltar:
Foreign Minister repeated usual arguments for decolonization and referred to existing UN resolutions to which US should adhere. He stressed that there was great sensitivity in Spain on this subject. The Secretary indicated that we did not intend to become involved in the matter but suggested that Spain might usefully seek to woo the Gibraltarians. Castiella replied that Spain had made a very generous offer but that no progress had been made with the British towards decolonization. He said Spain would not use force but had other means of pressure at her disposal and would apply them.
7. Mauritania:
Castiella gave the Secretary a message from the Mauritanian Foreign Minister./4/ Mauritania had expressed a desire to resume diplomatic relations with the US and had asked the Spanish Foreign Minister to sound out US reaction. The Secretary replied that he would check into the question immediately and give the Foreign Minister an official USG reply to transmit to the Mauritanians.
/4/Not found.
8. North Africa:
The Foreign Minister said that progress was being made on the decolonization of Ifni through negotiations with Morocco and talks had started. He said GOS hoped to solve the question within the next few weeks and that he hoped Ifni could be returned to Morocco within a few months.
Spain had good relations with Morocco and Algeria and had notably improved relations with Libya. Tunisia had just received a $20 million credit loan from Spain.
9. Equatorial Guinea:
He referred also to progress made towards independence for Equatorial Guinea and emphasized that this was another example of Spanish good faith on decolonization question. He said independence would probably be granted by October 12.
10. At the Foreign Minister's request the Secretary outlined briefly the present status of US-USSR relations and gave his assessment of the status of the Paris talks on Vietnam.
11. At conclusion Secretary and Castiella agreed that there was much work left to be done on base renewal and that there was need to keep in close contact.
Secretary said he hoped we could aim for final negotiation in September but that we should not be idle in the meantime and keep working on the problems.
Rusk
211. Letter From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, August 17, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret.
Dear Dean:
This is in reply to your letter of August 8 concerning our bases in Spain./2/
/2/In his letter, Rusk suggested closing Torrejon Air Force Base. (Ibid., SIG Files: Lot 74 D 355)
Your suggestion that we attempt to break out of our studies on cost reductions in Europe those portions relating to possible US force reductions in Spain is a reasonable one. It may, however, present some difficulties, since deployments in Spain are related to considerations of our overall military posture in Europe, and more particularly to the question of our tactical air capability on the southeast flank of NATO and in the western Mediterranean. Nevertheless, we will do our best to reach decisions with regard to Spain in advance of your next discussion with Foreign Minister Castiella.
You requested in particular that we give consideration to closing the air base at Torrejon, in view of Castiella's expressed concern over the proximity of that base to Madrid. While we are examining proposals for closure or reduction to standby status of Moron Air Force Base, near Seville, we have only been considering reductions in the level of our military population at Torrejon. I believe there are significant obstacles to closing Torrejon. The most important point is that it is our best base in Spain. It is far better equipped than the other bases in terms of communications equipment, administrative buildings, and a wide range of support facilities that relate directly to the staging of tactical and transport aircraft through Spain and to the headquarters requirements of the 16th Air Force. If we were to move the major elements at Torrejon to another base, it would require construction of additional communications, administrative, and support facilities, as well as considerable additional housing. The cost and time factors involved would depend upon the alternate base selected as an adequate substitute. At the present time the estimates on expense range from $10 to 20 million, exclusive of housing costs, but further study is required before any confidence can be felt in these figures. The moving costs would be substantially less if we returned the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing from Torrejon to CONUS, but, as Nick Katzenbach pointed out in his letter to Paul Nitze of July 22,/3/ it could have serious political implications because of its effect on our tactical air capability on the southeast flank of NATO and in the western Mediterranean.
/3/Not found.
Let me add that Castiella's concern about our presence at Torrejon does not appear to be shared throughout the Spanish government. The Spanish military, in particular, have made no objection to our presence there. Moreover, Torrejon is a principal operating base of the Spanish Air Force, and they would probably wish to continue to use it. If we left, they would have to pay the operating costs.
We are making progress in our preparations for negotiations in September. The DOD equipment package has now been developed, and the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Tim Hoopes, has discussed it with John Leddy. I understand that State has agreed that the equipment package constitutes a point of departure for our negotiations with the Spanish.
While I believe it would be well for the IRG/EUR and the SIG to consider in general the possibility of military reductions in Spain, I think that any detailed discussions of this matter should be confined to State-Defense channels.
As I believe you know, I have charged Tim Hoopes with principal DOD responsibility for the Spanish base negotiations. He and Ralph Earle, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, will continue to deal with your staff on the particulars of the negotiations.
Sincerely,
Clark
212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain/1/
Washington, August 22, 1968, 1645Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Landau; cleared by EUR, G/PM, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Rusk.
225515. Ref: Madrid 4813./2/ Subject: Spanish Base Negotiations.
/2/Telegram 4813 from Madrid, August 19, forwarded Castiella's request for a September 9 meeting with Rusk. (Ibid., POL 7 SP)
1. Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) will discuss negotiating position Spanish bases September 5. After consideration we must seek White House concurrence on agreed inter-agency position to enable Secretary to discuss terms with Castiella. To accomplish this, earliest meeting date would be September 16.
2. We foresee no difficulties with arrival of legal mission to discuss technical agreement September 3 or 4 and believe that it would be mutually advantageous to start legal talks on basis of existing proposals and counter-proposals. We see no need at this point to send a written U.S. response to latest Spanish counter proposals.
3. We believe that no useful purpose could be achieved by further meetings with a Spanish military mission until Secretary has had chance to present to Castiella the dimensions of the hardware package which the U.S. would be prepared to agree to following SIG consideration, Congressional consultation, and approval by the President. Only after GOS agrees in principle to amount offered could there be a fruitful discussion of detailed contents of package with Spanish military group. (FYI. We are considering separate grant and credit sales package. Detailed discussions with Spanish military may take considerable time, but could be accomplished after basic exchange of letters, which would state only value of grant and credit package subject to availability of funds.)
Rusk
213. Record of the 42d Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group/1/
Washington, September 5, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, SIG Files: Lot 74 D 344, 42nd Meeting. Secret.
CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION AND DECISIONS
PRESENT
The Under Secretary of State, Chairman
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. Poats for the Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, United States Information Agency
Mr. Fried for the Special Assistant to the President
The Under Secretary of Treasury
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
SIG Staff Director
DOD--Mr. Hoopes
DOD--Mr. Earle
JCS--General Bayne
Ex-Im--Mr. Sauer
Ex-Im--Mr. Balderston
BOB--Mr. Clark
State--Mr. Leddy
State--Mr. Furnas
State--Mr. Landau
State--Mr. Ruser
[Here follows discussion of future meetings and defense-related issues.]
III. Spanish Base Rights Negotiations
The Chairman congratulated Mr. Leddy on the contingency plan for Czechoslovakia./2/ The scenario and timing of the crisis had, of course, not been foreseen, and many of the contingency draft telegrams and papers had to be modified. But EUR's preparatory work had been most helpful during the first few days of the crisis. It provided a checklist of what had to be done and first drafts for many of the messages and papers. It would have been impossible for the Department to gear up so quickly for the crisis without this earlier work.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVII, Document 23.
Mr. Katzenbach then invited Mr. Leddy to review the points at issue in the forthcoming base rights negotiations.
Mr. Leddy said that the Spanish Foreign Minister was now definitely scheduled to meet with Secretary Rusk on September 16. It was essential that the United States Government have a clear position on the outstanding issues by that date.
A. Security Guarantees Toward Spain
Mr. Leddy said that the Spanish wished to strengthen the degree of assurance and commitment they felt was provided by the 1963 Joint Declaration.
A subcommittee of the IRG had thoroughly reviewed all the possibilities for strengthening the language of the Declaration. The IRG had reviewed these possible changes and had concluded that none of them would satisfy the Spanish./3/ We would be better off to take the position that the wording of the 1963 Declaration was the best we could offer and try to avoid opening up this matter.
/3/SIG Memo No. 82, August 31. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo No. 82)
The SIG agreed that the 1963 Declaration represented the maximum we could offer. Mr. Katzenbach took the view that, if for public relation reasons, the Spanish should insist on minor wording changes, we should be willing to consider them provided these changes would not substantively strengthen the language of the Declaration. As a practical matter, if Castiella should put forward alternative language, we would have no choice but to consider his proposals.
B. Economic Relations
Mr. Leddy said the second issue between the Spanish and ourselves was their treatment under the United States direct investment control program and, more generally, under our balance of payments program.
The Spanish consider their classification in Schedule C discriminatory in view of their weak balance of payments position and relatively under-developed economy in relation to the rest of Europe. We have agreed to set up a Consultative Economic Committee but we have no intention to change Spain's classification under the program or to provide further exemptions from the IET.
We will continue to take the position that there is no evidence our balance of payments program has significantly affected the level of United States investment in Spain. The recent drop in United States investment activity would have occurred even in the absence of tighter balance of payment controls. It reflects the fact that United States companies operating in Spain have completed their expansion programs for the time being.
The SIG agreed that:
--We would have no proposals to make for dealing with the subject; and,
--We cannot weaken the balance of payments program in order to smoothe the course of the base rights negotiations.
C. SOFA Negotiations
Mr. Leddy observed that a concurrent, related but separate, issue between ourselves and Spain was the renegotiation of the SOFA. A subcommittee of the IRG had prepared the United States position for these negotiations. The general conclusion was that we should go as far as we can to meet legitimate Spanish demands for better terms. The bench-mark for the United States negotiating position, generally speaking, was the SOFAs with NATO countries, including the supplemental agreement with the Federal Republic. We should not draw on the Far Eastern SOFAs as a model.
The SIG took note of some of the key issues including military tourism, unusual punishment, and reciprocal rights. There was agreement that we were unable to meet Spanish requests on this latter issue in view of the delicate problems this would raise in the area of State-Federal relations.
D. Military Assistance Package
Mr. Leddy reviewed the history of the negotiation to date, including Spanish demands for a $1 billion assistance package. He described the United States counter offer recommended by the IRG, including the breakdown of the package between grant and credit. He emphasized that the credits would be primarily for the purchase of new equipment not available on our excess list, whereas grant assistance would be drawn from second-hand excess stocks and required new appropriations in a range of $40 to $60 million. He noted the two qualifications to the United States offer of $100 million in credits--viz:
1) That commercial bank credits for military equipment purchases, inasmuch as they were discountable by the lending bank with Ex-Im, would be counted towards the $100 million ceiling; and,
2) That, if the Spanish should take up all or part of the $55 million available from Ex-Im until September 26, these amounts would also be chargeable against the ceiling.
Mr. Leddy then discussed the problem of funding. As regards FY 1969, he noted that there might be a need for up to $8 to $10 million in newly appropriated funds. There were several possibilities for dealing with this requirement:
--To find money in the shrunken MAP appropriation;
--To go for a supplemental after January;
--To pick and choose items that require no rehabilitation or can be readily rehabilitated in Spain. On balance, the question of when we start the grant program would probably not be critical and the Spanish would appreciate our problem if we should find it necessary to defer new grant aid until FY 70.
The question was raised whether we would not do well to start out with a lower figure than our maximum position.
Mr. Katzenbach said that he felt this tactical question should be left to the judgment of the negotiators.
The Spanish would either take our package or delay in order to negotiate with the next Administration. We should adhere to a figure of about $100 million grant even if the Spanish should refuse to accept it. This was, however, not to foreclose the possibility of a figure somewhat lower or higher if, on this basis, we should be able to conclude the negotiations. He was convinced that the United States would for some such figure be able to negotiate an extension of the agreement. He was not sure, however, that the Spanish would be willing to conclude an extension on this basis with the present Administration. A quick negotiation was in our interest-but the Spanish, for their part, could, if they wished, delay to have another try with the next Administration.
The point was made that the arguments in favor of a quick negotiation should be covered in the Memorandum to the President.
On Congressional consultations, it was agreed that these consultations would have to be carried out immediately and that we would not be able to wait until completion of Congressional action on the military assistance legislation because the President would not approve a United States offer without Congressional soundings. It was also agreed that these consultations should focus on the package rather than the problem of funding. Funding, if mentioned at all, should be treated lightly at the end of the consultations.
E. Statement About United States Presence
Mr. Katzenbach observed that it would be helpful to Secretary Rusk to be able to say something about intentions in regard to a consolidation or reduction of our military presence.
Mr. Nitze said that this matter was under review. We were planning to stay at Torrejon but there was the possibility that we might wish to transfer our operations from Moron. Such a consolidation of our air force operations at Torrejon, if it should be decided on, would result in some reduction of personnel. We would do this without a reduction of our combat and combat support capabilities. Mr. Nitze indicated that the Secretary of Defense might wish to move toward a decision on this matter in the next 30 to 90 days.
Mr. Rostow raised the question of timing of a public announcement in light of the events in Czechoslovakia. There was agreement that even though the planned consolidations would not reduce our capabilities, we would have this factor in mind in working out a possible announcement on this matter.
Action Summary
The Chairman directs:
[Here follows discussion of foreign internal defense policy.]
Spanish Base Rights Negotiations
EUR and SIG Staff to prepare a Memorandum to the President setting forth the SIG's conclusions and recommendations. (See SIG Memo #83, Sept. 11, 1968)/4/
/4/SIG Memo No. 83, September 11. (Ibid., SIG Memo No. 83)
The IRG/EUR recommendations to serve as guidelines on renegotiation of the SOFA.
A. A. Hartman
Staff Director
214. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, September 12, 1968, 10:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "Rec'd 11:10 a.m."
SUBJECT
U.S. Position on Spanish Base Negotiations
At Tab A/2/ is Nick Katzenbach's memo recommending you approve a package offer we would make to the Spanish in negotiating a 5-year renewal of our base rights agreement. Secretary Rusk meets with the Spanish Foreign Minister on Monday, September 16, to discuss the renewal.
/2/Not printed.
Paul Nitze, Joe Barr, Charlie Zwick, and Walter Sauer, acting head of the Ex-Im Bank concur in the recommendation.
Our agreement with Spain covers a naval base for Polaris-armed nuclear submarines and two air bases. Secretary Clifford believes that we will continue to need a base position in Spain over the next five years, but that we should be able to consolidate the two air bases and close down one of them.
Our first base agreement with Spain was made in 1953. The present agreement was renegotiated in 1963. It expires this September 27, but provides for a 6-month consultation period beyond that date. We have nothing to gain from deferring the negotiations, however, since we need the bases. Postponement would probably put Spain in a better position to press for a higher price.
The recommended package comes down to the following:
--Grant aid, drawn largely from excess stocks, with a "fair value" of $100 million but requiring budget funds (for rehabilitating the equipment) of $40 to $60 million over the 5-year period. (In the last agreement we gave the Spanish $100 million in new military equipment, paid entirely from budget money.)
--Ex-Im credits or guarantees, under normal terms, of $100 million for purchases of military equipment. (The Spanish bought about $180 million in military equipment from us during the past five years. They paid cash or financed commercially. Their financial position was stronger than it is now, so they did not take advantage of our offer to provide some Ex-Im credits.)
This package will be far below what the Spanish request. We would tell them, however, that we also propose to close down one of our bases. This will help them domestically to accept the lower price. It helps us by cutting our goals.
The Spanish also request:
--A security treaty with us such as we have with Japan. We refused this in the last negotiations and will do so again. We would go no further than the existing Joint Declaration of our common interests that went with the 1963 agreement. (The Joint Declaration is shown at Annex in State's memo.)
--Exemption from the direct investment controls of our balance of payments program. We will say no.
Congressional consultations do not indicate any serious difficulties on the Hill:
--Secretary Clifford and Paul Nitze were in touch with Senator Russell and Congressmen Mahon and Rivers. Russell had some question about the price but was sympathetic; Mahon approved; and Rivers gave his enthusiastic and unqualified endorsement of the package and said we should get on with the agreement.
--Bill Macomber and his people spoke to Senator Hickenlooper (regretted we had to pay anything but recognized the need); Senator Sparkman (bases important, price not too high); Congressman Frelinghuysen (saw need, hoped we could negotiate it at the price). They also heard from the following:
Senator Mansfield--does not like a deal with Spain but goes along on security grounds and is pleased we may be able to close down one of the bases.
Senator Dirksen and Congressmen Albert and Edna Kelly saw no problems.
Ford was ill, but his staff did not see any trouble.
I believe the package makes sense and that we should go ahead with the negotiations.
Walt
Required authorization for negotiating offer to Spain:/3/
/3/The President approved all three options. A handwritten note at the bottom of the page indicates that Fried's office was notified.
Grant aid: ($100 million fair value, subject to the availability of funds, requiring new appropriations of $40-$60 million over the 5-year period.)
ExIm credits or guarantees of $100 million for military purchases over the 5-year period.
Inform Spain we are considering closing down one of the two air bases and will consult with them before making final decision.
215. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, September 13, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 14-5 SP-US. Secret.
Dear Dean:
I refer to your letter of August 8 concerning a possible reduction of the US military presence in Spain, and to my reply on August 17/2/ that DoD would do its best to reach a decision with regard to this matter in advance of your forthcoming meeting with Foreign Minister Castiella on September 16. I am aware of the Spanish Ambassador's recent proposal to us that, if we are unable to meet fully Spain's requests for military equipment, we should consider a reduction in our military presence as a means of helping the Spanish government to accept an extension of the Base Agreement; and I have noted the SIG conclusion/3/ that a statement concerning our intentions on future force levels is probably essential to such a Spanish acceptance.
/2/See Document 211 and footnote 2 thereto.
/3/See Document 213.
Bearing these several factors in mind, we have studied the matter intensively within DoD and have now reached certain tentative conclusions; these would permit you to advise Foreign Minister Castiella along the following lines:
1. The US is currently studying its European deployments; while no decisions have yet been made, we do anticipate some reductions and consolidations of noncombat activities.
2. Within a program of consolidations and reductions, we would anticipate placing one more of the bases in Spain in standby status, comparable to the present status of Zaragoza; this would probably be Moron. Such a move would involve personnel reductions of about 4500, approximately half of whom would be civilian employees and dependents.
3. We would anticipate the continued use of Torrejon at approximately the present level of activity.
4. We have sympathetically considered your expressed concern about Torrejon, but have concluded that there are serious obstacles to its closure. It is far better equipped than the other bases in terms of communications equipment, administrative buildings, and a wide range of support facilities. Any attempt to move present activities from Torrejon to one of the other bases would cost the United States a good deal of money and time; and in view of our present stringencies, the requirement to fund such a move might well affect adversely the grant-sales package we are proposing to strengthen the Spanish armed forces. Moreover, if the United States should leave Torrejon and the Spanish Air Force wishes to continue to use that base, the Spanish government would of course have to pick up the operating costs.
5. We will consult with you further as we approach decisions on these matters.
I hope these suggestions will be helpful to you in your meeting with the Spanish Foreign Minister.
Sincerely,
Paul
216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain/1/
Washington, September 16, 1968, 2358Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Landau and approved by Leddy. Repeated to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAFE.
239577. Subject: Spanish Base Negotiations. Following based on uncleared memcon Secret/Noforn FYI only and subject to revision upon review:/2/
/2/The memorandum of conversation is ibid., POL 7 SP.
1. Secretary, heading U.S. group of negotiators, met for three hours with Spanish group, led by Foreign Minister Castiella regarding renewal of Base Agreement scheduled to expire September 26. Foreign Minister termed our offer of hardware package of $100 million aid and $100 million official credits as extremely low but agreed to have the contents of the package discussed further with Pentagon officials tomorrow, September 17./3/ Castiella also said that for the reduction of U.S. presence to be meaningful Torrejon rather than Moron should be deactivated but again agreed to have this matter further discussed between the Spanish military and Pentagon officials tomorrow.
/3/The memorandum of conversation is ibid.
2. Foreign Minister made his usual plea for an increased security commitment and Aguirre referred to the bilateral agreement between U.S. and Iran as an example. Secretary said he would look into the matter.
3. Finally, Spanish delegation, as on previous occasions, complained about the "discriminatory" inclusion of Spain in Schedule C of the President's balance of payments program. No concrete example of "discrimination" was offered. Under Secretary Deming agreed that Treasury would meet with the Spanish economic members of the negotiating team September 17 to discuss this matter further.
4. When we mentioned the Technical Agreement negotiations presently being held in Madrid, Castiella displayed little interest and referred to them as marginal.
5. Secretary Rusk told the Foreign Minister he would be available for further discussions at any time during the week and the Foreign Minister said he would return after the discussions with the Pentagon and Treasury had been concluded.
6. The general impression is that the Spanish, after some haggling, will be ready to extend the Agreement for another five years.
Rusk
217. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, September 21, 1968, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret; Noforn; Limdis. Drafted by Landau and approved in S on December 25. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.
SUBJECT
Renewal of Defense Agreement
PARTICIPANTS
Spain
His Excellency Fernando Castiella, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain
His Excellency the Marquis de Merry del Val, Ambassador of Spain
The Honorable Ramon Sedo Gomez, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Spain
The Honorable Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Director General of American and Far Eastern Affairs, Spanish Foreign Ministry
United States
The Secretary
Mr. John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director for Spain and Portugal
The Foreign Minister said that the problem facing us was the renewal of the base agreements. We were talking about the following:
1. Torrejon--the importance of this base was so great that there was no need to further mention it;
2. Zaragoza presently in caretaker status;
3. Moron, which was important; and
4. Rota, which probably was the most important of all U.S. bases.
[3 paragraphs (21 lines of source text) not declassified]
In addition to all this, the U.S. has the full cooperation and friendship of the Spanish people and their military. This [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Spain cooperated during the Palomares accident in keeping it as quiet as possible. The Foreign Minister said he just wanted to mention all this to let the Secretary know what Spain offers and that all this should be compared with the U.S. offer of 1968. What is Spain receiving for all these risks? The Foreign Minister said that all the U.S. offered was around $20 million per year. Perhaps by some tough negotiations this could be increased to 30 or even 40 million dollars, mainly in used equipment, some of it with very late delivery dates. On top of this the U.S. offers only a very reduced security guarantee. The Foreign Minister said he could not ask the Spanish people to accept this offer and if the Secretary were in his shoes, he would not consider signing such a deal which does not adequately reward Spain's friendship.
The Secretary replied that the U.S. valued Spanish cooperation but wanted to stress that all installations we had in Spain were mutually advantageous to both countries. Spain too was interested in U.S. troops and the presence of the Sixth Fleet. Thanks to the Foreign Minister's skill, Spain had improved her relations with the European countries and with the Western Hemisphere but this improvement was partly based on Spain's relationship with the U.S.. Now the situation, according to the Foreign Minister, is more dangerous in 1968 than it was before. In that case, our presence is more valuable to Spain and it is more important for Spain to have U.S. troops in Europe and to have the Sixth Fleet remain in the Mediterranean.
The Foreign Minister said that he valued the U.S. contribution and that he was aware of the protection it afforded Spain but with the protection goes the increased risk for Spain. If Spain did not renew the security arrangements the Sixth Fleet would remain and 250,000 men would remain in Europe. Spain would at the same time not have to take any risks. The Secretary said that the risk came from the enemy and that if the U.S. were not present the risk would be much greater. The Secretary said that in a friendly way he wanted to make it clear that he took exception to the Foreign Minister's remarks. He said this was not a responsible position to take.
The Secretary added that the U.S. also had made enormous financial contributions to Spain by building the bases and moreover Spain derived a considerable balance of payments advantage from the presence of our troops in Spain. In other countries we have offset arrangements; we have never asked Spain for one. The Secretary said that we are working under the assumption that both sides would reach agreement to their best mutual advantage and that there should be no fundamental qualitative changes in the agreement.
The Secretary said that he had seen a draft letter prepared by Treasury officials which clearly explained that our balance of payments program was not working against Spain and that the levels of U.S. investment in Spain were not expected to change. Spain would not derive any advantage from changes in reclassification to a different schedule because the Treasury had to look at all applications for Spain. The Secretary said that he was willing to sign this letter. The Foreign Minister allowed that he was grateful that progress had been made on this issue.
The Secretary said that on the matter of military assistance he was reluctant to say what he was about to say because if revealed he would be in deepest trouble. We were trying our best to be as forthcoming as we could to the Spanish request. The dollar figure which we gave the Spanish is the highest considering what pressure we are under. Out of the funds of the Department of Defense and our military assistance program we must finance "a hot war" in Southeast Asia, not only in Vietnam but also in Thailand, Laos and Korea. We have tried through internal arrangements within the Executive Branch to fund the request through the Department of Defense where the budget is concealed in another budget. If Spain would buy what we offer in the United Kingdom, France or the USSR, the equipment would cost between $400 and $600 million. If Spain were to manufacture it herself, it would cost many billions. The Secretary said that he was certain that the Spanish military and the U.S. military could work out the package and that we were meeting substantially Spanish requests.
The Secretary said that there would also be severe political repercussions if the U.S. and Spain were not able to reach agreement. He said a number of countries important to Spain would react in a negative way, for example, Turkey, Italy, Greece and Germany. These countries consider an agreement between the U.S. and Spain important. Only De Gaulle would be delighted. Moreover, at home we would be in deep trouble with Congress because Senators would say that if we had offered an open, cooperative and generous deal to Spain and if there were no agreement it would be tantamount to a Spanish confiscation of bases in disguise.
The Foreign Minister said that he would like to remind the Secretary that Spain too had made important sacrifices in the establishment of the bases. Millions of dollars had been spent in expropriating land and the bases had not been profitable for Spain. The Foreign Minister said he appreciated the efforts made about rectifying the existing discriminatory situation on the balance of payments problem by the offer to issue a letter. Castiella then said that he agreed with the Secretary that if no agreement were reached it would cause international concern but by the same token, it would enhance Spanish prestige because it no longer could be considered as a satellite of the U.S. but as a free and independent country. Moreover, internally a part of the Spanish people would applaud the end of the agreement if the American proposals were insufficient.
The Secretary replied that on the question of prestige Spain would have to choose. Of course, Nasser, Boumedienne and Tanzania would applaud non-renewal. But the prestige would go down in Western Europe, in Japan, in India and even in Yugoslavia and Spain had to choose where it wanted its prestige.
The Secretary suggested that the possibility existed that both sides were the prisoners of artificial military figures and maybe in the upcoming talks we should not use figures but talk about equipment. In this way we could talk about some increases in military assistance and the Spanish military probably could report back that they were satisfied.
The Foreign Minister said that it had always been the Spanish intention not to talk about figures but only about equipment because figures were misleading considering that equipment could be priced in various ways.
The Foreign Minister said that the Secretary had mentioned Boumedienne but that he would like to remind us that the Algerian Air Force, thanks to Soviet generosity, was infinitely superior to the Spanish Air Force which had obsolete equipment. He said the Spanish military were ready to help the U.S. but they must be armed to do so.
The Foreign Minister added that in the U.S. package we offered obsolete 102s. Mr. Landau interjected that in the discussion with Mr. Hoopes this matter had been clarified and that the U.S. Air Force was looking into the possibility of furnishing 104s as requested by the Spanish.
The Secretary suggested that the military should go ahead and have another try at the package on Monday with a view of reaching an agreement on the physical contents of the package as well as on the services which could be provided by the U.S. to the Spanish Navy and to the early warning system. These services were hard to translate into dollars and cents.
Castiella said that time was flying and there was need for him to meet again with the Secretary to talk about reduction of U.S. presence and security guarantees possibly on Monday.
The Secretary suggested that the military group discuss the reduction of U.S. presence at the time they talked about the package. Mr. Aguirre de Carcer said firmly that the Spanish generals were not authorized to discuss this question.
The Secretary then suggested that this matter be raised on the political level at DOD possibly with Mr. Nitze.
The Foreign Minister said that he would be pleased to send Under Secretary Sedo on Monday to see Mr. Nitze. The Foreign Minister again stressed that we had severe time limitations and that he could not sign until he was satisfied that Spanish defense needs had been met.
It was decided that the Spanish military would meet with the U.S. military group headed by Mr. Hoopes on Monday and that Mr. Nitze would see Mr. Sedo on Monday too. Following these meetings, another talk would be scheduled between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister.
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