218. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, September 25, 1968, 10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Landau and approved in S on October 1. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office.
SUBJECT
Spanish Base Negotiations
PARTICIPANTS
Spain
His Excellency Fernando Castiella, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain
His Excellency the Marquis de Merry del Val, Ambassador of Spain
The Honorable Ramon Sedo Gomez, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Spain
The Honorable Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Director General of American and Far Eastern Affairs, Spanish Foreign Ministry
United States
The Secretary
The Honorable Paul N. Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director for Spain and Portugal
The Foreign Minister stated that normally he always looked forward to coming to the Department of State but that today he came to the Secretary's office sadly and with a lump in his throat. For several days, while in Washington, he had come to realize that no progress was being made in the negotiations and that matters were beginning to turn in the wrong direction. This was a painful fact, sad both to the Secretary and to himself. Nevertheless, despite the difficult situation he now faced, the Foreign Minister still wished to thank the Secretary, Messrs. Nitze, Leddy, Landau, Deming, and Colman for their hard work and for having shown so much good will towards Spain.
The Foreign Minister stated that he wanted to summarize the situation as he now saw it and to compare what Spain had to offer and what the U.S. was ready to come up with in return. Spain offered four important military bases, two of which were of the greatest importance for the defense of the Western world. The base at Rota was the only other base together with Holy Loch where nuclear-powered Polaris submarines could enter. Rota's location is unique at the entrance to the Mediterranean. Also there was Torrejon, headquarters of the 16th Air Force, a powerful base with the longest airstrip in Europe. As a matter of fact, General Burchinal had told General Munoz Grandes two or three days ago that it was his hope that Torrejon might eventually become the headquarters for the whole U.S. Air Force in Europe. In addition to the four bases there were also communications facilities, assisting the U.S. and Europe. There were a number of other factors such as Colossus I and the privilege of U.S. overflight rights in Spain. If it were not possible for U.S. aircraft to fly freely over Spain and France, a problem would be caused for the U.S. Finally, pursuant to a secret agreement, Spain did not require prior consultation or notification if its bases were used in times of crisis. Spain is the only sovereign state that has gone so far in granting such valuable privileges.
The Foreign Minister said that it is not the fault of Spain that they are faced with such pressure of time and that such serious matters had to be discussed during the brief period of September 16 to September 26. There still exists a very big gap between the Spanish request and the U.S. counter-offer. The U.S. has offered some $20 million of military assistance per year and a line of credit of $100 million. On the other hand, Spain had listed its needs not in terms of money but in terms of actual requirements. The Foreign Minister stated that he wanted to table the latest Spanish proposal prepared by his military team which, although not expressed in terms of dollars and cents, should amount to about $500 to $600 million. It was indeed a drama that U.S. inability to provide Spain with $100 million of equipment per year would liquidate a friendship and an alliance. Next March the U.S. might have to start dismantling its bases and what was really painful was to see how much harm could be done to a cooperation and friendship that had developed over a 15-year period.
The Foreign Minister stated the news of this situation would be known around the world and that it would harm U.S. prestige in other countries. Greece, Turkey, and Italy have bases in the Mediterranean where they deny use of their facilities to Polaris nuclear submarines. These countries will be happy about the Spanish gesture because it will make their contribution more valuable in the future. There will be a quick and strong reaction on the part of the press. Regrettably, by looking at newspaper articles and editorials in the U.S. press, one could see that there was a lack of knowledge with regard to Spain's real contribution to Western defense. The American press usually dismisses the four bases in a cursory manner and neglects to take into account the communications centers, and the overflight rights. Spain would continue to be a friend of the U.S. but it hurt the Foreign Minister deeply to see how the U.S. could be harmed by the present situation.
The Foreign Minister stated that he could not understand why the U.S. could not come up with $100 million a year for these bases when the U.S. had a total defense budget of $72 billion. He said he felt that $100 million was a ridiculously low sum. He said that he did not know exactly how much could be purchased with $100 million or whether in fact the bases were worth that amount in terms of the defense of the free world. Spain had asked for this figure not because of blackmail but because it needed that level of assistance to cover its defense needs and, furthermore, Spain was willing to make its own contribution to the defense of the free world. The Czech crisis and other recent events had underlined once more the importance of conventional armies. While a country such as Denmark could contribute only several thousand troops to the common defense, Spain had 120 thousand men in uniform and in case of need could contribute half a million men to the defense of the West. But in the face of such offers there seemed to be no attempt on the part of the U.S. to attach great value to Spain's contribution. It appeared as if the U.S. wanted to defend the entire world alone and as if only U.S. lives could be committed to the defense of a civilization, which Spain also wanted to defend. Offering lives and taking risks was something that could not be evaluated in monetary terms and, therefore, $100 million was truly a ridiculously low sum. Spain refused to trade human lives in return for an insufficient package. Spain wants to make its contribution to the defense of Europe and of the West. While it was true that the U.S. had suffered 350,000 casualties since World War II, Spain's anti-communist stand had cost half a million lives during its bloody civil war.
The Spanish military team had found the American military representatives to be very unbending during their last meeting, which was a very short one, and the U.S. counter-offer remained basically unchanged. The Foreign Minister said he had remained in Washington hoping that tension would decrease. On Sunday, the Foreign Minister had called Mr. Landau to the Spanish Embassy (and he thanked him for coming so promptly) to describe some of the difficulties that he faced in view of the rapidly approaching deadline. The Spanish Council of Ministers was to meet on September 24 and the Spanish Chief of State was to leave Madrid on September 25. The Foreign Minister had said to Mr. Landau that he and his military advisers had to report to the GOS on the course of the negotiations by Monday night. In response to his report, the Spanish Government had met and had sent him the following cable:
At the Cabinet meeting on September 24 the Spanish Government has studied the position of the United States. The decisions of the Spanish Cabinet are as follows:
1. The U.S. offer of military assistance as presented on September 23 is totally unacceptable.
2. The Spanish minimum requirement cannot be reduced any further.
3. The Spanish Government cannot consider any alternate formulae through readjustment of the U.S. military presence in Spain.
4. In view of U.S. inability to meet the Spanish request, the Spanish Government wishes to apply the procedure provided by Article V of the Defense Agreement.
5. The Spanish Government authorizes the Foreign Minister to seek with the Secretary of State a jointly-agreed presentation to the press.
The last point was the only concession the Foreign Minister had been able to obtain from his Government to enable him to try to present the best possible picture to the press in the midst of this catastrophe.
The Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister on behalf of his colleagues and of himself for the Foreign Minister's very friendly remarks about their own role. He said he esteemed the Foreign Minister's able diplomatic expertise very highly. First of all, the Secretary expressed regret at the conclusions reached by the Spanish Council of Ministers. It was apparent that if the procedures provided for in Article V were now invoked, some serious problems would arise for both sides. From the diplomatic point of view, it was necessary to take note of the fact that the U.S. was in the midst of an election period and it was impossible to know at the present time who the next President would be and what the political composition of the next Congress might be. If Article V were to go into effect right away, the next Administration would only have two months for consultations while at the same time it would have to organize itself and look at some major problems, including the matter of negotiations with Spain. Secondly, it would be important to explain to the peoples of both countries why an agreement had not been reached. From that point on Spain and the U.S. would be following diverging paths. Regardless of what the explanations to the press might be, relations between Spain and the U.S. would begin to deteriorate. What the Spanish Government and the U.S. told their respective press and people would probably lead to a number of different interpretations and this was a problem that should not be minimized. It would probably result in a bad press for Spain in the U.S. and also for a bad press for the U.S. in Spain. While it was difficult to see the bearing of all of this on U.S. and Spanish prestige, it was clear to see that it would damage both sides. Its effect on Spain would be serious because Spain's prestige had risen in recent years, partly due to its good relations with the U.S.
The Secretary stated that the Foreign Minister had had a chance to consult with his Council of Ministers but since the Secretary did not know what Spain's latest reaction would be, he had not consulted with his own colleagues in the Cabinet or with the President. He would like to have a chance to do so before he gave a final reply to the Foreign Minister. He added that he would like to suggest to the Foreign Minister that, to avoid the negative consequences resulting from the invocation of Article V, he ask his Government for a six-month extension of the Agreements. This would give both governments and especially the new U.S. Administration enough time to analyze the problems before Article V was invoked. He hoped that the Foreign Minister would be able to consult with Madrid about this matter and to indicate its reaction as soon as possible. At the same time, the Secretary would discuss the problem with the President and with the Secretary of Defense. Unfortunately, the Secretary had to leave for Philadelphia to make a speech and would not be back until later today, but he would be at the disposal of the Foreign Minister as of tomorrow morning. In any event, Messrs. Nitze and Leddy would represent him in the meantime.
The Secretary stated that if it were difficult to get in touch with the full Council of Ministers or with the Spanish Chief of State another solution might be to waive the September 26 deadline and so to speak use the parliamentary procedure of stopping the clock.
The Foreign Minister said that with reference to the difficulties caused by the present election period that Spain had not chosen the date for these negotiations and that when the Agreement was signed initially the negotiators on both sides did not realize that the Agreement would expire during the time of the election campaign. Spain had studied the problem of the renewal for quite some time and had realized what some of the difficulties might be. Nevertheless, it did not want to play up to one or the other political parties in the U.S. and had always preferred to deal with the U.S. on a Government-to-Government basis and hoped that if there were to be a change in the Government in Spain, the U.S. would also deal with Spain on the same basis.
Now that Spain was required to ask for the cancellation of the Agreement, the matter of press relations became very important. The Spanish press is free and not controlled, and whoever thinks otherwise is obviously ill-informed. Be that as it may, the Spanish press had been silent during the course of the present negotiations because the Foreign Minister and his team had not sent out any information and there had been no leaks on the Spanish side. The press had reported just the fact that meetings had been held but had not divulged any of the substance. The Foreign Minister would now have to make the necessary efforts to inform the Spanish press, the world, and American public opinion of what had happened in connection with the bases and with the Agreement. This would obviously lead to a certain reaction on the part of the press, even though the Spanish Foreign Ministry would officially try to smooth things over as best it could.
With regard to the subject of stopping the clock, the Government of Spain and Spanish jurists had given some thought to the matter but the fact was that the Agreement had been approved by the Spanish Cortes and that certain legal requirements had to be met so that stopping the clock was not a feasible solution. In view of this, the six-month period of consultation would start tomorrow and the only possibility would appear to be the issuance of a joint announcement saying that the present negotiations could continue. This could be done only if it were possible to see that a fruitful solution would be forthcoming. The gap between $20 million and $100 million a year appeared to be a very rigid one, since the amounts quoted by both sides seemed to be final. If the U.S. felt that it was not worthwhile to pay such a price for the bases, then there was nothing that could be done. If, on the other hand, the U.S. agreed that they were worth the price, then it might be possible to find a formula to which both sides could agree, even if negotiations then had to continue for maybe another week or possibly as much as another month.
The Secretary stated that he assumed that under Article V consultations would continue for as long as six months. He stated that looking back on US/Spanish relations, the U.S. was now faced with a new situation because of the order of magnitude of Spain's present needs which bore no relation with the order of magnitude of its needs when the original Agreement was signed. He added that there must be a misunderstanding of our Constitutional system in the attempt to compare $100 million with the total of the $72 billion defense budget. The Congress appropriates funds for certain specific purposes and the $72 billion have been assigned to specific activities. Therefore, when it comes to funds for military assistance, we are really looking at just one small and restricted item in that overall budget. A great battle was continuously being fought in Congress in order to avoid further reductions in military aid appropriations. Finally, he stated that he had made an official proposal in his capacity as Secretary of State to extend the Agreement for six months and he hoped that since this was a new question put to the Spanish Government, the Foreign Minister would go back to his Government and submit it for its consideration. It was not too late to extend the Agreement for six months or a year and, therefore, he hoped that the matter would be given serious consideration and that he would be able to obtain a prompt reply.
Mr. Nitze stated that it had been his impression for many years that the Agreements had mutually benefited Spain and the U.S. and that the negotiations were not a matter of simply evaluating the direct benefits to the U.S. or to Spain but rather to recognize that both countries had worked together for their mutual interests and that the U.S. had done the best it could to strengthen the Spanish armed forces. Therefore, the matter should not be viewed by the Spanish solely as a question of payment to Spain for the use of some bases. He felt that the expression of this view would not be well received by his colleagues and by members of the U.S. Senate.
The Foreign Minister said that the new order of magnitude of Spain's needs compared to 1953 should not have come as a surprise since the cost of the most elementary consumer items had increased considerably since 1953 in every country in the world. He repeated that $100 million per year was the amount that Spain needed to cover its defense needs and that the U.S. Government should have foreseen such a request because it had been reminded several times in the past by the Foreign Minister himself that the negotiations would start soon. He added that Spain had very good friends in the Senate as proven by the fact that twice the Senate had asked for Spanish admission into NATO and as seen by attempts to fight any move to cut funds destined to Spain.
With regard to the proposal to extend the Agreement by six months, he felt that the Spanish Council of Ministers could not meet because some of its members were out of town and, furthermore, that it could probably not accept the proposal. Moreover, the period from September 1968 to the spring of 1969 would be a very dramatic one. Spain could not stop the clock just as the U.S. could not get the Russians out of the Mediterranean or out of Czechoslovakia. He stated that he was not refusing to continue his present round of talks but that he felt that the Spanish Government would not accede to the Secretary's last minute proposal.
The Secretary stated that the Foreign Minister was not saying that communications between the two governments had ceased and he suggested that the American Ambassador in Madrid could see members of the Spanish Government to transmit this latest proposal. He asked the Foreign Minister whether he would transmit the proposal through his own channels to the Government of Spain and the Foreign Minister replied that he would do so but that he did not see much hope for a favorable decision.
The Secretary stated that he would be at the disposal of the Foreign Minister for additional meetings on September 26.
219. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, September 26, 1968, 10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Landau and approved in S on September 30. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.
SUBJECT
Spanish Base Negotiations
PARTICIPANTS
Spain
His Excellency Fernando Castiella, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain
His Excellency the Marquis de Merry del Val, Ambassador of Spain
The Honorable Ramon Sedo Gomez, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Spain
The Honorable Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Director General of American and Far Eastern Affairs, Spanish Foreign Ministry
United States
The Secretary
The Honorable Paul H. Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director for Spain and Portugal
Mr. Joseph L. Smith, Country Officer for Spain
The Secretary stated that the six-month period of consultation pursuant to Article V of the Agreement started today and that he was anxious to know exactly and accurately what the Spanish requirements were for the continuation of the Agreement, since he would have to report them to the President and also after November 5 to the President-elect. At yesterday's meeting the Spanish Foreign Minister had indicated that Spain would invoke Article V and he had also tabled a new list of Spanish military equipment requirements. He asked whether that list was the total Spanish request or whether there were other matters. He also stated that the first question which the President and the next President-elect would ask would be whether it was the desire of Spain, as a matter of policy, to agree to a continuation of the Agreement or not.
The Foreign Minister said that he could say emphatically and unmistakably that Spain wants to continue its friendship with the U.S. and that it would be delighted to renew the Agreement on the basis of equality and dignity as well as on the basis of the minimum Spanish proposal tabled on September 25.
The Secretary remarked that it should be on the basis of equality and dignity not only for Spain but also for the U.S.
The Foreign Minister continued saying that he was authorized to sign the renewal of the Agreement today provided that the September 25 minimum Spanish request were met in total. If this were not possible then Spain would like to know what the position of the U.S. would be since March 26, 1969, was rapidly approaching and Spain would have to start thinking about changes in its policies. In any event, Spain wanted to continue being a good friend of the U.S.
He added that if Spain were to adopt a neutralist policy, Spain would not stop being a friend of the U.S. However, his purpose and the purpose of his Government was to strengthen this friendship and if the renewal was not signed today, he would continue working so that agreement could be reached as soon as possible, always on the basis of the minimum Spanish list.
The Secretary replied that he did not quite understand what the contents of such a neutralist policy included. Some countries in Western Europe believed that they could adopt what they described as a third position as if they were simply innocent spectators watching the big struggle between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in Western Europe. This was not the case, because Western Europe itself was the issue.
The Foreign Minister stated that such a new policy could be similar to that of Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria, i.e. a policy of neutrality and at the same time of sympathy for the U.S. Spain was not part of the Western defense system because it had been excluded due to ideological differences. Now the U.S. was unwilling to give Spain what it needed for its defense and therefore there was no other way out for Spain but to return to her traditional policy of neutrality. If the U.S. could not provide Spain with the necessary arms and a minimum level of military assistance, then Spain, although a poor country, would try to achieve its aims on its own. It should not be too difficult to do so since for example as recently as a few months ago the French Government had offered Spain 50 Mirage aircraft with very generous credit provisions which Spain had not even considered since it was counting on its friendship with the U.S. Spain could on its own acquire a smaller amount of weapons but they would be newer and they would be hers.
The Secretary suggested that this might prove to be very expensive and the Foreign Minister replied that might be so but that Spain would then readjust the structure of its Army and make it smaller so that savings resulting from personnel cuts could be channeled into the purchase of better equipment. Domestic industries could be developed so that military purchases in the U.S., which last year added up to $187 million, would be made in Spain itself.
The Secretary asked whether, if the U.S. were to return to isolationism, this would be in the interest of Europe and whether it would serve Spain's security.
The Foreign Minister stated that this would probably not be so but that it might prove General de Gaulle right when he said that Europe could not depend on the U.S. to defend it.
The Secretary stated that it was precisely de Gaulle who had made a massive contribution to an increased isolationist feeling in this country and specifically on the part of many Senators.
The Secretary inquired again whether the Spanish list of military equipment requirements was the only problem standing in the way of agreement.
The Foreign Minister stated that there were certain economic aspects that would also have to be clarified but he noted with satisfaction that the letter on economic problems which had been offered to him and which would be signed by the Secretary of State was a very productive step. He also said that some minor changes were required in the language of the mutual security guarantees. Nevertheless, the key issue was that of military assistance. Yesterday, the Foreign Minister said, he had received strict and clear instructions which authorized him to sign an extension of the Agreement only if the Spanish minimum list were accepted. If this were not possible, he had been instructed to invoke the procedure established in Article V.
The Secretary stated that he had had a chance to speak with the President and leaders of the Congress and that he could say that the U.S. could not accept the Spanish list. Therefore, the procedures provided for in Article V would come into play and both countries would keep in touch about future steps. He then gave a draft joint press statement to the Foreign Minister for his consideration and approval./2/
/2/For agreed text of the communiqu?, see Department of State Bulletin, October 14, 1968, p. 382.
The Foreign Minister asked if the Secretary had talked to Congressional leaders about the possibility of improving the mutual security guarantees to Spain.
The Secretary stated that the security problem was not something which the Congress could take up as a procedural question but rather that it was a matter of substance. The present Congress was to adjourn in about ten days and it was not possible now to foresee what the composition of the next Congress would be. Therefore, it was not practical to take up the security matter within the time limitations that were now being faced.
The Foreign Minister said that many of the Senators in the present Congress would continue in office and that preparations should be made to keep them informed and that the problem should be discussed with them. He said that his only complaint was that he had warned the Secretary back in October and November of 1967/3/ that all these problems would be coming up and that at the time he had urged that in 1968 there should not be a repetition of the anguished race against time that had occurred in 1963. He repeated that it was not Spain's fault that the conversations had been delayed for so long but that he deplored it nevertheless.
/3/See Document 206.
The Secretary replied that he was well aware that the Foreign Minister had raised these questions a long time ago and that there had been many contacts with Congressional leaders over the last months. The conclusions which he had given the Foreign Minister were the final positions arrived at after lengthy discussions with many leaders and he therefore could not accept the suggestion that the U.S. had in any way been negligent in its duties. Some Congressmen may have stated their own personal views in the course of the last months but it is really the leadership of the Congress and the corporate views of that body which should be considered. He said some foreign embassies have at times been confused by statements of individual Congressmen but it so happened that at the present time it was not possible to foresee what the corporate attitude of the next Congress or of the next President might be. All the Secretary could do was to describe the situation as he saw it today and as the present Congress also saw it today.
Mr. Nitze stated that all of the Senators and Congressmen with whom the Department of Defense had dealt on these matters felt that the position of the U.S. was correct and fair and that it was consistent with what they believed were the Spanish needs at the present time.
The Secretary then said that the U.S. would now proceed on the basis that it would like the Agreements extended which was also the feeling of Spain. He added that both sides should concentrate on solving their mutual problems during the next six months and that the U.S. would continue to act with good faith and with a spirit of cooperation and he expressed the hope that this would lead to satisfactory results.
Mr. Nitze stated that the Senators and Congressmen concerned with Defense were fully cognizant of the contribution of Spain and that they were very appreciative of them.
The Foreign Minister replied that if this were true, and he had no reason to doubt it, then the situation was very disappointing indeed and it did not offer much promise for the next six months of consultations.
Mr. Nitze stated that the main point which the American legislators kept in mind was that the present Agreements were mutually beneficial. They felt that it was not right to attach a monetary value to the contributions which either the U.S. or Spain made and that they considered the American proposal as right and proper because allies should help each other and should do whatever possible to be of assistance to one another. They were sure that the American offer was commensurate with the needs of the Spanish armed forces especially in the light of demands placed on the U.S. elsewhere and of the existing limitations in funds.
The Foreign Minister stated that if the U.S. was not capable of giving any more help than it now offered, it would be impossible to go any further and therefore maybe the GOS was right in denouncing the Agreement.
The Secretary stated that nothing profitable could be gained by discussing further the existing gap and that it would be better to see where both countries were at the present time and to lay the foundations for further constructive action. He asked the Foreign Minister whether the draft press statement was acceptable.
The Foreign Minister replied that in principle the draft was acceptable but that he would like to study it and give a firm reply by 5:00 p.m. today.
Mr. Leddy suggested that if there were any contacts with the press, both sides should say that talks were continuing. The Foreign Minister indicated that he wasn't interested in seeing the press for the time being. He also stated that he regretted that there had been no response to his latest proposal contained in the minimum list which he had tabled yesterday.
The Secretary replied that he had already indicated that he was not in a position today to say that the Spanish list was acceptable.
220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain/1/
Washington, October 17, 1968, 2301Z.
/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SP-US. Secret; Immediate; Noforn. Drafted by Gebelt and approved by Leddy. Repeated to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAFE.
257357. 1. The following is based on an uncleared memcon,/2/ is Noforn, FYI only, and subject to revision upon review.
/2/A memorandum of conversation is ibid., DEF 15-4, SP-US.
2. At his request, Spanish FonMin Castiella called on Secretary October 17 ostensibly for routine protocol farewell,/3/ but conversation developed into substantive exchange on renewal of bases agreement. Castiella was in an extremely relaxed and cordial mood.
/3/Castiella was in New York attending the UN General Assembly meetings.
3. After opening cordialities, Secretary asked FonMinister how one should approach a resumption of negotiations on the base negotiations--from a political or military point of view. The FonMinister said that military aid which was basic and fundamental was first and political aspects could be handled through regular diplomatic procedures. There then ensued an exchange on some of the complications that had developed during the earlier talks. The Secretary noted that one of the problems for the US was the continuing drain caused by the war in Viet-Nam and said that if that were behind us the US would have been in a different budgetary position, but unfortunately war was not yet behind us.
4. The Secretary then suggested that there were three stages which resumed negotiations might take: a) The Secretary and the FonMinister should reach a political agreement on the fact that as a matter of general policy both Spain and US wanted the Agreement to continue in the future. b) Then the best military minds of both countries should get together quietly and discreetly to discuss military cooperation between the two countries. (During such talks both sides would try to come up with common strategic concepts which would constitute framework within which US-Spanish cooperation would continue. US would not want to question Spain's sovereign responsibility for its own armed forces but would just discuss matter of conceivable common strategic concept and the provision of military equipment from that vantage point.) c) There could then be political conversations to clear up any remaining bilateral military or political matters.
5. Castiella enthusiastically endorsed Secretary's outline and stated both countries should not waste any time in setting up first contacts which should be between high-level and discreet military representatives. (Castiella indicated General Diez-Alegria would be a good representative for Spain.) Castiella said that Secretary's emphasis on concept of common strategy was of greatest importance because of sensitivity of Spanish people and desire to be a real part of Western defense effort. Secretary commented that in terms of over-all strategic concept and security of both countries it should be possible for both sides to identify their common requirements.
6. Secretary and FonMinister agreed on desirability of continuing Agreement and that they should now proceed to step two. Subject to agreement by Secretary Clifford and Spanish authorities, Secretary and Castiella expressed hope that top level military talks could start on November 15. The Secretary noted that by then US elections would have taken place and views of new Administration could be sought during course of negotiations.
7. Castiella took up the question of the Secretary's letter on the balance of payments situation which had been drafted in September and said that it would be appreciated if the letter could be sent without being considered part of the base negotiations because it would have a very powerful psychological effect, even though it was not a commitment on the part of the US. The Secretary promised to consider the matter./4/
/4/No letter has been found.
Rusk
221. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Madrid, November 18, 1968, 11:30 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. Confidential. Drafted by Landau and approved in S on November 25. The memorandum is Part I of II. Part II, which covered bilateral issues, is ibid., POL SP-US. The meeting was held in El Pardo Palace. Rusk visited Brussels November 12-16 for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting, before traveling to Spain November 16-18 and Portugal November 18-19.
SUBJECT
General Situation
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Ambassador Wagner
Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director, Spain-Portugal
Spain
General Franco
Foreign Minister Castiella
Spanish Ambassador to U.S. Merry del Val
Mr. Aguirre de Carcer, Director General for North American Affairs
The Secretary regretted that he had been forced by illness to postpone his appointment by one day and he wished to express his gratitude to General Franco for accepting the changed schedule. He delivered greetings from President Johnson to the Spanish Chief of State and said that he did not believe the election in the United States would make any difference to U.S.-Spanish relations. The safety of Europe was basic to the security of the U.S. and as this was a bipartisan policy he felt certain that the new Administration would follow the same approach. He was equally certain that the new Administration would continue the policy of esteem and friendship towards Spain and he did not foresee any policy changes. He said that the U.S. continued to be concerned about the situation in Central Europe, the Mediterranean and Vietnam, and invited questions from General Franco.
Franco said that he was greatly interested in all topics mentioned by the Secretary but that he was primarily concerned with the Mediterranean area. He said that the Mediterranean was of great importance to all of Europe and that Spain looked with justified alarm at the continued presence of the USSR in the Mediterranean.
The Secretary reported that he had been encouraged by the growing interest of the NATO countries in the Mediterranean situation, a welcome change from views expressed in previous years. Not only did Turkey, Greece and France show interest, but so did some of the countries more distant from the Mediterranean like Belgium and Holland. The Mediterranean was more of a political than a military problem--and the situation of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean was similar to the position of U.S. troops in Berlin, surrounded by hostile territory and cut off from their home base. The Secretary referred to the possibility that the Soviets might acquire base facilities and other support in Algeria and said that he had mentioned this subject to the French Foreign Minister. The latter shared his concern, but did not think that the Soviets had acquired any bases in Algeria. France, according to Debre, was opposed to the Soviet presence in Algeria and would follow the matter closely. What France might do to counter a possible Soviet build-up remained a matter of speculation.
General Franco said that the Mediterranean is most important to the life of Europe and that the Russian presence there was a total menace to all European countries and weakened the posture of NATO, particularly that of Greece and Turkey. He referred to the southern shore of the Mediterranean as the weak link because the countries located there received Soviet arms which mortgaged their freedom. He compared the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean to a steadily growing oil slick and said that if Soviet action in Czechoslovakia/2/ constituted a menace to Central Europe and in particular Germany, the Russian presence in the Mediterranean was a menace to all of Europe.
/2/Reference is to the August 30 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
The Secretary assured General Franco that the U.S. had warned the U.S.S.R. very strongly against any move against what the U.S.S.R. called "State interests of the U.S.", and that the U.S.S.R. had assured the U.S. at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia that there would be no infringement of those interests. He said the Soviets were under no illusion about our interest in countries where we have bases, or with which we have treaties or agreements. Although the Russians had responded seriously to our serious warning, they would have to be watched carefully because we were dealing with a communist government. As General Franco was aware the U.S. has the means of watching in some detail the movement of Soviet forces, but as of this moment there did not seem to be any indication that a use of force was contemplated or that what happened with Czechoslovakia would be repeated with Romania, Austria, Yugoslavia or Albania. The Secretary told Franco that we would advise Spain of any indications, as we understood Spain's interest in the matter. Another matter of concern was Soviet arms build-up in Egypt and Algeria and there were a number of Soviet technicians in Egypt. He hoped that the Jarring mission would be successful and would result in a limitation of Soviet presence in Egypt. The Secretary expressed appreciation for the interest the Spanish Government took in the Mediterranean situation and referred to the exchange of information during the last two or three years on this subject which had been of mutual interest.
General Franco asked whether the Czech situation was a result of spheres of interest established in Europe between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at the end of World War II.
The Secretary said it was just the opposite. The U.S. had agreed at Yalta to popular elections under Allied Commission supervision, but Stalin, behind the strength of the Red Army, simply snapped his fingers and invaded Eastern Europe. He added that we had never had any agreements with the U.S.S.R. about spheres of interest and that the Soviets did not consult with us prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia although we had warned them twice about this matter. The fact remained, however, that the Warsaw Pact and NATO existed and that use of force by one or the other meant war. He assured General Franco that the strong American reaction over Czechoslovakia was not based on friendship for the government of Czechoslovakia and that the Dubcek government gave us great difficulties. Soviet arms had been killing American soldiers in Vietnam. Nevertheless the U.S. wanted to make clear that even a small country was entitled to work out its own destiny.
General Franco wondered whether the U.S.S.R. decision to invade Czechoslovakia and Hungary could have been decided on strategic grounds by the Soviet Armed Forces overruling the political leaders.
The Secretary thought that this was possible because contrary to normal procedure the political leaders of the Soviet Union kept quiet and statements were made mainly by TASS, Pravda, Izvestia and on the radio. It was only two days ago that Brezhnev made his first statement. It was unfortunate, the Secretary said, that we had so little information and that complete secrecy was kept about what happened in discussions between the top Soviet leaders.
The Secretary and General Franco agreed on the strategic impact on Europe made by the invasion of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the Secretary suggested that Soviet leaders might be frightened of peaceful coexistence which had brought about closer ties between Eastern and Western Europe. The trend towards closer ties, however, was permanent and he was sure that there would be further changes in Eastern Europe.
In reply to General Franco's question about NATO reaction to Czechoslovakia, the Secretary made these points:
--Some European countries have finally abandoned their illusion about d?tente;
--It improved French willingness to cooperate;
--It made it possible for some countries to improve their defense budgets because public and parliamentary opinion had been aroused.
The Secretary said that NATO was composed of national forces and any strengthening in the military forces of an individual country would result in a strengthening of NATO.
He said he hoped that France would re-join NATO and added that the U.S. would hope that Spain would become a member of NATO, although there were some well-known difficulties.
General Franco said that the weakest parts of Soviet power were the occupied countries and lack of Soviet domination over those countries prevented the U.S.S.R. from attacking the West. He said it would be important to encourage resistance in the occupied countries in order to make it more difficult for the Russians.
The Secretary agreed and said that last June at Reykjavik he had proposed mutual withdrawal./3/ If the Soviet forces would leave Eastern Europe development in those countries would be accelerated. The U.S.S.R. unfortunately understood this, too, and had declined the suggestion. Events in Czechoslovakia had been costly to the Soviet Union and he was optimistic on a long range basis about development in Eastern Europe notwithstanding short-run difficulties.
/3/Reference is to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting June 24-25. For text of NATO's statement on mutual and balanced force reduction, see Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1968, p. 77.
General Franco said that we should not forget that there was no liberal movement in Czechoslovakia but only a different type of national communism.
The Secretary agreed but stressed that nevertheless it gave the Czechs more room to express their views. He said that even in the U.S.S.R. there are groups who are no longer under Communist Party control. Scientists in nuclear energy and space fields had become members of a world scientific community and were no longer controlled by the Party and this was a good development.
222. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, November 22, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Smith and Landau.
SUBJECT
General Wheeler's Discussions in Madrid
Attached is a copy of General Wheeler's interesting memorandum/2/ which you may wish to read in full reporting on his discussions with Spanish military officials in Madrid, November 18-20, 1968. General Wheeler reports that the Spanish took a hard line concerning the increased threat from Soviet forces in the Mediterranean and the inadequacy of the present defense agreements between Spain and the U.S. He estimates that in order to continue the full use of the Spanish bases, the U.S. offer will have to be approximately 100 million dollars more in grant aid than what might have been agreed earlier (i.e. $200 million instead of our offer of $100 million).
/2/Not printed.
In conversations with the Spanish Vice President, Admiral Carrero Blanco, and General Diez-Alegria, General Wheeler elicited the following information:
1. Spain has no intention of pursuing a neutralist course.
2. Spain must have a military force capable of unilateral defense actions, presumably in North Africa.
3. Considerable difficulty would be encountered in "stopping the clock" on the time period left for negotiations.
4. No decision has been made by the GOS, as yet, regarding the continued use of Torrejon Air Base.
5. Senior Spanish officials desire to continue a military relationship with the U.S., but consider the present arrangement an inadequate guarantee of Spanish security.
6. The Spaniards would leap at the chance to become a member of NATO, although they will not make any overt effort to do so.
General Wheeler agreed with Spanish military officials to hold the next meeting in Madrid on December 4, 1968, in order to identify in greater detail those threats which could affect either country, and to jointly study ways to meet such threats by determining appropriate tasks and missions which each should undertake. General Burchinal will be General Wheeler's representative for these discussions.
The JCS will meanwhile proceed with our present reassessment of the military value to the United States of base rights in Spain, to provide a basis for United States re-examination of our current position.
223. Memorandum From Edward Fried of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, November 29, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Confidential.
SUBJECT
U.S.-Spanish Bases Agreement
At an IRG/EUR meeting held November 26/2/ General Bane of the Joint Staff gave a rundown on General Wheeler's November 18-20 talks in Madrid with General Navarro, Chief of Staff of the Spanish Air Force. A copy of the agreed minute on the talks is at Tab A./3/
/2/No record of the meeting was found.
/3/Not found.
General Bane stressed the following points:
--The Spanish military is insisting on the creation of a joint U.S.-Spanish Military planning body which would plan joint exercises, joint utilization of the bases, and mutual defense.
--The Spanish want us to give them tactical nuclear weapons training to the same extent that we provide such training for our NATO allies.
--General Wheeler believes the negotiations are going to be very tough, and thinks that it is going to cost us another $100 million to get a renewal agreement. (Before the Spanish invoked Article V last September, they were asking for $690 million for the 5-year renewal; our top offer was $140 million.)
General Wheeler has designated General Burchinal as his representative for the next round of military talks with the Spanish, to be held in Madrid December 4. This meeting will be limited to an examination of and preparation of a report on:
--The threats which could affect either country, jointly or singly.
--The appropriate tasks and missions which the U.S. and Spain should undertake, bilaterally or unilaterally, to meet these threats.
DOD is now preparing guidance on these subjects for General Burchinal.
Ed Fried/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
224. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, December 5, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Confidential. Drafted by Landau.
SUBJECT
Spanish Base Negotiations
In your October 17 meeting with Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella you agreed that as a matter of national policy the two countries desired to continue the defense relationship. The same view was expressed by General Franco in your brief conversation with him in Madrid./2/
/2/According to the memorandum of conversation, Franco stated: "It had always been his wish to continue relations and that there existed a broad base of common interest for both countries. He stressed, however, that the agreements were old and had to be updated because of the change in the situation." (Ibid., POL SP-US)
You further agreed to a high level military meeting at the middle of November to come up with common strategic concepts which would constitute the framework for continued U.S.-Spanish cooperation; this to be followed by a related program of military assistance.
As a final phase you envisaged political conversations between yourself and Castiella to clear up any remaining bilateral military and political matters.
Military discussions were initiated by General Wheeler, November 18-20 and continued by General Burchinal in Madrid, December 4-6. A follow-up military meeting is scheduled to be held in Stuttgart, December 17-19, with a final round of military talks in January, possibly in Madrid, on a date to be agreed later.
In light of this timetable, it does not seem likely that you will be able to conclude the base negotiations with Castiella prior to January 20. In this connection you might recall that we have firm indications of Spanish interest to carry over the base talks to the incoming administration.
My inclination is not to press for rapid action but to let nature take its course. If you agree, please indicate. If you disagree, we will need to prod Defense to tighten up the schedule on military talks./3/
/3/Rusk initialed his agreement on December 6.
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.