United Kingdom
225. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All European Posts/1/
Washington, February 14, 1964, 2:23 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UK. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Holloway, cleared in BNA, and approved by Tyler. Prime Minister Douglas-Home visited Washington February 12-14. Preparatory documents, briefing papers, and memoranda of conversation from this meeting are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2368-2369.
1500. Talks with Douglas-Home and Butler.
Missions requested draw on communiqu&#eacute;(sent USIS Wireless File of Feb 13)/2/ and following summary in discussing this week's talks with UK leaders in Washington:
/2/Not found. For text of the communiqu?, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 610-612.
These talks can only be characterized as frank and far-ranging. We were not disappointed in our expectation that there would be agreement on most of the issues that face us. This did not inhibit either side from forcible statements of positions involving disagreements.
Specifically, the US and the UK will continue to press at Geneva for meaningful yet prudent disarmament measures. The British agreed with our intention to continue to seek bilateral agreements with the USSR where these are to our interest. On Berlin and Germany, we agreed to continue to discuss proposals in the Ambassadorial Group in Washington for possible approaches to the USSR for negotiations. Both sides remain unalterably committed to join with their allies in looking for honorable settlements with the USSR. Both were emphatically agreed that they will follow up every opportunity to pursue peace.
Obviously the conversations were responsive to the immediate problems the British face in Cyprus, Zanzibar and East Africa. The US gave full support to UK efforts to stabilize these areas. The British in turn expressed appreciation for this support and specifically for the US work in the Cyprus problem on which we are remaining closely and continually in touch./3/
/3/A February 13 memorandum of conversation regarding Cyprus is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVI, Document 12.
Southeast Asia was the subject of serious discussion, particularly the heavy responsibilities each country bears in Malaysia and South Viet-Nam. We concluded that the independence and freedom of both these countries are our vital interests.
The different philosophy of trade held by the two countries was clear in discussing trade with Cuba. The Prime Minister made plain UK determination neither to allow military material to be exported to Cuba nor to allow official credits to be extended to Castro for purchases of any material. But equally clear was UK determination to continue non-discriminatory treatment of all countries in trade in peaceful commodities on regular commercial terms. The PM did agree that Cuba represents a serious problem in subversion in this Hemisphere, but he could not for historical commercial policy reasons join us fully in our attempt to squeeze Cuba economically in order to isolate Castro politically. The different philosophies were reflected somewhat less starkly in the discussion of long-term credits to the Soviet Union, although the PM was again frank in his view that a "fat Communist" was a relatively safe Communist. We replied that it was not quite that simple and that controls on credit would force the Communists, if they really wanted to become "fat," to divert resources from military expenditures, a course obviously in all our interests.
We told the UK that we were not to be dissuaded from beginning the Kennedy Round talks on time, and the British agreed this was the best course./4/
/4/A February 12 memorandum of conversation dealing with the Kennedy Round is printed ibid., vol. XIII, Document 9.
On other matters, the communiqu&#eacute;needs little elaboration. However, the warm atmosphere of the talks and their frankness even on Cuba trade and long-term credits cannot be overstated. The Heads of the two governments plan to meet regularly.
Rusk
226. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Douglas-Home/1/
Washington, February 28, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, UK, Vol. 1. Top Secret.
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
In our talks in Washington we agreed that we would reaffirm together the understandings of our two Governments with regard to consultation in the use of nuclear weapons. I now confirm this agreement in the attached Memorandum of Understanding. It is very much like the one which President Kennedy sent to Prime Minister Macmillan in February 1961,/2/ except for minor but necessary editorial changes and the deletion of references to the IRBM (Thor) force which is no longer operational.
/2/Kennedy confirmed the understandings in a February 6, 1961, letter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)
I note also that our two Governments have a continuing commitment to consult with the North Atlantic Council concerning the use of nuclear weapons anywhere, if time permits./3/
/3/In a March 12 letter to President Johnson, Prime Minister Douglas-Home confirmed that the Memorandum of Understanding correctly represented the position of the U.K. Government and noted the continuing validity of the undertakings given by the two governments in 1962 to consult the North Atlantic Council, if time permitted, on the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. (Ibid.)
Let me take this occasion to say again how much Mrs. Johnson and I enjoyed your visit, and how clear its value is as we continue to work together on hard problems all around the world.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
Attachment
UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE BRITISH ON THE USE OF
BRITISH BASES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
1. Our understanding on the use of British bases is that the President and Prime Minister will reach a joint decision by speaking personally with each other before certain forces equipped with U.S. nuclear weapons and operating from bases in the United Kingdom will use nuclear weapons, namely SAC, British Bomber Command,/4/ SACEUR-assigned forces in the UK, and U. S. Polaris submarines in British territorial waters. The basic understanding is contained in the communiqu&#eacute;of January 9, 1952 covering the Truman-Churchill talks:
/4/Excluding aircraft of such Command equipped with British nuclear weapons. [Footnote in the source text.]
"Under arrangements made for the common defense, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time."
Procedures for carrying out this basic understanding were agreed upon in the Murphy-Dean Agreement of June 7, 1958, which was approved by the President and the Prime Minister. The covering document, the Report to the President and the Prime Minister, repeats almost literally the language of the Truman-Churchill communiqu?:
"2. The basic understanding between the United Kingdom and United States Governments, regarding the use of bases in the United Kingdom by United States forces, provides that such use in an emergency shall be a matter for joint decision by the two Governments in the light of the circumstances at the time."
2. There is a second, more general understanding with the British that we will consult with them before using nuclear weapons anywhere, if possible. The basic understanding on this point is contained in a memorandum of conversation of a meeting between the President and Eden on March 9, 1953. Eden had asked for an assurance of consultation by the President with the Prime Minister prior to U.S. use of any nuclear weapon.
"He (the President) said that the United States would, of course, in the event of increased tension or the threat of war, take every possible step to consult with Britain and our other allies."
The President reaffirmed this understanding when he wrote to the Prime Minister on October 27, 1960, in connection with the Holy Loch berthing:
"With reference to the launching of missiles from U.S. Polaris submarines, I give you the following assurance, which of course is not intended to be used publicly. In the event of an emergency, such as increased tension or the threat of war, the U.S. will take every possible step to consult with Britain and other Allies. This reaffirms the assurance I gave Foreign Secretary Eden on March 9, 1953."
3. It should be noted that the agreement for joint decision by the President and the Prime Minister does not extend to all U.S. forces under SACEUR and SACLANT but only covers those SACEUR-assigned forces (strike squadrons) based in the UK./5/ The other U.S. nuclear forces under SACEUR and SACLANT would only be covered by the more general understanding to consult if time permits.
/5/This should not be taken to exclude U.S. nuclear forces based in the UK which might be assigned to a NATO commander in the future. In such event such forces would be brought under the terms of the Murphy-Dean Report by appropriate amendment of that Report. [Footnote in the source text.]
227. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 2, 1964, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UK-US. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on June 29. The meeting was held in the White House.
SUBJECT
Tour d'Horizon with Harold Wilson, Leader of British Labor Party
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
Mr. Tyler
UK
Mr. Harold Wilson, M.P.
Mrs. Harold Wilson
Mr. Giles Wilson (son)
Mr. David Ennals (in charge of Research in Labor Party)
The President told Mr. Wilson he was glad to see him again and Mr. Wilson recalled that he had last been in the White House in April 1963,/2/ though he had come to Washington since then at the time of the funeral ceremony for President Kennedy.
/2/April 2, 1963. Documentation on the Wilson visit is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2236.
The President said to Mr. Wilson that things seemed to be going a little better in Cyprus, and Mr. Wilson agreed though he commented that it seemed that a vote at the UN on the resolution had been postponed until tomorrow./3/ The President said he had prepared a message to send to President Inonu of Turkey that very morning, but had held off from doing so because it seemed that the Turks were coming on board. He feared the postponement implied that there was some difficulty coming from Makarios. The President commented that he had seen Makarios last year,/4/ and had formed the impression that he was a very hard man. (The President called Mr. McGeorge Bundy on the phone in order to get the latest information on Cyprus.)
/3/Reference is to Security Council Resolution 186 (1964), adopted unanimously on March 4. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 566-567.
/4/September 1962; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVI, Document 263.
The President asked Mr. Wilson why the UK considered it worthwhile to continue to trade with Cuba, which represented only about $5 million, when by so doing the UK was creating so much anti-British feeling over here. The President said that after the Prime Minister's press conference in Washington on the subject, there had been a great deal of criticism of the UK. Had the Prime Minister merely pointed out that the UK had reduced its trade with Cuba from $55 million to $5 million, the effect would have been favorable instead of unfavorable. Mr. Wilson said that the reason why the Prime Minister had spoken in the way he did was in order to get votes at home by taking the position of a staunch defender of UK policy and interests. The President set forth the reasons that lay behind US policy toward Cuba and said that Castro's policy was a great threat not only to this hemisphere but to Western security as a whole. He said it was important that this fact should be understood. Mr. Wilson replied with classic British reasoning on not using foreign trade as an instrument of coercion except in exceptional cases. He recalled that when he was President of the Board of Trade he himself had instituted a UK embargo on shipments of arms to the Soviet Union, and that he had at one point cut off all trade with Hungary when the Hungarian government had arrested a British business man. However when it came down to non-strategic commodities, it was British policy to encourage trade across the board. He pointed out that buses could not be considered to be in this category. The President said that the situation must be looked at in terms of Cuba's needs to keep her economy going. He said that buses represented 80 per cent of Cuban transportation. On the other hand, US wheat sales to the Soviet Union were a one-shot deal and represented less than one per cent of the Soviet Union's need in wheat.
Mr. Wilson said he realized that this was a difficult issue between the United States and the United Kingdom and that he would do everything he could to keep it from playing a major role in the campaign. He said he thought that the British elections would take place in May or June, because the Tories would not be able to hold out until the last moment. He said he thought there would be a certain amount of anti-American sentiment aroused, in the course of the campaign, by the Conservative party. There were still memories of Suez, and there were back-benchers in the Conservative party who would play up to nationalistic feeling for electoral purposes. He stressed to the President that the Labor party was a strong supporter of NATO and the Atlantic community, and had a broad international outlook which was not the case with the rank and file Conservatives. He said the Labor party wanted to play a positive role in Europe but did not want "to be corralled in a little Europe with the Six." The Labor party was mindful of the broad interests of the Commonwealth and wanted to play a part which would be in active support of US efforts to maintain worldwide security.
Turning to defense, Mr. Wilson repeated almost verbatim the arguments he had used in his talk with Secretary Rusk./5/ He said that a Labor government would want to get rid of the national deterrent which made no sense at all for England today. He said this would save 300 million pounds which could be used to put back the British fleet on the high seas, and would permit an increase in conventional forces so that the UK could play an active and useful role in putting out brush fires when necessary.
/5/A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 UK.
The President asked Mr. Wilson for his views on the MLF. Mr. Wilson replied with the standard arguments which he had already expressed at lunch./6/ He said that the only circumstances in which the Labor government would support the MLF would be if this were the only way to prevent Germany from acquiring a national nuclear force. He said that he did not think that the German government wanted this, or that there was any support for this in German public opinion. The President asked Mr. Wilson whether he really thought that Germans had abandoned their desire to play a dominant role, and Mr. Wilson said that even if they wanted to do so, the West had the means of preventing this from happening. He felt that the MLF did have the result of putting the German finger on the nuclear trigger. He was apprehensive of a possible development whereby the United States would no longer retain the veto, and Germany might find herself in a position of casting a majority vote by "three to two." The President said that such a situation would never be permitted to arise.
/6/No record of this conversation was found.
Mr. Wilson said that in general the British elections would be waged and won on domestic issues, and he himself wanted to wage a campaign against poverty, as President Johnson himself was doing. The President asked Mr. Wilson how he saw the relationship between the UK Labor party and the Democratic party in the United States. Mr. Wilson said he thought that both had much in common. They were both parties of the people, with a strong social sense, and with a desire to develop and change institutions in the interest of the welfare of the majority, whereas the Conservative party was inclined to preserve the vested interests of a minority and to resist change and progress. The President mentioned the London municipal elections coming up in early April and asked Mr. Wilson how he thought they would go. Mr. Wilson said he was reasonably optimistic.
The President mentioned the A-11, the new US interceptor plane. He said it had a speed of 3.2 Mach and a ceiling above 70,000 feet. He said this was a very considerable technical advance which was of great importance to the Free World. He said he had sent a message to the Prime Minister informing him about the announcement before he had made it. Mr. Wilson said that this plane was a very great development and that it pointed up the fact that it was useless for the UK to try to play a role in the same league as the United States in the defense field. He said that the UK just wasn't "in the same line of country," and that this was further justification of the Labor party's policy to get rid of the national deterrent.
In conclusion, Mr. Wilson thanked the President for having received him, and his family, and said he hoped very much to have the chance of seeing him and Mrs. Johnson again in London and in Washington.
228. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 27, 1964, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UK-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Judd and approved in S on May 2. The memorandum is marked Part 3 of 8. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.
SUBJECT
Cuba
PARTICIPANTS
US
The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson, S/AL
William C. Burdett, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary
Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA
UK
Foreign Secretary Butler
Lord Harlech, British Ambassador
Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Undersecretary, Foreign Office
Denis A. Greenhill, British Minister
John Henderson, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary
John A. Thomson, First Secretary, British Embassy
Secretary Rusk said he was going to surprise Foreign Secretary Butler by discussing an aspect of the Cuban problem other than trade. He referred to over-flights of Cuba by U.S. U-2 aircraft. The Secretary said the Soviets were pulling out of Cuba and turning the surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) over to the Cubans. We had information that some Soviet passenger ships were en route to Cuba and we believed that these would be used to remove the remaining Soviet troops. We were glad to see the Soviets leaving but were not happy about the Cubans taking over the SAMs. A couple of weeks ago, we had sent the Cubans a low-key message on the subject but they had come roaring back with some Soviet support. Our flights are unobtrusive. They are seen only on radar. We feel that we must keep up some surveillance so that we know what is going on down there. If the Cubans try to prevent the over-flights we would have a nasty situation. Castro had turned down the two proposals which would have dealt with the problem, both of which had been approved by the Soviets. The first would have provided for UN surveillance and the second was for a nuclear-free zone.
Mr. Butler said that what would worry the British would be retaliation. The Secretary said there would be retaliation. We would take out a SAM site if a U-2 were knocked down.
Mr. Butler observed that the U.S. would be acting even more resolutely than the British had at Harib. Duncan Sandys said at the time of the Harib incident that the U.S. would have to support the UK because the U.S. would eventually want British support on Cuba. Mr. Butler added that at his press conference that morning, he had told the U.S. newsmen off the record that the UK would like to support the U.S. on Cuba. He presumed that our retaliation would lead the Cubans to take their case to the Security Council and the U.S. would have to cast its first veto.
The Secretary replied that he did not know if Cuba would go to the Security Council. We might take the matter to the OAS.
Mr. Butler asked what was our jurisdictional justification for over-flights. The Secretary replied that they had been approved by the hemisphere./2/ The Cubans were bound not to interfere with the over-flights. Mr. Butler asked what action might come out of the UN. The Secretary said that U Thant might be asked to send some observers to Cuba.
/2/For text of the OAS resolution on Cuba, approved October 23, 1962, see Department of State Bulletin, November 12, 1962, pp. 722-723.
Mr. Butler then asked if the U.S. would consult the UK before retaliating. Secretary Rusk said that we would give the UK advance notification. The Secretary said that the time would be very short.
The Secretary said that we had repeatedly sent to the Cubans signals on two points which bothered us. The first was a military connection with Moscow and the second was subversion in the hemisphere. We had good evidence that they were going on with their subversive efforts.
Foreign Secretary Butler recalled the Cuban crisis in 1962. When it came, Prime Minister Macmillan had called him and asked him to come to Number 10 Downing Street. Macmillan had said he couldn't stand to be alone at such a time. Mr. Butler had gone to 10 Downing Street and had been privy to the numerous communications exchanged between Macmillan and President Kennedy. He would say for the new Prime Minister that he would like the President or Secretary Rusk to use the communications which we have in the same manner as they had been used by Macmillan and Kennedy. He said he thought this was as far as he could take it. He added that the U.S. was playing with fire. Finally, Mr. Butler said he would like to make it absolutely clear that the UK was sympathetic and understood the U.S. concern with Cuba.
229. Message From Prime Minister Douglas-Home to President Johnson/1/
London, June 23, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Confidential. The message was transmitted by the British Embassy on June 23.
As you know, there has been friction over the past few years between the United States and other principal maritime nations about the regulation of shipping in several of its aspects. This has now reached a point where the application of United States legislation/2/ by the Federal Maritime Commission would, in our view, invade our jurisdiction and produce a situation which it would be politically impossible for any British Government to accept. Other principal maritime nations are faced with the same difficulties.
/2/Reference is to the Bonner Act, amending the Shipping Act of 1916. For text of P.L. 87-346, approved October 3, 1961, see 75 Stat. 762.
I am disturbed about the possible effects of this situation on the general state of the Western Alliance. As things are, we shall be faced with recurrent crises, the first on July 3, the date now set for the conclusion of dual rate contracts. In these circumstances I would ask you to give your most serious consideration to the annexed Memorandum,/3/ in which I suggest both that an international conference should be held to consider the basic question of jurisdiction in these matters, and also that you should not take action against our shipping while the question of principle is being discussed.
/3/Not printed.
I am sure you will agree that we must find a way out of these difficulties and my suggestions are designed to provide one. I hope you will find them helpful./4/
/4/In a June 25 memorandum to the President, Francis Bator and McGeorge Bundy advised, "We think the Prime Minister's message is largely for the record and we do not think his hints of reprisal should be taken at face value," suggested that the United States extend the period of grace to September 1, offering a meeting on the "narrow question of jurisdiction," and maintain its position "as we must, under the law." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 5) The President approved this position, which was transmitted to the Prime Minister in a message of June 25. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)
230. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/
London, October 16, 1964, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 UK. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Department of Defense, Rome, Paris for Finletter, The Hague, Bonn, Brussels, Moscow, and Luxembourg.
1776. From Bruce. Now that Harold Wilson will shortly be Prime Minister, it might be appropriate to speculate about his possible attitude toward Anglo-American negotiations.
I believe we will find him, at least for a considerable time to come, desirous of personally controlling all important aspects of British policy, foreign and domestic. The charge during the campaign that he was a "one man band" was fully justified. In fact, the contribution to victory made by other leaders of the party including those likely to be Cabinet ministers, was relatively minor, except in their own constituencies. Indeed, those who commanded a national audience were often sources of acute embarrassment, since their utterances sometimes required rectification by him.
As a politician, Mr. Wilson clearly demonstrated his superiority in intellectual ability, adroitness, and persuasiveness, over his associates. The disparate elements in Labour ranks became cohesive under his leadership, united by a desire to win. It is to be expected that once the rewards are apportioned, there will be a resumption of internal feuds, exposing the doctrinal factionalism that has long plagued a party representing so many conflicting philosophies.
Intrigued by the manner in which the American President is served by a personal staff, Mr. Wilson is likely to make a small scale adaptation of it for his own use, especially in the early days of office. Since Cabinet officials must sit in Parliament, the decisions usually reached with their advice and concurrence may be made more often than has been customary by the Prime Minister alone, perhaps after consultation with a sort of "kitchen Cabinet" of non-Parliamentarians.
He will have in the key positions of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Minister of Defense, appointees on whose judgment in affairs vital to their own departments and to the national security, he will not completely rely. The same will apply, in lesser degree, to heads of the great domestic areas of government. Consequently, while the PM will preserve the appearance of operating under normal Cabinet conditions (it being remembered that its members have traditionally been accustomed to exercise more independent authority than do ours), he can be expected himself to outline, and support in negotiations, those essential policies requiring agreement between our two countries.
We must therefore prepare ourselves for a greater degree of high level negotiation with the British than has been our previous experience. Callaghan, Healey, and whoever becomes Foreign Minister may eventually be replaced by stronger individuals, but for the present their field of maneuver will be restricted.
The PM will, within a short time, wish to have a date set for conversations with President Johnson, whose re-election is taken for granted in the UK.
It is tempting to try to analyze Mr. Wilson's character, but to do so would require a magazine length report. No telegraphic summary could do justice to his complicated, often inconsistent, personality; only his future actions will disclose whether his numerous detractors or admirers have properly assessed his intentions and capacities. I would, however, recommend to those in our govt, who must shortly deal with him, an article in the Sunday Telegraph of October 11, by Peregrine Worsthorne entitled "A Man With Fire in His Belly, But."
I do not entirely subscribe to those views expressed by the author summarized in the statement: "The Labour Govt, should it be elected, will find itself opposing the United States on a major issue of policy (MLF), outraging the West Germans and delighting the Russians all in the first few weeks of office."
I consider that Mr. Wilson is too clever by half to commit such an egregious blunder. While he is unlikely to accommodate his foreign policies to those of the United States to the same extent as have a succession of Conservative governments, if our negotiations are skillfully managed from the beginning (but only so) I believe we can, with patience, enter into transactions with him to our mutual benefit. In the particular case of the MLF, though he and most of his party have no liking whatever for it, if he thinks he can gain large national advantages by participating in it, his reluctant assent to doing so will depend on a comprehensive bargain with us.
There is no chance, in my opinion, of his signing the treaty until there have been discussions between him and ourselves on the whole issue of NATO defense, about which he entertains strong convictions and prejudices. Nevertheless he is keenly aware of the paramount necessity of reaching, after extensive argumentation, an accord with us on NATO defense and on the general terms of foreign policy, excepting such questions as trade with Cuba, long term credits to the Soviet Bloc, recognition of Communist China, and other matters which we have been unable to settle to our satisfaction with preceding British governments.
The greatest single danger, provided he is satisfied otherwise, to an agreement with Mr. Wilson on the principle of British adhesion to the MLF (he will certainly under any conditions propose some alterations in the current plans) will, in my estimation, spring from his over sanguine views of what concessions might be obtained from the Soviet Govt in the security field. I do not think that in his frequent trips to Russia he has been hornswoggled, but he has certainly cajoled himself into believing he can negotiate more successfully with the Soviet Govt than any other allied statesman. Until he has had his beard singed, he may attempt to persuade us to use the MLF as a bargaining counter with the Soviets, and to be prepared to abandon it in return for a spectacular Soviet offer on disarmament.
A lesser danger is that in proposing to renounce Britain's independent nuclear deterrent, he will cherish expectations of receiving from us a greater quid pro quo than our own interests should permit. If, by what he calls "renegotiation of the Nassau Pact," he could arrive at an understanding with the US that he could represent to his own people as establishing a special relationship with us on the control and use of nuclear military weapons, only short of an equal right to a finger on the trigger, he might well consider MLF accession a low price to pay. I think it would be both unwise and unnecessary for us to consider such an arrangement.
Regarding Britain's entry into the Common Market, or participation in European integration in any form, Mr. Wilson and his party can be expected to be far less likely to move in that direction than have been the Conservatives. He has so forcefully and optimistically pledged himself to the development of trade with the Commonwealth, and imposed such conditions on possible membership in the Common Market, that it would seem probable he will experiment with the Commonwealth idea for at least a year before seriously considering an alternative.
We will find Mr. Wilson a resourceful, tough, realistic, opinionated bargainer, but solely our own lack of equal resourcefulness and determination would enable him to profit at the expense of our more powerful position.
Perhaps these observations are sufficient for the moment. What we should expect from Mr. Wilson on British Guiana, countries East of Suez, the Kennedy Round, balance of payments and other fiscal questions,/2/ and additional topics of joint concern, cannot be usefully developed at this time.
/2/In telegram 1805 from London, October 16, the Embassy commented further: "Wilson will be confronted immediately with over-hanging problem of difficult British balance of payments. In Embassy opinion, problems may assume grave proportions, although much of it now seems suppressed, dealt with by short term borrowing and hidden from public eye and consciousness." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 2)
His domestic programs will have tangential consequences for us. It remains to be ascertained whether he is dedicated to developing class warfare. The small size of his majority may impede swift action aimed at eliminating important sectors of the free enterprise system. His anticipated proposals for taxation are awaited with fear in the City. From a national standpoint, if radical changes occur in fiscal management, as advocated by some of his advisers, there will be a further diminution of confidence, already impaired by a Labor victory, amongst Britain's creditors. This may prove his most serious problem.
The important thing is for us to be alert, when the time comes, to advocate our own policies, and to persuade him to conform his to them where we have made a reasonable case. We will not find him impervious to reason, but will discover he is sceptical of some of our cherished political, economic and military beliefs. He will be a tough nut to crack.
Bruce
231. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 25, 1964, 12:15 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw and approved in U on October 27. The meeting was held in Under Secretary Ball's office. Roll was sent by Prime Minister Wilson to explain British economic policy to U.S. officials. Wilson's correspondence with President Johnson on the subject, together with a statement of U.S. policy, are in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VIII, Documents 13, 14, and 16.
SUBJECT
British Economic Measures
PARTICIPANTS
Sir Eric Roll, Permanent Under Secretary, Ministry of Economic Affairs
The Under Secretary
G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary, E
J. Harold Shullaw, Director, BNA
Sir Eric Roll gave the Under Secretary three copies of the statement being made by the British Government on October 26 concerning the urgent economic measures it is taking to deal with the balance of payments problem./2/ Sir Eric said he wished to stress the speed with which the new government has tackled the problem and the new approach which it represents. He said the contrast was not only with respect to the Conservative stop-go policies, but also with respect to Labor's former policies. He said the leaders of the new government had rejected a return to the Sir Stafford Cripps siege economy measures of 1946-1947. Sir Eric expressed the view that this is a very significant development and, if the course is maintained, it can affect the whole range of government policy, and not alone on the economic side.
/2/The statement announced a plan to correct the U.K. balance-of-payments deficit. The plan's principal measures comprised a 15 percent surcharge on all manufactured or semi-manufactured imports and a system of export rebates. Extracts of the significant portions of the Government White Paper, "The Economic Situation," are printed in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1963-1964, pp. 20939-20994.
In response to a question from Mr. Johnson, Sir Eric said that he did not expect that there would be a drawing from the IMF before the end of November or early December. In the discussion which followed on the statement to be made by the Department on October 27, concerning the British measures, Sir Eric offered a number of minor suggestions but expressed himself as satisfied with the positive and helpful character of the proposed statement. He undertook to endeavor to obtain a public statement by a United Kingdom minister regarding the Kennedy Round negotiations to be made shortly after the British statement on the balance of payments measures./3/
/3/Apparent reference to a November 3 speech by Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan. For extracts of the significant portions, see ibid., pp. 20395-20396.
232. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 27, 1964, 12:15 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on October 29. The meeting was held in the President's office. A record of the conversation relating to NATO and the MLF is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 93. Memoranda of other portions of the conversation are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2240.
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
The Secretary of State
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. William Tyler
UK
Patrick Gordon Walker, Foreign Secretary
Lord Harlech, British Ambassador
Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. Gordon Walker told the President that he was very glad to be in Washington and appreciated being received by the President. He said that the policies of our two countries were very close. After the President had made complimentary references to the role of Lord Harlech as Ambassador, the Secretary of State gave a general account of the current round of discussions which he said had been very satisfactory. Thirty or more subjects had been broached and we had found that our purpose was the same on nearly all points. He said there had been a wide range of agreement. He discussed the status of the MLF question and said that Mr. Gordon Walker had raised some ideas which the Secretary wanted us to think about very carefully. He said that these ideas should be subjects of discussion with other governments.
The President said that he was very glad to hear this and he made complimentary remarks about the members of his Cabinet and about the role of the Secretary of Defense.
The Secretary of State said that among the important matters which had been discussed we had found ourselves in agreement on (1) Article 19,/2/ and (2) British Guiana. The President said with regard to Article 19 that we were interested in finding any face-saving device to let the Soviet government get off the hook. The Secretary then gave a run-down on the US position on Article 19.
/2/Reference is to Article 19 of the UN Charter.
The President asked Gordon Walker for his estimate of Soviet policy in the light of the recent changes. Mr. Gordon Walker said he naturally did not know what had been going on but was inclined to think that something sudden must have happened to precipitate the sudden change in leadership./3/ He thought that perhaps Khrushchev may have had in mind an initiative on Germany which may have been unacceptable to the other Soviet leaders. He thought that there was also possibly an element of criticism of Khrushchev's handling of the Chinese problem. He also thought that the question of the allocation of resources had played a role in Khrushchev's political demise.
/3/Reference to replacement of Khrushchev as Soviet Prime Minister and Party Secretary by a collective leadership of Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin.
The President asked whether Mr. Gordon Walker thought that Soviet policy was likely to get tougher. Mr. Gordon Walker said it was hard to know. He had found it particularly interesting that the satellites had stood up so frankly in expressing reservations about the recent change.
The President asked what Mr. Gordon Walker thought about Vietnam. Mr. Gordon Walker said that the Prime Minister and he very much wanted to talk about this matter after the US elections. At all events he could assure the President that the UK Government would not say anything on the subject which might be embarrassing to the United States.
The President asked whether Prime Minister Wilson wanted to come to Washington. Mr. Gordon Walker replied emphatically in the affirmative and said he thought the best time might be during the Christmas recess of the British Parliament.
The President asked whether the British Government had found de Gaulle's trip to Latin America/4/ interesting and stimulating. The President said he rather felt that the trip had been a flop. Mr. Gordon Walker said that at any rate it had been a good demonstration of de Gaulle's physical energy, but he agreed that de Gaulle hadn't left much behind.
/4/September 21-October 15.
The President asked for Mr. Gordon Walker's views on Italy. Mr. Gordon Walker said that he thought that the present Italian government must be helped in any way we could. He said it was the only possible political formula. He spoke highly of Saragat. He added that he was sure that Nenni was now a dedicated anti-Communist but his political authority had recently been reduced and he was perhaps beginning to fail somewhat due to his age and to his bad fall a couple of years ago.
The President asked about the Labor Government's margin in Parliament. Mr. Gordon Walker was rather optimistic and said that things were not as bad as was generally thought. He said that the government could count in a certain measure on support from the Liberal Party. He said that one factor working for the government was general distaste in England for another election.
The President asked what Mr. Gordon Walker thought about Chancellor Erhard. Mr. Gordon Walker said he thought that Erhard was a weak man who wanted to be loved by everybody, and that this was not a good state of mind for a politician to be in. The President said that he liked the contrast between Erhard and Adenauer. He felt that Erhard had some flexibility whereas Adenauer "thought that the Communists were going to eat him before breakfast every morning." Mr. Gordon Walker agreed and said that Erhard's electoral prospects were not as good as they might be since the Socialists had shown increasing strength in recent local elections.
The President turned to Cuba and said he hoped the UK Government was not going to announce a new deal between now and next Tuesday. He recalled the experience he had had with Sir Alec Douglas-Home in January [February] on the same subject./5/ The Secretary of State mentioned the possibility of the UK developing its trade with other Latin American countries and thus being in a position to justify giving up trade with Cuba on purely commercial grounds rather than by announcing a change in policy.
/5/See Document 225.
Turning to the UK domestic financial situation, the President asked whether the UK was going to cut down on its imports. Mr. Gordon Walker thanked the President for the US reaction to and support of the measures which the UK had just announced. The President commented that these measures had been understood here as being necessary and that we had been glad to support them. He said he hoped that the UK would find it possible to give a quid pro quo by helping us on Cuba. Mr. Gordon Walker said that he felt that one must take into account the fact that if the UK had not sold buses to Cuba then the French would have done so but he hoped that we would make an effort to bring the French into line on trade with Cuba too. He reiterated his thanks for the way the Administration had reacted to the current UK financial difficulties. The Secretary said that we would be glad to sell the UK more beef and the President commented that he was delighted to get this support for his difficulties from the Secretary.
Returning again to the subject of a visit to Europe, the President said that he would be glad to see the Prime Minister here in early December if this was mutually convenient. He thought that he himself would be heavily involved in the first few weeks of the New Year with budget and other matters such as the economic and State-of-the-Union messages to the Congress so he would have to see later how things looked for a possible visit some time in the spring.
The President said in general that the US Government wanted to be as helpful as possible to the UK. He said that there was some uncertainty in the air with new governments and changes occurring in many places. He remarked that he was counting on absentee votes from Americans in the UK to help him out in next week's elections. He observed that there had been some pretty active and successful organization of Americans in England.
The President asked Mr. Gordon Walker what he thought about the Chinese Communist explosion of a nuclear device. Mr. Gordon Walker said he was glad that it had been announced ahead of time by the US government./6/ The President commented that this was due to the wisdom of the Secretary of State, who in turn said that it had been the President's decision. Mr. Gordon Walker said that naturally the explosion itself had come as no surprise but it was still a disturbing development. What had surprised them was the fact that the Chinese had used U-235 instead of plutonium.
/6/For text of President Johnson's statement on the Chinese nuclear explosion on October 16, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book II, pp. 1357-1358.
The President said that he thought our intelligence cooperation was excellent and that he was glad that Mr. McCone was going over to London soon to see the Prime Minister. Mr. Gordon Walker said he would be very glad to see Mr. McCone and valued our close relationship in this field. The Secretary commenced that our cooperation was so intimate that we occasionally knew everything about each other's diplomatic activities. Mr. Gordon Walker said that he greatly valued our close relationship in this field and wanted it to continue.
233. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson/1/
London, November 19, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, UK, Vol. 1. Top Secret.
I feel that I ought to let you know that we are facing a serious situation on sterling./2/ The pound has been under strong pressure for several days, and although the last two days were better, we cannot be sure that this improvement will continue. The pressure is coming from a number of sources, including the Continent, and probably for a variety of motives.
/2/Wilson discussed the run on the pound in The Labour Government, 1964-1970, pp. 31-38.
We intend, as you know, to draw at the beginning of next month enough of our I.M.F. standby to repay the short term credit we have received from the Federal Reserve and the other central Banks. We might perhaps then expect to have a little over $300 million left in our standby. We shall also have reconstituted the swap facility with the Federal Reserve; the other central Banks also may be willing to give further short term assistance, though this cannot be certain in present circumstances. But, if the run on sterling continues at anything like Monday's rate, we shall have exhausted the credit facilities at present available to us in a matter of weeks. We are being advised that, if we raised the Bank rate this week, we should probably halt the drain. But we are very reluctant to do this since it would run counter to the long-term policies we are developing for dealing with our basic economic problems; and I have no doubt that these are on the right lines and will be successful if only they are given time to work.
Moreover, I believe that an increase in our Bank rate would be as unwelcome to you as it would be to us. Am I right in thinking this? Of course, if you are intending shortly to raise your own discount rate for your own reasons we shall reluctantly have to follow you; and I would hope that we could then make this a concerted operation. But if, as I believe, this is not in your mind, we for our part will do our best to withstand the pressure.
In any event, however, recent experience has shown that, if we are to outmanoeuvre the speculators in the short term and to give our longer term policies the chance to mature, we need substantial reinforcement for sterling as rapidly as possible. We therefore have it in mind to approach the I.M.F. for a further standby of $1,000 million; and we shall greatly value your support. In order to take the necessary soundings Sir Eric Roll is returning to Washington today. He will be able to give you, if you wish, a fuller explanation of our thinking; and I shall be most grateful if you can let me have your reactions as soon as possible.
234. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson/1/
Washington, November 19, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, UK, Vol. 1. Top Secret.
Thank you for your frank exposition of the problems you are facing with sterling. You can be sure of our deep interest in your efforts to maintain its integrity.
As to your Bank rate, we recognize that this is a decision you must take based on your views of what is necessary for the defense of sterling./2/ We agree with your concept that more fundamental attacks on the basic problems of your trade deficit are preferable to early and indiscriminate use of Bank rate.
/2/The United Kingdom raised its bank rate to 7 percent effective November 23.
As for our own discount rate, this is a matter for our Federal Reserve Board which, as you know, Congress has made independent in this regard of the Executive Branch. However, I am informed that they do not feel that our domestic economy requires any increase in our discount rate.
We will of course be glad to give all the help we can to Sir Eric Roll in his efforts to obtain an additional IMF standby. I think it is essential to continue the close cooperation between our people on all aspects of your current problem, and I will fully inform you in advance should there be any modification of our present situation.
235. Editorial Note
Prime Minister Wilson, Foreign Secretary Sir Patrick Gordon Walker, and Defense Minister Denis Healey visited Washington December 7-9, 1965, for talks with U.S. officials centering on the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF). Documentation relating to these discussions together with an editorial note outlining other subjects touched upon in their meetings is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIII, Documents 59-62. A briefing paper on the international economic situation, prepared in the Department of the Treasury, is ibid., volume VIII, Document 19. A memorandum of conversation relating to British defense plans is printed as Document 236. A record of a meeting between the President and Prime Minister dealing with the British economic situation is printed as Document 237. For text of statements by the President and Prime Minister and the joint communiqu&#eacute;issued at the end of their talks, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pages 615-616. The meetings are discussed in Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970, pages 44-51.
236. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, December 7, 1964, 3:45 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, MLF No. 4. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Tyler and approved in S on December 16. The meeting was held in the library of the British Embassy.
SUBJECT
Defense Problems
PARTICIPANTS
US
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Ambassador David Bruce
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. George Ball
Mr. William R. Tyler
UK
Patrick Gordon Walker, Foreign Secretary
Denis Healey, Secy of State for Defense
Lord Harlech, British Ambassador
Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secy of State
Sir Henry Hardman
Sir Solly Zuckerman
Sir Burke Trend
Mr. J. N. Henderson
Gordon Walker said the UK wanted first of all to go a little into the general defense problem and then focus on the specific problem of Atlantic nuclear defense arrangements. He asked Mr. Healey to lead off.
Mr. Healey said that at the Chequers meeting on the weekend of November 21 and 22,/2/ the discussion had concentrated on the future defense policy of the UK over the next ten years, under the shadow of economic pressure. It had been taken for granted that costs would continue to rise. At the same time it was very hard to keep the defense effort down. The only practical way to reduce expenditure would be to cut down the number of people. This was not easy to do nor was it really possible to achieve the necessary economies by reducing bodies. The only other way was to economize in equipment. This raised the question of what role the UK expected to fill. What was to be its mission? The UK was the only European power contributing both to European defense, and to the defense of freedom outside of Europe. A great majority of the British people was in favor of maintaining the UK's extra-European role, which included its obligations to the Commonwealth, to SEATO, to CENTO, and to the bases in third areas. The UK was in fact almost alone from Suez to Singapore. The UK felt very strongly that the danger of a major war in Europe was now very small. On the other hand, the danger of war outside of Europe was already great and growing greater. Had it not been for the UK's prompt action in throwing "nugatory forces" into East Africa earlier this year, the West might have had another Congo on its hands. The breakdown of UK defense expenditures in percentages of allocation was roughly as follows: 10 per cent for a strategic nuclear role, 30 per cent for the defense of Europe, 30 per cent "overseas", 30 per cent home defense. Healey went on to say that he would like the reaction of the US Government to the priorities of the UK defense effort. The UK would like the US to consent to a nuclear role for 88 V-bombers and some Polaris submarines which would make a major contribution to a solution of the problem of nuclear defense arrangements of the Allies. The UK was prepared to put its entire strategic reserve in the Alliance. It would agree to a German veto within NATO. It could not put all its V-bombers inside Europe because it was important that some be reserved for a non-nuclear role outside of Europe.
/2/Reference is to a meeting of Ministers, advisers, and service chiefs at the Prime Minister's weekend retreat. The meeting is discussed in Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970, pp. 35-37 and Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men, and Donkeys, pp. 374-377.
The UK was also concerned by the question of weapons: the weakness in the UK's present defense planning was that it was not able to produce scenarios based on the needs of war outside of Europe, e.g.: such varying needs as those for police actions in East Africa, compared with a nuclear exchange with Communist China. Healey went on to say that it would be highly desirable that the US and UK (1) compare and clarify their respective roles in these areas of the world; (2) increase and extend their cooperation in logistical support in each other's efforts; (3) cooperate in the field of nuclear weapons in relationship to responsibilities and possible contingencies. With regard to its world-wide responsibilities, excluding Europe, the UK could cover 95 per cent of contingencies likely to arise. However, in order to cover the last 5 per cent, an additional effort of something like one billion pounds sterling would be necessary. Even with regard to operational requirements the UK should have the best weapons available, and this meant the desirability of buying certain US weapons rather than some being produced at home. Quite apart from the economic benefits involved, the UK needed to maintain its R&D. This would have to be discussed with the US if the UK were to "go American" for certain weapons. There had been a "great congruence" of attitudes at the Chequers meeting. The problem was to translate attitudes into policies, and policies into hard programs.
Gordon Walker said that already ten years ago there was a problem of the size and kind of bases which could be maintained. He felt that if the problem of Malaysia could be settled,/3/ the UK could look forward to some solution for Aden. He said that in terms of cost effectiveness, much the best thing would be if the UK maintained Aden and Singapore.
/3/Following the 1963 action granting independence to the Malaysia Federation, the Government of Indonesia claimed portions of the new state's territories and launched a limited war, which it labeled a "confrontation," to back its claims. The United Kingdom provided military aid to Malaysia.
The Secretary thanked Gordon Walker and Healey for their account of the general defense problem facing the UK. He urged HMG to give full weight to the role of the UK as a world power. The UK had not reduced her world role, in spite of suggestions to this effect in the press. We were mindful that there were 26 nations in the UN which were "children" of the UK. Then there was the Commonwealth. The US wanted the UK to play as large a role as possible. It could do certain things which the US, because of certain fancies, could not itself do so well. We would look with the greatest concern at a diminution of the UK's role, which was of very great importance to us. What the UK did had a considerable bearing on what we ourselves were able to do. The US had been carrying a very heavy budgetary burden over many years. In 1947 our defense budget was $10 billion. Since then we had spent over $600 billion in war expenditures. Since World War II the US had suffered 160,000 casualties at the hands of the Communists. (Gordon Walker repeated this figure in a tone of surprise.) We had provided over $100 billion in aid. We could not be the gendarmes of the universe. At heart, the American people are isolationists. Because of all this, what others are doing has a great effect on what we ourselves are able to do. The UK role has a multiplying effect on our own role. This emphasizes the importance to the US of what the UK itself does. The French had cut back in Southeast Asia and also in Africa. West Germany and Japan had not been able, for various reasons, to shoulder their proportionate share of the common defense burden. The interests of the free world required the UK should play a role not only in terms of its own interests but in terms of the interests of the free world as a whole. We would agree that there was no prospect of a major war on the horizon at this time. However, we should be careful about the conclusions we draw from this. If this is indeed true it is due to the fact that NATO is strong. Any change in the NATO force structure would have to be very carefully considered in terms of its implication for the defensive strength of the West and of the conclusions which the Soviets might draw from it. The Secretary said that he was not enthusiastic about trying to resolve the question on the basis of long discussions and analyses of NATO strategy. The problem was to decide what was prudently required on both sides. He had the impression that the Soviets were now interested in the possibilities of a formulation for the thinning out of troops. He wished to emphasize that this was a very ticklish matter which required frank and extensive discussion between allies.
Secretary of Defense McNamara said that he understood HMG's objectives to be: (1) to accord priority to the UK's extra-European forces; (2) to reduce the level of UK forces over a period of ten years, and to hold the military budget at the current absolute level. Healey said that the time-frame envisaged was ten years, and that the effect would be to reduce the percentage of the military budget in relation to the GNP from 7-1/2 per cent to 5 per cent. McNamara said that these objectives were completely contradictory if the UK were to try to achieve them by reducing men. Today, the US had twice as many men in uniform per thousand of population as our Allies. The people of the US were not prepared to accept this situation in the long run. He said the UK must retain its manpower at the present level, if not increase it. A corollary of this was that the UK would not need to reduce its forces in Europe. (At this point Healey demurred and said something about the situation inevitably requiring some adjustment in Europe.) The Secretary of Defense said that except for the foreign exchange impact there was no need for the UK to reduce its forces in Europe. The only way to reconcile forces with the objectives was to make hard decisions regarding equipment. It was necessary to destroy the myth that an arms industry is necessary for economic expansion. He said that research and development in the US absorbed only about 5 per cent of the defense budget. We could help by working on working out a cooperative R&D development program with the UK. He said that, speaking frankly, the UK was financing certain projects which made no sense militarily and really represented a waste of money, in particular the TSR-2,/4/ as well as certain other projects. He thought both the UK and the US could benefit through greater integration, but he realized that this was a very painful process in terms of domestic problems for the UK.
/4/A British-designed prototype fighter aircraft.
Gordon Walker said that the weapons and equipment needed for a military mission in Europe were different from those required for areas outside of Europe. McNamara agreed, and said that what the US needed from the UK was a firm policy of acting as a world power. On this basis, the US could help with the problem of the 5 per cent which Healey had alluded to. The Secretary wondered whether anything could be done to increase the contribution and participation of the Commonwealth, which had great reserves of power and other assets to contribute. Healey said the trouble had been that hitherto any extra-European role had looked as though it were "the dying legacy of an imperial power." When the UK had intervened in other parts of the world it had simply looked colonial. Also, people were inclined to ask why the UK should play a world role if the empire were no longer there to justify it. He said that if the UK once took a clear decision to play a world role, this would be not to protect British interests, but to contribute to peace and stability in the world. He said Australia had made some effort of late to help. Gordon Walker said he thought the UK could convince Australia to increase its contribution to the common effort. For example, Darwin would be useful as a triple base. India was a problem, but if we assume increasing Chinese pressure and a settlement of the Kashmir problem, he thought the UK could probably develop an Indian contribution over the next 10 to 15 years. Healey said the anti-colonial trauma was dying. He felt that a real military capacity without any colonial aims contributed to the creation of stability in the world. Gordon Walker said there was an economic problem involved, and he felt that the UK needed some thinning out of its forces. Healey commented that for all they knew, they might have to send another battalion to British Guiana in the next few days. He said a more formal agreement was needed in NATO, that the UK should be entitled to withdraw troops from Europe for special purposes at short notice. Gordon Walker said that whatever the UK did in Europe should help the strengthening of the defense of Europe and that manpower was a vital factor in this.
Turning to nuclear matters, Healey said that HMG recognized the growing anxiety on the part of non-nuclear powers with regard to a guarantee by the nuclear powers. There was also evidence of a sense of a need on the part of non-nuclear powers to play a greater role, and there was growing interest in the whole nuclear problem and its organization. Theoretically, there were only two ways of meeting this: (1) to give non-nuclear powers nuclear weapons; (2) to give them more influence over, and greater participation in, the operation of nuclear weapons within NATO. The first was, of course, unacceptable, and as for the second, unless the nuclear powers retained their veto over the use of nuclear weapons this would constitute dissemination. He said that this stark truth could be fudged in negotiations but not in practice. The talk about a "European clause" had understandably given some Germans the idea that eventually the US might be prevailed upon to give up its veto. The central problem was that whatever the organization of a new nuclear force might be, either the nuclear powers must retain their veto or they would be engaged in dissemination.
[Here follows discussion of British proposals for an Atlantic Nuclear Force.]
The discussion then broke up shortly before five o'clock in order to move to the White House.
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