Spain
177. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 11, 1964, 6:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Tyler. The meeting was held at the White House.
SUBJECT
Spanish-American Relations
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Antonio Garrigues, Ambassador of Spain
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary
President Johnson met with the Spanish Ambassador in the Treaty Room of the White House before the start of the Diplomatic Reception.
The Ambassador informed the President that he had been named Ambassador to the Holy See, and would be leaving soon. He said he had conferred at length in Madrid with members of the Spanish government, and with General Franco, who had asked him to convey a personal letter to President Johnson./2/ The Ambassador thereupon gave the President the original letter and an English translation. The Ambassador said he regretted leaving Washington, and that he wished to emphasize how important to Spain were good relations with the United States. He stressed repeatedly that Spain recognized the United States as the great defender of the Free World, and as the major factor in resistance to Communism and in the search for peace. He said that whatever differences there might be between Spain and the United States, such as the question of trade with Cuba, must be seen within the broad framework of Spanish-US friendship which was a vital element in Spain's foreign policy.
/2/A copy of the letter, which conveyed Franco's assurances that relations with the United States would remain close, together with President Johnson's reply, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 SP-US.
The President thanked the Ambassador for his words and said he was sorry to hear the Ambassador was leaving. He knew how much Ambassador Garrigues had contributed to our good relations with Spain. The President said the United States Government was pleased that it had been possible to renew the US-Spanish Defense Agreement./3/ The President said that he was already aware of the contents of General Franco's letter/4/ and that he appreciated the sentiments which it expressed with regard to the Spanish policy of close and friendly relations with the United States. The President said he reciprocated these sentiments.
/3/For text of the joint declaration concerning the renewal of the 1953 defense agreement together with the related exchange of notes, signed at New York September 26, 1963, see 14 UST 1406.
/4/In a February 6 memorandum based on his talks with Garrigues, Secretary of State Rusk informed the President of the likely contents of the Franco letter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 SP-US)
The President said that the matter of trade with Cuba was an extremely serious one and that he felt that Spain must consider the effects of this issue on the course of Spanish-US relations, as well as on the fortunes of the Free World as a whole. He emphasized that Castro was an instrument for penetration and subversion of democratic governments and institutions, not only in the Western Hemisphere but, as recently shown in the case of Zanzibar, in other parts of the world. It was the purpose of the United States to bring about the end of the Castro regime so that Cuba could be ruled by a freely elected and democratic government. For these reasons the United States Government looked to its allies to cease trading with Cuba in order not to lend Castro economic support, or to make things easier for him. The President said he felt very strongly on this matter and he hoped that this fact would be taken into account by the Spanish Government.
The Ambassador did not reply directly to the President, and the conversation ended on this note.
Comment: Subsequently, during the reception, Ambassador Garrigues expressed to me his unhappiness and concern about the question of Spanish trade with Cuba and the emphasis which the President had placed on this matter. I told the Ambassador that he should be aware that the United States Government did indeed feel very strongly that our allies should do everything possible to reduce, or, better still, eliminate trade with Cuba in critical commodities. The Ambassador argued that Spain had needed sugar and that Cuba was the best source of supply. He also referred to the British and the French and said it was obvious that the other allies of the United States were not following our policy in this area either. I said that this was going to make difficulties all around, that there should be no misapprehension on the part of the Spanish Government as to the importance of this issue to us, and I mentioned the provision in the Foreign Assistance Act under which aid cannot be given a country which permits its ships or planes to be used for trade with Cuba./5/ I also said I understood that the five Spanish ships engaged in trade with Cuba all belonged to one individual. My remarks seemed to make the Ambassador uneasy, and he said that this matter was very complicated. The Ambassador said that the Embassy has been working on a formula which he thought might be reconciled with the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act, and that it had been sent to Madrid for the Spanish Government's consideration. He said that he hoped Spain's trade with Cuba which was so small and of so little importance would be looked at by the United States Government within the framework of Spanish-American friendship and close alliance. I said I thought that the attitude and actions of the Spanish Government on this issue would be considered by the United States Government as an indication of the value which the Spanish Government places on our relations.
/5/Reference is to Section 620a of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, P.L. 88-205, approved December 16, 1963. For text, see 77 Stat. 386.
178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain/1/
Washington, March 5, 1964, 11:59 a.m.
/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 SP-US. Confidential. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson.
2766. In farewell call by Ambassador Garrigues on Deputy Under Secretary Johnson March 4, both expressed gratification for successful outcome Section 620 FAA talks. Johnson said that, while this settled legal question of transportation by Spanish ships and aircraft, there remained policy question of trade, and referred to press despatches from Madrid in this regard. Ambassador stated that, from his talks with Franco and Foreign Minister, he absolutely certain Spain had no policy for large or long-term increases in trade with Cuba. Serious but hopefully short-term shortage obliged Spain purchase Cuban sugar, which would have to be paid for primarily in Spanish goods. Sugar shortage should be resolved within two years.
Johnson urged that to maximum possible extent such payments be made in "soft goods" and pointed out that Spain could expect US to be especially sensitive to sales of machinery, transportation items, spare parts and replacements. Garrigues repeated it was absolutely out of question that Spain would greatly increase trade with Cuba. He said Spain's relations with Cuban exiles and Latin America obliged GOS to be moderate and discreet in its relations with Cuba. Garrigues said he would report conversation to Madrid.
Garrigues said that he was making trip through Latin America prior to return to Madrid and would report to Madrid sentiment in that area with respect to Cuba.
Rusk
179. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 23, 1964, 12:30 p.m.
/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ECIN 6 EEC-SP. Confidential. Drafted by Ortiz and approved in S on May 8. The memorandum is Part 1 of 3. Memoranda of other portions of the conversation dealing with Spain's trade with Cuba and use of the Rota naval base are ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.
SUBJECT
Spain's Association with the European Economic Community
PARTICIPANTS
Spain
Fernando Castiella, Foreign Minister of Spain
Alfonso Merry del Val, Ambassador Designate of Spain
Angel Sagaz, Director General for Relations with the U.S., Spanish Foreign Office
Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Charg? d'Affaires of the Embassy of Spain
United States
The Secretary
Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary
Mr. Frank V. Ortiz, WE
Mr. Donald Barnes, Interpreter
During his call on the Secretary, Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella reviewed Spain's position on relations with the European Economic Community (EEC). The Minister said that as the renewal of the U.S.-Spanish Defense Agreement provided for an exchange of views he desired the U.S. to understand fully the Spanish position on this important problem. The Minister said that although Spain's relations with the U.S., Latin America and the Arab countries were of first importance, Spain's policy for many years had also been designed to draw Spain closer to Europe. Thanks to Spain's improved economic position achieved with the help of the U.S. and international organizations, Spain's relations with Europe had improved greatly. Some two years ago Spain decided that her economic future lay in association with the EEC to which Spain's exports were greatest. While seeking association with the EEC, Spain remains strongly committed to European unity.
Two years ago Spain sent a letter to the EEC Council asking for talks leading to Spain's association./2/ This application had a great psychological impact in Spain. Spain's labor and business men reviewed their thinking and operations and the autarkical system in Spain was being dismantled in preparation for Spain's entrance into the Common Market. After a careful study of the Rome Treaty no clause was found to which Spain could not subscribe. As a result of the expectation that Spain would eventually be a member of the EEC Spain had evolved considerably economically and socially, as any impartial observer could attest.
/2/The February 9, 1962, letter requested the opening of negotiations for association with the European Community with the objective of eventual Spanish membership. Regarding U.S. policy toward Spanish association with the EEC, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 25.
Spain was requesting associate rather than full membership as it would take approximately 10-12 years for the Spanish economy to be ready for full membership. In essence Spain desired relations with the EEC similar to those of Greece and Turkey. There was no need now to decide on full membership for Spain.
The Minister said the crisis over British membership in the EEC had delayed consideration of the Spanish petition. Now that such consideration was being given, maneuvers by Spanish exile groups with Socialist circles in Belgium and Italy had resulted in opposition in those countries and the Netherlands to Spain's association. France and Germany were giving strong and active support to the Spanish application. The Spanish exile groups apparently considered that membership in the EEC was a matter of life or death for the Spanish regime. The Minister said that this was not the case. However if the door to the EEC were to remain closed, Spain of necessity would be forced to re-orient her trade and other policies. Spain, which is on the threshold of an ambitious economic development plan, is at an important cross-roads. The GOS needs to know in which direction Spain's future lies. It is because of this that her relationship to the EEC needs to be determined. A change of Spain's present policies would result in turning Spain on an inward course, interrupting encouraging Spanish evolution towards liberalized institutions and integration with Europe. Spanish trade would also have to be re-oriented with unforeseeable results.
The Minister said that Mr. Spaak, the current head of the EEC Council, was taking the position that Spain could associate with the EEC in a commercial sense. The Minister said that commercial discussions with the EEC were not of great significance to Spain as Spain was a member of GATT, and commercial problems could be resolved there. However, a form of economic association with the EEC which would involve certain financial advantages is what Spain sought.
The Minister reviewed the problems for Spanish association originating in Italy. He said the Italian Socialists were putting great pressures on Saragat and Nenni. The Minister noted that the Rome Treaty had not set up political qualifications for EEC membership. However there may be an element of agricultural competition between Italy and Spain. The Minister said that very confidentially the Spanish Government had been assured of support for its position by leading Italian political figures as well as industrial and other influential elements and that Italy's position had already begun to soften. The Italians had very great commercial and investment interests in Spain. The Spanish market was an expanding one and Italian interest in this market would influence Italy's position. The Minister said these factors had been brought to the attention of the Italian Government. Italy's opposition to Spanish EEC association was harmful to the Spanish people. It did not matter much if Spain were excluded from NATO but exclusion from the EEC was a serious problem for Spain and Spain would be forced to act to protect her interests. The Italian problem seemed on the road to solution as just recently the Italian Foreign Minister had assured the Spanish Ambassador that Italy would not impose obstacles to conversations regarding Spanish association with the EEC.
Belgium too was greatly interested in the Spanish market. However the Belgians had been told their opposition to Spain on the EEC question would affect Belgium's position in the Spanish market. The Social Democratic party in Belgium was assuring Spain of its support for the Spanish position and Spain was confident that the Belgian position also would change. The Netherlands had a very favorable balance of trade and Spain had hoped the Dutch position too would undergo modification.
The Minister repeated that Spain was not seeking full membership but only discussions which would lead to the most appropriate economic relationship for Spain given the present circumstances. The Minister said that while he believed the matter was developing favorably he requested that the Secretary put in a good word with the Italians and Mr. Spaak so as not to interrupt Spanish evolution along the road which is desired by all. A meaningful relationship of Spain to the EEC would be to everybody's interest.
The Secretary listened without comment to the Minister's presentation and noted his arrival in Brussels on May 9th at the time of the EEC Council meetings/3/ when the Spanish application would be considered.
/3/Secretary Rusk was in Brussels May 9 to address Belgian-American associations. He subsequently visited the United Kingdom before attending the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting at The Hague May 12-14.
180. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, September 16, 1964.
/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US. Confidential. Drafted by Tyler.
I called the Spanish Ambassador this afternoon and told him I was speaking to him quite personally and informally. I told him that because of your high regard for him you had not wanted to dwell too long on how upset you had been by the UPI story out of Madrid, according to which the Spanish government held the United States Government responsible for the aggression against the Spanish ship./2/ However I knew that you hoped that the strength of your feelings on this matter had not passed unnoticed by him.
/2/The Aranzazu was attacked on September 13 by two small boats equipped with machine guns while off Cuba. Three Spanish citizens on board were killed. Rusk met with Merry del Val on September 16 to discuss the attack. Their meeting was reported in telegram 254 to Madrid, September 16. (Ibid., POL 33-6 CUBA)
The Ambassador took this in very good part and assured me that he was fully aware of your position. He repeated that this news story was a distortion of the communiqu&#eacute;which had been issued by the Spanish Foreign Office, the text of which he had received and which bore out his explanation to you. He added that the Spanish press was playing up the whole incident in an unfortunately dramatic manner./3/
/3/Telegram 378 from Madrid, September 25, reported that Ambassador Woodward met with Foreign Minister Castiella who affirmed that the Government of Spain rejected any notion of U.S. responsibility for the incident and expressed his desire to improve relations between the two governments. (Ibid.)
Bill
181. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 22, 1965, 2:30 p.m.
/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw and approved in S on April 2. The memorandum is marked Part 3 of 4. The meeting was held at the British Embassy.
SUBJECT
Gibraltar
PARTICIPANTS
UK Side
Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart
Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office
Michael Stewart, Charg? d'Affaires a.i., British Embassy
R. S. Crawford, Assistant Under Secretary, Foreign Office
Michael Hadow, Counselor, Foreign Office
J. N. Henderson, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary
John Harris, Special Assistant to the Foreign Secretary
Christopher Everett, First Secretary, British Embassy
US Side
The Secretary
Ambassador Bruce
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, NEA
J. Harold Shullaw, Director, BNA
Harrison Symmes, Deputy Director, NE
The Foreign Secretary raised the subject of Gibraltar and the difficulties being experienced with Spain./2/ He said that the Spanish Government has charged that the British action in giving a measure of self government to the people of Gibraltar violates the Treaty of Utrecht. Mr. Stewart said that his government does not regard limited self government as constituting a transfer of sovereignty which is forbidden by the terms of that Treaty. The British Government is prepared to negotiate with the Spanish Government on such problems as smuggling, but it is not prepared to negotiate on the question of sovereignty. Furthermore, it is not prepared to negotiate while the Spanish continue their harassment at the border. He asked if there was any way in which the US could help.
/2/Following a UN request for further discussions between the United Kingdom and Spain regarding the future of Gibraltar, the Franco government tightened border controls, claiming that it was seeking to reduce smuggling into Spain.
The Secretary said that in the case of Puerto Rico we have always been able to tell critics to ask the Puerto Ricans what their wishes were with respect to the relationship with the U.S. He asked the Foreign Secretary if the UK could take a similar line with respect to Gibraltar. Mr. Stewart replied that there is no doubt but that the people of the Colony would support continued British rule. They have no desire to see a change in sovereignty.
The Secretary said that we would see what we can do to counsel moderation. The Spanish Foreign Minister will be in Washington this week and the Secretary said he would try to find out what he could about Spanish intentions./3/
/3/A March 24 memorandum of the conversation between the Secretary and Castiella is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. I. Subsequently, during an April 15 discussion of Gibraltar with Prime Minister Wilson, Rusk stated: "Castiella had told him he did not think there was a really serious problem there." A memorandum of this conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UK-US.
182. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 24, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved by Bundy on March 25. Castiella also met with Secretary Rusk on March 25. A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 SP.
SUBJECT
Call of Spanish Foreign Minister on President
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
McGeorge Bundy
William R. Tyler
Spain
Foreign Minister Castiella
Ambassador Merry del Val
The Foreign Minister congratulated the President on the successful Gemini flight./2/ The President thanked the Foreign Minister and said that he thought the relations between Spain and the United States were on the whole good, though he could not understand why the Spanish government was dealing with Cuba and purchasing sugar above world market prices. At the President's request, Mr. Bundy succinctly outlined the reasons why the United States feels that it is against the interest of the free world as a whole, and in particular of the Latin American countries which are the target of Communist intervention and subversion, to have dealings with Cuba which strengthen that country's economy. The Foreign Minister said that Spain had made the sugar agreement with Cuba last year because it was in need of substantial sugar imports. He also said that Spain had eliminated its own shipping with Cuba. However there were many Spanish nationals in Cuba, whose interests and well being the Spanish government had to bear in mind. He said that there was one flight a week between Spain and Cuba and that there were 40,000 applications for this flight from Spaniards wishing to be repatriated. The Foreign Minister also said that wheat had been sold by Western countries to the Soviet Union and Communist China, and he implied that these transactions were comparable to Spain's contract for purchase of Cuban sugar. Mr. Bundy then pointed out the difference between the Spanish case and the grain sales. He said that the latter had no effect on the stability of the Soviet regime, whereas even a difference of 2 or 3 per cent in the Cuban economy could make things easier or harder for Castro. He repeated that if it were merely a question of dealing with Cuba by ourselves, there would be no problem, but that the issue was Castro's policy toward other countries in this hemisphere, and of the economic resources available to him in order to continue to carry out that policy.
/2/Reference is to Gemini III, which made a 3-orbit, 4-hour flight on March 23.
In conclusion, the Foreign Minister thanked the President for having received him, and mutual good wishes were exchanged.
183. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Spain (Duke) to the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (McKillop)/1/
Washington, July 26, 1965.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Robert W. Zimmerman.
SUBJECT
Some Observations on U.S. Policy Toward Spain
REF
Your Memorandum to Mr. Leddy of June 25, 1965/2/
/2/Not found.
With a good deal of interest and appreciation, I read your synthesis of our policies here in Spain. There was not one idea expressed which I would modify in any way. I would like to add, however, a few other thoughts that seem worth putting on paper.
While the 1963 Guidelines Paper/3/ perhaps is acceptable in general terms, the Embassy has always thought it left much to be desired. In fact, very shortly after it was received in Madrid, the Embassy submitted a brief commentary in the form of an Airgram (A-783, April 17, 1963)./4/ During the past several months the Embassy has developed an alternate version of the 1963 Guidelines Paper which it intends to submit shortly for Department consideration./5/
/3/Apparently a reference to "Report on U.S. Policy Toward Spain," printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 375.
/4/Entitled "Comments on Policy and Guidelines for Spain," not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US)
/5/Not found. A note in the margin reads: "Not yet received, July 26, 1966."
Turning to specific matters, however, it may be that in the future some opportunity may present itself for collaboration with other Western European countries in projects in Spain, and I believe we should be alert to this possibility. I was reminded of this the other day when the French Ambassador suggested to me that American and French policy toward Spain was identical, even though it might be for different reasons. He alleged that France now encourages powerful neighbors in Germany, a self-reliant Spain, and a stable Italy and since he considered that the U.S. wanted an independent and sturdy nation--Spain--on Europe's south flank, we should be able to collaborate in certain fields. My French colleague was perhaps a little ingenuous in this suggestion since we are quite clearly rivals in Spain from the point of view of investments, the development of atomic energy plants, space operations, military sales, and almost what have you. But nevertheless his comments reminded me of this general proposition of cooperation that might be possible in some cases, if not with France, with others such as Germany.
Parenthetically I might note that the French Ambassador in the same conversation declared that Spaniards in many circles are reluctant to even contemplate integration into Europe because of fear of rejection on the one hand, and of inferior status on the other. He went on to say that we should do everything possible to make them conscious of their opportunities as Europeans. I have no quarrel, of course, with his later statement that we should make them conscious of their opportunities as Europeans. However, I think there is little doubt that knowledgeable Spaniards are quite conscious of the fact that Spain must become a part of an integrated Europe, and certainly most of the opposition wants such integration for political purposes. Officially, of course, Spain has made its bid to become an associate member of the Common Market and while there are many, it is true, who fear the consequences for Spain from an economic point of view if the application were to be accepted today, there is little danger of this and they are counting on perhaps two or three years of further negotiating delay at least in order to put their own economic house in order, the better to compete at some future date. After all, the Economic Development Plan/6/ has this premise as one of its basic considerations.
/6/Reference is to Spain's second Five-Year Economic Development Program, 1963-1967.
One point which we might keep in the back of our minds insofar as Spain's integration with Europe is concerned, is the possibility of some form of collaboration with NATO on a local regional basis. The prize of Spanish membership in NATO is apparently impossible, but such limited collaboration might not appear to the GOS as simply a back-door association, and it would make sense militarily, especially as Spanish ASW capabilities increase. I am thinking of the possibility of GOS collaboration in the new NATO-Iberian Command to be established in Lisbon;/7/ the discussions of Maltese association with NATO might perhaps suggest some possibilities in this direction.
/7/NATO's Iberian Command, headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, was transferred to Lisbon in 1967.
I believe it would be well for the U.S. to bear increasingly in mind certain dangers that may develop for Spain, and possibly for our interests here, at the time of transition. The problem as I see it is that it seems almost inevitable that at the point in time when Franco disappears from the scene, European labor organizations and some of the European socialist parties may very probably seek to intervene in some way or another in the Spanish scene. The problem is not only that of outside intervention, to which the Spanish inevitably react strongly, particularly if it is clumsily done, but also that many of those groups will be working from an emotional background of 25 years ago. I think we must give some serious thought to this problem as it could seriously exacerbate the internal problems that might develop within Spain during the sensitive transition period. Greater exchanges of visits between this Embassy and our other missions in Europe certainly will help to educate our own European embassies to the complexities of the Spanish situation, but there may be situations that will arise in which our missions can be helpful in making representations to various European socialist parties and labor groups so that such possible intervention might at least be channeled along intelligent lines.
The other day we reviewed the situation in Spain with Joe Slater of the Ford Foundation and discussed various ways in which the Foundation might support our efforts here. We all agreed that it would be useful to establish here a forum for the stimulation of interest in international affairs such as a Foreign Affairs Council. Slater subsequently discussed the idea with the Conde de Motrico, former Ambassador to the United States and France, and other Spaniards and got an enthusiastic reaction. Through Slater's initiative an organizing committee has been set up and visits to countries which have Foreign Affairs Councils will be arranged with financial assistance from the Ford Foundation.
Shifting to the subject of our contacts with the Spanish opposition, I would only suggest that we should bear in mind the necessity of maintaining our flexibility. What I mean by this is that for the present we must be careful in such contacts not to become overly identified with any one group. Some of the older opposition leaders are beginning to fall by the wayside, and inevitably there will be a rise of new leaders in the indeterminate time between now and the date on which the transition or "crisis" period begins. This is particularly true in the labor field where I am convinced that the future labor leaders of Spain are probably young people whom neither we nor Spanish labor itself has as yet identified. Flexibility in most circumstances would seem to be the most desirable posture--at least initially.
Turning to another area entirely, I think we should also consider the necessity of placing some of our operations in Spain on a more formal permanent footing that might provide some assurance of carrying on in the event of a radical shift of government in Spain at some point in the years to come. Actually it appears that the GOS as well would like this formalization of some of our commitments. I might cite as an example our NASA facilities in the Canaries/8/ which are founded at present solely on an exchange of letters. In this particular instance you will of course be aware that the Spanish Government itself has suggested that the Canary Islands NASA facilities be formally tied in with the Robledo complex outside of Madrid in a new arrangement between our two governments that hopefully we will begin to negotiate next fall.
/8/An agreement on space research projects was concluded by an exchange of notes in Washington April 14, 1966. For text, see 17 UST 493.
As a final thought I should like to underline the fact that we must bear in mind that while we do have substantial influence in Spain, and while good Spanish-U.S. relations are a prime keystone of present GOS policy, our influence here is also limited (particularly in political matters) by the fact that although Spain's world position is assisted by its relations to the U.S., we are the ones normally requesting facilities for projects of one kind or another ranging from the base complex through extensive NASA facilities to special communications stations. This does not, of course, mean that we cannot exercise our influence, even in political matters, from time to time when it seems important for us to do so, but it does mean that we must exercise considerable caution and be particularly adept in doing so.
As to the succession problem, I will have more to say on this after our military establishment committee has had a chance to present some of its preliminary thoughts. It is a subject of course with which you and I will have to keep in continuous touch./9/
/9/In an August 26 memorandum to Robert Anderson, Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, George Vest of the Office of Regional Political-Military Affairs, commented: "Frankly, I see no future in the [Duke] idea. . . . Don't expect formal military collaboration to precede political acceptability for Spain." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 4 NATO)
184. Letter From General Franco to President Johnson/1/
Madrid, undated.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Spain. Secret. The letter, which is typed on stationery of the Spanish Embassy in Washington, was delivered by Ambassador Merry del Val to Secretary Rusk for transmission to the President on August 20. A memorandum of their conversation is ibid., Country File, Spain, Vol. 1.
My dear President Johnson:
I am most grateful to you for making available to me such a sincere report on the South Vietnam situation and of the efforts, both in the political field and through diplomatic channels, which the United States is coupling with its military action in an attempt to open the way for a peaceful settlement. I am well aware of your responsibilities as the leading nation of the world at this time, and I share your interest and preoccupation, in which we Spaniards join with you at all times. I am well aware also of the fact that a military abandonment of Vietnam by the United States would affect the whole security system of the free world.
Because of my military and political experience, I am in a position to appreciate the great difficulties which the task you have undertaken involves: the guerrilla warfare in the jungle is decidedly favorable to subversive native elements and allows them to contain superior forces with only a small number of troops; the most powerful weapons would lose their effectiveness against small scattered objectives; there are no vital objectives to destroy to put an end to the struggle; established communications are held on to precariously and only through the deployment of great number of troops. It would be very difficult to defeat subversion with conventional weapons. War in the jungle is an unlimited adventure.
On the other hand, although acknowledging the unavoidable consideration of your country's prestige which might be involved, it would not be possible to disregard the conflict's possible immediate consequences. Lengthening the war, would serve to impel the Vietnamese into becoming an easy prey for Chinese imperialism, and even assuming that the strength of the Vietcong could be broken, the sporadic attack of the guerrillas would continue for a long time and would therefore demand a prolonged military occupation of a country where you would always be regarded as foreigners. The results evidently would not seem to compensate the sacrifices entailed.
Although subversion in Vietnam may at first glance seem to be a military problem, it really is, in my opinion, a profound political problem; one included in the destiny of new nations. It is not very easy for the West to understand their innermost and deeply rooted problems. Their struggle for independence has stimulated nationalist sentiments; their lack of interests to protect and their state of poverty impel them toward social-communism, which offers greater possibilities and hopes than the liberal system sponsored by the West, that reminds them of the great humiliation of colonialism. Nations generally tend to favor communism because, apart from its power of seduction, it is the only effective avenue left open to them. The play of Russian and Chinese Communist aid appears to them to be a matter for opportunity and profit.
We should not lose sight of these facts. Things are as they really are and not the way we would like them to be. We must work with the realities of the new world and not with chimera. Is not Russia a reality with which we have had to cope? May we not be sacrificing now the future to apparent demands of the present? In my opinion, we have to help these nations to find their political way just as we have found our own.
In the face of new events, it is not possible to maintain the rigidity of old attitudes. What the big nations in Geneva agree upon/2/--and whether such decisions will please the people and secure their conformance--are two different matters. It is difficult to defend in the future and in the eyes of the world, this artificial separation of the nations, which even if it was expedient at a given moment, will always leave a longing for unity open.
/2/Reference is to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference.
I realize that the problem is very complex and that it is determined by an American interest to defend the nations of Southeast Asia from the threat of Communism; but since this problem is eminently political in character, it is not solely possible to dispel this threat by the force of arms.
In observing these events from the European area, as we do, we may be mistaken. Let us continue, however, to hope that everything can be solved, since fundamentally the principal parties involved hope for the same thing; the United States, that Chinese Communism will not invade the territory of Southeast Asia; the nations of Southeast Asia, to keep China as far as possible from their borders; Russia, that her future rival, China, will not expand and grow; and Ho Chi Minh himself wishes to unite Vietnam into a strong nation which China will not absorb.
I do not know Ho Chi Minh, but in view of his record and his efforts to expel the Japanese, first, the Chinese next, and the French later, we must give him credit for being a patriot who cannot be indifferent to the annihilation of his country. And apart from his well-known reputation as being a tough adversary, he could, without doubt, be the man of the hour needed by Vietnam.
In the higher interest of saving the people of Vietnam and of Southeast Asia, I think it is worthwhile for all concerned to make some sacrifices.
I have wished, my dear President, to make known to you these confidential observations in terms of honest and sincere friendship. Although I know that many of these considerations are constantly in your mind, I have wanted to give you my loyal appraisal of the situation in the service of peace and of the future of the Asiatic countries.
Sincerely,
Francisco Franco/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
185. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Spanish Ambassador (Merry del Val)/1/
Washington, September 14, 1965.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, NATO 6 SP. Confidential. Drafted by Beigel and cleared by Acting Secretary of Defense Vance, Llewellyn Thompson, and Leddy.
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
You recently discussed with Ambassador Thompson the significance of a statement made by the Secretary of Defense during Congressional hearings on the Department of Defense appropriation for the coming year./2/ These hearings are held every year over a period of months and relate to all aspects of the United States military effort and requirements of the Department of Defense and the military establishment. The particular statement to which you referred consisted of extemporaneous responses by Secretary McNamara to four questions during the hearings held last February 26.
/2/In telegram 192 to Madrid, August 24, the Department of State reported that Merry del Val had presented Thompson with a memorandum dated August 24 "indicating GOS very upset and astonished over remarks by Secretary McNamara." (Ibid.) A copy of the Spanish memorandum is an attachment to a September 3 memorandum from Leddy to Rusk. (Ibid.) For text of McNamara's February 26 statement, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations, 1966, Part I (Washington, 1965), pp. 343-344.
I have reviewed, together with Secretary McNamara, the questions and answers to which your Government has drawn attention. I would like to emphasize that the response to which you referred concerning the relationship of Spain to NATO was descriptive of the present situation and in no way detracts from the public position of the United States Government and Congress as favoring Spanish membership in NATO. We realize that such membership may be achieved only with unanimous agreement of all the parties concerned.
United States recognition of the important role of Spain in the security, well-being and development of the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas remains as stated in the Joint Declaration of September 26, 1963./3/ This question did not arise in the course of the hearing at which Secretary McNamara testified. It is unfortunate that the brief responses given to the few questions posed at that time could have given any other impression.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 177.
We recognize that Spain is making a major contribution to the defense of Europe through its agreements and arrangements with several NATO countries, including the United States, through the use of Spanish military and other facilities, as well as through the extensive cooperation between the Spanish armed forces and those of several NATO countries including our own. I recall the statement of Secretary McNamara before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 13, 1963,/4/ that this contribution by Spain is "important to the defense of Western Europe as well as the United States."
/4/For text, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1963: Hearings (Washington, 1963), pp. 165-179, 213-214.
Secretary McNamara's statement was related in no way to the spirit and courage of the Spanish armed forces, whose dedication and valor have been demonstrated on many occasions. The United States Government, under the Military Assistance Agreement with Spain, has been contributing to the efficiency and capability of those forces for more than ten years, and continues to do so under the current five-year program of military training and equipment grants and sales, and concomitant ship loans.
I ask that you inform your Government that we consider relations between our two countries to be based on cordial and sympathetic understanding of the interests and responsibilities of both countries, that our mutual security depends upon a continuation of these close and friendly relations, and that we trust no other construction will be placed upon these basic considerations.
Sincerely yours,
Dean Rusk/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
186. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Embassy in Spain/1/
New York, October 6, 1965, 2302Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (SP) VIET S. Secret. Repeated to Saigon and to the Department of State as Secto 32, which is the copy printed here.
3. Following is based upon uncleared memcon Secretary and Spanish FonMin Castiella Oct. 6 in NY, FYI, Noforn, and subject to revision:/2/
/2/Memoranda of conversation between Rusk and Castiella are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2458.
1. Castiella said GOS close to final action on assistance program for South Viet-Nam. Meeting of Council of Ministers scheduled in Madrid Oct. 8 (Castiella plans return to Spain to attend) to deal with this matter. Currently GOS plans provide loan of coastal vessel as well as medical assistance./3/ Secretary expressed appreciation this action as symbol international solidarity in support of South Viet-Nam.
/3/Telegram 358 from Madrid, October 9, reported: "With respect to Vietnam, ForMin said gift of ambulances was initial step but he did not indicate what type of further aid might be given." (Ibid., Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US)
2. Castiella announced that GOS had agreed to establishment of US space tracking station at Robledo de Chavela./4/
/4/For text of the October 11 amendment to the 1964 agreement, see 16 UST 1710.
3. Castiella asked for US agreement to use DC-8 aircraft purchased through Guaranty Trust Co. to supplant worn-out Super Constellations on Iberia flights Madrid-Havana. According Ambassador Del Val these DC-8 purchased with "gentlemen's understanding" that they not be used for such flights without agreement of USG. Secretary told Castiella he would look into matter./5/
/5/In a November 13 letter to Castiella, Rusk confirmed that the U.S. position was that "If DC-8 aircraft are used on the service to and from Havana, their flight frequencies should be reduced so as to maintain the present annual passenger capacity level." He added: "I note that your Government is unable to agree to this." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US)
Discussion also included Spanish bilateral relations, NATO, and other subjects.
Rusk
187. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 14, 1965.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 SP-US/SATRUSTEGUI. Confidential. Drafted by Ortiz. The memorandum is Part 1 of 2 Parts. A memorandum of the portion of the conversation dealing with Gibraltar is ibid., POL SP-US.
SUBJECT
Bombing of a Spanish ship in San Juan harbor
PARTICIPANTS
Spain
The Marquis de Merry del Val, Ambassador of Spain
Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Spain
U.S.
Assistant Secretary Leddy
Robert Anderson, Acting Director, Office of Western European Affairs
Frank Ortiz, EUR:WE
The Ambassador called at his request. He presented a memorandum concerning the bombing of the Spanish ship Satrustegui in the harbor of San Juan, Puerto Rico./2/ The Ambassador asked if the investigation by U.S. agencies had produced any indication as to the perpetrators of the act. He asked if anyone had been detained. He cited specifically the Cuban refugee leader Orlando Bosch who in statements to the press had assumed responsibility for the attack.
/2/The memorandum was not found. An explosive charge rigged to the hull of the passenger ship detonated on October 9. Approximately 100 passengers on the ship escaped serious injury.
The Ambassador said the attack on the Satrustegui was a more serious affair than the attack last year on the Aranzazu because the latest incident had taken place in U.S. territorial waters and Bosch made his statement in Miami./3/ He said it was a well-known fact that no Spanish ships called at Cuban ports and the shipping company to which the Satrustegui belongs has not permitted its ships to call at Cuban ports for over three years, at great loss to the company. The Satrustegui was now laid up for repairs and this Spanish Company (The Compania Transatlantica) would suffer further losses.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 180.
The Ambassador said he regretted to state that the Spanish Consul General in San Juan reported that he was receiving no cooperation from local authorities there with regard to the incident./4/
/4/In a November 3 letter to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, Under Secretary Ball requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation furnish the Department of State with whatever information it believed would be of use to the Spanish Government. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 SP-US/SATRUSTEGUI)
Mr. Leddy replied that the appropriate U.S. agencies were conducting a very vigorous and active investigation of the incident. The agencies were aware of the statements made by Mr. Bosch.
The Ambassador said the incident could very well have serious adverse repercussions in Spain which would redound to Castro's benefit. Mr. Leddy repeated that the U.S. was using its investigative resources vigorously.
The Ambassador said he hoped he would soon have a satisfactory explanation to forward to Madrid./5/ He pointed out that the public statements by Bosch claiming responsibility constituted a second problem to the incident itself since either Mr. Bosch was responsible for the bombing and should be prosecuted or was insane and should be put in an asylum.
/5/In telegram 350 to Madrid, October 11, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to inform Foreign Minister Castiella that the incident would be thoroughly investigated and those found responsible brought to justice. (Ibid.)
188. Editorial Note
Secretary of State Rusk visited Madrid on December 16, 1965, for discussions with Spanish officials. Rusk met with General Franco for a discussion that centered on Vietnam. Documentation on Rusk's visit is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2584 and 2585.
189. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 18, 1966, 9:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
Information has been received that two of the nuclear devices which were carried on the B-52 which crashed in Southern Spain yesterday/2/ experienced a low order high explosive detonation. Although no nuclear reaction would result, such a detonation could cause a radiation hazard. However, if the detonation was minimal it is possible that no radiation hazard would occur.
/2/A B-52 aircraft from the 68th Bomb Squadron, based at Seymour AFB, North Carolina, and carrying four nuclear devices, collided in mid-air with a KC-135 aircraft of the 97th Air Refueling Squadron, based at Blytheville AFB, Arkansas, over the village of Palomares shortly after 10 a.m. local time. Both aircraft crashed. Seven crew members from the two aircraft died in the accident, and four members of the B-52 crew survived. Three of the nuclear devices landed on Spanish soil and one fell into the sea. The fourth device was recovered from the sea on April 7.
There are sufficient qualified technical personnel now on the scene to properly take care of any situation which may exist in relation to these two weapons. Included among the personnel are Major General Wilson, Commander of the 16th Air Force (SAC) and Major General Beck for SAC headquarters.
Based on minimal information received, it is not possible to accurately estimate the situation. However, it is not believed that there is any basis for undue concern over the low order detonation of the two weapons.
White House Situation Room
Kenneth Rosen
Briefing Officer
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