Washington, May 15, 1967.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Appendix A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

Tel Aviv, May 15, 1967, 1920Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated Priority to Amman and to Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Beirut, Kuwait, Dhahran, London, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, CINCMEAFSA, Jerusalem, Aden, and Sanaa. Received at 5:14 p.m. Passed to the White House and USIA at 5:40 p.m.

/3/No memorandum of this conversation between Battle and Ambassador Harman has been found. Secretary Rusk told Battle that morning that "we should have a very frank talk with the Israelis" and that "it was very important for the Israelis to sit tight." (Notes of telephone conversation at 9:46 a.m. on May 15, prepared by Rusk's personal assistant Carolyn J. Proctor; ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls) Telegram 194189 to Tel Aviv, May 15, instructed the Embassy to approach the Israeli Government at the highest level and express the U.S. hope that the Israelis would "maintain steady nerves in interest avoiding serious deterioration area situation." (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

2. Bitan said that following talks with PM Eshkol and FM Eban he authorized give following GOI reaction this representation.

B. GOI hopes infiltration and sabotage will stop.

C. If there no further sabotage there no reason anyone to worry.

D. GOI interpretation Egyptian demonstration troop activities is that Syrians trying involve Egypt in Syrian-Israeli issue and if Egyptian concentration true Syrians could represent this as support.

3. GOI has no objection foregoing being transmitted to Cairo.

4. Situation with Syria is obviously precarious and, if additional serious sabotage incidents such as attacks on settlements, main roads etc. continue it impossible predict GOI will sit idly by without reacting. However, I believe GOI aware risks escalation, disposed make minimum effective response, and exercise what to them would seem maximum patience. I doubt that they will be very impressed in any event with Nasser's foot shuffling one way or the other.

Barbour

Washington, May 15, 1967, 9:04 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Atherton, cleared in draft by Davies, and approved by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow. Sent Priority to Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Beirut, Kuwait, Dhahran, London, USUN, Paris, Jerusalem, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and Moscow.

194945. 1. Under Secretary Rostow called in British and French Ambassadors jointly May 15 for exchange of views on current Syro-Egyptian-Israeli situation, emphasizing in particular following points:

/2/Assistant Secretary of State Lucius D. Battle met with Syrian Charge Galeb Kayali on May 15. Battle said that guerrilla incursions into Israeli territory were exacerbating Arab-Israeli tensions and urged all parties to exercise restraint. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid.)

/3/Telegram 7496 from Cairo, May 15, reported that Charge David Nes had raised the subject of the Israel-Syrian crisis with UAR Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad that morning. Riad said that his government viewed the events of the last few days "most seriously," that "all necessary military precautions" were being taken, and that "any move by Israel would be met by immediate UAR response." (Ibid.)

/4/Telegram 5299 from USUN, May 15, conveyed the text of a press release issued by U.S. Representative to the United Nations Arther Goldberg that day. (Ibid., POL ARAB-ISR)

/5/Document 2.

D. By diplomatic approaches Damascus and Cairo, we hope reassure GOI and relieve pressure on Israelis to take unilateral action in response recent terrorist attacks whose increased sophistication makes them particularly serious.

2. French Ambassador Lucet commented that Tripartite Declaration remains basis for French policy. While agreeing on usefulness of diplomatic approach, Lucet expressed reservations re Security Council meeting. UK Ambassador Dean concurred, stating situation did not appear serious enough convene Security Council particularly in view latest information from Tel Aviv.

3. Rostow raised question as to whether it might possibly be useful to approach USSR in view strong Soviet position in Syria, noting indications that Soviets have in past attempted exercise restraining influence on Damascus.

/7/Printed from an unsigned copy.

Washington, May 15, 1967, 7:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Confidential.

/2/The President's Daily Diary indicates that he met from 11:30 a.m. to 12:10 p.m. on May 16 with New York banker Abraham Feinberg and Washington attorney David Ginsburg, who were to report on their trips to Israel. (Johnson Library) No record of the meeting has been found.

/3/A package of military and economic assistance to Israel had been under discussion for several weeks; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Documents 414 and 416.

/4/Tab A was not found attached.

/5/Tab B was a brief memorandum of May 12 from Harold Saunders of the NSC Staff to Rostow, with an attached memorandum dated May 1 from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs Townsend Hoopes to Rostow and another dated April 17 from Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President. For text of the McNamara memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 405.

/6/A note attached to a May 15 memorandum from Saunders to Rostow on the Israel-Syria-UAR tension states that Battle said this to Harman at their meeting that morning, making clear that the decision had been made before the border tension. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 1)

/7/Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow.

/8/ A May 15 memorandum from Saunders to Rostow commented on a possible vice-presidential visit to the Middle East, arguing that if the situation cooled off, a high-level meeting with UAR President Nasser might clear the air in U.S.-UAR relations. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Saunders Memos)

/9/Two Americans at the AlD mission in Yemen had been jailed in April on charges of attempting to destroy the city of Taiz; they were released on May 17. For information concerning this episode, see the Yemen compilation in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXI; see also ibid., vol. XVIII, Document 417.

In hearing their report on their trip to Israel, you may want to ask whether they have any feeling for Eshkol's intention to attack Syria. Border tension mounted sharply over the weekend after Eshkol and the Israeli Chief of Staff threatened an attack if terrorist raids from Syria into Israel continue. The UAR has ostentatiously put its forces on alert.

We sympathize with Eshkol's need to stop these raids and reluctantly admit that a limited attack may be his only answer. However, without preaching, you would be justified in letting these gentlemen know that a miscalculation causing a Mid-East blow-up right now would make life awfully hard for you. We want to make Eshkol think twice without giving him cause to blame us for holding him back if events later prove that a limited attack now would have been the best answer.

Walt

Cairo, May 16, 1967, 0834Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated Immediate to Amman and to USUN, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, Damascus, and Tel Aviv.

/2/Telegram 194188 to Cairo, May 15, instructed Nes to meet again with Foreign Minister Riad, express U.S. concern at the increase in tension, tell him the United States had urged restraint on the Israelis and was unaware of any major changes in disposition of Israeli forces, tell him the United States was also urging restraint on the Syrians, and suggest that the UAR could play a useful role in urging the Syrians to put an end to the terrorist incidents that were inflaming the border situation. (Ibid.)

1. I have seen El Feki regarding the mounting tensions in the Near East and in particular on the Israeli-Syrian border.

/3/Telegram 194639 to Cairo, May 15, conveyed the points made by Bitan to Barbour. (Ibid.) See Document 2.

/4/Telegram 5302 from USUN, May 16, reported conversations at the United Nations, including an Israeli request that the Secretary-General convey two points to the UAR and Syrian representatives: the Israeli Government was not making any military dispositions on the borders with Syria and the UAR, and it was planning no military action unless action was taken against Israel. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR/UN)

3. El Feki followed all of this most carefully and with genuine interest. He said that he was particularly struck by the fact that whereas the Israelis denied any build up on the Syrian border, no mention was made of Jordanian border. He also read from one of his intelligence reports which highlighted fact that yesterday's Jerusalem parade did not include any significant heavy equipment, thus revealing that such equipment had been kept with units.

/5/President Kennedy stated during a press conference on May 8, 1963, "We support the security of both Israel and her neighbors." He also stated, "This Government has been and remains strongly opposed to the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East. In the event of aggression or preparation for aggression, whether direct or indirect, we would support appropriate measures in the United Nations, adopt other courses of action on our own to prevent or to put a stop to such aggression, which, of course, has been the policy which the United States has followed for some time." For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 373.

5. El Feki said that the position of his govt was likewise very clear and had been stated repeatedly. The UAR will never take the initiative in attacking Israel. However, in the event of any large scale Israeli attack against its neighbors the UARG cannot await UN intervention or even that of the great powers but would have to come to the assistance of victim of aggression without delay.

6. El Feki seemed genuinely eager to be in touch with us regarding present Near Eastern tensions and I think we should maintain a continuing dialogue here, in Washington and in New York with the Egyptians with a view to reassuring them and calming their fears. I am certain that they are now merely reacting to those fears and have no aggressive intent.

Nes

At 10 p.m. Gaza time on May 16, 1967, United Arab Republic Brigadier Eiz-El-Din Mokhtar gave Major-General Indar Jit Rikhye, the commander of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, a letter from Lieutenant General Mohammed Fawzi, Chief of Staff of the UAR armed forces, stating that in accordance with his instructions to the UAR armed forces to be ready for action against Israel in case of any aggressive Israeli action against any Arab country, UAR troops were concentrated in Sinai on the UAR eastern borders. He requested that Rikhye withdraw all the UNEF troops in the observation posts along those borders. Rikhye replied that he would report the request to UN Secretary-General U Thant. The Secretary-General replied at 6:45 p.m. on May 16 through the UAR permanent representative at the United Nations asking for a clarification of the request. His reply stated in part:

"If it was the intention of the government of the United Arab Republic to withdraw the consent which it gave in 1956 for the stationing of UNEF on the territory of the United Arab Republic and Gaza it was, of course, entitled to do so. Since, however, the basis for the presence of UNEF was an agreement made directly between President Nasser and Dag Hammarskjold as Secretary-General of the United Nations, any request for the withdrawal of UNEF must come directly to the Secretary-General from the government of the United Arab Republic. On receipt of such a request, the Secretary-General would order the withdrawal of all UNEF troops from Gaza and Sinai, simultaneously informing the General Assembly of what he was doing and why."

The Secretary-General's message is quoted in a report which he submitted to the UN General Assembly on May 18. For text of the report, see Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Volume VII, U Thant, 1965-1967, pages 424-433. Concerning the establishment of UNEF, see Secretary-General Hammarskjold's report to the General Assembly on November 20, 1956, with an annexed aide-mémoire on the basis for the UNEF presence in Egypt; ibid., Volume III, Dag Hammarskjold, 1956-1957, pages 373-376. An aide-mémoire of August 5, 1957, in which Hammarskjold described his November 1956 exchanges with the Egyptian Government over the conditions that should govern UNEF's withdrawal, is ibid., pages 377-382. General Rikhye recorded his recollections of the UAR demand and subsequent events in The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force Leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967 (London and Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass and Company Limited 1980). Documentation relating to UNEF is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, POL 27-4 UN, although most of the documentation pertaining to UNEF withdrawal is ibid., POL ARAB-ISR.

Washington, May 17, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. I. Secret.

SUBJECT
Urgent Message to Eshkol

We had hoped yesterday that tension in the Israel-Syria-UAR triangle was dropping after an ostentatious Egyptian show of putting its forces around Cairo on alert. Last night, however, we and the Israelis learned that the Egyptians have moved forces into the Sinai. Now they have moved forces in front of the UN Emergency Force on the Israel-UAR border and all but ordered it to withdraw.

The UAR's brinksmanship stems from two causes: (1) The Syrians are feeding Cairo erroneous reports of Israeli mobilization to strike Syria. Regrettably, some pretty militant public threats from Israel by Eshkol and others have lent credibility to the Syrian reports. (2) Nasser probably feels his prestige would suffer irreparably if he failed a third time to come to the aid of an Arab nation attacked by Israel. Moderates like Hussein have raked him over the coals for not coming to Jordan's aid in November or to Syria's when Israel shot down 6 of its MIG's last month.

In this highly charged atmosphere, it's probably impossible for Israel to get away with a limited retaliatory strike for the next terrorist attack from Syria. But the Syrians may try harder than ever by turning loose the terrorists either to force Israel to eat crow by taking further sabotage attacks without reacting or to drag them and the UAR into a fight. Eshkol may even decide that Egypt's move to the border pushes him too far.

/2/The draft message as approved by the President, with an attached note directing that it should be sent LDX to Ben Read, is ibid.

I have worked with State to make this message as sympathetic as possible while trying still to strengthen Eshkol's hand against his hawks. Arthur Goldberg is aware of the Secretary's proposal and approves. We will follow events closely to be sure the message isn't overtaken by events before delivery.

/3/Neither option is checked. On the memorandum "Call me. L." appears in Johnson's handwriting next to the two options. A note in Rostow's handwriting at the top of the page states that the President approved by telephone at 6 p.m.

See me

Walt

Washington, May 17, 1967, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Rusk; cleared by Battle; and cleared with changes by Walt Rostow.

196541. Please deliver following personal message from President to Prime Minister Eshkol:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am following very closely the tense situation in the Near East and am deeply concerned about the maintenance of peace in that area. We have made known our concern in Damascus and Cairo and are working closely with other countries in the United Nations. Our efforts will continue.

I know that you and your people are having your patience tried to the limits by continuing incidents along your border. In this situation, I would like to emphasize in the strongest terms the need to avoid any action on your side which would add further to the violence and tension in your area. I urge the closest consultation between you and your principal friends. I am sure that you will understand that I cannot accept any responsibilities on behalf of the United States for situations which arise as the result of actions on which we are not consulted.

With personal regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson"

Rusk

Washington, May 18, 1967.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Appendix A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

Washington, May 17, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Popper on May 17. The memorandum was evidently sent to Rusk on May 18.

SUBJECT
The UAR and UNEF

/2/"Yesterday" is a handwritten addition on the memorandum.

/3/"Tomorrow night" was changed by hand to "tonight" on the memorandum.

/4/"Yesterday" is a handwritten addition on the memorandum.

"The UNEF went into Gaza and Sinai over ten years ago with the consent of the government of the UAR and has continued there on that basis. As a peacekeeping force it could not remain if that consent were withdrawn or if the conditions under which it operates were so qualified that the force was unable to function effectively. The Secretary General regards the situation as being potentially very grave. On the basis of reports thus far received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, the Secretary General knows of no troop movements or concentrations along any of the lines which should give rise to undue concern."

This statement obviously impairs our ability to keep the Force in place over UAR opposition. The general principle has been that UN peacekeeping forces are emplaced with the consent of the government on whose territory they are stationed. What is not clear-and there is no precedent-is whether, that consent being removed, the UN Force is required to depart.

/5/Secretary-General Hammarskjold's report of October 9, 1958, on the experience with UNEF is printed in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Vol. III, Dag Hammarskjold, 1956-1957, pp. 230-292.

"The consequence of such a bilateral declaration is that, were either side to act unilaterally in refusing continued presence or deciding on withdrawal, and were the other side to find that such action was contrary to a good-faith interpretation of the purposes of the operation, an exchange of views would be called for towards harmonizing the positions. This does not imply any infringement of the sovereign right of the host Government, nor any restriction of the right of the United Nations to decide on the termination of its own operation whenever it might see fit to do so. But it does mean a mutual recognition of the fact that the operation, being based on collaboration between the host Government and the United Nations, should be carried on in forms natural to such collaboration, and especially so with regard to the questions of presence and maintenance."

/6/The aide-mémoire is quoted in Secretary-General Thant's May 18 report to the UN General Assembly. (Ibid., Vol. VII, U Thant, 1965-1967, pp. 424-433)

/7/"Tomorrow" was changed by hand to "today" on the memorandum.

New York, May 19, 1967, 0149Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-4 PAL/UN. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Moscow, London, and Paris. Received on May 18 at 10:43 p.m.

5357. UNEF. I called on SYG and Bunche this morning accompanied by Pedersen to survey present status of UNEF and to urge strongly SYG not take decision to withdraw UNEF without fullest consultation with perm members SC and with GA.

SYG said he had not yet received official request for withdrawal, although El Kony (UAR) was scheduled to see him right after I did (at which time he did present the request).

/2/See Document 6.

I also suggested SYG's first response to request for withdrawal might be appeal to Nasser, which we had previously been told he was considering. SYG said he had this morning been "advised seriously and confidentially" not to make such appeal. (He did not say who this came from.)

I told SYG we suspected there was a great deal of face and political maneuvering in current situation and that with careful handling we might yet preserve situation and UNEF role. Canadians had told us that in Riad's approach to them in Cairo he had said they were not prepared to discuss principle of withdrawal but were prepared to discuss modalities. Perhaps this was something that could be worked on. Perhaps an appeal from him or a request by him for SC meeting under Article 99 would provide means to restore situation.

SYG said he would make report to GA and to SC but he was resist-ant to idea of using Article 99. Bunche also expressed view UAR was quite serious, noting he had just received report from Rikhye that UAR troops in Sinai had gone right up to borderline, so that now they were directly opposite Israeli battalions.

Bunche also emphasized practical difficulty of supplying and maintaining force if UAR wanted to harass it and said that in any case most countries supplying contingents would withdraw them immediately if UAR so demanded.

In concluding session I again urged that SYG not take responsibility upon himself. I noted this was matter of great political consequence and I urged he consult widely with members, especially perm members of SC and defer any commitment in response to UAR request until he had done so.

/3/Telegram 5360 from USUN, May 19, conveyed the text of the statement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

Goldberg

Amman, May 18, 1967, 1505Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Baghdad, Cairo, Jerusalem, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, Jidda, Beirut, Damascus, London, and Tel Aviv. Received at 3:23 p.m.

/2/Telegram 3596 from Amman, May 17, reported that Ambassador Burns had met that afternoon with King Hussein, who said he viewed the situation in the Middle East as the most critical since 1956. (Ibid.)

1. In discussing the present situation in the Middle East, Hussein observed that the apparent target for possible Israeli attack is Syria. If the UAR does not react militarily to an Israeli attack on Syria, Jordan will stand still. If, as is more probable, Nasser must and does react, if only nominally, Jordan will have to take sufficient action to keep from being a conspicuous scapegoat, but this would not entail a direct armed clash with Israel so long as an Israeli attack on Syria were of limited duration.

2. The King feels that the Middle East is in for an extended period of serious trouble. He views the factors and issues involved as much more complicated than they appear on the surface. He considers, for example, that infiltration is only symptomatic of the underlying situation. He believes it is important that all concerned will keep the entire picture in the broadest possible focus to insure that all of the factors involved, both short and long range, are properly and accurately calculated. In this context he noted that while Syria might logically be the next target of attack, Jordan is just as likely a target in the short run and, in his opinion, an inevitable one in the long run. In support of this he said that he is not at all convinced that the Israelis have accepted the status quo as a permanent solution. Israel has certain long range military and economic requirements and certain traditional religious and historic aspirations which in his opinion they have not yet satisfied or realized. The only way in which these goals can be achieved, he said, is by an alteration of the status of the West Bank of Jordan. Thus in the King's view it is quite natural for the Israelis to take advantage of any opportunity and force any situation which would move them closer to this goal. His concern is that current area conditions provide them with just such opportunities-terrorism, infiltration and disunity among the Arabs being the most obvious. The present state of tension in the Middle East provides a cover, so to speak, for an Israeli attack on anyone of their choosing. Hussein pointed out that in 1956 Israel was threatening Jordan but in fact attacked Egypt; in November 1966 it was the Syrians with whom Israel's relations were at a nadir yet it was Jordan who was attacked. Admittedly, said Hussein, there would have to be a casus belli for an Israeli attack against Jordan, such as a terrorist incident in Israel across from the Jordanian border. In such event Israel might attack Jordan alone, or Jordan and Syria together. The Jordanians are making the maximum effort to interdict terrorists, but, he observed, there always exists the possibility a terrorist would get through who would do serious damage. Or, he added, an incident could be manufactured if the risks and gains appeared worth it.

/3/Israel attacked the Jordanian village of Samu on November 13, 1966, in a large-scale raid in retaliation for recent terrorist incidents. Documentation relating to the incident is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 332 ff.

4. In any event, asked Hussein, what would the US do if his hypothesis proved correct? He had been assured on countless occasions by US officials that the US would not permit the Israelis to alter the status quo. He had been told when last in Washington, he said, that Jordan did not need additional armament because the Sixth Fleet would protect him.

5. I replied that the US stood by its declarations (Tripartite Declaration, Eisenhower reaffirmation of November 9, 1955, Eisenhower Doctrine and Kennedy statement of May 8, 1963) that the US would not acquiesce in changes of the border by force. Just what form US action would take would have to be decided at the time in the light of circumstances then existing.

6. Hussein replied: "Yes, I know those declarations. In such a contingency as I have described there would be need for immediate US assistance to force Israeli withdrawal. The other Arab states would not help Jordan, and it would take too long for the US to act. I predict that if the Israelis remain in Jordan for any extended length of time, the pres-ent regime here would fall. The same thing would happen if the Israelis succeeded in extracting significant concessions as the price for withdrawal. As you know, I no longer believe the Israelis have a stake in my regime, so that its demise would not deter them from such action. In my opinion, the chances of the contingency we have talked about arising would be practically eliminated if the Israelis were clearly on notice you would forcibly intervene."

7. Comment: Whatever Hussein's beliefs he does not want to tangle with Israel and will be guided by prudence. If, however, a serious terrorist incident should occur in Israel across from the Jordanian border, I defer to judgment of Embassy Tel Aviv but I would imagine that, given the present tense atmosphere and the precedent of Samu, no one could rule out the possibility that Israel might hit Jordan. There is little doubt the Jordanians would in such event counterattack. The King realizes a counterattack would court escalation, but he is convinced that not to counterattack would mean the end of his regime through internal upheaval. I would guess the counterattack would follow swiftly upon the attack, and be of lesser scale than the original attack.

/4/Telegram 198899 to Amman, May 20, approved the line Burns had taken with the King as reported in telegram 3612. It instructed him to reiterate to the King the assurances contained in the President's letter of November 23 (see ibid., Document 346) and to inform him that the U.S. Government still stood by President Kennedy's statement of May 8, 1963, and that the U.S. estimate of Israeli intentions toward the Jordanian regime had not changed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN)

Burns

Tel Aviv, May 18, 1967, 1630Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Nodis. Received at 4:30 p.m. Walt Rostow sent a copy to the President with a May 19 8:30 a.m. covering memorandum. Johnson wrote on the memorandum: "Get meeting set up." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VII)

/2/Document 8.

/3/Telegram 3640 from Tel Aviv, May 18, reported that Ambassador Barbour had delivered the message conveyed in telegram 196541 (Document 8) to Foreign Minister Eban, since he already had a meeting scheduled with Eban at the latter's request. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

/4/Document 14.

2. Text Eshkol reply as follows:

"Jerusalem, May 18, 1967

Dear Mr. President,

I have received your personal message of May 18, 1967.

/5/Barbour reported his conversation with Eban in telegram 3639, May 18. Eban stated the Israeli view that if the UAR were to order UNEF off its soil, it would be necessary to reconvene the UN General Assembly. He warned that if the UAR military buildup were to continue, there would be a buildup on the Israeli side as well and urged U.S. efforts to convince the Soviets that it was in their interest to diffuse the tension. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

I should like to summarize my main conclusions:

/6/Circular telegram 196738, May 17, summarized Rostow's conversation with Harman that afternoon. Harman stated that the nub of the problem was Syrian support of terrorism and urged public reiteration of U.S. opposition to terrorism. Rostow stressed the importance of Israel's taking no military action without consultation with the U.S. Government, "since such action would involve us all." (Ibid.)

My first conclusion, therefore, is that every effort should be made to emphasize, proclaim and condemn Syrian responsibility for these terrorist acts, in order to deter their continuation.

Second: The Egyptian build-up of armor and infantry in Sinai, to the extent so far of approximately four divisions including 600 tanks, is greater than ever before, and has no objective justification. Egypt knows that there is no foundation for reports of troop concentration against Syria. Yet even after receiving information on this subject from UN and other sources, the UAR has increased its troop concentration. This naturally forces me to undertake precautionary reinforcement in the south. One of the dangers that we face is that the Egyptian troop concentration may encourage Syria to resume terroristic acts under the false impression of immunity.

The only way of avoiding the effects of an escalating reciprocal build-up is for Egypt to return to the previous posture in Sinai. This would immediately affect our own decisions and arrangements.

I urge the full application of international influence to secure the end of abnormal troop concentrations.

Third: It would be very unfortunate if the UN authorities were to give an impression of irresolution in connection with the presence of the UNEF in Sinai. It is not the function of the United Nations to move out of the way in order to facilitate warlike acts. I hope that the Secretary General will insist that he cannot affect the status quo concerning the UN force in Sinai without a mandate from the General Assembly. There is ample legal basis for this.

/7/Extensive documentation on the negotiations leading to the creation of UNEF under General Assembly resolution 1000(ES-I), November 5, 1956, and the replacement of Israeli troops by UNEF troops in Sinai and Gaza, completed March 8, 1957, is in Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, volumes XVI and XVII.

Fourth: There may be an impression in Cairo and Damascus that Soviet support for Egypt and Syria is assured, and that therefore they have no need of restraint. This factor would be an emphatic clarification by the United States to the Soviet Union of the American commitment to Israel's independence and integrity and the American will and capacity to defend stability in the Middle East. I can hardly exaggerate the importance and urgency of such an approach to the USSR. It is one of the central keys to the improvement of the situation.

/8/Concerning the conversations between Johnson and Eshkol, June 1-2, see ibid., 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Documents 65 and 66.

In view of the magnitude of the issues involved, I have felt at liberty to speak with frankness on five problems in all of which I believe that the United States is in a position to make a vital contribution to the avoidance of dangers and the reinforcement of peace.

Signed Levi Eshkol."

Barbour

Tel Aviv, May 18, 1967, 1720Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

/2/Document 13.

1. Following are amplifying comments re Eshkol message made by Foreign Minister Eban referred to in my immediately preceding telegram.

2. First, GOI wished to point up fact of Syrian responsibility. One had only to look at what Syria had achieved in Middle East: it had involved itself in troubles with Israel; it had embroiled the UAR in crisis that short time ago UAR had no intentions get embroiled in; and it was trying similarly to embroil Jordan and Lebanon. Syrian responsibility had to be brought to light and emphasized in most explicit way. GOI realized what Syria trying to do re Lebanon and Jordan, and not prepared to be taken in. Focus GOI interest remained Syria.

3. GOI appreciated advice and exhortations contained in President's letter but it had to ask what could be the President's advice if there were another terrorist incident, and another. The logic of advising patience in the current context was understandable but GOI had to ask at what point did the US think that a maximum accumulation of this kind of incidents would be reached when further patience could no longer be warranted.

4. Second, GOI wished to point up false premise on which the Egyptian troop concentrations rested. Egypt has been informed by those who should know including the US that there were no Israeli concentrations opposite Syria. If this escalation continues, soon there will be large armies facing each other across a short distance. The international community had a legitimate interest in trying to bring this situation back to normal. Israel did not know by what means this might be achieved, through diplomatic channels or otherwise. It was not for Israel to say, but in Eban's opinion if present UNSYG's predecessor were still in that position "he would have been out here three times already."

5. Third point related to the UN is thought that UNSYG has thus far shown too little resistance to UAR's UNEF demands. Already at one UNEF post within view Israeli positions UNEF personnel had moved out. There were reports out of UAR today that UAR wanted UNEF out of UAR and Gaza, though there no confirmation of these reports yet. In Israel's view any changes in status UNEF was not unilateral act but matter involving several parties. It resulted from agreement with UN signed by UAR. As Eban recalled understanding voiced by US representative UN at time was UAR had agreed force to remain until its removal would no longer result in military confrontation in ME. To yield to Egyptian demands would be against spirit these arrangements. Israel had accepted the establishment of UNEF on its southern borders under certain conditions and so Israel is party to this arrangement. Eban recalled US-Israel discussions in which US took responsibility suggesting March 1957 arrangement by which Israeli troops were withdrawn from Gaza. Thus this was not a matter for SYG to decide "at drop of a hat." Changes UAR was suggesting re UNEF would involve intricate structure of Middle East stability. Israel regarded this as a major development and hoped SYG would not yield without serious and earnest discussion in GA or Security Council acting as GA's agent.

6. Fourth was the question of the USSR. This was aspect of problem in which only the US could exercise its unique influence. GOI must observe that Soviet commitment to Syria was being articulated more loudly than US position of support of Israel and more generally of status quo in area. GOI would not suggest form in which US might reiterate its support but it felt that unless it was done there would be no restoration of equilibrium in area. GOI knew that USG did not want to reiterate its commitments unnecessarily but if there was ever a time for such a reiteration it was now, with terrorism in the north, mobilization in the south and the Soviets hovering over it all. It did not matter how the Soviets got the message, publicly or privately, just so they got it.

Barbour

Washington, May 18, 1967, 10:01 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Atherton and cleared by Eugene Rostow. Sent to Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Beirut, Kuwait, Dhahran, London, USUN, Paris, Jerusalem, Moscow, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA.

/2/Telegram 197661 to Moscow, May 18, informed the Embassy of Rostow's conversation with Soviet Charge Tcherniakov and suggested "making same point in low key in Moscow." (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Ambassador Thompson reported in telegram 5016 from Moscow, May 19, that he told Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin during a brief luncheon discussion that day that the United States was using its influence to calm the situation and hoped the Soviets were exercising as much pressure in Syria as the United States was in Israel. Dobrynin replied, "I think we can match you." (Ibid., POL ARAB-ISR)

2. Re reports SYG would order UNEF withdrawal, Harman suggested every effort should be made to play for time by (a) stressing logistical problems involved and (b) raising legal questions-e.g. need to consult members UNEF Advisory Commission per earlier Hammarskjold position.

3. Rostow agreed delaying tactics desirable; problem was that, despite valid question whether SYG has authority withdraw UNEF, he might simply announce decision to do so. Hopeful sign was that SYG reportedly anxious go to Middle East and now awaiting Cairo reaction this proposal.

/3/See footnote 5, Document 13.

5. Rostow said he hoped report was not true that UAR had moved troops to Sharm el-Shaikh. Even if this was the case, however, it would be mistake to initiate any action against such deployment of Egyptian troops on Egyptian soil. Rostow emphasized USG would not wish to see Gulf of Aqaba closed but nothing should be done until and unless this was attempted. (Rostow made it clear in previous discussions that no action should be taken without prior consultation.)

/4/See Document 36.

Rusk

Washington, May 18, 1967, 9:39 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Atherton; cleared in draft by Popper, in substance by Director of the Office of Inter-African Affairs Fred Hadsel, and by Under Secretary Rostow; and approved by Davies. Sent to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, Algiers, Khartoum, Rabat, Tripoli, and Tunis and repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Damascus, London, Paris, and Moscow.

197664. 1. Action addressees unless overriding objection perceived should approach Governments at appropriately high level along following lines:

A. In current dangerous situation in Middle East, USG has been urging restraint on Israel and considers it important that Arab states do likewise in Damascus and Cairo. We consider UNEF important instrument for stability and urge other governments to convey to UAR the hope that UNEF can continue play useful role it has fulfilled for over a decade.

B. Main thrust of our policy is to work through and support United Nations efforts to preserve peace in Middle East. We are giving urgent consideration to steps that might be required in support of UN role.

C. Since Soviet position will be important factor in present crisis, we are encouraged by report we have of statement by one Soviet representative to high official of another government that, while Soviets have supported Arabs against Israel on numerous occasions, they would not wish Arabs to force confrontation with Israel which could escalate into open hostilities. This position was supported by statement Soviet Charge Washington to Under Secretary Rostow on 18th that although Soviet sympathies on side of countries representing "National Liberation movements" Soviets desire area remain calm and rumors heard by USG that Syrian Government had been promised unlimited military as well as political support from the Soviet Union were unlikely.

2. For Jidda and Amman: We are concerned by reports that UAR forces occupying Sharm el-Shaikh. While recognizing sensitivity this issue for GOJ and SAG, we must convey to those governments sense of extreme importance we attach to maintaining free passage for all shipping in Gulf of Aqaba.

3. For Amman: Suggest for obvious reasons you omit para C above from your presentation.

Rusk

Washington, May 19, 1967.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Appendix A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

Tel Aviv, May 19, 1967, 1430Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 2:23 p.m.

/2/Documents 13 and 14.

/3/In telegram 3654 from Tel Aviv, May 19, Barbour reported that the Israelis considered UAR troop dispositions to be assuming a posture more capable of offensive action than they had previously thought, and that consequently the Israelis had increased their counter measures somewhat. Barbour had urged that Israel take only the barest minimum dispositions and avoid measures on a scale that would increase the danger in the situation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

2. Specifically, they ask whether they will receive answer Eshkol's reply to President, which they hope, and urge that in altered circumstances they would regard it appropriate that US assurances to Israel re support in event aggression be reiterated publicly.

3. I have put to them in strong terms importance they keep their nerve and not do anything in their anxiety to heat up the situation further. I have gone so far as to say that their professed frustration at this development and apparent fright of UAR force now facing them, which although large is obviously not of invasion magnitude, is giving me qualms as to their own strictly defensive intentions. Naturally they protest vigorously, and as of now I think truthfully. However, the potentialities are such and Israel's concerns with Nasser as principal opponent in Arab world so deep seated and long enduring that I find it conceivable at least that counsels of opportunity could sway them into major adventure next few days.

4. I consequently recommend that we consider what we can do to calm them down. Anything the President could say in reply Eshkol that would strengthen latter's resolve continue limit his objective to restoration status quo would be helpful. This connection, particular reference to Sharm-el-Sheikh obviously especially telling.

Barbour

Washington, May 19, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Popper.

SUBJECT
Latest on the Middle East

At John Walsh's suggestion, I am summarizing what we know about the Arab-Israeli crisis as of mid-afternoon today.

/2/A copy is attached to the memorandum. The text is printed in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Vol. VII, U Thant, 1965-1967, pp. 433-438.

2. The report describes the way in which the UAR penetrated the UNEF area of observation, moved past the observation posts toward the frontier, and issued ultimata to the UNEF troops to withdraw, even going to the length of firing two artillery ranging shots. This is counter-balanced by a comment on the Israeli "buzzing" of General Rikhye's aircraft.

3. The Canadians were instructed to call a Security Council meeting today, but have delayed in response to the Secretary General's plea to give him at least 24 hours more.

/3/Goldberg reported in telegram 5375 from USUN, May 19, that UN Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs Ralph J. Bunche had told him Secretary-General Thant would be leaving for Cairo on May 22 to try to establish a basis for a continuing UN presence in the area. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69 POL ARAB-ISR)

/4/Goldberg's conversation with Fedorenko was reported in telegram 5370 from USUN, May 19. (Ibid.)

/5/Goldberg's conversation with El Kony was reported in telegram 5364 from USUN, May 19. (Ibid.)

/6/Telegram 5374 from USUN, May 19, transmitted the text of the message that Israeli representative Gideon Rafael had given to Richard F. Pederson of the U.S. delegation. (Ibid.)

(a) Any interference with free passage through the waters off Sharm al-Shaikh would have "grievous and grave consequences";

(b) Any aggressive move by UAR forces, directly or through encouragement of infiltration, would have grave consequences;

(c) Any resumption of the Syrian campaign against Israel would have grave consequences no matter which border it crossed (no doubt a reference to Syrian terrorists coming from Jordan or Lebanon).

8. A mechanically transmitted copy of the Secretary General's report is attached, with apologies for the poor legibility.

Washington, May 19, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid. Secret.

SUBJECT
Our Commitments to Israel

/2/The attachment, titled "The US Commitment to Israel," is not printed.

In essence, our commitment is (a) to prevent Israel from being destroyed and (b) to stop aggression--either through the UN or on our own.

The immediate questions before us, which you will want to discuss this afternoon, are (a) whether we should reiterate this position publicly and (b) if so, what we are prepared to do to back up that statement.

We understand that U Thant is prepared to go to the Middle East to try to defuse this situation. On the negative side, he appears ready to withdraw the UN Emergency Force on the UAR-Israel border.

Our first effort must be to keep him out in front and stiffen his spine.

Next, we must learn from Secretary McNamara what we could do militarily if we had to move.

Only then should we decide whether to restate our commitment. Personally, I would prefer to keep a public statement until last but to consider first another private approach to the USSR and private assurances to Eshkol.

/3/See Document 22.

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. I. Secret.

Washington, May 19, 1967.

SUBJECT
Other Israeli Items

In talking with Luke Battle yesterday, Ambassador Harman made the two following points:

1. Prime Minister Eshkol would like to make an official visit to the US. Early October would be particularly convenient because he could stop here in conjunction with a visit to Argentina. He would simply like to discuss future trends in the Middle East. Ambassador Harman noted that this request pre-dates the current crisis. Luke acknowledged the request and said he assumed that the Israelis would not expect an immediate response.

2. He asked whether there were any further progress on the aid package. Luke said we would not have any final answers yet and suggested that now might not be the time for us to go before the world with a large aid commitment to Israel. Harman said that, of course, it could be kept quiet for as long as we wished.

We have had other quiet suggestions from the Israeli Embassy that an answer on the aid package now would be a big boost for morale in Jerusalem. I think, if you want, we could give them answers on everything but the APCs without much harm, provided we asked them to keep it quiet for the moment. They do want to get on with their PL 480 and long range military spares buying.

One new note has been injected into the problem of APCs. The Israelis announced quietly right before their Independence Day Parade that they would be buying some armored cars from France. They probably still want the APCs from us but these French cars are ideal for patrolling, so it looks as if they want the APCs for other purposes. This might provide an added reason for our separating APCs from the rest of the aid package. We could give them the rest of our answers and ask them to explain where these French cars fit into the picture before talking about APCs further.

Rostow

/2/The last two options are checked.

President Johnson met from 5:38 to 6:59 p.m. on May 19, 1967, with Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Special Assistant to the President Walt Rostow, and White House Press Secretary George Christian. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) According to Rostow's notes of the meeting, they agreed that Ambassador to France Charles E. Bohlen and Ambassador to the United Kingdom David K.E. Bruce should ask the French and British Governments what they were prepared to do concerning the Middle East situation, with a view to reviving "as much of the tripartite as we can." Rostow's notes continue: "President wants to make sure Arabs know what our declarations are." The agenda for the meeting had listed U.S. contingency plans among the items for discussion under "Middle East," but Rostow's notes state, "Wasn't much discussion about contingency plan." The bulk of the discussion concerned Vietnam. (Notes of meeting with the President, May 19, and agenda for meeting; ibid., National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President, January-June, 1967) A May 1966 paper entitled "Politico-Military Contingency Planning for the Arab-Israeli Dispute" was sent to Rostow on May 19 with a covering memorandum from Art McCafferty. The paper stated that it was unlikely that U.S. forces would be committed to combat participation in Arab-Israeli hostilities but that they might have essential roles to fill defending U.S. interests, protecting U.S. nationals, discouraging Soviet intervention, and possibly providing logistics support for UN military operations. (Ibid., Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. I)

I-6576/67

Washington, May 19, 1967.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, Middle East 092. Confidential. A copy was sent to Department of Defense General Counsel Paul C. Warnke on June 9.

SUBJECT
Possible Redeployment of 6th Fleet

/2/Three papers prepared by the Contingency Coordinating Committee over the weekend to update the contingency paper of May 1966 (see Document 22) were sent to the White House from the Department of State on May 22. They are filed with a covering memorandum of May 22 from Art McCafferty to Walt Rostow. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis)

/3/A note in McNamara's handwriting connected to this sentence reads: "5/19. I will talk to Gen. Wheeler. RMcN." In a telephone conversation that evening, McNamara and Rusk agreed that the Sixth Fleet should steam at normal speed until it reached a position approximately 1 day's distance from the Eastern end of the Mediterranean. (Notes of telephone conversation at 7:20 p.m. on May 19 prepared by Rusk's Special Assistant C. Arthur Borg; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls) JCS telegram 5893 to USCINCEUR, May 20, confirmed telephone instructions that elements of the Sixth Fleet should be moved to the Eastern Mediterranean, with the center of gravity of the area of operations within 2 days' steaming of the Eastern shore, and the Eastern edge no more than 1 day's time. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 7, Appendix H)

/4/The attachment, entitled "Sixth Fleet-Position of Major Units, 19 May 1967" lists CTG 61.7 (Com PhibRon 6), with 1,431 Marines on the USS Cambria, in Naples; CTG 60.1, USS America and 3 DDs, with approximately 120 Marines on board, in Livorno and CTG 60.2, USS Saratoga and 6 DDs and 1 CLG, with approximately 100 Marines on board, en route to Palermo.

Townsend Hoopes

Washington, May 20, 1967.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Appendix A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

Washington, May 20, 1967, 7:17 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Popper, and approved by Under Secretary Rostow. Also sent priority to Cairo, Moscow, and USUN.

198916. Ambassador Harman called urgently on Under Secretary Rostow morning May 20.

/2/Reference is apparently to Harman's May 18 conversations with Rostow and Battle; see Document 15.

2. Ambassador Harman reported "disturbing conversation" between FonMin Eban and Soviet Ambassador. Latter asserted terror incidents on Syrian border work of CIA, adding "We have warned you. You are responsible. You are responding to provocation by CIA." Harman said this raised possibility we may be getting double talk from Soviets. Supporting this, he noted Syrian press and radio trumpeting Soviet Novostny Agency statement that Soviets stood behind Syria and would support if Israel attacked. Ambassador thought it important to get to the Soviets since they and the Syrians now were "pointing the finger." Situation raised possibility of Soviet-Syrian-Egyptian collusion. He also stressed great importance of prompt public and diplomatic reaffirmation USG support of Israel against aggression. Under Secretary replied that request will be at forefront our considerations.

3. Under Secretary asked whether Israel knew French view on the validity of the Tripartite Declaration. Harman replied the French were taking serious view of situation and intervening in Cairo. Under Secretary said it would be useful if Israel could clarify French position for if situation becomes bad, Tripartite planning would be useful. Ambassador Harman indicated that while Israel had liaison with French military, there had been no joint planning.

4. Ambassador Harman reverted to importance Israel ascribed to right of passage through Gulf of Aqaba, noting that the British, French, and Canadians had been involved with us in 1957 assurances. Stressed importance U.S. policy remaining diplomatically apparent.

5. Harman said U.S. DefAtts briefed yesterday in Israel on danger posed Israel by UAR deployments which now clearly taking form offensive posture. This had required precautionary measures on Israel's part.

/3/Telegram 198809 to Tel Aviv, May 20, states that the Department had given careful consideration to Bitan's request for a U.S. destroyer visit to Eilat but had concluded that it would not contribute to a lessening of tension. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

/4/A May 19 memorandum from NSC Executive Secretary Bromley K. Smith to Walt Rostow states that Eugene Rostow had called to report that he had given Department of State approval to the shipment of 20,000 gas masks; the shipment was to be processed over the weekend. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. I)

Rusk

New York, May 20, 1967, 2149Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo and Tel Aviv. Received at 7:33 p.m.

5388. Middle East Crisis.

1. I called on SYG and Bunche this noon right after release of announcement of his trip to Cairo. Told him I was pleased he was making trip and that I would say so publicly after meeting. On basis telecon with Under Secy Rostow, told him that while Israelis were playing situation cool, they were reappraising situation and now believe UAR had offensive intentions. Told him troop movements and dispositions of UAR forces indicated to them operations of offensive character. Bunche then said UN reports today were that there were heavy Syrian concentrations in Galilee area.

2. I told SYG we had a second concern which was UAR use of poison gas in Yemen. Said evidence included canisters with Cyrillic markings. Said we had grave apprehensions lest this gas also be employed in present circumstances, consequences of which would be grave. My own impression was that he would express apprehensions in Cairo on this point.

3. I also told him our current reports from AmEmb Cairo were alarming about mood now prevailing there. Told him I had spoken yesterday to El Kony (UAR), Tomeh (Syria), Fedorenko (USSR), all troop contributing countries, all members of SC except Keita (Mali), as well as reps of other Arab countries in area. Told him I had given El Kony and Tomeh solemn assurances that US was not involved in any steps in area in spite of anything Syrians were saying. Told SYG this applied to CIA as well as to other agencies of USG. There no CIA operation going on. There was nothing to it. Matter had been carefully reviewed with Director of CIA. Allegations were complete nonsense. Told him UAR line, elaborated in Al Ahram this morning, was alleging great plot, in which culmination would be establishment of UNEF on Syrian frontier after battle between Israel and Arabs.

4. Told SYG we were receiving confusing signals from Sovs. Noted I had obtained nothing really from Fedorenko except his statement USSR did not want war and that he would report to his govt. Also noted Ukrainian and Byelorussian reps yesterday had expressed satisfaction over current situation and noted UN ought to get out of peace-keeping business and that Fedorenko had said this demonstrated undesirability of UN force under SYG control. Noted for his private information only that in Moscow after Thompson had said US was using its influence against any kind of use of force no matter what the provocation was, Dobrynin said USSR would do no less. Added however that since that time Sovs appeared to be supporting stories of US involvement and even to have initiated them. (I also told SYG our approaches urging restraint upon Israel had been at highest levels.)

5. SYG said he going to area with some trepidation. He may or may not have any success. He had some ideas which he had discussed with Martin (Canada) which Martin fully shared. His basic idea was to enlarge the effect of UNTSO in area as well as on other frontiers. This would have to include enlarging of the units. He said first step already under way. He then read telegram from General Bull reporting from EIMAC Chairman that Egyptians had suggested EIMAC occupy three platoon camps in Gaza as observation posts. SYG said he had sent instructions to accept this immediately and he expected eleven UNMOs, transferred from other posts, to be there within two days.

6. SYG said that for 17 years Secretariat had exercised its initiative to augment or diminish observers, who had once totaled over 750. More recently Sovs had for first time questioned SYG's authority to do this with respect to UNMOGIP in Oct 1965. In private Fedorenko had complained mainly about national composition of the observers, but in Feb he had also had confidential note from Fedorenko taking position he could not increase UNTSO without SC action. Thought it highly likely Sovs would raise this matter if he took any current steps and suggested that perhaps SC meeting would be wisest course in present circumstances. I replied that of course there was current opposition to SC meeting on the part of some members and that both Israel and UAR were against it. I said this could not be controlling. I noted that SC could not, for example, stand aside if fighting broke out. With respect to enlargement of TSO I said I thought current situation might be distinguishable from normal augmentation.

7. I asked him whether in request for UNMOs UAR had included Sharm el Sheikh. He said no but that he proposed to raise matter of Sharm el Sheikh in major effort in Cairo. (He did not elaborate on the context in which he would raise it, but he is clearly fully conscious of implications that would flow from stopping shipping.) Bunche said UAR and UN were currently in joint occupation of Sharm el Sheikh and that so far UAR forces had not sought to interfere with shipping which is going through the straits.

8. I noted that if UNTSO and IMAC operations were to be recommenced Israeli cooperation would be required. Told him I had already advised Rafael this morning of my personal view that Israel should re-examine its position on this matter and I had subsequently had confirmation this was Washington's viewpoint as well.

/2/May 22.

Goldberg

Damascus, May 20, 1967, 1330Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated Priority to Amman and to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, London, Jidda, Moscow, Paris, Tel Aviv, CINCSTRIKE, DIA, and Aleppo. Received at 12:56 p.m. Advance copies were sent to the White House, USIA, CIA, DOD, and NSA at 1:45 p.m.

/2/In telegram 1151 from Damascus, May 20, Ambassador Smythe reported that he was seeking an appointment with Syrian Foreign Minister Makhus to urge Syrian restraint, restate U.S. policy on aggression in the area, support UN peacekeeping instruments and measures, caution that a guerrilla incident could spark a conflagration, and inform Makhus that the United States was counselling restraint at the highest levels of the Israeli Government. (Ibid.)

1. In hour and half session with FonMin Makhus (reftel) early afternoon May 20, whom Ambassador met without usual accompaniment DCM or Pol Chief at FonMin request, Makhus discussed points raised by Ambassador in friendly but inflexible manner.

2. In response Ambassador's caution at explosive potential recent arms buildup, Makhus replied US aware of threats Israeli leaders have made against Syria which left SARG and UARG no choice but believe Israeli aggressive intents. Said also SARG investigations showed Israeli troops in DMZ. SARG and UARG thus mobilized and made mutual defense treaty operative. Said although Israel created tense situation, measures SARG and UARG have taken are welcomed by all Arabs. Palestine issue is "sacred cause" and will never die, never be extinguished. Citing Crusaders, Makhus said "occupation of another's territory can never be eternal." Reiterating all Arabs ready, Makhus wanted USG understand any Israeli attack will be answered by war, regardless of consequences.

3. As for guerrillas, which Ambassador noted could trigger war no one wants, Makhus emphasized Palestinians are single people, wherever scattered, and no one has right rule them. They need not ask anyone's permission fight for usurped homeland. Having waited 18 years for UN carry out resolutions which Israel refuses honor, Palestinians have right self-determination and right fight for freedoms guaranteed by UN Charter, UN resolutions, and internal law. SARG refuses "for once and for all" take any responsibility for actions Palestinians in their fight for rights and for despoiled homeland, since Palestinians not under command Syria. "Israel took their land; Israel must deal with Palestinian people." As for infiltrators, "all might US armed forces Vietnam unable contain guerrillas there." SARG refuses be threatened by others every time Palestinian takes action as infiltrator, such accusations being but excuse for aggression against Syria. Re UN peacekeeping, said SARG and all other Arabs had welcomed UNEF, but defended UARG right to request departure.

/3/Concerning President Kennedy's statement of May 8, 1963, see footnote 5, Document 5. President Johnson endorsed Kennedy's statement in a toast at a dinner for Israeli President Zalman Shazar, August 2, 1966. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 796-797.5. In reply Ambassador's emphatic denial that USG or any agency seeking overthrow SARG or plot against it, Makhus said he pleased have USG deny such role and hoped sincerely US will prove it speaks truth and show this in practical manner. Said he hoped fog between our countries and people would be dispersed, and that American people and "Embassy staff in Syria" will work to see no conspiracy against SARG occurs.

Smythe

Cairo, May 21, 1967, 0900Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, London, Tel Aviv, and USUN. Received at 6:18 a.m. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, and NSA at 6:45 a.m.

/2/In telegram 7754 from Cairo, May 20, Charge Nes declared that the UAR Government regarded the situation as serious and was "not play acting" and reported indications of UAR officials' state of mind. (Ibid.)

/3/In paragraph 2 of telegram 7754, Nes reported that Aziz had told Miles Copeland that UAR forces had been given orders to "hit Israelis with everything they have" if anything erupted along the border and that Palestine Liberation Organization leader Ahmed Shukairy had moved his headquarters to Gaza, PLA units were in the front lines, fedayeen raids would occur, and if the Israelis retaliated, the Egyptians would strike back. Aziz had also said that Nasser "believes what he says about CIA plots and this is major factor contributing to present crisis." Copeland, a former CIA officer, was in Cairo on private business. Nes commented that his account might not be accurate.

2. When Parker pointed out that statements by US Senators not statements official US policy and that we had been endeavoring restrain Israelis as well as Arabs, Abdul Aziz asked why there had been no statement by responsible American allocating responsibility fairly. Israelis had threatened attack Syria and had massed troops near border for that purpose. USG had said nothing. As soon as UAR took defensive meas-ures however USG had gone into orbit. It clear we prepared protect Israel but didn't care about Egypt or Syria.

/4/Reference is to a statement made by Eshkol in an April 1967 interview. Asked whether he would expect help from the United States if Israel were attacked in force by its neighbors, he stated that Israel would rely primarily on its own army but that he would expect help, "especially if I take into consideration all the solemn promises that have been made to Israel. We get these promises when we ask the United States for arms and are told: 'Don't spend your money. We are here. The Sixth Fleet is here.' My reply to this advice is that the Sixth Fleet might not be available fast enough for one reason or another, so Israel must be strong on its own." (U.S. News and World Report, April 17, 1967, p. 76)

4. Comment: It clear to us UARG had talked itself into believing story of US-Israeli plot to create incident which would result in stationing UNEF along Israel-Syrian border. It also seems clear that Nasser has resolved to deal with this imagined threat thru massive power play which, if successful, will be his biggest political victory since Suez, even if no shot is fired. If Syrians continue Fedayiin incursions and Israelis retaliate, there will be serious hostilities and Arabs apparently confident they can win in long run. If Israelis do not retaliate, Nasser will have forced them to back down and will have won first Arab victory over Israelis, and incidentally will have won another victory over US in Arab eyes. By his present posture Nasser has abandoned his traditional position of not wishing to start fight except at time and place of his own choosing because timing of hostilities now in hands Fatah-Asifa and Israelis. Do not believe Nasser would have done so unless he fairly confident of victory. He is playing for keeps and we should make no mistake this regard. We hope visit of UNSYG will lead to at least temporary deescalation of war atmosphere now prevailing.

Nes

Washington, May 21, 1967, 9:49 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Eugene Rostow and his Staff Assistant Robert T. Grey, Jr., and approved by Eugene Rostow. Also sent to Paris and repeated to USUN, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Damascus.

198959. Middle East Crisis.

Ambassador Dean (UK) called on Under Secretary Rostow this afternoon and made following points:

1. He invited comments on draft of letter George Brown is planning to send to U Thant before Thant's trip to Cairo, assuring him of UK support for a peaceful solution through the UN, urging Thant to seek to persuade UAR to allow UNEF to remain in Gaza area and pressing strongly for a continuing UN presence in area either in form of expanded UNTSO or some new UN body. Brown stresses continuation of UN presence in Sharm-el-Sheikh and emphasizes importance UK attaches to rights of free navigation in international waterways and seriousness with which UK would view any interference with free passage in Gulf of Aqaba. Brown also urges U Thant to visit Tel Aviv and to hold an immediate meeting of Security Council after his return from area.

/2/Telegram 198944 to London and Paris, May 21, reported that regular meetings had been held concerning the Middle East crisis with British and French representatives in Washington and at the United Nations, and summarized the discussion at a meeting held in Washington that day. The stat