U.S. Department of State

Washington, May 22, 1967.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, Israel 400.137. Secret.

SUBJECT
Gas Masks for Israel

/2/The words "for cash" are a handwritten addition on the memorandum.

The Egyptians have used chemical agents, including nerve gas, in the Yemen recently. Israeli intelligence reports that Egypt has brought gas shells or bombs forward to the Sinai in its recent deployments. Although we believe it highly unlikely that Egypt would use gas against Israel, this possibility cannot be altogether discounted.

Secretary Rusk is aware of and supports the Israeli request to purchase American masks, even though all concerned (including the Israelis) recognize that the number of masks involved is too small to do much good and that by themselves could not assure adequate protection against the type of gas which may be used. This would be essentially a psychological gesture.

/3/Neither the "approved" nor "disapproved" option was checked.

/4/Rostow discussed this in a May 20 memorandum to Rusk. He stated that according to an Israeli intelligence report, Egyptian troops in the Sinai were equipped with gas masks, and canisters of gas had been seen. Whether or not this was true, he continued, "we know that the Egyptians have used several kinds of poison gas in their aerial bombing of the Yemen, and that some of the gas at least is extremely lethal, and of Soviet origin and manufacture." He suggested several possible actions, including the possibility of briefing the Secretary-General before his trip to Cairo. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Middle East Crisis Files, E. 5190, Box 19, NE Situation, May-June 1967, Folder 1)

Townsend Hoopes

Washington, May 23, 1967, 2:45 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Toon; cleared by Stoessel, Leddy, and Davies; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated Immediate to USUN.

199746. Within past few hours, situation in Middle East has seriously worsened. Nasser has announced that Gulf of Aqaba will be closed to Israeli flagships, and while we have Israeli commitment to consult with us before attempting to run the blockade, we cannot hope to restrain Israeli action much beyond next 24 hours. Obviously, Nasser must be restrained from further hostile action if we are to avoid serious flare-up.

We are concerned lest Soviets may not be fully aware of recent Nasser moves and the dangers they hold for peace in the area. Accordingly we believe it would be useful for you to see Gromyko soonest to express our grave concern at deterioration of situation, cataloging for his information following recent moves giving rise to this concern:

1. Egyptians have mounted massive military buildup in Sinai despite fact Israelis at that time had taken no action on their side of frontier that would justify this move.

2. This buildup has increased Egyptian military strength in area from normal level of 30,000 to 50,000.

3. Egyptians have demanded withdrawal of UNEF and SYG has complied.

4. Egyptians have moved naval units south into Red Sea toward entrance to Gulf of Aqaba.

5. Nasser has just announced Gulf would be closed to Israeli flagships, adding that if "Israelis want war, we welcome it."

You should inform Gromyko that Sovs themselves have said war in Middle East is in interest of no one. We are doing what we can to avoid flare-up. Purpose of this demarche is to share with Soviets evidence available to us that gives rise to concern. We assume Soviets as anxious as we to avoid further worsening of situation, and that they are aware of our repeated public commitments to support the territorial integrity and political independence for all countries in the Near East, and our opposition to aggression and the use of force and the threat of force against any country.

Rusk

Washington, May 23, 1967.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Appendix A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

Cairo, May 23, 1967, 1140Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received at 9:48 a.m. and passed to the White House at 10:10 a.m.

/2/Document 35.

/3/Nolte reported in telegram 7864 from Cairo, May 23, that he had given the President's letter to Foreign Minister Riad and asked him to deliver it to President Nasser. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

2. Will convey here key points and follow with more detailed summary.

/4/Nolte, a newly appointed ambassador, arrived in Cairo on May 21 and had not yet presented his credentials to Nasser.

/5/Telegram 199731 to Cairo, May 22, summarized a conversation that evening between Ambassador Kamel and Under Secretary Rostow. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

5. FonMin said UAR would stop Israeli ships and confiscate strategic cargoes all other vessels. UAR would not commit aggression but would resolutely defend itself against attack. We conclude US is thus in direct confrontation with UAR.

/6/Nolte reported the conversation in detail in telegram 7873 from Cairo, May 23. (Ibid.)

7. FonMin cordial, candid, resolute, position well thought out. Strong impression Egypt would carry through as advertised.

Nolte

Moscow, May 23, 1967, 1310Z

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received at 10:53 a.m. and passed to the White House at 11:20 a.m.

/2/Documents 35 and 38.

1. I saw Gromyko at 2:30 today and after informing him of note verbale (State 199710) sent to Israel and Arab states, I carried out instructions contained in State 199746.

/3/The portion of Johnson's May 22 message to Kosygin concerning the Middle East reads as follows:

"The increasing harassment of Israel by elements based in Syria, with attendant reactions within Israel and within the Arab world, has brought the area close to major violence. Your and our ties to nations of the area could bring us into difficulties which I am confident neither of us seeks. It would appear a time for each of us to use our influence to the full in the cause of moderation, including our influence over action by the United Nations."

This message was transmitted in telegram 198583 to Moscow, May 19; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIV, Document 215.

It was difficult to say what reasons they had. Possibly these groups were counting on success in their ventures. All statements that Israel was allegedly threatened and that other countries, and particularly Syria, were following policies to the detriment of Israel, were groundless. From the first days of its existence, Israel had followed an unfriendly policy toward the Arab states. Circles in Israel claimed that there was subversive activity against Israel and that they would counter this by their own actions. Such charges were groundless, and the Soviets did not believe them. This was nonsense. There was a certain analogy between these charges and those that were traditionally made about Soviet activities against the West. The Soviet Union considered these charges as a pretext for Israeli actions. The Soviets had good relations with Syria and the Syrians categorically rejected the Israeli charges and said they were only a pretext. The Soviet Union thought that certain nations including the US could exert a restraining influence in greater degree than it had up to now. We had special relations with Israel and would best know how to go about this. It was not up to the Soviet Union to tell us what to do. We were aware of the demarche which the Soviet Govt had made to the Israeli Govt. Gromyko said that of course his remarks today did not predetermine the answer which might be made to the President's message to Kosygin.

3. I said he was doubtless aware of the fact that the Soviet Charge in Washington had been informed of rumors which were apparently put out by the Syrians to the effect that they had the full backing of the Soviet Union. I said I thought it would be pointless at this time for us to argue the general question of Israeli-Arab relations and would only refer to the fact that at the time of the Suez crisis, we had shown our good faith. I thought the important thing was to address ourselves to the immediate problem that was made particularly acute by the Egyptian action with respect to shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba. I pointed out that Nasser's actions had been taken after the statement of the Israeli Govt that it could not tolerate a blockade of the Gulf and a few hours after the statement of the US Govt that it considered these to be international waters.

4. I was struck by the fact that Gromyko did not pursue either of these statements further. He said many cables were coming in on this subject, and [I] concluded the conversation by thanking him for receiving me promptly.

5. Would appreciate knowing if anything is to be said to the press.

Thompson

Washington, May 23, 1967, 12:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. I. Secret. Received at 1:05 p.m., according to a handwritten note on the memorandum. A handwritten note on another copy states that Rostow took a copy to the Tuesday lunch. (Ibid., Middle East Crisis, Anderson Cables) The President had lunch at 1:18 p.m. with Rusk, McNamara, Walt Rostow, George Christian, and Helms. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No other record of the discussion has been found. The Middle East was at the top of the agenda. (Ibid., National Security File, Rostow Files, Tuesday Luncheon Suggested Agenda)

Mr. President:

/2/Former Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson.

1. He is going to Beirut on Thursday on business. (The Panamanian Eleta is going on the same day to Spain to see his daughter graduate from school.)

2. From Beirut he goes to Amman in Jordan to see King Hussein. He is going because he has been asked to arrange the lease of the Jordanian Airlines to a U.S. firm, and to help develop potash and phosphates in Jordan.

/3/Anderson called Rusk the morning of May 23 and told him he was going to Beirut and to Jordan and asked if there was anything he could do. Rusk mentioned a possible message to Nasser and said he might want someone to talk to Anderson when he was in Beirut. (Notes of telephone conversation at 9:35 a.m. on May 23, prepared by Carolyn J. Proctor; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

4. I asked him for any observations on the present scene. He says he doesn't believe the Arab nations want war. Nasser, however, faces a "terrible internal problem." His people are very close to starvation. A month ago when a food ship came into harbor, shopkeepers were instructed to put a sack of flour in front of their shops to prevent food riots. He believes we made a serious mistake in cutting off Nasser without food as we did. He said that he found no obstacle in his conversations in the Senate. When I said that the problem appeared to be in the House, he said: "No one asked me to talk to anyone in the House."

5. Moreover, Nasser feels cut off from the United States. He is an informal rather than formal man, and State Department communications are, for him, no substitute for informal, high-level communications--Presidential letters and emissaries.

6. Nasser's present action, in Anderson's view, is a reflection of his internal tribulations. They have been made worse by some ill-advised Israeli statements, and Nasser's knowledge that the only thing that can congeal the split Arab world is uniting against Israel.

7. He then made two concrete suggestions:

/4/Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, Vice President and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAR Armed Forces.

/5/Rusk called Anderson later that day and said he had had a further talk with the President. He asked if it was possible for Anderson to go to Cairo and Anderson expressed willingness and said the Egyptian Ambassador had encouraged him to go. Rusk suggested he tell the Ambassador he would be glad to come. Anderson asked if Rusk had talked to the President about his earlier suggestion that someone come to Washington to see the President. Rusk said they had not discussed it but suggested that Anderson tell the Ambassador that if a high Egyptian official were to come to New York for a Security Council meeting, it could be arranged for him to make a quiet visit to Washington and see the President. (Notes of telephone conversation at 7 p.m. on May 23, prepared by Carolyn J. Proctor; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

Walt

Washington, May 23, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by the President.

SUBJECT
Israeli Aid Package

/2/Rusk's memorandum of May 22, attached, recommended approval of the aid package for Israel on a secret basis. It commented that the $16 million credit for military spare parts was of particular importance. Concerning the package of military and economic assistance to Israel that was under discussion prior to the outbreak of the crisis, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XVIII.

However, one major point is unclear--the APC's. There was a time when I felt you might want to split these off from the rest of the package. This would disturb the Israelis now but the long range reasons for doing so have not changed. Gene in drafting the attached recommendation for the Secretary intended to include the APC's. However, we want to be clear on this with you because this may get us into delivering hardware either in the middle of a conflict or shortly after. It could be a promise that would be hard to live up to.

The alternative is to give them answers on all but the APC's and say we'd like to talk about them.

For your reference, the whole package is described on the attached chart.\3/

/3/The attached chart, headed "Israeli Aid Package," dated May 8, listed the various elements of the package in three columns, headed "Israeli Request," "Katzenbach-McNamara-Goldberg Proposal," and "Your Decision."

Walt

/4/None of the options is checked. A list of the President's decisions is attached to a May 23 memorandum from Rostow to the President that states this was what he had decided at lunch about the Israeli aid package. It records Johnson's approval of a cash sale of 100 APC's for $3.7 million, preferably the sale of 100 Italian APC's with U.S. license, with a direct U.S. sale only if that arrangement was not workable, a $2 million cash sale of tank spare parts, $14 million military credit at 5 percent interest for Hawk and tank spare parts, sale of $27.5 million in food at 2-1/2 percent interest, $20 million in Ex-Im loans, $5 million for special Africa assistance, agreement to establishment of facilities for Hawk missile maintenance, and agreement to offshore procurement for U.S. aid programs. A handwritten note on Rostow's memorandum reads: "Feinberg-Krim: Pres has agreed to this, but nothing can be announced." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67) Telegram 200673 to Tel Aviv, May 23, states that Eugene Rostow had informed Harman of the decisions with the understanding that there should be no publicity until mutually agreed upon. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-ISR)

Washington, May 23, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 28. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The memorandum is unsigned, and bears no drafting information. It was sent to the President with a brief covering memorandum from Walt Rostow stating that two memoranda from Helms, which the President had requested that morning, were attached. The second memorandum has not been identified.

SUBJECT
Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capabilities

1. The judgment of the intelligence community is that Israeli ground forces "can maintain internal security, defend successfully against simultaneous Arab attacks on all fronts, launch limited attacks simultaneously on all fronts, or hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully a major offensive on the fourth." In the air, the judgment is less clear: the Israelis "probably could defeat the Egyptian air force if Israel's air facilities were not damaged beyond repair."

2. Those judgments rest essentially on the proposition that the quality of Israel's military leadership, its ability to organize operations and maintain its equipment in a high state of readiness, and the high morale and intelligence of the individual Israeli ground soldier will make up for Israel's quantitative inferiority in men and equipment. The Israelis have consistently stressed intensive training, with emphasis on armor, standardization of weapons, rapid and reliable communications, and a very strong tactical intelligence effort. Egyptian capabilities in these areas appear to be inferior.

3. Moreover, in the air, the Israelis have been acutely conscious of the difficulty of defending their air facilities, and have made strenuous efforts to overcome the fact that their bases are very short warning time from the Arab borders. They have "hardened" their fields with dispersed pens, for example. Israeli pilots and tactics are considered superior, and, in terms of operationally assigned fighter aircraft rather than total inventory, Israel has a slight edge--256 to 222.

4. Israeli planning is based on a short war, conducted by ground forces with air cover. If this assumption should prove wrong, Israel might well be in trouble, since the Arabs' quantitative superiority would come into play. At M+48 hours, for example, Israel would have 280,000 men vs. the Arabs' 117,000 deployed in the vicinity of the Israeli borders. But the total strength of the Arab armies is nearly 500,000, vs. the same 280,000 on the Israeli side.

5. This is not to say that the rout of the Egyptians in 1956 will be repeated. The Egyptian forces have improved substantially in the past eleven years, and they have acquired considerable operational know-how by rotating combat units in Yemen. Nevertheless, we consider that the Israeli forces have retained an over-all superiority.

Washington, May 23, 1967.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry Files: Job 80-R01580, Box 10, Folder 210, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Helms used the notes for a briefing at a White House meeting on May 23; see footnote 1, Document 42.

[Omitted here are pages 1-10 unrelated to the Middle East.]

THE MIDDLE EAST

I. The situation in the Middle East took a very serious turn last night, although there is no evidence that either Israel or the Arab nations really want a war.

A. The trouble is that--except for the smaller nations like Jordan and Lebanon--neither do they want peace very badly.

B. Now Nasir has announced that he is closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, and he must know that to the Israelis, this ranks as a casus belli.

1. [1 line of source text not declassified] an Egyptian coast artillery unit has been sent to take over positions being given up by the United Nations Emergency Force at the mouth of the Gulf, where the shipping channel lies within easy artillery range.

2. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

II. The crisis has arisen from the persistent raids by Palestinian terrorists, supported by Jordan, into Israel.

A. The Israelis trounced the Syrians in an air battle on April 7. There have been 14 terrorist incidents since then. The Israelis, concerned because the raids are showing growing capabilities, have renewed their standard warnings of retaliation.

1. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

B. The Syrians, chronic believers in an aggressive U.S.-Zionist conspiracy, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The Egyptians, embarrassed because they had not helped the Syrians in April, then made a big show of marching into Sinai, partly to show good faith, partly in hopes of deterring the Israelis.

C. Egyptian intentions are not yet clear. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

1. Our knowledge of the movements of non-bloc shipping is incomplete. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

2. At least one British and one Panamanian ship are on their way in, but we think they are bound for Aqaba, in Jordan.

3. There is also one Soviet ship due to leave Aqaba. Another, now in the Mediterranean, is also bound there. We doubt that the Egyptians will bother them.

4. Most important, we believe that one or more tankers must be en route from the Persian Gulf ports to Eilat because this is how petroleum reaches Israel. We have not yet identified any such tankers yet, however.

III. Now the Egyptians have about 50,000 men, 71 aircraft, and 500 tanks in Sinai on or near the Israeli border. This falls short of figures claimed [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] but it is still twice as many tanks, three times the air strength, and 20,000 more men than Egypt has normally had there.

IV. The Israelis in turn are convinced that they are facing a new situation, with UAR forces beefed up and the UNEF safety mechanism withdrawn. They have carried out at least 40 to 50 percent mobilization as a protective measure, and are re-assessing their security requirements. Today, Levi Eshkol called an emergency meeting of the national security panel.

A. As I remarked earlier, we have considered that the Israelis probably rate any attempt to interfere with shipping to their southern port of Eilat as a cause for war.

B. They have also been quite firm in the warning that any new terrorism involving Israeli loss of life will bring some form of retaliation against the Arabs.

C. We believe Tel Aviv will not accept any attempt to impose a U.N. presence or controls on Israel.

IV. The Soviet attitude is of the utmost importance to the Arabs at present, [1 line of source text not declassified].

A. [2 lines of source text not declassified] The Arabs, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] they must maintain the line in their propaganda that the Soviets will somehow come to their aid.

B. The Soviets face real difficulties; they don't want a full-blown war, particularly one which could well bring U.S. commitments into play, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] than come down unequivocally on the side of peace. Unrest and tension are and have been exceptionally useful to the Soviets in their attempt to erode Western influence in the Middle East.

C. The private Soviet line was probably given to Ambassador Thompson in Moscow last Friday when Thompson told Dobrynin he hoped that the Soviets were exerting as much pressure in Syria as we were in Israel. Dobrynin answered: "I think we can match you."

V. Even with restraining Soviet pressures, the danger lies in the fact that the leaders on each side are being moved by the chain of events, rather than controlling those events at this point.

A. The Israelis, for example, feel that they must now patrol by land and air into Sinai, and there is a hint of fatalism in the Arab moves which is clearly expressed in Nasir's aggressive announcement about the Gulf of Aqaba.

B. Under the circumstances, war can now come from accident, incident, or miscalculation.

Washington, May 23, 1967, 1729Z.

/1/Source: National Security Agency, NSA Archives, Accession No. 45981, U.S.S. Liberty Correspondence and Messages, 1965-1968. Secret. Repeated to CNO, CINCLANT, CINCLANTFLT, COMSERVLANT, COMSERVRON 8, DIRNAVSECGRU, DIRNAVSECGRULANT, NSA REP LANT, ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU, DIRNAVSECGRUEUR, HQ NSAEUR. The following note appears on the telegram:

"M/R: The present situation in the Middle East has resulted in NSA declaring a SIGINT readiness Bravo. In order to augment coverage in the area, the diversion of the USS Liberty (USN 855) is considered a necessary course of action in view of the Liberty's excellent collection, processing and reporting capabilities and her ability to remain on station for extended periods. USNS Valdez will be directed to leave all available ME tech support at Rota, Spain [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] when she makes a scheduled call o/a 24/25 May.

"The diversion of the Liberty will result in the loss [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for the remainder of the presently scheduled cruise due to terminate 25 Aug 67. However, in view of the potential US involvement in the ME, this must be considered an acceptable loss."

ADP/224-67. Subj: Diversion of USS Liberty.

/2/After approval by the JCS/JRC, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the 303 Committee, the JCS/JRC directed movement of the Liberty to the Eastern Mediterranean by way of Rota, Spain, through a message from COMSERVRON 8, 240020Z May 67. ("Report of the JCS Fact Finding Team: USS Liberty Incident, 8 June 1967"; JCS Files, 898/392)

Paris, May 23, 1967, 1747Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA, Damascus, DOD, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Moscow, Tel Aviv, and USUN. Received at 3:37 p.m. and passed to the White House and USIA at 4:20 p.m.

/2/Document 35.

Alphand at this juncture considers situation extremely serious and said that Egypt's decision to close Gulf of Aqaba put an entirely new light on the situation, particularly in view of the various declarations Israel, British and French had made in the UN at the time of withdrawal of Israeli troops from Sinai in early 1957. He offered his opinion that there was a high degree of possibility that Israel would attack if Egypt actually stopped a ship.

In reply to my question as to the validity or not of the Tripartite Declaration, Alphand said French Government was not taking any position in principle on this but felt it would be a mistake to invoke this declaration; the French were all in favor of informal consultation taking place but he felt that a formal reference to the Tripartite Declaration would not have a positive effect in the Arab world. Therefore the French preferred to consult without mentioning the declaration.

At this point a telegram was brought in to Alphand from Seydoux reporting that the "not-aligned members" as he phrased it of the Security Council would request a meeting of the four this afternoon in New York at 2:00 p.m. New York time to consider the situation between Israel and the Arab states and to decide what actions the Security Council should take.

In reply to my question Alphand said he did not know whether the French would be prepared to attend this meeting since, in his words, it depended a great deal on the attitude of the Russians. Alphand said if three powers were to meet formally without Russia it would give the appearance of a "cold war". I told Alphand this was all very well but that refraining from "cold war" would have to work both ways, with which he agreed.

Alphand had told me earlier that the French had already made a demarche in Cairo and admitted that their approach to the Soviets two days ago had yielded very little satisfaction.

Comment: It seems to me the French are playing a very careful game with considerable eye to their relations with the Soviet Union, and are not prepared to act in a tripartite fashion. I think they are uncertain as to the Soviet attitude but until this becomes clear I do not think they will be disposed to take many very active steps on their own for counseling moderation and restraint.

Bohlen

Washington, May 23, 1967, 4:30 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Read.

1. The Secretary decided against holding a backgrounder tonight in view of the President's reconsideration and decision to go on television this evening with a statement of his own.

2. It was decided that evacuation from Tel Aviv and Damascus should occur simultaneously but that all posts would be given discretionary authority to proceed with evacuation of USG dependents.

3. It was the consensus that the Soviets probably do not want a blow-up in the Middle East based on our knowledge here of Soviet intent.

4. On Congressional matters the Secretary indicated that the President considers it vital that we have Congress with us on each important move. Ambassador Battle is scheduled to brief the Hill further on the House and Senate sides tomorrow. The White House has been strongly advised by members of Congress that we obtain a joint resolution of support for USG actions if there is going to be actual fighting.

5. The UK, Canada and Denmark have already agreed to join us in a letter requesting Security Council action. Brazil has raised certain problems. When signed, the letter would become public. The Secretary General has sent word that he does not want to stand in the way of Security Council action if that is the wish of the members, but if there is a division of opinion he hopes such action will await the SYG's return on Friday. The Secretary General's first meeting with a UAR official, Foreign Minister Riad, is at 3:00 a.m. EDT Wednesday.

6. George Thomson arrives in Washington at 8:30 a.m. on Wednesday and will see Under Secretary Rostow at 10:30 and the Secretary at 11:00. The Secretary wants the control group to initiate urgent consideration of what the Maritime powers might say and do. He thinks that Maritime action may proceed concurrent with Security Council action or before or after the latter, but he emphasized that Maritime actions must be approved at the highest level and have strong Congressional support.

7. Noted.

8. Not resolved.

At 6:10 p.m. on May 23, 1967, President Johnson made a statement for radio and television on rising tensions in the Near East. He stated that the United States was particularly concerned with three potentially explosive aspects of the situation: the "warlike acts" from the territory of one state against another, the "hurried withdrawal" of the United Nations Emergency Force from Gaza and Sinai, and the recent buildup of military forces. He stated that the purported closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping had brought a new and grave dimension to the crisis and that the United States considered the gulf to be an "international waterway" and felt that a blockade of Israeli shipping was "illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace." He declared that the right of free, innocent passage of the international waterway was a "vital interest of the international community," and said the United States was "firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of the area" and "strongly opposes aggression by anyone in this area, in any form, overt or clandestine." He stated that he had been in close contact with Ambassador Goldberg at the United Nations and hoped the Security Council could act effectively. The text of the statement is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pages 561-563. The initial draft of the statement, prepared in the Department of State, was sent to the President with a May 22 memorandum from Rusk. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. I) Additional drafts, along with related material, are filed ibid. and ibid., Country File, Middle East Crisis.

Tel Aviv, May 23, 1967, 2145Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 6:37 p.m.

/2/Telegram 199836 to Tel Aviv, May 23, conveyed instructions from Eugene Rostow to Barbour to explain that U.S. views on the gravity of the situation had been fully and forcefully set forth in Cairo and Moscow. It stated that the Department expected the problem to be handled along the lines of the President's letter to Eshkol (Document 30) and Rostow's letter to Harman (Document 36). (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Middle East Crisis Files, 1967, Entry 5190, Box 10, Arab/Israeli Crisis, By Post)

1. Cabinet meeting just concluded has decided to despatch Foreign Minister Eban to Washington, London and Paris leaving here 0300 hours Wednesday, May 24. Public announcement will state trip for purpose participation UN deliberations.

/3/Not found.

3. I believe that our conveying strong sense of US recognition its involvement in Israel's problem at this time has had major effect in buying time. Whether unilateral Israeli action was imminent in matter of hours I suppose only history will reveal but my impression is that it was and that it has now been postponed for several days, although I am aware of possibility postponement is wishful thinking my part. In any case it has been made clear to me that further decisions as to Israeli action will depend on outcome Eban's talks primarily Washington, but also London and to lesser extent Paris, and he has been told to be back in Israel by end of week.

Barbour

New York, May 24, 1967, 0318Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated Priority to Moscow, and to Cairo and Tel Aviv. Received at 12:32 a.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, and CINCSTRIKE at 12:50 a.m.

5426. Subject: ME Crisis.

1. Although he had studiously avoided contact with other SC members during the day seeking to discuss ME crisis, Sov Rep Fedorenko saw Goldberg at his request on short notice at 7:30 p.m. May 23. Atmosphere was cordial despite obvious differences of approach.

2. Goldberg, who accompanied by Buffum, explained we had from beginning of this crisis sought to include Sovs in consultation including suggestion to SYG that he consult Sovs since we consider both of us have major responsibilities for preventing war in ME. He said our understanding, based on various talks with Sov officials including Gromyko, was that Sovs shared our view that war in this area was undesirable and it was in our joint interests to try and prevent it. Fedorenko agreed this was so.

3. Goldberg then explained reasons why we support convening May 23 SC to discuss issue and outlined approach we planned to take in Council mtg as follows:

A. Although SYG is in Cairo, we share Sov view that SC has primary responsibility for keeping the peace and believe it should not shirk this responsibility.

B. As result Nasser statement on closing Gulf of Aqaba and Eshkol's announcement this wld constitute act of aggression, we are convinced current situation extremely fragile and cld erupt into hostilities momentarily.

C. Under circumstances while we wld not advocate giving SYG blank check, we think SC cld contribute to his efforts pacify situation by calling on parties to exercise maximum restraint and cooperate with U Thant's efforts.

D. Another facet of current situation involving both Sovs and US, indeed all maritime powers, was Nasser's decision not only to close entrance to Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping but also to prevent shipment of "strategic materials" through gulf. Over thirty countries involved in shipping via this route who, like ourselves, would be unwilling to submit to interception and inspection by UAR. We assumed USSR, as proud country, wld also be unwilling accept similar limitations. Goldberg said that if Dardanelles closed to Sov Union, for example, we cld imagine this cld create intolerable situation for them.

E. US approach in SC mtg wld be calm and unprovocative seeking maximum degree of agreement of Council members designed to facilitate U Thant's efforts and not to impede them. We believe the maximum support of appeal for restraint by Council cld have salutary effect particularly if supported by both Sovs and US.

4. Fedorenko heard out Goldberg's presentation in more serious vein than usual but demurred on several points. In particular, he argued that SC mtg not necessary now; various govts concerned, including our own, have just made statement on this issue which should suffice. Implying--but not saying--that Sovs had made bilateral approaches to Arabs, he said that what our govts do directly in a matter of this kind is much more important than what is done at UN. He professed view that SC likely inflame situation further, said he sees no need for SC to move so rapidly and expressed preference mtg be delayed until SYG ready to report. He acknowledges, however, right of members to request mtg under present circumstances and intimated that while he was opposed to holding mtg this evening as we had originally suggested, he wld acquiesce in mtg tomorrow (Goldberg assented re timing).

5. Fedorenko also recalled that Sov position in earlier days (1957) had held that entrance to Gulf of Aqaba was in Egyptian territorial waters and therefore under UAR control. He seemed unprepared to respond to Goldberg's observation that past eleven years' practice of free passage had proved, if anything necessary to do so, that Gulf of Aqaba is international passage. He also did not appear to have recognized that not only Israel but large number of maritime countries were directly involved by terms of Nasser's closure of gulf.

6. He seemed to take at face value US assurance that our purpose in Council wld be to avoid polemics and seek non-contentious outcome designed to strengthen peace in ME and was remarkably mild in his protestations that SC mtg not necessary for this purpose.

7. At conclusion of mtg Fedorenko suggested we review situation tomorrow once more to ascertain real need of SC pursuing matter to conclusion now. Goldberg readily agreed, emphasizing once more that peace extremely precarious and that while we have urged Israel that confrontation shld be avoided, we had no assurance this was possible. Our one concern was to leave no channel unexplored for maintaining peace.

8. Interesting sidelight was Fedorenko's almost open contempt for GA as reflected in his comments on lack of judgment and utility in convening special session on SWA; he has made similar disparaging remarks concerning GA in past.

9. He also seemed most susceptible to Goldberg's argument that in crisis situation of this kind, if SC is to retain any respect and authority, it must not abdicate its responsibilities. He also appeared take some comfort in statement that US did not believe SYG shld get blank check and that SC had its own responsibilities apart from U Thant's.

Goldberg

Washington, May 24, 1967, 8:45 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. I. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Mr. President:

[4 paragraphs (8 lines of source text) not declassified]

/2/Not printed.

Walt

Washington, May 24, 1967, 11-11:40 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Middle East Crisis Files, 1967, Entry 5190, Box 3, Other. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Filed with a memorandum of a conversation between Eugene Rostow and Thomson that began prior to the conversation with Rusk and resumed following it, and a memorandum of a U.S.-British plenary session held that afternoon. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)

SUBJECT
The Near East Crisis

PARTICIPANTS

United States
Secretary of State
Eugene Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
William J. Handley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
John P. Walsh, Deputy Executive Secretary

United Kingdom
George Thomson, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Sir Patrick Dean, UK Ambassador to the US
Rear Admiral Bartosik
Christopher H. D. Everett, First Secretary of Embassy

Following welcoming remarks by the Secretary, Minister Thomson said he would like to describe to the Secretary the decisions of last night's Cabinet meeting. He said the meeting was called in a crisis atmosphere. Intelligence information indicated that there was an immediate threat by the UAR to close the Strait of Aqaba and that, unless action were taken, the Israelis might well be involved in a preemptive strike. The Cabinet recognized that there were obvious risks in any action that was undertaken by HMG; however, a failure to act might well contribute to an outbreak of fighting between the Israelis and the Arabs which could escalate into an East-West confrontation. Under these circumstances, the Cabinet had decided to authorize steps to assure the right of innocent passage through the Straits with a thought in mind that this could be a deterrent to Israeli action. It was agreed that Prime Minister Wilson would issue a statement tonight reaffirming the UK statements on this subject in 1957. In addition, George Brown was sent East to Moscow to discuss this subject with the Soviets and he had been sent West to Washington to do likewise. He had been instructed to discuss this matter in depth with the USG and to bring back a practical scheme of action which would include the nuts and bolts of a maritime agreement. An instruction had been sent by HMG to the British Embassies in main maritime countries advocating a declaration of principle on the right of peaceful passage and indicating a willingness to explore the possibilities of international action. With crossed fingers HMG felt that procedures of this nature might deter the Israelis and the UAR and take some of the heat out of the crisis. He wanted to share the thinking of his government on this subject with us and to try to work out a practical, reasonable and workable scheme of action. It was hoped that we could, in cooperation with as many other countries as possible, mount an operation to deter the UAR. This would have two legs in naval terms: (1) a probing escort operation in the region of the Strait of Tiran; and (2) this operation would be momentarily exposed and therefore must be backed up by a credible military operation in the Eastern Mediterranean which would show adequate forces to the UAR. The essential attributes of the proposal would be (a) based firmly on US/UK cooperation and (b) should be international in nature including countries other than UK and US. The British Government also felt that some type of political proposal should be developed to provide a face-saving device for Israel and the Arabs.

The Secretary responded by stating that we welcome the visit of the Minister and the British activities in this matter. The current situation confronts us with certain problems which he would wish to call to the attention of the Minister. We need, he said, before any shooting starts to make sure that Congress was with us. This would involve some delay. We will have to explore carefully the British proposal and discuss it with Congress. The Secretary said that he had had a long session with the SFRC yesterday. There had been a general recognition that we can not stay out of the problems of the NE and that the Arabs cannot be permitted to drive the Israelis into the sea. On the other hand, it was the consensus that any decisions taken must involve multilateral action and the UN must be utilized to the maximum degree in this situation. Any declaration that might be developed should be supported by as many countries as possible. In this situation, he said the "more" truly the "merrier".

The Secretary urged that on an ad referendum basis our two staffs should try to work out a feasible plan which would involve as many countries as possible. We should carefully box the compass in respect to these proposals and should endeavor to persuade the French, Italians, Scandinavians and as many others as possible to join.

/2/Reference is to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone signed at Geneva, April 29, 1958; for text, see UST 15 1606.

/3/Egypt-Israel General Armistice Agreement, signed at Rhodes on February 24, 1949; for text, see UN doc. S/1264/Corr. 1 and Add. 1. A copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Middle East Crisis Files, 1967, Entry 5190, Box 16, Israel and Egypt Armistice Agreement.

/4/Documentation pertaining to the cease-fire arranged under United Nations auspices on November 6, 1956, is in Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, volume XVI.

Washington, May 24, 1967, 12:35-1:25 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Files, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4, Tab 52. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum but according to a May 25 memorandum from Saunders to Bromley Smith, it was drafted by Saunders. (Ibid.) The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)

/2/The meeting had been scheduled for a discussion of South Arabia, but Walt Rostow recommended in a May 23 memorandum to the President that he use the meeting for discussion of the Middle East crisis. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File, Briefing Papers for NSC Meeting, May 24, 1967) A May 23 briefing memorandum from Rostow to the President prepared for discussion of South Arabia reads in part as follows: "The main issue in the Middle East today is whether Nasser, the radical states and their Soviet backers are going to dominate the area. A related issue is whether the US is going to stand up for its friends, the moderates, or back down as a major power in the Near East." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXI, Document 96.

Those Present
The President
The Vice President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Secretary Fowler
General Wheeler
Mr. Leonard Marks
Under Secretary Eugene Rostow
Assistant Secretary Lucius Battle
Mr. Walt W. Rostow
Mr. Farris Bryant
Mr. George Christian
Mr. Bromley Smith
Mr. Francis Bator
Mr. Harold Saunders

Secretary Rusk opened the meeting with a report on the current Arab-Israeli situation. He described it as serious but not yet desperate:

--The U. N. Security Council is meeting, and it is important to have it in session on this issue. We do not yet have a full report from U Thant's talks in Cairo, but Bunche reports that the Egyptians have suggested a return to the General Armistice Agreements as they stood before the 1956 fighting. That might relieve the pressure in the Straits of Tiran, but the Israelis might not be in the mood to make that kind of concession.

--We are in touch with the USSR. Privately we find the Russians playing a generally moderate game, but publicly they have taken a harsh view of the facts and have laid responsibility at Israel's door--and by inference at ours. Syria and Cairo say publicly they have Soviet support; but our general impression is that this is somewhat less than complete.

--Israeli Foreign Minister Eban will be here on May 25. We have insisted on consultation, and he is here to consult. The borders have been reasonably quiet, but the Straits to the Gulf of Aqaba are the main issue, both for Israel and for the major maritime nations. We are consulting with the British about this today.

--In a "thoughtful discussion" with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 23, he found unanimity that we should not act unilaterally, and that we should work through the UN and multilaterally.

In summary, he could not promise that this crisis would be over in 24 hours; but he had the impression that no government wants war.

Secretary Fowler asked to what extent we were looking into economic sanctions and to what extent we should be trying to influence the IMF and World Bank to operate in this situation. He had in mind economic sanctions that might be in the nature of a counter-blockade. We might hold the Israelis off if we could convince them we are hurting the UAR more than the blockade is hurting them. Secretary Rusk said that from the Fund's viewpoint, any agreement with the UAR consummated today would be reckless.

The President suggested that Eugene Rostow and Secretary Fowler look at all the cards we have had to play in this field. Secretary Fowler indicated that he was seeing Mr. Schweitzer of the IMF and private bankers from New York in the next couple of days, and we could begin laying any ground work necessary.

The President then said he would like to hear views on what we do if all these other measures fail. We should play out the UN and other multilateral efforts until they are exhausted. "I want to play every card in the UN, but I've never relied on it to save me when I'm going down for the third time. I want to see Wilson and De Gaulle out there with their ships all lined up too." But all of these things have a way of falling apart. He mentioned, for instance, early Congressional support for his actions in Vietnam. Therefore, we have to figure out what we can do if all these other courses fail.

In a parenthetical exchange, the President alluded to statements by Senators Symington and Fulbright to the effect that the U. S. could not manage two crises at once. They see it as a choice between Israel and Vietnam and believe we ought to withdraw from Vietnam. He told Secretary Rusk to let Senator Mansfield know that this kind of music in the Senate is just what Kosygin wants to hear.

Secretary Rusk before leaving the meeting commented that we were witnessing an interesting reversal of roles--doves have become hawks, and vice versa.

The President then turned to Secretary McNamara for a military appraisal of the situation. The Secretary said in general that there is no substance to the Fulbright/Symington notion that the U. S. cannot manage both Vietnam and the Middle East crises at the same time. He then turned to General Wheeler for a detailed run down of our military posture in the Mediterranean and the current disposition of Arab and Israeli forces.

In addition to those facts widely current in our intelligence estimates today, General Wheeler indicated that it would be harder to open the Gulf of Aqaba than we had at first thought. Because of the two Egyptian submarines in the Red Sea, we would need an ASW unit, the nearest of which is now in Singapore--two weeks away.

General Wheeler suggested that if Israel does try to open the Gulf, it will attack first by air, striking initially the UAR's naval forces in the Red Sea and the air bases in the Sinai. Only after establishing air superiority would the Israelis try to take out the battery at Sharm al-Sheikh. Therefore if the Israelis move, it might not be possible to localize a strike designed simply to open the Straits.

A brief discussion of possible presence of unconventional weapons followed. General Wheeler pointed out that the Egyptians have used three kinds of gas in Yemen. However, Mr. Helms was quite positive in stating there were no nuclear weapons in the area. General Wheeler said he was less well informed "but more skeptical."

In summary, General Wheeler noted that we have a powerful naval force in the Mediterranean; that our land forces are few, limited to about 1400 Marines now ashore at Naples, three days away; that our nearest ASW unit is two weeks away, since we cannot send one through the Suez Canal; that the UAR coastal battery and naval and air forces in the Red Sea will be the units employed to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba; that we will have trouble with overflight and staging rights in Turkey, Libya and Spain if we have to introduce our own ground forces; and that the Israelis can hold their own.

On the last point, the President asked for a new reading on Israeli capability. He said Ambassador Goldberg is less certain about Israeli superiority. Mr. Helms noted that he had sent a recent assessment to Ambassador Goldberg but had had no response yet. Both Mr. Helms and General Wheeler promised to review this estimate.

/3/British Defence Minister Denis W. Healey.

General Wheeler responded by saying that our first approach should be to give Israel military aid and all the support it needs for long-term military operations. If we are convinced that the Israelis can hold the Arabs, then we should back them down the line and rely on Arab inefficiency and lack of homogeneity to weaken the Arab cause. We should start immediately discussions with Israelis on their stockpiles and our replenishment capability. Our current understanding is that they are stocked for about 30 days.

The President then turned to Soviet motives and asked General Wheeler whether or not the Soviets had staged this Middle East crisis, the trouble in Hong Kong, and other such diversions simultaneously to force us to turn our attention from Vietnam. Neither General Wheeler nor Mr. Helms saw any sign of Soviet calculation behind these crises, though of course both admitted that the Soviets would view them as a godsend.

The President returned to the question of what we would do after relying on Israeli forces. General Wheeler noted that a long war would hurt the Israeli economy. At that point we would have to decide whether we were going to send in forces and confront Nasser directly.

The President asked whether, if we intervened, the USSR could avoid doing likewise. General Wheeler said he thought the USSR might just cut its losses and back out.

Secretary McNamara saw the whole situation evolving somewhat differently. He thought the initial exchange would be a fierce air battle for air superiority which would deplete aircraft inventories on both sides. Then both the U.S. and the USSR would be faced with requests for air support. He felt that the USSR might supply Soviet-piloted aircraft.

The President returned to Soviet motives. Mr. Helms said that he felt the USSR likes the situation as it is now but is not ready to rush in. The Soviets would like to bring off a propaganda victory as in the 1950's with them as the peacemakers and saviors of the Arabs, while we end up fully blackballed in the Arab world as Israel's supporter.

Mr. Helms said he was not as bearish as Secretary McNamara on Israeli air capability. He said the Israelis had taken the MIG that defected from Iraq last year through all kinds of maneuvers in Israel and had demonstrated in the 7 April air battle with Syria that they had learned their lessons well.

The President asked what is in Nasser's mind. Mr. Helms thought he had achieved his objective now. Secretary Fowler asked whether he might be looking for someone to hold him back. Mr. Eugene Rostow noted that he was looking for someone to hold the Israelis back.

The President asked about British Minister of State George Thomson and Israeli Foreign Minister Eban, and whether he should see either of them. Eugene Rostow said that Thomson had not raised the subject, but that Eban will definitely want to see the President. When the President asked whether this would be desirable, Mr. Rostow replied that he felt we had held the Israelis back from a strike yesterday and that the President would undoubtedly have to see Eban.

In conclusion, the President asked Mr. Battle for an assessment of what is in Nasser's mind. Mr. Battle said that, until Nasser threatened to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba, he would have agreed with Mr. Helms that all Nasser wanted was a limited propaganda victory. Now that he has gone as far as he has, Battle said he cannot help but wonder whether Nasser either has more Soviet support than we know about, or had gone slightly insane. He noted that it is most uncharacteristic for Nasser not to leave a door open behind him, and that is exactly what he appears to have done in this case.

Battle sketched Nasser's problems and motives on the broader front to include internal economic trouble and a tightening food supply, his drive to regain leadership in the Arab world, and his need to recoup his position on the world stage.

Washington, May 25, 1967, 10:37 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 UAR-US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Battle, cleared by Bromley Smith, and approved by Department of State Deputy Executive Secretary Herbert B. Thompson.

201638. Following based on uncleared memcon, is FYI, Noforn and subject to revision upon review:

/2/UAR Ambassador Mustafa Kamel made a farewell call on the President from 2:32 to 3 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

President referred to grave situation facing Middle East, pointing out he had in recent letter to Nasser and in communications over the past always indicated willingness find road to friendship. Former Secretary Bob Anderson, a trusted friend of President's since latter's days with NYA, would soon be in Beirut and available consultation Egyptians if they so desired. If Egyptians would listen to Secretary Anderson, President Johnson would listen to him and believed Anderson's mission clearly offered opportunity for contact with trusted friend of President's.

Comment: Battle has talked with Secretary Anderson who said Ambassador Kamel called him immediately following White House appointment. Anderson has told Ambassador Kamel he will be Beirut Hotel Vendome for day or two and if Egyptians wish, he will be happy come over meet with Nasser but only if Egyptians want him to do so and consider trip useful. Anderson intends primarily to listen and will make no effort mediate current crisis.

In view Department, Anderson's presence will offer special opportunity to Egyptians to pass word through special channel if they wish re current crisis. If Anderson comes, he will be in touch with Ambassador Nolte and will undoubtedly want briefing current Arab-Israeli confrontation

/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.

Washington, May 24, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. I. Secret. An attached note indicates a copy was sent to Read.

SUBJECT
Conversation with ARAMCO Representative

ARAMCO's Washington representative, John Pendleton, called me this afternoon to read a telegram which he had received from ARAMCO's Vice President Brougham, who is currently visiting Beirut.

Brougham reports a conversation with Saudi Arabian Petroleum Minister Yamani at Beirut airport on 23 May. Yamani is convinced there will be war between the Arabs and Israel. Syria is pushing Nasser toward war, and Russia must not resist the Syrians too sharply because Moscow fears Syria is leaning toward Peiping.

/2/Telegram 4848 from Jidda, May 24, reported that when Ambassador Herman Eilts gave Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Sayyid Omar Saqqaf a copy of the note verbale contained in Document 35, Saqqaf stated that the Saudi Government did not agree that the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway; in the Saudi view, it represented Arab waters, and the Arabs had the right to close it. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

/3/Telegram 206646 to Jidda, June 1, states that on May 25 Eugene Rostow sent an informal message via Aramco to Yamani assuring him that the U.S. Government was doing all possible to restrain the Israelis, reiterating U.S. dedication to the principle of free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, and expressing the hope that the Saudi Government would realize that it too had a stake in this principle. Yamani later told Aramco he had conveyed this message to the King. Yamani commented that in his opinion, the UAR and Syria could handle Israel and therefore efforts at restraint were not important, and that even if Saudi Arabia had an interest in keeping the Gulf of Aqaba open, it could not say so. (Ibid.)

H.H.S.

Washington, May 24, 1967, 11:13 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Eugene Rostow's Special Assistant Thomas O. Enders and approved by Rostow. Also sent Priority to London, Moscow, and Paris, and to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Damascus, and Amman.

201585. Subj: Four-Power Meeting on Middle East.

1. Lucet came in to see Undersecretary Rostow this afternoon to propose a quadripartite meeting of Ambassadors to the UN. Paris is making similar approaches in Moscow and London.

2. Lucet's instruction said that situation has sharply aggravated in the past few days, particularly following Egypt's announcement to close straits. Whatever the different points of view, it read, question now is to preserve peace and to make sure that no party is contemplating any action which might endanger it. Nothing can be attained unless four great powers agree on necessity of maintaining peace. Therefore they should meet together to examine what to propose and undertake and particularly to be sure that none of the parties concerned engages in any operation of force. Subsequently the four powers can take up discussions of various modus vivendi. In the immediate future, the four Ambassadors to the UN should meet in New York. Very fact of their meeting should have a calming effect.

/2/Goldberg said this at the conclusion of a statement to the UN Security Council on May 24; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 12, 1967, pp. 871-873.

4. Real problem, Rostow said, is not whether you meet but whether you can agree. French statement says in effect that no one should make the situation worse. Does that mean that the Israelis should refrain from challenging blockade or that Arabs should desist from their claim? US has taken very grave responsibility of asking Israel to refrain from sending a ship down from Gulf of Aqaba. But that is not a position that can be held indefinitely. Israelis might well have moved to strike yesterday had it not been for US intervention. They will not hold off for long unless Cairo gives assurance it will not exercise their claim. Any number of formulas can be found but basic point is that there is no way to compromise on free passage through straits.

5. Rostow outlined British proposal for declaration by maritime powers and said we thought well of it. Lucet had no reaction from Paris to our earlier queries.

6. Rostow also raised report we have had that Egyptians are trying to buy wheat in France and urged French to delay. This is no time, he said, to slacken pressure on Nasser.

7. Rostow asked about resupply position for French equipment in Israeli armed forces should war break out. Lucet said he would look into the question.

Rusk

Washington, May 25, 1967, 11:15 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Thomas M. Judd (EUR/BMI). The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

SUBJECT
Middle East Situation

PARTICIPANTS
George Thomson, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador
Christopher Everett, First Secretary, British Embassy

The Secretary
Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BMI

The Secretary asked Mr. Thomson if he had any further news about George Brown's talks in Moscow. Mr. Thomson replied that Mr. Brown had talked for over an hour with Kosygin. They had also had a private talk. In the main talk, Kosygin took a hard line, merely repeating the official announcement the Soviets had issued. When chided by Brown, Kosygin had heatedly denied that the Soviets were standing by doing nothing. Brown got the impression that an argument was going on in the Soviet Government as to what their policy should be. He also got the impression that the Russians were greatly worried about the situation and that they were working on the Arabs. Mr. Brown did not think this necessarily meant that the Russians would be willing to work with us constructively in the Security Council or on the Gulf of Aqaba problem.

Mr. Thomson mentioned that Prime Minister Wilson had sent a message to Kosygin endorsing the idea of a four power meeting. George Brown was not sure the Soviets would be willing to do anything about this proposal. Brown had mentioned it to Gromyko, who had not responded.

Mr. Thomson went on to say that the British Cabinet had met that morning (May 25). There had been little substantive discussion in the meeting. It had consisted mainly of a briefing by the Prime Minister on the talks which Brown had in Moscow and those he (Thomson) had in Washington. The Cabinet endorsed the idea of a four power meeting, preferably under UN auspices. It had also decided to send Fred Mulley, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, to Paris to sound out the French as to precisely what they in mind.

The Secretary said we were not happy with the idea of a four power meeting outside the UN. Mr. Thomson replied that he had discussed this matter with the Prime Minister the previous night. The British Government now thought that a meeting under UN auspices would be best.

Mr. Thomson asked the Secretary what he thought of US-UK planning to date. The Secretary said he hoped we could get something together today to show to the President. The Secretary said we were worried about the time element. We didn't know how long the situation could be held.

Mr. Thomson asked how long we thought the Israelis could be held. The Secretary replied he did not know. We were making it clear to the Israelis they shouldn't count on our support if they moved on their own. They were probably most worried about the Straits of Tiran. They remembered that in 1956 they had been promised that their ships could go through the Suez Canal but nothing had been done to implement the promise.

Mr. Thomson said that agreement had been reached in the Anglo-American talks the preceding day on the main outlines. A draft declaration by the maritime powers had been prepared. It had been agreed which countries should be asked to sign. It also had been agreed that approaches should be made to capitals. There was a problem as to how to marry this with the UN procedures.

Mr. Thomson said there were some difficulties on the military side in regard to the plan to organize a naval force in the Red Sea. The British thought this should be a limited force. If we acted with determination, it should be sufficient. If Nasser should react, we had adequate retaliatory force available in the Eastern Mediterranean. Mr. Thomson said the Americans wished to put a strong force into the Red Sea. The British felt that a carrier in the Red Sea would be a sitting duck if Nasser got nasty.

Continuing, Mr. Thomson said that there would be many formidable obstacles to overcome in organizing the task force. The UK thought the task force should at least nominally be more than Anglo-American. The Dutch and Italians might be possibilities. It might even be possible to put one of their admirals in command of the Red Sea force. The overall commander would have to be American.

There was another problem, Mr. Thomson said. The vital traffic to Eilat was tankers carrying POL for Israel. They all flew the Liberian flag. It would be embarrassing if these Liberian ships were not willing to accept our protection and escort. A prior approach to the Liberian Government would be necessary. Mr. Thomson thought this could be best made by the American Government.

The Secretary said that Mike Pearson, a number of years ago during the Suez incident, had suggested that the smaller countries might do a job like this. He doubted that there would be any volunteers this time. The Secretary asked if the British had any information as to the Norwegian attitude.

Mr. Thomson said they had heard nothing. This was disturbing inasmuch as they had several times asked the Norwegians about their attitude.

Mr. Thomson said we might wish to explore the possibility of a floating UNEF. This would have the advantage of being something new. It would not involve Nasser having to retreat from his present position. There might even be Egyptian participation in such a fleet which would probably consist of a few small patrol craft, and possibly a helicopter. Such a course might be sufficiently reassuring to the Israelis.

The Secretary said one of his colleagues had mentioned that morning that under the UNEF Resolution the Secretary General of the UN had the authority to organize a naval force for the Gulf of Aqaba. The Secretary said he doubted very much if the Secretary General would be willing to touch this one.

Moscow, May 25, 1967, 1415Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority. Repeated to USUN, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Paris. Received at 1:18 p.m. A copy was sent to the President on May 26 at 11:30 a.m. with a memorandum from Walt Rostow noting that it was Ambassador Thompson's assessment of the Middle East crisis. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis)

5125. 1. From the way the Soviets are handing the Middle East crisis, I conclude that they were well aware of Egyptian plans and probably not averse to the Egyptian action in stirring up this affair. I have considerable doubts however that this included the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba. The omission of reference to this action in the official Soviet statement, the fact that a high Foreign Office official alleged that he did not know of it at 11:00 a.m. on Tuesday, and the fact that that this would not fit in with what I would conceive to be Soviet strategy, lead to this conclusion. I am convinced that the Soviets would not want to become militarily physically involved in a Middle East war. If we and the British and perhaps others force the opening of the Gulf, the consequent damage to Nasser's prestige, as well as the demonstration of Soviet impotence to render other than moral support, make this a stupid move from the Soviet point of view unless, of course, they are convinced that Nasser can get away with it. On the other hand, I do not think that if war had started without this move the Soviets would have been too concerned about their ability to stay clear and yet make appropriate noises which they could exploit whenever a settlement was reached. Even if the Israelis should clobber their Arab neighbors, the Soviets might calculate that the hatred this would engender for the West would enable them to reestablish their position in the Arab world.

/2/Telegram 5422 from USUN, May 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

Thompson

Lake Harrington, Canada, May 25, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. V. Secret. Drafted on May 26. The President met with Prime Minister Pearson and External Affairs Minister Martin at the Prime Minister's summer residence at Lake Harrington, Quebec, following a visit to the Canadian Universal and International Exhibition (EXPO '67) in Montreal. According to Johnson's Daily Diary, he was at Lake Harrington from 1:25 to 3:45 p.m. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Conversations of the President on May 25, 1967, with External Affairs Minister Martin and Prime Minister Pearson

I do not believe that any significant exchanges of views took place between the President and the Minister for External Affairs until after the President met with the Prime Minister and Martin at Lake Harrington. [Omitted here is a description of the trip to Lake Harrington.]

/2/The conversation after lunch is recorded in a May 25 memorandum of conversation drafted by Davies and Country Director for Canada Rufus Z. Smith, except for a private conversation between the President and Prime Minister, which according to Prime Minister Pearson, concerned Vietnam. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. V)

/3/According to the memorandum of conversation cited in footnote 2 above, Pearson said he thought the best course was to seek quadripartite agreement in the Security Council but if necessary, they should accept quadripartite talks outside the United Nations. Johnson responded that he would consider quadripartite talks only in the frame- work of the United Nations.

/4/According to the memorandum of conversation cited in footnote 2, it contained the following points: George Brown reported that the Soviet attitude on the Near East was not particularly encouraging; Eban had told the British that the Israelis would not strike until he returned from his talks in Washington but if nothing had been worked out by then, Israel would have to strike first; and the British supported De Gaulle's proposal for quadripartite talks even if it meant talks outside the United Nations.

/5/Reference is to Goldberg's May 24 statement before the UN Security Council; see footnote 2, Document 57. A memorandum concerning the background of Goldberg's statement is attached to a June 1 memorandum from Read to Rusk. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR)

/6/Circular telegram 202592, May 26, stated the options open to the U.S. Government seemed to be twofold: to limit its actions to UN and diplomatic channels, which would "almost certainly" lead to an Israeli strike against the UAR and perhaps hostilities with Syria, or to give firm assurances to the Israelis that the Strait of Tiran would remain open and take all necessary measures either alone or with the British to enforce them. Paragraph 1(B) was the second option. (Ibid., POL ARAB-ISR)

/7/Telegram 201794 to Ottawa, May 25, conveyed briefing points for the President's discussion of the Middle East situation with Pearson. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

/8/According to the President's Daily Diary, on the helicopter from Andrews Air Force Base to the White House, Johnson and Rostow talked briefly about the meeting with Pearson, "summarizing by saying that 'Canadians and Europeans will still not accept responsibility . . . they say it's not their trouble, and why should they get in the Middle East now, too.'" (Johnson Library)

[Omitted here is a summary of the conversation, on unrelated matter, en route to the airport.]

W.W. Butterworth

Washington, May 25, 1967, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. No classification marking. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

/2/ Richard Helms described and quoted from the CIA appraisal at a conference on the Six-Day War, held June 3-5, 1992. He stated that Johnson met with him and some of his other advisers after his return from Canada and asked Helms and JCS Chairman General Earle Wheeler to "have this scrubbed down," that is, to re-examine the situation and produce a new paper. (Parker, Richard B., ed., The Six-Day War: A Retrospective (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1996), pp. 216-217) Johnson met with Rusk, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, Helms, Eugene Rostow, General Wheeler, Battle, and Walt Rostow from 7:02 to 8 p.m. on May 25. Vice President Humphrey joined them at 7:25 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of their discussion has been found.

Walt

P.S. The two estimates--Israeli and CIA--both show how explosive are:

/3/The postscript is written in Rostow's handwriting on the memorandum.

MEMORANDUM FOR
Mr. Bromley Smith, White House
Mr. Rusk, State
Mr. Eugene Rostow, State
Mr. Hughes, State
Mr. McNamara, Defense
General Carroll, Defense

SUBJECT
Appraisal of an estimate of the Arab-Israeli Crisis by the Israeli Intelligence Service

/4/Not printed, this estimate is an unsigned memorandum of May 25, headed "Israeli Intelligence Estimate of the Israeli-Arab Crisis," [text not declassified]. The latter, citing various pieces of information, stated their conclusion that the UAR was now actively seeking war. The memorandum notes that the Israelis believed that holding the initiative was the key to the situation and that the opportunity to take the initiative would soon be gone. It notes that they strongly urged that the issue at stake was not Israel but whether the Middle East would fall under Soviet control.

2. We do not believe that the Israeli appreciation presented [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was a serious estimate of the sort they would submit to their own high officials. We think it is probably a gambit intended to influence the US to do one or more of the following: (a) provide military supplies, (b) make more public commitments to Israel, (c) approve Israeli military initiatives, and (d) put more pressure on Nasser. The bases for our disagreement with the Israeli view follow.

3. Not all the statements in paragraph 2 are confirmed by what we now know. According to our information:

Only the 3rd Brigade of the Fourth Armored Division is in Sinai

A. The Fifteenth Armored Brigade has been ordered to leave Yemen.

B. We have no information on the formation of a Second Army Group.

C. We are unaware of any message from the Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo informing Baghdad of the UAR's military aims.

D. We know of no UAR naval vessels which have left the Red Sea and entered the Mediterranean.

E. The UAR Defense Minister did go to Moscow, but we know nothing of his plans.

In our view, UAR military dispositions in Sinai are defensive in character.

4. Nasser has already had significant success in exploiting the crisis to restore his influence and acceptance at home and abroad as leader of all the Arabs. He probably realizes that these gains would be quickly reversed if he were humiliated or suffered military defeat. He probably calculates, however, that his interests would be satisfied by any resolution of the crisis other than humiliation or defeat. He may not regard military victory over Israel as essential to his ends.

5. We believe that the UAR is acting in this crisis essentially to put pressure on Israel short of attack on Israeli soil. Whereas the UAR armed forces have improved in capability during the past decade, Nasser still probably estimates that he does not have--even with the support of the other Arabs--the capability to destroy Israel by a military attack. On the other hand, Nasser shows increasing willingness to pursue a policy of high risk in challenging Israeli interests, such as free access to the port of Elath. Nasser may be convinced that his armed forces are sufficiently strong to be able successfully to hold off an Israeli attack at least for long enough to get great power intervention. Nasser evidently estimates that his ability to inflict damage through bombing on Israeli cities would discourage an Israeli attack.

6. The steps taken thus far by Arab armies do not prove that the Arabs intend an all-out attack on Israel. The Iraqis have long been obliged to send troops to assist Israel's Arab neighbors in case of conflict. The Iraqis simply lack the ability to send meaningful amounts of troops to fight against Israel. They are not prepared to supply and maintain sizeable units in a conflict. Lebanon's military capability is insignificant and the Lebanese are likely to participate in a conflict only to the minimum extent consistent with maintaining relations with the other Arab world. There have been no coordinated maneuvers by the various Arab states and it would be difficult if not impossible for the various Arab units cited in paragraph 3 of the Israeli estimate to be used in concert. In sum we believe these are merely gestures which all Arab states feel compelled to make in the interests of the fiction of Arab unity, but have little military utility in a conflict with Israel.

7. As for the report that the Egyptians are preparing to use chemical warfare in the Sinai, the use of gas in this terrain and in mobile engagement would be difficult if not entirely counterproductive for the UAR. And given Israeli air defense, we do not believe that the UAR has the capability to make effective use of gas against urban concentrations.

8. We believe the Soviet aim is still to avoid military involvement and to give the US a black eye among the Arabs by identifying it with Israel. Once this is accomplished--and this is happening fast--we think that the Soviets will not wish to increase the crisis further. They probably fear an Israeli victory over the Arabs and that it would damage their image as defender of the Arabs. They probably could not openly help the Arabs because of lack of capability, and probably would not for fear of confrontation with the US.

London, May 25, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Secret. The transmission time on the message is 2313Z, which is apparently in error, since Rostow sent it to the President at 6:45 p.m. with a memorandum noting that it was more detailed than the indirect report the President had received that afternoon in Canada. He also noted that Rusk was reading it. For Wilson's account of British policy during the crisis, the war, and its immediate aftermath, see Harold Wilson, The Chariot of Israel: Britain, America and the State of Israel, pp. 329-361.

I have not been in touch with you direct so far about the Middle East situation because our people have been in such close and continuous touch and particularly because George Thomson has himself been in Washington discussing all this with Dean Rusk. But we have taken stock today in the cabinet in the light of what we have heard from George Brown in Moscow (which I am bound to say, is not so far particularly encouraging on this front: of George Thomson's report: of my own talk yesterday with Eban (you will have had an account of this via George Thomson): and, finally, in the light of de Gaulle's proposal that this should be handled, at least initially, on a four power basis.

The French have told us--and no doubt yourselves--that they are thinking in the first instance of a meeting of the four permanent representatives in New York. Their approach rests as you know on the basic proposition that, if any good is to come out of the Security Council, it can only result from some four power understanding. It is not at all clear to me how far de Gaulle has thought through this proposition. His political purposes are, of course, fairly transparent in terms of French influence and of seeking to avoid French involvement in any exclusively Western approach. (Eban told me that de Gaulle advised him strongly not to get too closely involved in any exclusively Western tie-up.)

But the fact that this approach may be designed to enhance French standing and, perhaps, to cut down to size some of the General's Western allies, need not, in my view, prevent our recognizing its intrinsic merits. It seems to us to have two potential advantages. First, if we can get the Russians into a four power discussion--and as far as I am concerned I would be glad for this to happen either at ambassadorial level in New York as at present suggested by the French, or eventually at a much higher level somewhere else (summit if necessary in view of the terrible dangers involved)--this could mean that they are clear-headed enough to see the immense dangers of a major confrontation with the West in a part of the world where neither side can confidently expect to control the passions or reactions of the local participants. In that situation, there might be a prospect of reaching agreement with them. Secondly, if the French initiative peters out because the Russians will have nothing to do with it, the French can hardly then just fold their hands and play no further part. The prospect of drawing them into a wider Western operation should be somewhat enhanced. Either way, the prospects for peace should be a little brighter.

These are the reasons why we decided today to announce our support for the French proposal--and I dare say that in authorizing Arthur Goldberg's statement of support for the idea, which I saw last night, your government had the same kind of considerations in mind.

Meanwhile, we have, as you will have heard, agreed that George Thomson should continue to work out with Dean Rusk the terms of any eventual approach to the other maritime powers and of the draft declaration for which we might canvass their support. When the cabinet discussed this this morning, it was clear to us, from the reports already received from our ambassadors in a number of key maritime countries, that we should not get the kind of support that is required for any such declaration until all efforts to get something constructive out of the Security Council have demonstrably failed. In these circumstances, and given the intrinsic value of the French proposal anyway, we felt that before we could finally decide on the terms and method of proposing the joint approach to the maritime powers, we must give the French four power approach a chance to prove itself.

As I write this, I learn that by the time it reaches you, you will probably have talked with Mike Pearson. I need not say how much I welcome this meeting. Canada has a key role to play in all this and we shall of course be keeping in the closest touch with them too. This is indeed a further reason why I am very glad that I shall be able next week to see both Mike and yourself. Clearly we shall have to give a good deal of time to the Middle East situation. I hope things there will be a bit clearer by the time we meet--and I hope even more that there will not have been a major explosion there--but I am sure you share my own desire that, overshadowed as events may be for the time being by the Arab-Israel crisis, we shall be able to have a good talk about the other important issues on our agenda.

If, meanwhile, you can let me know how you see things, especially in the light of your talk with Mike, I shall welcome this.

Tel Aviv, May 25, 1967, 2240Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Top Secret; Nodis; Flash. Received at 8:05 p.m. Walt Rostow sent this telegram to the President at 10:14 p.m. with an attached note: "Herewith the same message Eban transmitted to Secretary Rusk as it was received and evaluated by Ambassador Barbour." Telegram 202239 to Cairo, May 25, states that at 5 p.m. Eban advised Rusk of a flash message from Eshkol that the Israeli Government was convinced a UAR-Syrian attack was imminent. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR) No memorandum of this conversation between Rusk and Eban has been found. In a telephone conversation with Goldberg, Rusk referred to a message from Israel and stated that the Israelis "are calling on us for an immediate statement that an attack on them is an attack on us." (Notes of telephone conversation prepared in S, May 25, 8:15 p.m.; ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls) Eban described the message and his conversation with Rusk in An Autobiography (New York: Random House, 1977), pp. 348-350, and in more detail in Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eyes (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1992), pp. 382-383.

3785. 1. FonOf Director General Levavi accompanied by Argov of American Department came to NA House 2300 hours this evening. Levavi said they called at moment of grave peril for Israel. Instructions had been sent to Harman for Eban, who should be consulting with highest U.S. levels within hours, to say that attack by Egypt and Syria appeared imminent and that it essential for U.S. to declare its intention to abide by its commitments and to implement declaration by appropriate movement U.S. forces to Israel's support.

2. Information on which this conclusion of Egyptian and Syrian intentions based is: (1) Egypt has held establishment of second army group in Sinai to reinforce divisions already there and has ordered armored brigade from Yemen to join such group. It has increased tanks in Sinai to total of 800. It has reversed naval forces proceeding to Aqaba and ordered them returned to Mediterranean. It has sent cabinet minister to Moscow to coordinate operations between Egyptian and Soviet Governments. (2) Syria is to receive Iraqi troops by airlift and has increased offensive posture its forces already on frontier. (3) Jordanians have announced willingness accept Iraqi and Saudi Arabian troops.

3. In addition to foregoing Egypt has started fabricating incidents with Israelis such as alleged clash with border patrol.

4. All this indicates that Egyptians and Syrians no longer concerned with Aqaba but prepared launch full scale attack against Israeli existence.

5. I noted there appeared doubt that in fact Jordanians anticipate any Iraqi or Saudi troops there to which Levavi responded Jordanians not important. The seriousness of the situation is Egypt and Syria and he reiterated that these developments most perilous for Israel.

6. While it obvious this further attempt strengthen Foreign Minister Dan's hand in discussions in Washington, I am confident that Israeli apprehensions are to them most genuine. As indicated in more detail in report forwarded by another channel earlier today information repeated to me tonight as to Egyptian moves is in large part result hard intelligence and there every collateral indication Egyptian belligerence unabated.

7. I told Levavi that since Eban had departed for Washington I did not have further information in addition to that I had passed on on Tuesday but that it my impression there had been no change in U.S. determination as I had expressed it to them at that time.

Barbour

Washington, May 25, 1967, 8:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Rusk's Special Assistant C. Arthur Borg. Sent to the President at 11 a.m. on May 26 with a covering note from Walt Rostow.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary said that the President wanted him to make a number of points: 1) The information available to us does not really support the belief that an attack by the UAR and Syria is imminent. We have looked into the examples cited by the Chief of Israeli Intelligence very carefully throughout the course of the day including the reports of armored brigade movements from Yemen, movement of UAR naval vessels, and the nature of military dispositions in Sinai. With regard to the latter they appear defensive to us (Eban interjected to point out that a defensive alignment in one area may mask an offensive preparation in another). 2) We wish to make available to the Israeli Government, through our Embassy all the information we obtain; it is important that there be a prompt sharing of all information available to each of us in order to permit the fullest possible analysis of the situation. 3) At this juncture we need to know the Secretary General's impressions from his trip to the Middle East. We believe that a UAR attack will be irrational before his report is submitted to the Security Council. Such an attack would impose "enormous political burdens on Nasser." 4) The President particularly wanted Eban to understand that our government did not have the authority to give an assurance along the lines of "an attack on you is an attack on us" without full Congressional association with such an undertaking. Such NATO-type treaty language would be unfortunate because of the tremendous debate it would raise regarding war-making power under the Constitution. (The Secretary commented at this point on the curious reversal of the dove and hawk roles induced by the Middle East situation and noted the unfortunate inference that the United States might be forced to make a choice between the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Eban replied that everyone has his own "favorite part of the world." Eban stressed in a more serious vein, however, that Prime Minister Eshkol should not be held to specific language with regard to his request of the President. The important point was that there must be an effective expression of "warning and deterrent".) 5) We wish to make a maximum effort multilaterally. The United Nations should have a chance to find an answer before we consider other initiatives. At the same time the UK initiative regarding a declaration by Maritime countries is a good one and we are working urgently on this. The more countries that could be associated with the British proposal the better. We consider the situation in the Tiran Strait a grave matter: for Israel, for us and because of principles that have a worldwide effect. 6) The President asked that it be particularly emphasized that preemptive action by Israel would cause extreme difficulty for the United States. In our position of world leadership, the American people would do what has to be done if "the fault is on the other side and there is no other alternative". Therefore, the question of responsibility for the initiation of hostilities is a major problem for us. Of course if we had information that the other side was moving this would be a matter of great concern.

In response to the Secretary's query, Eban confirmed that Eshkol had sent messages to the British and the French similar to the message to the President. With regard to the question of possible preemptive action he wished to comment that during the past two weeks "the reality has been consistently worse than the projections". The Secretary interjected that this was behind our desire for more intensive mutual consultation. We wish to keep very urgently in close touch on all aspects of the situation. It is essential that we share our information in order that we can evaluate it together.

/2/Eban, Harman, Rafael, Evron, and Israeli Attach? Brigadier General Joseph Geva met with Eugene Rostow, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Foy D. Kohler, Battle, Sisco, Legal Adviser Leonard C. Meeker, and Walsh for a working dinner after Eban's meeting with Rusk. A memorandum of the conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. After the dinner Eban met privately with Eugene Rostow. A memorandum of that conversation, which Walt Rostow sent to the President along with the memorandum of the conversation with Rusk, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II.

The Secretary asked what the key element was in Israel's withdrawing from the general armistice arrangements. Eban stated that two elements are vital: an effective cease-fire and frontiers which are respected. The machinery utilized is not the essence and UNEF was effective from 1956 to 1967 because the two vital elements were present. Ambassador Harman also noted that the Suez blockade against Israeli ships was not compatible with the armistice agreement.

With regard to the Secretary's query about the Israeli attitude toward foreign forces on its territory, Eban replied that the key question is one of function. UNEF, for example, has been tied to a specific geographical situation; if UN forces were moved from Gaza to Israel they would lose their deterrence.

Eban emphasized that his government was interested in any possible action related to the Strait problem. It would be most useful, for example, if the President were to send Prime Minister Eshkol a message commencing with the statement that "we are going to open the Straits" and then proceeding with discussion of detail. The Secretary replied that it was important to find out what the various alternatives can yield. He noted, for example, that the President had decided that we should complain to the non-permanent members of the Security Council (except Bulgaria) about their "soggy attitude" on the Middle East situation. This was in line with our view that members are entitled to act in support of the United Nations Charter despite the possibility of a veto. With regard to action in the Security Council Eban replied that Israel wants a verdict for something it is already entitled to do. He cited Secretary Dulles as thinking that the onus should be put on others. It was therefore important to take effective action with regard to the Strait and then let others come to the Council with a complaint if they wished.

The Secretary returned to the vital importance of more intensive mutual consultation and stated that we would start this tonight. He commented that our Embassy in Tel Aviv had been worried about "an arm's length attitude" on the part of the host government and we hoped this could be corrected.

Washington, May 26, 1967, 12:43 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Eugene Rostow. Cleared by Lucien L. Kinsolving for the NEA crisis task force. Also sent Flash to London, Tel Aviv, Moscow, and USUN. A copy was sent to the President on May 26 with a memorandum from Walt Rostow stating, "You may wish to see how the message to the UAR Ambassador was handled last night." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II)

202587. On instructions Undersecretary Rostow called in UAR Ambassador at 10 p.m. to transmit the following message: "Your adversaries believe that a surprise attack by UAR from Egypt and Syria is imminent from moment to moment. We know this is unthinkable. We cannot believe the government of the UAR would be so reckless. Such a course would obviously have the most serious possible consequences. Therefore we are continuing to advise restraint on the part of GOI." We do not wish you to follow this up directly, but you must know about the message if the issue is raised.

Rostow explained that we were transmitting this rumor, which we believed and hoped was not true, as a friendly act.

/2/Telegram 202576 to all American diplomatic missions, sent at 10:26 p.m. on May 25, stated that the embassies in Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Amman had decided on evacuation of official dependents. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

FYI: The basis of this warning is an urgent report transmitted this afternoon by FonMin Eban to the Secretary. The answer to the Israelis is being considered. President will see him tomorrow. Meanwhile, we felt it indispensable to transmit this warning. End FYI.

Rusk

Washington, May 25, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, United Kingdom, Vol. 6, Prime Minister Wilson Correspondence File, 12/31/66-12/31/67. Secret. The message was transmitted May 26 at 0453Z. Filed with a draft that Rostow sent to the President on May 25 with a memorandum indicating that it had been amended by Rusk. Johnson initialed the memorandum, "OK. L."

CAP 67447. From the President to the Prime Minister.

I had a good talk today with Mike Pearson. He can, evidently, talk for himself. But it is my impression that he wishes us all to stay together in this Middle East crisis: First, to see if anything useful can be accomplished in the UN; and then to work out something along the lines that you have suggested and about which George Thomson has been talking with our people in Washington. I have the impression that--if it comes to the point--the Canadians will join the party.

We had hoped--and still hope--that this track will keep the Israelis steady; but I should report to you that Eban came in this afternoon to Dean Rusk, on a very urgent basis, with the following.

He reported that a message from his Prime Minister indicates they fear an early general attack on Israel by the UAR and Syria. What they have asked for in this situation is immediate application of the U.S. commitment, backed up by a public declaration as well as practical actions. They would like a statement by us that an attack on Israel is equivalent to an attack on the U.S. They also want this announcement accompanied by an instruction to U.S. forces in the area to coordinate action with the Israeli Defense Force against any possible attack.

Our own intelligence estimate does not back up their statement, and we are not inclined to be as alarmed as they appear to be. We are taking the line with them here that our own knowledge does not coincide with their estimates. We are also pointing out that as far as the U.S. is concerned, the President and the Congress must proceed together in dealing with this problem, and on a multilateral basis.

We are also urging upon Eban the real danger of any pre-emptive action by the Israelis which would create an impossible situation in the Middle East as well as in the U.S. It would, we fear, create real difficulty in getting the support of other countries, to say nothing of Congressional support in the U.S.

I will see Eban tomorrow, as I feel I must. I plan to follow the same line with him Dean Rusk is taking tonight.

I would be interested to know whether your intelligence people share our judgment that the Israeli assessment is overdrawn; and, indeed, what your estimate of Nasser's intentions is.

I should also like you to know directly my own view about the notion of four-power meetings outside the United Nations. I am against them, for reasons we can discuss when we meet on June 2. I am, of course, quite content to have the permanent representatives of the members of the Security Council meet in New York; but I do believe it would be unwise now to encourage quadripartitism outside that framework.

I must say that the initiative you have showed in this crisis thus far has been greatly appreciated here where our capacity to act hinges so greatly on some of us at least being able to move together.

Cairo, May 26, 1967, 1000Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis; Noforn. Received at 7:32 a.m. and passed to the White House at 7:50 a.m. A copy was sent to the President with a May 26 memorandum from Walt Rostow stating, "You may wish to get the flavor of the perspective of our Embassy in Cairo." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. I)

/2/Telegram 3775 from Amman, May 26, transmitted an oral message from King Hussein to the highest U.S. authorities stating that the United States was risking the hostility of the entire Arab world and complete loss of influence in the area for the indefinite future by the appearance it was giving of identifying itself with Israel over the Tiran Strait and related issues. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

/3/In telegram 7956 from Cairo, May 25, Nolte suggested a possible package deal in which Israel would give refugees a choice between peaceful repatriation or full compensation, international status for Jerusalem and the question of frontiers under the original partition arrangements would be subject to negotiation, Israel's existence would "in effect" be recognized by the Arabs, and Israel would gain freedom of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and an end to the Arab boycott. (Ibid.)

1. DCM, Parker and I impressed by cogency of King Hussein's message to US reftel (Amman's 3775).

2. We agree that our efforts should be directed toward dissociation from appearances of support for Israel versus Arabs and strictly toward UAR-Israel confrontation. We should remain neutral in this confrontation stepping in only if hostilities erupt and then as peacemaker.

3. Otherwise, we foresee heavy cost to US in terms political, economic and other relationships in Arab world, and in terms cold war balance of power. Equally, see little chance viable future for Israel save as armed beachhead, guaranteed by US (Cairo 7956).

Department pass Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv.

Nolte

Washington, May 26, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UK-US. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information indicated. The date is handwritten on the paper with a query but is evidently correct. The text, except the last paragraph, was sent to London in telegram 203642, May 26. (Ibid., POL ARAB-ISR)

UK-US TALKS ON THE NEAR EAST

/2/May 24 and 25

Thomson reported that the Cabinet: feared that the imminent closure of the Gulf of Aqaba would inspire a counterstrike by the Israelis. This, in turn, might lead to a bloodier war than occurred in 1956, possibly involving the major powers. In view of these dangerous possibilities, the Cabinet authorized discussions in Washington and Moscow, a public statement by the Prime Minister reaffirming the right of free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, a cautionary warning to the Israeli Government, and approaches to the maritime powers proposing a multilateral Declaration of the rights of innocent passage.

The U.S. side shared the British assessment of the seriousness of the Near East Crisis.

The ensuing discussions resulted in tentative agreement on a staffing and ad referendum basis along the following lines:

1. Press for effective action through the United Nations, and in particular at the current meeting of the Security Council, to guarantee freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. We should seek to ensure that any resolution included an endorsement of the principle of freedom of passage. If the Soviet Government abstained, the principle would have received U.N. approval. In the event of a Soviet veto, action by the maritime powers would nevertheless be seen to have received wide international support.

2. U.S. and U.K. diplomatic approaches in the capitals of maritime states to canvass support for a multilateral declaration (text attached)3 to assert freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran. This diplomatic action would take place at the same time as action in the United Nations. The countries to be approached might include Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Greece, France, Panama, Liberia, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, Honduras, Argentina, Brazil, Philippines, Ethiopia, Kenya and Malagasy Republic.

/3/The draft declaration, dated May 24, is attached but not printed.

3. U.S. and British military advisers were to explore the possibilities and modalities of military actions deemed necessary to assert freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. Discussions commenced on the basis of a tentative British plan involving (a) a small UK-US probing force to escort merchant vessels in the Straits of Tiran; (b) a covering force consisting of the British carrier Hermes and its escorts; and (c) a deterrent force in the Eastern Mediterranean consisting of the 6th Fleet, the British attack carrier Victorious and the British bombing force on Cyprus. The British contemplated these forces to be under U.S. command.

The JCS prefer that the force be designed as a protective presence--not for escort duty--and be capable of defending itself. There is as yet no meeting of the minds between the military on the design of the force, which will have to be taken up by the two Governments.

/4/The report from Bruce is not attached.

I-35592/67

Washington, May 26, 1967, 10:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 77-0075, Memoranda of Conversations between Secretary of Defense McNamara and Heads of State (other than NATO). Top Secret. Drafted by Jordan and approved on June 5 by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Townsend Hoopes. The meeting was held in McNamara's office at the Pentagon.

SUBJECT
Dangers of Arab-Israeli War

PARTICIPANTS

Israeli Side
Foreign Minister Abba Eban
Ambassador Avraham Harman
Brigadier General Joseph Geva, Defense Attach?

United States Side
Secretary of Defense--Robert S. McNamara
Deputy Secretary of Defense--Cyrus Vance
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff--General Earle G. Wheeler
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (NEA)--Rodger Davies
Director, Near East and South Asia Region, OASD/ISA--Col. Amos Jordan

Mr. Eban said there were three key elements in the situation as it has developed over the past week or so. First, the Syrian terrorist attacks, second, the Egyptian troop concentration in the Sinai and the precipitate withdrawal of the UNEF and third, the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. Mr. Eban said, as an aside, that the withdrawal of UNEF would prove a historic tragic blunder. The immediate danger now is the Gulf of Aqaba situation which fundamentally alters the geo-political dimensions of the Arab-Israeli dispute and threatens the very existence of Israel. It is far more serious than terrorist attacks or troop deployments, for its consequences would be to cut Israel off from one-half of the world and leave it crippled.

Mr. Eban felt this was the strongest possible issue to draw a line on, since the Israeli position was not only juridically sound but had been "consecrated" by thousands of sailings under dozens of flags over a period of ten years. Nasser had tried to cancel this right in one brief speech. Closure of the Gulf is cause for war; it is as if the U.S. were to continue its Pacific maritime activities but to have all its Atlantic ports and trade closed off.

Mr. Eban said the Israeli Cabinet had met just before his trip and the decision was made to fight rather than to surrender to a blockade in Aqaba; Israel would not try to live on one lung. It had delayed thus far in striking because of President Johnson's urgings and because Ambassador Barbour had spoken of another alternative to surrender or war, namely, that the maritime nations would keep the Straits open. His (Eban's) mission to the U.S. was to find out if this was a real alternative and what steps the U.S., the UK, and others were prepared to take regarding it. Israel believed that the U.S. could open the Straits easily and with virtually no risk. It would only take a few U.S. escort vessels.

/2/Ambassador Harman delivered a copy of this document, unsigned and untitled, dated February 26, 1957, to Eugene Rostow with a covering letter of May 26. It states that at a meeting on February 24, 1957, the Israeli Ambassador sought clarification on U.S. attitudes and intent on matters discussed in the U.S. memorandum of February 11, 1957. It continues with side-by-side summaries of questions asked by Ambassador Eban and replies given by Secretary Dulles. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-2 ARAB-ISR) The U.S. record of the meeting on February 24, 1957, between Dulles and Eban is in Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XVII, pp. 254-267. The next day Reuven Shiloah, Minister of the Israeli Embassy, gave Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs William M. Rountree an Israeli working paper, unsigned and undated, summarizing Eban's queries and Dulles' comments. According to the U.S. memorandum of the conversation, Shiloah emphasized that the paper had no status as a document. (Ibid., pp. 270-271) No record has been found in Department of State records showing U.S. acceptance of the Israeli paper as an agreed minute.

/3/A second document delivered to Rostow by Harman on May 26, headed "Summary of Conversation, Secretary Dulles' Residence, Washington, D.C., 24 February 1957," quotes paragraph 13 of a speech given by Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir before the UN General Assembly on March 1, 1957. It states that the quoted passage was drafted by Eban and Dulles and that Eban had in his possession in Jerusalem a draft with the words "by armed force" added in Dulles' handwriting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-2 ARAB-ISR) An extract of the paragraph is quoted in footnote 2, Document 131. Dulles and Eban discussed the statement to be made by Meir in two meetings on February 28, 1957. Memoranda of the conversations are in Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XVII, pp. 311-313 and 325-326. The text of the Israeli draft declaration, as revised after Dulles' meeting with Eban, is ibid., pp. 313-317. The complete text of Meir's statement is in UN document A/PV.666; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, pp. 936-940.

Secretary McNamara asked how long Israel envisaged that the U.S. would have to escort merchant ships through the Gulf if it adopted Israel's plan. Minister Eban did not answer directly but said that it was important for the U.S. to begin escorting immediately and not to let the present situation jell as had occurred with respect to the Suez Canal. In time Egypt would find its interests served by a removal of whatever US-UK naval presence would be necessary in the area for escort duty and therefore would relieve the blockade. Egypt would find it too humiliating to have indefinitely to "submit to force."

Mr. McNamara questioned whether the situation would move in this way inasmuch as Egypt really would not be submitting to force and the continuance of its posture would cost it nothing. Mr. Eban's response was only that we were all faced with an immediate problem and he could not see very far into the future in this matter. He then went on to say he thought the "balloon would go up" next week unless he could take back with him definite American assurances of ultimate action to keep the Straits open. Such assurances should not be conditional on others joining; if the U.S. left it conditional, others would not join. On the other hand, if the U.S. made clear its determination to support free passage, unilaterally if necessary, then other nations would join. He said he needed to take back to the Prime Minister a clear idea of the "logistics" of necessary action to assemble forces and to push ships through the Gulf.

Again reverting to the scope and firmness of prior U.S. commitments he said Aqaba would be a test of whether the U.S. keeps its commitments. Mr. McNamara replied that there should be no question in anybody's mind about the U.S. willingness to honor its commitments; we had demonstrated that in many ways. Mr. Eban suggested that there was question in some minds about whether the U.S. could both carry on in Vietnam and honor its commitments in the Middle East. Mr. McNamara said he hoped there was no doubt in Minister Eban's mind for there certainly was no question of our military capabilities.

Mr. McNamara went on then to say, however, that Israel should realize that an Israeli attack under present circumstances would have most serious consequences. We cannot undertake to support Israel if Israel launches an attack. He said that the U.S. agreed with the Israeli view that Israel would prevail in a conflict, even if hostilities were initiated by Egypt, and that the issue before us should not be a preemptive attack by Israel but how to prevent hostilities. He read the pertinent passage from the President's speech of May 24 and said that he thought this made clear our continuing commitments. We must, however, exhaust the UN route and secure Congressional and public support for necessary measures.

Mr. Eban observed that action through the UN could not amount to anything in view of Russian intransigence. He said that Mr. deGaulle had tried fruitlessly with his 4-power approach and Foreign Minister Brown had been equally unsuccessful in Moscow. The UN phase of the action should be very short for that route is a cul-de-sac.

Mr. McNamara asked how General deGaulle saw the situation. Mr. Eban responded that he had seen Mr. deGaulle early on in the crisis when he still had his fixation about the 4-power approach. Now that that approach had foundered Mr. deGaulle should be approached again since in 1957 the French had been the strongest supporter of Israel's rights in the Gulf.

At this point in the meeting Ambassador Harman was called to the telephone urgently and he reappeared in a couple of minutes with a note which said that a recheck of Israel's intelligence had confirmed Prime Minister Eshkol's flash warning of yesterday that a UAR-Syrian attack was imminent. Mr. Eban said this is not just an evaluation of intelligence but is "information", a word he later changed to "knowledge." Mr. McNamara said that our intelligence differed on some of the facts Prime Minister Eshkol had relied upon; but, more importantly, our appraisal of the facts was different. We thought the Egyptian deployments were defensive in character and anticipatory of a possible Israeli attack.

General Wheeler asked if Minister Eban's reference to the reaffirmed intelligence of an imminent attack as "knowledge" meant that Israel knew with certainty the Egyptians' intent, for example through an agent, as well as their troop dispositions. Mr. Eban reaffirmed the statement that this was knowledge.

General Wheeler restated the American view of Israel's military superiority and said that, although we recognize that casualties would be greater than in 1948 and 1956, Israel would prevail. He went on to observe that as far as the ground situation was concerned, if the Egyptians came out of their prepared positions to attack they would be at a further disadvantage. He added that an attack against Israel would also importantly change the political picture.

Mr. Eban's rejoinder was that Israel believed its forces would win and he agreed that the balance of power had not been shifted by deployment of the last few days. He added that he assumed the American commitment to Israel was not, however, restricted only to the circumstances in which Israel was losing. Under the best of circumstances casualties would be great and Israel's urban areas were open to devastation. Shouldn't there now be a plan for joint action if hostilities break out? Surely the U.S. does not intend to stand by and merely watch. The Foreign Minister said that if Prime Minister Eshkol's suggested formula for an American statement (in essence, "An attack on Israel is an attack on the U.S.") was not a feasible way to proceed, surely another way could be found. The Prime Minister wants to know what the U.S. is prepared to say and do.

Mr. McNamara said that the President would respond on these points. He felt that there had been inadequate exchanges of intelligence and supply information between us and he hoped that we could improve these. He said that he now understood the Israelis' problem better and that he felt the conversation had been very useful to him.

Washington, May 26, 1967, 11:10 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified].

Mr. President:

/2/The attachment conveying this assessment was telegram STRIKE 4553 from CINCSTRIKE, May 26, 0801Z.

One underlying problem is, of course, that the Israelis feel that the longer a confrontation over Aqaba is avoided--and the issue is kicked around in the UN--the more their rights in the Straits will become eroded.

Walt

Washington, May 26, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XII, 1965-1968. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Walt Rostow forwarded it to the President at 12:07 p.m. with a covering memorandum commenting: "It follows the lines you suggested to me earlier but lacks an answer to the questions: Who would join the British party; What would be consequences of this approach in Arab world and elsewhere." (Ibid., NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 2)

SUBJECT
Your Conversation with the Israeli Foreign Minister

As you know, the Israelis have told us their intelligence indicates that an Egyptian and Syrian attack is imminent. They have therefore requested a U.S. public statement of assurance and support to Israel against such aggression. Our intelligence does not confirm this Israeli estimate. Foreign Minister Eban, in his conversation with me last evening, indicated that he would not press this Israeli view and request. He said the telegram would not have been written as it was had he been there. He seems satisfied on this point with the precautionary message we gave the Egyptian Ambassador. He also agreed that improved cooperative arrangements with our intelligence were urgently needed.

In our conversations with Eban last night, he made clear that Ambassador Barbour's intervention on May 23 held off a preemptive strike. Barbour was authorized to float the British idea of a maritime group, which could effectively protect maritime rights in the Gulf of Aqaba if UN action failed. That idea gave the Israelis hope for the first time that there might be a third choice for them, apart from surrender or war. Eban is here to find out whether this alternative is feasible. Their Ambassador describes the visit as "a fateful mission".

You have two basic options now:

(1) to let the Israelis decide how best to protect their own national interests, in the light of the advice we have given them: i.e., to "unleash" them. We recommend strongly against this option.

(2) To take a positive position, but not a final commitment, on the British proposal. The British Cabinet meets on the plan tomorrow.

We recommend this policy, as our best hope of preventing a war which could gravely damage many American national interests.

Leaving aside detail, the essence of the plan that we have in mind following our talks with George Thomson is this:

(a) a short, energetic effort in the Security Council;

(b) a public declaration by the maritime powers, which would be made as soon as possible, preferably while the Security Council was in session; and

(c) a contingency plan for an international naval presence in the area of the Gulf. That plan is now being drafted by British and American experts. If the governments reached agreement on the program as a whole, the naval force would be assembled as soon as the scheme was approved. It would not become operational for a time. And hopefully, its presence would itself deter UAR from an attack on shipping.

(d) at the same time, we should prepare the way to propose in the U.N. that a U.N. presence between Israel and Egypt take a position along both sides of the Israeli-UAR frontier. If Egypt refuses, we can ask Israel to accept. Such a force could prevent hostilities along that frontier, if both sides pulled back, as Eshkol has proposed.

Eban's preliminary reaction to the British idea is hopeful, provided we can be positive enough about our commitment to it to justify Israel in not going to war at once. He now thoroughly and I think sympathetically understands your political and constitutional problem. What he wants is as specific and definite a statement as you can make under the circumstances that we are seriously considering joining with other maritime nations at the end of the U.N. road in the plan for an international naval presence.

We put the case against preemptive strikes to Eban very hard last night, both from the military and the political points of view. I pointed out to him that we have lived with this issue a long time in connection with the Soviet Union, and come down definitively against the idea.

Despite this, Eban still believes, I think, that in the context of Israel's problem, surrounded by menacing concentrations (armed among other things, with nerve gas), he needs something pretty solid to hold the line against his hawks.

They have absolutely no faith in the possibility of anything useful coming out of the U.N.

Continuing informal consultations with Congress indicate support for an international approach and caution regarding U.S. unilateral commitments and action. We will have a draft joint resolution for your consideration by the end of the day.

We would suggest that you make the following principal points to Foreign Minister Eban:

1. We do not disagree with the Israeli assessment of the unlikelihood that the Security Council will be able to adopt a resolution which would be effective in assuring free and innocent passage through the Straits and the Gulf. However, we do believe that an attempt must be made even if only to demonstrate that the United Nations is unable to act in this situation. The proposals which are presently being discussed in New York are: a resolution assuring the free and innocent passage of vessels in the Straits and the Gulf; the resumption of full implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement; and a possible UN naval patrol comprised of such middle powers as Canada, the Scandinavian countries and others. Moreover, the Secretary General is apt to come up with some other ideas, but his report is not expected before Saturday of this week. These matters being discussed in New York will have to be dealt with even though it is unlikely that formal Security Council action will result.

2. We believe that the UK proposal for a declaration on the part of the principal maritime powers in support of freedom of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba should move forward, after appropriate consultations with Congress and concurrently with the UN consideration. We would then be prepared to encourage maritime powers to join in such a Declaration which would be presented to the Security Council, not for formal approval, but for inclusion in the record of proceedings. Several governments have already made or have under consideration statements to this effect.

/2/A memorandum Rostow sent to Johnson at 12:35 p.m. summarizes Goldberg's comments, conveyed through Sisco, on Rusk's recommendations. It states that Goldberg thought this sentence went too far; he preferred: "Our intention is to pursue appropriate measures that the Straits and Gulf remain open." (Ibid., Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II) A message from Goldberg to the President, conveyed by telephone at 2 p.m. that day, suggested a "face-saving solution" involving recognition of UAR sovereign rights over the Straits of Tiran, recognition of the right of international innocent passage through the Straits for non-strategic cargoes, and a confidential "gentleman's agreement" that the UAR would not intercept non-Israeli flag ships for inspection and that Israel would neither send Israeli flag ships through the Straits nor send strategic goods through the Straits on flag ships of other nations. He suggested that such a proposal might be floated through a third party. (Message from Goldberg to the President, received by telephone May 26; ibid.)

4. We will consult with the Israeli Government at every step of the way, and we expect the Israelis to reciprocate. We know and appreciate that in light of the difficulties which have developed as a result of Nasser's unilateral steps, it is difficult for Israel to be patient and prudent in circumstances where its vital interests could be adversely affected. Nevertheless we can proceed only on the assumption that Israel will make no military move that would precipitate hostilities in the area. Preemptive action by Israel would cause extreme difficulty for the United States. In our position of world leadership, the American people would do what has to be done if "the fault is on the other side and there is no other alternative". Therefore, the question of responsibility for the initiation of hostilities is a major problem for us. Of course if we had information that the other side was moving this would be a matter of great concern.

5. The fundamental guiding principles of the U.S. are the preservation of international peace and security and the preservation of the political independence and territorial integrity of states of the Near East. We have opposed aggression from any source in the past and will continue to do so.

6. We recognize the stresses and the economic cost to which the current situation is subjecting Israel. Bearing this in mind, the United States is prepared to discuss with Israel means of relieving the economic impact of current special burdens on the Israeli economy. We will continue to review the military supply requirements in light of the changing situation.

Dean Rusk