Washington, May 26, 1967, 1:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Miscellaneous Material. Top Secret. Drafted on May 27. Filed with a covering memorandum from Saunders to George Christian stating that he had dictated this draft from his notes and Christian could make additions or revisions before putting it in the President's records. A few handwritten corrections by Saunders appear on the source text and on a copy that Saunders sent to Walt Rostow. (Ibid., Vol. II) No copy with further revisions has been found. The agenda for the meeting, prepared by Rostow, is ibid. The meeting, held in the Cabinet Room, began at 1:33 p.m. The President left the meeting at 3:10 p.m. and returned at 3:51 p.m.; the meeting ended at 4:05 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

SUBJECT
Meeting on the Arab-Israeli Crisis, May 26, 1:30 p.m.

The President began the meeting by asking General Wheeler to summarize the military picture.

General Wheeler described Israeli and UAR forces as follows:

Israeli forces are 55-65% mobilized with 160,000 now in the ground forces. Israel has not yet called to duty the support forces that would be necessary for a long campaign. The Air Force and Navy are fully mobilized. The UAR has moved some 50,000 troops into Sinai and established them along two defensive lines, one behind the other. They have moved a number of fighter aircraft into the Sinai. In addition, they have established a small Naval force and 12 MIGs at Hurghada, across the Red Sea from Sharm al-Sheikh where there are a 3000-man parachute battalion and 4 coastal defense guns.

He described the military situation as of the moment as basically static. Although there have been two overflight incidents, neither side looks as if it is readying for attack. The UAR's dispositions are defensive and do not look as if they are preparatory to an invasion of Israel. The UAR has gained some military advantage by moving into Sharm al-Sheikh and by advancing its forces into the Sinai. He concluded, however, that Israel should be able to resist or undertake aggression and that in the long term Israel would prevail.

In response to the President's question, he believed that Israel could maintain the present level of mobilization for two months without causing serious economic trouble. Full mobilization, however, would cut into the economy. We believe Israel's full war stocks are designed to carry three or four weeks. To continue beyond that would require resupply. He thought the UAR could continue for at least a month.

The President asked General Wheeler to confirm whether anything indicates that either side will attack. General Wheeler answered that there were no indications that the Egyptians would attack. If the UAR moved, it would give up its defensive positions in the Sinai for little advantage.

He believed that the Israelis would win air superiority. The UAR would lose a lot of aircraft. Israel's military philosophy is to gain tactical surprise by striking airfields first but he believes this is not absolutely essential to Israel's gaining air supremacy.

He concluded by noting that on the Israeli side the greatest danger is the state of mind. The Israelis believed that if the situation jells, it jells in favor of the Arabs.

The President asked whether there was any military reason why we should make any declaration or any military moves now. General Wheeler said he saw none.

In response to the President's request, Secretary Rusk summarized the situation. Israeli Foreign Minister Eban had come in the previous afternoon with a flash message from Eshkol that the Israeli government expected an Arab attack imminently. Eshkol requested that we put our Mediterranean forces in touch with the Israeli Defense Force to coordinate action in the event of such an attack.

Secretary Rusk had told Eban that our intelligence does not support the view that Israel is threatened with imminent attack. He noted that U Thant said that everything he had heard in Cairo tends to exclude that likelihood also. He explained to Eban the President's problems with Congress and strong Congressional feeling that the US must not act unilaterally. He cautioned against a preemptive Israeli attack and said that we could not be responsible if Israel goes off on its own.

Secretary Rusk felt that Eban the following morning had pulled away somewhat from the message of Thursday evening. He indicated to the Secretary on the phone that he would not have sent that message had he been in Jerusalem. However, he did cite the "apocalyptic" mood in Israel and the heavy pressure for a strike. Eban expected to return to Jerusalem for a Sunday Cabinet meeting which might be "the most important to be held in the history of Israel."

Secretary McNamara had reported that he had met with Eban from 10:30 to 11:20 a.m. He said Eban was back on the tack of the night before--that a surprise Arab attack was imminent. Eban said Israel by itself had two alternatives--surrender or a preemptive strike. He had come to explore a third--what the US might do to open the Gulf of Aqaba. He stressed US commitments and expressed concern that so far he had had no indication that the US was ready to use force. During the meeting Eban received a message stating that the prediction of attack was no longer just an appraisal but was solid information. However, he was vague on the source of this information.

Secretary McNamara had said that the Israelis would stand alone if they initiated an attack. He cited the importance of our gaining Congressional support and working through the UN. Eban had questioned the efficacy of the UN. He predicted nothing would happen there and asked why Israel should not act now.

/2/See Document 69 and footnote 2 thereto.

/3/The aide-mémoire of February 11, 1957, as made public on February 17, 1957, and Lodge's statement before the General Assembly on March 1, 1957, stated that the United States believed that the Gulf of Aqaba comprehended international waters. See footnote 6, Document 36, and footnote 6, Document 32. President Eisenhower reiterated this position in an address of February 20, 1957. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, pp. 147-156)

/4/At his news conference on February 19, 1957, Dulles said, "The President has inherent power to use the forces of the United States to protect American ships and their rights all over the world. But he has no power, in my opinion, to use the forces of the United States on behalf of the vessels of another flag unless he is given that authority by some congressional resolution or by a treaty." (Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1957, 115 p. 404) The complete record of the news conference is ibid., pp. 400-406.

/5/See footnote 3, Document 69.

Mr. Eugene Rostow interjected that it was important to settle in our own minds the doctrine of "first strike." It was important to decide whether the UAR by proclaiming a blockade of the Straits, had already made a first strike.

The President then asked Mr. Battle to describe the Arab situation and Mr. Sisco to describe the Israeli position.

Mr. Battle noted a vigorous Soviet effort to turn this crisis into a US-Arab confrontation. He suggested that Syria had been ahead of Nasser for a while but would now follow his lead. He suggested that Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon will probably be weakened in the current crisis. The closer we get to Israel, the more difficult it will be for the moderate Arabs to stay at arms length from Nasser. He was sure Hussein and Faisal must be having nightmares over being drawn into this conflict, but they could not stay out of a holy war against Israel. The rest of the Arab world would not be important, except that Kuwait will probably be pressed to bail the UAR out financially and Libya may be under pressure to abrogate our base rights at Wheelus.

Mr. Battle summarized by saying: (1) whatever we do we are in trouble. If we fail to stand by Israel, the radical Arabs will paint us as a paper tiger. If we stand by Israel, we will damage ourselves seriously with all the Arabs. (2) We must remember that the Arabs never stick together for long. We know that eventually strains will reappear.

Mr. Sisco described access to the Gulf of Aqaba as the "gut issue" for Israel. Backing down would amount to surrender and maybe even the beginnings of dissolution of the State of Israel. On the economic side, Israel depends on this route for most of its oil imports and for many exports to the markets of Africa and Asia it is trying to develop. Legally, Israel has the same interest as we do in keeping the Straits open as a matter of principle. Israel has made it clear that if the choice is surrender or action on any of these fronts, it will choose action. Mr. Sisco pointed out that Israel has no faith in the UN. The UN Security Council proved itself unable to deal with the problem of cross border terrorism after the Syrian incidents last October. Nor does Israel have faith in the ability of UN Truce Supervisory Organization to in any way limit these incidents. It has no faith in the General Assembly as now constituted. The composition of the General Assembly of today is quite different from the Assembly which after Suez established the UNEF. Mr. Sisco predicted that any General Assembly action today would be anti-Israeli. To top off their lack of faith in the UN, they feel U Thant is biased against them. He rushed to pull out the UNEF, and his slowness in getting out his report played into the UAR's hands. Then he went to Cairo and not to Tel Aviv. They feel he will not come up with anything more than some "gimmick proposals" to rationalize the status quo.

In summary, the Israelis are deeply concerned that with the passage of time and with the double standard in New York, they can hope for little more than gradual quiet acquiescence in the status quo. The Israelis believe that they have a special relationship with us. They are willing to exhaust the UN avenue if it does not take too much time, but they want assurance that at the end of that road the Straits will remain open. Mr. Sisco thought that cooperation among the maritime states perhaps with the support of a Naval escort to keep the Straits open would be the kind of concrete proposal the Israelis might be willing to accept.

The President asked what kind of force might be available. Mr. Sisco believed it would be impossible for the UN to approve any such UN force. However, we are working on a force involving at first the US-UK and maybe Canada--and then the Dutch, other Commonwealth nations, the Japanese and maybe the Argentines.

The President interjected that the Canadians had not promised anything but he felt from his conversation with Prime Minister Pearson that they would probably go along.

Secretary McNamara questioned whether the UK proposal brought here by Minister of State George Thomson had full UK military approval. This is something we will have to work out. In any case, we would not want to launch any Naval probe of the Straits until the UN has played itself out and until Congress has endorsed our proposal.

In response to the President's further question, General Wheeler described briefly the Naval forces now in the vicinity of the Red Sea--two U.S. destroyers (the Fisk and the Kennedy) and the flagship of COMIDEASTFOR (the Valcour). The UK has several frigates and minesweepers in the immediate area and the Hermes, a commando carrier, is somewhere not far from Aden. In the Mediterranean there is a substantial US force, and we hope we might persuade the Italians and even the Greeks to join. However, what is in the Mediterranean may not be useful in the Red Sea.

Mr. Eugene Rostow briefly described Eban's purpose in coming to Washington. He stated his belief that on Tuesday, May 23, we had held the Israelis off from striking. At that time he had authorized Ambassador Barbour to describe to the Israelis the proposal that George Thomson had brought to Washington. Eban now described that as Israel's first ray of hope and said that he had come to Washington to find out how serious that proposal was. Israel would regard the closing of the Straits as justifying self-defense under Article 51, but Eban is disposed to recommend that his government go along with us in an effort to unite the maritime nations behind a plan to keep the Straits open by collective action. He felt that if there were some hope that an international group would keep the Straits open, this would be sufficient to stay Israel's hand. Eban had said he also was disposed to go along with this plan if the President were behind it. Mr. Rostow said that this was the specific question the President could expect Eban to put to him when they met.

Secretary Rusk added that Eban needs to take home something that he and his government can use to contain the "apocalyptic pressures" they face. He said he recognized that that was the Israeli government's problem. He assured the President that Eban understands the nature of our public relations problems.

The President then asked what he should tell Eban.

/6/The Secretary-General so stated in his report to the Security Council on May 26. For the text, see Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Vol. VII, U Thant, 1965-1967, pp. 438-443.

/7/The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (P.L. 213), approved October 26, 1951, provided for the suspension of economic aid to nations supplying strategic commodities to Communist countries. (65 Stat. 644)

Secretary Rusk pointed out that the sensitive issue is whether Israel will insist on the right of passage for Israeli flag vessels. As a practical matter, the UAR might allow the continued passage of non-Israeli ships, but Israel may not be willing to settle for that. In any case though we should concentrate on the Straits, we won't get too far until U Thant reports.

Secretary McNamara said he saw no "perishability" in the situation as it stands except for the fact that Israel probably can not sustain its mobilization for too long without economic cost. He asked the President whether getting support for a probe would be politically harder two to three weeks from now. The President asked whether a probe could actually be made.

Secretary Rusk said he had told Eban what he had said to Gromyko in the Berlin crisis of 1961-62. He had said then that the USSR could have war in five minutes but a peaceful answer would take more time to work out. The Secretary said he had told Eban that Israel has a tremendous stake in the world's view of its actions, particularly who is responsible for a shooting war if one starts. He had told Eban that Israel would not be alone unless it chose to go alone. He had emphasized that the US can not be drawn into war by the unilateral action of others. Because of US public opinion and the views of Congress we must exhaust all other avenues first. The Israelis must give our efforts a chance.

The President asked General Wheeler to comment on the efficacy of an effort by the maritime powers to keep the Straits open. He suggested that he could tell Eban that we would work through the UN even though we have our doubts what that course will produce. Then we could put our eggs in a multilateral basket by the maritime powers provided the military situation does not deteriorate in the meantime.

General Wheeler said that if the President decides to force the Straits the best way is by a series of steps. First, we might send a non-Israeli flag cargo vessel into the Straits. Then a cargo vessel with military escort (he noted apparent UAR instructions not to accost any vessel with a military escort). If these vessels were attacked, the least we could do would be to strike the air and naval bases from which the attack was launched. This would be a more limited operation than what the Israelis would have to mount. They would probably have to destroy all the Sinai airfields as part of any air attack on Sharm al-Sheikh or Hurghada.

In summary, General Wheeler expressed the view that the UAR would back down if the maritime powers were able to muster an impressive enough force. He felt that this would be the most precise military response we could mount; a show of force by the Sixth Fleet near the UAR's coast line might encourage the Israelis to attack or trigger an attack by Nasser as a last desperate act.

The President asked whether the UK has enough interest to "stand up with us like men." General Wheeler cited the UK's substantial oil interests and opined that the UK could not tolerate Nasser as the dominant force in the Middle East. The President asked, "If you were in Eban's place and we told you we were relying on the UN and a group of maritime powers, would that be enough to satisfy you?" General Wheeler answered that he would drive a harder bargain. He would agree to go along provided that the US guarantee to back Israel if these efforts failed. He said he might gamble that the US would have to back Israel anyway but would try to get some more formal assurance. The President turned to the rest of the group around the table and asked two questions: (1) Are there other elements of the situation we have overlooked? (2) What do you recommend? "Dean has to fly off to Iowa for a speech; the Vice President has a birthday party; and along about sundown I have to bell this cat. I need to know what I am going to say."

The Vice President summarized his view by focusing on the Gulf of Aqaba as the central issue and expressed his doubt that the UAR would attack. He felt the UAR would understand that we have a great stake in the freedom of the seas. He noted that this is a matter of life or death for Israel and we could not expect Israel to trust Nasser's word.

The Vice President then asked what about the UAR's capability to endure a high degree of mobilization over any period given its economic weakness. He wondered whether Nasser wasn't trying to blackmail us. He felt the UN would not do much. At the end of the road, we have a large stake in keeping the Straits open. Unless Israel thinks we are going to back them, it will attack.

The Vice President suggested that the President tell Eban that we have a stake in the freedom of the seas but that we also have a stake in peace in the Middle East. The Israelis have to have faith and we will use everything we can to achieve our ends.

The President asked whether he could go that far, and Secretary McNamara said he didn't think so.

Mr. Clifford pointed out that all we are acting from at the moment is a UAR announcement that it would close the Straits. As far as we know--since the UAR had been talking about our Battle Act--the UAR might allow even oil tankers to go through the Straits.

The President asked whether we expected a test soon and Mr. Vance and Mr. Eugene Rostow noted that there are conflicting reports. The Israelis say that one tanker has already been stopped in the Red Sea but we have no confirmation.

/8/Reference is to the language agreed upon by Secretary Dulles and Ambassador Eban on February 28, 1957; for Foreign Minister Meir's statement the next day, see footnote 3, Document 69.

Mr. Clifford went on to say that regardless of the legal points involved, in world opinion the UAR has not yet moved. So far we have had only an oral threat. He felt it exceedingly important that Israel not take the first overt step. If it does, we will bear the brunt of the world's reaction.

Nevertheless, Mr. Clifford felt that Israel's life was indeed at stake and that we must assure access to the Gulf. If Nasser succeeds in closing the Gulf, he will have won a major victory.

He felt that we have an excellent issue in the freedom of the seas and that we must call Nasser's bluff. We must put him in a position where he either takes an overt act against free shipping or backs down. Mr. Clifford made a major point of the fact that our ultimate objective is to put an Israeli ship through the Straits and on into its port.

He concluded that there is no obligation to say all of this to Eban later in the day. He felt it would be enough to say that we sympathize, that we are studying this but have no commitment to make yet. The President asked whether Eban would not misjudge this as a cold shoulder and go home to advise his Cabinet that it could not count on the US. Mr. Clifford felt that our expression of sympathy would be enough. Secretary Rusk asked whether this would not sound as if we are diluting our commitment. Mr. Clifford said we need not volunteer any statement on what we would do in the Straits, but the President laughingly said he was sure he would have a chance to discuss that subject.

The President asked whether this would be enough for Eban to take home to keep the Israeli Cabinet from deciding to strike. Secretary McNamara said he thought a little more was necessary. He said that in his conversation with Eban that morning Eban had in a sense asked whether we were not walking away from the commitments of our predecessors. Secretary McNamara would stop short of endorsing all previously made commitments because "there is some pretty bad language in them." He suggested writing a new statement of our position.

Mr. Ball suggested that two problems should be separated: (1) the principle of free passage in international waterways has been covered in the 1958 Convention of the Seas; (2) the question of belligerent rights is a separate one.

Mr. Ball indicated on the basis of his conversation with Mr. Shoaib of the World Bank that Muslim world opinion is coalescing against Israel. Shoaib felt that even the Iranians would have to line up against Israel eventually. Therefore, the Israelis would be "out of their minds" to attack. Their rights will be as clear two weeks from now as now. We should live up to past commitments but we should not underestimate the possibility of a grave oil crisis if we end up on the Israeli side of a fight. US companies would be under serious attack and would probably be nationalized.

Mr. Fortas described the problem as how to keep the Israelis from striking. We will open the Straits over the long run but the critical time is Israel's Cabinet Meeting Sunday. Mr. Fortas did not feel that Mr. Clifford's suggestion went far enough. He felt we would have to assure Eban that one of these days we will assure that an Israeli flagship will get into the Gulf. Mr. Fortas felt that Eban understands our problems but needs a package he can sell to the Cabinet in Jerusalem.

The President asked whether Mr. Fortas meant we would enforce the passage of an Israeli vessel with our men and ships. Mr. Fortas answered that we would use whatever force necessary. The President said he did not believe he was in a position now to say that.

The President indicated that Eban would not get all he wants. The big question was whether we will regret on Monday not having given him more. Nevertheless, we have the unanimous pressure of the Congress to try the UN and multilateral machinery.

The Vice President reiterated his point that we should tell Eban we have as big a stake in freedom of the seas as Israel does and that Israel should have faith that we will do what we can to protect that principle.

The President left the meeting at this point and suggested that the other participants might want to stay on and draft a statement for him to use with Eban later.

In the subsequent conversation, Secretary McNamara suggested four elements as part of what the President might tell Eban: If Israel initiates an attack, it will stand alone. If the UN fails and subject to Congressional approval, the President would work with other nations to insure keeping the Gulf open.

Mr. Fortas warned that we would not have a realistic choice between participating and not participating even if Israel provokes hostilities. He did not feel we could say that Israel will be alone.

Secretary Rusk stated that if Israel strikes first, it would have to forget the U.S. The Vice President countered that hostilities would face the President with the most serious politics imaginable. We will not be able to play with legalisms.

Secretary Rusk then tabled for the group's consideration a possible statement for the President to use in talking with Eban. That draft and a copy of the statement as the President amended it and finally used it are attached.9 The President rejoined the meeting long enough to make those changes.

/9/Not attached but see Document 74.

Meeting adjourned.

H.S.

No. 874A

Washington, May 26, 1967, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Situation Reports. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The cover sheet indicates the report was sent to Bromley Smith and seen by Walt Rostow.

The Watch Committee met in special session at 1400 on 26 May to review the possibility of hostilities in the Middle East, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

The Watch Committee findings are as follows:

1. On the basis of our review of all available intelligence, we do not believe the Israeli claim that Egypt is preparing to launch an attack against Israel [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

2. Concern of the Israelis that their strategic position is deteriorating could lead to a decision to attack or retaliate for reasons other than a blockade of the Gulf or Israeli deaths resulting from Arab terrorist acts. A test of the more limited issue of the Strait of Tiran may not come in the immediate future since the tanker Nora, previously scheduled for Eilat, has been diverted.

Washington, May 26, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Secret. The statement, headed "Draft," is unsigned. It is filed as an attachment to Rostow's May 26 memorandum conveying Goldberg's views on Rusk's recommendations for the President's meeting with Eban. (See footnote 2, Document 71.) Rusk's handwritten draft of the statement is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 2. A copy with the President's handwritten revisions is ibid., Appointment File, June 1967.

The United States has its own constitutional processes which are basic to its action on matters involving war and peace. The Secretary General has not yet reported to the UN Security Council and the Council has not yet demonstrated what it may or may not be able or willing to do although the United States will press for prompt action in the UN.

I have already publicly stated this week our views on the safety of Israel and on the Strait of Tiran. Regarding the Strait, we plan to pursue vigorously the measures which can be taken by maritime nations to assure that the Strait and Gulf remain open to free and innocent passage of the vessels of all nations.

I must emphasize the necessity for Israel not to make itself responsible for the initiation of hostilities. Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone. We cannot imagine that it will make this decision.

Washington, undated.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Filed by the Johnson Library. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

[document number not declassified]

Washington, May 26, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 5/67-7/67. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence. An attached note from Helms to the President states, "This is our response to your request of two days ago that we review again the military capabilities of Israel versus the Arab States."

MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES

Summary

Israel could almost certainly attain air superiority over the Sinai Peninsula in 24 hours after taking the initiative or in two or three days if the UAR struck first. In the latter case, Israel might lose up to half of its air force. We estimate that armored striking forces could breach the UAR's double defense line in the Sinai within several days. Regrouping and resupplying would be required before the Israelis could initiate further attacks aimed at driving to the Suez Canal. Israel could contain any attacks by Syria or Jordan during this period.

Discussion

1. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are at a numerical disadvantage to the combined strength of Israel's Arab neighbors in terms of aircraft, armor, artillery, naval vessels, and manpower. Nonetheless, the IDF maintain qualitative superiority over the Arab armed forces in almost all aspects of combat operations. The high quality of training and maintenance, the degree of operational proficiency, and the important, but intangible, morale factor give the advantage to the IDF, which operates through a single command structure and over interior lines of communication.

2. In contrast, the Arab states are hampered by a lack of cohesiveness and by friction among Arab leaders. The United Arab Command (UAC), even at the present state of alert, is ineffective either as a command or a coordinating structure. Only the UAR, Syria, and Iraq are coordinating military activity to any extent. Jordan, with limited offensive strength, is reluctant to become heavily engaged. Iraqi participation is limited by distance and internal security needs. Lebanon has no offensive capability. The principal Arab military strength lies with the UAR, which has now mobilized and has deployed the equivalent of about five divisions for a strength of over 50,000 in the Sinai Peninsula. Though field experience acquired by Egyptian forces in Yemen has improved their over-all military capabilities, the presence of some 35,000 UAR troops in Yemen and limited reserves at home restrict the additional forces available for use against Israel.

[Omitted here is more detailed discussion.]

Washington, May 26, 1967, 7:15-8:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, President's Appointment File, May 26, 1967. Secret; Nodis. The date and time of the meeting are from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but it was apparently drafted by Sisco, whose handwritten notes are in Department of State, Sisco Files: Lot 70 D 237, Middle East. Earlier, from 6:11 to 6:45 p.m., the President met with Israeli Minister Evron and Walt Rostow. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No U.S. record of the meeting with Evron has been found. According to Evron's report of the meeting, printed in Michael Brecher, with Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 136-137, the substance of the President's comments was similar to his statements to Eban. Johnson described his meeting with Eban in The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 293-294. Eban described it in An Autobiography, pp. 354-359, and in Personal Witness, pp. 386-391.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Secretary Robert S. McNamara
Mr. Eugene Rostow
Mr. Walt W. Rostow
Mr. George Christian
Mr. Joseph J. Sisco

Foreign Minister Eban
Ambassador Harman
Minister Evron

/2/May 28.

We had raised the possibility of a third alternative: an international solution.

He had come to explore that possibility. Eban referred to possible action by 17 maritime powers in the Suez crisis who came out strongly for freedom of passage and freedom of the seas.

He reviewed for the President his conversation with DeGaulle, characterizing DeGaulle's attitude as "everything having to be talked out between France and the Soviet Union". Eban did not have great expectations regarding French support, although he said that the French in the last few days, have been helping them with assistance for the Israeli armed forces. France has "opened its armories" to Israel. Regarding his conversation with Wilson, he was pleased that the UK is willing to play an active role in this matter on an international basis, but only if the US was part of the whole effort.

First question raised by Eban was what can and will the US do to carry out its commitments to keep the Straits and the Gulf open? Eban, referring to the President's statement of a few days ago, said the policy is there but the question is what are you willing to do to enforce it. He characterized the Straits and Gulf issue as the crux of the matter, since the Israeli position in Africa and Asia is dependent on this link.

Second question related to UAR intentions. Eban said he has been receiving numerous cables from home that UAR preparing overall attack on Israel. He said the US is skeptical, but his Prime Minister has told him the Israeli assessment is based on facts. What if this Israeli assessment is true? Should there not be a US warning? He stressed that Israel has to take this matter seriously since Nasser, in his speeches and otherwise, has made it clear that the UAR objective is destruction of Israel. He then suggested that it was desirable for Israeli and American military to get together and to plan what should be done if the Israeli assessment proves true.

President Johnson said he had made the US view absolutely clear in his public statement a few days ago. He thought it was wise for him to make that statement when he did, and he continued to believe this today. It may not have had the effect it should have, (he said he saw tonight on television a parade in Cairo against the US) but we feel strongly on this matter and therefore I decided to make this statement to the American people and to the world.

What to do and when to do it in order to assure free access to the Straits and the Gulf is another question. President Johnson said he is of no value to Israel if he does not have the support of his Congress, the Cabinet and the people. Going ahead without this support would not be helpful to Israel. We have a vital interest in maintaining free access to the Gulf and Strait, and we have made it clear that the closing of the Straits by Nasser would be illegal. As to the Israeli Cabinet meeting on Sunday, this is a decision for the Israeli Government to take without direction from us. However, the Cabinet should know that our best efforts and our best influence will be used to keep the Strait and the Gulf open to Israeli ships. We must now await the Secretary General's report. If we move precipitously, it would only result in strengthening Nasser. Moreover, we must do everything we can through the UN, we must see where it leads, even though we do not have great hopes.

The President continued that when we have the Secretary General's report, we intend to pursue the UN track vigorously. How satisfactory the result would be he did not know. He said he was not confident, and he cited the inability of the UN to do something about Viet-Nam. He said nevertheless the UN course must be pursued in the first instance. The President then went on to say that when it becomes apparent that UN is ineffective, Israel and its friends, including the United States, who are willing to stand up and be counted can give specific indication of what they can do. He referred to a public declaration by the maritime powers and an international naval force in the Straits area. We are making our best effort, the President said, and Israel ought promptly to get some judgment as to what other maritime powers are willing to do, what the French and British are willing to do. We would like to try to formulate an effective plan. Maybe other countries such as Italy, Canada, Argentina, Japan and the Netherlands might join with us. Eban interjected perhaps the Scandinavians would join.

The President then stressed that he did not want any of this information to get out of this room, but he said to Eban very confidentially that he thought Canada would be willing to provide a couple of ships if necessary. The President thought that it ought to be possible with Israeli, US and UK leadership to evolve an effective plan. How effective a plan could be would depend on many factors that we cannot now see. We do not know what the Secretary General will report. We do not know what the Security Council will do or not do. We did not know what our Congress would do. We are fully aware of what three past Presidents have said but this is not worth five cents if the people and the Congress did not support the President. After the Secretary General's report and the Security Council has considered the matter, we can see where we go from here. He said it would be well for the Israeli Cabinet to focus promptly on how to get the seventeen maritime countries to take steps to keep the Straits open. We want to keep the waterway open for Israeli ships as well as for the vessels of other countries. We will have to face up to this at some point.

The President said candidly that he did not find appealing Prime Minister Eshkol's ideas which were conveyed to him yesterday. We are not retreating, we are not backing off or forgetting what we have said publicly, but if he were to respond affirmatively to Prime Minister Eshkol's request of yesterday, this wouldn't be worth ten cents and Israel could get no help from the US. The US assessment does not agree with that of the Israelis: our best judgment is that no military attack on Israel is imminent, and, moreover, if Israel is attacked, our judgment is that the Israelis would lick them. Time would not work against Israel, it would not lose by waiting for the Secretary General's report and Security Council consideration. During this period there would not be any deterioration in the Israeli military position. We know it is costly economically, but it is less costly than it would be if Israel acted precipitously and if the onus for initiation of hostilities rested on Israel rather than on Nasser.

The President continued that the US, its people, its friends hold similar views to those of the Israelis regarding the waterway, and we are determined to find a resolution of this problem. The President expressed doubt that a number of other maritime powers would be willing to take steps unless UN processes had been exhausted. We must mobilize international support for our effort. He realized that the world had been brought to a new and grave situation, that the Gulf is an international waterway, and that the blockade is illegal and dangerous. But Eban should also tell his Cabinet about our problems.

At the same time, Israel must not make itself responsible for initiating hostilities. With emphasis and solemnity, the President repeated twice, Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone. The President added he did not know much about the Israeli Cabinet but he could not imagine that they could make such a decision. The President stressed that he had been spending most of his time on this problem and he intends to continue to do so in order to bring about a satisfactory resolution. At the same time he stressed that this must be done on a step-by-step basis, and that he would do everything that he is permitted to do. When we make a decision on what we will do, we will and must have reasonable expectation of support at home and internationally for the action that we intend to take. We are Israel's friend. The Straits must be kept open. We cannot bring about a solution the day before yesterday. If he were to take a precipitous decision tonight he could not be effective in helping Israel. Eban knew his Cabinet, the President knew his Congress after 30 years of experience. He said that he would try to get Congressional support; that is what he has been doing over the past days, having called a number of Congressmen. It is going reasonably well. He had also asked Bohlen and Bruce for suggestions that they might have or the Governments to which they are accredited might have to bring about a satisfactory solution.

/3/Document 74.

/4/The paper is not attached, but is quoted in Document 139. The slightly different text quoted by Eban in Personal Witness, p. 390, is presumably based on Harman's notes.

Eban said the President had said many impressive and sympathetic things. If the United States puts together a maritime group, Eban said Israel should be part of that group. Going to the UN is not enough, since the Soviet veto would prevent any action. Eban added with emotion that Israel was full of indignation at the Secretary General, whose precipitous decision to pull out UNEF had done greater harm to Israel than any other single act that he could recall. The Secretary General took this step without consulting Israel as his predecessor, Hammarskjold, had indicated would be done. Eban said Thant owes Israel a great deal for his blunder. The UN was a useful diplomatic conference, but it is not today an organ of security upon which Israel or any other state can rely. Referring to the possible restoration of the Armistice Agreement, Eban said this had two holes in it: the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf and of the Suez Canal. Eban hoped the UN exercise could be gone through quickly and as innocuously as possible. In response to the President's query, Eban said he was hopeful the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan and a number of others would respond favorably to join in a naval escort plan. These had responded favorably in support of the principle, but there would have to be US encouragement in order to get them to take concrete steps.

The discussion turned briefly as to when action is taken to transit the Straits and Gulf, and Eban said the test did not have to be with an Israeli ship. The President interjected we are not going to say it's all right if the rest go through, but Israel's ships cannot.

Then Eban spoke slowly and precisely, and said the question he posed was is there a disposition on the part of the US to take action? Time is important. I intend to respond to the Cabinet that there is such a disposition on the part of the US to act. He was confident that when Nasser saw a US-UK flag on an escort ship, he would think twice about violating the rights of nations in international waters, especially if the vessels are escorted. Eban inquired whether he could show the Cabinet a systematic plan to act, this would help him a great deal.

In response to Secretary McNamara's query, Eban ticked off Uganda, Malaysia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Japan, Netherlands as other possibilities if a naval escort team is formed. But he stressed that each one of these countries has asked or will ask, is the US with us? He thought they would join in international effort, but these countries would not want to take the first leap, and that the US role was key. He also thought the Scandinavians might participate, particularly in view of the fact that Sweden, on behalf of the Nordics, had made a statement in support of freedom of shipping in international waterways. The President, at this point, urged Eban to step up their efforts in the capitals in this regard.

Once again, choosing his words carefully, Eban said "I would not be wrong if I told the Prime Minister that your disposition is to make every possible effort to assure that the Strait and the Gulf will remain open to free and innocent passage?" The President responded, "yes".

Eban then returned to the question of the possible imminent attack of the UAR on Israel, stressing that they had information which led them to this conclusion. He didn't understand why the US didn't believe this, and stressed the need to put our intelligence people together to evaluate the situation. Under Secretary Rostow raised the question of improved military and other liaison with the Israelis, suggesting that our intelligence people should get together and compare evaluations.

Secretary McNamara, in some detail, explained to Eban that three separate intelligence groups had looked into the matter in the last twenty-four hours and that our judgment was that Egyptian deployments made were defensive. Secretary McNamara said that, if attacked, Israel would deal the UAR a set-back. Under Secretary Rostow reminded Eban we had conveyed to the Egyptians this concern of the Israelis. Eban stressed Israel wants contact at the military level, the military people want some link. The President stressed that all of our intelligence people are unanimous regarding the assessment; that an attack is not imminent; and that if the UAR attacks "you will whip hell out of them". Eban referred to the apocalyptic atmosphere which existed in Israel. Harman said he hoped they were wrong and their assessment was incorrect, but nevertheless if Israel was attacked it would not have any telephone number to call, no military group to plan with, and he, too, stressed the need for planning. Under Secretary Rostow recalled that we had given the UAR an additional warning on the hypothesis that our intelligence estimate might be incorrect.

President Johnson, while saying we do not want to establish any joint staff which would become known all over the Middle East and the world, told Secretary McNamara to get together with the Israelis and to look into this problem. Secretary McNamara said we feel we are not getting the information we should from the Israelis and that an exchange of information would be useful. It was agreed some liaison arrangements would be made.

Washington, May 26, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Confidential. A note on the memorandum in Johnson's handwriting reads: "Walt, What do you suggest--L." A copy was sent to Rusk with a handwritten note: "Sir: This is the roundabout message from Nasser mentioned by Walt Rostow." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US)

Mr. President:

/2/Not found, but see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 341.

/3/No other record of this conversation has been found.

Against this background, I report the following:

At 4:10 p.m. today, Friday, May 26, 1967, Mr. James E. Birdsall telephoned the following message:

"I have this message, conveyed from Nasser. I don't vouch for it. I am just the conduit.

"Earlier Siddiqui visited Cairo and had a visit with Nasser. Nasser told him he would still like to be friendly with the U.S. and would like to see Siddiqui again after May 20. On May 20 Siddiqui cabled Ali Hafiz in Cairo and inquired whether visit still desired. Less than 24 hours had reply that emphatically Nasser wanted to see him. On May 24 he visited Nasser.

"This is the message from Nasser: 'Now is the time when all Arab people are waiting to see an act of friendship on the part of the USA. His urgent request is that the U.S. undertake no direct military action in the form of landings, shifting of naval fleet, or otherwise. Nasser assured Siddiqui that the UAR had no intention of fighting. What they are doing is returning to the 1956 frontier. He assured Siddiqui that this matter would soon be terminated without any fighting. He informed Siddiqui that his current actions were intended only to prove to the Arab world that Saudi Arabia and Jordan are false friends. And the Arabs should follow Nasser who is their friend. He also wishes to prove that President Johnson is impartial as between the Arabs and Israel and that he will not take any sides in the present war of nerves. If President Johnson can grant Nasser's request, he can be assured that Nasser will place his entire services at President Johnson's disposal.'

"If, after President Johnson's consideration, there is any good news to convey to Cairo, Nasser requests that he (Birdsall said he assumed it would be from him (Birdsall) to Siddiqui to Ali Hafiz to Nasser) cable to arrange another meeting at an early date."

Mr. Birdsall ended by saying he would like a telephone call as to whether message given to President Johnson, so he can notify Nasser.

Walt

Washington, May 26, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Secret.

SUBJECT
The Middle Eastern Crisis

1. The first thing that calls for explanation in the present crisis is why Nasser chose at this moment to abandon his long-standing reluctance to risk military confrontation with Israel.

a. At the immediate moment Nasser was probably prompted to initiate these maneuvers by Israeli threats against Syria. He probably felt that he had to identify himself with Arab nationalist interests and that some action on his part would refurbish his image in the Arab world. These views, however, are probably insufficient to explain all the events that have occurred.

b. He probably had decided (though he stated the contrary not long ago) that his armed forces were improved to the point where they could successfully stand off an Israeli offensive, even though they might be unable to defeat Israel decisively. Accordingly, he may have felt that if he could get his army properly deployed in the Sinai Peninsula and elsewhere, the chances of war would be acceptable.

c. It is possible that the Soviets encouraged him in these views. We do not believe that the whole operation is a Soviet plan, or even that the Soviets urged him to his present course of action, but their attitude must have been sufficiently permissive so that he knew he could count on political and logistic support from them in the course of the crisis. The interests of the Soviet Union itself would obviously be served by successes for Nasser at the expense of Israel and the US.

d. The US preoccupation with Vietnam and the bad blood occasioned thereby between the US and the USSR, probably had some important influence on the nature of Nasser's decision as well as its timing.

e. There may have been some element of desperation in Nasser's attitude, arising from the parlous condition of the Egyptian economy, the worsening of relations with the US, a belief that some sort of US-Israeli plot against him existed, and perhaps a fatalistic conclusion that a showdown with Israel must come sooner or later, and might best be provoked before Israel acquired nuclear weapons.

f. He may also have concluded, from a tactical point of view, that he could gamble on US influence and perhaps some Israeli indecisiveness to prevent an Israeli offensive at the early and most vulnerable stages of his deployments.

2. The movement of UAR troops seems to have gone smoothly and expertly. Yet there must have been in this as in other crises a large element of accident in the actual course of events. For example, Nasser probably did not expect such a speedy departure of UN forces from Sharm el Sheikh, giving him opportunity for a quick seizure of the position and an announced closing of the Strait. He has thus far managed the crisis, from his point of view, with great skill and success.

3. Clearly Nasser has won the first round. It is possible that he may seek a military show-down with Israel, designed to settle the whole problem once and for all. This seems to us highly unlikely. We still do not believe that Nasser considers his forces (together with those of other Arab states) capable of carrying such a campaign to a successful conclusion. And in our opinion they are not so capable. Moreover we believe that the Soviets would almost certainly advise Nasser against a military effort of this magnitude, perhaps with strong insistence.

4. The most likely course seems to be for Nasser to hold to his present winnings as long as he can, and in as full measure as he can. As of the moment he has vastly enhanced his own prestige in Egypt and throughout the Arab world, diminished the standing of Israel and, at least for the moment, administered a serious setback to the US. Moreover, by simply standing where he is he places the Israelis in an extremely difficult position. He keeps the crisis at high pitch, and as long as this continues the Israelis must remain mobilized. This they cannot do for long without adverse effects upon their economy.

5. The Israelis face dismaying choices. Surprised and shaken by Nasser's action, they failed to take the instant military counteraction which might have been most effective. If they attack now they will face far more formidable opposition than in the rapid campaign of 1956. We believe that they would still be able to drive the Egyptians away from the entrance to the Strait of Tiran, but it would certainly cost them heavy losses of men and materiel. We are not sure that they have sufficient stockpiles of ammunition and equipment for a war lasting more than three or four weeks, and it is possible that they would not embark upon a major campaign without prior assurances from the US of adequate resupply.

6. But the alternative for the Israelis is perilous. To acquiesce in the permanent closing of the Strait of Tiran would constitute an economic and political setback from which no early recovery would be foreseeable. The Israelis would expect, correctly we believe, that the Arabs over the long run would be encouraged to undertake new and still more dangerous harassments. We are inclined to believe that unless the US and other major powers take whatever steps are necessary to reopen the Strait, the Israelis will feel compelled to go to war.

7. In this event they might choose to begin hostilities by attacking Syria and wait for the Egyptians to respond. If the Egyptians did not, Nasser would lose much of what he has gained. If they did, they would lose the advantage of their defensive positions.

8. The Soviets are unlikely to take vigorous steps to calm down the crisis so long as it continues to produce deleterious effects upon Israel (and the US) and advantages for Nasser. Nevertheless they may be apprehensive about the future course of events. They may not have known in advance about the closing of the Strait. We do not believe that they desire a Middle Eastern war or that they have planned with Nasser the destruction of Israel at this juncture. They will probably oppose by diplomatic and propagandistic means any efforts by the US and the Western Powers to open the Strait. But, if we assume an attempt by the Western Powers to open the Strait by military force, we do not think that the Soviets would use their own armed forces in opposition.

9. One almost certain objective of the Soviets is to see the US more firmly and publicly identified with Israel. This would have the obvious effect of making the entire Arab world--including in an ambivalent way even the more conservative states--convinced that the US is irrevocably committed to their common enemy. It would further weaken the US position in the area, threaten US oil interests, and strengthen the Soviet position as friend and protector of all Arabs against their imperialist foes. This Soviet aim has already been realized in considerable degree. Moreover the Soviets must be glad to see US attention diverted from Vietnam, but it does not seem likely that they think the Middle Eastern crisis will appreciably affect US military capabilities or intentions in Southeast Asia.

10. One important question is what the Soviets would do if the Israelis attacked the UAR and waged a successful campaign. Such an event would be a grave setback for Nasser and, by extension, for the USSR itself. Nevertheless we do not believe that the Soviets would intervene in the conflict with their own combat forces. They could, of course, use their bomber and missile forces against Israel, but they would be very unlikely to do so, though they might threaten it. They do not have the capability of introducing lesser kinds of forces (ground troops, or volunteers) in this area with sufficient speed to be decisive, and we do not think they would try to do so. They would be cautious about the risk of armed confrontation with US forces. And they would probably count upon the political intervention of great powers, including themselves, to stop the fighting before Nasser had suffered too much damage.

11. The position of other Arab countries than the UAR is, at this stage of crisis, ancillary and comparatively unimportant. Conceivably Syria might touch off larger hostilities by attacking Israel in force, but we believe that both Nasser and the USSR would be opposed to such action. If war broke out Syrian forces would engage, other Arab states would send help, but it would not matter very much. The crisis in its present acute intensity is essentially one between Israel and the UAR, the US and the UAR, and (to a more moderate degree) between the US and the USSR. The course of events will depend upon the action and reactions of these powers.

For the Board of National Estimates:

Sherman Kent
Chairman

Washington, May 27, 1967, 1:42 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Eugene Rostow and his staff assistant Robert T. Grey, Jr., and approved by Rostow. Repeated Priority to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Paris, and USUN.

203800. Memcon Between Ambassador Dean and Under Secretary Rostow.

At his request Ambassador Dean called on Under Secretary Rostow, 10:30 p.m., May 26, to inquire about the results of the Eban visit.

1. Mr. Rostow opened the conversation by saying that USG was still not sure whether the basic strategy was going to work but we would know very soon. Our evaluation, which was confirmed by Eban, was that we had held the Israelis from making a strike by raising the possibility of a third solution between surrender or war. When we floated the British suggestion of a maritime force Eban had come over to determine whether this third option was in fact assured.

2. The Government's policy was explained to him along these lines: a) Exhaustion of UN proceedings; b) A public declaration by the maritime powers as soon as possible; c) Determination to pursue vigorously and urgently the question of a maritime presence to insure passage through the Gulf of Aqaba for all nations specifically including Israel.

3. We had two days of intensive discussions with Eban to make this third alternative as specific as possible under the circumstances, taking into account our Constitutional procedures and the necessity for making any maritime force an international effort.

4. We do not know if this will hold the Israelis but we emphasized to Eban over and over again the grave imprudence of Israel striking the first blow. We did not thoroughly examine the question whether the announcement of intention to close the Gulf as distinguished from an actual closing would justify retaliatory action by the Israelis under Article 51.

5. The purport of our statements was explicit, that Israel should not act alone and not take on the onus of acting alone.

6. Our intelligence has been reviewed by three different groups and we are convinced that the UAR is in a defensive rather than an offensive posture. Nasser has Sharm-el-Shaikh and seems to be holding on all other fronts. The Israelis have come back over and over again checking and rechecking their own military estimates. We expected that they would tell us they were going to strike but instead they merely requested clarification regarding the proposed maritime plan.

7. Everett, UK, said that UK assessment was that there was a continuing steady military buildup in the UAR and that the UAR could now assume an offensive posture. Rostow reported that USG had some disquieting intelligence which indicated that the Soviets had been egging the UAR on. This was not solid but it was worth taking a look at.

8. Dean asked how Rostow had found Eban. Rostow replied that Eban was not agitated and appeared serious and moderate. He gave a sober rather than a passionate presentation. Eban had indicated that he thought the maritime plan was a starter if he got solid assurances from the President. We have no direct evidence as yet of Eban's conclusions, and what he will recommend. Rostow thought in the light of his talk last night and his impressions today that Eban's recommendation would be positive.

9. Dean said UK reports indicated that Israeli Cabinet was in joint consultation and that Ben Gurion was back. UK felt that there would be a crucial Cabinet meeting either Sunday morning or Saturday evening. Their word is that it will be a "peace or war Cabinet."

10. On the question of using a neutral tanker to test the Straits, Rostow indicated that while we were inclined yesterday to let a test come, USG would consider the Prime Minister's advice very carefully and would take no steps on the matter without further consultation.

11. Rostow indicated that Israel had not discussed the modalities of the proposed maritime force but that Eban did ask that Israel be allowed to participate in it. USG had urged them to mount a diplomatic effort in making the enterprise a success.

12. Rostow asked Ambassador Dean what news he had about Cabinet meeting. Dean indicated that the Hermes had been turned around and was now sailing west toward Aden and that the Cabinet did not like the idea of a test probe in the Gulf. The Cabinet was, however, most anxious to learn about the results of the Eban visit.

13. Dean said that his own view was that any UN action would be exceedingly slow and that we would be lucky if we got an SC meeting by next Wednesday.

14. Rostow noted that the Russians had been reticent on the status of the Gulf as an international waterway and cited article in the Soviet press which was guarded. He also indicated that USG was considering what tactics we propose to take in the UN and that we would want to remain in close touch with the UK on this in New York. In any event USG felt that maritime planning should move ahead.

15. Rostow suggested that US and UK should move on the maritime declaration at the same time we move on the SC. The question with the maritime declaration was how clear you could make the implied commitment to use force if necessary to protect freedom of the sea and still induce governments to sign on.

Rusk

New York, May 27, 1967, 0809Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Tel Aviv Immediate, and to London and the White House. Received at 4:08 a.m.

/2/Telegram 203796 to Tel Aviv, repeated to USUN, May 27, summarized the meetings with Eban, including his meeting with the President. (Ibid.)

/3/Telegram 5492 from USUN, May 27, transmitted the text of a memorandum from Eban on the 1957 U.S. "commitment on free passage in the Straits of Tiran." (Ibid.)

1. Eban had received encouragement from talk with President, noting goodwill toward Israel shown by President.

2. He stressed GOI desire avoid war

3. He said that if GOI had commitment to timetable or scenario on establishing innocent passage of Straits of Tiran within a few weeks, it could live with it. Main problem was that precise agreed sequence events lacking.

4. Eban observed that Israeli military not spoiling for fight.

/4/The citation is incorrect. Telegram 5494 from USUN, May 27, transmitted the portion of the text of the Secretary General's May 26 report to the Security Council that concerned his talks in Cairo, assessment of the situation, and possible courses of action. The report is cited in footnote 6, Document 72.

/5/The last paragraph of telegram 203796 to Tel Aviv reads: "Israelis agreed to cooperate in improving intelligence cooperation, and we undertook to look into possible liaison arrangements through DOD."

/6/Telegram 203796 quotes a slightly revised version of Document 74, with one sentence added at the end of the first paragraph: "It is our considered judgment, based upon information from many sources, that an imminent surprise attack is not indicated."

8. While Eban could not predict GOI reaction to it, Goldberg strongly reminded him of necessity further consultation before any die cast and Eban recognized such necessity.

9. Eban observed DeGaulle had only pronounced lofty phrases signifying nothing about what French would do about Straits. French however giving GOI for first time all military equipment they asked for and were not pressing on money aspect. Goldberg informed Eban about Seydoux statement that France would not support SC res on innocent passage because wished avoid any commitment take action to uphold it.

Goldberg

Tel Aviv, May 27, 1967, 1150Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. Received at 8:23 a.m.

/2/See footnotes 2, 5, and 6, Document 81.

/3/Telegram 203752 to Tel Aviv, May 26, summarized Eugene Rostow's May 25 conversation with Eban after the latter's meeting with Rusk. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR) See footnote 2, Document 64.

1. Eshkol in continuous session with colleagues and military. FonOff rep called me in great urgency 1100 hours to ask if I had report Eban conversation with President. No report received by GOI. In view obvious agitation of caller I judged situation critical and called at Defense Ministry at once where I conveyed to Levavi (Director General FonOff) who immediately informed Eshkol substance reftels re conversations with President and UnSec Rostow.

2. Believe this helpful. However, Israelis took occasion embark on emotional, evidently sincere, exposition their thesis that evidence available to them conclusive that Nasser has "crossed his Rubicon" and surprise aerial attack expected any moment. My remonstrances that our most careful and equally authoritative assessment is to contrary were met by argument we behind times and essential intelligence this regard had been received in last few hours. They talked in terms of surprise air strike knocking out Israeli airfields and rendering their response ineffective. They said they had intercepts of Egyptian messages to confirm situation as they see it. Also frightened by fact four MIGs overflew Israel yesterday and Israeli Airforce not able intercept.

3. Levavi also read translation note received last evening from Soviet Ambassador advising caution and saying Soviets not want war Middle East. But, Israelis added, this not what Egyptian War Minister Moscow telling Cairo. Note seemed to me mild in tone and sound in content. I asked if Soviet Ambassador indicated similar message sent Nasser and they said he had said he did not know. I said I would think similar message probably has been sent Nasser.

4. Clearly, Israeli military pressing very hard for authority to take preemptive action and probably threatening Eshkol with dire military consequences for Israel if he does not do so. I emphasized again and again in strongest terms I could muster President's statement to Eban that "they would not be alone unless they decide to go alone." Also said essential at minimum they await Eban's arrival with full report before taking any action. They gave impression Eshkol will do so.

5. Broadest impact this session with me is that GOI cannot be convinced Nasser will not strike first. If he does, Israelis have no secondary response capability and they think they likely be lost. Crunch in government decision is what specifically we prepared do in event they eschew initiative and rely on our intervention if Egyptian attack occurs.

6. Levavi said in most earnest voice that, in his view, immediate despatch covertly of U.S. military officer to talk in terms U.S. estimates and capabilities directly with Israeli military might succeed in lessening IDF apprehensions to acceptable degree. In circumstances, if at all possible, I urge that we send such an officer. Eban may be able provide voice of reason on his arrival but I am convinced GOI situation so closely balanced as of moment that this additional exercise worth the effort.

Barbour

Washington, May 27, 1967, 9:57 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Houghton, and approved by Pierre Shostal in S/S. Also sent to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Kuwait, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Jerusalem, and USUN.

/2/Not found.

2. On behalf all Arab Ambassadors, Lebanese, Kuwaiti and Libyan Ambassadors called on the Secretary May 27 on instructions their governments to express concern of Arab countries about present Arab-Israeli crisis. Lebanese, who was principal spokesman, explained that in interest US-Arab relations, he wished to express to the Secretary deep feelings of the Arabs in the current crisis. Following represents main points of presentation.

3. Present situation had deep roots in Palestine problem beginning with creation of Israel. Although Arabs had many differences among themselves, they were all united on Palestine problem and against Israel.

/3/See Document 49.

5. Present situation was very dangerous one. President, in emphasis in his statement on having problem handled by UN had taken wise course. This was best way of avoiding irritations caused by Suez crisis, which had same roots in basic Palestine problem. Was sure wise leadership of US would facilitate solution in UN, but to do so and not lose support Arabs, US must remain impartial in UN deliberations.

6. Ambassadors emphasized that no Arab state wanted to start war and no one wanted unfriendly relations with US.

7. The Secretary welcomed opportunity to hear their views. Although he could understand deep roots of feelings in that part of world, US had nonetheless been working for closer relations with our Arab friends. He noted that some of problems stemmed not from Israel but from differences among the Arab states themselves.

8. The Secretary noted two elements in current situation. The first was possibility of an outbreak of hostilities. He was pleased to note that Ambassadors felt no Arab state wanted war. In existing tension, this was important if present situation was not to degenerate into hostilities. On our part, we had made strong efforts with all parties concerned to urge calm and restraint. He hoped there would be no military initiatives. We did believe UN should be in forefront in finding solution.

9. The second element was problem of Straits of Tiran. This was not just an Israeli problem, but one for all maritime states. If solution could be found to this problem, he thought tensions would perhaps subside.

10. He was not sure about the Fatah or the Palestine Liberation Force. If they continued activities, there would be trouble. He could not understand why Nasser announced his blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba at the very time that the Secretary General of the United Nations was on his way to Cairo. Nasser should surely have known from the President's statement of the deep concern over this problem. He assured the Ambassadors that we would be making maximum efforts during next few days here and in the Security Council to find a solution to the problem. We did not think any country wanted war, but that did not produce a solution.

11. A discussion then ensued on the problem of the Straits of Tiran. The Arab Ambassadors pointed out that no Israeli ships had passed through the Straits during the period 1947 through 1956. Consequently, the Straits could not be of vital importance to the Israelis. The Straits had been opened to the Israelis as a result of the aggression of 1956. Nasser, by his action, had restored the position pertaining prior to that aggression. The Ambassadors hoped the United States could use its good offices to persuade Israelis not to begin war over Straits issue.

12. The Secretary emphasized again the seriousness of the problem and the importance of the right of innocent passage through the Straits being maintained.

Rusk

Moscow, May 27, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, U.S.S.R.--Presidential Correspondence. Secret; Nodis. The source text, a translation transcribed in the Division of Language Services of the Department of State, was sent to Walt Rostow, along with the original letter in Russian, with a covering memorandum of May 31 from Read. The classification appears on the translation but not on the original letter. Soviet Charge Yuri N. Chernyakov gave the letter to Secretary Rusk at 3 p.m. on May 27. After Soviet Country Director Malcolm Toon translated the letter, Rusk told Chernyakov he would transmit it to the President immediately. He told Chernyakov he could inform his government that Rusk regarded the letter as highly important, especially its last paragraph, and that the U.S. Government was making a maximum effort to restrain all governments in the crisis area, including Israel. (Ibid., Country File, Middle East Crisis)

Dear Mr. President:

According to information being received by the Soviet Government the State of Israel is actively engaged in military preparations and evidently intends to carry out armed aggression against neighboring Arab States. Under conditions of extreme tension at the borders of Israel with the UAR and Syria, Israeli militant circles are attempting to impose upon their Government, their country and their people an "adventurist" action for the purpose of resolving all problems by military means. There is a danger that these circles may cause an armed conflict, which would be fraught with important consequences for the cause of peace and international security.

We understand that in the situation now taking shape much depends upon the United States and upon you personally, Mr. President, as to whether Israel will undertake such a reckless act. In this respect there cannot be any other view. If there will be no encouragement on the part of the US, then Israel will not dare step over the line.

/2/See footnote 3, Document 41.

That's why we are in favor of a restraining influence, but, of course, not to the detriment of the lawful interests of the Arab States. Their actions are of a defensive nature. Moreover, it is precisely restraint that they are exercising and, as we know, they do not want a military conflict.

Of course, if the "adventurist" line should prevail and if arms should be used, this could be the beginning of far-reaching events. Should Israel commit aggression and military operations begin, then we will render aid to those countries that are subjected to aggression.

Neither we, nor you, nor the Arab countries, nor the people of Israel are interested in a conflict. We appeal to you to take all necessary measures to prevent an armed conflict. We, for our part, will also undertake measures in that direction.

Respectfully,

A. Kosygin
Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR

Washington, May 28, 1967, 2:05 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Grey and approved by Grey for Eugene Rostow.

203966. Memcon Between Ambassador Harman and Under Secretary Rostow.

At his request Ambassador Harman called on Under Secretary Rostow, 6:30 p.m., May 27.

1. Mr. Rostow opened the conversation by saying that we had many rumors, some good some bad. The news from the Dutch was good and the British were standing firm on their proposal. Harman asked about the French. Mr. Rostow said that we had pushed the French very hard on the UK proposal. We had pushed the Indian Ambassador very hard as well.

2. Ambassador Harman indicated that he had talked to Mr. Sisco about the UN situation and that he had heard that USG was working out solution putting the finger on belligerency. Mr. Rostow replied yes and that in our view positions taken in the UN tended to become permanent. He noted that Harman had heard what highest authority had said on question of passage for Israeli flag ships through Gulf of Aqaba. The USG was not opposed to a two or three week even-handed moratorium which would enable a high-level representative of the Secretary General to visit the area and study the situation. The key issue in any proposed moratorium was whether or not the UAR would agree not to blockade the Strait of Tiran.

3. Ambassador Harman asked if USG was firm on the question of allowing Israeli flag shipping into the Strait of Tiran. Rostow replied that Ambassador had heard what US officials had said on this question during Eban visit.

4. Ambassador Harman asked what other nations were taking same line. Rostow replied that to date we had affirmative responses from the UK, Dutch and Canada. Rostow also said that USG was working out a tentative scenario over the weekend. Harman emphasized that it was important for him to be in every step of the way as GOI expected to sign maritime declaration. Rostow said USG expected that GOI would sign declaration and that it was possible that GOI could have ship in escort squadron as well.

5. Rostow asked that GOI give us report on the actual number of Israeli flag vessels in the last five years which had actually passed through Strait of Tiran. Harman agreed to provide this information but said it was academic in view USG position.

6. Harman asked when USG thought that tentative scenario would jell. Rostow said probably this weekend.

7. Rostow noted that escort force was merely to show flag and that the ultimate guarantee for safety of this force was US 6th Fleet and vessels from other maritime powers stationed in Mediterranean. Our general thought was to get the maritime declaration out soon and continue planning to assemble naval presence but not to surface it until SC action reached certain point probably in two or three weeks. Rostow also noted that USG would have to consult with Congress and mobilize public support for its position. Harman said that two or three weeks' delay disturbed him as actions were beginning to take place on the ground. This was part of over-all situation and it was time for quick action. The tactics taken in the SC were of crucial importance.

8. Rostow noted that when Foreign Minister Eban had asked if it was USG position to pursue UK initiative vigorously he received an affirmative answer. Harman said that he had been asked for a detailed appraisal of US position and wanted to use the word determination. Rostow said words that had been used were fealty to prior commitments and determination but that problems of US Constitutional process and necessity of gaining public support had been clearly explained.

9. Harman asked about question of liaison between Israeli and US military. Rostow replied that in fact the place to start was with intelligence and that we should inform Ambassador tomorrow as to first steps.

10. At 9:15 p.m., May 27, Ambassador Harman was called in by Rostow who explained the USG had just received important message from Soviets which was phrased not as threat but as an appeal. The Soviets claim to have information that an Israeli attack was imminent. They had appealed to the US to use its offices to prevent the Israeli attack. Rostow also indicated that Soviet message had indicated a desire to use Soviet influence to restrain Arabs. We had forwarded an urgent message to GOI stressing importance of GOI not making first military move.

Rusk

Washington, May 27, 1967, 9:09 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis; Literally Eyes Only for Ambassadors. Drafted by Eugene Rostow, cleared by Walt Rostow, and approved by Secretary Rusk. Repeated to London and USUN.

/2/Walt Rostow sent the draft message to the President at the LBJ Ranch in CAP 67455, May 27, noting that it had been cleared by Rusk and McNamara. Johnson's revisions are indicated in an attached note by Assistant to the President Jim Jones, who informed Walt Rostow. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II) Rostow relayed them to Rusk by telephone. (Notes of telephone conversation, May 27, 7:40 p.m.; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

/3/Barbour reported in telegram 3822 from Tel Aviv, May 28, that he had delivered the message at 6 a.m. He also reported that the atmosphere prevailing the day before, that a decision on a military initiative was only hours away, had been dispelled. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II)

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have just this afternoon received a most important and private message from the Soviet Union. I am sharing its contents with you on a personal and intimate basis. It should under no circumstances become public.

/4/This is a slightly revised version of a sentence added by the President.

Mr. Eban will be reporting to you fully on my talk with him, and on our interest in the safety and vital concerns of Israel.

/5/In the draft, the first part of this sentence read: "It is essential that Israel not take any preemptive military action".

/6/The President eliminated a sentence at this point in the draft that read: "Preemptive actions by Israel would make it impossible for the friends of Israel to stand at your side." Jim Jones' note states that if Walt Rostow and Rusk felt something like this was necessary, the President suggested, "Without exception our Congressional leaders have made it clear that preemptive actions would find no support here." Jones stated that if something like that was used, the President wanted to talk about it first.

In my reply to the Soviets I shall of course take up your and our common views about the international character of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran.

Yours faithfully,

Lyndon B. Johnson"

If any explanation is necessary, you should add that the British and we are proceeding urgently to prepare the military aspects of the international naval escort plan, and that other nations are responding vigorously to the idea. The Dutch and Canadians have already joined, even before a text was presented to them. With that assurance of international determination to make every effort to keep the straits open to the flags of all nations, unilateral action on the part of Israel would be irresponsible and catastrophic.

Rusk

Washington, May 28, 1967, 0152Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 9:53 p.m. An attached typed note, dated May 27, 11 p.m., quotes Johnson's comment to Jim Jones: "I don't see where he says, 'let's stand up and be counted.'"

CAP 67462.

Mr. President,

Herewith Prime Minster Wilson weighed in on the Middle East with an acceptable proposal and a phrase nice to read: Countries, "with the guts to stand-up and be counted." Let's hold him to it.

Signed

WWR

Many thanks for your message. I'm grateful too for the very full account we have had of Eban's talks with yourself and others in Washington. I warmly welcome the insistence with which you urged caution on the Israelis. But I am addressing you now because I fear that, despite all your efforts and ours, there must be a serious likelihood that, after the Israeli Cabinet has met tomorrow (correction--today) to consider Eban's report, you and we will find ourselves confronted with what could amount to an Israeli ultimatum--that, if we do not give them even more categorical assurances than both of us have given so far about the right of passage through the Straits of Tiran, they will feel obliged to assert those rights by force, in whatever manner and at whatever time seem most appropriate to them. This is the vital issue. Closure of the Straits is what Nasser has gained. It affects a vital Israeli interest.

George Thomson and your people made good progress this week and now the military are following this up urgently. It is clear that we shall soon have a workable schema, though I know you agree with me that it is vitally important that we should plan to develop this through the United Nations, if possible, and in any case on the widest possible basis of international co-operation (even if you and we are going to have to do most of the donkey work). But I am gravely concerned at the time factor. An Israeli ultimatum (or something like it) on the lines I have suggested would open up a dramatic prospect of great power confrontation in an area where, as I said to you the other day, none of us can hope to control the local combatants, except perhaps by such direct military involvements on one side or the other as to constitute an unavoidable challenge to the other side. The potential dangers of that happening are such as to make it essential that everything is done to avoid it. I have in mind particularly the need to avoid a situation in which it could seem to the world--and, even more important, the Soviet Union would be enabled to claim--that the United States and Britain were taking sides militarily in the Arab-Israel conflict. In fact we have made it clear that our commitment is addressed to the principle of freedom of passage through the Straits as an international waterway: and, given a workable scheme, this is what we should do with you and any others we can persuade to join us. But, as I said in my earlier message, we can be under no illusion that we shall easily get them to do so unless we have demonstrably exhausted the United Nations possibilities. And part of this effort at the United Nations must, I am convinced, turn around an attempt to get the Russians involved on a four-power basis. We are going into this with our eyes open, knowing full well that French and Soviet estimates of the possibilities are likely to be different from our own. But we believe that we must exploit the intrinsic merits in the four-power approach, which is to get the Russians to face up to their responsibilities to prevent a really dangerous confrontation. We may not succeed: Probably we shall not. But our public opinion will not, I believe, understand or support what we may have to do hereafter if we cannot show convincingly that we have tried.

Accordingly, I want you to know that I have tonight sent a personal message to Kosygin urging on him the dangers of this situation and inviting him to get Fedorenko to join with Goldberg, Seydoux and Caradon, in the context of the present meeting of the Security Council, to see whether it really is impossible for them to hammer out something which could make sense in this crazy Middle Eastern situation. One of the main reasons I have done this was because George Brown had come back from Moscow convinced that the Russians are beginning to realize the gravity of the situation for which they themselves are so largely responsible and are really concerned to avoid an escalation into a major confrontation. I am not so naive as to believe that this means that they will cooperate with us at New York. But I believe it is our duty to try. If we fail and if the Security Council likewise fails then I believe that there are enough countries in the world with the sense to realize that world peace is more important even than trying to go on working through an impotent United Nations, and with the guts to stand up and be counted. In those circumstances, we should I believe get the broad basis of support that we want for our declaration and for any eventual enforcement action--who knows, perhaps even France might agree?

I need not say that in addressing Kosygin I have had much in mind your own reservations about four-power action outside the United Nations framework: and I have said nothing to him about any four-power activity anywhere else or at any level.

I am of course informing De Gaulle as well. We have heard today from the French that they still have no reply from the Russians. And they seem content simply to sit tight and wait for it to turn up, as if delay were what they really wanted. But the French clearly can have no objection to my urging Kosygin to support a French initiative.

Since I wrote this, we have heard from Pat Dean of the Russian approach to you. I note that you will be sending a message to Eshkol. I do not think I need send him any further message since our Ambassador in Israel was instructed this afternoon (in the light of a somewhat ominous remark to George Thomson by the Israeli Ambassador here) to make a further urgent approach to the Israeli Government urging them to maintain their present policy of restraint while international efforts to find a solution continue.

I think this latest news adds force to the approach I have made to Kosygin as described in this message.

Washington, May 28, 1967, 1:31 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, USSR, Kosygin Correspondence, Vol. I. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador. Drafted and approved by Rusk. Walt Rostow sent the draft message to the President at the LBJ Ranch in CAP 67457, May 27, noting that it had been cleared by Rusk and McNamara. An attached typewritten note, dated May 27, 9:30 p.m., contains the President's comment: "That's okay with me." It indicates that Jim Jones relayed this to Walt Rostow. (Ibid., Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II)

203963. Following is text of letter from President to Kosygin handed Soviet Charge tonight. Deliver text to Gromyko soonest possible Sunday, informing him we have used both channels because of importance of message.

"Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am replying immediately to your letter of today about the critical situation in the Near East. Since receiving your message, I have sent a further communication to Prime Minister Eshkol.

I can assure you that I have been making a maximum effort to counsel moderation on Israel and its neighboring Arab States. I agree that you and we both must do everything we can to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. We welcome your assurances as to your efforts in this direction.

The Israeli Government and people are in a state of high tension. They have heard the announcement as to the closing of the Strait of Tiran, they have seen the withdrawal of UN forces along their border and that of the United Arab Republic and they hear daily calls for a 'holy war' on the part of the Arabs to destroy Israel. It is important for both of us to do everything we can to reduce the further inflammation of the situation.

It seems to us of vital importance that a prompt solution be found to the issue of the Strait of Tiran. You and we, as important maritime powers, have a large interest in international passage through narrow waters connecting international seas. We urge you to counsel the United Arab Republic to refrain from interfering with the passage of vessels through the Strait. We hope that the Secretary General or the Security Council can find an early answer but I do not wish to underestimate the gravity of this particular problem. If this issue can be resolved, I should think that the prospects for reducing tension and restoring stability in the area would be greatly improved.

I do hope that your and our parallel efforts to avoid hostilities in this situation will succeed.

Yours faithfully,

Lyndon B. Johnson" End Text.

Rusk

Washington, May 28, 1967, 1653Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 12:14 p.m. A handwritten "L" on the telegram indicates that it was seen by the President.

/2/The remainder of the telegram quotes the text of telegram 3832 from Tel Aviv, May 28. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 ISR)

1. Cabinet meeting which began at 1500 hours local has recessed subject to call if necessary. Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of Knesset now in session. PM Eshkol will address Knesset tomorrow probably in afternoon or early evening.

/3/Barbour reported in telegram 3834 from Tel Aviv, May 28, that the Cabinet decision was "to postpone military action for few weeks in favor of continuing effort to ascertain whether diplomatic activity can solve crisis." (Ibid., Office of the Executive Secretariat, Middle East Crisis Files, 1967, Entry 5190, Box 6, Arab-Israeli Crisis, Chron, Tel Aviv)

/4/In telegram 3835 from Tel Aviv, May 28, Barbour transmitted the text of draft paragraphs that Prime Minister Eshkol intended to include in his speech to the Knesset. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR) Telegram 204024 to Tel Aviv, May 28, conveyed suggested changes, primarily to eliminate any suggestion of the content of Eban's conversation with Johnson. (Ibid.) The text of Eshkol's statement before the Knesset on May 29 is printed in Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents, 1947-1974 (Jerusalem: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1976), pp. 774-777.

Barbour

Washington, May 28, 1967, 11:30 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Eugene Rostow, cleared by Walt Rostow, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to London, USUN, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

204027. Please transmit the following message from the Secretary to the Foreign Minister.

Dear Mr. Gromyko,

/2/Documents 84 and 88.