Tel Aviv, May 30, 1967, 0900Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received at 7:05 a.m.

3857. 1. In hour long meeting at his request Eban reviewed to me developments to date and Israelis' current concerns and ideas as to next steps.

2. He said Cabinet decision on May 28 not to go it alone had been taken decisively in closely balanced situation largely on basis message received by Prime Minister that morning and on his (Eban's) report his conversation Washington. Cabinet fully persuaded by his report of wisdom playing out diplomatic hand including the Security Council on understanding that effective enforcement capabilities to assure assertion of right to free and innocent passage through the Straits would be marshalled during same period. The relatively few additional politicians such as the Security and Foreign Affairs Committee to which he had also been able to make his classified exposition had also welcomed US position. However, Eban sensed that the widespread uninformed public here is becoming increasingly uneasy as to just where Israel stands in the diplomatic arena. Consequently, while he does not advocate any public revelation results his Washington conversations he would appreciate it if anything could be done in the background, perhaps off the record with the press in the United States, to re-emphasize determination displayed by President in latter's May 23 statement.

3. Turning to the Security Council, Eban said he could not urge too strongly that we avoid any resolution on the legal rights of free and innocent passage through the Straits. He said he had discussed this with Ambassador Goldberg on his way back to Israel. In Eban's view, any effort discuss such a resolution would inevitably give opponents opportunity to becloud and weaken essential impression of world support such legal rights. He strongly urged that instead we follow 1957 General Assembly procedure of tabling a declaration by those powers willing to agree on legal validity of rights. He added a general resolution by the Security Council in favor of peace and tranquility would be acceptable provided its negotiation did not unduly protract Security Council deliberations. He emphasized that situation still so delicate that time is very limited. Eban said he considering going to New York for Security Council meeting. He would like to put Israeli case personally. However, he had not yet made up his mind. He feels such trip might be misinterpreted here publicly as suggesting too much Israeli reliance on UN which in present circumstance would weaken government's control of internal situation. In this connection, in line with request made to him in Washington that GOI use its efforts to enlist support of others, Ambassador Comay, formerly Israeli rep to United Nations, is embarking on visit several countries this morning. However, since GOI not fully informed as to exact state of play of consultations between US, UK and other governments and does not wish to cross any wires they are instructing Ambassador Harman to ascertain in Washington our ideas as to where and how Comay could make most useful contribution. Meanwhile, he is proceeding to the Netherlands since the Netherlands have already been in direct touch with GOI.

4. GOI does not of course anticipate that Security Council will be able to do anything effective to open Straits. It is relying on US-UK plan for international force to provide decisive capability.

5. Eban then remarked that crucial as the Straits issue is, even perhaps a more dangerous situation exists as a result of the confrontation of large Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai. Incidents there so far have been minor but a major clash could set off a conflagration at any time. In view of GOI best hope avoiding conflict that front is Soviets if they could persuade Nasser of necessity diminish tension by thinning out his concentrations. GOI would be more than happy to make parallel pullback. Eban hopes US going to bat with Sovs to this end.

6. Finally, Eban noted, while US and GOI intelligence estimates still considerably at variance but nevertheless Israelis prepared accept our conclusion that Egyptian attack not imminent, it impossible to rule out completely continued danger of full scale surprise attack by Nasser. It consequently essential everything possible be done to assure optimum US-Israeli posture in such an event. US had agreed to increase liaison in intelligence field, which being done. He had also discussed in Washington desirability of direct military liaison for contingency planning purposes and he wished reiterate importance GOI attaches to this matter.

7. Eban presented foregoing in measured non-emotional terms. It was remarked to me later by official also present that obviously Prime Minister and Eban have staked everything on assurances of support he obtained in Washington and there is considerable apprehension here that they may be optimistic in believing Nasser will give us time to follow scenario on which we have embarked. Same official also commented however that despite personal misgivings Chief of Staff Rabin is displaying firmest determination hold the hawks in line and strictly subject to political, that is Prime Minister's, orders.

Barbour

I-23434/67

Washington, May 30, 1967, 10 a.m.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files: FRC 330 71 A 4919, 333, Israel. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on June 2. The meeting was held at the Pentagon. A typed notation on the memorandum indicates Hoopes saw it.

SUBJECT
US Support of Israel

PARTICIPANTS

Israel
Brigadier General Joseph Geva, Israeli Defense Attaché
Lt Col Moshe Amir, Assistant Israeli Defense Attaché

/2/In the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

At his request, General Geva called to discuss US support of Israel in the present crisis. In essence, General Geva asked for a policy decision that the US would set aside previous policies and procedures and agree to far-reaching military cooperation and support of Israel in the light of the present crisis.

/3/See Document 69.

General Geva insisted that both Israel and the US have accepted a grave responsibility by restraint. He emphasized that Israel had nothing to gain by war. General Geva went on to indicate his concern with events in Jordan and stated that while he did not think the Soviet Union would interfere physically in the conflict it was supporting the Arab States diplomatically and with equipment.

General Geva stated it was his understanding that a "special relationship" between the US and Israel now exists. Under these circumstances he could not understand why Mr. McNamara had refused to loan Israel 150 to 200 thousand gas masks. Colonel Jordan explained that a loan might not be legal but that the US would supply the gas masks as soon as we could work out the necessary arrangements.

General Geva indicated that he foresaw problems with respect to military hardware. As examples, he mentioned the following:

(1) Israel is in the process of converting M-48A1 tanks to diesel-powered M-48A3's. This conversion process will take a year and a half, during which time these tanks are not available for operational use. Israel is now exploring the question of whether to request additional US tanks because of this difficulty.

(2) Israel had requested certain ECM equipment which had previously been refused. He asked whether it was necessary in this case to follow previous procedures (i.e., policies). Given the present "special relationship", he could not understand why the US seemed unwilling to release this equipment. (On at least one previous occasion Israel was refused ECM equipment on both policy and security grounds; the Senior Control Group recently decided to take no action on this ECM request for the time being since the time required to deliver and put this equipment in operation would be so long that it would not be useful in the present crisis.)

(3) Israel had asked that the USAF ship gas masks to Israel in Air Force C-130 aircraft but had been refused. General Geva felt that the "new approach" to Israel's problems should result in positive decisions on this kind of request. He foresaw that Israel would have serious financial and operational difficulties in transporting equipment to Israel in time to be useful during the present crisis.

Colonel Jordan indicated that he recognized the Israeli concern, but the issues General Geva was raising went far beyond the responsibilities of his Directorate. He would, however, take up these matters with Mr. Hoopes and Mr. McNamara. Colonel Jordan pointed out that the US has many interests in this crisis, one of which is to attempt to defuse the crisis. In his personal opinion it might make matters worse if the USAF were to deliver equipment in C-130 aircraft since such action might send the wrong signal to the other side. It was important for the US to maintain its ability to take the heat out of the situation by diplomacy and to stave off a conflict.

General Geva then took up the problem of US support of Israel's position with respect to the Gulf of Aqaba and possible US military support of Israel. He stated that in the present crisis the US is surely not neutral. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles had given commitments with respect to freedom of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. He referred to written assurances by Secretary Dulles and statements by Ambassador Lodge in early 1957. He also stated that Nasser seems to consider that Israel is isolated and is therefore playing all of his cards. It is important that Nasser understand that Israel is not isolated, and that the US in effect is supporting Israel's position.

An informal discussion of the US position and problems ensued. In general, DoD spokesmen pressed the ideas that we have interests in other countries in the area such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan; that the US is in a very difficult position which requires that it maintain flexibility. Maintaining flexibility may preclude overt, massive aid. If we can carry through with some influence in the Arab world, we may be able to achieve a settlement which will protect not only US interests throughout the area but also the long-range interests of Israel.

General Geva raised the question of combined contingency planning. He foresaw a situation in which Hussein might be overthrown or for some other reason the US would consider it necessary to intervene with military forces. He pressed the thought that combined planning after a decision had been made to undertake joint action would not work. Would it not be better therefore to undertake discussions and possibly combined planning at an early date?

General Geva indicated that despite the President's commitments to closer cooperation with Israel in defense and intelligence fields, the Israelis were finding that these commitments were being construed narrowly by those given the responsibility for carrying them out. Colonel Jordan indicated that he understood the point General Geva was making but that these matters were far beyond the responsibility of his Directorate. However, General Geva's views would be made known to the proper authorities. Colonel Jordan went on to reemphasize the fact that the US is involved in a very delicate situation. People at all levels including Secretaries McNamara and Rusk are wrestling with these problems and are making plans. These also involve the UK and other maritime countries. The President also wished to have consultations with Congress, which will take time. Colonel Jordan expressed the opinion that when these matters have reached an appropriate point he felt sure that discussions with Israel would be undertaken. At the moment we are most concerned that these efforts, which were of interest both to Israel and the US, not be jeopardized by hostilities.

Cairo, May 30, 1967, 1528Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN for Goldberg. Received at 12:58 p.m. and passed to the White House at 1:09 p.m. Walt Rostow transmitted the text to the President at the LBJ Ranch in CAP 67501, May 30. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, 5/12-6/19/67, Vol. 2)

/2/Retired Ambassador Charles Yost. Telegram 203930 to Cairo, May 27, informed Nolte that the Department was sending Yost, then serving as consultant to the Department of State, to Cairo to talk to Nolte and members of the Embassy staff and to bring back to Washington a first-hand impression of the situation and the possibility of finding solutions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

1. I find Ambassador and other two senior officers this Embassy are all firmly convinced (1) that Nasser had publicly committed himself to course in this crisis from which he cannot and will not retreat, (2) that his commitment includes application of Aqaba blockade to oil, (3) that Nasser would not be deterred by threats except clear and credible intent to apply overwhelming force, from which he would expect to harvest major political victory, and (4) he would probably welcome, but not seek, military showdown with Israel. Substantially same appraisal has been made to me by General Rikhye and AUC President Bartlett.

/3/See footnote 6, Document 60.

/4/Course B was the second option: to give firm assurances to the Israelis that the Strait of Tiran would remain open and take all necessary measures either alone or with the British to enforce them.

Nolte

Washington, May 30, 1967, 2038Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 4:28 p.m. A handwritten "L" on an attached note by Jim Jones, May 30, 7:35 p.m., indicates the President saw it. Another attached note indicates that Rostow sent copies to Rusk and McNamara.

CAP 67504. Evron came in to see me at 3:00 p.m. with these points.

1. A message from Eshkol to you will probably come in tomorrow.

/2/An article in the May 30 New York Times by John W. Finney, attributed to Congressional sources, reported that the Johnson administration was considering a possible compromise solution to the Middle East crisis under which the Gulf of Aqaba would be open to all non-Israeli ships, including those carrying cargoes to Israel, until an international convention on the Strait of Tiran could be negotiated. The note by Jim Jones cited in footnote 1 states: "Rostow says both he and Rusk have talked to Finney and Tom Wicker about the injustice and inaccuracy of the story today. Walt does not know what the NY Times will do about it however. Jim." It continues: "George Christian talked to Max Frankel who agreed that the story should not have been printed."

3. He said you made extremely clear to Eban your political problems and the implications of those problems for timing. From letters that came in the Israeli pouch today, it is clear that they also have acute problems of timing. I asked how long they could sit still before there is show down on the Aqaba issue. He said about 10 days.

4. As for tests in the Gulf as to which kind of ships Nasser would turn back. He felt them extremely dangerous unless we were prepared to back our play promptly. It would be politically and psychologically most disheartening to a have a series of tests in which the ships were turned back by the Egyptians. It would also commit Nasser more deeply each time. Therefore, he was against tests until we had mounted the force to make innocent passage stick as a principle.

5. He said that Prime Minister Eshkol was likely to express to you his "disappointment" that we had not picked up the suggestion of Eban for some sort of military liaison. He said the Israeli record of security in matters of this kind was excellent--citing a secret visit of the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army to the Sixth Fleet. Such liaison need not be permanent but merely for the duration of this particular crisis. Without such liaison, we might get into a situation of conflict without even knowing the aircraft signals on both sides which could produce a first-class disaster.

6. I asked him if he thought Nasser was interested in fighting Israel or only in picking up political capital in the Middle East at the expense of Hussein and Feisal. He said for the first time in his life he believes that Nasser on balance wants to fight Israel.

Washington, May 30, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Sent to the President with a covering note from Walt Rostow: "Mr. President: Herewith a somber letter from Prime Minister Eshkol, foreshadowed this afternoon by Evron."

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to convey the following message from His Excellency Levi Eshkol, Prime Minster of Israel, to His Excellency Lyndon Baines Johnson, President of the United States of America.

"Dear Mr. President,

/2/See Document 86.

"Your message and your remarks and assurances to Mr. Eban had an important influence on our decision to await developments for a further limited period before taking measures of our own to meet the challenge of the illegal blockade, the aggressive build-up of Egyptian forces on our southern frontier and the continuation of terrorist incursions into Israel territory. These provocations are further heightened by President Nasser's proclaimed intention to strike at Israel at the first opportunity with a view to bringing about her destruction.

The accumulation of hostile acts and pressures is extraordinarily intense. In the light of these pressures and of the possibility of a concerted Arab assault, a point is being approached at which counsels to Israel will lack any moral or logical basis. I feel I must make it clear in all candour that the continuation of this position for any considerable time is out of the question.

"The sympathy and understanding which you have expressed towards my country encourages me to summarize the steps which need to be taken in order to restore a minimal stability:

"(a) The Straits of Tiran: I welcome the assurance that the United States will take any and all measures to open the Straits of Tiran to international shipping, and that the United States and Britain are proceeding urgently to prepare the military aspects of the international naval escort plan, thus underlining the international determination to make every effort to keep the straits open to the flags of all nations, including Israel. It is crucial that the international naval escort should move through the straits within a week or two. With every further delay, President Nasser will consolidate his illegal policy of a fait accompli. Any hope of getting effective United Nations action for opening the straits is doomed to failure. I rely on your own friendship, your principles of international legality and on your assurances that the United States, if necessary, will open the straits on its own. Without freedom of passage through the Gulf, Israel's vital interests, her national and regional status, her relations with Africa and Asia and her international trade will be gravely undermined. We shall in no circumstances accept such a situation. We reserve our right of self-defense as was agreed with the United States Government in February 1957. Recent history shows that the appeasement of an aggressive dictator in one matter leads to a further escalation of extortionist demands.

"(b) The United Nations: We have conveyed to Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant our view that in the light of the United Nations failure, the very least he can do is to insist that the blockade and troop concentrations be cancelled. There can be no reward for unprovoked aggression, and the idea of President Nasser putting conditions to Secretary General U Thant is unacceptable. We cannot entertain any discussion based on conditions prescribed by President Nasser.

/3/See Document 77 and footnote 1, Document 63.

/4/For documentation concerning Eshkol's visit to Washington in June 1964, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Documents 65-67.

/5/On May 30 King Hussein and President Nasser signed a mutual defense agreement providing that an attack on either party would be considered an attack on both and that any joint operations would be under the command of the chief of staff of the UAR armed forces. The text is printed in The New York Times, May 30, 1967. Iraq adhered to the agreement on June 4.

Respectfully yours,

Levi Eshkol

Prime Minister"

The Ambassador of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to convey to the Honorable the Secretary of State the renewed assurances of his highest consideration.

Washington, May 30, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. It was sent to the President with a covering note from Walt Rostow, dated May 30, 6:30 p.m., stating that it was the basic background paper on the Middle East, for discussion and decision at lunch on May 31. A May 30 memorandum from Read to Rostow, which accompanied the memorandum when it was sent to the White House, states that it had been approved by Rusk and McNamara. (Ibid., Vol. III)

SUBJECT
Arab-Israel Crisis

As you know, our scenario on the Middle East situation envisages three steps:

a. Action in and outside the United Nations to head off the imminent threat of Arab-Israeli hostilities and to seek a political settlement of the Gulf of Aqaba question;

b. Formal and public affirmation by the largest possible number of maritime nations of their support for the principle that the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways; and

c. Contingency planning for testing UAR interference with the right of free passage for ships of all nations through the Strait and the Gulf, and contingency planning for the use of force, as necessary, to support that right. Implementing action would be undertaken only after measures in the United Nations had been exhausted and after Congressional approval had been obtained.

The debate in the Security Council will probably be long and drawn out; the May 29 session indicated little disposition to agree on any specific resolution at this stage. During Council discussion, there will be substantial opportunity to launch various private negotiations, involving the President of the Council (Denmark, in June); the Secretary General; the British, French and Russians; and the protagonists themselves. These are a part of the UN process which may be of greatest importance in the end. At the proper time, the text of the Joint Declaration should be circulated in the Security Council for the information of UN Members.

The British have already made soundings on the proposed Declaration (without providing a text) with the Italians, Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, Greeks, Panamanians, Liberians, and Japanese. We believe they have also discussed the idea of an international naval task force in the Red Sea with these nations.

We have made informal soundings on the Declaration (also without providing a text) and on the possible use of force, with the French, Belgians, Canadians, Dutch, Indians, Italians, and Norwegians.

The reactions to the soundings have varied. Most nations are prepared to support the principle regarding international waterways, but shy away from considering the use of force to secure adherence to that principle. Apart from the British and the Dutch, only the Canadians have so far indicated a possible willingness to participate in a naval task force; the extent to which the Dutch and particularly the Canadians would be prepared to join with us in the use of force is not yet clear.

/2/The enclosures are not printed, but see Documents 111 and 112.

The purpose of these approaches would be to obtain signatures to a Declaration, which reaffirms the principles you set forth in your statement of May 23, but which does not commit the signatories to participate in the use of force. The British and we would inform the Israelis when these approaches are made, and suggest that they back them strongly in certain capitals. We would also at the same time determine whether certain nations would join with us in the use of force, if necessary. These nations should include: Italy, France, Argentina, Brazil, and Japan in the first instance. We have suggested that the British and Dutch approach the Nordic countries.

Decisions are desirable on the movement of merchant vessels through the Strait to the Israeli port of Eilat. We have discouraged such tests of UAR intentions thus far, although some ships have gone through to Aqaba, the Jordanian port. All such ships have acknowledged the UAR controls, although none has been stopped, so far as we know. Armed force has not been used.

As part of our contingency planning, we are considering the possibility of tailoring the traffic pattern of ships entering the Strait during the next 10 days, in order to clarify the limits of the UAR policy of blockade--e.g., whether they intend to bar Israeli-owned as well as Israeli flag ships, and how they propose to define "strategic goods." We might for example encourage the attempted passage of an Israeli-owned (but non-Israeli-flag) ship carrying clearly nonstrategic cargo to Eilat; and if that passed without interference, we might attempt passage with a more "strategic" cargo (e.g., oil). Within this period, such tests would involve no armed escort and no counteraction in the event passage was refused. The purpose would be to clarify the limits of UAR policy and to build a public case for support of free passage.

A serious program of this kind would require consultation with Congressional leaders and an Israeli promise to accept the possibility of rebuff without retaliation. Tel Aviv may not be able to give such a promise, and the scheme may prove infeasible for other reasons--e.g., our inability to stage-manage the ownership, flag, and cargo of the shipping headed for Eilat. On the other hand, limited tests appear feasible within the next few days, and we propose to go forward with these where the risks appear acceptable. A Panamanian ship (Israeli-owned) loaded with hides is now heading for the Strait, bound for Eilat. We plan to do nothing to discourage its passage through the Strait.

A military task force may be required to support, with force, the right of innocent passage, on behalf of the international community, through the Gulf of Aqaba in view of the UAR's announced blockade. The essence of this concept is that an international force could keep the Strait open for all flags, thereby obviating an Arab-Israeli war. Such a task force should be composed of as many maritime nations as are prepared to join it in a reasonable time. In practice, only the US, the UK and possibly the Dutch and Canadians are likely to participate.

Conceptually, the task force would consist of two parts. First, a protective force in the northern Red Sea which would provide a protective presence for merchantmen testing the Straits, and an escort if the UAR, should turn back or fire on unescorted ships; second, a reinforcing force in the Eastern Mediterranean which would be available for reinforcing support if the UAR fired on merchantmen and their escort.

A limited protective force of four destroyers (two US and two UK), a tactical command ship (US), and a light aircraft carrier (UK) could be assembled in the northern Red Sea in about a week. If the carrier Intrepid, now in the Mediterranean, transits the Suez Canal in the next few days, together with her appropriate escorts, these could be added to the force. Application for transit of the Canal has been filed. Even with these additions, however, such a force would be devoid of adequate self-contained air cover and ASW protection and thus subject to attack and damage by UAR sea and air forces in the area (the reinforcing force could provide some air cover over the Tiran area, but the distances from the Eastern Mediterranean would limit operational effectiveness). A stronger, better balanced protective force--augmented primarily by US naval units from CONUS--could be assembled in 25-30 days.

US and UK forces already in the Mediterranean provide a powerful reinforcing force (consisting of 3 US carriers, 1 UK carrier, and numerous other vessels). British air forces in Cyprus may also be available. If the UAR fired on merchantmen and their escorts, aircraft from these Mediterranean forces could, and might have to, intervene in the Tiran area or strike at major air bases and installations in the UAR.

The risks involved in testing the blockade with a limited or even an augmented protective force are not negligible. If Nasser is not deterred, the possibility would exist of wider conflict. This possibility is being urgently studied, both politically and militarily.

Much of the Congress is away until Wednesday and some, including Senator Fulbright, will be away longer. We recommend immediate Congressional consultations on the Hill on the Declaration with the leadership, the key Committees (Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs and Commerce), and with senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. This meeting would be for the purpose of: (1) providing an up-to-date briefing on the current situation, and (2) reviewing our general strategy, with specific reference to the proposed Maritime Declaration. We recommend that the formal approaches to other nations regarding the text of the Declaration not be undertaken until after your discussions with the Congressional leaders.

Additionally, we plan to continue our daily efforts to brief other members of the Congress. As in the past few days, however, these briefings will continue to concentrate on current developments, and to avoid speculation about future developments.

In this situation, we believe that a Joint Congressional resolution would be politically necessary before US military forces are used in any way. The timing of a formal request to the Congress for such a resolution should, however, be carefully considered. While it is true that many Congressional doves may be in the process of conversion to hawks, the problem of "Tonkin Gulfitis" remains serious. Thus an effort to get a meaningful resolution from the Congress runs the risk of becoming bogged down in acrimonious debate. We recommend therefore that a formal request for such a resolution be delayed until (1) it has become clear to the Congress that we have exhausted other diplomatic remedies in and outside of the United Nations, and (2) our soundings indicate that such a request will receive prompt and strong support. The text of an appropriate resolution is Enclosure 3.

We hope to complete actions on the Declaration toward the end of this week. We would seek to have the military contingency planning, with the UK at least, well under way by the end of the week of June 5.

/3/No indication of the President's decisions on the recommendations appears on the memorandum. Walt Rostow told Rusk in a telephone conversation the next morning that the President wanted "some inventive thinking done on plans for dealing with this thing" and "did not want us to get too locked in to the maritime idea if in fact it turns into bilateral action." In addition, Rostow said, the President wanted the Israelis and the British "out in front in organizing the party." (Notes of telephone conversation prepared by Carolyn J. Proctor, May 31, 11:32 a.m.; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

1. That you approve the draft Declaration of the Maritime nations, at Enclosure 2.

2. That following Congressional consultations on Wednesday you authorize us to send a telegram substantially in the form of the text at Enclosure 1, instructing our Ambassadors in selected countries to seek commitments from the Governments to which they are accredited to adhere to the Declaration.

3. That following Congressional consultations, you authorize us to proceed at once to sound out France, Italy, Argentina, Brazil and Japan on an informal basis about the possibility of their participating with us in the use of force if necessary to secure effective observance of the right of free passage for all nations.

4. That you authorize us to add the Dutch, the Canadians, and other prospective members of the action party at a later point to form an international planning group which would be built around the British-American naval consultations.

5. That you approve the enclosed draft Joint Resolution for preliminary discussion late this week, or early next week, with Congressional leaders.

/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.

Washington, May 30, 1967, 11:59 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated Priority to London and USUN. Drafted by Eugene Rostow and approved in substance by Rusk.

204948. For the Ambassador.

1. We are seeking tomorrow to obtain at least nine votes in SC for resolution supporting para 14 of SYG's report to SC, calling on all parties to refrain from acts of belligerence or other acts that might exacerbate tensions.

2. Crucial goal of our strategy in seeking to avoid general war in M.E. is to restore status quo ante, so far as shipping to Eilat is concerned. A predicate to that strategy is a vote backed by at least nine members of SC supporting SYG's suggestion of a moratorium which would include UAR's not carrying out its threat to close the Strait to Israeli shipping and the shipping of what it regards as strategic cargoes to Israel.

/2/Bohlen reported in telegram 19549 from Paris, May 31, that he had seen Alphand, had given him "the current French line," that putting forward a resolution that would not receive Soviet support would only sharpen the issue, harden positions, and make negotiations more difficult. Alphand had agreed, however, to telephone Couve de Murville in Venice to get his decision on instructions to the French representative at the United Nations. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Unless such a suspension of UAR plans can be achieved, our considered judgment is that force will almost surely be involved, either by Israel under Article 51 of the Charter or by international maritime group to open the Strait, or by both.

Please stress that this note does not prejudice position GOF may decide to take later on basic issue of international law as applied to Strait of Tiran, should the issue arise in S.C. We are seeking now no more than a pause for diplomacy, which otherwise would have very few days to avert a clash whose implications are nearly impossible to foresee. We find it almost inconceivable that GOF would not support this moratorium plan.

Rusk

Washington, May 31, 1967.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Appendix A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

On May 31, 1967, from 1:15 to 2:30 p.m., President Johnson held a luncheon meeting with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Vice President Humphrey, George Christian, and Walt Rostow. The latter's agenda for the meeting indicates that next steps in the Near East crisis headed the agenda, with the focus on the Rusk-McNamara recommendations in Document 103. A briefing memorandum prepared for Secretary Rusk similarly indicates that the Rusk-McNamara recommendations would be discussed and lists three additional points under the topic Middle East Crisis. The first item, "Use of U-2," is not further explained. An attached "G memo" (presumably a memorandum from Kohler) is not attached to the briefing memorandum. The second item states that the President wanted Rusk or Eugene Rostow to call in Harman and "indicate to him formally where the Eshkol letter exceeded the statement of our commitment." The third item states that Sisco, Battle, and Meeker were forming a Task Force to consider urgently possible solutions other than the US/UK Maritime Plan, and that the President had told Walt Rostow that morning that he "wanted urgent work done on this." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, President's Luncheon Memoranda: Lot 70 D 164)

Amman, May 31, 1967, 1825Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Rostow sent a typed copy of the telegram to the President on June 1, with an attached note that reads: "Mr. President: Herewith King Hussein asks for your neutrality. Our Arab friends really find it difficult to remember what President Eisenhower had to do to get the Israeli troops out of Sinai. Walt." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. III)

/2/Telegram 3929 from Amman, May 31, reported a meeting between Burns and King Hussein. The King told Burns that after his trip to Cairo, he was convinced Nasser would not back down on the Strait of Tiran issue. He said Nasser believed the United States had the power to prevent Israel from going to war. Burns replied that if Israel concluded its survival was at stake, no amount of U.S. pressure would help. Hussein said Nasser and all the Arabs fervently hoped that in the event of hostilities, the United States would take no action against the Arabs. Nasser also told the King that in case of U.S. intervention against the UAR, he was prepared to ask for Soviet assistance. King Hussein said Nasser seemed confident that if the U.S. Government took "aggressive action" against the UAR the Soviets would give him "the required support." (Ibid.)

1. During meeting with Ambassador reported reftel, King said with great earnestness that he wished to propose to the President that he authorize issuance of public statement by a White House spokesman clarifying US policy towards the current crisis which would include the following points:

A. The USG seeks to be neutral between the parties to this dispute.

B. The main objective of the USG is to preserve peace and it is willing to use its good offices to this end.

C. The USG will not be responsible for hostilities in Middle East and will not be party to them.

D. USG will oppose any party who starts a war.

2. King said that he was making this suggestion as an old friend of the US. He felt such a statement would be a contribution to peace and consistent with what the Arabs knew were the moral principles of US.

3. Without such clarification, and however the crisis turned out, said the King, he was concerned that the US could suffer irretrievable loss among the Arabs.

Burns

Washington, June 1, 1967, 11:08 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Grey and Eugene Rostow and approved by Eugene Rostow. Also sent to Cairo and USUN.

206657. Memcon Between Ambassador Harman and Under Secretary Rostow.

At his request Ambassador Harman called on Under Secretary Rostow afternoon May 31.

/2/See Document 112.

2. Ambassador Harman inquired about the French position on this question. His own feeling was that signing a declaration was one thing but that he doubted whether the French would participate in the naval exercise.

3. Ambassador Harman then pressed the Under Secretary what US next step would be, asking specifically how long we would drag out the action in the SC. Mr. Rostow replied that Ambassador Goldberg was pressing hard for the disposition of his motion and that the US was standing firm on paragraph 14 of the SG report which raised the question of belligerency.

4. Mr. Rostow said that in his opinion Nasser would be inclined to hold on to what he has and not take any more risks, concentrating on the moderate Arab States rather than Israel, if he could hold to his victory at Sharm al-Sheikh. The issue of how to test the announced blockade was crucial in getting back to the status quo ante.

5. Ambassador Harman then asked when and what test would we use to force the Strait. Mr. Rostow replied that we were discussing two sets of plans: (1) possibility of sending unescorted ship through the Strait and (2) question of sending escorted ship through the Strait. He indicated that the question of force was a difficult one. Who uses force first and in what way would it be used could determine many aspects of the outcome. We were studying this one very carefully. In all our planning, however, the doctrine of the measured response applies. He reiterated to the Ambassador that our policy still ad referendum was to have the international community take on the question of the Gulf of Aqaba and hence separate it from the Arab-Israeli conflict. He reiterated the advice that GOI should not strike first.

6. Mr. Rostow said that we were joining HMG in proposing the maritime declaration overnight and moving ahead on Congressional consultations.

7. After a brief discussion of the situation in Jordan, Ambassador Harman pointed out that it was his Government's understanding that the planes USG had recently provided to Jordan were for training and defense against Syria and would not be used against Israel. Under the present circumstances the Israeli Government would expect that these planes be withdrawn.

/3/Reference is to the President's statement to Eban; see Document 77.

9. Ambassador then raised the question of liaison between USG and GOI military. If Nasser decided to strike it would be a quick strike, perhaps only 5 or 6 minutes flying time separated the opposing air forces. He said USG must appreciate that with this buildup continuing every day GOI was becoming more and more nervous. He reminded the Under Secretary that the US was still talking about an ad referendum scenario whereas Israel could be attacked at any moment. His Government had clear indications that Nasser had been disappointed when Israel did not strike first last week. They had no telephone number to call, no code for plane recognition, no way of getting in touch with the Sixth Fleet.

/4/The minutes of the June 3 meeting of the Control Group state that the group discussed this request and agreed that it would be kept under daily review. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Middle East Crisis Files, 1967, Entry 5190, Box 17, Minutes/Decisions of the Control Group, Folder 1)

11. Ambassador Harman then informed the Department that he would make three immediate requests: (a) One Hawk battery and 100 missiles to be flown to Israel immediately; (b) 140 M60 tanks. (The 140 M-48A1's previously purchased were being upgraded and this work would not be finished for another year.); (c) 24 A-4E Skyhawks for immediate delivery with ground equipment, armaments and operating parts for 5,000 flying hours. GOI also needed 10 chief petty officers to assist them in establishing a crash program to train 10F to use these planes. Mr. Rostow said he would inform DOD immediately. The requests would of course be presented in detail in the normal way to the DOD.

Rusk

Washington, May 31, 1967, 6:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, President's Appointment File, June 1967, Middle East Crisis. Secret. Rostow sent a copy to McNamara with a note saying that the President wanted him to have it. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, Israel 091.112) He also sent a copy to Rusk. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US)

Mr. President:

As instructed, I had Evron in this afternoon at 5:30. I explained to him your concern at the language used with respect to the U.S. commitment in Prime Minister Eshkol's message of yesterday. I went over again your talking paper which, I reminded him, was your formal communication to which the rest of what you said was an elaboration. He said he understood what I had told him; but he was deeply concerned.

The reason was this. He went up to New York to meet Minister Sapir, who has just arrived in the U.S. to raise money for Israel. Sapir told him that after Eban reported, the Cabinet voted on war or delay, and split 9 to 9.

The Prime Minister then cabled Harman and asked Harman his and Evron's personal assessment of the President's intentions.

Harman and Evron then said that it was their personal assessment that President Johnson intended to see this through even if, in the end, the United States was the only nation standing beside Israel. They did not for one moment imply that this is what you told Eban. They merely took on their shoulders the "heavy burden" of giving to their Government their assessment of the feelings and intentions of the President of the United States.

Evron added that for some reason he--Evron--is regarded in Israel as a hawk. Sapir told him that it was this personal assessment which tipped the balance.

Evron wanted me to be extremely clear that:

--he in no way attributed his judgment to what the President told Eban;

--he and Harman held themselves alone responsible for making this assessment of President Johnson.

He said he told me this story to understand what the effects might be of a message from Washington which appeared to be a "backing away" from what the President told Eban.

He then asked me: "Has the President's attitude changed since he saw Eban?" I said I did not believe that the President's attitude had changed since that time. What the President was reacting to was language in a communication between Chiefs of Government which was inexact. The President felt that it was extremely important for the Government of Israel fully to understand the constitutional setting in which the President had to make his dispositions. The whole context of the talk with Eban was the limitations which the President had to face in implementing his policy stated on May 23.

He then said, "Am I wrong in assessing the President's personal determination as I did?" I said that, as a government servant, it would be wrong for me to communicate that kind of judgment. I said, "You have known President Johnson for a long time and have a right to make your own assessment."

With tears in his eyes, he said: "So much hinges on that man."

I told him that our reaction to Prime Minister Eshkol's formulation would be conveyed more formally; but that I wished him to understand the kind of difficulty it posed for the President.

He then went on to make three observations:

--the first soundings taken by their ambassadors in Scandinavia, Canada, etc., were not hopeful, although this may not be the last word;

--in their contacts with the Congress they believe support is building for a strong stand by the United States not confined to former doves. He said that in this matter Nasser was doing their work for them;

--finally, he said that Israel expects war. They do not expect to attack, but to be attacked. They are grateful for the swiftness with which the Pentagon is now dealing with the pipeline; but Harman will be in to see the Secretary of State with requests for an additional Hawk battalion for air defense and some other urgent military assistance. He hopes that we shall be able to respond.

Walt

Washington, May 31, 1967, 8:05 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls. No classification marking. A handwritten notation indicates there was no distribution. Prepared by Carolyn J. Proctor.

/2/No such message has been found. Telegram 205677 to Cairo, May 31, sent at 9:17 p.m., asked whether Anderson was still in Cairo and whether he could remain one more day. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/ANDERSON) Telegram 8296 from Cairo, June 1, received at 1:33 a.m. replied that Anderson was leaving at 9 a.m. and that it was not possible to alter the arrangements. (Ibid.)

/3/Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance called Rusk at 9:25 p.m. to say that Rostow had called to ask what Rusk, McNamara, Vance, and Eugene Rostow wanted to do about the Soviet ships in the Mediterranean. Vance said he and McNamara thought that if the President wanted to do something, they should announce the next day, after the Intrepid went through the Suez Canal, that they were holding it and two or three destroyers in the Red Sea pending events. Rusk said he thought this would be more inflammatory than Sixth Fleet action, and would "look like a doublecross." He was inclined to say more about movements from the East Coast or the North Atlantic. Vance said they could look at this again the next day. (Notes of telephone conversation prepared by Proctor, May 31, 9:25 p.m.; ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

Washington, May 31, 1967, 10:46 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Battle, William D. Brewer, and Director of the Office of OECD, European Community, and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs Deane R. Hinton; cleared by Eugene Rostow and Walt Rostow; and approved by Secretary Rusk. Walsh initialed for Rusk. Davies cleared the list of addressees with Counselor Nigel C. Trench at the British Embassy. Also sent to Dhahran, Jerusalem, U.S. Mission Geneva, Hong Kong, Paris, USRO Paris, CINCSTRIKE for POLAD, MAC for POLAD, and CINCEUR for POLAD. Rostow sent a draft to the President at 4 p.m. on May 31, with a covering memorandum stating that it would serve as a talking paper when the Declaration of Maritime Nations was presented, and that he thought the President should personally clear it. The "Cleared" option on Rostow's memorandum is checked.

205690. Subj: Maritime Declaration.

/2/Document 112.

2. After coordination with British following action addressees should deliver draft declaration urgently to host Governments, making points set out below and soliciting their prompt support: Athens, Panama, Monrovia, Tokyo, Ankara, Tehran, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Dublin, Manila, Addis Ababa, Abidjan, Mexico City, Caracas, Lisbon, Tananarive, Reykjavik. Since FRG is not UN member, approach in Bonn should seek separate FRG statement conforming as closely as possible to draft declaration.

3. British will make initial approach in following capitals, with U.S. following up, Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki, The Hague, Paris, Brussels, Stockholm, Rome, Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, Accra, Nairobi.

4. This message sent other recipients for info only.

5. In presenting declaration, you should stress following:

a. Current Near East crisis is worst since 1956. Withdrawal UNEF at UAR request has removed essential buffer between UAR and Israel and their two armies now confront each other. Accident or miscalculation could be calamitous.

b. Situation has been made even more acute by announced UAR intention close Gulf of Aqaba both to Israel-flag vessels and to vessels of all other flags carrying "strategic cargoes" to Israel. UAR has thus put forward claim to control Israel's sole seaward access from south. Israel regards such access as essential and considers any interference with it as a threat to Israel's very existence. Gravest questions of war and peace accordingly arise. In judgment USG joint action by maritime nations is the only alternative to an almost certain war.

c. It is the view of the USG that Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba constitute international waterway both by test customary usage (innocent passage for all Israeli-bound vessels has been normal for decade) and by general provisions international law which are reflected in 1958 Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea to which 33 states, including USSR, are parties. (FYI of Aqaba riparians, only Israel is a party. End FYI.) The UAR action clearly poses a test to these recognized rights of navigation through international waterways.

d. Through the efforts of the UNSYG and the current consideration of the problem by the UN Security Council it is hoped that processes can be brought to bear leading to a satisfactory solution of the present critical problem. As part of this general effort, the USG believes it is important for the world's major maritime states clearly and with solidarity to reiterate their views regarding both the general principles involved in this situation and their specific application to the Aqaba case.

e. Issuance of a declaration with such broad support would be most useful at this juncture in supporting current UN efforts and the rule of law with respect to maritime traffic. The USG hopes that host government will be willing join with other like-minded states who also being approached in issuing declaration in very near future. The declaration reaffirms position taken by maritime powers in 1957 which was subsequently reflected in the 1958 Geneva Convention.

6. In response to queries you may take following line:

a. If asked re our basic intention, you should respond our aim is to remove present danger to peace and resolve current problem by means of international action through the United Nations.

b. If asked what our intention would be should efforts through the United Nations fail, you should state that we would address questions which would then arise at that time, but we would not now exclude the possibility of protecting maritime rights outside the UN.

c. If asked how far association with joint declaration would commit host governments to further joint action as opposed to consultations, you should give assurance that participation in issuance declaration constitutes a commitment only to the statement of principles contained therein.

d. If asked whether changes can be made in the text you should say that we will of course consider most carefully any suggestions but that many nations are being approached and that the mechanics of substantial redrafting would obviously be difficult.

7. FYI. A number of maritime states publicly supported principle freedom of transit through Gulf of Aqaba in United Nations debates in early 1957 as part general international effort secure Israeli withdrawal from Sinai Peninsula. These included: UK, France, Italy, Canada, Sweden, Belgium, New Zealand and several others. If addressees able ascertain host government took such clear position at that time, point should of course be stressed that what is needed now is merely reaffirmation host government's longstanding position.

8. It is expected that Israeli Ambassador will be in touch with you and will strongly support your efforts and those your British colleagues.

9. For Tel Aviv-Under Secretary Rostow gave text declaration this afternoon to Ambassador Harman.

10. For Bonn-Septel of instructions follows. End FYI.

11. Report reactions priority.

Rusk

Washington, May 31, 1967, 10:47 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Legal Adviser Leonard C. Meeker and Hinton; cleared by Battle, Eugene Rostow, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Rusk. Walsh initialed for Rusk. Also sent to Dhahran, Jerusalem, U.S. Mission Geneva, Hong Kong, Paris, USRO Paris, CINCSTRIKE for POLAD, MAC for POLAD, and CINCEUR for POLAD.

205691. There follows draft declaration of maritime nations sent you either for action in accordance septel or for info:

The Governments of maritime nations subscribing to this Declaration express their grave concern at recent developments in the Middle East which are currently under consideration in the United Nations Security Council. Our countries, as Members of the United Nations committed to the Purposes and Principles set forth in the Charter, are convinced that scrupulous respect for the principles of international law regarding freedom of navigation on international waterways is indispensable.

In regard to shipping through the waterways that serve ports on the Gulf of Aqaba, our Governments reaffirm the view that the Gulf is an international waterway into and through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage. Our Governments will assert this right on behalf of all shipping sailing under their flags, and our Governments are prepared to cooperate among themselves and to join with others in seeking general recognition of this right.

The views we express in this Declaration formed the basis on which a settlement of the Near East conflict was achieved in early 1957-a settlement that has governed the actions of nations for more than ten years.

These views will guide our policies and action in seeking to assure peace and security in the Near East.

Rusk

Washington, May 31, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. III. Confidential. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

SUBJECT
Today's Security Council Meeting

/2/UN document S/7919.

/3/UN document S/7919.

Fedorenko maintained a running, sarcastic challenge to Goldberg to explain our naval blockade of Cuba in 1962 in light of our present championing of maritime rights.

/4/June 2.

Walt

Washington, May 31, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Secret. Saunders sent the memorandum and its attachment to Walt Rostow with another memorandum, which states that Saunders wanted to ensure that "we consider a quite different alternative than you were discussing this morning." It also notes that "we may face a situation where no one will come in with us on the regatta" and in that case, Saunders hoped they would "at least stop and reconsider."

WWR:

Just to keep thoughts flowing to you, attached are two papers which add up to a debate:

/2/Reference is apparently to Document 115.

The first is an argument for letting Israel go. The second is an argument for avoiding Israeli involvement at all costs.

Hal

/3/This memorandum recorded a conversation with Saudi Prince Mohammed and another Saudi visitor, both of whom urged that any U.S. action to open the Strait of Tiran must be based on international law rather than on the basis of helping Israel, or no Arab moderate could support it.

ARAB-ISRAEL: WHERE WE ARE AND WHERE WE'RE GOING

What has happened. In the two weeks since Nasser mobilized we have reversed the policy of 20 years. Instead of staking our bets on an evenhanded relationship with the Arabs-moderate and radical alike-and the Israelis, we are now committed to a course that will more likely than not lead us into a head-on clash with a temporarily united Arab world. Whereas we relied on Israel to hold its own militarily and built our influence with Arab moderates to Israel's benefit, today we are acting as if we can only protect Israel by confronting the Arab world and surrendering our influence with the moderates to Nasser.

What else we could have done. By not stopping an Israeli strike as early as 21 May when Egyptian positions were still fluid, we would probably have witnessed a limited Arab defeat and then had to move the international machinery in to restore peace. Israel's reputation would have suffered and long-range prospects for reconciliation would have been set back. But assuming she held her own, we would not have been linked with Israel and she would have brought to bear the only counter that the US or anyone else has yet found to the war of national liberation-force. Nasser as a dominating force would have been physically weakened, and the moderate governments might have been freed to ignore him and concentrate on their own development in association with us.

Why we held Israel back. As a humane government, we are naturally inclined to choose peace over the unknowns of war. Though we have ourselves chosen force to stop aggression in Vietnam, we argued strongly against pre-emptive war on the basis of our own decision not to use this device against the USSR and because world opinion would not permit us to come to the aid of an aggressor.

The price we have paid. It seems that the UAR has won all the chips to date, but Israel may really be the big winner. For twenty years Israel has sought a special relationship-even a private security guarantee-with us. We have steadfastly refused in order to preserve our other interests in the Middle East. We argued that our policy worked to Israel's best interest too. Now we are committed to side with Israel and, in opening the Straits of Tiran, even to wage war on the Arabs. In short, we have chosen sides-not with the constructive Arabs and Israel but with Israel alone against all the Arabs.

Whoever is the bigger winner, we are the sure loser. If we follow our present course, we stand to lose economically (see the Task Force's rundown of the "economic vulnerabilities") and to suffer substantial Soviet gains. If we back away from Israel, we're a paper tiger. In building a new Middle East along the regional lines in your vision, the closer we get to Israel, the longer we delay our constructive contribution to make that vision a reality.

Need we pay that price. When we committed ourselves last week to open the Straits for Israel, we did so believing that Nasser might back down or, at least, would not tangle with militarily escorted vessels. Instead, in his Sunday press conference and other conversations, he has made it clear he is not trying to open any doors behind him. To the contrary, he made clearer than ever his determination to close the Straits to Israeli flag vessels and oil tankers headed for Eilat. Ambassador Yost warns vividly that we can no longer count on Nasser to back down.

While Nasser may not shoot at a destroyer escort, he is lining up the other Arab countries to retaliate against all blockade runners by closing off oil supply, nationalizing property, closing bases, boycotting commerce, closing ports to shipping, etc. If we follow our present course, it is hard to see how we can make good our commitment without paying a tremendous price in the Arab world-unless Nasser backs off, and he shows no sign of doing that.

The other choice. Events may show that other maritime powers are not willing to join the regatta. Congress at that point may not support our opening the Straits alone. Or a major terrorist incident may open the whole situation up again by shifting attention from the Straits to a new front. If any of these happen, I would enter the strongest plea to stop and think about whether we shouldn't put the brakes on a little.

The other choice is still to let the Israelis do this job themselves. Eshkol himself says he'll have to go this route within a week or two if we can't produce. He's correct that we don't have any right to hold him back longer while his enemy gets stronger unless we're willing to take on the Arabs ourselves. Pretty soon we'll have Soviet warships in the Red Sea. We ought to consider admitting that we have failed and allow fighting to ensue.

I know this may fly in the face of the President's own feelings about Israel. But the question is whether we can help Israel more in the long run by alienating ourselves from the Arab world or by backing off just enough to keep our hand in there.

Hal

Washington, May 31, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Secret. Read sent the report to Walt Rostow with a May 31 covering memorandum. A May 31 memorandum from Battle to Rusk, also attached, states that it was the first report of the Working Group on Economic Vulnerabilities, comprised of representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the White House staff. The group was a subcommittee of the Middle East Task Force. A May 31 memorandum by Eugene Rostow formally established the Task Force and a Control Group, chaired by Rostow and including Walt Rostow, Vance, Kohler, and Battle. Battle chaired the Task Force, which included Hoopes, Popper, Country Director for Soviet Affairs Malcolm Toon, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Donald A. Wehmeyer, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon, and Saunders. (Ibid., Vol. III) The Task Force suspended its formal meetings on June 15. (Memorandum from Eugene Rostow to the Control Group and Task Force, June 15; ibid., Vol. VI)

GULF OF AQABA: THE ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES

/2/The attachments, titled "Vulnerabilities of Arab Countries to US Economic Actions," "Oil," "Financial Aspects," and "Airline Traffic Rights," are not printed.

(i) We have little economic leverage on the Arab countries, almost none on Egypt. We have run down our aid programs close to the vanishing point, except to Jordan-where a cut-off would almost certainly bring down Hussein's moderate regime. The food import needs of Egypt and other Arab countries are less this year than normally; the USSR can supply them-at least through the summer-without difficulty. Our exports are largely standard items easily available elsewhere; denial would hurt the Arabs only in the implausible event of a worldwide embargo. We could deny them use of their deposits-more than $2 billion in London, $700 million in New York. But this is more a gun at our head than at theirs.

(ii) The Arab countries together have powerful economic weapons to use against the Atlantic nations, particularly Britain.

(iii) Egypt and Syria alone cannot inflict serious damage. Their direct power is limited to closure of the Canal and pipelines; we could manage the effects of both of these acts.

(iv) The costs become very high when the oil-producing states-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and the Gulf Shaikhdoms-find it necessary to move against Anglo-American oil interests.

(v) At worst the oil producers could expropriate our holdings and deny petroleum exports to the Atlantic countries. This would mean:

--Loss of up to $500 million in net US foreign exchange earnings from oil holdings per year;

--Loss of net non-oil trade earnings of up to an additional $500 million;

--Loss of billions of dollars in US capital assets;

--UK loss of up to $1 billion in foreign exchange earnings;

--A crisis in sterling and in the international monetary system.

(vi) There is a high risk that the oil producers would do their worst in the event of a military engagement-or perhaps even escort action-in the Gulf of Aqaba.

(vii) Short of a military confrontation, we would have to expect the oil-producing countries to take some action against us, ranging from scattered sabotage to sequestration of oil holdings and selective prohibition of exports. These costs would be more manageable, but the effects might at least in part be irreversible.

(viii) Our ability to minimize these costs depends on:

--Holding the Europeans to a common front by presenting a credible prospect that we can face Nasser down quickly enough to avoid major disruption in oil supplies (most of them have stocks for 50 days).

--Making it clear to the Europeans and Japanese that we stand ready to bear our share of the physical and money costs of disruption in oil flows, including eventual rationing.

--Giving the producing countries the best possible excuse for moderation by presenting a plausible image of evenhandedness towards Arab and Israeli, along with a prospect of Nasser's failure.

(ix) If it appears that there will be a major and continuing interruption in oil flows, the Europeans and Japanese will be seriously tempted to make side deals with the producers--including takeover of US and UK operations.

(x) Even if the Arabs do their worst, we believe we can maintain the flow of aviation and other fuels to Viet-Nam--now supplied almost entirely from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain--from domestic sources. This would require protection controls and product allocation procedures in the US.

Washington, June 1, 1967.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Appendix A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

Damascus, June 1, 1967, 1346Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Aleppo, Algiers, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, Kuwait, USUN, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and Moscow. Received at 11:43 a.m. and passed to the White House at 12:15 p.m. Walt Rostow sent a copy to the President, at 2:10 p.m., with a memorandum calling it the "full flavor and feeling of one of our Arabist Ambassadors." Rostow also attached a copy of telegram 8313 from Cairo, June 1, which reported the Belgian Ambassador's view that Nasser "would not budge an inch on Aqaba" and that Israeli military action would be preferable to action by the Western powers. Rostow's memorandum states he wanted the President to have before him as wide a range of perspectives as possible. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. III)

/2/Circular telegram 204952, May 31, sent to all U.S. missions, stated in part, "we are inclined to believe that unless a war between Israel and UAR breaks out, the political goals of the UAR and the Soviet Union are Nasser's ascendancy in the Arab world, and Soviet control of oil and other interests vital to the security of the United States, Europe and the free world generally." It outlined the steps underway to obtain action in the UN Security Council and signature of a Declaration of Maritime Nations, and it stated that contingency planning was underway for testing the UAR blockade and establishment of an international task force to support free passage for ships of all nations through the Strait and Gulf. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

/3/Telegram 8093 from Cairo, May 28. (Ibid.)

/4/Smythe argued in telegram 1200 from Damascus, May 29, that the only U.S. commitment to the area was to oppose aggression from any source and that this should include an "aggressive act reopen Straits of Tiran." (Ibid.) He cited telegram 8046 from Cairo, May 27, in which Nolte argued that Israel had used force to acquire passage rights in the Gulf of Aqaba in 1956 and was now faced with the same situation in reverse with the UAR's reestablishment of the status quo ante 1956. (Ibid.)

2. There appears to be consensus best minds, most knowledgeable area experts that outline US policy to date directly opposed short and especially long term US national interests in area. Policy charts collision course with monolithic Nasser-led Arab nation. Deterioration US position has been so rapid that I believe we faced with few alternatives beside mounting salvage mission. Plan "isolate UAR from our ME friends" feeble if not ridiculous hope, particularly in light Husayn's dramatic trip to Cairo and solidarity views all Arab leaders well-disposed to US vs. our present policy stance.

3. US firm determination keep Tiran Straits open either through UN mechanism or by joint operation major maritime powers seems foredoomed. Cards already stacked against any effective UN action this sort in view indications substantial support UAR stance, and ambivalence SC members, others not fully committed support UAR, Arabs. Action by maritime powers would be thinly veiled direct US, UK intervention which destined produce perilous confrontation.

4. US "evenhanded" ME policy is viewed by Arabs as fraud, and US actions during current crisis have confirmed this belief. Our Arab friends have pleaded that we simply take our "even-hand" off. Nebulous commitments we have re Tiran Straits must be weighed in view area consequences if we honor them. Consensus informed opinion indicates disaster for us if it pushes Tiran claim either in multilateral guise or unilaterally

5. My view of situation, perhaps oversimplified, is that US reaping full harvest 20 year area policy which has regarded Israel as fulcrum, highest priority interest. This has rankled Arabs who now feel strong enough to challenge US, hoping jar it into full realization its total position now in jeopardy unless it revises its priorities in light overall US national interest. Failing this, Arabs determined smash US influence in area (in which they expect USSR backing). On scales we have Israel, an unviable client state whose ties, value to US primarily emotional, balanced with full range vital strategic, political, commercial/economic interests represented by Arab states. The folly of US pursing present policy obvious without further elaboration.

Smythe

Washington, June 1, 1967, 1545Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 7, Appendix H. Secret. Repeated to CNO, CINCLANT, CINCLANTFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, CTF 64, USS LIBERTY, DIRNSA, NSAEUR, DIRNAVSECGRU, ADIRNAVSECGRU, DIRNAVSECGRULANT, DIRNAVSECGRUEUR.

/2/DIRNSA G/104, 311960Z May 67, not printed.

1. (S) When RFS request sail Liberty IAW following sked:

a. 2 Jun. Depart Rota.

b. 2-8 Jun. En route via Gibraltar Strait CPA as safe nav permits. Then via northern Africa coastal route to posit 32-00N 33-00E. CPA Morocco, Malta 3 NM: claimed list 3 NM. CPA Spain, Tunisia, Sardinia, Sicily, Crete 7 NM; claimed dist 6 NM. CPA Algeria, Libya, UAR 13 NM; claimed dist 12 NM.

/3/DIRNSA ADP/242-67, 292013Z May 67, had requested that the Liberty operate in this area, which was proposed operational area 3 of five proposed operational areas. It stated that the actual operating area should be adjusted as necessary for operational and safety reasons. (National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History Historical Collection, Series VII, Crisis Files, Box 16e, COMSIXTHFLT Messages re Liberty)

2. (U) Request JCS (JRC), CNO, CINCLANT (JRC), CINCLANTFLT be included as info addees on all Movereps, Daily Sitreps, and Incident Reports.

3. (U) En route tech tasking IAW ref.

4. (U) Procedures for developing July sked follow.

Cairo, June 1, 1967, 1435Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated Priority to USUN. Received and passed to the White House at 11:58 a.m. A copy was sent to the President by Walt Rostow at 4:05 p.m. with a note describing it as "an evenhanded view" from Yost. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. III)

/2/In telegram 205157 to Cairo, May 31, Battle responded to Yost's views in Document 100. He stated that past experience had shown that "bursts of Arab determination and 'unity' were of relatively short duration," and he asked, "Are we right in assuming that passage of time without direct Israel challenge to UAR or Arab positions would make more flexible situation in which to work?" (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

1. Agree that Arab unity is fragile affair and present display will not last indefinitely. However, there is agreement among those I have consulted that it has been extremely well orchestrated and has acquired sufficient momentum to carry it for some time, certainly several weeks.

2. While popular enthusiasm is helpful, and can be turned on and off with relative ease, it is not essential, at least in UAR, to maintaining firm military and political posture. This depends almost wholly on leaders and armed forces. There is little likelihood of "battle fatigue" among either of these in near future.

3. There is little question that passage of time without serious challenge to UAR or Arab positions would create more flexible situation and less heated atmosphere. However, continued public challenge to UAR position on Aqaba and reports of maritime powers preparing to break blockade by force constitute built-in issue on which to keep tempers at high pitch and maintain Arab unity at current or higher level.

4. I recognize problem Department faces in endeavoring to restrain Israelis from military action by assuring them of alternative means of breaking blockade. However, as long as prospect either of Israeli attack or Western use of force in straits seems imminent, Arab excitement and unity will probably mount rather than decline.

5. Crisis could probably be defused if way could be found to put Aqaba issue on ice for few weeks. However, this would presumably require either UAR temporarily permitting oil to pass or Israel temporarily acquiescing in oil being excluded. We doubt Nasser could tolerate former without unacceptable loss of face.

6. If crisis could be defused in this respect, we believe, barring accidents or provocations, modus vivendi governing other elements of problem, such as UN observers along UAR-Israeli frontier, could probably be worked out. Under these circumstance passions would cool off and traditional Arab diversity be likely to reassert itself.

7. This estimate is based on assumption, which I am inclined to believe is correct but cannot vouch for, that Nasser will be satisfied at this juncture with substantial restoration status quo ante 1956 and will not exploit or be swept along by present Arab euphoria to claim further gains at Israeli expense. Of course, longer crisis continues at current temperature greater is danger bids might be raised on both sides.

Nolte

New York, June 1, 1967, 2246Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 7:46 p.m.

/2/Telegram 5555 from USUN, June 1, reported a conversation at breakfast that day between Goldberg and Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi. (Ibid.)

/3/Telegram 5559 from USUN, June 1, reported a conversation that morning between Goldberg and Yugoslav representative Danilo Lekic. (Ibid.)

I talked to Israeli PermRep Rafael shortly after noon June 1 and told him that on a personal and confidential basis I had probed with both Iraqi FonMin Pachachi and Yugo PermRep Lekic possibility of exercising influence on Nasser to back down sufficiently in order to achieve a breathing spell during which crude oil shipments would continue to pass through the Straits of Tiran to Elath. Rafael did not demur nor approve. He did comment in a negative sense on the prospect of prolonging present UN debate. I told him we not prepared for showdown vote on our draft res June 2 and that he should anticipate probability delay action on res until June 5.

Goldberg

Washington, June 1, 1967, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. III. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received at 1:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

/2/Representative Emmanuel Celler of New York.

/3/Representative Thomas E. Morgan of Pennsylvania, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Congressman Celler explained that he and Morgan were working closely together in providing leadership in the House with respect to the Mid East crisis.

They wish me to convey to you the following:

1. The clear majority sentiment in the House of Representatives is pro-Israel. They feel Israel is being "pushed around" by Nasser.

2. They are worried about the effect of the passage of time on Israel with respect to the build-up of Egyptian forces in Sinai and the debilitating consequences for the Israeli economy.

3. They feel we shall, in the end, have to "do something" to open the blockade at Aqaba--multilaterally or otherwise.

4. They do not believe that the Soviet Union will directly confront us if we so act. They will react indirectly.

5. They wanted it clearly understood that they are "Administration men"; they fully support the President; they fully support your statement of May 23; and they wish to do nothing that you would not regard as helpful.

6. Celler then asked, "Would the President regard it as helpful if we generated a strong statement of support for his position on Aqaba?" He said that without even trying, they got over 100 signatures last week.

I replied that I could not speak for the President. It was my impression that the President might need their support in the days ahead, and it might be wise to await the President's direct guidance. But I could be wrong; and if the President wished them to generate a statement of support, I would let them know.

Celler did most of the speaking; but, at each point, he asked Morgan for confirmation that this was also his view. Morgan explicitly stated his agreement at each point and at the end when I summarized their message to you.

Walt

/4/This option is checked.

Washington, June 1, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. III. Secret.

/2/The agenda for the meeting is ibid.

/3/See footnote 1, Document 115.

1. Tim Hoopes' subcommittee4 organized a scenario for a test probe in the Straits of Tiran that projects 15 to 18 days to mobilize the necessary charter vessels to test the blockade. Since the Israelis may well be assembling their own group to move sooner, I wonder if we have this much time and whether we don't need something sooner. Eshkol

/4/Hoopes chaired the Task Force subcommittee on contingency military planning.

doesn't sound as if he can sit still this long.

/5/See Document 108. Walt Rostow's handwritten notes on the memorandum summarize the requests: "1 Hawk battery, 25 A 4 E's, 140 tanks, M-60" with the note, "No extras." Harman made the requests formally in a June 1 note to Rusk. A June 2 memorandum from Battle to Rusk states that the Department of Defense was still examining the requests but had indicated already that neither A4s nor Hawks were available; concerning the M-60 tanks, "our production line is tight but we are studying availabilities." (Harman's note is filed as an attachment to Battle's memorandum; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-ISR)

/6/June 5.

/7/The draft has not been found, but see Document 139.

5. Prime Minister Wilson is scheduled to hold a press conference at the British Embassy late tomorrow afternoon. We want to nail down what he is going to say so that he will not take us any farther than we want to be taken.

Hal Saunders/8/

/8/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Lisbon, June 1, 1967, 1700Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/ANDERSON. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Handled as Nodis. Received at 4:34 p.m. and passed to the White House at 5 p.m.

1514. Dept pass President and SecState only from Robert Anderson.

/2/May 31.

2. I discussed with him possibility Marshal Amer or Zakaria Mohieddin coming to United Nations for routine visit and then going secretly with me to Washington to see President and SecState. Nasser replied that he could not send Amer because of crisis, but would very much like to send Zakaria Mohieddin and would have him there Sunday or Monday if he received a message from me confirming that Zakaria Mohieddin could secretly visit with President and explain all of Nasser's points of view. He asked me if any exploration of this subject had been made before I left and I replied affirmatively. However, before Zakaria Mohieddin should come, I would want to confirm that President would see him under these circumstances. I earnestly recommend that Zakaria Mohieddin be received and have an opportunity of visiting with President and SecState. I have arranged to send message from here through Embassy Cairo which will be understood by Nasser and Zakaria Mohieddin will leave immediately if your rely to me is affirmative.

Wellman

/3/Telegram 206060 to Lisbon, June 1, asked Anderson for a detailed summary of his report as soon as possible. In telegram 206614 to Lisbon, June 1, Rusk told Anderson that the President would like to see a cable report on the most significant points made by Nasser as soon as possible after his return. It further stated that the President would be glad to receive Mohieddin privately if he came to the United Nations. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/ANDERSON)

Washington, June 1, 1967.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 77-0075, Memoranda of Conversations Between Secretary McNamara and Heads of State (Other than NATO). Top Secret; Personal and Eyes Only for the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. Prepared on June 2. A copy was sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and a stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McNamara saw it on June 2.

/2/Amit visited Washington May 31-June 2. At a conference on the Six-Day War held June 3-5, 1992, he stated that he had three objectives in this mission: first, to compare notes on the situation, second, to find out whether any action was being planned to reopen the Strait of Tiran, and third, "to tell the Americans, I, Meir Amit, am going to recommend that our government strike, and I wanted to sense what would be their response, their attitude toward that." (Parker, Richard B., ed., The Six-Day War: A Retrospective, (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1996), p. 139)

Amit said that he met with McNamara for 40 minutes and told him three things: first, a short description of the military situation, second, the impact of the Israeli mobilization on Israel's economy and the fact that it could not be sustained for a long period, and third, "I told him that I'm personally going to recommend that we take action, because there's no way out, and please don't react. He told me it was all right, the president knows that you are here and I have a direct line to the president." He said McNamara asked only two questions: how long a war would last, to which Amit replied, "Seven days," and how many casualties Israel would sustain. Amit said, "Here I became