Lisbon, June 2, 1967, 1030Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 8:29 a.m. Walt Rostow sent a copy to the President at 12:40 p.m. with a memorandum stating, "It is urgent that we decide whether we should inform the Israelis of this visit. My guess is their intelligence will pick it up. We would be wise to have Sec. Rusk tell Harman." He also added, "In the light of this picture of Nasser's mind, we must work out most carefully the scenario for talks with Mohieddin." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Anderson Cables)

1517. Eyes Only for President and SecState from Robert Anderson.

1. There follows a summary of my talk with President Nasser. Unless otherwise indicated, I will be trying to express his point of view to me.

2. After exchange of pleasantries, Nasser said he became worried and afraid of Israeli attack because of speeches and his own intelligence of mobilization by Israel and the intelligence shared with Syrian Govt. As an example, he stated that 13 brigades were mobilized near Syria.

3. Nasser explained that he did not want repetition of 1956 affair when he was reluctant to believe that an attack had begun and was slow in moving troops to Sinai only to be caught between the Israelis in the north and the British at Port Said. He said he felt he had no choice but to mobilize and send troops to Sinai, which he did, and request the removal of UN forces. While he did not say so, I believe he was surprised at the rapidity of the removal of UN troops because he said they were only a token force and would have created no real obstacle.

/2/May 31.

5. It was pointed out that if Israel felt she was virtually alone she might be motivated to strike first in order to secure a strategic advantage and that so long as she felt she had friends she might be restrained. Nasser replied that this was a risk which he would have to accept and that he thought first Israeli target and main thrust of Israeli offensive would be against Egypt and Cairo. He said that elaborate plans had been made for instant retaliation, and that he was confident of the outcome of a conflict between Arabs and Israelis.

6. Nasser said that Hussein requested a meeting with him and that he agreed on the basis that it would be secret unless an agreement was reached between them. Nasser then consulted with the govts of Morocco, Algeria, Iraq and Syria. All of these agreed that some agreement with Hussein was desirable except Syria who was opposed to any agreement with Jordan. He was asked if he had consulted directly or indirectly [with] the Saudi Arabs and he replied that he had no contact, direct or indirect, with the Saudi Arabs or Faisal. However, Nasser felt that Faisal was in a difficult position and could not avoid participation if fighting began.

7. With reference to Gulf of Aqaba, Nasser stated that for eight years after 1948 the Straits had been closed to Israeli shipping and was open only by the illegal act of Israel, France and England, and he proposed merely to return to the status of 1956 which had been at least tolerated by all the nations for eight years. He explained that even we had deplored and opposed the act of the Israelis, British and French which changed the status quo in 1956. He stated that the Straits of Tiran were navigable only in a width of three miles which was clearly territorial waters and that he intended to maintain this position. He was asked specifically what commerce he would allow through the Straits under his concept and he replied by saying that the exclusions would be 1) Israeli ships, 2) oil or any refined products, and 3) arms for Israel. Here he stated that all countries claimed territorial waters to a greater distance offshore than he was asserting and further that he was at war with Israel and had been since 1948 with nothing existing between them except an armistice, and that under these circumstances he was entitled to assert jurisdiction.

8. He was asked if he would consider referring this matter of the Straits to either the United Nations or the World Court, in view of the fact that four countries had borders on the Gulf. He replied that he would not submit the question to the UN because the Israelis normally treated resolutions of the UN not favorable to them as "pieces of paper." He said that he did not have sufficient knowledge of the World Court to answer specifically about referring the matter to the World Court for decision but would consult his legal advisers. This was qualified by saying that he did not want to undertake any course of action that would take "years" to decide.

9. He also stated that even if he agreed on some other course of action, any other course of action would be strongly opposed by all Arab countries who were now his allies. On this point he seemed on the one hand adamant about the position he had taken in the Straits and yet he did not rule out completely possibility of a World Court review if it could be done speedily. For the time being I think he will remain firm.

10. He was asked if he was not prepared to accept Israel as a matter of fact, even though he might have emotional and legal feelings concerning the establishment of the country in Palestine. Nasser replied by saying that he did not believe stable and lasting peace could be achieved without disposing of the refugee problem. He was asked if this could be done by compensation as well as some limited return of refugees. He replied that he thought practically all refugees would return if permitted and that even if compensation were paid they would not be satisfied but would continue to agitate for return to Palestine. He went into long discourse on Arab mentality as it affects their feelings toward the place where they were born and reared.

11. Nasser stated that he had been prepared to sign an agreement with the Monetary Fund but had just received a letter saying that the Fund wished to review their relationships with Egypt further. He then stated he was glad he had not signed the agreement with the Fund because they were unreasonable and left him no flexibility. He emphasized that he did not want to be subject to economic pressure. It was explained to him that neither the Fund nor local American banks were in fact exerting pressure when they did not comply with national requests since they were all governed by strict rules that limited their own flexibility in making loans to countries that did not comply with all regulations.

12. Nasser expressed keen desire to have friendship of American people and American Govt explaining that under no circumstances was he a Communist. On other hand, he felt that US policy was motivated largely by the large Jewish vote in US and that American Govt would be reluctant to oppose this voting strength. He then called attention to the fact that Eisenhower had taken a strong position in 1956 against Israeli invasion and this had not hurt him politically.

13. He seemed anxious to have Zakaria Mohieddin explain his position directly to US Govt and said he hoped we would take the long view because the Arab countries stretched from Morocco on the west to Pakistan on the east and that now he even had the support of Pakistan and India. He did not see how a minority in the US could influence US policy to oppose what such a vast region and such large numbers of people believed proper. It was explained to him that the US Govt was not motivated by political considerations but was concerned essentially in maintaining peace and the integrity of countries.

14. At this time Nasser said that if the policy was for Arabs and Israelis to live together harmoniously and Israel should allow a million refugees to come back to Palestine, which would solve the refugee problem and still the Israelis would have two million of their own citizens in the same country, this, he said, would be true "living together."

15. He made it clear that he felt US was taking the lead in peace efforts but that these efforts were oriented toward Israel and not toward the Arab point of view. He kept reassuring me that he was not going to start a war but that he was not responsible for all groups and that he would intervene in any actual conflict begun. He stated that under present circumstances Jordanian troops, insofar as the Israeli problem was concerned, were under UAR command. This of course is applicable to other troops such as Iraqis and Algerians who were reporting for duty.

16. This I think summarizes the basic points of our conversation on which I will elaborate further on my return.

17. For your general information I spent three days in Beirut before going to Cairo. During this visit I saw Saudi Arabs, Kuwaitis and Iraqis, as well as Lebanese. They are people who are generally moderate and have a tendency to oppose Nasser. At this time they were all applauding Nasser's action, insisting on the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba and taking a position that the US was supporting a minority for political purposes. I am impressed more because of the quality of the people who made these assertions than the fact that they were made. Under the circumstances it would seem desirable that whatever international arrangements are thought proper it would be helpful if the initiative could be taken by some country other than US and that US be in a position of support of international efforts to secure peace rather than leadership which seems to be construed as favoring Israeli cause.

17. [sic] During our conversation Nasser was relaxed, in sport clothes, and seemed confident both of his intelligence and of his military capability. We had no discussion re Soviets except his assertion that he was not and would not be Communist. I believe he would regard any effort to open the Straits of Tiran as hostile and any act of aggression, whether originating from Israel or resulting from actions in Syria by the terrorist groups, would bring response. He stated that his target system was prepared and that this time he would be ready.

/3/June 3.

19. Upon rereading this text I want to make clear as I understand it UAR has military command over its own troops, the Jordanian troops as related to any Israeli problem, the troops committed by Iraq, Algeria or any country sending troops, but does not include command over Syrian troops. It is because of this latter situation which I think bothers Nasser as to whether or not the Syrians might undertake unilateral action designed to force a confrontation. It was because of his concern on this subject that he was asked if he would intervene even if the Syrians acted against UAR desires and the reply was affirmative.

Wellman

Washington, June 2, 1967, 11:30 a.m.-1:15 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Leddy and approved by the White House and S on June 14. The memorandum is part I of IV. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House. At the same time (11:35 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.), President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson met privately in the Oval Office. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of their meeting has been found.

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

Americans present
Secretary of State
Secretary of the Treasury (part time)
Secretary of Defense
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Walt Rostow (part time)
EUR--Mr. John M. Leddy
Mr. Francis Bator (part time)
S/CPR--Mr. James W. Symington

British present:
Sir Burke Trend, Secretary of the Cabinet
Sir Patrick Dean, Ambassador
Admiral Sir Nigel Henderson, Head, British Defense Staff
Sir Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Advisor
T. T. Brenchley, Assistant Secretary Foreign Office
Donald Murray, Head, South East Asian Department, Foreign Office
A. N. Halls, Principal Private Secretary to Prime Minister
A. M. Palliser, Private Secretary to Prime Minister
T. D. Floyd-Huges, Press Secretary to Prime Minister

This conversation ranged over various aspects of the Arab-Israeli confrontation in the Middle East and lasted about an hour and a half. The following brings together the main substantive points brought out in the discussion.

/2/June 6.

/3/May 28.

Secretary McNamara said that the Israelis feel that they could start hostilities now or a week from now and prevail. They believe their capabilities are perishable as time goes on, but Secretary McNamara thought they could delay from 2-4 weeks and still accomplish their military objective. They would try to destroy the Egyptian airforce first and thus gain ability for a tank strike to take Sinai and the Straits.

Secretary McNamara said the Israelis think they can win in 3-4 days; but he thinks it would be longer--7 to 10 days.

Secretary McNamara said that the Israelis felt that they could not keep up their mobilization for more than a week or two. He believed that they could sustain it for a longer time economically (it is costing them about $1 million a day); but the real problem is political and because of this they probably would have to act within two weeks. The economic strain of mobilization was much greater on the Israelis in their tight manpower situation than on the Arabs with their large unemployment.

Sir Burke Trend, in response to a question from Secretary McNamara, said that the UK military analysis of the Israeli capabilities was close to that of the US but perhaps a bit more conservative and rested on the assumption that the Israelis would not let things go too long. Both sides agreed that an Israeli military success would take more than a few days and possibly a week plus. Certainly it would take longer than it took in 1956 and it would be bloodier.

Sir Burke Trend inquired what effect an Arab-Israeli war would have on Egypt's ability to maintain its forces in Yemen. Secretary McNamara said he did not have a firm opinion. His best guess is that they could contain the military--it was a very small force--but that it would be politically difficult for Nasser to do so at the moment when he is faced with an all-out Israeli attack.

The Secretary thought that the worst problem that would face the US would be if the Israelis were defeated and were about to be driven into the sea. Secretary McNamara doubted that the Israelis would lose; and that we would have a real problem if the Soviets came in to save Egypt.

Sir Burke Trend thought that Nasser may have his eye on the next step--beyond the Straits problem. The Secretary thought that Nasser was riding a tiger. He had been preaching Jihad or Holy War. If it doesn't occur, or if the Straits don't remain closed, he may find it impossible to restrain popular passions.

The Secretary said that although there had earlier been some confusion on the point it was now clear that the Egyptian blockade covered oil--in other words it is the Battle Act list plus oil. It was not yet clear however what the Egyptians would do if a non-Israeli flagship carrying oil for Eilat should attempt passage.

The Secretary observed that there were two passages into the Gulf of Aqaba other than the Straits of Tiran; one of these--the Enterprise Passage--appeared to be navigable and was some four miles from the Egyptian coast. The navigability of the third passage was in some doubt. Both of these possibilities should be looked into. Secretary McNamara said it was highly unlikely that these have been mined.

It was brought out in the discussion that no ship so far had transited to Eilat; all have gone into Aqaba in Jordan.

The Secretary observed that Israeli access to Eilat is not really vital in an economic sense. The question is rather political. The Israelis consider that they have had a firm international commitment for guaranteed access since 1957 and the legitimacy of their territorial position in Eilat is not really in doubt.

Both sides felt that the Soviets probably had not been informed by Nasser of his intended action regarding the Straits of Tiran. In their public statements the Soviets have carefully skirted the question of the Straits, simply supporting the Egyptian claim to territorial waters which is beside the point. We have nothing back ourselves from the Soviets on the Straits question.

The Secretary thought that if the Israelis attack and are winning that the Soviets would do "something;" they would "help;" but we do not really know what kind of help this would be. He observed that apparently both the Arabs and the Soviets think the US is capable of commanding Israel.

/4/See Document 129.

Sir Burke Trend wondered what economic pressures might be brought to bear against the Arabs. Secretary Fowler pointed out that more economic and financial pressure could be exercised from the other side than from ours--cutting off of oil exports, expropriation, monetary measures damaging to sterling, etc. The Egyptians can depend on the Soviets for wheat and on the Kuwaitis for money. He observed that the recent failure of the IMF to extend a $30 million loan to the UAR was not really so disadvantageous to the Egyptians since the main purpose of the credit was to enable them to make good on their default to private banks and reestablish their credit position.

The Secretary thought that with respect to the Israelis other countries could help. He would not be surprised if the Israelis didn't get as much as $100 million from the American Jewish community.

Commenting on the British financial situation, Secretary Fowler felt that outstanding swaps, including those with the Continent, provided a healthy cushion. It would be undesirable to try to improve the situation in advance of hostilities since it would cause speculation. It was agreed on both sides that for the time being at least the market was in fairly good shape.

The Secretary pointed out that if the Arabs should do anything to cut off the flow of oil Europe would face a serious shortfall even with maximum supplies from the Western Hemisphere.

/5/Document 111.

/6/The Montreux Convention, signed June 20, 1936, by Britain, Bulgaria, France, Japan, Rumania, the Soviet Union, and Turkey; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. CLXXIII, p. 213.

The Declaration speaks of "asserting rights" to innocent passage in the Straits. Sir Burke Trend inquired what was meant by asserting rights other than through the use of force. The Secretary replied that this could cover various actions such as public statements, appeals to the World Court, proposed UN resolutions, economic reprisals, etc. He suggested that at some point it might be useful to introduce the Declaration into the UN machinery in order to keep the talk going. For example, the Danish Chairman of the Security Council might possibly use this in talking with the Arabs.

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara made it very clear that any participation by the US in the use of force would have to be supported by Congressional action. We have consulted intensively with the Congressional leaders in the last ten days. It is clear that there is a passionate aversion on the Hill to any unilateral action by the US. We would have to have UN action or at least broad multilateral participation. If we were to ask for Congressional support at this moment we could not get it. We will first have to continue our efforts in the UN and achieve multilateral support for the Maritime Declaration. Secretary McNamara recalled that Secretary Dulles in 1956-57 had made it very clear that Congressional action would be required for the use of force in the Middle East.

In a further discussion of this point it was agreed on both sides that there would be no US-UK joint planning in the military field at this stage. The danger of leaks was too great. The British side indicated that it, too, was hesitant to move too fast in the military area.

There was some discussion of the possible naming of a mediator. Perhaps someone like Gus Lindt, Swiss Ambassador to Moscow.

Sir Burke Trend inquired what a mediator might conceivably do in terms of speculation. The Secretary replied that one thing he might do would be to try to persuade each side of the consequence of a war and from a realization of this perhaps build toward a way out. He observed that this was the way the Berlin crisis had been handled.

Secretary McNamara asked about Pearson's position on the use of force. Sir Burke Trend said that Pearson was not yet ready to answer.

The Secretary inquired whether Pearson might not play a mediating role as he had in the past. The British side said he felt that he would be regarded by the Arabs as being too biased.

Both sides agreed that SYG U Thant had acted precipitately in removing the UNEF. The Secretary pointed out that he had gone beyond what Nasser requested and had moved faster than Nasser expected. Moreover, the Secretary understood that during U Thant's trip to Cairo he had proposed to the Egyptians a strategic embargo including oil but that the Israelis had turned this down. The question was why did U Thant feel that he had the right to make an offer of this kind?

The British asked why the US has not made public the Egyptian use of gas in Yemen. The Secretary replied that this information would have greater impact internationally if it came from the Red Cross rather than from the US. Mr. Rostow said that we had just released a report to the four governments concerned and planned to publish text he thought about June 5 or 6. (Reference to the report appeared in The New York Times on June 3.)

Ambassador Dean raised the question of further planning. He said that there were four separate areas: political; military; oil; and finance. He thought that we should keep these four areas under some kind of overall control and also to give consideration to making them multilateral at some stage.

It was again pointed out by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara that it was too early for military planning (for example, it would have been disastrous if we had been caught in military planning last week) and that we will just have to see how things develop. Secretary Fowler emphasized the importance of immediate planning in both the financial and oil fields. We would be derelict if we did not plan for these.

The following appeared to be generally agreed:

1. There would be a small group on overall matters on the US side to keep in touch with a similar group on the UK side.

2. Military planning was out for the time being.

3. The British are ready to come to Washington to talk about oil next week.

4. Monetary and financial discussions should be developed between the US and the UK through established official channels including the two Treasuries, the Bank of England and the New York Fed. There should be no approaches to the private sector at this stage because of the dangers of speculation.

Washington, June 2, 1967, 12:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. III. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Saunders sent a copy to John Walsh with a memorandum of December 10, 1968, commenting that the memorandum was the clearest statement "on whether we had a 'commitment' from Eshkol to wait two weeks." He added, however, "but even there there's a possibility of our overreading. I was there and sat through Walt's dictation of the memo and believed at the time it reflected accurately what Eppie said. But by that time, even Eppie may have been overtaken by thinking in Jerusalem." Saunders indicated that Walsh should particularly note Evron's reply to Rostow's first question in paragraph 6. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US)

Mr. President:

Evron came in today at 11:00 a.m. with the following extremely important statement. It is not (repeat not) a communication from the Government of Israel. Moreover, he underlined several times the need for it to be held within our government in the narrowest possible circle.

Nevertheless, Evron does not talk irresponsibly.

Here is his statement.

1. Time is working rapidly against Israel.

Nasser's forces are being built up and digging in. The Arab military forces are being unified and consolidated. The economic costs for Israel are rising. The political and psychological pressures for a prompt solution are increasing.

2. They took our advice to wait as a cold, responsible calculus. Nevertheless, it is now clear that the military cost to them of a war with Egypt is rising every day.

3. He then asked what our reaction would be to the following scenario:

/2/Reference is to a copy of the second document that Harman gave to Eugene Rostow on May 26; see footnote 3, Document 69. It quotes paragraph 13 of Foreign Minister Golda Meir's speech of March 1, 1957, before the UN General Assembly, which reads in part: "Interference, by armed force, with ships of Israel flag exercising free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran, will be regarded by Israel as an attack entitling it to exercise its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and to take all such measures as are necessary to ensure the free and innocent passage of its ships in the Gulf and in the Straits."

/3/The attachment also quotes Lodge's statement before the UN General Assembly on March 1, 1957, taking note of the declarations in Meir's statement and indicating that its expectations were "not unreasonable."

4. His questions then were:

--Would the United States stand by its political commitment in 1957 that Israel under these circumstances was asserting a legitimate right of self-defense?

--Would the United States stand off any Soviet intervention in that kind of war?

5. I immediately replied that this was not a question to which I could give a responsible answer. I said that the scenario he outlined was not the one raised by Foreign Minister Eban with the President; but, obviously, it was an alternative which might be considered. I said I would report it to the President.

6. I then asked some questions on a wholly personal basis:

First: How much time did they think they had?

He replied that they had made a commitment to hold steady for about two weeks. He would measure that from the Cabinet meeting last Sunday. Therefore, he was talking about things that might happen in the week after next; that is, the week beginning Sunday, June 11--although he indicated that there was nothing ironclad about the time period being exactly two weeks.

Second, I asked him what about the stories of the Israelis buying and organizing ships to run the blockade on a national basis?

He said they were taking action of this kind; but they would not move to run the blockade without there being a clear political decision in Israel, of which we would be made aware.

7. Two other points emerged in the final stage of our conversation. First, he appeared to suggest that it might be better for us in our relations with both the Arab world and the Soviet Union if we were not the ones to force the issue. He also referred to intelligence which we share that Nasser's response to a U.S.-escorted probe would be not to fire. Therefore, the issue of Israeli access to the Gulf of Aqaba might be left hanging indecisively.

8. Second--and fundamental to his whole presentation--was the question: Do we still stand by Lodge's assent (and Foster Dulles') to Golda Meir's statement in General Assembly? The track discussed between Eban and the President--on which we have hitherto been moving--is consistent with the commitments made in 1957 that we would ourselves assert the right of innocent passage; that we would assert that right on behalf of others; but that we would have to engage through our constitutional processes if we were to use force to assert that right with force on behalf of others. What is involved in the track he is suggesting is reaffirmation of the other branch of our 1957 commitment incorporated in the Golda Meir statement and Lodge's assent.

WWR comment: Although it cannot be emphasized too strongly that Evron was not making a formal communication from his Government, I believe we should most urgently consider the track he suggests. It has always been an alternative. It has its attractions, as one measures up the consequences for our relations with the Arab world and the Soviet Union, as compared to that which was agreed with Eban. It also carries the risk of a terrible blood bath. There is also the possibility of a combined scenario--in which the Israelis assume responsibility for responding to attack on their flag ship, but against the background of a naval force standing by to shepherd through other flagships. But this--like the Eban scenario--would require a prior Congressional Resolution.

Walt

Washington, June 2, 1967, 3:47-4:45 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Davies. The time is from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)

SUBJECT
Near East Crisis

PARTICIPANTS

H. E. Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Ephraim Evron, Minister of Israel

The Secretary
M--Mr. Eugene V. Rostow
NEA--Rodger P. Davies

Ambassador Harman, departing for consultation in Israel within a few hours, had asked to see the Secretary to learn what he could tell his government concerning U.S. assurances of support. The Secretary responded that at this juncture nothing could be added to what the President had already communicated to Prime Minister Eshkol.

In answer to Ambassador Harman's question on the Maritime Declaration, the Secretary said we hoped to get at least 14 adherents. Both the Dutch and the Belgians seemed to be aboard and, since Costa Rica supported the principle in 1957, we hoped to get support from this country and other Latin American states. The reaction in Bonn had been encouraging, but it might be well if Israel could work on the French and Canadians who seemed to be lagging.

Ambassador Harman said reports of Portuguese support for the Declaration were embarrassing since the Africans would be extremely sensitive to anything supported by Portugal. The important thing to Israel is the timetable. We should assure the closing off of Security Council action soon; the longer it runs on, the more difficulties there will be. Already the "breathing spell" was giving rise to rumors and reports of "deals".

The Secretary said that apparently there had been a complete misrepresentation of the U.S. Government's position on the Declaration stemming from briefings that had been given in the Congress. It might ease matters if the Declaration could be made public, but we could not move in this direction until other governments had a chance to discuss it. We hope it can be released when it is clear that the Security Council can do nothing on the problem.

In answer to the Ambassador's question, the Secretary said that the key issue was return to the status quo ante on use of the Gulf of Aqaba. Nasser, however, was firm on his present stand. Whether he can be moved is anybody's question. The Secretary indicated that the Maritime Declaration might provide a "handle" for the Secretary General to take further action and indicated that we have not had anything back from the Soviets on their attitude toward the question of the Strait.

The Ambassador asked whether he could faithfully report that the USG position is that there must be a return to the status quo ante, that there would be no "deal".

The Secretary said this was what we were seeking to bring about. In the Security Council it is apparent that the Soviets would veto anything calling for the parties to forego belligerency. We believe we have eight votes in support of our draft resolution and are somewhat hopeful that we may be able to line up nine.

/2/Rusk and Eugene Rostow met separately with Iraqi Foreign Minister Pachachi on June 1. Telegram 206672 to Baghdad, June 2, which summarized their conversations, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXI, Document 193. After meeting with Rusk and Rostow, Pachachi met with the President. No record of that conversation has been found.

The Ambassador repeated that the timetable on the Naval Task Force and next steps was of supreme importance to Israel.

The Secretary said we are going ahead on all contingencies, looking at all factors. Joint consultations would be started shortly. At present we have not developed a multilateral context, and from the Congressional angle this was of great importance. We believe the Dutch would join with us but are not sure now of the Canadians. It is important that we be joined by a half dozen or so before we can move ahead on timing. There have been no final decisions. On these, the President and the Prime Minister must be in touch.

The Ambassador said he would come to the crux of Israel's concern. The military situation is deteriorating rapidly.

Hussein's accord with Nasser, Arab military coordination, the dispatch of Iraqi troops to the UAR and Jordan, the move of Saudi troops to the Aqaba Gulf area, the big build-up of Syrian forces, the caving in of Lebanon with respect to Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) activities, and the stationing of PLA units on all frontiers are causing heightened concern in Israel. The time has come for effective resistance to Nasser. Nasser's declaration that the situation had been returned to that of 1956 was now followed by threats that it would be returned to that of 1948. Israel has mobilized 100,000 reservists in addition to its regular forces. In these circumstances Israel must know the modalities of the U.S. commitment. In addition to the direct threat to Israel of the coalescence of the Arabs around Nasser, there were ripples which must certainly concern the West, not only in connection with its position vis-à-vis the Soviets but also with the implications for Turkey and Iran. If there is a rapid show of strength in Tiran, this could affect the entire situation. Everyday the situation was allowed to continue however heightened pressures and danger. The question he would be asked in Jerusalem was: What is the attitude of the U.S. toward the question of the Strait and toward the general situation? What action would the U.S. take if hostilities began in either connection?

The Secretary said on such matters the President and the Prime Minister should be in touch. However, the question of who initiates military activities is important. The Soviets will support the Arabs if they are attacked. An Arab onslaught on Israel would create a different situation from that of an Israeli attack on the Arabs. This is a most important consideration for the Congress. Israel should weigh heavily any decision to attack.

Ambassador Harman said that those responsible for the destiny of Israel will not be prepared for any deal or a "Munich". Israel is prepared to face the present danger and would prefer to face it than to have its security slowly eroded. Israel understands the importance of who fires the first shot, but does Israel have to accept 10,000 casualties before the U.S. will agree that aggression has occurred? Aggression exists in the build-up of forces on all of Israel's borders, the blockade of the Strait of Tiran, and the belligerent statements threatening the extinction of Israel. In the context of President Kennedy's statement of May 8, 1963, the aggression is already mounted.

The Secretary said that there is some difference between what is said and what is actually done.

The Secretary said that no one can say what the Soviets will do in the event of hostilities. However, if a Jihad mentality is evoked by the Arabs and the Arabs don't attack, how long can this state be maintained. A stalemate could work against Nasser.

Mr. Evron replied that a military build-up sets in motion a chain of events that probably will lead to military action.

The Secretary said we have been told categorically that Egypt will not attack. If we had these assurance from the Soviets in connection with our own security, the U.S. would not rush into a confrontation.

Ambassador Harman said the Soviets were a different people from the Arabs. The Soviets played a rational form of brinkmanship. In answer to the Secretary's question as to how much influence the Soviets actually wielded in Cairo, Ambassador Harman said that this was a weakness on the Soviet side through which their restraint could be neutralized. Nasser's momentum is such that Israel's assumption is that he must be in deadly earnest.

Had Israel acted on May 23 against the advice received from the U.S., Israel would be facing a different political and military situation from that faced today. Israel was at a disadvantage.

The Secretary said that Nasser was sending former Prime Minister and Vice President Zakariyah Muhi ad-Din to Washington this week end. If he should say anything significant, we would let Israel know.

Ambassador Harman said Soviet moves now seemed directed toward gaining time and confirming the new status quo. Israel had a strong feeling that the Soviets would not seek a confrontation with the U.S. in the Middle East. The gut question in Israel is what would the U.S. do to help Israel?

The Secretary said this depends in part on who initiates hostilities. Ambassador Harman questioned what this meant. What does Israel have to take in a situation where she is threatened not with aggression but with genocide? Egypt's action in closing the Strait is a clear act of aggression. Israel was convinced that an attack was inevitable. Nasser has cast himself in a certain role, and now there is no room for any other course of action. If he is challenged quickly and strongly, this might prevent inflation of the conflict. Since May 16, Nasser has shown how he can make rapid moves. Israel operates from five airfields. This question is foremost in Israel's mind. Air power is decisive. If Israel loses initially, Israel has had it. There will be little to salvage. This situation can arise any time. Israel did not agree with the estimate given by Mr. McNamara and General Wheeler that it could absorb a first strike. Israel is not seeking hostilities, but Nasser seems to be playing "for broke". The situation calls for speedy action. The farce in the Security Council must be broken up.

The Secretary said that there were some advantages to Security Council considerations. The fact that the Cuban problem was in the Security Council didn't affect the settlement, but it did allow some prestige to be salvaged which weighed in the settlement.

/3/According to a telegraphic summary of the conversation, the Dolphin was formerly the Greek-owned Arion. (Telegram 207977 to Tel Aviv, June 3; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

The Secretary said that John Finney and Chalmers Roberts do not speak for the USG. What the Prime Minister and the President say to each other is the important factor. Ambassador Harman said the public in Israel lives on the New York Times and the Washington Post.

/4/June 4.

Paris, June 2, 1967, 1910Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 4:46 p.m.

/2/In telegram 206658 to Paris, June 1, Rusk asked Bohlen to see Couve de Murville as soon as possible to review the British proposal for a Maritime Declaration and to urge French cooperation. (Ibid.)

/3/May 28.

2. Couve then said that he would give me what he had just said this afternoon to the Israeli Ambassador, which he thought fully reflected present French attitude toward the situation [in] the Middle East. It follows:

Soviet attitude still uncertain although there had been some indications in New York from Fedorenko of his desire to maintain contact individually with Western powers and that Fedorenko showed no desire to poison the atmosphere. He said he had told Eytan that there were essentially only two solutions to the present state of affairs in the Middle East. One was to go to war, which he impressed on Eytan would be folly since even if Israel scored a military victory it would certainly not lay any groundwork for the future which must in some form or other and at some time or other include accommodation between the Arab states and Israel. If war is excluded, the only other way was negotiation, which would include not only the question of the Gulf of Aqaba but also other questions of a military nature dealing with terrorism, etc., in the area. He told Eytan if the status of the Gulf of Aqaba is discussed neither side will get one hundred percent of what they want and compromise would probably be necessary and to the French Government this should include the normal passage of civilian goods. Couve admitted that the question of the Egyptian attitude towards POL as to whether or not it is a strategic cargo remains unclear and would obviously be a subject of discussion. Eytan asked how could any negotiations take place, to which Couve had replied that it was obviously not possible at the present juncture to have direct Arab/Israeli discussions but there were many other intermediaries, including the great powers. He said he had taken the liberty of mentioning to Eytan that he was convinced of the good will of the U.S. but some indication of a comparable attitude was needed from the USSR. Couve said Eytan had made no comment but Couve had emphasized very strongly the point with him that apart from war the only way out was negotiation. Couve then told me that in regard to the Security Council it was quite clear that neither the U.S. resolution nor the Indian (of course Egyptian inspired) had any chance of obtaining the votes ofall members of the Security Council. Therefore, Seydoux had been instructed to point this out to the Council and to suggest the drafting of a resolution which would merely urge calm on the countries directly involved, which conceivably might obtain the support of all members. Couve however admitted that there was as yet no sign that the Russians were willing to meet in a group of four.

/4/Telegram 206752 to Paris, June 2, noted that news reports were quoting a comment by French President De Gaulle concerning the Middle East to the effect that whoever shot first would not have French support and asked the Embassy to check on the accuracy of the statement and its meaning. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

3. Couve said the statement issued after the cabinet meeting this morning set forth France's opinion towards the Maritime Declaration. He said France did not consider this a good idea at the present time and was therefore not "a partisan" thereof. In reply to my question he said it was not an absolute flat refusal but a disinclination to go along with it at present.

Comment: Couve's general attitude showed that French position had not really changed since the beginning of this crisis; that they still are hopeful that the Soviets will change their negative attitude and be willing to join in some form of negotiations and that through these negotiations there might be some arrangement made which would cover the passage of cargo of a non-strategic value, particularly POL through the Straits. He showed no willingness at all to consider the issuance of a Maritime Declaration and certainly none to even contemplate the action in the event it was rejected.

Bohlen

Cairo, June 2, 1967, 2029Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 6:20 p.m. A copy was sent to the President on June 3 with a note from Walt Rostow calling Nasser's response "quite uncompromising," noting that Nasser was willing to receive Vice President Humphrey or to send Vice President Mohieddin to Washington, and stating that he and Rusk agreed that "we should proceed to get Mohieddin here." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis)

/2/Telegram 207861 to Cairo, June 3, states that the President would welcome a visit from Mohieddin and that in view of the urgency of the situation, "we hope it will be possible for him to come without delay." It states that, if asked, Nolte could say that a corresponding visit to Cairo by a "very senior representative of the President" would be sympathetically considered if both Presidents decided such a step could be useful. It states that Harman had been informed about the possibility of the visit. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

2. Cairo, June 2, 1967. Dear President,

3. I welcome your initiative in writing to me on the current situation in the Arab homeland. For however distant the point of agreement between us seems from the scope of our outlook at the present stage, I am convinced that any joint endeavor on our part to establish communication of thought, might at least contribute to dissipate part of the artificial clouds intended to depict the exercise of right as a sin and the right of defense as aggression.

4. It would be useful in the assessment of current events, to view them in their chronological and logical entity, to avoid misunderstanding and make a sound, reasonable, and fair evaluation of the facts we face.

5. Hence, I shall try to set forth a number of facts which I would term as preliminary:

6. First: It is essential that we go back to the few days which preceded the measures which the United Arab Republic took of late, and to recall the dangerously aggressive situation created by the Israeli authorities vis-à-vis the Syrian Arab Republic, the hostile threats proclaimed by a number of Israeli leaders, and the accompanying mass troop concentrations on the Syrian border in preparation for an imminent aggression on Syria. It was only natural then, that the United Arab Republic should assume her responsibilities and take all measures necessary for defense and to deter the planned aggression against our countries.

7. Second: Defense measures taken by the United Arab Republic made it imperative that our armed forces move to their advanced positions on the border to be able to cope with developments and through their very presence foil Israel's premeditated invasion. Urged by our concern for the United Nations Emergency Forces, we found it imperative that they should withdraw: such has become our final position on the matter.

8. Third: Following the withdrawal of the UNEF, it was only logical that the United Arab Republic armed forces should occupy their positions, among which was the area of Sharm el Sheikh overlooking the Straits of Tiran. It was equally logical that we exercise our established sovereign rights on the Straits and on our territorial waters in the Gulf.

9. Here again, I wish to take you a few years back to the tripartite aggression on Egypt: We still recall with appreciation, the fair position adopted by your country with regard to that aggression.

10. Prior to the aggression, the United Arab Republic exercised its established legal rights with regard to Israeli shipping in the Straits and the Gulf. These rights are indisputable. Following the departure of the United Nations Emergency Forces and their replacement by our armed forces in the area, it was unthinkable that Israeli shipping or strategic materials destined for Israel be allowed passage. Our position thereon, in addition to Ily being legitimately established, it indeed aims at removing the last vestige of the tripartite aggression, in consonance with the moral principle which rules that no aggressor be rewarded for his aggression.

11. In all the measures we have adopted in defense of our land and our rights, we have underlined two points:

12. First: That we shall defend ourselves against any aggression, with all our means and potentialities

13. Second: That we shall continue to allow innocent passage of foreign shipping in our territorial waters.

14. These are facts relevant to the direct position proclaimed by the United Arab Republic, and which we feel afford no ground for some to create a climate of crisis or to launch that psychological campaign against us.

15. While this campaign takes on new dimensions and forms we notice complete and regrettable overlooking of a number of other facts which I wish to term as basic. These are the very facts which carry full weight on current events and will continue to have their bearing on the future until all appreciate fully and assess their dimensions and roots. Here I shall refer to two facts:

16. First: The rights of the Arab people of Palestine. In our view, this is the most important fact that should be recognized. An aggressive armed force was able to oust that people from their country and reduce them to refugees on the borders of their homeland.

17. Today the forces of aggression impede the Arab people's established right of return and life in their homeland, despite the UN resolutions, the last of which was adopted last year.

18. The second fact is related to Israel's position towards the Armistice Agreements: a position represented not merely by the constant violation of those agreements, but which has gone as far as to deny their presence and refuse to adhere to them. It has even gone as far as to occupy the demilitarized zones, oust the UN observers and insult the international organization and its flag.

19. Those are two basic facts which should be considered in the assessment of today's events and developments.

20. In your message you referred to two points:

21. First: you urge that we put the past aside and endeavor to rescue the Middle East or rather the whole human community through the avoidance of hostilities. Here, allow me to refer to the policy of the United Arab Republic which does not restrict herself to placing world peace as an objective, but goes beyond that and assumes a positive role on which I do not wish to elaborate lest I should border on the area of self-glorification. As for endeavors to avoid military operations, I have but to emphasize what I have already declared that the measures we have adopted were imposed by the forces of aggression and their conceit as well as by their belief that they have reached the stage where they could impose their aggressive policy. Yet, our forces have not initiated any aggressive act, but no doubt, we shall resist with all our potentialities any aggression launched against us or against any Arab state.

22. Second: Your observation that the conflicts of our time cannot be solved by the crossings of frontiers with arms and men. Here, I share your view. Yet, we have to see how this principle is applied to every case. If you are referring to the crossing of the demarcation lines by some individuals of the Palestinian people I would urge the importance of considering this aspect in the general perspective of the question of Palestine. Here also, I may ask how far any government is able to control the feelings of more than one million Palestinians who, for twenty years, the international community--whose responsibility herein is inescapable--has failed to secure their return to their homeland. The UN General Assembly merely confirms that right at every session. The crossing of the demarcation lines by some Palestinian individual is, in point of fact, merely a manifestation of anger by which those people are naturally possessed as they meet with the full denial of their rights by the international community, and by the powers which side with Israel and assist it materially and morally.

23. Whatever our attempts to divide the aspects of the problem, it is imperative in the end that we return to its origin and fundamentals, namely the right of Palestinian people to return to their homeland, and the responsibility of the international community in securing them the exercise of this right.

24. My letter may seem rather long in a way: Yet, it was my wish to explain briefly some of the basic features of the situation we now face in the Arab region.

25. Finally, I wish to assure you that we would welcome listening to Mr. Hubert Humphrey, the United States Vice President, at anytime he may choose to visit the UAR. We shall provide him with a picture of the situation as we conceive it amidst the fundamental events faced by the Arab nation today. I am ready to send Vice President Zakareya Mohieddin, to Washington immediately to meet with you and expound our viewpoint.

26. Please accept my regards and considerations.

27. (Sgd) (Gamal Abdel Nasser) President of the United Arab Republic.

Nolte

Washington, June 2, 1967.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. III. Secret; Sensitive. 5 pages of source text not declassified.]

Washington, June 2, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. III. Top Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
A Scenario of the Soviet Role

From the bits and pieces of Intelligence we have been receiving on the Soviet role in this crisis, it might be useful to set down the following "scenario." It's a guess, but I think it is about as probable as any other hypothesis.

The understandings reached during Gromyko's trip in late March were probably general in nature, and not an "attack plan."

In early May, it is probable that Soviet agents actually picked up intelligence reports of a planned Israeli raid into Syria. I would not be surprised if the reports were at least partly true. The Israeli have made such raids before; they have been under heavy provocation; and they maintain pretty good security (so we might well not know about a planned raid).

Intelligence being an uncertain business, the Soviet agents may not have known the scale of the raid and may have exaggerated its scope and purpose.

Apparently the Soviets warned the Syrians. Whether they deliberately magnified the threat is hard to say. They bear neither the Israeli nor ourselves any great love, and there may well have been some element of deliberate exaggeration. However, this was not necessarily a calculated incitement to conflict--made out of whole cloth and responsive to a global design. The Soviets did accompany their warnings of Israeli action with advice toward restraint.

The Syrians and the UAR were also quite ready to exaggerate what the Soviets said and feed on their own fears and ambitions.

There is still no evidence that Nasser consulted with the Soviets or got their agreement to close the straits. In fact, the Soviets have still taken no position on the straits issue.

Like everybody else, the Soviets know that Nasser is two strikes ahead--with the withdrawal of UNEF and the strait now effectively closed for almost two weeks. They are in a position where it is extremely difficult to back out of a position of supporting their friends across the board. Whatever the situation before, they have the strongest interest in maintaining the status quo and consolidating the victory. About the only negative influence from the point of view of their self-interest is the danger that things will really get out of hand. However, they increasingly realize how close to out-of-hand things are. We understand from New York that Fedorenko now is taking things more seriously.

I doubt that the Soviets are much more confident than we are in their ability to call the shots and control their friends. That's not very confident.

N.D.

I-23411/67

Washington, June 2, 1967.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, Middle East, 381.3. Secret; No Release. A stamped notation on the memorandum, dated June 14, indicates that McNamara saw it.

SUBJECT
Middle East Situation

/2/The attachment, a June 1 memorandum from Hoopes to the Middle East Control Group, recorded a May 31 meeting of the Military Contingency Working Group that considered the feasibility of testing the UAR blockade by unescorted ships. The working group also decided to continue military supply shipments to Near East countries under existing commitments, but to make no new commitments. A copy of Hoopes' memorandum is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Middle East Crisis Files, 1967, Entry 5190, Box 18, Control Group Data, Vol. I, Folder 1.

/3/For Harriman's conversations with the Shah, see telegrams 19869 and 19914 from Paris, June 5 and 6 in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXII, Documents 207 and 208.

/4/The reference is to a quotation in Hoopes' memorandum from a May 31 CIA report (not found). It estimates that if a U.S. ship were escorted through the Strait of Tiran by a U.S. naval vessel, ignoring all challenges, UAR forces would let them through under protest. It continues: "We do not believe that Cairo wishes to make any direct encounter with US military power. Indeed the UAR may see a US naval challenge of the blockade as serving their interests, as the political consequences of such a move would be far-reaching. The UAR would formally accuse the US of acting as Israel's military ally to commit aggression against the Arabs. It would expand and intensify its propaganda and diplomatic efforts against special US positions throughout the Arab world. In particular it would seek to harass US oil operations and urge the nationalization of US oil properties in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and Libya. During the present super-heated and emotional climate prevailing in the Arab world, US interests in the area would almost certainly suffer considerably."

I attach particular importance to the conclusion reached by the Working Group (on page 6) that, given the present atmosphere in the Arab world and the effectiveness of Arab and Soviet propaganda, it would not be possible to present a Western blockade running (particularly if armed escort were involved) as simply an assertion of a recognized international right. Those propaganda media would almost certainly succeed in branding the US as the ally and protector of Israel against the Arabs. On this judgment, we could not avoid a damaging political polarization in the event that we organize and attempt to use a naval task force (whether US or multilateral).

One reason why I am pessimistic about the number and quality of likely adherents to a maritime declaration is that many of the potentials are now beginning to believe that even such a declaration on their part would lead to serious discrimination against their Middle Eastern interests by Nasser-directed Arab actions. Their judgment in this respect acknowledges Nasser's political power. As you know, the French are extremely cool to both the declaration and the naval escort, the Canadians have made quite clear that they will not participate in a naval force and that even their adherence to a declaration depends on the adherence of several others and on a "balanced program" designed to resolve the crisis without violence. The British Cabinet gives increasing evidence of softening its position, as it contemplates the UK's severe economic vulnerabilities in the Middle East (oil revenues, passage through Suez, and the fact that Saudi and Kuwaiti deposits in London represent two-thirds of the UK's sterling balance).

It is increasingly my conviction (as I believe it is Mr. Vance's) that we must put our major efforts into seeking a political settlement based on compromise, and should be extremely cautious about pinning our hopes on a broadly supported maritime declaration and especially about getting publicly committed to a naval escort force. It is possible that the indication in yesterday's Cairo press that oil may not be a "strategic" commodity in the UAR view is an important ingredient of such a political compromise.

/5/In a meeting with Ambassador Burns on May 31, King Hussein requested withdrawal of a small USAF detachment stationed in Jordan to provide training on F-104 aircraft to Jordanian pilots. Burns reported the meeting in telegram 3929 from Amman (cited in footnote 2, Document 107). Circular telegram 206650, June 1, states that the Jordanian Government had requested withdrawal of the USAF aircraft as well. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR) The USAF personnel and aircraft were in Jordan to provide training to Jordanian pilots for 18 F-104 aircraft Jordan was purchasing, which were scheduled to begin arriving in July 1967. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 373, footnote 3.

Townsend Hoopes

Washington, June 3, 1967.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Appendix A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

Washington, June 3, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. III. Secret. Rostow sent a draft letter, drafted by Battle and Sisco, with his handwritten revisions to the President at 7:25 p.m. on June 2. Johnson marked his approval on Rostow's covering memorandum. (Ibid.) Rostow sent him the letter for signature with a covering memorandum on June 3 at 2:50 p.m., noting that he understood Johnson wanted to read it again before it was sent and adding, "It may be urgent that we put this letter on record soon." (Ibid.) The final letter includes additional revisions, which, according to a handwritten note by Harold H. Saunders, were given to him by the President on the telephone on the afternoon of June 3. (Ibid., NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis) A copy of the draft with Saunders' handwritten revisions is filed ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 30. A handwritten note on the letter states that it was sent to the Department of State at 4:30 p.m.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

/2/See Document 102.

Our position in this crisis rests on two principles which are vital national interests of the United States. The first is that we support the territorial integrity and political independence of all of the countries of the Middle East. This principle has now been affirmed by four American Presidents. The second is our defense of the basic interest of the entire world community in the freedom of the seas. As a leading maritime nation, we have a vital interest in upholding freedom of the seas, and the right of passage through straits of an international character.

As you know, the United States considers the Gulf of Aqaba to be an international waterway and believes that the entire international maritime community has a substantial interest in assuring that the right of passage through the Strait of Tiran and Gulf is maintained.

/3/See Document 77.

"The United States has its own constitutional processes which are basic to its action on matters involving war and peace. The Secretary General has not yet reported to the UN Security Council and the Council has not yet demonstrated what it may or may not be able or willing to do although the United States will press for prompt action in the UN.

"I have already publicly stated this week our views on the safety of Israel and on the Strait of Tiran. Regarding the Strait, we plan to pursue vigorously the measures which can be taken by maritime nations to assure that the Strait and Gulf remain open to free and innocent passage of the vessels of all nations.

"I must emphasize the necessity for Israel not to make itself responsible for the initiation of hostilities. Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone. We cannot imagine that it will make this decision."

/4/Before Saunders added Johnson's revisions, the first two sentences of this paragraph read: I told Mr. Eban I could not foresee then, and I cannot now foresee, the specific steps which may prove desirable and necessary. I explained that I want to do everything I can to provide Israel with effective American support."

/5/Before Saunders added Johnson's revisions, the last two sentences of this paragraph read: "And, as you will understand, I cannot act at all without full backing of Congress. I am now in the process of urgently consulting the leaders of our Congress."

We are now engaged in doing everything we can through the United Nations. We recognize the difficulties of securing constructive action in the Security Council, but we are convinced that the world organization, which for the past decade has played a major role in the Middle East, must make a real effort to discharge its responsibilities for the maintenance of peace.

We are moving ahead in our diplomatic efforts, in concert with the United Kingdom and with your diplomatic representatives, to secure a declaration by the principal maritime powers asserting the right of passage through the Strait and Gulf. A copy of this declaration has been given to your Ambassador. Such a declaration could be an important step both in relation to the proceedings in the Security Council and also in the event those proceedings do not lead to a successful outcome.

/6/Before Saunders added Johnson's revisions, the last sentence of this paragraph read: "I would not wish the United States to move in isolation."

On the matter of liaison and communication, I believe our relations can be improved. We have completely and fully exchanged views with General Amit.

We will remain in continuing communication with Ambassador Harman and Minister Evron here in Washington and value greatly the exchanges we are able to have through them with the Government of Israel, as well as through Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Washington, June 4, 1967, 2:03 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Battle on June 3 and approved by Rusk.

/2/Document 139; the text was transmitted in telegram 207955 to Tel Aviv, June 3, which states that Rusk gave the letter to Evron that afternoon. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR) Rusk met with Evron from 5:15 to 5:40 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)

2. Secretary briefed Charge in general terms talks Prime Minister Wilson in which Middle East problems had figured prominently. Clear from these discussions that U.S. and U.K. were mobilizing support on Declaration and considering carefully contingencies that might follow. In addition, U.S. and U.K. looking carefully into economic, financial, and other aspects problem. Clear that U.K. regards matter as serious issue to which it is giving most urgent attention. From U.S. point of view, important question was how involve as many governments as possible in plans for future. Secretary assumed GOI talking to France and Canada. French position at present unsatisfactory which was perhaps not too surprising. One key question was what France would do if merchant vessel transited Straits and UAR fired first shot. De Gaulle statement not precise on point.

3. Evron pressed Secretary re time factors current plans to which Secretary replied U.S. working very hard several tracks. Should know by about Monday what Security Council can do. We are trying speed up consideration Declaration with target for mid-week to know how much support we have. Moreover, Department spending much time with Congressional groups to inform them of situation. So far response in Congress constructive and encouraging but indicates strong feeling U.S. should deal with problem multilaterally.

4. Evron agreed transmit letter Prime Minister soonest.

Rusk

Washington, June 3, 1967, 7:17 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted and approved by Rusk. Sent to Algiers, Amman, Baghdad, Baida, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, Rabat, Sanaa, Tel Aviv, and Tunis.

207956. Eyes Only for Ambassador from Secretary.

I wish to express my personal appreciation to our Ambassadors in Arab Capitals for their full and timely reporting and for frank expressions of views on the present situation in the Near East. The considerations which you have advanced are being taken fully into account in a situation which is as complex and as dangerous as any we have faced. I should like to put before you some additional considerations and ask you to put your minds to possible solutions which can prevent war.

1. You should not assume that the United States can order Israel not to fight for what it considers to be its most vital interests. We have used the utmost restraint and, thus far, have been able to hold Israel back. But the "Holy War" psychology of the Arab world is matched by an apocalyptic psychology within Israel. Israel may make a decision that it must resort to force to protect its vital interests. In dealing with the issues involved, therefore, we must keep in mind the necessity for finding a solution with which Israel can be restrained.

2. Each side appears to look with relative equanimity upon the prospect of major hostilities and each side apparently is confident of success. Which estimate is correct cannot be fully known unless tested by the event but someone is making a major miscalculation. It does not help that Israel believes that time is working against them because of the continuing Arab build-up and deployment of forces. If anything could be done in the direction of reversing the mobilization on both sides, this would, of course, be a great advantage.

3. You should bear in mind the background of the application of the statement of four American Presidents that (to quote from President Johnson's statement of May 23) "The United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of that area." You will recall the actions taken by the Eisenhower Administration when Egypt was attacked by Israel, Britain and France and when Lebanon was seriously threatened by Syria. You will recall our steady and substantial support to Jordan to reinforce its position over and against Egypt. You will recall that President Kennedy sent a squadron of U.S. fighters to Saudi Arabia as a demonstration of support when Saudi Arabia was being threatened by Egypt. Most of you may know that we used a major diplomatic effort in Cairo to cool off subversive and propaganda assaults upon Libya. We supported Algeria's demand for independence and have tried to steady the nerves of Tunisia and Morocco when they felt threatened by Algeria. When Israel has been attacked by terrorist groups we have supported Israel; when Israel resorted to disproportionate actions of retaliation against Samu in Jordan, we publicly and privately censored Israel in the strongest terms. I suggest we have a strong case for the idea that we have been even-handed with respect to the political independence and territorial integrity of Near Eastern countries.

A major issue for us in this present crisis involves the commitments we made at the time of the wind-up of the Suez affair. At that time we were acting on behalf of Egypt. As a part of the settlement which obtained the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai, including Sharm el Sheikh, we assured Israel that we would support an international right of passage through the Strait of Tiran. We endorsed Israel's statement in the General Assembly (in fact it was drafted in consultation with Secretary Dulles) that Israel would have the right under Article 51 of the Charter to protect its flagships transiting that Strait if fired upon. Egypt was aware of these positions and, although it did not endorse them at the time, it was the beneficiary of the arrangements made.

4. The central principle of international law involved in the Strait of Tiran was encompassed in the Conventions on the law of the sea of 1958. This principle is of vital importance to us all over the world where there are many such narrow passages connecting bodies of international waters. In any event, the United States has given some pledges on the matter and we must give the most sober attention to all the implications of such pledges and any failure on our part to insist upon them.

5. There may be some flexibility in what Cairo would be willing to do before major hostilities. The Strait of Tiran is a key issue. The free passage of crude oil is a major part of that issue. We shall not know details until further explorations of the problem with Cairo or intermediaries. We cannot abandon, in principle, the right of Israeli flagships to transit the Strait. There might be some possibility of a breathing space if in fact passage were permitted for genuinely peaceful traffic, including crude oil. This is not a proposal on our side but an indication of a possible de facto standstill pending further diplomatic effort.

6. I have presented these considerations in order to enlist the best thought of our Ambassadors in Arab Capitals as to profitable approaches to the problem. It will do no good to ask Israel simply to accept the present status quo in the Strait because Israel will fight and we could not restrain her. We cannot throw up our hands and say that, in that event, let them fight while we try to remain neutral. I should be glad to have any further suggestions any of you might have on this situation.

Rusk

Washington, June 3, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Situation Reports. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified].

SUBJECT
Who Would Win a War? Israel or the UAR

/2/The attachment is apparently a draft of Document 76.

2. It concludes:

--Israel could get air supremacy over the Sinai in one to three days--depending on who struck first.

--Israel would lose a third to half of its air force. (This estimate may be high; one-fourth to one-third losses might be closer to the mark.)

--Israel would drive the Egyptians west of the Suez Canal in seven to nine days.

--Israel could contain any attacks by Syria or Jordan during this period.

3. Since this was written, the UAR has gained a number of military benefits:

--The UAR has consolidated positions in Sinai.
--The UAR has manned the Straits of Aqaba.
--The UAR has mined certain areas.
--Arab command, control, and planning has probably improved.
--The threat to Israel posed by Jordan has increased.
--UAR logistics in the Sinai have probably improved.

4. By a delay of one week--28 May to 4 June--the Arabs have made a net military gain if war should now occur. The ultimate outcome--according to "my experts"--would be unchanged. Israel would still win, but

--It might take 8-10 days to drive to the Suez.
--Israel might suffer 5-10% more casualties.

5. If war outbreak were delayed one more week--to 11 June, the Israeli military position would probably deteriorate further--but at a slower rate. "My experts" judge that:

Israel would still win, but

--It might take as much as 9 days to two weeks.
--Israelis might suffer an additional 5% casualties.

6. After 11 June, the military balance would not change until the economic effects of mobilization began to affect military posture.

7. Some of my experts think that the above underrates Israel. I suspect that if I were a responsible Israeli commander, I might be less sanguine even though I had no doubt about the ultimate military outcome. The only other nagging doubt is that sometimes in the past professional military opinion has been awfully wrong, but I can find no objective basis to challenge the present estimate.

8. Thus, I conclude that Israeli concern about delaying a war which they fear is inevitable is based primarily on their concern about a deterioration in their political and diplomatic position rather than on military factors.

G

[document number not declassified]

Washington, June 3, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 5/67-7/67. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence.

THE CURRENT FOCUS OF THE NEAR EAST CRISIS

Summary

Reporting during the past few days has focused on two primary aspects of the Near East crisis. One is the rapidly growing belief in Israel that time is running out, and that if Israel is not to suffer an ultimately fatal defeat it must very soon either strike or obtain absolutely iron-clad security assurances from the West. The second aspect is the rise of a euphoric, band-wagon spirit among the Arab States, leading even moderate Arabs to believe that the time may in fact have come when the Arabs can close in on Israel with some hope of success. There are in addition a number of reports indicating that anti-US actions are being planned, to be put in motion if the US moves to frustrate what the Arabs now tend to see as a "victory."

1. All reporting from Israel shows mounting pressure for a "decision." The popular applause greeting General Moshe Dayan's appointment as defense minister--"go, go Moshe"--indicates that the mood is strongly "action." Dayan's appointment should assure that the "hawks" accept decisions of the coalition government more readily than they otherwise would, but it also indicates that Prime Minister Eshkol has suffered a setback and must adapt his policy to the views of the tough-minded military whom Dayan represents.

2. The Israeli military, [1 line of source text not declassified], have already shown apprehension over the consequences of extended delay. The Egyptians have been permitted to make an orderly build-up of ground forces in Sinai, moving aircraft to advanced fields and setting up at least the rudiments of an air defense system there. The Israeli strategy calls for gaining control of the air as the first essential step in the campaign. Although all reports indicate that the Israelis are still confident of victory, they are increasingly nervous about the cost, and, even more important, about the possibility that the Egyptians may somehow get in an initial air strike on Israeli cities or air fields. The Israeli "hawks" may fear that such a strike would do significant psychological damage to the affluent Israeli society, even if it did not have much material effect.

3. The Arabs are sniffing blood. So fast and far does Nasir's band-wagon seem to be rolling that even the Iranian government, long friendly to Israel and bitterly hostile to Nasir, has been compelled to issue a statement mouthing phrases about Muslim solidarity. Tunisian President Bourguiba, the only "Arab" leader in recent years to suggest publicly some modus vivendi with Israel, has also had his government say that it stands behind, though evidently not with, Nasir.

4. The Arabs evidently expect that the US and the UK will come to Israel's rescue, and are doing some planning for this eventuality. Their view of US and British policy is being fed by a stream of "intelligence" reports--e.g., that US airborne brigades in West Germany are on alert; "confirmed" information that Wheelus Field is being used to ship US arms to Israel; that British, French, and US airmen have arrived in Israel; that Israeli rockets have been stationed at Eilat under US instructions.

5. The range of Arab reaction in the event of US and UK intervention, or indeed before such a development, is indicated not only by public threats to close up the Suez Canal, to destroy Western oil assets, etc., but also by some specific preparations. [4 lines of source text not declassified] Terrorist bombing against US offices in Saudi Arabia was resumed on 2 June. Meanwhile, the US Embassy in Kuwait has reported that it assesses the possibility of an oil shutdown there as more real than it had been earlier in the crisis. In Libya, the present mood is that the US base at Wheelus would be closed.

6. Although the tenor of many of the anti-US pronouncements suggests that they are being issued more to head off pro-Nasir pressures than to express actual intentions, there seems to be a real danger in the cumulative effect of the threats. In countries where there are obvious and available targets other than oil or military installations--e.g., the American University of Beirut, US or UK airline and branch bank offices--these might be subjected to direct attack even before Arab governments moved in on oil or base installations where their own interests are more heavily engaged.

7. In less tangible terms, the damage to the US position in the area already appears serious. During the past twenty years, a generation of Arab youth have grown to maturity under bombardment of the idea that Israel would not exist if the US had not created it. This conviction is hardening, and is reflected in the new, rude frankness with which Arab leaders talk to our representatives, as well as in such out-of-the-way items as a Sudanese editorial calling for local enforcement of the Arab boycott against Ford and Coca Cola. These things are not serious in themselves--and some of the editorials and demonstrations are no doubt paid for by the Egyptians or Soviets--but they are pointers of the way in which minds are moving as the crisis deepens.

8. Nor are hardening attitudes toward the US limited to the Arabs. In Israel, particularly among the hawks, there is a rising chorus of sentiment which sees Washington as holding Israel back and thereby selling the Israelis out. This is the other side of the general belief in Israel that only the Israelis really know how to deal with the Arabs and could do so successfully were it not for US pressures.

Washington, June 4, 1967, 11:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. III. Secret. Rostow sent copies to Rusk and McNamara.

Mr. President:

The purpose of this memorandum is to lay out a course of action for the coming week (or two weeks) which will maximize the chance that we can: (1) achieve our objectives in the Middle East without an Arab-Israeli war; and (2) should such an Arab-Israeli war come about, produce minimum damage to the U.S. position in the world and to our position in our own country, including continued support for the war in Viet Nam.

It is now increasingly clear that the Israelis will wait only about a week to take on themselves the forcing of the blockade at the Gulf of Aqaba. They clearly envisage forcing Nasser to fire the first shot; they will respond on a limited basis in Sinai but be prepared to fight a war against all the Arab forces arrayed against them without external assistance in manpower or other direct application of foreign military force.

The plan for an international regatta to force, say, an oil ship through the Straits is unlikely to get operational support except for four countries: the U.S., the U.K., Australia, and Netherlands.

The moderate Arabs--and, in fact, virtually all Arabs who fear the rise of Nasser as a result of this crisis--would prefer to have him cut down by the Israelis rather than by external forces.

Beyond these factors the situation in the Middle East is that the radical nationalism represented by Nasser, while powerful at the moment in the wake of his breakthrough against U Thant, is waning: Arab socialism and other such doctrines have not proved successful; the moderates of the region (Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon) have done better than Egypt, Syria, and Iraq; Nasser's plans for external expansion have not gone well; in short, we are dealing with Nasser not on a rising trend but in somewhat the same as Khrushchev in the Cuba missile crisis; Nasser is trying to achieve a quick fix against an underlying waning position.

Just beneath the surface is the potentiality for a new phase in the Middle East of moderation; a focusing on economic development; regional collaboration; and an acceptance of Israel as part of the Middle East if a solution to the refugee problem can be found. But all this depends on Nasser's being cut down to size.

The problem before us is whether this crisis can be surmounted in ways which lead on to that historical transition and which avoid: the destruction of Israel, on the one hand, or the crystallization of a bloc unified only by a hostility to Israel, which would require us to maintain Israel as a kind of Hong Kong enclave in the region.

The Israelis believe that their long-run future in the area--including the Arab mentality--requires that they solve the problem before them on their own. They wish in the end to be part of the Middle East. They feel that dealing with this situation on their own is necessary to achieve not merely self-respect but respect in the region.

They believe taking on the blockade themselves will make it easier for the United States to support them in other ways, short of troops. They believe it easier for the U.S. to honor its commitment of 1957 to recognize the legitimacy of their forcing the blockade than to mobilize on an international basis an effective U.S. and international commitment to use force to break the blockade. Their own diplomatic soundings, like ours, make clear how small the party would be prepared to use force to assert the international interests in the Gulf of Aqaba, including Israeli interests.

They perceive that the USSR is less likely to intervene with military force if they take on Nasser than for U.S. and a few friends to take on Nasser on the Aqaba issue; and they judge it would be better for U. S.-Arab relations in the long run, but also in terms of Western interests in Middle Eastern oil.

Although there is some conflict of judgment, the bulk of the evidence before us indicates that the moderate Arab view--as well as the view among our Ambassadors to the Arab world--is that it would be wiser for the Israelis to deal with the present situation than it would be for us.

--To open the Gulf of Aqaba to at least oil for Israel--which has become the test of who wins this trial of will and nerve--without war if possible.

--To do so in ways which maximize the chance of long-run peace in the area, including movement towards acceptance of Israel as part of the Middle East.

--In any case, to honor all commitments made in 1957--even, if, in the end, an Arab-Israeli war comes about; that is, our commitment to put through a U.S. flagship; to assert the right of free passage for others; and to regard Israeli counteraction to a UAR attempt to close Aqaba by armed force as involving for Israel legitimate rights of self-defense under the UN Charter.

--To act, in general, in such a way as to unify the political base in the U.S. around our Middle East policy so that we do not weaken the political foundations for our further conduct of the war in Viet Nam.

Here are the main elements in a scenario and their sequence--required to achieve these objectives.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 148.

In making this point clear, we must also present to him a willingness to move forward with other critical issues in the area where progress is required, if, indeed, the region is to settle down and move towards peace and stability, including: the placement of UN observers on both sides of the borders; Arab refugees; regional economic development; water; and the damping down of the arms race. There is considerable legitimate argument as to whether Nasser is now postured as a Hitler, determined at all costs to exploit temporary Arab unity to crush Israel once and for all, or whether he is a shrewd operator, working off a weak base, willing to settle for as much as he can get from this crisis. If the latter is the case, a package deal of this kind is the best way to smoke him out. If he wants war, the Israelis and we will be in much better shape if we have laid the deal before the world.

--In any case, so far as U.S. public opinion is concerned, opinion in the Middle East, and opinion in the world, we must quickly produce a posture in which the hard-core issue of oil through Aqaba is diluted by the evocation of a larger, more attractive, and more basic objective; namely, to begin to transform the Middle East from its present dangerous, unstable situation into one in which there is the possibility, at least, of movement forwards toward cooperation, development and acceptance of Israel as part of the region.

--By the time we have transmitted this offer to Nasser, we would also have been able to take stock of the response to the declaration of innocent passage through Aqaba and have some feel for how many countries are willing to escort vessels going through the Gulf to Eilat. The stage would then be set for going to Congress and asking for a resolution. (About, say, Thursday of the coming week.)

--The resolution for which we would ask in this scenario would have these characteristics: It would recall and state the three 1957 commitments; it would empower us to use force, if necessary, to support the transit of Aqaba by U.S. flagships and those of other nations, except Israel; it would recognize the government of Israel's expressed desire that it handle the question of its own flagships with its own force; but it would recognize that if the transit of such ships was met by armed force, the Israelis had the right of self-defense. The resolution would call for all parties to permit transit of the Gulf on the basis of the situation between 1957 and the present crisis; and it would appeal for movement forward with respect to peace in the area, including action on UN observers, refugees, development, the regional arms race, etc.

--Behind the scene we would be working for an Aqaba formula in which the oil flow would continue to Eilat; the Israelis would maintain their claim to put flagships through, but not exercise it; the UAR would ignore the fishing trawlers that go in and out of the Gulf; the International Court of Justice would take over the legal controversy involved; the forces in Sinai would demobilize; and, in this interval, we would try to get the Middle East and the world community to go to work on UN observers; refugees; development; etc. (With that kind of resolution and an explicit understanding that we would recognize Israeli rights of self-defense if their vessels were stopped by armed force, it might be possible to hold the Israelis for another week; that is, from Sunday, June 11 (roughly their present D-day) to the 18th of June. In that interval we would have to do two things: bring maximum pressure to bear to get a diplomatic settlement, including maximum pressure on Moscow; and organize a forcing of the blockade in terms of something like the following sequence, designed to fulfill the three U.S. commitments.

--A U.S. vessel goes through with escort, bearing a civilian non-strategic cargo; although it might contain oil. On present evidence, that vessel would not be fired on, although if it contained oil it might be contested.

--A non-U.S. flagship (either Israeli-owned or not) would go through with a civil cargo, backed by whomever the naval powers turn out to be;

--Then, finally, an Israeli vessel would go through and the issue would be put squarely to Nasser to whether he would fire upon it, our having made it clear that we regard Israeli rights of self-defense as legitimate, if armed force were used to stop it; but the background to such Israelis forcing action would be a known formula that if oil were permitted to flow to Eilat, the Israelis were willing to have the whole matter put to the International Court of Justice.

--Timing and the Israeli tactical military situation. As we now know, they would prefer to go directly to the test of the Israeli flag, and, in effect, have us stand down on our other commitments, except, of course, our commitment to regard their case as legitimate. Another reason they may wish this to have some element of control over the time which Nasser faces this showdown. If the objective of the exercise is a situation where we achieve oil to Eilat without a war, marching down quite openly to the sequence described above, is a superior scenario. It would also relieve us of a most dangerous problem; namely, of our knowing Israeli plans but holding them secret as did the British and French at the time of Suez, with all the consequent ugly debate and controversy which continued down to the present day. Our interest, and, in fact, the Israeli interest is to do this job like the sheriff in "High Noon", rather than through tactical surprise and quiet secret understandings between Tel Aviv and Washington.

--If we regard the transit of oil as the gut issue here, when should oil be brought in and under whose flag? On this I have no firm judgment but suspect the best auspices would be the most natural situation: a foreign flag backed by the escorting party. But there is some virtue in our taking oil in--preferably not Iranian oil with the U.S. flag flying.

--What, precisely, is the formula for Aqaba that Israel would accept? Is it prepared to accept a situation where oil goes through w