U.S. Department of State

Washington, June 11, 1967, 9:10 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, President's Appointment File, June 1967. No classification marking. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. McPherson had just returned from a 4-day visit to Israel, following a 2-week trip to Vietnam. Also see Harry McPherson, A Political Education (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), pp. 413-417.

The solid part of what I understand about the Middle East situation has already been communicated by Wally Barbour; I was with him during most of his meetings with Israeli officials. What follows are additional impressions.

I don't need to remind you that I was almost completely in the dark about the events that led up to the outbreak of war. Saigon newspapers leave a good deal to be desired in world news reporting. I arrived in Tel Aviv at 3 a.m. last Monday, was awakened by Wally at 8, and began my education half an hour later to the sound of air raid sirens.

In four days I met Eshkol once, for about an hour (this was Thursday noon), Eban briefly but rhetorically, the Israeli intelligence chief, and the Army J-2. I talked with Moshe Bitan, head of the Foreign Office American section, two or three times a day. I went to the Negev with a Joint Staff colonel, and got to the Gaza border before we ran out of road and into objections from the Israeli military that the town of Gaza had not yet fallen and that we ought to get the hell out of there. I went north to Haifa, Nazareth, and within a few miles of Tiberias near the Syrian border. They would not let me into Jerusalem before they took the Old City, and when they did take it, it was too late for me to go.

1) Eshkol sends you his best wishes.

2) Bitan told us on the first day that they didn't want our troops or planes; they would do the job themselves; they just wanted us to keep the Russians off their backs, and they wanted "two or three days to finish the job." On the last day, he said they still wanted Sky-Hawks very much.

3) There is no doubt in my mind about how the war started. After their intelligence chief first talked about "responding to Egyptian attacks"--this was Monday noon--it became clear after questioning that such attacks, if any, could only have been a provoked artillery exchange. More likely there was no such exchange, but a simple preventive assault on the ground in Sinai and by air in Sinai and Cairo. You know their intelligence about Egyptian armored concentration in Sinai; they claimed to have evidence that an Egyptian assault was "imminent", within a few hours, north of Eilat and into Jordan--thus cutting off the Gulf of Aqaba from northern Israel. My feeling is that it was not so imminent, but that the Israelis simply decided to hit first before the tactical situation got worse.

4) By noon the war was essentially won. We sat outside Eshkol's office about that time. As the sirens went on again, and when we asked the intelligence chief whether we should go to a shelter, he looked at his watch and said "It won't be necessary."

5) On the Gaza border on Tuesday, at a point where one of the earliest thrusts was made, we saw exhausted truck drivers lying about in the shade, sleeping and talking. When I mentioned the fatigue on their faces, my Israeli colonel said "They've earned the right to sleep. They've been driving down here since Sunday afternoon. The place looked like Detroit Sunday night." The "response" began Monday morning.

6) The spirit of the army, and indeed of all the people, has to be experienced to be believed. After the doubts, confusions, and ambiguities of Vietnam, it was deeply moving to see people whose commitment is total and unquestioning. I was told that 8-year-olds went to the telegraph office Monday morning to deliver telegrams, as the regular force of messengers had gone off to military duty. In the Negev one hot afternoon, I saw two good-looking girls in uniform riding in the back of a half-ton jeep, one with a purple spangled bathing cap on her head, the other with an orange turban. They were headed for the front, driven by two burly sergeants. (Incidentally, Israel at war destroys the prototype of the pale, scrawny Jew; the soldiers I saw were tough, muscular, and sunburned. There is also an extraordinary combination of discipline and democracy among officers and enlisted men; the latter rarely salute and frequently argue, but there is no doubt about who will prevail. )

7) The temper of the country, from high officials to people in the street, is not belligerent, but it is determined, and egos are a bit inflated--understandably. Israel has done a colossal job. There was never any doubt of the outcome, because "there was simply no alternative." And what has been done has been done not only for Israel, "but for the U.S.--we got you out of a difficult situation in the Middle East" (Bitan and the military).

8) Some Israelis, chiefly the military, would like to retain most of the territory they have taken. Eshkol, Eban and Bitan do not talk in such broad terms. I had the distinct impression that they had not thought very clearly, or very long, about what next. Beating the Arabs and keeping the Russians from complicating things had pre-occupied them. Nevertheless every Israeli I talked to said in effect that no government could survive that gave up the Old City or control of Sharm-el-Sheikh, at the straits of Tiran. Regaining the Old City is an event of unimaginable significance to the Israelis. Even the non-religious intellectuals feel this way.

9) Though this could change at any moment, and may be only last week's opinion, my feeling is that

a) they do not want the Sinai, though they do want it "de-militarized"--no longer used as an Egyptian staging area.

b) they do not want to annex the West Bank of the Jordan, as this would involve taking in great numbers of Arabs whose loyalties are unpredictable.

c) they could conceive a "protected state"--neither Jordanian nor Israeli--in the West Bank lands, managed by international authorities. Eshkol said this.

d) they will remain in Sharm-el-Sheikh, and they could imagine a group of maritime nations authorizing Israel to serve as its agent in keeping the Gulf of Aqaba open to shipping; and conceivably joining with Israel in doing the police work. This also from Eshkol.

e) they must either retain the Old City, or absolute and guaranteed access to it.

f) they would like to straighten a few borders, particularly to cut off some of the Jordanian salients that threaten their access to Jerusalem; and also to widen Israel at its narrowest point, north of Tel Aviv at Natanya. (I am for this; Barbour's house is about five miles south of Natanya, and Tuesday morning I awoke to the sound of bombs hitting Natanya and of shelling over the hills at Herzliyya, about six miles away toward Jordan.)

10) There are constant references and comparisons to 1956. The Israelis do not intend to repeat the same scenario--to withdraw within their boundaries with only paper guarantees that fall apart at the touch of Arab hands. We would have to push them back by military force, in my opinion, to accomplish a repeat of 1956; the cut-off of aid would not do it. While they are contemptuous of the UN's performance, they did not write it off as a forum or means of resolving the main issues. They were far more affirmative, however, about a major-power settlement.

11) What they want far more than territory, of course, is a peace treaty that recognizes the State of Israel.

12) They seem to hate Nasser, but not the Egyptians; to hate all the Syrians; and to feel a kind of enraged contempt for Hussein--"that stupid little king who gave control of his country to Nasser." Nobody really has any ideas about how to bring about a reduction in hatred between themselves and the Arabs.

13) I have no such ideas, either; after listening to Arab radio, with a driver-translator, for four days, I don't think "multilateral aid schemes" will do the trick with the Syrians or the Egyptians. The others are not so intransigent and aid may work. I do think we, the British, and the French should turn every screw in an effort to use this occasion for bringing about Arab recognition of Israel.

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, June 11, 1967, 5:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. V. Confidential. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Mr. President:

/2/Notes of Bundy's telephone conversation with Rusk are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls.

1. Bundy will see Ambassador Goldberg this evening from 8 to 9:30 to review the problems we face in the UN this week.

2. Bundy talked by phone today with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Goldberg and both Rostows.

3. A first priority action is to persuade the Israeli Government to make the most moderate public statement of their position that they can. Secretary Rusk will talk to Ambassador Harman about this.

4. Bundy believes the line we should hold to for the next few days is "let's have peace." He says now is not the time for new policy statements. He opposes those officers in the State Department who want to underline the territorial integrity clause of the May 23 statement. Old boundaries cannot be restored.

5. Bundy believes we should promptly resume conversations with the Soviets by having Ambassador Thompson talk fully but quietly with Dobrynin who is expected in Washington this week.

6. Bundy will be in Washington in mid-afternoon tomorrow. The Situation Room knows how to reach him at any time.

Bromley Smith

Washington, June 11, 1967, 6:52 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Atherton, cleared in draft by Davies and Houghton and in substance by Elizabeth Brown, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated Priority to Amman, Beirut, USUN, and Jerusalem.

210212. 1. We consider it of utmost importance, both politically and psychologically, that urgent and unambiguous effort be made reassure West Bank inhabitants they have nothing to fear by remaining where they are or, for those who have already fled, returning to their homes. Continued mass exodus to East Bank will not only pose added threat to existence Hussein regime but contains seeds of new refugee problem which will greatly complicate settlement of situation created by last week's hostilities. During SC debate June 10, Ambassador Goldberg said following:

"We are concerned for example at the moment about the safety and welfare of the people in Jordan and we express the conviction and the hope and the trust that they will be treated in all humanitarian ways--that they will stay in their houses, have adequate measures for safety and welfare--and we will use our influence and we are using our influence* in that direction."

2. Dept considering issuance statement to focus attention on position outlined by Goldberg in SC. What is most needed, however, is public assertion along these lines by GOI, making unequivocally clear that GOI wants West Bank residents to remain and welcomes return of evacuees who have left. To be effective, such statement should outline specific measures being taken to safeguard property, continue civil administration, preserve law and order, maintain public services and restore normal conditions of life as rapidly as possible. Invitation to voluntary international welfare agencies to participate in these efforts would, in our view, be essential factor in generating confidence in Israeli intentions.

/2/Barbour reported in telegram 4078 from Tel Aviv, June 12, that he had made strong representations on this. He reported that the Israeli estimate was that not more than 30,000 had actually left the West Bank and that Israeli policy was not to have West Bank inhabitants depart. (Ibid.)

Rusk

Washington, June 16, 1967, 10:05 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Grey and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, USUN, and London.

212139. Subject: Rostow-Harman Memcom June 12.

1. Amb Harman opened the conversation by reviewing Israeli intelligence estimates on Arab rearming. He passed on the following list: June 6--Algeria loaded a ship bound for Cairo with tanks. June 8--A ship loaded with 70 tanks, 37 artillery pieces and other military equipment was supposed to leave the Soviet Union for the UAR. June 9--GOI believed that UAR had only 50 planes left. However, on that day, 27 MIG-17's and 2 or 3 MIG-21s arrived in UAR from Algeria. June 10--Iraq promised to send a battalion of Centurion tanks to Jordan and the Saudi and UAR Governments discussed arrangements to allow for the transit of MIG-17's from Yemen to the Arab-Israeli front. June 10--3 Iraqi infantry brigades and 1 armored brigade moved into Jordan. 15 Soviet An-12's arrived in Cairo and since the 10th approximately 35 An-12's had landed at Cairo. The Israelis believe that these transport planes could be carrying MIG-21's. June 11--The 120th UAR brigade left Yemen for the UAR and a tank unit was in the process of leaving. Also on the 11th the UAR was in the process of signing a new military supply contract with the Soviet Union and the Iraqis were also asking for new military equipment from the Soviets.

2. Mr. Rostow noted that the Algerian Government was taking a hard line in the present situation and that this could involve serious problems for Morocco, Libya and Tunisia.

3. Mr. Rostow remarked that pressure was mounting for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal and that there was some indication that the Arab world might be considering using oil as a weapon to force Israeli withdrawal. There was a possibility that there would be serious trouble in the UN if the Soviets deleted the word "aggression" in their proposed Security Council resolution.

/2/The text of Eban's June 6 speech before the Security Council is printed in Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents, 1947-1974, Vol. II, pp. 784-792.

Rusk

Washington, June 12, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. No classification marking. An attached action slip indicates that it was handled as Exdis. Harman gave the note to Eugene Rostow on June 12; see Document 266.

/2/Document 256.

The Government of Israel feels that the statement that "there is every reason to believe that the U.S.S. Liberty was identified, or at least her nationality determined, by Israeli aircraft approximately one hour before the attack" is unfounded.

Nor can the Government of Israel accept the statement that "the attack must be condemned as an act of military recklessness reflecting wanton disregard for human life."

The Government of Israel is of the view that the drawing of such conclusions before a full investigation has been made is unwarranted.

The Government of Israel has already announced the establishment by the Chief-of-Staff of the Israel Defense Forces of a Commission of Enquiry to make a full investigation of all the facts and circumstances. The Government of Israel will make available to the Government of the United States the findings of this investigation, and, for its part, would hope that the Government of the United States will make available to the Government of Israel the findings of its own investigation.

The Government of Israel recalls that as soon as this tragic error occurred it immediately informed the Government of the United States of what had taken place. The Government of Israel immediately assumed responsibility for this error and conveyed its apologies and deep regret for what had occurred and for the grievous loss of life.

Subsequently, as mentioned in the Secretary of State's Note of June 10, 1967, the Government of Israel took the initiative to offer to make amends for the tragic loss of life and material damage. Further, all assistance was offered by the personnel of the Israel Defense Forces to the U.S.S. Liberty, but these personnel were informed by the U.S.S. Liberty that such help was not needed. The area around the U.S.S. Liberty was immediately searched by Israel Defense Forces personnel, by plane and boat, and subsequently search efforts were renewed.

The Government of Israel has standard instructions of the most stringent nature to all its military personnel that the personnel and property of the United States as of all countries not involved in hostilities, shall not be endangered. These instructions have been renewed.

The Government of Israel regrets that it was not given prior information by the Government of the United States of the presence of a United States vessel in an area which the United Arab Republic had warned neutral vessels to avoid, as it was an area of hostilities. The area was in fact being used by the United Arab Republic for purposes of hostilities against Israel. It would be appreciated if the Government of Israel could be given timely information of the approach by United States vessels to shores where the Israel Defense Forces are in authority.

The Government of Israel renews its offer to make amends and has instructed the Ambassador of Israel to reiterate its profound regret for the consequences of what was admittedly a tragic error.

The Ambassador of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Honorable the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest regard.

A.H.

Washington, June 12, 1967, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. V. No classification marking. Wriggins sent a copy to Bundy.

Walt--

SUBJECT
Today's Thoughts on Arab-Israel Problem

In the euphoria from Israel's remarkable performance, I said last week, "It's a new ball game." After Nasser's political performance on Friday, and noting the positions taken by the Arabs since then, I suspect that if it is a new ball game, it will have many all-too-familiar plays.

While the Israelis occupy substantial parts of neighboring Arab states, Syria and Egypt can sit it out for some time yet. True, the economic pressures on Egypt will mount as the costs of mobilization continue and the canal tolls remain stopped. While food supplies now in hand will last three or four weeks, their new harvest will be starting now and requisitioning of supplies is feasible. If the Soviets are willing to provide substantial help, Cairo could hold out longer. Much will depend on whether Nasser can retain his army. My guess is he will be able to hold out for months rather than weeks.

/2/The attached copy of telegram 4229 from Amman, June 11, bears the following handwritten note in an unidentified hand: "Walt, This is a wise telegram from Amman." The telegram transmitted Burns' recommendations for U.S. policy in the Middle East. It argued that Israeli magnanimity with the Arabs would be Israel's best means of obtaining real gains and that if there was to be any likelihood of a lasting peace, "Israel must not further humiliate the Arabs." It declared, "It appears to us that what Israel should want most are rights: rights of access to the international waterways, to the Holy City, and the right to have a logical defensible border with her neighbors. If she aims at any semblance of peace with the Arabs, she should not expect, with but a few small exceptions, territorial changes." It urged immediate U.S. public statements expressing concern at the exodus of evacuees from the West Bank and calling on Israel to keep them in place and urging Israeli withdrawal from territories captured in the recent fighting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

However, I fear that unless we weigh in in Tel Aviv, Dayan, rather than Eshkol, will call the tune. I understand the President's reluctance to get his hand in the machinery. But if he doesn't, privately or publicly, I believe we are in for a long and stormy stalemate during which the Russians will more than make up for what they have temporarily lost. And it will be at our expense.

I suppose by now the outlines of a possible settlement are fairly clear:

(1) formal Arab recognition of Israel's existence;

(2) safety from Syria's direct threat from the heights (a de-militarized zone on the Syrian heights might do it);

(3) internationalization of the Old City and sharing of tourist earnings;

(4) guarantee of free passage for all ships through Sharm el-Sheik and Suez;

(5) a bold Israeli initiative on Arab refugees. With their new strength they can afford to be more generous than during their frightened past. This might include: (a) free private choice for up to 10-15 percent of the "old" refugees; (b) substantial Israeli and international financing of their resettlement in Israel; (c) training and resettlement arrangements, internationally financed with the cooperation of the oil rich states, for resettlement elsewhere of other refugees; (d) if Israel holds on to Gaza, these refugees, after careful vetting, might also be settled in Israel;

(6) Israel withdraws from Sinai, the West Bank and Syria, leaving (a) an international presence at Sharm el-Sheik; (b) a de-militarized zone on the Syrian heights; (c) an adjustment of frontiers with Jordan to broaden the wedge into Jerusalem, etc.

It is unlikely that a settlement reached under international auspices will have the viability of an agreement reached by the Arabs negotiating directly with Israel. On the other hand, this is precisely what the Arabs are the least likely to want to do. How can we encourage a direct negotiation between the two when our own leverage has been so materially reduced by these events? Perhaps we can use the impending Soviet initiative at the UN to promote some form of Arab-Israeli dialogue?

Howard

Washington, June 12, 1967, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Minutes and Notes. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The notes are Saunders' handwritten notes of the meeting. Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Raymond L. Garthoff and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs-Designate Paul Warnke were also present. The meeting ended at 8:52 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Rostow's agenda for the meeting is ibid., National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. V. See also Document 270.

THOSE PRESENT
Fowler
McNamara
Katzenbach
Vance
Wheeler
Helms
Llewelyn Thompson, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow
Eugene Rostow
Sisco
Clifford
W.W. Rostow
McG. Bundy
Harold Saunders

The President joined the meeting about 7:35 p.m.

George Christian came in at 7:40 p.m.

Consensus: reaction sour. "Terrible note."

--Release our note? Can't decide until facts known.

--Consensus: Publishing exchange wouldn't do any good. Release summary, if needed. Get Israelis to recall it.

--Dept. to provide draft summary statement on the facts to date.

/2/A paper entitled "Developments at the United Nations Over the Next Week or Two," drafted by Sisco on June 12, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Special Committee Meetings.

USSR going to pull out all stops to develop UNGA as a propaganda forum.

--Add to agenda of special GA now in session, or

--New special session.

We can't prevent.

--Tradition of not opposing.

--General doubt on who fired first shot. USSR cld. get majority.

--UNGA much less manageable for us.

--One alternative: USSR will probably try to get simple condemnation of Israel. Last time: 1951 when we got Chicoms condemned.

--Other possibility: drop "aggression" in favor of "withdrawal behind ADL, Gulf open, return to GAA's." We'd be in small minority.

McGB: More turnaround time? To sort ourselves out.

EVR:

23 May--the three problems

5 June--move to new beginning

UNSC resolution--not attempt withdrawal until condition of peace, end of belligerence.

McGB: This may get us through this week, but we still don't know our position.

Sisco: Does slow down UNSC.

Katz: We need a position that goes beyond UNSC. Political problems in Israel.

Fowler: Have we mentioned requirement for general acceptance of state of Israel?

McGB: We've backgrounded but have never made major policy point.

Sisco: UNGA has a corridor function. Might call FM's.

WWR: How Hussein thinks he can settle his problems? USSR trying to keep Arabs together, prevent [sentence not completed].

/3/A draft telegram to Tel Aviv with a message from Rusk to Eban, with a covering note of June 12, is ibid.

Should we pin them down formally at all?

--Shouldn't we find out elements of thinking in GOI. (Clifford).

--EVR: part of process of approaching Russians. Is timetable overtaken if Gromyko coming to NY.

--Danger of freezing positions.

McGB:

(1) Reservations.

(2) Meanwhile asking Barbour.

/4/A marginal note at this point indicates that the President came in at 7:35 p.m.

Send this telegram to Barbour; ask him to do the job.

/5/A June 12 memorandum from the Control Group to Rusk and Bundy on the subject "Restraints on Arms Shipments to Israel and the Arab States" recommended "that the US promptly raise with the Soviet Government our conviction that the two countries should seek an understanding on the problem of arms supply to the Arab States and Israel. Such a bilateral approach would supplement other efforts now underway to raise this issue with the Soviets as well as with others in the UN." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Special Committee Meetings)

/6/A reference to Danish representative at the United Nations Hans R. Tabor, who was President of the Security Council in June.

British: not optimistic, wldn't join. Doubt UN registry wld have much effect.

Pres: Check with USSR. Why don't we both agree? Dane.

--Went back to Eshkol's statement that Israel stood alone. Noted USSR wld. soon get fed up with Israel's braggadocio.

--Israelis are mobilizing sentiment against our protest.

(b) Immediate shipments

--General

--MIG airplanes

--CIA: pace routine but not enough to change military knowledge.

If move on Dane, follow-up note to USSR.

/7/A June 12 memorandum from the Control Group to Rusk and Bundy on the subject "Emergency Relief in the Middle East" is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Special Committee Meetings.

Let's hold up

President wished USG didn't have to do it.

--Fowler: reviewed history of development banks in ME
--We will proceed that way.

Hold over.

--Israel: pressure to let people go.

find out what King Hussein wants.

--Israelis (Jews) are really bitter toward him.

Pres. agreed.

Pr. When do we have to stand up and be counted in UN?

"Real question is whether ?territorial integrity' of all states"

/8/A note written at the side of the page here reads: "Meeker: What has been our position on troop withdrawal in past situations following cease-fire?"

McGB: Eshkol on a spot.

Fowler

1. For Isr on belligerence.
2. Isr has to give territory.

Clifford: We have to face up to our past statements.

Pr: Summarize as black a picture as we can of Sov. shipments. Tell Israelis, "It wasn't Dayan that kept Kosygin out."

Washington, June 12, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Special Committee Meetings. Secret. Also see Document 269.

SUBJECT
Minutes of NSC Special Committee, 6:30 p.m. Monday, 12 June in the Cabinet Room

1. After reviewing the Israeli Government's reply to our note protesting its attack on the U.S.S. Liberty, the Committee decided (a) to clear up our own preliminary understanding of the facts surrounding the attack and (b) to suggest unofficially to the Israelis that they take back their note and rewrite it in a more moderate vein.

2. The Committee agreed it is important to learn as much as we can about Israeli and Jordanian intentions. However, members felt strong reservations about approaching either government formally now for fear of solidifying unreasonable demands. The President approved informal soundings in both capitals.

3. The President instructed the Acting Secretary of State to pursue a proposal for having the President of the UN Security Council call on all Middle East arms suppliers to register future arms shipments with the UN.

4. The President indicated a strong desire not to have the USG out in front on emergency relief operations. The Committee decided to hold off a US decision for a couple of days.

5. The Committee agreed that we should encourage George Woods to take the lead in longer term Middle East regional development planning.

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, June 12, 1967, 9:34 p.m.

/1/Source National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by George M. Bennsky (NEA/UAR) and Country Director for France and Benelux Robert Anderson, cleared by Burgus and Davies, and approved by Leddy. Sent to Luxembourg for Secretary Rusk, who was there to attend a ministerial meeting of the NATO Council June 13-14. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, USUN, and DOD.

/2/Telegrams 20111 and 20112 from Paris, June 12; not printed. (Ibid.)

/3/Rostow's June 10 conversation with Lucet is summarized in telegram 210147 to Paris, June 10. (Ibid.)

2. In call on Assistant Secretary Leddy June 12 Lucet made following points from instructions he had just received from Paris:

/4/The Constantinople Convention, signed at Constantinople on October 29, 1888, by Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, Spain, Turkey, and the Netherlands, provided that the Suez Canal should always be open to every vessel, without distinction of flag. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 22, 1956, pp. 617-619.

/5/The declaration that Egypt sent to the UN Secretary-General on April 24, 1957, stated that the Egyptian Government would continue to respect, observe, and implement the terms and spirit of the Constantinople Convention. For text, see UN document A/3576, S/3818; also printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 13, 1957, pp. 776-778.

B. Re arms control in Middle East, French Government agreed desirability of arms agreement for Middle East must be part overall political settlement in area and expected arms question would be eventually discussed in this context. As for immediate problem, French did not see how controls could be developed without consulting the Soviets who would argue that Arab position not same as Israelis since Arabs were victims of aggression and therefore had right to be resupplied.

C. As for proposal to consider use of UN and notification SYG re arms shipments to area, French Government thought this would be vetoed immediately by Soviets.

3. Leddy questioned Ambassador Lucet regarding the status of French arms supplies to Israel. The Ambassador said he had nothing on this from Paris but thought arms shipments had stopped on commencement hostilities but that some spares were now being shipped. He said he would check further with Quai d'Orsay.

4. Ambassador Lucet said for time being French Government was not able say more re questions raised by Rostow June 10.

Katzenbach

Washington, June 12, 1967, 10:32 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Nodis. No drafter appears on the telegram; cleared by Battle, Eugene Rostow, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. Also sent to Luxembourg as Tosec 19 for Rusk.

210497. 1. We are attempting to work out best USG positions during coming days on issues we will have to face in UNSC and on other problems on which we are being questioned by Congress and the press--some of which can be deferred but others not. Such questions include UN resolutions re withdrawal to armistice lines, present posture on our repeated statements about territorial integrity of all ME nations, regional arms control, military/economic aid, etc. Arriving at realistic and equitable USG views hinge in considerable measure upon our determination of ultimate GOI objectives, particularly about territorial questions, refugees, status of Jerusalem, Sharm al Sheikh, and Suez Canal.

/2/See footnote 3, Document 194.

/3/Barbour reported in telegram 4065 from Tel Aviv, June 11, that all signs indicated Israel's major expectation as a result of her military success was the direct negotiation of a political settlement with her neighbors. He concluded: "As the most powerful state in the Middle East, Israel feels entitled to demand peace treaties with its neighbors and it seems likely now that GOI will insist on trying this approach." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

3. We would also like you to discuss GOI objectives with the highest Israeli officials you think appropriate to attempt to gain confirmation of GOI positions at this stage of post hostilities, realizing that there are soft and hard liners in Tel Aviv and that we will have to factor out initial GOI bargaining positions in the process. For this purpose it seems advisable to us not to seek a "final" GOI position on any of the key issues, which might tend to freeze maximum demands, but rather for you to engage in a continuing series of discussions with high GOI officials.

/4/Document 273.

Katzenbach

Washington, June 12, 1967, 10:37 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eugene Rostow on June 11, cleared by Kohler and Battle, and approved by Katzenbach. Rostow had earlier initialed Rusk's approval. Repeated to Luxembourg as Tosec 20 for Rusk.

210499. For Ambassador Barbour.

/2/The sentence originally instructed Barbour to convey the quoted message to Eban from the Secretary at the earliest opportunity. Telegram 210498 to Luxembourg (Tosec 21), June 12, states that the President preferred an informal approach "in fear Israelis would present maximum demands and get feet in concrete." (Ibid.) The text of the draft telegram cited in footnote 3, Document 269, is the same as the message in telegram 210499.

/3/See Document 223.

/4/See Document 227.

/5/See Document 158.

In general, we have been proceeding in reliance on Ambassador Harman's repeated statements to us that your government has no territorial ambitions, but that it did not intend to withdraw its forces from the positions they now occupy except "to a condition of peace." If peace can be achieved, he has told us, the Government of Israel is prepared to participate in a constructive approach to the problem of refugees, and other long-standing difficulties.

In the light of what has happened during last few momentous days, and the difficult political atmosphere at the U.N., I should appreciate a statement of your government's policy in as much detail as present circumstances permit. We do not want any misunderstandings between us to complicate the difficult task we all face in seeking arrangements to assure a just and durable peace in the Near East.

As far as the attitude of the US is concerned, our principal points of departure are (a) President Johnson's reaffirmation on May 23 of long-standing American policy that "the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of the area"; (b) the necessity to establish a regime of peace in the Near East in which neither side claims the right to infringe upon the rights of the other in the name of a state of belligerency; (c) the vital interest of the United States in its own relations with the Arab and Muslim world, a relationship in which Israel itself has an important stake; (d) the overriding necessity through magnanimous and imaginative policies to lay the foundation for a genuine reconciliation among the peoples of the Near East, even though it may require time. On the last point we know that you are at least as aware as we of the vital interest of Israel in its relations with its Arab neighbors who will number some 100 million people in the next quarter century.

We would be glad to have your views as soon as possible because of the developing situation in the Security Council.

Katzenbach

Washington, June 12, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Intelligence Reports, June 20-21, 1967. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The memorandum is one of a series: "Special Assessments on the Middle East Situation."

NASIR'S SITUATION AND POSITION AMONG THE ARAB LEADERS

1. The wide-scale and largely spontaneous demands in Egypt that Nasir continue in office have demonstrated that no early replacement of Nasir is likely. Nasir probably counted on getting a favorable reaction to his resignation, though he many have been prepared to step down if sentiment ran against him. While he is unlikely to be thrown out of office, there is some question as to the extent of his power. He may be forced to take advice from top associates, and the wholesale changes in the military command are probably designed at least in part to head off unrest among the officers over the debacle.

2. It would be the sheerest speculation to estimate Nasir's chances for survival over the long term until some clear idea of the dimensions of a peace settlement can be formed. At most, we can say that he probably will not be able to convert this debacle into a smashing victory as he did in 1956. As the extent of Egypt's humiliation becomes known, resentment against him is likely to grow. It is unlikely that any group seeking to oust Nasir would try to do so at a time when it would appear to be capitalizing on Israeli successes, for it would be highly vulnerable to charges of being "agents of imperialism." In the long run, disillusion over Nasir's performance will probably manifest itself in greater discontent within Egypt than he has hitherto faced and in time this might lead to a coup. But, for some time, the immediate traumatic effects of the defeat impel the Egyptians to stick with Nasir and seek other scapegoats.

3. In trying to assess the chance of a move against Nasir, it should be noted that we have had relatively little information in the past on political attitudes in the officer corps and, given the reduction of our diplomatic staff, are unlikely to get more.

4. The state of Nasir's relations with his fellow Arabs varies. His prestige has suffered greatly with the Arab governments. Yet, as demonstrations in dozens of cities testify, he still enjoys wide public popularity. A very large number of people accept the story that Israel could only have crushed Egypt with the assistance of the US and UK. Nasir has succeeded in associating many others with him in defeat, and this tends to mute expressions of discontent. He is trying to reassert leadership through the mechanism of the summit meeting of Arab chiefs of state. But it is an indication of his weakened position that he feels it necessary to have another leader associated with him in calling for such a meeting.

5. Even in defeat, Nasir is unwilling to drop all old quarrels; he remains on bad terms with King Faysal of Saudi Arabia. The Egyptian leader failed to mention Saudi Arabia among those states which "adopted honorable attitudes" in the crisis, though the latter sent troops to Jordan and stopped oil shipments to the US and UK and has so far refrained from encouraging the Yemeni royalists to harass the Egyptians in Yemen, though it apparently has renewed some arms shipments.

6. Jordan's Husayn has a good public image as a loyal colleague of Nasir who fought bravely and whose defeat was no worse than Egypt's. Moreover, he apparently feels secure enough vis-?-vis Nasir to reject a suggestion from the latter on a joint statement condemning alleged US and UK military actions. The other monarchies have made gestures of support-stopping oil shipments, sending small numbers of troops. The monarchs generally, as well as Tunisia's Bourguiba, are pleased that Nasir has been defeated. They share the general Arab shame and bitterness at Israel, however, for having inflicted such a defeat. While all the Arab conservatives would feel obliged publicly to associate themselves with Nasir's moves against Israel, they would probably be far more reluctant to follow Nasir's lead in adopting measures against Western powers, e.g., nationalizing oil, which would seriously harm their interests.

7. Of the revolutionary states, Algeria is disgusted at the humiliating collapse of the UAR Army. Boumedienne has been reported as "out of his mind" with rage at Nasir; the Algerian premier has not, to our knowledge, answered Nasir's plea for him to call an Arab summit conference. The Algerians are suspicious of Nasir's abilities and probably are unwilling to help restore Nasir's prestige among the Arabs. Boumedienne's current trip to Moscow may indicate an intention to upstage Nasir. Syria, berated last week by Cairo and Amman for failing to join vigorously in the fight, has regained some stature and sympathy in Cairo as a result of its 9 and 10 June fighting with the Israelis. We know little of the present situation in Damascus; the leadership is probably badly shaken. There was serious infighting among regime leaders prior to hostilities, and changes at the top are likely. The attitudes of such an altered regime to Nasir are not predictable at this time.

8. In the past year, Iraq had evolved a position of balance between Cairo and other Middle Eastern capitals. It participated in a joint political leadership with Egypt, but sought better relations with Iran and Turkey. Radical sentiment has risen in the present situation; a number of pro-Nasir politicians have been released from detention. Despite the UAR's defeat, it is likely to have a fair amount of influence in Baghdad in coming months, although Iraqi moderation is likely to reassert itself in time.

9. Until armistice arrangements have been worked out, the Arabs will feel considerable pressure to stay together. The emotions wrought by the conflict will encourage this sense of solidarity. However, a number of the Arab states--particularly the oil exporters--realize that their interests are not served by taking anti-Western positions. Hence the disposition of these states to follow Nasir's lead will be limited. In sum, there will probably be a large measure of solidarity in opposing Israel and rather less in supporting Nasir.

Rabat, June 13, 1967, 0946Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 SUDAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Received at 6:08 a.m. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, and CINCSTRIKE at 7:15 a.m.

5492. 1. FonMin Laraki told me last night Nasser and Boumedienne pressing hard for immediate Arab summit in Khartoum. Apparently, most if not all Arab governments, including Tunisia, have agreed. King sent message yesterday to Nasser GOM does not believe summit should be held before meeting of Foreign Ministers in Kuwait to prepare necessary groundwork. Laraki said King feels summit under circumstances would serve Nasser's purposes and assist Boumedienne in his dramatic efforts to replace Nasser as leader of the Arab nations. GOM feels summit now likely be dominated by extremists who would steamroll disastrous series of resolutions which can only exacerbate situation and will not contribute to an effective Arab position in settling present crisis.

2. Comment: King considers urgent need for Arab moderates to prevent extremists from retaining control Arab policy. However, position seriously affected by existence of many factors hostile to moderates in present situation, including deep humiliation of the Arabs, Israeli post cease fire thrust into Syria, seizure of sacred sanctuaries of Islam by Israelis in Old City of Jerusalem, substantially uncontested statements of Israeli leaders on intention to follow military hostilities by territorial annexation and deep-seated belief among most Arabs that US and UK indirectly and directly responsible for Israeli military prowess and success against Arabs.

3. In my view, it is highly essential that we consider ways and means of discreetly supporting the moderates. Embassy has already listed leading priorities in this respect. It now becomes urgent that we push ahead on these in every way possible.

Tasca

Tel Aviv, June 13, 1967, 0835Z.

/1/Source: National Security Agency Files, Center for Cryptologic History Historical Collection, Series VIII, Box 16d, DIA (USDAO, Tel Aviv) re Liberty. Secret; Immediate; Noforn. Repeated to COMSIXTHFLT and CINCUSNAVEUR. Received at the National Military Command Center at 1411Z.

/2/Not found; it apparently requested additional information concerning telegram 0854 from USDAO Tel Aviv, June 10, which reported that an Israel Aircraft Industries official had told a U.S. Air Force representative that on the morning of June 8, he had heard transmissions on Israeli Air Force air-to-ground control frequencies of an aircraft that had sighted a ship and had identified it as having a U.S. flag. (Ibid.)

1. Have queried our primary source who says impossible at this time to go back to the secondary. Secondary source is not, in fact, a witting supplier of info but rather a knowledgeable person whose conversations occasionally reveal useful info. To ask direct questions would put him on guard and dry up the source.

2. Primary source states from context of original conversation he believes strong probability the reference transmissions took place prior to 080600Z.

3. Further information received from Embassy officer who spoke to young IDF Navy officer. The Navy officer claims he was aboard one of attacking MTBs. MTB saw a ship under air attack with smoke issuing from sides. Thought they saw guns on bow. They joined in attack and after torpedo launch at about one mile close to short distance at which time they saw US flag which had been obscured by smoke. Officer says CO of his MTB extremely remorseful and concerned.

4. From data available here ALUSNA reconstructs probable but not certain series of events.

A. IDF aircraft reported ship and identified her as US.

B. IDF AF HQ may or may not have broadcast info to all units, but probably uninformed aircraft returning from strike in Egypt with unused rounds attacked Liberty.

C. MTB's saw aircraft attack and presumed Liberty to be Egyptian ship. Therefore they eagerly raced into action without waiting to identify our ship.

5. Coordinated with Embassy.

Tel Aviv, June 13, 1967, 1730Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received at 3:16 p.m.

/2/Documents 272 and 273.

1. I saw FonMin Eban in Jerusalem this noon at my request in effort elicit Israeli thinking on questions urgently facing us now that cease fire is in operation. In accordance with State's 210499 I said we now desire to turn to next steps within and outside United Nations and that we urgently need to know GOI's policies for the future. I emphasized the pressures we face in the Security Council to require Israeli troops to withdraw to previous lines. Noting that our posture is that defined by the Security Council resolutions we have tabled, I stressed importance of obtaining as much Israeli precision as to its thinking as possible at earliest moment. As to United States points of departure I mentioned President's reaffirmation on May 23 of our commitment to support the political independence and territorial integrity of all nations in the area, the necessity to establish a regime of peace eliminating claims by either side of the right to infringe on the rights of others because of belligerency, U.S. vital interests in relation to the Arab world, and the overriding necessity that through magnanimous and imaginative policies, the foundations laid for a genuine reconciliation among peoples of the area.

2. Eban apologized that there must of necessity be a lack of precision in Israel's thinking as to detailed polices because of the dramatic, rapid changes which had taken place and had raised opportunities which were inconceivable before and for which Israel unprepared. He repeated what he had said in the Security Council that this hour of danger is also an hour of opportunity and it is essential to move forward to peace and not backward to belligerence. He added that since the earlier exchanges between the United States and Israel, particularly between the President and the Prime Minister just prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the situation had in fact been disrupted. It is impossible now to reconstruct but we must build anew. In the circumstances the point of reference cannot really be the pre-June 4th situation.

3. What Israel wants is quite simple: (a) security and (b) peace. Neither of these has been enjoyed before. Involved in the achievement of these goals are problems in the juridical, demographic and territorial fields. Israel has not yet had an opportunity to study each in detail. He reiterated that the disruption is so complete that they cannot rebuild but must erect a new edifice. He noted with satisfaction that the U.S. resolution tabled in the Security Council is forward looking in line with this concept.

/3/Reference is to a Soviet draft resolution introduced on June 8 that condemned Israel's "aggressive activities" and violation of the Security Council's resolutions of June 6 and 7 and demanded that Israel immediately halt its military activities against neighboring Arab states and withdraw its troops behind the Armistice Lines. A revised version submitted on June 13 condemned Israeli "aggressive activities" and continued occupation of UAR, Jordanian, and Syrian territory and demanded immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the Armistice Lines. (UN document S/7951 and Rev. 1 and 2) The text of the revised resolution of June 13 is in Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1967, p. 12. On June 14 the Security Council voted on the operative paragraphs of the resolution; both paragraphs failed to receive a majority.

5. Eban said that as he sees the situation at present there are two questions: (a) how to build and (b) what ideas exist as to the shape in which the area should be rebuilt. As to how to build, Israel feels strongly that there should be direct discussions between Israel and its neighbors to achieve viable arrangements for peace. A solution should not be imposed by outside powers. In direct dialogue Israel and Egypt, for example, should together determine frontiers, attitudes toward each other, etc. If Egypt should suggest another forum for the discussion, it should be told it has the wrong address and it should approach Israel. To my comment suggesting some skepticism as to whether Egypt and the others would in fact seek a peaceful solution or might not merely sulk in their tents behind the cease fire arrangement, Eban expressed confidence that Egypt would be under sufficient indigenous pressure to eliminate the present situation and all that had preceded it to seek negotiations. As to ideas about the shape of the new structure in the Middle East, Eban said that the Israeli Government is engaged in urgent consultations to work out specific ideas on each of the problems involved. He could not as yet indicate the outcome of these discussions but suggested that in formulating some of the questions involved he might give some clues as to present thinking. Questions relating to Egypt are, how can Egypt and Israel live together? How can an absence of belligerence in two waterways be assured? How can Sinai be prevented from becoming another springboard for attack and perhaps most difficult of all, what about Gaza? As to Syria, how can Israel ensure that it is not perpetually under Syrian guns, or in a position where Syria can cut off its water system. Most complex of all, he said, is Jordan and/or the Palestinian West Bank. He asked whether it is intelligent to endeavor to reproduce the unity between the West Bank and Jordan or some sort of separate relationship between the West Bank and Israel and Jordan. How can religious interests in Jerusalem be assured and also the sanctity and unity of the Israeli Holy Places? He indicated clearly Israel completely rules out the possibility of re-dividing the city of Jerusalem now that is has become united.

6. Eban then turned to tactical considerations. He recognized the requirement for speed particularly under the pressures created by United Nations procedures repeating again that it is tactically most desirable for the parties directly involved to get together and that he hoped very shortly for more specific ideas on the problems concerned. He urged that in the meantime a holding operation of at least short duration be undertaken and that the world not be intimidated by the Soviets. He again said it would be most tragic if the Soviet doctrine reflected in the Soviet Security Council resolution were accepted. Israel will hasten the crystalization of its ideas to permit more constructive consultation with U.S. One problem he describes as almost solved, Jerusalem is in fact united but the problems of international and spiritual interest there remain. On these he thought it wise not to be specific too quickly.

7. Finally, Eban concluded by summarizing Israel's position as wanting peace and direct negotiations and recognized that details require early but intensive study. He urged we not be too fatalistic as to timing. We must gain some time but also must act rapidly.

8. As a postscript, Eban said he may go again to United Nations but before doing so he wants to formulate Israel's ideas. He would not envisage putting specific proposals through the United Nations but recognizes that there are certain problems in which the international community's interests are greater than others.

For example, what international or naval guarantees could be obtained for the straits? The United Nations presence had not helped on that point in the past but some other guarantees might be sought. Also Israel's policy toward the various religions in Jerusalem was of great interest internationally and probably should be the subject of a quick Israeli declaration.

Barbour

Washington, June 13, 1967, 3:55 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. V. Confidential. Copies were sent to Bundy and Katzenbach. Rostow sent the memorandum and Document 279 to the President at 4:55 p.m. A handwritten "L" on Rostow's covering memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Mr. President:

Minister Evron asked to see me today to pick up a copy of the talk I gave in Middlebury.

In fact, he raised two matters:

1. The Israeli negotiating position. He said that a month ago there was no serious crisis in the Middle East; 10 days ago they felt they were being throttled; now there is temporary euphoria and relief at the military victory; but they have not had time to think through their position. The job for Israel is, having won the war, now to try to win the peace. He asked if we had any advice? I said he knew our formal positions, notably the President's statement of May 23 and everything else down to the resolution inscribed at the UN Security Council. We are clearly for both territorial integrity in the Middle East and for peace. Our powers to make peace, however, are extremely limited. A major attempt to retrieve the Soviet-radical Arab positions is under way, including apparently a meeting of the General Assembly. A great deal hinges on what kind of a position they take and especially whether it is one that will draw to it the majority in the UN General Assembly and, in the end, moderate Arabs. As the President had made clear in his press conference this morning, we were committed to certain principles in this situation but did not have a program.

He said that he understood this and, without instructions, he would only say this: It is important that the Arabs find out in the political offensive that the Russians cannot deliver any more effectively than they could deliver militarily. If this political counteroffensive fails, he feels that the Arabs may be willing then to talk. I said, once again, that what happened in the General Assembly and happened with the moderate Arabs depended upon the positions put forward by Israel.

2. He then turned to the notes concerning the Liberty. He said that he found no difficulty with our finding the issue "incomprehensible." He was disturbed by the use of the word "wanton"; and he would have wished that we had recognized how promptly the Israeli government had informed us of the error. He said Golda Meir had been with Rabin when he was informed; that considerable soldier "almost fainted" at the news of the attack. He was greatly disturbed by the Newsweek item in Periscope. Without in any way going around his Ambassador or the State Department, it was his personal suggestion that both notes might be amended or dropped and the "tone of the exchange lowered." He repeated that he saw nothing wrong at all in our asking how it could have happened; who did it; and our requesting that the Israeli government do something about it. The implication of purposeful action, however, he felt was most unfortunate.

He said that although final confirmation had not come to Washington, it was his understanding that those involved in the attack were about to be severely punished.

I explained to him that there was a good deal of strong Congressional feeling about the matter. In addition, the President and the military were understandably concerned. The language of the note was precise. We found the incident literally "incomprehensible." He said the Court of Inquiry was working as fast as it could. Perhaps when we had conducted our investigation, we could close out the incident with some kind of joint statement.

I noted and said I would pass along his thoughts.

Walt

Washington, June 13, 1967.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File. Middle East Crisis, Vol. V. Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

Washington, June 13, 1967, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Committee, Minutes and Notes. No classification marking. The meeting took place in Under Secretary Katzenbach's office. The notes are Saunders' handwritten notes of the meeting. See also Document 281.

THOSE PRESENT
Katzenbach
McNamara
Vance
W.W. Rostow
McG. Bundy
E.V. Rostow
Battle
Sisco
Saunders

/3/The word "Agenda" is written in the margin.

2. McGB: Back off for a moment & look at our position.

/4/"Lodge got invitation to go to Cairo. Not now. Lodge is a red flag to Israelis." is written in the margin, followed by "Anderson." Apparently a reference to Robert Anderson.

WWR:

--Get Israeli position.
--Dialogue with Arabs.

McGB: UNGA won't produce a favorable resolution.

WWR: Territorial integrity & non-belligerence.

Sisco:

--Generalization: no 2/3 majority for resolution we could buy.
--Sovs. Trying to bolster hands diplomatically.
--President shld go to UN & get out.
--Not going to get reasonable settlement next 2-4 months.

Consensus: No settlement 2-4 months.

/5/The words "Agenda?" and "Draft speech to UN." are written in the margin.

McGB: Here's where we were, are, are going.

Katz: Paper on the problems.

NEA consultants--call tonight for Thursday

IO consultants

McGB: Suppose Israeli demands shake down to

(a) Gaza
(b) int'l guar. for Aqaba
(c) Sinai back to UAR, perhaps demilitarized
(d) West Bank--to Jordan, refugees,
(e) more than demilitarized Syrian heights
(f) condition of peace.

Could USG be sympathetic to that position?

/6/"Consensus: President should make speech." is written in the margin.

McN: We can't take position of any concreteness now or even next week. Don't see how we can take a position. Speech ok.

McGB: Pres. can identify problems--leave parties to propose specific solutions. Pres. can say that UNGA can become propaganda debacle.

WWR: Refugees: criticize both Arabs & Israelis.

Battle:

/7/The comments "McGB: that's safer." and "LDB: doubts we'll know." are written in the margin.

McGB: Formulate interests of Arabs

--Self-respect in own national pursuits.

McN:

/8/"60 m. U.S." and "2.5 m." are written in the margin.

McGB: I don't see President asking Senate for guarantees.

McN: I don't think we ought to get him into this.

McGB: A deep policy question. How firm is the US commitment to Israel. Had the feeling Monday that we would not--in the end--have put troops in. Debate over this, especially if Israel had been attacked. US constitutional processes--none of these commitments ever backed by Congress.

McN: Territories. Israelis won't ever depend on guarantees. Eban given lesson in US constitutional processes, and he won't ever forget it.

McGB: US President will have to be residual military supplier.

EVR: Oil to neutralize Europe on arms.

LDB: Will be give in our position on territorial integrity. Question is when.

President's statement.

Sisco: Here's where we'll give.

(1) Sharm el-Sheikh.
(2) Gaza--nobody wants it.
(3) West Bank.

WWR: Arms control internal to region.

McN: Don't get far out on elements of solution. Shld Pres. lead toward a solution?

McGB: No. Pres. by stating problems leads toward solution.

Nasser Options

CIA: Estimate: Can Israel hold what it's won? What is cost to them? to us? How long can the [sentence incomplete]. Don't ask Israelis.

LDB:

/9/The words "Food, Suez, Tourism, Cotton, Seed Crop, Oil" are listed in the margin.

Possibility of living with impossible. "I want him to fall."

Succession:

1. If army in control, turn over to cohorts
2. Unknown Col. Nasser
3. Totally to left (Ali Sabri) or pro-Western elements (unlikely)

Cld N. execute a diplomatic revolution & come to terms with Israel?

LDB: No.

WWR: Need good sophisticated estimate on economics. If he needed $5-600 million & USSR wldn't, shyster.

/10/The words "'Israel had the courage of our convictions.'--Reston." are written in the margin.

LDB: Don't get on policy again we can't sustain.

/11/The words "Spanish Amb" and "Canadian Amb--Starnes" are written in the margin. John Kenneth Starnes was the Canadian Ambassador to the United Arab Republic.

--Econ.

Jobs to be done

1. Political paper on problems & assessments.
2. Draft speech.

Political team--Luke Battle: responsibility

(1) EOB paper

--binocular view.
--Dick Ullman.

/12/The names Eilts, Tasca, and Barbour are written in the margin.

Deadline:

/13/The words "By Wed. night" are written in the right-hand margin. The words "Dream world vs. real world." are written in the left-hand margin.

Who's the audience?

--US Jews
--UN
--Most Am. people.

Nuclear: Kohler to look.

NPT: guarantees for non-nuclears.

Washington, June 13, 1967, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Special Committee Meetings. Secret. See also Document 280.

SUBJECT
Minutes of Informal Meeting, 6:00 p.m., 13 June, Mr. Katzenbach's office

1. The group discussed whether the President should speak to the coming UN General Assembly and agreed on the following preparatory actions:

a. Mr. Katzenbach to cable Secretary Rusk laying out the considerations so the Secretary could mull them over and be prepared to discuss them at the 14 June Special Committee meeting.

b. Messrs. Sisco and E.V. Rostow to prepare separate drafts of a UN speech in time for the President's Wednesday night reading.

c. Mr. Battle to assume responsibility for producing a paper covering the whole range of political and territorial problems to settle issues and making some judgment on their acceptability. Mr. Bundy to have a couple of non-government experts produce independent papers along the same lines. Although these papers must necessarily be tentative at this stage, they are necessary as yardsticks for judging the content of the UN speech.

d. Messrs. Battle and Sisco to call a joint meeting of the NEA and IO consultants for 15 June.

2. The group requested two studies:

a. An SNIE on Nasser's prospects for survival, including both economic and political vulnerabilities.

b. A paper answering the questions: How long can Israel hold the territory it has won? What are the costs?

3. The group noted the importance of getting a better picture of the nuclear problem and tentatively agreed to ask Mr. Kohler to take a look at this.

McG B

Washington, June 13, 1967, 9:54 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Brewer on June 12; cleared by Battle, Solomon, and Director of the Office of Fuels and Energy John G. Oliver; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Also sent to Kuwait and repeated to Dhahran and London.

/2/Concerning these approaches, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIV, Document 240.

2. Dept believes direct USG response to host governments as result this approach through oil companies would be inappropriate. However, if you believe would be useful you may give host governments following oral comments re USG position without in any way indicating statement prompted by oil companies' approach. End FYI.

/3/At President Johnson's June 13 news conference, a reporter referred to his May 23 statement reaffirming the U.S. commitment to the territorial and political integrity of every nation in the Middle East (see Document 49) and asked how he was going to honor that commitment. He replied: "That is our policy. It will continue to be our policy. How it will be effectuated will be determined by the events of the days ahead. It will depend a good deal upon the nations themselves, what they have to say and what their views are, what their proposals are after they have expressed them." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, p. 612)

4. For Dhahran. Please inform Brougham of foregoing.

5. For Kuwait. Gulf representative Law reports that Lee will shortly inform GOK of companies' approach to us. Your discretionary use of foregoing applies after Lee has informed Kuwaitis.

6. In addition foregoing, addressees may, of course, draw on President Johnson's comment at his press conference June 13.

Katzenbach

Washington, June 13, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. V. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

/2/For text of the President's June 8 letter to King Faisal, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXI, Document 290. The King's reply was transmitted in telegram 5272 from Jidda, June 12, a copy of which is attached to the source text.

Faisal reiterates his desire to continue your close personal relationship and urges us to be even-handed in picking up the pieces of the Mid-East war. He has no doubt that the Israelis committed aggression and asks you to help make sure that they don't gain territorially.

I pass this on only because it is typical of the strong pressures we are getting from our Arab friends to say that our support for the territorial integrity of all the states in the area means pulling the Israelis back behind the 1949 Armistice lines and not forcing a peace settlement. Mac Bundy has seen, and we will have recommendations for you soon.

Walt

SC No. 01415/67

Washington, June 13, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, CIA Intelligence Memoranda. Top Secret; Trine; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence. A covering memorandum from Helms to the President states that it was the "special study" he had requested the previous evening. Helms' notes of the June 12 meeting of the NSC Special Committee indicate that the President requested a "special study on strafing & torpedoing of USS Liberty--pilot conversations, etc.--everything we can get--NSA, etc." (Central Intelligence Agency Files, DCI Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 11, Folder 12, DCI (Helms) Miscellaneous Notes of Meetings, 1 Jan 1966-31 Dec 1968) Rostow sent a preliminary version of this report to the President at 12:45 p.m. on June 13 with a covering memorandum calling it "CIA's first cut at the problem" and noting, "They do not find evidence of U.S. identification before the attack." (Ibid.)

THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE USS LIBERTY

The US Naval technical research ship Liberty was attacked by Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats off the Sinai Peninsula on 8 June. The following account of the circumstances of the attack has been compiled from all available sources.

1. The Liberty reported at 9:50 a.m. (2:50 a.m. Washington time) on 8 June that it had been orbited by two delta-wing jet fighters, presumably Israeli Mirages. At 3:05 p.m. (8:05 a.m.) the Liberty was strafed by unidentified jet aircraft. The Liberty apparently was not able to establish communications with other units of the US Sixth Fleet during the air attack, and the first information available to the US commanders was after the subsequent attack by unidentified torpedo boats, which occurred at 3:25 p.m.

2. At 4:11 p.m. (9:11 a.m.) the US Commander in Chief, Europe, notified the National Military Command Center in Washington that the Liberty was under attack and was listing to starboard after being struck by a torpedo. The Commander of the US Sixth Fleet declared the attacking units hostile and sent attack aircraft from the carriers America and Saratoga to protect the Liberty. A good part of the ship's communications equipment was destroyed by the crew during the attack but emergency communications were soon established with the Saratoga and with the naval communications station in Greece. Because of the tenseness of the situation and the communications delays, the initial reports from the Liberty were sketchy and somewhat confusing.

3. According to these reports, however, the sequence of events took place as follows. The ship was attacked at 3:05 p.m. (8:05 a.m.) by unidentified jet fighters, believed to be Israeli, at position 31-35N, 33-29E. Six strafing runs were made by the jets. Twenty minutes later three torpedo boats closed at high speed and two of them launched torpedoes after first circling the Liberty. One torpedo passed astern, and the other struck the starboard side of the ship in the spaces occupied by the SIGINT collectors. One of the boats was later identified as Israeli and the hull number of one unit was noted as 206-T. Some 50 minutes later two Israeli helicopters arrived on the scene.

4. None of the communications of the attacking aircraft and torpedo boats is available, but the intercepted conversations between the helicopter pilots and the control tower at Hatzor (near Tel Aviv) leave little doubt that the Israelis failed to identify the Liberty as a US ship before or during the attack. Control told (helicopter) 815 at 3:31 p.m. (8:31 a.m.) that "there is a warship there which we attacked. The men jumped into the water from it. You will try to rescue them." Although there were other references to a search for the men in the water and although US units later searched the area, no survivors were recovered from the sea, nor were there any indications that any of the 22 missing personnel from the Liberty had been lost overboard.

5. A subsequent message from the control tower to the helicopter identified the ship as Egyptian and told the pilot to return home. Although the Liberty is some 200 feet longer than the Egyptian transport El Quesir, it could easily be mistaken for the latter vessel by an overzealous pilot. Both ships have similar hulls and arrangements of masts and stack.

6. The weather was clear in the area of attack, the Liberty's hull number (GTR 5) was prominently displayed, and an American flag was flying. The helicopter pilot was then urgently requested to identify the survivors as Egyptian or English speaking (this being the first indication that the Israelis suspected they may have attacked a neutral ship). The helicopter pilot reported seeing an American flag on the Liberty. In another intercept between an unidentified Israeli controller and the helicopter number 815, the pilot reported that number GTR 5 was written on the ship's side. The controller told the pilot the number had no significance.

7. Thus it was not until 4:12 p.m. (9:12 a.m.) that the Israelis became convinced that the Liberty was American. This was about 44 minutes after the last attack on the ship and the attack had apparently been called off, not because the ship had been identified, but because it seemed to be sinking. (The US Defense Attach? in Tel Aviv reports that Israeli helicopters and the three torpedo boats searched the area until 6:04 p.m. (11:04 a.m.).) The Israeli offer of assistance was declined because of the sensitive mission of the ship. According to US Navy reports, the ship was saved only through the efforts of her crew.

8. The ship suffered heavy material and personnel casualties. A hole estimated to be 39 feet wide at the bottom and 24 feet wide at the top near the waterline was opened by a torpedo. The ship is flooded below the second deck between frames 52 and 78 (36-inch frame spacing). The crew carried out emergency destruction of classified communications and radar equipment, but the ship's engineering plant is intact. Several flash fires and cannon holes throughout the superstructure caused some minor damage and the ship's motor whale boat and virtually all of its life rafts were lost. Personnel casualties include 10 killed, 90 wounded, and 22 missing, most of whom were probably trapped in the flooded compartments. The wounded and the dead have been removed from the ship and some additional crew members put aboard. The ship is expected to arrive in Malta on 14 June for dry docking and hull repairs. Security precautions are being taken to protect the classified intercept equipment in the flooded spaces. The US Navy has convened a board of inquiry to look into the incident.

9. The USS Liberty is a converted Victory class merchant ship utilized as a SIGINT collector. The unit had moved from its normal station off West Africa to provide additional SIGINT coverage of the Middle East crisis. Official US statements, however, have described the Liberty as an electronics research ship which had been diverted to the crisis area to act as a radio relay station for US embassies.

10. The Liberty sailed from Rota, Spain, on 2 June under orders to patrol no closer than 12.5 miles of the UAR coast and 6.5 miles of the Israeli coast. A modification of orders issued by the Commander of the US Sixth Fleet at 12:17 p.m. (5:17 a.m.) on 8 June had not been received aboard the Liberty, according to the ship's commanding officer, before the Israeli attack. This change, together with messages from other commands which ordered the Liberty to approach no closer than 100 miles of the coasts of the UAR and Israel and 25 miles of the coast of Cyprus, was delayed in transmission in part because of a misunderstanding of responsibilities for delivery.

11. At annex is a listing of events in chronological order.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

(Stated times are local; Washington times in parentheses)

COMSIXTHFLEET then recalled the aircraft launched from the carriers America and Saratoga and sent two destroyers to assist Liberty. Liberty proceeding north-west at eight knots.

There was no further contact between Liberty and Israeli forces. Two Soviet ships have trailed the Liberty, which proceeds under escort to Malta.

Washington, June 13, 1967.

/1/Source: NSA Archives, PCG, ACC 33824, USS Liberty Incident. Top Secret; Trine.

SUBJECT
INR Comments on the USS Liberty Incident, June 8

/2/Not reproduced.

No traffic has appeared pertaining to Israeli military communications in this zone before and during the air and sea attacks on June 8. (We are checking further.) Our first intercept is logged at 1231Z, presumably three minutes after the torpedo attack; this message is the first in a series of commutations believed to have been conducted between Israeli ground radar-control stations and helicopters. The 1231Z message refers to "a warship that we attacked," and directs the helicopters to attempt to rescue vessel crew members reportedly in the water. At 1234Z, the ground control station reported that the ship had been identified as Egyptian. (We do not know the basis of this identification.) At 1256Z, the helicopter pilots were ordered to report the nationality of any crew members rescued. At 1302Z, an Israeli ground station, responding to an unaudited message, asked: "did it clearly signal an American flag?" and requested a further check.

In a separate report from USDAO Tel Aviv, a reliable American source was told by a senior Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) official that on the morning of June 8 he heard IDF transmissions at air-to-ground frequencies. An aircraft reported sighting a ship, was ordered to investigate, and reported back that the ship had a US flag. The aircraft was ordered to recheck and made a second and possibly a third pass, confirming at least for a second time that the flag was US.

/3/Brackets in the source text.

Washington, June 16, 1967, 11 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; NATUS. Drafted and approved by Eugene Rostow. Also sent to USUN and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Tehran, Kuwait, Jidda, Rabat, Tunis, and Rawalpindi.

211672. At his request, Ambassador Harman called on Undersecretary Rostow on June 14.

1. Ambassador Harman reported that the Israeli Board of Enquiry investigating the attack on the U.S.S. Liberty would finish its hearings on Friday afternoon. Its findings would be made shortly thereafter, and would be given us when ready. The Ambassador asked when our Board would complete its own study of the matter. Rostow replied that he did not know but would find out. He assured the Ambassador that the findings of our Board would be made available to GOI when they were prepared. (After consultation with Secretary McNamara, Rostow informed Harman that the U.S. enquiry into the matter would be finished within a few days, and the findings completed shortly thereafter.)

/2/Harman asked Vance on June 17 about the Israeli request for immediate delivery of 48 A-4 aircraft. Vance told him it would be impossible to meet the request without withdrawing aircraft from U.S. forces in Southeast Asia, and that they felt this could not be done. The earliest possible delivery date would be for the four A-4s previously promised for December 1967. (Memorandum for the record by Vance, June 17; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, Israel 452)

/3/During a call on Battle on June 14, Harman stated that he was puzzled because in the past 7-10 days, Israeli Embassy officers and attaches had not been getting responses from the Departments of Defense and State on new requests for routine military items; their inquiries were being met with "rather indefinite expressions that matters like this were being looked into at higher levels." Battle said he would try to get a clear answer on this for the Ambassador. (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-ISR)

4. Harman stressed again GOI tactics of delay in the UNGA, to give the government a chance to recover its breath and think through its posture.

Rusk

Washington, June 14, 1967, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Minutes and Notes. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The notes are Saunders' handwritten notes of the meeting. The President's Daily Diary indicates that the meeting ended at 8:25 p.m. It lists NSC staff member Roger Morris and John Devine among those present, in addition to those listed here. (Johnson Library) See also Document 288. Bundy sent an agenda to the President earlier that day, with attached outlines of a possible statement to the United Nations, headed "Another Possible Outline," "Rostow Draft Summary," and "Sisco Draft Summary." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Special Committee #1) A notation on another copy of "Another Possible Outline" indicates it was drafted by Bundy. (Ibid., Special Committee Meetings)

THOSE PRESENT
Vice President
McNamara
Fowler
Katzenbach
Vance
Wheeler
Helms
Clifford
W.W. Rostow
McG. Bundy
E.V. Rostow
Amb. Thompson
Battle
Sisco
Harry McPherson
Harold Saunders

Secretary Rusk and Amb. Goldberg came in about 7:00 p.m.

George Christian came in at 7:30 p.m.

President came in at 7:38 p.m.

/2/See the attachment to Document 288.

Israel

/3/The word "Press?" is inserted above the word "Policy".

/4/"Press guidance" is written in the left margin.

48 A-4: we don't have; we can't accelerate.

250 M-60 tanks

Hawks batteries

/5/The section headed "Israel" is written to the right of paragraph 4 under section headed "Restatement US arms supply policy."

Must avoid any position that looks as if we are reneging on any agreement.

/6/Brackets in the handwritten source text.

Should we unhook from 1949 agreements?

(Sisco: Art. 12 of GAA calls for renegotiation)

Katz: Unhook but don't say those aren't g [sentence not completed].

/7/"Morris doing" is written in the left margin. Reference is to Goldberg's first June 13 statement; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1967, pp. 5-9.

Rusk:

1. Nothing in lines jeopardize Israel if they are peace lines.

2. Self-determination: West Bank.

--Israel's keeping territory wld create a revanchism for the rest of the 20th c.

3. Israel must be accepted.

--McN. doesn't think recognition alone enough.

Goldberg:

1. Israelis willing to create internat'l religious enclaves in Jerusalem.
2. Syria creates greatest USSR concern.

WWR: Use Syrian heights to bargain on arms race.

Thompson: USSR would accept Israel, open Aqaba, Jerusalem--but on territory they wouldn't.

If Kosygin comes, you shld go.

If not, far from clear.

/8/A June 14 memorandum from Bundy to the Special Committee on the subject "Tents for Jordan," states that the Jordanian Government had requested 5,000-10,000 tents and noted steps that other countries were taking to provide emergency relief. Bundy recommended sending the tents. He stated, "We badly need a few gestures toward our moderate Arab friends to balance the increasingly effective Nasser charges that we have sided completely with Israel. This is a one-shot arrangement. It is not likely to get us dug in on any long-term program of refugee relief. Leonard Marks informs me he can make effective use of a gesture of this kind on The Voice of America." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Special Committee Meetings)

/9/"Working for refugees and residents on both sides." is written to the right of these words. The words "President approved." are written below. "Tell USIA," with a telephone number, is written next to those words.

Water drops:

If Red Cross agrees, we wld go ahead.

Katz: Tourist ban.

/10/"SA, Kuw, Mor, Tun, Leb?, Israel" are listed next to the last two lines.

Washington, June 14, 1967, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Committee, Special Committee Meetings. Secret. Drafted on June 15; also see Document 287.

SUBJECT
Minutes, NSC Special Committee, 6:30 p.m., 14 June in the Cabinet Room

1. The Committee approved the "Restatement of Current U.S. Arms Supply Policy to the Middle East" (attached) with the two following changes:

(a) At the end of paragraph 4 add: "Any further approvals or shipments will require the prior approval of the Secretaries of State and Defense."

(b) In the footnote on page two, amend line 5 to read: ". . . this policy, if unmodified over the next several months, would block shipment of the Israeli arms package approved. . ."

In discussing this item, the Committee (a) noted the importance of not appearing to renege on recent commitments, and (b) agreed specifically that we should not for the moment consider Israel's new requests for A-4 aircraft, M-60 tanks and Hawk missiles.

2. The President approved immediate shipment of 5500 tents to Jordan.

/2/Telegram 210998 to Geneva, June 14, instructed the U.S. mission to approach the International Committee of the Red Cross to ask if the ICRC wanted such assistance. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

4. The President rejected a proposal to raise the ban on tourist travel to the crisis area.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typewritten signature.

Washington, June 14, 1967.

SUBJECT
Restatement of Current US Arms Supply Policy to the Middle East

The Control Group wishes to restate the present arms supply policy, in order to assure its full understanding by all concerned.

1. All shipments of military equipment to those states which have broken diplomatic relations with us have been suspended as of June 8. With respect to government-to-government agreements (grant aid and credit sales under the Military Assistance Program), this has involved stopping shipments at depots, manufacturers' facilities, and other sources; it has also involved efforts to repossess shipments at the port or enroute, to the extent such shipments are still within US control. With respect to direct commercial sales, this has involved the immediate suspension of outstanding munitions export licenses and the stopping at US ports of all shipments under such licenses.

/4/This policy suspends munitions export licenses covering $238,000 in arms for Lebanon; there are no outstanding export licenses for Jordan. It does, however, stop all scheduled grant aid shipments to Jordan under MAP (about $1.5 million per year in spare parts) and suspends the sales contract for 12 F-104 aircraft under which initial deliveries to Jordan are scheduled for August 1967. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. Munitions export licenses issued, prior to June 8, to states in the area which have not broken relations with us remain in effect. Under this arrangement, the following magnitudes of equipment would continue to be deliverable: Israel $38 million; Saudi Arabia $57 million; Kuwait $17,000; and Morocco $16,000.

/5/The value of pending requests for munitions export licenses blocked by this action is: Israel $1.2 million; Jordan $59,000; Kuwait $125,000; Lebanon $47,000; Saudi Arabia $3.2 million; Syria $463,000; and Iraq $390,000. In addition, this policy, if unmodified over the next several months, would block shipment of the Israeli arms package approved by the President on May 23 (100 APC for cash, $14 million of Hawk and tank spares for credit), and the 1966 agreement to sell 48 A-4 aircraft to Israel. [Footnote in the source text.]

Tel Aviv, June 15, 1967, 1130Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Liberty. Confidential. Also sent to OSD, CNO, Department of State, COMSIXTHFLT, CINCSTRIKE, CINCUSNAVEUR, JCS, DIA, USUN, CINCEUR/USEUCOM, CTG 60.2, USAFE, CINCUSAREUR, and CTG 60.

/2/Telegram 0886 from USDAO Tel Aviv reported that Bloch informed Castle on June 13 that General Rabin had appointed an official court of inquiry in the Liberty incident. (National Archives and Records Administration, Rg 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

1. Commodore Shlomo Erell, Commander in Chief IDF Navy, asked ALUSNA to call upon him early evening 14 June. Commodore presented apologies and expressions of regret in regard Liberty incident to the U.S. Navy on behalf of Israeli Navy and said he was preparing letter to CNO USN. He said incident was great mistake: that IDF Navy personnel involved felt "terrible" and that the incident in fact spoiled all feeling of victory of IDF Navy in recent hostilities.

2. Erell stated he did not want to comment on elements of incident until the Israeli court of inquiry had rendered findings. When asked if those findings would be transmitted to the United States the commodore said he presumed they would be.

3. As in every case when Israeli officer mentions the incident Commodore Erell remarked on how close Liberty was to shore line. ALUSNA replied that Liberty was in international waters.

4. Comment: A. Commodore Erell was obviously very discomforted by need for and fact of meeting with ALUSNA which might be part of explanation why there was so long a delay between event and first official IDF Navy presentation of apologies.

B. The U.S. Ambassador has been informed in other channels that Israel court of inquiry will probably complete its actions on 16 June.

5. Coordinated with Embassy.

Tel Aviv, June 15, 1967, 1200Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Nodis. Received at 9:58 a.m. Rostow sent a copy to the President at 5:30 p.m. with a covering memorandum commenting that "a process of realism is beginning to set in in Tel Aviv just as the initial rigid Arab position is beginning to show some cracks. With time and patience on our part--and a lot of behind-the-scenes work with both the Arabs and Israel--something constructive might still emerge." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VI)

/2/Telegram 211231 to Ankara and several other embassies, June 14; not printed. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

1. Reftel requesting comments updating assessments as to Israeli position on settlement is captioned only Limdis and was repeated to a number of posts. My comments go somewhat further and are perhaps more negative than I believe it desirable to circulate in that classification at this time. I am consequently using the higher Nodis indicator.

2. Israeli attitudes and position in relation to the situation resulting from the hostilities last week and their views as to settlement may be recapitulated and summarized as follows: They genuinely believe that a completely new situation has been created which offers an opportunity to move forward to their goals of durable peace and security such as never existed for Israel to date. Their primary purpose will be to seek the removal of the restrictions on their sovereignty and existence as heretofore demonstrated by the armistice regime which never moved forward, as intended, to peace treaties.

3. Israeli Government thinking as to specific parameters of a settlement has not yet crystalized. However as of this time they believe certain goals to be obtainable. Tactically the majority of authoritative circles seem confident that pressures created by the impact of their defeat in the neighboring countries will be sufficient to persuade the Arab regimes to seek direct peace negotiations. In such negotiations the Israelis would be guided by a determination that Jerusalem shall not be redivided, that the West Bank and Gaza should not be annexed to Israel for the reason that they contain so many Arabs that annexation would alter the complexion of Israel into that of a binational state, that free access to the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal should be guaranteed by the absence of a right on the part of Egypt to invoke a state of belligerency to deny Israeli access, and that insofar as Syria is concerned provision must be made to prevent the border settlements there from continuing to live under the threat of Syrian bombardment.

4. Despite the majority adherence at present to the foregoing as attainable objectives, the last few days have indicated that some skepticism is arising in certain quarters close to the seat of power here as to whether this is a realistic assessment. I detect considerable skepticism as to whether the tactic of achieving bilateral negotiations by merely standing pat will work and a growing belief if direct negotiations are feasible that they will have to be under some international umbrella. Similarly there seem to be those who now estimate that to maintain Israeli sympathy among nations having particular religious interests in Jerusalem and especially the Vatican, it will be necessary to envisage some sort of international regime to control or supervise and thus protect the religious interests generally in the city, although presumably such international arrangement would be within the context of an agreement whereby the political entity of Jerusalem would be maintained under Israeli administration. The same individuals are inclined to doubt the government's exploration of some autonomous status for the West Bank will also turn out to be practicable and tend to assume that after taking account of necessary minor frontier rectification to provide additional Israeli security, the West Bank will probably be returned to Jordan. Further, and perhaps more crucial in views of the power relationships involved, I am beginning to hear important voices question whether physical Israeli possession of the heights in Syria, which is now regarded as an essential security requirement, will ultimately become feasible. If not, an international regime of some sort guaranteeing the demilitarization of that area may finally result. In this connection it may be noted that I am now reliably informed, although second hand, that the cabinet decision to clear the Syrian heights militarily was a last minute, on balance reversal of a decision that, regretfully as the Israelis might feel, Israel would have to accept the cease fire without embarking on that expedition. A communication from 14 Kibbutzim on the frontier that unless the action was undertaken they would resettle elsewhere seems to have tipped the scales. The importance of this episode is the indication that the Israeli Government was aware of the Soviet factor in relation to Syria and is presumably still conscious of it.

5. There is of course an enormous difference between the government's position which the Israelis are now trying to implement and these latter more sober estimates of realistic possibilities. Consequently if things work out in this more limited achievement the psychological let down will be of major proportions. In all probability the United States will have to exercise considerable persuasion with the Israelis to achieve a solution salvaging maximum U.S. interests in the whole area before the course of forthcoming diplomatic maneuvering is run. To minimize the impact here I believe it desirable that so long as the Israelis wish to pursue their tactic of bilateral negotiation and to the extent we do so without taking an unacceptable risk of confrontation with the Soviets, it would be to our interest to avoid specific U.S. initiatives. I would anticipate that as things proceed the Israelis will discover that some, at least, of their stated objectives are not attainable and may then come to us for assistance in a more realistic frame of mind.

Barbour

Washington, June 15, 1967, 5:10 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Judd and approved in S on June 27. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

SUBJECT
Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Ambassador Battle, Assistant Secretary for NEA
Thomas M. Judd, UK Desk Officer

Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador

Ambassador Dean said he would like to have an exchange of views on the Middle East situation. Stressing that he was speaking without instructions, he expressed serious concern regarding developments. He noted that Britain was short of tankers and badly needed to get oil from Libya. He thought Kosygin was up to no good in coming to New York. The Soviets were trying to make matters more difficult for the Western position in the area.

The Secretary said we had received confirmation that Kosygin, Gromyko and the other Soviet leaders were coming to New York. We had a press report to the effect that de Gaulle would be willing to go to New York to attend a summit meeting and another from London saying Wilson was willing to come if Kosygin was also coming. During the recent NATO Ministerial Meeting, the Secretary said, all the discussion was to the effect that NATO members should not provide any of the 62 votes necessary to call a special session of the General Assembly. This position had dissolved when the rumor spread that Kosygin was coming. Many think it would be wonderful if the President and Kosygin could sit down to talk things out. They had forgotten that at the last such meeting we were presented with an ultimatum on Berlin.

Ambassador Dean inquired concerning the Secretary's views as to what could be done to bring about a settlement in the Middle East. The Secretary replied that we were not trying to draw up a clear blueprint. We wished to keep our position flexible in case the countries in the area could come up with any answers themselves. A solution would have to provide for:

(1) recognition of the existence of the state of Israel;
(2) doing away with the "rights of belligerency";
(3) some settlement on the waterways;
(4) progress on refugees; and
(5) progress on arms limitation.

There remained the problem of the old city of Jerusalem. This was going to be tough.

Ambassador Dean asked what type of negotiations we favored. Ambassador Battle replied that our interests would be better served by individual rather than collective negotiations. These would be difficult to arrange. A mediator was needed to go around to the various countries. The Secretary noted that Israel had said it would not accept a mediator.

The Secretary asked if Ambassador Dean had seen a report that the French had said they would not recognize any territorial changes not agreed to by all parties concerned. Ambassador Dean replied that he had not and asked what the French were up to. Ambassador Battle said they seemed to be making a clear effort to play both sides.

New York, June 15, 1967, 2113Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Confidential; Exdis. Received at 6:19 p.m. Rostow sent a copy to the President at 7:40 a.m. on June 16 with a covering memorandum commenting: "Herewith UAR begins to toss an anchor to windward and tries to open a dialogue with us." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VI)

5736. Number two man in UAR mission, Amb Hilmy, who is former general, phoned Buffum today to relate fol message. Since there are no diplomatic relations between our govts and since UAR would still like to be able to exchange views with US, he has been detailed to serve as a channel for this purpose. Hilmy indicated he is available to transmit messages or otherwise exchange views at any time. He asked that this info be kept confidential. Buffum said he would transmit this message to Washington and was sure US would welcome fact that official channel remains open despite rupture of relations.

/2/An alternate member of the UAR delegation to the United Nations.

/3/Telegram 212159 to USUN, June 16, commented, "We know from experience that it is habitual for Egyptians in time of crisis to offer themselves as communications channel. They instinctively believe that maintenance of channels of communication more important than substance of what two countries may have to say to each other." It expressed a preference for Mohamed Riad as a communications channel, should future circumstances warrant. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US)

Goldberg

Washington, June 15, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Committee, Special Committee Meetings. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. It is apparently the status report prepared in the Department of State cited on Walt Rostow's agenda for the meeting. (Ibid., Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VI)

SUBJECT
Status of Efforts To Curb the Flow of Arms to the Arab States and Israel

/2/Rusk attended the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Luxembourg June 12-14. Telegram 477 from Luxembourg, June 14, summarizes his statement on the Middle East situation at the June 13 meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, NATO 3 LUX (LU)) Documentation on his discussions at the meeting is ibid.; also ibid., Conference Files, 1966-1972, Entry 3051B, CF 186-194.

/3/Counselor of the British Embassy John E. Killick conveyed the British reply to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Jeffery C. Kitchen. (Memorandum of conversation, June 13; ibid., Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12 NEAR E)

/4/Telegram 20111 from Paris, June 12, reported French views on this. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

/5/Telegram 210839 to USUN, June 13, conveyed these instructions. (Ibid., DEF 12 NEAR E)

3. On June 14, Ambassador Thompson expressed to Soviet Charge Chernyakov our concern that arms shipments to the Near East could lead to a renewed spiral in the arms race. He noted that the problem had both short and long term dimensions. Chernyakov acknowledged concern over this problem, but noted the pressures on the Soviet Union from the Arabs and the need to demonstrate Soviet support.

4. We recommend consideration be given to the position we should take on this subject with Premier Kosygin.

Washington, June 15, 1967, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Minutes and Notes. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet room at the White House. The notes are Saunders' handwritten notes of the meeting. The meeting ended at 8:15 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

THOSE PRESENT
Rusk
McNamara
Fowler
Goldberg
Wheeler
Helms
W.W. Rostow
Clifford
McG. Bundy
Vance
Thompson
Battle
Harry McPherson
H. Saunders

The President and George Christian came in about 7:30 p.m.

1. Fowler's report on market.

2. Kosygin: arriving NY late tomorrow after talk with de Gaulle.

3. France--arms--Algeria.

4. Reply to Liberty note? McGB to check action with Katzenbach.

5. Arms control.

--Thompson's conversation with Chernyakov is sufficient for the record.

--Subject should be in any speech to UNGA & good talking paper for LBJ-Kosygin.

--Goldberg: neutral parties not eager to press arms registration. Shall we advance proposal ourselves? Do we table a proposal? Do we offer a resolution in our speech?

--Tied in with UN presentation.

6. Vance: water drop? Planes being prepared.

EVR-Harman-Dayan & UAR Red Cross--they to look over area in Israeli helicopters.

--Reply to Vatican.

--Press guidance OK.

7. Wheelus: McN: "marginally desirable."

/2/The note "If King wants us out, we have no choice--McN. agrees." is written in the margin. Documentation on U.S. relations with Libya is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXIV, Documents 40 ff.

8. Attend UN: Two separate questions.

a. President's own decision.

b. Whether we tell UK.

9. Arab Foreign Ministers: add strong para.

10. Jidda. Solomon to talk to Aramco on jet fuel to Vietnam.

/3/The Fifth Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly met June 17-July 5 and July 12-21.

Alternative: Speak on national TV hookup before.

Let Kosygin have his show.

DR: "I have some preference for your going." In & out.

AG: Problem: will Arabs walk out? They have done this on other problems. (USSR wld be against walkout)

Fowler & Christian: Walking out a plus.

Pr: Instinct

(a) this is Kosygin's show
(b) see any heads of state come
(c) no hurry to gallop up there
(d) don't show too much eagerness
(e) any hope of achieving anything?

Thompson & Clifford: Exceedingly important to see K. Use UN speech as excuse, if need be.

Wld. meeting set us back? China spotlight.

Thompson: Key Soviet question: Can they do business?

DR: Ultimatum? Kennedy-Khrushchev.

Washington, June 15, 1967, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Minutes and Notes. Secret.

SUBJECT
Minutes, NSC Special Committee

6:30 p.m., Thursday, 15 June, Cabinet Room

1. In response to the Libyan Government's request that we withdraw from Wheelus Base, the Committee approved instructing Ambassador Newsom to reply that, in accordance with our position in 1964, we are prepared to resume discussions leading to withdrawal--no timetable to be specified. The consensus was that if King Idris wants us to leave, we have no choice.

2. The Committee noted progress made in readying equipment for a water drop to Egyptian stragglers in the Sinai Desert and agreed that we should make public our offer to the International Committee of the Red Cross to make planes available. The Committee also agreed to expedite our reply to a plea from the Vatican on this subject.

/2/See Document 296. Telegrams 211605 to Beirut, 211610 to Rabat, and 211611 to Jidda, all dated June 14, are similar but not identical. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

/3/Telegram 211613 to Amman, June 15, stated that the United States hoped to avoid a new arms race in the Middle East and therefore was not approving any export licenses or any further shipments under the Military Assistance Program to any of the participants in the conflict "at this time." It also instructed the Embassy to assure King Hussein of U.S. concern with Jordan's security and to tell him there had been no U.S. decision in principle against supplying arms to Jordan. (Ibid., DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN)

4. The Committee instructed Assistant Secretary Solomon to discuss with Aramco officials their interpretation of Saudi Arabian oil export limitations to include jet fuel for Vietnam. The consensus was that we should not acquiesce.

McG. B.

Washington, June 15, 1967, 10:32 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Houghton, cleared by Davies and the NSC Special Committee, and approved by Battle.

211615. For Ambassador at opening of business June 16.

1. Prior to Foreign Minister Touqan's departure for Arab Foreign Minister's meeting in Kuwait, you should convey to him following USG position on current crisis:

2. We are urgently studying problems growing out of recent Arab-Israel hostilities in an effort to defuse situation. In this connection you may assure him that we stand by our support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all states in the Near East in accordance with the reaffirmation on June 13 by President Johnson (press conference) of his May 23 statement (copies of both should be provided). In our view, it is of prime importance for all states to take steps now to assure that there is an end to the periodic hostilities and the state of belligerency which have marked Near Eastern history in the last two decades. The USG is fully prepared to work both in the UN and directly with other states for lasting arrangements which will serve permanently to reduce tensions in this region. The UN resolution submitted to the Security Council by the USG on June 8 was designed to accomplish that end.

3. We have been and are concerned with conditions on the West Bank. To alleviate the situation, we have vigorously intervened with the Israelis for them to encourage West Bank residents to remain there and resume normal life. We have been somewhat encouraged by these efforts and will continue them. We approve of UNRWA's continuing its operations on the West Bank and we are supporting other measures to assist people in Jordan who have suffered from the hostilities.

4. We realize that GOJ has raised in past days a number of important questions which we have not answered. We can only assure GOJ that we have Jordan's interest very much in mind and will be in touch with the GOJ as soon as we have sorted things out. In the meantime, we hope that the GOJ can continue to exercise, as far as circumstances permit, a moderate influence on Arab counsels, as without moderation on all sides, there is little hope for reducing present tension.

5. We are deeply chagrined that some Arab countries have broken relations on the basis of outrageous charges and would be gravely disturbed if there were further action based on the same falsehoods.

Rusk