U.S. Department of State

Washington, June 14, 1967.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry Files: Job 80-R01580, Box 10, Folder 210, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Nine annexes are filed with this draft briefing, including a chronology of the crisis, a chronology of the Arab-Israeli Task Force established May 23; and copies of other memoranda entitled: "Overall Arab-Israeli Military Capabilities," May 23; "Israeli Intelligence Estimate of the Israeli-Arab Crisis," May 25; Office of National Estimates memorandum "The Middle Eastern Crisis," May 26; "Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States," May 26 (Document 76); "The Current Focus of the Near East Crisis," June 3; [text not declassified]. The package is filed with a letter from J. Patrick Coyne of the President's Foreign Intelligence Board indicating that he and General Taylor had reviewed it. The briefing was prepared for a PFIAB meeting on June 15-16. No minutes of the meeting have been found.

MIDDLE EAST COLLECTION CAPABILITIES

I want to discuss with you first our various facilities for intelligence collection in the Middle East, and how they performed during the latest crisis.

I. By and large, we had the right assets, and enough of them, in place and operating when the crisis began. We were able to reinforce them adequately as the crisis developed. They provided timely advance warning, and furnished the basis for an excellent estimate of the probable outcome.

A. Once the shooting started, however, for a variety of reasons I will come to in a minute, we were less than well informed on the tactical progress of the fighting.

[heading not declassified]

II. [9 lines of source text not declassified]

[Omitted here is detailed discussion.]

V. [10 lines of source text not declassified]

[Omitted here is detailed discussion.]

Overhead Reconnaissance:

VI. Intensive overhead reconnaissance would have produced a substantial amount of tactical situation intelligence, but political considerations precluded the use of most of our capabilities.

[Omitted here is detailed discussion.]

C. Overhead reconnaissance therefore provided no intelligence during the actual fighting phase, but we did have two satellites--a KH-4 and KH-7--in orbit during the developing period from May 16 to May 30.

1. Each satellite was limited to six or eight passes over the Middle East, but we made the fullest possible use of them.

2. The KH-4 was already up when Nasir began moving his troops forward and closed the Gulf of Aqaba, but we fed in some requirements which were covered in the second basket. The KH-7 was tasked for Middle East targets before it was launched.

3. Photography from the KH-7 on May 29, for instance, revealed no evidence of the 5,000-man force which was supposed to be defending Sharm-Ash-Shaykh. It did find MIG-15s on two previously unoccupied airfields in southern Syria.

[Omitted here is detailed discussion.]

XII. The Mediterranean Bureau of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service bears the blame for disturbing Washington sleep when the fighting started at 2:05 our time Monday morning. Their flash, based on monitoring the Israeli Radio, was 20 minutes ahead of the news agencies and 50 minutes ahead of the first official reporting on the outbreak of hostilities.

[Omitted here is detailed discussion.]

XIII. To summarize, then, we had adequate facilities in place to spot the crisis, and watch it as it developed. If we were somewhat short on the actual play-by-play, once the fighting actually started, it was the result of political decision or mischance, rather than any shortcoming in foresight or planning. I have emphasized the limits on our capabilities because that is the most useful element in seeking benefit from a post-mortem. Next I would like to tell you briefly the positive reporting we were able to accomplish with those capabilities.

POSTMORTEM: REPORTING ON THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

I. Matching the performance of the intelligence collectors, at the other end of the process the intelligence community displayed a high degree of good analysis, sound evaluation, and timely warning in its finished intelligence production on the Arab-Israeli crisis.

A. It is a bit difficult to pick the starting point for any one particular crisis in a feud which has persisted for 20 years, but a good case can be made that this one began to take shape last November.

B. On November 5, 1966, we reported in the Central Intelligence Bulletin that Tel Aviv probably considered that they had exhausted peaceful methods, channels, and remedies for stopping raids into Israel by Palestinian terrorists.

1. The obvious conclusion was that the Israelis would once again try military reprisals, and we began watching for Israeli deployments or spot mobilizations.

2. Eight days later, the Israelis struck at suspected Arab terrorist bases in Jordan.

C. As we analyzed the effects of this raid, we concluded that:

(One) It had badly shaken the stability of the Jordanian regime, the principal moderate on Israel's borders, and might impel the Jordanians to closer cooperation with the Egyptians in military matters;

(Two) The Tel Aviv government had probably picked Jordan because the military commanders considered the Syrian border terrain less suitable for sharp, limited reprisal; and

(Three) The raid would not deter the terrorists, trained, supported, and directed by the Syrians. The Israelis would therefore soon feel constrained to strike directly at Syria again despite the difficult terrain.

D. In our current intelligence reporting, accordingly, we kept close watch over the ensuing months on both the terrorist raids, and the Israeli reaction.

1. The Central Intelligence Bulletins of January 7 and January 10 reported renewed firing across the Syrian-Israeli border.

2. A finished intelligence report on January 17 called the situation there "explosive."

3. The actual "explosion" was delayed for some weeks by meetings of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission, but the Central Intelligence Bulletin during this period periodically reported, quite correctly, that the meetings were making no progress on basic issues, and that the Israelis were probably preparing substantial retaliation for the next suitable Syrian provocation.

E. On April 7 the Israelis turned a border shelling incident into an aerial dogfight, and inflicted a sharp defeat on the Syrian Air Force, shooting down six MIG-21s without losing a single Israeli plane.

1. [8 lines of source text not declassified]

2. I should also note at this point one of the soft spots in our record. Our reporting concluded that neither side would soon seek another major engagement. In retrospect, it was a sound judgment in the light of the facts, but it did not make sufficient allowance for Nasir's overreaction to the next Israeli warning against terrorism.

II. On May 10, our daily reporting noted that there had been 14 terrorist incidents in Israel since the air battle on April 7, and that while there had been no fatalities, pressure was mounting in Israel for another reprisal raid.

A. On May 12, Prime Minister Eshkol warned publicly that "if there is no other way," Israel would have to use "appropriate means" to punish the Syrians for terrorist acts.

1. Four days later, the Israeli military intelligence chief implied to the U.S. Defense Attach? that Israel might launch air strikes against Syria if there were fatalities from terrorism.

B. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

C. On May 14 and 15, Nasir placed the Egyptian armed forces on "full alert," and began moving ground forces into Sinai with much fanfare.

D. [7 lines of source text not declassified]

III. The result of all this, in effect, was to put the intelligence community on full alert too. The Arab-Israeli situation was a daily item in the Central Intelligence Bulletin [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] from May 15 onward, and on May 18 we began issuing additional situation reports twice a day for the White House.

A. We disagreed with the Arab evaluation of Moscow's support, and noted [1 line of source text not declassified] that we expected the Soviets to tread warily, but [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that the Syrians seemed to be doubletalking themselves, and possibly the Egyptians, into believing that the Soviets would come to their aid in the event of an Israeli attack.

1. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

IV. Early on May 23, Cairo time, Nasir--who by this time had accomplished the complete withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force--announced that he was again closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli-flag shipping and to other ships carrying strategic material to Eilat.

A. Early on that same day, Washington time, we noted [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that the Israelis would consider this a justifiable cause for war.

1. I told two Congressional subcommittees that same morning and a White House lunch conference that war could now come at any time "by accident, incident, or miscalculation."

2. I brought to that same White House lunch a CIA memorandum, concurred in by Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler and later passed along to Ambassador Goldberg, which stated that we believed the Israelis would be able to defeat any combination of Arabs, and that Israeli planning was still based on a short war.

B. At this point--May 23--we put a 24-hour Arab-Israeli Task Force to work in our CIA Operations Center, to focus all available intelligence and expertise on the responsibilities for current reporting.

C. I have with me a chronology of the many memoranda produced by the Task Force, examples of some of these papers, and a compilation of our regular reporting on the situation over the past two months in the Central Intelligence Bulletin [1 line of source text not declassified].

1. It is a sizable stack, however, and if I may, I will just gist for you some of the more interesting examples:

--[7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

--On May 26, the Office of National Estimates surveyed the situation, speculated on what had prompted Nasir to run the risk of major hostilities with Israel, and concluded: "We are inclined to believe that unless the U.S. and other major powers take whatever steps are necessary to re-open the Strait of Tiran, the Israelis will feel compelled to go to war. . . . If the Israelis attacked the U.A.R. and waged a successful campaign, . . . we do not believe that the Soviets would intervene in the conflict with their own combat forces . . . They would probably count upon the political intervention of great powers, including themselves, to stop the fighting before Nasir had suffered too much damage."

--Also on May 26, CIA in collaboration with DIA produced a memorandum entitled "Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States," which opened with the following summary: "Israel could almost certainly attain air superiority over the Sinai Peninsula in 24 hours after taking the initiative, or in two or three days if the U.A.R. struck first. In the latter case, Israel might lose up to half of its air force. We estimate that armored striking forces could breach the U.A.R.'s double defense line in the Sinai within several days. Re-grouping and re-supplying would be required before the Israelis could initiate further attacks aimed at driving to the Suez Canal. Israel could contain any attacks by Syria or Jordan during this period."

(I might note that in early drafts, our analysts more specifically stipulated "two to three days" to break the Egyptian Sinai defenses, and a total of "seven to nine days" to the Suez Canal if the Israelis had to pause to re-group, but they had to be a bit less specific to get through the coordination process.)

--Finally, let me read you the summary of a CIA Memorandum circulated to the White House, the NSC-level, and the intelligence community on the morning of Saturday, June 3, two days before the fighting began: "Reporting during the past few days has focused on two primary aspects of the Near East crisis. One is the rapidly growing belief in Israel that time is running out, and that if Israel is not to suffer an ultimately fatal defeat, it must very soon either strike or obtain absolutely iron-clad security assurances from the West. The second aspect is the rise of a euphoric, bandwagon spirit among the Arab States, leading even moderate Arabs to believe that the time may in fact have come when the Arabs can close in on Israel with some hope of success. There are in addition a number of reports indicating that anti-U.S. actions are being planned, to be put in motion if the United States moves to frustrate what the Arabs now tend to see as a 'victory.'"

Washington, June 15, 1967.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files: Job 80-R01447R, PFIAB Correspondence, 1967-1968. Secret. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence, Directorate for Plans, Directorate of Science and Technology, and the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.

/2/The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board met June 15-16. Also see Document 297.

[Omitted here is the portion of the briefing concerning Vietnam.]

/3/A photographic interpretation report of satellite photography of the Middle East, "KH-4 Mission 1042-1, 17-22 June 1967, Middle East Edition," is printed in Corona: America's First Satellite Program (Central Intelligence Agency: Washington, D.C., 1995), pp. 289-297.

7. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

8. The members were particularly interested in the details of the information passed by the Soviets to the Arabs before the outbreak of hostilities. Dr. Baker and Mr. Pace inquired at some length as to why the vaunted Soviet intelligence apparatus proved to be so inadequate. Mr. Parmenter and [name not declassified] explained that there is no indication that Soviet intelligence was bad but that it is evident that what they passed to the Arabs was not accurate and was probably not a reliable gauge of what they must have known.

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

Washington, June 15, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VI. Secret. Prepared in the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency.

NASSER'S PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL

1. The loud demands in Egypt that Nasser continue in office, even though they may have been partly engineered by the leadership, had the intended effect of at least momentarily strengthening Nasser's popularity. The immediate traumatic effects of the staggering defeat impel the Egyptians to stick with Nasser and seek other scapegoats. The widely believed allegation of US and UK military involvement may offset the criticism which otherwise would have been directed at Nasser for the defeat. In the UAR, moreover, there is no obvious alternative to Nasser, nor do we have any reliable indications of plotting among the top ranks to replace him. We conclude that he is not likely to be replaced at least within the next month or so.

2. Nonetheless, the military debacle has undoubtedly raised serious doubts about Nasser's leadership in important segments of the population and even diminished his authority among key figures of the regime. Despite the grant of extensive personal powers from the rubber stamp parliament, he may be forced to depend much more than in the past on the consensus of his top associates. The resignations of Abdul Hakim Amer and other senior officers indicate disagreements and conflicts within the officer corps and raise questions about the capability of the armed forces to provide Nasser the kind of support on which his authority has depended in the past. The wholesale changes in the military command are probably designed at least in part to head off unrest among the officers over Egypt's defeat. We know little of the political attitudes in the officer corps, however, and are unable to judge the extent of such unrest.

3. Over the longer term Nasser's chances for survival appear more questionable. He probably will not be able to convert this debacle into a positive political victory as he did in 1956. As the extent of Egypt's humiliation becomes known, resentment against him is likely to grow. We expect that at a minimum disillusionment over Nasser's performance will probably manifest itself in greater discontent within Egypt than he has hitherto faced. If this unrest becomes particularly strong within the military establishment it might in time even lead to a coup. Nasser is undoubtedly well aware of these dangers. For one thing he will seek to reequip the armed forces and will hope that this will help ensure their loyalty. He is also likely to seek to disarm his opposition by adopting a tough stance in the political and diplomatic arenas in an effort to identify his enemies with Israel and the West.

4. Nasser's longer range future will depend in some degree on how the problems raised by the present situation are sorted out. Unless he can appear to score political and diplomatic successes against Israel and the West, his standing inside Egypt will weaken further. In seeking any settlement there are clear limits to his freedom of maneuver. Any move by Nasser to come to terms with the Israelis, for example, would run counter to his efforts to recoup his stature among Arab nationalists generally, and would thus tend to weaken him within Egypt. It would also risk touching off a radical reaction within the Egyptian military, particularly as Nasser's control may have been weakened by the recent personnel changes.

5. In the months ahead, the prevailing mood in the Arab world is likely to be one of extreme frustration. Arab solidarity will be severely strained under the pressures of self-interest of individual Arab states, recriminations over failures, and bickering over future tactics. Certain longstanding Arab controversies, suppressed during the crisis with Israel, will be resumed. These trends would of course add to Nasser's difficulties in maintaining his leadership at home.

/2/Including $1.2 billion in hard currency obligations to the Free World. [Footnote in the source text.]

7. While to the best of our information the war itself has done little damage to the country's agriculture and industry, it has worsened Egypt's hard currency problems. The UAR is currently suffering a loss of about $30 million per month--about half of its normal hard currency earnings. Closure of the Suez Canal deprives Egypt of about one-third of its hard currency earnings. When the Canal will be reopened is more a matter of political decision than of physical obstruction. The Israelis have captured UAR oil fields in Sinai which have been providing oil worth $5 million a month in hard currency. Fields remaining under Egyptian control, including the new El Morgan field, meet only about 75 percent of the UAR's domestic oil needs. The UAR has also lost tourist receipts amounting to about $5 million a month.

8. These losses from the war are in addition to the approximately $25 million per month deficit Egypt has been incurring on its hard currency account over the past year. This shortage has been temporarily alleviated by grants of foreign exchange from Communist China ($10 million) and Kuwait ($28 million). Such sums should ease the impact of foreign exchange losses for at least a month. The UAR probably will receive some additional loans and grants in the weeks ahead from both Arab and Communist countries. Meanwhile, the UAR must face the problem of making some provision for its hard currency debt funding of almost $250 million due in 1967.

9. The war itself has not seriously affected the UAR's food situation which was already tight. Soviet deliveries against a pledge of 400,000 tons of wheat will begin arriving this month, and Communist China has pledged 150,000 tons. In addition, Egypt's current wheat crop of 1.6 million tons is now being harvested. The domestic crop, plus scheduled imports, are probably enough to meet the UAR's grain needs until December. The USSR could cover Egypt's food needs for some time, especially in view of its bumper crop in 1966, but the Soviets would be reluctant to assume a long-term obligation in this respect.

10. By and large the Communist countries are not in a position to provide the kind and quantity of goods the UAR now gets from the West. The UAR still relies on the West for the supply of machinery and spare parts for most of the old established industries and most of its requirement for sophisticated electrical equipment, chemicals, and fertilizers, all of which must be paid for in hard currency. Since industry accounts for almost a third of GNP, an import curtailment from the West would have severe and fairly immediate impact on the modern sector of the economy.

11. If the Canal remains closed, if Israel retains control of Sinai, and if Egypt receives no substantial financial aid, economic difficulties will become considerably more onerous as time progresses. These will be largely manifest in the cities, where unemployment, shortages, and inflation will probably cause some unrest. While these troubles in themselves would not be likely to cause insurmountable problems of political control, they could add substantially to any pressures within the regime for a change of leadership.

The Soviet Role

12. It is clear from the above that Nasser's ability to cope with his various economic, military, and diplomatic problems depends heavily on the attitude of the USSR. We have no doubt that Moscow is now bent on restoring its influence in the Middle East. But it is by no means clear how far the USSR is prepared to go, particularly in terms of financial and military aid, to bolster Nasser's personal leadership. It is likely that Moscow is still reviewing the situation and is not yet prepared to make major and long-range commitments. While we believe that the USSR will decide to give Nasser substantial support, it may be that Moscow will view his demands for diplomatic backing and particularly for military and economic aid as excessive. The Soviets would thus have an incentive to move Cairo back toward normalization at least of its economic relations with the West. This would give difficulties for Nasser at present, but he might in time judge that he could move in this way and still survive politically.

For the Board of National Estimates:

Sherman Kent

Amman, June 16, 1967, 1326Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Rabat, Tunis, USUN, Beirut, Jerusalem, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, Khartoum, Kuwait, and Jidda. Received at 10:28 a.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, and CINCSTRIKE at 11:45 a.m.

4370. For the Secretary.

1. If there is to be hope of lasting peace in the Middle East, obviously both the Arabs and Israelis must be brought to want it and to be reasonable regarding the terms of the settlement.

2. It seems to us from Amman that if this is to be accomplished on the Arab side the moderate Arab states must be helped into as strong a position as possible to carry the day against the radical Arabs. If the moderates cannot carry the day, they will feel forced to adopt the stand of the radicals.

3. Thus far our statements have not had the result of strengthening moderate Arab forces.

4. We suggest that the following, if done immediately, would strengthen the moderate hand and counterbalance Soviet support of the radical's position of revanchism.

5. USG to announce at the highest level, hopefully by the President: (A) USG has been and continues to be neutral in the Arab-Israel dispute. (B) USG calls upon all parties concerned to work out through the UN a just, equitable and lasting peace. (C) Pending the conclusion of a permanent settlement, USG proposes that Israeli forces withdraw to the previous armistice lines under a formula which will insure the security and integrity of all parties concerned.

6. One such formula, which would best be proposed by a party other than US, might be demilitarization under UN supervision of Arab territory presently under Israeli occupation.

7. Of the three portions of the statement proposed in para 5 above, the most imperative and urgent is sub-section C. In our opinion, we should make the statement even in the absence of precise formula for implementation.

Burns

Washington, June 16, 1967, 3:05-3:55 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin-Thompson Conversations, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis. The memorandum is part 2 of 3. Walt Rostow sent all three parts to the President on June 19, with a note stating that he had already been informed of the conversation but might like to see the full record. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Middle East Crisis

PARTICIPANTS

Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

The Secretary
Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador

The Secretary remarked that we thought we had had a commitment from Israel not to initiate hostilities. The Egyptian Ambassador had told us upon instructions that they would not begin them.

We were wholly uninformed of any Israeli attack. When Dobrynin asked if we had not known about it on the eve of the attack, the Secretary said we had no advance information whatever. He himself had been called about 2:30 in the morning. We had thought we had about another 10 days before Israel would make a judgment on what it would do about the closing of the Strait of Tiran. Asking that the Soviets not pass this on to any other Government, the Secretary said that Robert Anderson had had a long personal talk with Nasser. Although no serious problem had been solved, Nasser had decided to send his Deputy Prime Minister here, and we had thought this would be a very important conversation. The Secretary said that on the Strait of Tiran there was involved not only our general attitude on the innocent passage of international straits, but also the commitment by President Eisenhower in 1957 about the Strait of Tiran, which was in the interest of Egypt. Although Egypt had not formally underwritten this commitment, they were well aware of it. Nasser had told Anderson that the Egyptians had been surprised both with the speed with which U Thant acted on their request on UNEF and also on his action in withdrawing all of UNEF although it had only been asked to withdraw from certain areas. Sharm al Shaikh had not been included in the areas from which withdrawal was requested, and if U Thant had not acted so precipitously and had at least referred the matter to the Security Council in order to gain time the whole issue of the Strait might not have arisen.

When the Secretary inquired about the atmosphere in Moscow, Dobrynin replied that everyone had lots of work.

The Secretary said he thought he should inform the Ambassador of the strong negative public reaction in this country to the statements that Fedorenko had made in the Security Council debates in New York and particularly to the polemical nature and tone of his remarks. The State Department and the White House had received some 200,000 letters, many of which referred to this aspect. When Dobrynin inquired whether any of this had been on TV, the Secretary replied that almost all of the proceedings had been televised including one session at half past four in the morning.

Dobrynin said that the manner of speaking depended very much on the speaker. While Fedorenko, of course, had his instructions and knew the general line, none of his speeches were written in Moscow.

The Secretary said that the problem was complicated because the big powers could not command or control the small powers in the area. When Dobrynin said they could be influenced, the Secretary replied that we could not command the Israeli, and he doubted whether the Soviets could command Nasser. The Secretary thought that we would have to return to the Security Council at some point.

Dobrynin said that it had made a very bad impression in Moscow that the fighting had continued after the Security Council resolution. While the Soviets had been talking with us on the "Hot Line," they had been directly in touch with their Ambassador in Damascus.

The Secretary said he had sent a strong message to Eban in the middle of the night saying that the fighting simply had to stop. A problem for us had been that the UN observers had been restricted on both sides, as had our military attaches, and it had been difficult for us to get any information.

Dobrynin asked why we opposed Israeli withdrawal. The Secretary asked "withdrawal to what"? Dobrynin replied "to the armistice lines." The Secretary asked whether it was expected that this be done while the Arab States were still in a state of belligerency. The Arabs would not recognize existence of Israel and when we talked to the Egyptians about the Strait of Tiran they rested their case on still being in a state of war. He thought that withdrawal standing alone did not solve anything. He said it was difficult for us to say to the Arabs that we supported territorial integrity if they won't recognize the existence of Israel. The Arabs take part but not all of our position. Over the years we had in fact acted more often on behalf of the Arabs than Israel, and he mentioned Libya, Lebanon, Jordan, and the events of 1956. He concluded that there must be some recognition of the fact of Israeli statehood.

Dobrynin said that the Soviets would like for all of these countries to have better relations. They had no interest in the continuation of tension in this area.

The Secretary said we hoped there could be some limitation on the arms race in this part of the world. As he had often said, it was only the Soviet Union and the United States who were really interested in applying arms reduction to themselves. We were not the principal arms supplier to that part of the world. We thought it would be constructive to have some understanding on this problem.

Dobrynin said that in the present situation it was, of course, difficult because of recent events.

The Secretary referred briefly to the Israeli attack on our ship, the Liberty.

Washington, June 16, 1967, 1959Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3. Secret; Nodis. The text was sent to the Embassy in London in telegram 212063, June 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARABfISR)

CAP 67542.

None of us can predict what situations may arise in the days ahead, but my present thinking is this.

/2/Messages of June 15 and 16 from Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson conveyed Wilson's thoughts on the forthcoming Special Session of the UN General Assembly and expressed interest whether Johnson planned to attend. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, UK, Vol. 6)

First, at the moment I doubt that anything useful can come from my personal participation in the General Assembly.

Second, from the beginning of this crisis I have not looked with favor on a four-power meeting outside the U.N. Security Council. It is something of an illusion that the four powers have the capacity to design and impose successfully a peace plan on the Near East. The states of the area have made it abundantly clear that they are not subject to effective control from outside. What the major powers can do is to try to create a climate in which the nations of the area themselves might gradually settle their affairs on a peaceful basis. But I am not confident that a four-power session is the best way to do this.

Moreover, I should think both of us would wish to avoid the possibility of having the four of us split or otherwise be strained in such a session.

I hope we can keep in close contact in the days ahead as the situation evolves, and we might wish to counsel together shortly after the smoke clears to assess the situation and see what is required to move things forward towards our common objective of stable peace in the area.

Washington, June 16, 1967, 10:30 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Wolle, cleared by Atherton, and approved by Carroll Brown (S/S). Repeated Priority to USUN, Jerusalem, Kuwait, Jidda, Beirut, Amman, and London.

212156. Following based on uncleared memcon. Noforn, FYI and subject revision upon review.

1. Ambassador Harman at his request called on Secretary June 16. Said FonMin Eban would arrive over weekend for UNGA session with four Parliamentarians accompanying: Mrs. Meir, Shimon Peres of RAFI, Hazan of Mapai and Rimalt of Liberal Party. Asked if Eban inscribed to speak early, Harman said did not know. Secretary said he saw advantage in Eban's speaking soon after Kosygin, both for effect of small country contrast with great power and for sake of getting Israel's case before Assembly early as possible. Asked when USG rep would speak, Secretary said we had reserved first place but had not yet decided whether to use this position.

/2/See Document 277.

/3/Reference is apparently to the President's remarks at his June 13 news conference; see footnote 3, Document 282.

3. Secretary said USG position still evolving but some preliminary comments were possible. Said that whatever the dominant mood of moment, it most important that wisdom prevail in terms of long-term need of Israel to live at peace with its neighbors. This was overriding necessity. Also, it important that Israel, if it believes winning time is important (as Harman had just outlined) should also give time for some calming of high emotions pervading Arab lands due to recent events. Secretary said he understood Knesset might be thinking of imminent action to take over old Jerusalem. Such action would signal to other side that time is not an available commodity. It would create impression world would be presented with one fait accompli after another. Said GOI should appreciate there is very strong international interest in Jerusalem, as expressed in early UN resolutions. It should not underestimate sensitivity of this problem. Secretary strongly urged that no action be taken that would be viewed as fait accompli.

4. Harman responded with reference to 1949 USG posture of support in UN for Swedish concept of safeguarding rights in and access to Holy Places without administration as corpus separatum. Secretary said point he wanted to make was that there has existed from the beginning very strong international interest in status Jerusalem. In his view this should be recognized by some form of discussions, not treated unilaterally without possibility of such discussion.

/4/Telegram 212218 to Tel Aviv, June 17, instructed the Embassy to make urgent representations along the line taken by Rusk with Harman, urging the Israeli Government to refrain from action on the status of Jerusalem that would be viewed as a fait accompli on the eve of the Special Session. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Barbour replied in telegram 4189 from Tel Aviv, June 18, that Rusk's views had been passed urgently to Eshkol. (Ibid.)

6. Secretary stated we agree with GOI objective of achieving a real peace, with Israel thereafter accepted by all as fully sovereign state with all perquisites going with it. But attaining direct negotiations with Arabs would be difficult and he thought would take some time. He hoped GOI not underestimating difficulty of achieving this.

7. Harman said that for Soviets to be able bludgeon resolution through UNGA would put premium on extremism in Middle East. If this drive blunted, would be very significant, for Arabs might come to realize they are on verge of having to face a new reality, i.e., recognition of Israel. This realization might not now have to dawn first in Egypt, as GOI had previously thought, but might begin elsewhere and spread. Secretary noted that Arab moderates are in difficulty just as are Arab extremists, and that surely Soviets would be making major drive to recoup losses and press for their brand of extremism in as many Arab countries as possible. Receptivity of Arabs and others to this Soviet drive would in part be governed by Israel's attitude, conduct and posture in days and weeks ahead.

8. Harman said flatly that if Soviet resolution goes through, Israel will have to stay where it is. It would not settle for 1957-type arrangement. Israel now feels it has earned a real peace. Harman said recent crisis and hostilities had been frightening experience that "could easily have gone the other way." Secretary said "that is why we advised you not to do it."

9. Secretary said we would study GOI thinking as outlined by Eban and Harman and be in touch later.

Rusk

Washington, June 16, 1967, 10:03 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Marshall W. Wiley (NEA/ARN) and Houghton; cleared by Hoopes, Director for Operations in the Office of Politico-Military Affairs Joseph J. Wolf, Atherton, and Davies; and approved by Eugene Rostow.

1. If Hussein asks you for categorical assurances that there is no distinction between our policy on arms delivery to Israel and to Jordan you may reply that we have suspended the signing of any sales arrangements or related new commitments concerning arms deliveries to Israel and the Arab states. We have no grant program of arms or military equipment to Israel. We are now undertaking a thorough study of the overall arms supply problem in the Middle East and no final decisions have yet been reached.

/2/Burns stated in telegram 4355 from Amman, June 16, that he planned to meet with King Hussein on June 17 to convey the contents of telegram 211613 but anticipated that Hussein would press him for assurances that the United States was making no distinction between Jordan and Israel in military assistance matters. (Ibid., DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN) He noted that SecDef telegram 7852, June 15, appeared to place Israel in a slightly more favored category. Telegram 211613 is summarized in footnote 3, Document 295. SecDef telegram 7852 has not been found.

2. Department believes instructions contained State's 211613 should be reassuring to Hussein.

3. FYI. We have made a distinction between the two countries as far as commercial shipments where export licenses have already been issued are concerned. We are also continuing negotiations, up to but not including signature, of new agreements with Israel under the conditions described Defense 7852. For example, immediately after outbreak hostilities we shipped moderate quantities of ammunition, gas masks and other sundry items to Israel. You should know also that some [$]38 million of licensed materiel on Munitions List for Israel still in pipeline has not been embargoed. Largest single item is 20 million tank parts. While nothing is in similar category for Jordan, some 56 million is in pipeline for Saudi Arabia, including 50 million for Hawks. We point this out to you so that you recognize that foregoing presentation is intentionally carefully worded. End FYI.

Rusk

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. The paper, unsigned and undated, was sent to McGeorge Bundy on June 19 by Executive Secretary of the Control Group John J. Walsh with a covering memorandum transmitting two papers submitted by the Control Group to the Special Committee. The second paper, headed "The Arms Supply Question and the UN," undated, is not printed. Both papers were revised and approved for transmission to the Special Committee by the Control Group on June 17. (Minutes of 22nd Control Group meeting, June 17, 11 a.m.; ibid., Office of the Executive Secretariat, Middle East Crisis Files, 1967, Entry 5190, Box 17, Minutes/Decisions of the Control Group, Folder 1)

THE NUCLEAR FACTOR IN THE NEAR EASTERN SITUATION

1. The most significant feature of the role of nuclear capabilities during the Arab-Israeli hostilities was the absence of direct impact. In contrast to the situation in 1956, the Soviet Union made no indirect nuclear threats, and did not engage in "ballistic blackmail." Instead, the "Hot Line" was used to reinforce the coincident desire of the USSR and the US to avoid any direct involvement of the nuclear powers in the conflict.

2. The recent belligerents themselves do not, of course, have nuclear weapons, and no allegations to the contrary have so far entered the exchange of charges and allegations. In the short run, it is not likely that the nuclear factor will affect the confrontation or the contest over a settlement.

3. Over the longer run, in the absence of a significant political settlement, it is likely that the recent hostilities and continuing conflict heighten the pressures for one or both sides to acquire unclear capabilities. Despite its recent successes, Israel may conclude that in the last analysis it must rely only on its own military power to defend its vital interests. Especially if Israel is eventually compelled to settle for something much less than it feels it should gain from its victory, concern over the future may well impel the Israelis to proceed with a nuclear weapons program. In the words of Tom Lehrer's ditty, "The Lord is our Shepherd, it says in the Psalm, but just to be sure--we gotta have the Bomb."

4. The Arabs are, of course, highly suspicious of Israeli nuclear intentions, and may be influenced by their suspicions whether these are well-founded or not. If, however, the Israelis in fact take the nuclear road, this would be bound at some point to become known and to insure a frenzied Arab reaction of some kind. None of the Arab countries have either the general industrial base, or the foundations of nuclear industry in particular, on which to launch a nuclear weapons program of their own during the period while Israel could be acquiring its own nuclear weapons. The Arabs will, therefore, have to look elsewhere. One possible recourse would be to try to build overwhelming conventional superiority of their own, and perhaps also to stress CW, and then to strike Israel before it could build up a nuclear arsenal. However, in view of the recent debacle, this latter course of action could only be a desperate last resort. Perhaps the Arabs would turn to Moscow, and fall even more into line behind Soviet foreign policy positions in order to get whatever hedged Soviet pledges of nuclear support might be forthcoming. The Soviets are not likely to provide nuclear weapons, even under their own custody. Particularly in view of the lack of direct Soviet military support during the recent hostilities, and actual continuing Soviet caution with respect to potential Great Power nuclear confrontation, some Arabs might be tempted at some point to risk their ties with the USSR by turning to the Chinese Communists for nuclear weapons. And the Chinese might feel they could gain influence with the Arabs and others in the Third World, at modest cost, and with real risks only to the Soviet Union, the Western Powers, and the Near Eastern countries themselves.

5. Thus, the need for effective measures to curb nuclear proliferation in the Near East has grown. Moreover, the credibility of the US as a party able to reassure each side that its adversary is not getting nuclear weapons has certainly been impaired by the recent developments. There would appear to be three possibilities to meet the proliferation problem: (a) a firm non-acquisition undertaking, preferably with mandatory IAEA safeguards, by both Israel and the UAR as a provision in a general settlement; (b) a Near Eastern nuclear free zone; or (c) Israeli and Arab adherence to a general non-proliferation treaty. Possibilities for action along the first course should be kept in mind, but it is unlikely that progress in the highly complex tangle of elements already necessarily involved in the settlement would be facilitated by tossing in yet another contentious problem. However, at some point it might prove possible to raise the proposition of mutual safeguarded undertakings not to acquire nuclear weapons in a general compromise package settlement. A nuclear-free zone might be possible, although the question of defining the area to be covered could raise serious problems for the US. On balance, the best solution--if it becomes feasible--would be a non-proliferation treaty. With respect to a non-proliferation treaty, negotiations in Geneva are now going as satisfactorily as can be expected. If and when a non-proliferation treaty is open for signature, it will of course be important to press hard for Israeli and Arab adherence.

6. At least heretofore, the UAR has endorsed a non-proliferation treaty, with safeguards; Israel has been conspicuously silent as to her stand on such a treaty. In general, the difficulties in getting Israeli, and perhaps UAR, acceptance have probably increased. On the other hand, the Arabs may wish to obtain international safeguards on the more advanced nuclear program of their adversary; it is less likely, but possible, that the Israelis might consider that such a treaty would head off possible Arab acquisition of nuclear weapons from the Russians or Chinese. Of course, the final positions of both sides on non-acquisition or general non-proliferation undertakings will be greatly influenced by progress, or lack of progress, toward a viable general settlement. Israel, as the power whose security is most imperiled by non-nuclear military power in the long-run, and as the power with a real nuclear potential, will be most reticent to give up its nuclear option with substantial progress in meeting its long-term security requirements in some other way.

7. The question of peaceful nuclear programs in the Near East should also be borne in mind. We have been examining the possibility of a nuclear de-salting plant in Israel, including conducting a joint survey with the Israelis. If it is decided to proceed with this project, we might want to tie our agreement not only to Israeli acceptance of IAEA or equivalent safeguards on the nuclear energy component of the desalinization project itself, which would of course be necessary, but also to Israeli acceptance of IAEA or equivalent safeguards on all their indigenous nuclear facilities as well. With due regard to economic feasibility and other considerations, including progress on a political settlement, we might also consider making parallel offers of assistance to the UAR at the time we agreed to assist the Israelis, providing there is a government in power with which we could conclude an agreement.

INDIGENOUS CAPABILITIES TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Israelis have two nuclear reactors; a US-supplied research reactor at Nahal Sereq of 5 MW capability, and a larger French built reactor at Dimona of 25 MW capacity. The research reactor is under IAEA safeguards, the Dimona reactor is not under IAEA safeguards, but has been inspected by the US. This latter reactor is capable of producing enough plutonium for approximately one nuclear weapon per year, and the plutonium produced in this reactor to date is equivalent to that required for about one weapon.

The spent fuel rods in which the produced plutonium is present are still at Dimona and have not been subjected to chemical separation. The original plans called for the shipment of these fuel rods back to France for reprocessing, but no schedule for their shipment is known. Although there have been reports of an Israeli chemical separation plant, these have not been confirmed, and it is not believed that the Israelis presently have a chemical separation plant completed or in any advanced state of construction. It would probably be eighteen months before such a plant could be built and the plutonium separated for weapons use.

In summary, it is believed that prior to the recent crisis the Israelis had probably not made a decision to develop nuclear weapons, but probably had decided to keep that option open. If they were to make a decision today, it would probably be 18 months or longer before they could have their first weapon, and then they could produce approximately one weapon per year thereafter.

The capabilities of the Arab countries for development of nuclear weapons are virtually non-existent. The only Arab country with a reactor is the UAR, which has a small 2 MW Soviet-supplied research reactor at Inchass. This UAR reactor has no potential for fissionable materials production to support a weapons program. Any indigenous weapons program in the UAR could not be carried out for many years. Furthermore, it is not believed that the Soviets would supply the UAR with such potential (or with nuclear weapons) directly.

Both Israel and the Arab countries have aircraft that could be adapted to deliver nuclear weapons. The recent hostilities demonstrated both the effectiveness, but also the vulnerability, of air forces. Attention is, therefore, likely to be placed on missile delivery systems if nuclear weapons are ever acquired.

The UAR has had a much publicized, but quite ineffective, surface-to-surface ballistic missile development program underway for several years. The best product is the 200 n.m. range Conqueror, but even it has been unsuccessful to date. Unless Cairo receives considerable outside help, the prospects for deploying this or any other missile are remote.

Israel has a modest but energetic missile research and development program of its own, but we have no evidence that it has plans to try to produce a ballistic missile system. At the same time, Israel does have a contract with the French firm Dassault for the MD-620, with a range of 250 n.m. Israel may already have contracted for or at least expressed an interest in buying as many as 250 of these missiles.

Washington, June 17, 1967, 5:50 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls. No classification marking. The notes were prepared by Mildred J. Asbjornson, Rusk's secretary.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM W ROSTOW

[Omitted here is discussion of an unrelated matter.]

R said he had had an interesting talk with Bob Anderson. A was seeing the Arabs in town. He saw Shamaz in Beirut and the consensus was among the Fon Mins that they were prepared to recognize the state of Israel. They don't want to say this as a collective group. They are prepared to have Sinai demilitarized, they cannot live with a totally Israeli Jerusalem; they are worried about Jordan. The main appeal was that this statement of the Pres get as much territorial integrity into it as possible. Nasser is in deep trouble and is sending only Fawzi--an errand boy. Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in trouble. The French and Russians are trying to get hold of US and Brit economic interests. They hate the Russians. Suez is thorny. Their problem is mob rule. He thinks if you can negotiate and put an end to belligerence it is tantamount to recognize Israel as a state. Sec asked if this would be secretly and bilaterally with each one and announced together? R said Anderson said he didn't want to get in our way but R said he was sure the Pres and the SecState wanted him to sit and listen. R said McPherson was with him now and they were pulling together what Bundy and Rostow (Gene) were doing.

Tel Aviv, June 18, 1967, 1030Z.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Liberty. Confidential. Also sent to OSD, CNO, Department of State, COMSIXTHFLT, CINCSTRIKE, CINCNAVEUR, JCS, DIA, USUN, CINCEUR/USEUCOM, CTG 60.2, USAFE, CINCUSAREUR, CTG 60, USDAO London, USDAO Paris, and USDAO Moscow. Received at the Department of State at 8:22 a.m.

0928. Subject: Israeli Court of Inquiry in USS Liberty incident.

1. ALUSNA called to FLO evening 17 June. LTC Efrat, Aide to General Rabin, IDF COS stated following:

A. Gen Rabin extends his personal regrets to the CNO USN for the sad mistake of the USS Liberty incident.

B. Gen Rabin decided to provide via ALUSNA a synopsis of the findings of IDF Court of Inquiry although those findings have not yet received final review from CO Shimgar, the IDF JAG.

C. After review and translation to English, a full transcript of the findings of the IDF Court of Inquiry will be transmitted to the USG either though AmEmbassy Tel Aviv or Israel Embassy, Washington, D.C.

2. The synopsis of the findings of the IDF Court of Inquiry as taken down verbatim by ALUSNA from Col Efrats oral presentation is as follows:

"A. It is concluded clearly and unimpeachably from the evidence and from comparison of war diaries that the attack on USS Liberty was not in malice; there was no criminal negligence and the attack was made by innocent mistake.

B. Attack rose out of a chain of three mistakes, each of which by itself is understandable: First mistake was decisive. Navy and AF HQ had received a number of wrong reports stating El-Arish was being shelled from the sea. This wrong information formed the background and main factor leading to attack on Liberty. IDF CNO and assistants were convinced that shelling was being done by unidentified ship or ships which were discovered at the time near the shore off El-Arish. Even the officers who knew of the identification of Liberty early the same morning did not connect Liberty with the unidentified ships said to be shelling El-Arish. The IDF Navy is not responsible for the mistaken report of shelling and the reasons for the mistaken report are outside scope of the inquiry at hand. The Navy and AF HQs took the reports at face value.

Second mistake, which when added to first resulted in aircraft attack on Liberty, was a mistaken report that Liberty was steaming at 30 knots. This mistake has two significances. A. When Liberty was identified in morning, her max speed was determined from Janes Fighting Ships to be 18 knots. Therefore, even if the unidentified ship were thought to be Liberty, the fact that she was reported to be making 30 knots would have denied the identification.

B. In accordance with IDF Navy standing orders, an enemy ship in any waters which is attacking Israeli ships or shelling the Israeli shore may be attacked. If there is info of enemy ships in the area, any ship or ships discovered by radar which are determined to be cruising at a speed above 20 knots may be considered an enemy. Since the speed of the unidentified ship was fixed at 28 to 30 knots, the IDF Navy was entitled to attack without further identification in view of the background of info on the shelling of El-Arish. IDF Naval OPS section had ordered the MTB's who reported Liberty's speed as 30 knots to recheck and only after confirmation of that speed was the info considered reliable and aircraft were sent to attack. The question of possible negligence in establishing the speed at 28-30 knots when in fact Liberty's max speed is 18 knots is discounted by the IDF CNO who testified 'that such estimations require expertise. In an MTB there may be great discrepancies in fixing the speed of a vessel moving in front of it, especially if the estimate was made only over a short interval of time. It is quite feasible that there may be such a mistake even if you measure it twice or more.' As a result of the incident maybe the standing order should be reconsidered but no criminal negligence is found in the MTB's fixing of Liberty's speed.

Third mistake caused execution of the second stage of attack on Liberty, this time with torpedoes from MTB's. This was the mistaken identification of Liberty as the Egyptian supply ship El Quesir. Here I (that is, the officer conducting the inquiry who LTC Efrat identified parenthetically as Col Ram Ron, former Israeli Military Attach? to Washington, D.C.) must state my doubts whether the identification was not done with a certain overeagerness as this happened when serious doubts were already beginning to arise as to the identification as an Egyptian ship. It has been established by the evidence of the C.O. of MTB Div that the doubts which had begun to arise in the pilots as to their accuracy of identification did not get to the C.O. of the MTB Div at that time, but he already knew that the ship was not a destroyer but a supply or merchant ship and this should have caused extra carefulness in identification. On the other hand, I (again Col Ron) must state the extenuating circumstances and difficulties of identification under the following conditions:

(1) Ship was covered with thick smoke. (2) When asked to identify itself, the ship did not do so and behaved suspiciously. (3) It appeared to the DivCom that there was a gun on the fore-castle of the ship and that the ship was firing toward the MTB's. These observations were recorded in the war diary at the time of action.

If we add to these factors that under the circumstances when the ship was completely covered with smoke there was, in fact, apparently a great similarity between it and El Quesir. Two officers a CDR and a LT on two different MTB's who had no communications between them both identified the ship at the same time as El Quesir. The IDF CNO decided that on the basis of reports on hand that this identification was feasible. Therefore I (again Col Ron) have come to the conclusion that there was certainly no criminal or serious negligence in this case. Finally I (Col Ron) have to add that a grave additional mistake not less decisive than the three above mistakes made by IDF was made by the Liberty itself. On this question, I (Col Ron) have the evidence of the IDF CNO and JAG which complement each other and from which it is clear that the American ship acted with lack of care by endangering itself to a grave extent by approaching excessively close to the shore in an area which was a scene of war and this at a time when it was well known that this area is not one where ships generally pass, this without advising the Israeli authorities of its presence and without identifying itself elaborately. Furthermore, it appears that the ship made an effort to hide its identity first by flying a small flag which was difficult to identify from a distance; secondly by beginning to escape when discovered by our forces and when it was aware of the fact that it had been discovered, thirdly by failing to identify itself immediately by its own initiative by flashing light and by refusing to do so even when asked by the MTB's. From all this I (Col Ron) conclude that the ship Liberty tried to hide its presence in the area and its identity both before it was discovered and even after having been attacked by the AF and later by the Navy and thus contributed a decisive contribution toward its identification as an enemy ship."

Comments: 1. All above is dictated by LTC Efrat who was translating from a document written in Hebrew.

2. LTC Efrat paused at one point in his reading to point out the GOI had received a statement from USG saying that Liberty had been identified six hours prior to the attack rather than one hour as stated in an earlier USG communication.

3. LTC Efrat probably noted ALUSNA's appearance of surprise and incredulity as he read off some of the above points. When he finished his reading he asked what ALUSNA thought of the findings "off the record." ALUSNA pretended he had not heard the question and thanked the Colonel for his time. The burden of diplomacy bore heavily on ALUSNA whose evaluations are:

A. The IDF Navy standing order to attack any ship moving at more than 20 knots is incomprehensible.

B. Two of the IDF justifications for their action are mutually contradictory. First they say that since the speed of the unidentified was as high as 30 knots they could not have thought it was Liberty. Then they say the ship was feasibly identified as El Quesir. El Quesir has max speed of 14 knots, four less than Liberty. If the "30 knot ship couldn't have been Liberty" it follows it also couldn't have been El Quesir.

C. That a professional Naval officer of the rank of commander could look at Liberty and think her a 30 knot ship is difficult to accept.

D. The smoke which covered Liberty and made here difficult to identify was probably a result of the IDF AF attacks.

4. While walking to their cars, LTC Efrat mentioned that Gen Rabin has never been so angry as when he read the current Newsweek magazine comment on the Liberty incident. ALUSNA remarked that he took no notice of news media reporting on the incident.

5. ALUSNA was called to FLO earlier in the day to receive a copy of IDF CNO letter of regret and condolence to CNO USN. ALUSNA was informed that the Israeli Military Attach? in Washington, D.C. will deliver the original to Adm McDonald.

6. Coordinated with Embassy.

In an address before the Department of State Foreign Policy Conference for Educators on June 19, 1967, President Johnson declared that recent events had proved the wisdom of five principles of peace in the Middle East. The first and greatest principle, he stated, was that "every nation in the area has a fundamental right to live, and to have this right respected by its neighbors." Second was "another basic requirement for settlement: justice for the refugees." Third was that "maritime rights must be respected." Fourth, the conflict had demonstrated "the danger of the Middle Eastern arms race of the last 12 years." As an initial step to deal with this problem, he proposed that the United Nations immediately call upon all of its members to report all shipments of military arms into the area. Fifth, he declared, the crisis underlines the "importance of respect for political independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the area." He reaffirmed that principle but added that it could be effective "only on the basis of peace between the parties." What the nations of the region needed, he stated, was "recognized boundaries and other arrangements that will give them security against terror, destruction, and war." Furthermore, he declared, there "must be adequate recognition of the special interest of three great religions in the holy places of Jerusalem." He offered the assurance that the U.S. Government would "do its part for peace in every forum, at every level, at every hour" but he declared that the main responsibility for the peace of the region depended on the peoples and leaders of the region. The text is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pages 630-634.

Drafts of the speech are in the Johnson Library, Statements of Lyndon B. Johnson, June 15-June 23, 1967. Harry McPherson sent a draft to the President at 11 p.m. on June 17 with a covering memorandum stating that it blended "Gene Rostow's travelogue of world problems, and Mac Bundy's compression of today's final Middle East draft." A June 18 draft bears a note that it was cleared with Rusk.

Washington, June 20, 1967, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Rostow. The meeting was held at the Madison Hotel.

SUBJECT
Meeting of the President and Chairman Kosygin, the Middle East & Vietnam

PARTICIPANTS
Yuri N. Tcherniakov, Counselor, USSR Embassy
Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Part I--Middle East

1. Counselor Tcherniakov apologized for shifting the lunch to which he had invited Rostow some time ago from the Embassy to a restaurant. He explained that the Embassy staff had been sent to New York, and hoped that it would help facilitate a meeting between the President and Chairman Kosygin. Rostow replied that the President did indeed wish to see Chairman Kosygin. As Tcherniakov knew, an invitation had been issued before we had been officially informed that the Chairman was coming. Tcherniakov said that that fact was appreciated, but, he said, there were difficulties, since the main purpose of the Chairman's trip was his appearance at the U.N., and there were complications with respect "to allies and others." Rostow said we understood these problems so far as Chairman Kosygin was concerned. There were complications also for the President. We thought it natural for the Chairman, when in a country, to call on the head of its government. However, the question of discussing the possibility of a visit was in the hands of the Secretary, who was doubtless in touch with Foreign Minister Gromyko on the subject. Tcherniakov said that was the case, and the men were being assisted by the Dobrynin-Thompson "task force." He hoped they succeeded in solving the problem. Rostow said we hoped so too.

/2/Kosygin addressed the UN General Assembly on June 19. An excerpt of his speech is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 534-537.

On the first point--Israel's right to live--Tcherniakov said that there never was any question of the Soviet position on this issue, which they viewed as fundamental. There had been a good deal of discussion about how much emphasis it should receive in the Kosygin speech, but all had agreed that the statement had to be made. Rostow remarked that we were accustomed to reading Soviet speeches with care. The important fact was that the theme had been stated. Tcherniakov said the Arab doctrine of a right to destroy Israel was "nonsense," and the source of a great deal of the "tragedy" in the area.

He hoped we would use our influence with Israel not to be too hard in their victory, referring to Arab pride, and confusion of thought at this point. He thought time was needed for the dust to settle.

Rostow said that as Tcherniakov could see from the President's statement, we did not think, in view of what had happened during the last ten years, that it was practical or realistic to expect the Israelis to withdraw until there were assurances they would return to a condition of peace. Surprisingly, Tcherniakov said he fully agreed. Rostow said there were natural anxieties everywhere that the Israelis had large territorial ambitions. We could not speak for the Israeli Government, but our impression so far was that Israel did not want great territorial changes, but peace and security. There were marginal problems, of course--the Syrian heights, Sharm al-Sheikh, the Gaza strip, and, most difficult of all, Jerusalem. Tcherniakov said that naturally something would have to be done about border security and international interests in Jerusalem.

Rostow said that we had been interested during the last few days by a flow of reports at various levels about a growing interest among the Palestinian Arabs in an arrangement of reconciliation with the Israelis, involving either the West Bank of the Jordan or even the whole of Jordan. We had no governmental position on the question, but, on preliminary consideration, we found the idea important. If the Palestinians could reach an accommodation, through a federation or otherwise, it could eliminate the refugee question, make it easier to solve the question of Jerusalem, and relieve the other Arab states of the incubus of their supposed obligation to wipe out Israel. Such a plan could also simplify problems of border security.

Tcherniakov said, speaking personally, that he was most interested in the possibility. He was not aware that the idea had come forward in recent days. The Soviet Government had supported a proposal of that kind in 1947 or 1948, when the Palestine problem was acute. He asked whether he could call the possibility to the Foreign Minister's attention. Rostow replied that of course he could, stressing, however, that it was not a United States Government position.

Rostow put emphasis on the issue of arms limitation. We thought a resumption of hostilities in the face of the cease fire was unthinkable. Tcherniakov dismissed the possibility.

On the second point in Kosygin's speech-the need of the leading powers to achieve a common vocabulary, Rostow said we were in full agreement. Tcherniakov would have noticed the President's care to avoid making the propaganda war worse. The President's speech stressed our interest in "narrowing differences" with the Soviet Union. The Chairman would find us ready to cooperate in the effort. Tcherniakov referred to the spirit of Tashkent, and the need for us together to work out an approach that could bring peace to the Middle East. He stressed that the Soviet Union had tried to prevent hostilities, as we did, but that there were forces in the situation which couldn't be controlled. Rostow said we had been puzzled by the rumors of an Israeli mobilization against Syria, which seemed to persist even after the Secretary General had denied them. Rostow said that we had been at pains to make our position clear to the Soviet Union throughout the crisis. We had noted that they had never publicly supported the Egyptian claim with regard to the Gulf of Aqaba. From the point of view of the two countries' national interests, and in the light of what Tcherniakov had said, he thought it should not be difficult for the Soviet Union to accept the approach indicated by the President's five principles.

Rostow asked Tcherniakov if they thought Nasser could survive. He replied that in their estimate it was possible. Nasser lacked a sense of reality, but perhaps recent events would help in that regard.

[Omitted here is Part II--Vietnam.]

Washington, June 20, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Minutes and Notes. Secret.

/2/The President met with Katzenbach, McNamara, Helms, Bundy, Walt Rostow, and George Christian at lunch on June 20. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Rostow's notes on a copy of the agenda for the meeting indicate that he made the decisions at that time. (Ibid., Files of Walt Rostow, Meetings with the President, Jan.-June 1967) No other record of the meeting has been found.

/3/On June 21 the Department of State announced the lifting of the travel ban to Israel, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia. (Circular telegram 215088, June 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

2. The President approved resumption of normal relations in all fields of economic, technical and food assistance to all nations in the Middle East area who have not broken relations with the United States. (Among those who have taken diplomatic action in this direction, only the Lebanon is not considered to have broken relations.) It is expected that the usual procedures of Presidential approval with respect to specific economic actions will be followed. No decisions have been made on military shipments.

3. The President directed that Mr. Leonard Marks should be asked to prepare a comprehensive plan for U.S. action to increase the voice of reason on medium-wave radio in the Arab-speaking world--as against the voice of Cairo. Mr. Marks has been asked to draw as required on the appropriate departments and agencies.

McGeorge Bundy

Washington, June 21, 1967, 3:55 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Minutes and Notes. No classification marking. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

SUBJECT
Special Committee Meeting at 6:30 today, Cabinet Room

The items of Middle East business for today are as follows. There is no urgent need of decision, and while I think it would be a help to us to get your preliminary reaction to some of the choices, none of these matters is so urgent as to require decision--or even your presence if you are too busy.

Michelmore, the Commissioner General of the UN Relief and Works Agency, has reported to the UN that he has an immediate need for a lot more money. He hasn't said how much, but magnitude is not the real problem. We have about $5 million of AID contingency money that could move in this direction if need be, and this would certainly be a reasonable start.

The real problem is to make sure that we do not get sucked in to one more large-scale dole with no prospect of solution in the Middle East. If we get back into the business of paying most of the UNRWA bill, we create an almost automatic dampener to incentives for settlement by either Israel or the Arabs. I have therefore asked State to give intensive study to the question of ways and means of tying any possible new emergency relief to conditions or processes that would somehow constitute a pressure for "justice for the refugees." Nick Katzenbach will lead a discussion of these possibilities this evening.

The noises from places as far apart as Morocco and Lebanon suggest that we should be coming to a decision on limited arms shipments to moderate Arabs. From your point of view, this will be a good thing to have done before we have to climb into bed with the Israelis again. From another point of view, the longer we can wait, the better. From still another standpoint, there may be a special virtue in cautious military hand-holding with really decent Arabs (like the strong Lebanese general who seems to have kept the Lebanon out of the war).

/2/Reference is to a document given to Ambassador Bohlen by Winston Guest, who said he had received it from a friend with excellent Arab contacts. It stated that the Egyptian authorities were ready to make great political concessions if serious economic aid, especially U.S. wheat, could be offered to them very rapidly. Telegram 20454 from Paris, June 21, transmitted the text of the document, which had reportedly been given to the French Government on June 20 by the Egyptian Embassy. Rostow forwarded a copy of telegram 20454 to the President on June 21, with a note saying that according to Clark Clifford, the source was extremely knowledgeable in Arab affairs. (Ibid., Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VII) A June 21 memorandum from INR Deputy Director George C. Denney, Jr., to Acting Secretary Katzenbach recommended that he regard the document with skepticism. (Ibid.)

/3/A statement issued by the French Government on June 21 suggested that the war in Vietnam had contributed to the hostilities in the Middle East and stated that "France condemns the opening of hostilities by Israel." The text is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 542-543.

4. The special problem of Jordan

We have always been Hussein's best friend and hand-holder and there is a tactical question now whether there will be important things to say to him pretty soon. If there were any sign of a magnanimous peace between him and the Israelis, we should encourage it. One way of moving quietly in this direction with no obvious initiative on our side would be to encourage Hussein in the thought he has expressed that he might wish to come to the United Nations. If he did that his speech would be quite likely to make a favorable impression on the American public (especially if Macomber talked to him beforehand), and it would be natural for you to receive him in Washington as the head of Government and give him some good advice. Since this last one engages you directly, it is obvious that nothing will be done until you have had a chance to consider the case and give orders.

McG. B.

New York, June 21, 1967, 5:30 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Harriman on June 30. The meeting took place at the Waldorf Towers during the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

SUBJECT
US-UAR Relations

PARTICIPANTS

UAR
Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Asst. to UAR President for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Hassan Sabri al-Khouli Adviser to the UAR President
Mr. Mohammed Riad, UAR Foreign Ministry

US
Ambassador Harriman
Donald C. Bergus, NEA/UAR

Mr. Harriman said that he was calling on Dr. Fawzi informally and in a personal capacity. The US Government was unhappy about the grave situation in the Near East and the false and unnecessary charges made by the UAR. The important thing was to ascertain whether our two Governments had any common objectives which they could support. He referred to President Johnson's statement that all Near East countries had to recognize each other's right to exist and our support of the territorial integrity and political independence of all. We wished to move in that direction. If Dr. Fawzi had anything to say, Mr. Harriman would listen. Mr. Harriman said he had not come to argue but to see if there were a possibility for useful discussions among men of good will. He referred to the Secretary's high personal regard for Dr. Fawzi and his willingness to meet with him if this would be useful.

Dr. Fawzi said he appreciated this initiative. Ambassador Harriman was a good American; he tried to be a good Egyptian. This was a sufficient denominator. Neither had the right to feel peevish or to keep each other in a corner.

What we had to deal with was the outburst of June 5. Ambassador Harriman would appreciate the difficulty of asking people to give under threats of duress. Any gains secured by force and violence should not be allowed. He was not ready to talk about a broad settlement until we could agree on this preliminary.

Ambassador Harriman said it was in the U.S. interest to find a durable peace. This was a situation where both sides could be completely rigid. Suggestions had been made for some intermediary. He did not know who would be agreeable to the UAR. General de Gaulle had been mentioned but he, perhaps, was too much in the international limelight. Dr. Fawzi said the UAR had given no expression to this matter "in public." It was keeping an open mind and exploring all means to get out of this situation. He considered that a mediator had to be carefully selected. He reacted against "volunteers."

Ambassador Harriman wondered whether under present circumstances Dr. Fawzi would like to talk to Secretary Rusk. Dr. Fawzi thought that he and the Secretary could talk freely together, might talk usefully, but that "we might not be able to see matters crystallize through our first talk." He reciprocated Secretary Rusk's personal regard.

Dr. Fawzi continued that the UAR was open-minded regarding the method of resolving the present difficulty but would not cede on the basic principle. "We might at one stage find a good way to differentiate between form and substance," he commented. Ambassador Harriman said that we had taken a position on the Gulf of Aqaba as a result of the 1957 discussions. We were also committed to support the territorial integrity and political independence of every country in the area. The U.S. had no commitment on any other aspect of the substance of the dispute. Ambassador Harriman said that the cease-fire gave us time.

Dr. Fawzi said that we must not overestimate the amount of time we had. Important matters such as the Suez Canal, interests in Arab oil including Egyptian oil, were at stake. The longer the delay the less chance there was for a renewal of serenity. Mr. Harriman said time also worked for the other side. Once people got used to roaming around newly-acquired territory, the harder it was to get them to move away. The Suez Canal was a two-way street. The UAR needed the tolls. We were not much involved, but the UAR's friend India was very much involved. Dr. Fawzi admitted that the UAR needed every pound it earned from the Canal and felt sorry for the Indians. The UAR kept the Canal open to commerce on one sole condition, that it not be attacked.

Dr. Fawzi reiterated an interest in seeing Secretary Rusk. He planned to be in the United States for another week or ten days. He wanted to say that it remained the basic policy of the UAR to have good relations with the United States. He had told the British the same thing. The UAR also prized its good relations with the USSR with whom it had many ties. Dr. Fawzi appeared to indicate a preference that his meeting with the Secretary take place after a possible Johnson-Kosygin meeting, but said he was at the Secretary's disposal any time.

Washington, June 21, 1967, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Minutes and Notes. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Notes are the handwritten notes of Harold H. Saunders. The President joined the meeting from 6:50 p.m. until 7:06 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Bundy's memorandum for the record, June 21, states: "1. The President agreed to see King Hussein if he comes to the United Nations. 2. The President agreed that we should let it be known quietly that we do not consider General de Gaulle an acceptable mediator of a Mid-East solution." (Ibid., National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Minutes and Notes)

THOSE PRESENT
Katzenbach, Acting Secretary of State
McNamara
Wheeler
Helms
Clifford
W.W. Rostow
McG. Bundy
Vance
E.V. Rostow
Battle
Harry McPherson
Harold Saunders
[name not declassified], CIA

The President came in at 6:50 p.m.

George Christian came in at 6:55 p.m.

/2/The following appears at this point in Saunders' notes in a box, apparently added later in the discussion: "President said: 'I'm going to be easily raped by anyone who wants to pay cash. I've been giving it away for so long. . . .'"

--Swedish appeal in UN.
--What can we do now to avoid permanent commitment to status quo.
--Responsibility to those holding political authority.

EVR: Work through UNWRA.

--WWR: Regional increment 60%.
--McNamara: We shouldn't put up 70%. Put it on regional basis.
--McGB summary:

--Battle: decrease share
--Refer back to Dept. for a framework in which our contribution would be well down.

/3/In a statement released on June 27, the President announced that the United States would join with other nations in a special effort to provide emergency assistance in the Middle East and announced the establishment of a reserve of $5 million from contingency funds for this purpose. He stated that he had directed U.S. participation in the appropriate UN emergency programs of food and medical relief and that the U.S. Government was offering $100,000 for use by the International Red Cross to assist victims of the conflict. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, p. 660)

/4/Not further identified.

/5/Helms' notes of the meeting say on this point: "DOD opposed to arms shipments for Libya--OK on Morocco and Jordan." (Central Intelligence Agency Files, DCI Files: Job 80-B1285A, Box 11, Folder 12, DCI (Helms) Miscellaneous Notes of Meetings, 1 Jan 1966-31 Dec 1968)

--Not something we need to rush in on.
--Get it around that de Gaulle not going to be our mediator.

--Hussein. LBJ wld. see.
--On Am. TV.

Moderate the moderates.

New York, June 22, 1967, 0455Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv. Received at 3:27 a.m. Passed to the White House at 3:44 a.m. Secretary Rusk was in New York June 19-June 23 to attend the Special Session of the UN General Assembly.

5845/Secto 13. Following uncleared memcon FYI Noforn and subject to revision.

/2/Telegram 5844 from USUN, June 22, reported the discussion of topic B. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

Secretary referred to sentiment UNGA re need for reaffirmation principle of withdrawal before meaningful discussions on bases for settlement could take place. He believed there were two separable questions as regards form and substance. If we could be clear on substance we could then be more flexible on modalities.

Eban stated Israeli inter-ministerial committee had come to some tentative conclusions which he would like to discuss with Secretary but not others.

Egypt-Israel. Israelis wanted peace treaty on basis present international frontiers. This would involve Israeli maritime passage through Straits Tiran and Suez Canal and air passage over straits. In context non-belligerency this would mean Israel would be treated like everyone else. In same context Israel envisaged demilitarization of Sinai, which was natural barrier between two countries. From Egypt, Israel wanted only security, no territory. Israelis felt Egypt might be attracted to this concept.

Important thing that there must be treaty which committed Egyptians. Israeli unwilling accept another understanding on basis of assumptions. This had been major fault of 1957 arrangements which had committed much of world but not Egypt.

Israel-Syria. Israelis would like peace treaty on the basis of the international frontiers with some understanding that Syrian hills overlooking Israeli territory would be demilitarized. Israelis would also like assurances that Syria would not use returned territory for purpose of diversion of Jordan waters away from Israel. Eban noted that Syrians unable divert these waters now because Israeli held essential territory. Eban concluded that Israel was offering both Egypt and Syria complete withdrawal to international frontiers. These terms not ungenerous.

Gaza. Eban noted that Egypt had never claimed Gaza, had not accepted responsibility for occupying it, or for the refugees. The natural thing was for Gaza to be in Israel. Israelis would make every effort on behalf of Gaza population which totaled over 350,000 people. This plus Israel's present Arab population would bring total Arabs in Israel to about 700,000. Israelis wondered whether some could not be settled elsewhere, e.g. northern part of Sinai, "Central Palestine" or West Bank of Jordan. Israelis would like to maintain status of UNRWA as source of assistance to these people.

West Bank of Jordan. Eban said Israeli thinking "less crystalized" re West Bank. They were still working on basis two tendencies, two conceptions in GOI. One tendency assumed that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan would continue and that an agreed settlement on the basis of the demarcation line should be worked out. Another idea was that there should be some kind of association between the West Bank and Israel on the basis of autonomy and economic union. The difficulty with this latter approach, said Eban, was that it would push Hussein back across the Jordan River. Moreover, there were no international constitutional precedents for such an arrangement.

The Secretary interposed by wondering whether there were not precedents on the basis of letting the people concerned decide. Eban replied that GOI was trying to take soundings on the intelligence level. There were some "serious" Arab leaders on West Bank who felt that their relationship with East Jordan had been artificial and had provided them no security. Others had Hashemite loyalties.

Secretary inquired if there were no significant Egyptian military presence in Sinai what would be situation in the Negev? Eban pointed out that until UNEF removed there had been the slenderest military presence possible in the south of Israel.

Secretary commented that it was helpful to have these preliminary thoughts. He was not clear as to whether doctrine of innocent maritime passage through Straits of Tiran also applied to air passage. Eban felt that doctrine would apply, in light of relevant international conventions re air transit, except in times of war. Secretary asked whether economic arrangements between Israel and West Bank might not be conduit to bring Trans-Jordan into similar arrangement. He realized Israelis were angry at Hussein but advised that they should not sell him short. Eban admitted that Israelis' first reaction had been to write Hussein off but they now heard that Hussein was being properly contrite.

Secretary said he wanted to raise two points:

1. Refugees. We continued to get bad information on the refugee situation. Apparently several thousand Arabs per day continue to leave Israel. It would be great tragedy if the refugee problem was re-created. Our information does not agree with Israelis' statements on this matter. Eban said he had spoken with the military governor of Jerusalem (who happened to be his brother-in-law) on this point. The Secretary suggested that Israel be less rigorous in its process of screening of people who left the West Bank during the hostilities and now wish to return. He felt that Israel could take some chances in this respect and that world opinion would press Israel very hard on the refugee question.

2. Jerusalem. Secretary hoped that Israel would be very careful with regard to Jerusalem as it involved actual or latent passions of an enormous number of people. The matter was very delicate and could be a source of strong anti-Israel feeling in the United States. Eban replied that Israel was trying to put the Christian holy places under Christian control and the Moslem holy places under Moslem control. Eban admitted that Israel had a job to do in projecting publicly its intentions regarding access to holy places.

Eban referred to reports of Soviet replacement of military aircraft to Egypt. He agreed that full replacement might take a year. At the same time Israel's own aircraft inventories were low. Israel had lost 42 planes in hostilities. This had led to GOI request for expedited implementation of present contract to supply Skyhawks to Israel. Secretary replied that this was being considered in Washington at the present time. He did not know whether Soviets intended to replenish fully Arab inventories or to make a more modest gesture. Secretary said that he would try to find out from Gromyko if there was any Soviet interest in some arms limitation. Secretary noted that this was issue affecting whole area and that we were under heavy pressure for arms from friendly Arab countries.

Rusk

New York, June 22, 1967, 0455Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 2:18 a.m. A typed and slightly paraphrased version was sent to the President by Arthur McCafferty at 7:15 a.m.

5841/Secto 9. Eyes Only for President and Acting Secretary.

/2/Document 157.

We then turned to the immediate problem before the Assembly and it is clear that the central issue will be the relation between the withdrawal of troops and other elements in a general settlement. Gromyko reaffirmed the commitment of the USSR to the existence of Israel as a state and recalled that both they and we had voted for the creation of Israel twenty years ago. He seemed to show flexibility on international maritime rights although he commented perhaps these matters should be dealt with in special arrangements similar to the Montreux Convention on the Bosporus. For lack of time we did not get into other elements of a permanent solution, but it is quite clear that they will press for the priority of withdrawal over against the settlement of other issues. I drew the distinction between procedure and substance and said that I thought if there could be broad agreement on substance, modalities could be found to deal with questions of procedure. I also told him I did not think that Israel had any particular interest in trying to retain Egyptian or Syrian territory. (This was based on an earlier conversation I had had with Eban.)

I talked to him briefly about non-proliferation which we continued at dinner and got the impression that they were reasonably satisfied with the draft text worked out in Geneva which omits article three. He emphasized the importance of controls and said there should be an international system which did not discriminate in favor of members of a particular NATO family. I told him this was not an issue of principle between the USSR and the US but that the obstacle was his friend General de Gaulle. I asked him if Kosygin had discussed NPT with de Gaulle and was told the subject had not come up. He seemed to be more optimistic about the Indian attitude than we.

In a later private exchange Gromyko indicated he would probably stay on for about a week following the departure of Kosygin. This probably means that he will stay around to do his best to get their kind of resolution from the General Assembly. I definitely got the impression that they were prepared to drop the condemnation feature if a simple unadorned demand for withdrawal could get the necessary number of votes.

/3/Telegram 5848 from USUN, June 22, reported Rusk's dinner conversation with Gromyko. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S)

Goldberg

Rabat, June 21, 1967, 1148Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Repeated to Algiers, Tunis, COMAC for POLAD, CINCUSNAVEUR, USCINCEUR for POLAD, USUN, Amman, Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli. Received at 5:36 a.m. on June 22.

5635. 1. FonMin Laraki told me June 20 that FonMin meeting in Kuwait dealt with two basic resolutions. One was presented by the Moroccans at the outset and represented view of moderates. This provided for dealing with Arab-Israeli problem through diplomatic channels, stressing importance of immediate withdrawal of Israelis to 1948 armistice lines. The other resolution strongly supported by UAR, Algeria, and Syria provided for an all-out boycott, nationalization and elimination of all economic ties with imperialists (US and UK) as well as their ejection from "bases" such as Morocco and Libya. Morocco led moderates (I am happy report Libya supported Morocco) and was successful in having its resolution approved. I suspect diplomatic channels meant transfer FonMin meeting to New York and effort in UN to obtain withdrawal of Israelis.

2. Laraki told me he had hard time as "extremists" made all the arguments familiar from Radio Cairo, Algiers, and Istiqlal here and sought to pin down definition of US as an aggressor country as much as were the Israelis.

In his view, it will be impossible continue hold the line against the "extremists" if the US does not come out unequivocally for a withdrawal of Israeli forces. No Arab nation could accept principle of continued Israeli military occupation of Arab lands. In his view, it might be possible to combine the withdrawal with a UN guarantee of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the countries concerned. This is an interesting idea which would have the effect of internationalizing the tripartite declaration of 1950 and is worth exploring.

3. In any event, I must stress again the continued Israeli occupation of Arab lands including Jerusalem puts the moderates in an impossible position and gravely compromises our position with the Arab world as long as we do not state our position unequivocally on this subject in some appropriate forum, reconciling our interests in Israel at the same time.

Tasca

SC 08384-67

Washington, June 21, 1967.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files: Job 85-01007R, Box 5, Folder 50. Top Secret; Trine. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence.

SUBJECT
The Israeli Statement on the Attack on the USS Liberty

1. The preliminary report of the special Court of Inquiry convened by the Government of Israel has concluded that the "attack on the USS Liberty was not in malice; there was no criminal negligence and the attack was made by innocent mistake." The report, however, has been turned over to the military judge advocate who has ordered a preliminary judicial inquiry by an officer empowered to convene court martial.

2. According to the Israeli findings a chain of three regrettable mistakes led to the attack by Israeli jets and torpedo boats upon the USS Liberty on 8 June 1967.

3. The first mistake was decisive and set the scenario for the subsequent errors. On the basis of erroneous reports, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) was convinced that Israeli positions near El Arish were being shelled by an unidentified vessel off the coast. However, "even the officers who knew of the identification of Liberty early the same morning did not connect Liberty with the unidentified ships said to be shelling El Arish."

4. (CIA has no evidence of these erroneous reports, but the information is plausible in light of the very speedy Israeli advance and the heat of battle in the El Arish area. The UAR Navy is not known to have shelled Israeli shore positions on 8 June. The above admission that Israelis had identified the Liberty--presumably following the overflight by jets at 9:50 AM (2:50 PM EDT)--is the first indication that the Israelis knew the Liberty was in the area prior to the attack.)

5. The three Israeli torpedo boats patrolling near the Liberty reported that the unidentified vessel was steaming at 28-30 knots. A check of Liberty's maximum speed in Jane's led IDF headquarters to believe that the unidentified (radar) target was a high speed combatant and not the Liberty. Considering the erroneous information on the shelling of Israeli coastal positions, the IDF asked the torpedo boats to verify the unidentified vessel's speed and then ordered an air attack.

6. (It is most bizarre that a qualified naval commander would twice compute Liberty's speed to be 30 knots or that the IDF would authorize an attack solely on the basis of an unidentified high speed contact. There is not a ship of Liberty's general appearance capable of such a speed and few have deck guns capable of shelling coastal installations. If the authorization to attack was made solely on radar tracking, the attacking aircraft would normally make a preliminary identification pass over the ship.)

7. The Israeli torpedo boats then joined the fray. They claimed they mistook the Liberty for the Egyptian transport El Quesir and attacked with torpedoes after the jets had broken off. This attack is laid to the overeagerness of the torpedo boat skippers as the jet pilots were already having their doubts as to the ship's identity. The Israelis further state that the Liberty refused to answer a challenge sent by flashing light prior to the attack by the torpedo boats and the ship was firing toward the Israeli torpedo boats.

8. (CIA concurs that the torpedo attack was made by overeager Israeli commanders. There have been no US Navy reports of the visual challenge--probably issued in the heat of battle--but if such a challenge were received it would have been answered.)

9. A partial explanation for some of this unprofessional military performance is found in a report from Tel Aviv that at least one of the officers aboard the torpedo boats was a reservist recalled to service during the mobilization. In light of the demonstrated Israeli military capabilities, however, it is difficult [to] attribute all of the contributing errors to inept personnel.

(Sources: USDAO Tel Aviv 0928/1 Jun 67, 18 Jun, Confidential

USDAO Tel Aviv 0933, Jun 67, Secret No Foreign DissemCIA Intelligence Memorandum, "The Israeli Attack on the USS Liberty," SC No. 01415/67, Top Secret Trine

10. The findings of the Israeli Court of Inquiry generally are consonant with the conclusions made in the CIA Intelligence Memorandum. It is now known, however, that the IDF Headquarters had identified the Liberty, probably more than four hours before the attack. The Israelis presumably thought the vessel they were attacking not to be the Liberty, for it is also clear that when the initial attack took place the ground controllers and the pilots believed the ship to be a belligerent. In addition, the Israelis have admitted that the jets were ordered to attack the unidentified vessel and, therefore, the Liberty was not taken under fire by overzealous pilots, acting on their own. We do not know if they had been advised of the presence of the Liberty in these waters.

11. Two rather incongruous statements in the findings of the Court of Inquiry only detract from their explanation. The Israelis offer as a reason for the air attack a standing IDF order authorizing an attack upon any ship steaming at a speed above 20 knots if Israeli ships or shore positions in the area are being shelled. To say the least, it is questionable military policy to authorize an attack upon an unidentified ship based solely upon a radar track of over 20 knots and erroneous reports that Israeli positions were being shelled. The Israeli statement that the Liberty could not be identified because it was covered with smoke also is a piece of self-serving over rationalization. Clearly the smoke was the result of the Israeli attacks.

/2/A DIA memorandum of June 13 to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff states: "There is no available information which would conclusively show that the Israelis made a premeditated attack on a ship known to be American. In fact the best interpretation we can make of the available facts is that Israeli command and control in this instance was defective." A June 28 addendum to the memorandum states that further information had clarified the sequence of events but failed to show that the attack had been premeditated and did not alter the interpretation of the incident in the prior memorandum.

New York, June 22, 1967, 10:30 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls. No classification marking. The notes were prepared by Carolyn J. Proctor. Rusk was at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. ROBERT B. ANDERSON (NYC)

A called to report on his morning meeting with Iraqi For. Min. Pachachi and Lebanon FM Hakim. A said it was incomprehensible to him how much animosity they hold for our representatives; this was not meant personally, but P had told him that when he got down to see the Sec and Pres he was told to see Gene Rostow and he said he might just as well have been talking to a representative of the Israeli Govt; they would not discuss this subject or have any faith in resolutions offered by a US Amb or anyone of this faith. A had discussed at some length with them that they must face the realities of life. A said their principal point was they must have withdrawal from the territory; they said US has been silent on this. A said he was not speaking for his govt but suggested a declaration by General Assembly or Security Council along the line of the right of all states to live being recognized; if the state of belligerency was declared ended by all parties, then we could see where we are; P said he would be willing to explore that but he could not be committed until he saw the language; he said if A cared to show them something they would discuss it with their colleagues. A said he was not part of the US Govt, but he would not be happy to have them merely explore it--he would expect them to try to sell it; he indicated that if the language could be agreed on, perhaps something could be worked out. P had said we had no idea of the image we had in his country; P said we must believe that US gave them some encouragement, intelligence; when A had explained why he believed this was not so, P had said he had to believe him but we could never get our people to believe it. P said they need some liaison with the Dept; he realized the Sec was busy; A had suggested Battle whom P had not heard of; P had said he had been told ERostow was running Near East affairs. A said P mentioned a Goldberg speech in the early '60s in which he said he was a Zionist. A said their one great thesis was restoration of territory; they were agreeably interested in their ability to look at, examine and if the language was properly phrased consider a meeting of their colleagues to consider such a declaration. Sec said it was just possible something could be worked out on that line. Sec thanked A.

Washington, June 22, 1967, 1454Z.

/1/Source: National Security Agency, NSA Archives, Accession No. 45981, U.S.S. Liberty Correspondence and Messages, 1965-1968. Secret; Savin.

SIGINT Readiness Bravo "Crayon" Report Nr. 2149.

Aftermath of Israeli Attack on USS Liberty, 8 June 1967.

1. General

The following activity is based on Israeli plain language VHF/UHF voice communications intercepted on 8 June 1967 between 1229Z and 1328Z. This activity deals solely with the aftermath of the attack by Israeli jet aircraft and torpedo boats on the USS Liberty (GTR5). There are no COMINT reflections of the actual attack itself.

2. Summary

At 1230Z, two Israeli helicopters 810 and 815, were dispatched by Hatsor to the area of the incident to check for survivors of an unidentified "warship." Approximately at 1234Z, the air controller at Hatsor clarified the identity of the ship to the two Israeli helicopters by informing them that it had been identified as Egyptian. At 1239Z, Hatsor told the helicopters that it was an Egyptian cargo ship.

At 1307Z, Hatsor told helicopter 815 to take any survivors that spoke Egyptian to El Arish ((31-08N 34-54E)), but if they spoke English to take them to Lod ((31-58N 34-54E)).

At 1312Z, the Israeli helicopter 815 apparently informed Hatsor on a different frequency that it had sighted an American flag on the ship. Hatsor then asked the helicopter to make another pass to check "if this is really an American flag."

The helicopters and the MTBs were communicating on a UHF frequency whereas the helicopters and the air controller at Hatsor were using VHF throughout. At 1310Z, helicopter 815 informed the MTB using callword "Pagoda" that the ship was not in danger. The same helicopter then reported that G.T.R.-5 was written on the ship and inquired if this meant anything. The MTB replied in the negative.

Throughout this intercept, the USS Liberty is referred to as the "big one" while the three Israeli motor torpedo boats are referred to as the "small ones." The helicopters used call signs 810 and 815. The air controller at Hatsor Air Base used call word "Tribune." The MTBs used callwords "Thorn," "Pagoda," and "Crisis." The callword "Jewel" is not identified, but may be Haifa.

3. Details

Comment: This activity had been reported in a condensed version by USA-556 in its 2/J15.[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]/R23-67, 082015Z, and follow-ups.