U.S. Department of State

New York, July 20, 1967, 0449Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Moscow and the White House. Received on July 20 at 2:12 a.m. The telegram contains handwritten corrections based on a cabled correction. (Ibid.) Rostow forwarded a copy of telegram 290 to the President on July 20 with a covering note commenting that the essence of Goldberg's report was that "the Soviets would like to find an agreed formula on the Middle East but they cannot bring around the extreme Arabs." He added that Goldberg particularly wanted the President to read the cable. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow)

290. Middle East.

1. I met for over an hour this afternoon with Gromyko and Dobrynin at Sov mission "for tea". Meeting held at Gromyko's request in response to my suggestion he have dinner with me tomorrow. Sisco, Buffum and Pederson also present. Only other person present was Soviet interpreter.

2. I opened conversation pursuant to my telecon with Secty by conveying fol points to Gromyko:

(A) Foster return from Geneva was to consult with technical experts and should not be taken as any lessening of interest in our part re non-proliferation agreement.

(B) We wanted to continue to enlist their cooperation in the search for a peaceful solution on Vietnam.

(C) We hoped there could be cooperation and parallel policies in Middle East. We noted USSR had expressed itself in favor of national existence of all ME states and of peaceful solution. We thought our policies coincided in many respects and hoped USSR would use its influence in interests of peace.

3. Gromyko replied:

(A) Non-proliferation was now matter of control and of control system. USSR favored IAEA system.

(B) He did not want to reiterate details of what Kosygin had said about Vietnam. USSR regretted US policy there and had pointed out to US the way out more than once.

(C) On ME we had each expressed our points of view. If US wants peace there then our policies coincide. USSR is for peace. There was no question on Sov side about existence of Israel. We both shared responsibility for its creation. In Arab world there were extreme tendencies, essence of which was inclined not to recognize Israel as a state. Sov Union was not sympathetic to this, which was no secret to US.

US and USSR faced fol situation. There had been discussion in broad forum. Both had agreed on existence such a state and that other views were unjustified. Was it possible we could not settle prevailing situation and then preserve future peace?

Gromyko said he would not use strong words, though they were appropriate to Israel. What was way out? No doubt US can influence Israel, and on withdrawal of troops. USSR had its own influence on certain extreme tendencies. USSR does try to influence these extreme tendencies. He had noticed that in course of GA US had not tried to find way out but had created obstacles on way to normalizing situation in ME and created difficulties on possibility of USSR influencing extremist tendencies in Arab world. For example, he said that if we want to secure peace in region we must find in relation to belligerence a form of expression that would accomplish what you want and at same time temper and if possible put end to extremist tendencies in Arab world. On other hand such formula should be presented in form acceptable to other side. This was question of form, not of principle.

If we want peace and not war, and if we agree on principle, can't we find an expression. Belligerence had become almost a cabalistic formula. Could we not find a formula possible even identical in meaning. Why not a new form with same ideas expressed in way acceptable to other side (Arab states). It was difficult to say right now revolve 180 degrees, not only difficult but impossible. USSR understands them on this. Why not combine withdrawal (nothing is possible without withdrawal) with a formula leading to peace on basis of respect of sovereignty of states in ME---in its broad and deep sense--as expressed in Charter, with or without mentioning Charter. It should be deep enough to express what we believe. Form must be flexible enough to be acceptable to both sides. Too many suspicions had been raised on both sides. Maybe questions of form were causing a high wall to be raised.

4. I replied that I had not intended to burden him about non-proliferation but just to convey a message, and said we persevered in effort to reach an agreed solution. Had also mentioned Vietnam not to re-open discussions but to convey Secty's emphasis on desirability of concerting our effort for peaceful solution. I said he knew our position which had been fully explained by President at Glassboro. We understood each other's positions and obligations, and expressed hope our great countries could find way to peaceful solution.

/2/July 9.

To be specific, when Amb Dobrynin had approached Secty and me over week ago first question he had asked was whether we were interested in peace. We had replied definitely yes. There was nothing good to come from lack of peace, and much good from an honorable, just, and peaceful solution. I did not disagree that it was not easy to turn around 180 degrees. His assessment of Arab problems in this regard was true of Israelis as well. This did not mean that we should not try. Our view was that it was important for us both to take position on principles we both could stand on and to agree upon a common expression of them in an appropriately worded res. We did not conceive that proper statements of such principles would necessarily be agreed right now to by either the Arab states or Israelis. We still thought they should be stated by us in the GA or SC and widely supported and that we could build on them for a peaceful solution. Gromyko had stated problems were those of form, not of principle. Between US and USSR I believed that was so, although not true of contending parties. We should continue to try, to make an effort to lead toward an acceptable formula under which we could each use our influence on both sides.

/3/See Document 348.

/4/Telegram 289 from USUN, July 20 (erroneously dated July 21), reported discussions concerning this proposed draft resolution. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

I observed these paras would be an affirmation of principles. GA could only recommend, and issue would be remitted to SC to work out how to effectuate them. I thought this was a statement that USSR could accept. Most of language in second para came from the Kosygin statement. We still believed this formula contained nothing inconsistent with Sov or US positions or with UN Charter. US had gone considerable distance with this formulation. It included withdrawal in terms desired by USSR. It eliminated word "belligerence", and in our view we could proceed in SC to sort problem out in all its elements.

I said we did not believe it was in interests of either of us to resume sad warlike situation which had prevailed in area all these years. We thought this formula was an appropriate framework, because we thought we did not disagree on principles. To find a framework acceptable to both sides of the conflict, however, would be very difficult, understandably. We had hoped that at least we and USSR could get together and concert actively for overall peace in cooperation. We were still at loss as to why this formula not accepted by USSR. We understood difficulties of Arabs, and of Israel, but not for Sovs.

5. Gromyko replied that maybe we (USSR) had understood word "recognition" wrong. Said if it were just USSR it would be easier for us to talk. It was necessary for him to take into account events and moods there (Arab world). Formula should be definite enough to include peaceful existence and exclude repetition of military events there. On other side it should be flexible enough for Arab countries to accept from point of view of form, so that it would not be in sharp contradiction with mood of area. He was talking about form. For USSR it is certain we want peace there. Can we not have enough ingenuity to find a formula that would coincide with your goals, our goals, peaceful coexistence for all states there. What concrete language would you suggest? Perhaps a short res like LA text. We should avoid cabalistic word "belligerence", but find a formulation that goes in same direction.

Gromyko said wording of formula I had given to Dobrynin was still too harsh. It mentioned Arab states and Israel. Maybe there could be formula meaning same but not mentioning either. This was test of ingenuity, search for flexible formula. On content he had nothing different in mind.

6. I replied we were indeed flexible and suggested para on withdrawal delete word "Israel" and substitute "by the parties to the conflict" and that the para on national existence delete reference both to Arab States and Israel and instead refer to "acknowledgment by all member states in area that each enjoys right to maintain etc."

7. Gromyko replied that from Arab point of view second para might still give some difficulties, though we all agreed with it, and even common sense and also Charter supported it. Suppose we said: "that sovereign rights must be respected by all states in accordance with Charter of UN". Sovereignty conveyed same idea in different form. Perhaps we could refer to sovereign rights, or to territorial integrity. Asked whether withdrawal to June 5 positions acceptable.

8. I replied that many claims had been made in name of sovereignty, for example blocking of Gulf of Aqaba, and that this language was not precise enough. Either tomorrow or later in SC we must have a solution. Perhaps fresh approach was needed, as Gromyko has said. That was why we had suggested this language. I said that if they could confirm that Aqaba was not involved we would not fuss about June 5 date. Gromyko replied that it was not involved. He then asked whether we did not have a still more flexible formula that all could accept.

I said I thought effort to get a res that all would accept was very difficult. We should aim for the one that both sides involved would not vote for, but that we jointly could support. Said there are also times when flexibility was exhausted. We did have one other suggestion, which I had put to Amb Dobrynin Monday, and which avoided word "belligerence", which was that "termination of all states of war and any and all claims thereto is expected". We could also add words "without delay" in both paras. I said we had undertaken study of Russian formulas about termination of belligerence, and that to best of our knowledge Sovs used same word for state of war and state of belligerence, noting translation Dobrynin had given us seemed to have no legal background.

9. Gromyko confirmed that there was no difference in Russian between state of war and state of belligerence. There was problem term had acquired among Arabs. I pointed out this was not a problem in Russian text but only in English and French versions, which could be met by change such as we had suggested. "Belligerence" was one of the states of war that would be terminated under this formula. I stated that with these proposals I had exhausted my flexibility and asked for some indication of flexibility on his side.

10. Gromyko said he needed some time to think the matter over. He would need to do some consultations. I said I did not think we could get agreement from parties now, but I did not see how they could take exception to such principles. Buffum added that perhaps it would be easier for them if principles were adopted by UN, to which they could later conform; we had some indications from moderate Arabs this might be so.

11. Gromyko then commented that words "without delay" fitted well in first para (on withdrawal) but not so well in second para, which dealt with complex policy questions while first one dealt with an act. He did not raise question of a different approach, but of acceptability, not a question of a change at expense of anyone's interests.

12. I replied we felt there must be equality of principles. We could drop "without delay" from both paras or add it to both. (Gromyko clearly was only going through motions on this point.) I then noted that LA res might be more helpful in this regard. Words "is expected" were, according to our info, strong words in Russian, and could be used in both paras. Then made point I was discussing these two paras in context putting them in LA text.

13. Gromyko then said he wondered if we couldn't get word "states" out without changing meaning. A UN member was a state. I interjected we could say that each member of the UN in the area enjoyed the right to a national state of its own. He then said he would think whole matter over. He did not see clear possibilities, but he would like time to think and study. He as FonMin could take decision for his govt but Arabs have definite instructions here. (I inferred he was saying his instructions were he could agree to anything Arabs would agree to.) He did not know how often they received them; perhaps this depended on urgency of situation. In any case consultations were required, and it would be difficult to conclude them by tomorrow. If he saw possibilities in these texts and needed another day or so he wondered whether we would be agreeable.

14. I said that we wanted to complete the GA, but that if USSR was seriously consulting about possibilities along such lines as I indicated we would be willing for GA to go over until Friday. Gromyko said he thought that would be enough time. Suggested US should consult own position as well. I repeated we had exhausted our flexibility. Hoped we could reach agreement soon either in GA or SC. Gromyko said it would be better in GA so we would not clash in SC.

/5/See footnote 4 above.

16. Afterward pursuant to press inquiries we agreed with Dobrynin that we would confirm meeting had taken place and that questions relating to GA were discussed.

Comment: I think it is unlikely Sovs will be able to move far enough away from radical Arabs (especially Algeria and Syria) to accept either of positions I gave him, though he seemed to be considering the first one. On other hand Gromyko was clearly interested in getting something more out of GA than Indian procedural res. Inasmuch as his emphasis was on persuading Arabs to accept something, and inasmuch as all our info indicates they have no intention of doing so, probability, though not certainty, is still return to procedural res Friday.

Goldberg

Washington, July 19, 1967, 7:45 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files l967-69, POL UAR-US. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Whirlwind. Drafted by Bergus, cleared by Eugene Rostow and Battle, and approved by Katzenbach.

9613. For Ambassador Tubby from Battle.

/2/Reference is to telegram 232 from Geneva, July 19, for Battle from Representative to the European Office of the United Nations Roger W. Tubby. It reported that Elwy Hafez, who identified himself as a member of the UAR National Council and a close friend of Nasser, had called on Tubby. Hafez said that Nasser had told him 6 days earlier that he wanted to reestablish good relations with the United States and would receive anyone close to President Johnson on a secret basis or would send Vice President Mohieddin to Geneva or elsewhere for talks. He said that Nasser was "through with Russians," that he wanted above all else to develop his country, and that he realized the United States could do more than anyone else. He said Nasser told him he wanted the United States to be the sole intermediary between the UAR and Israel; he would not recognize Israel or deal directly with it, but he would agree to "live and let live" if Israel would return to the 1956 borders. (Ibid.)

/3/Donald Chamberlain, Vice President of American Locomotives, Inc., and Wahid Siddiqui, a Pakistani representative of that company in Geneva, accompanied Hafez in his call on Tubby.

2. Would appreciate your delivering following message to Hafez:

3. Please use slug designator Nodis/Whirl Wind for all communications on this subject.

/4/Tubby reported in telegram 247 from Geneva, July 20, that he had delivered the message to Hafez, who was returning to Cairo that day. Hafez thought arrangements could be made for Mohieddin to meet with Anderson on a secret basis, preferably in Geneva. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files l967-69, POL UAR-US) Telegram 10370 to Geneva, July 20, states that Anderson was willing to go to Geneva and would prefer a meeting on July 30. (Ibid.)

Rusk

New York, July 21, 1967, 0123Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 US-UAR. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Received on July 20 at 10:28 p.m.

304. UAR Attitudes.

/2/Bergus became principal officer of the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in Cairo in August.

Turning to GA, he informed us that Gromyko had met with Fawzi this morning and had put to them two formulations "which had been discussed by Gromyko and Goldberg" on previous evening. Riad said that fact that discussion had taken place had enhanced US position in Arab eyes and that UAR at least no longer believed the rumors spread in corridors that US wanted no result whatsoever from GA. Riad implied his del favorable to language (which he did not describe other than to refer to "is expected" formula) which Gromyko had discussed with them this morning but that the decision rested in Cairo. Moreover, he said UAR having great difficulties with the Syrians and Algerians. Also said there would be a question as to who would put forward proposal if there were one.

Riad said UAR had maintained open contact with Americans here on direct instructions of Fawzi, who had resisted criticism from other Arabs in doing so. He said UAR and US both needed each other, perhaps in different degrees, but it was necessary to both. He said we should keep in close touch as matters develop in Cairo and elsewhere. There was no need for any broker between US and UAR; this would only complicate matters and require payment of "broker's fees". He said Bergus would be kept fully informed of views and currents in Cairo.

Riad described Sudan role within Arab group since outbreak of conflict as being a moderating one, saying our impression that Sudan was among extremists was not correct. Described new Iraqi Govt as a strong one, with a leadership which was more closely identified with UAR and a leader who was a nationalist and progressive but not a leftist. Said new govt was more objectionable as previous one to Syrians and effort would be made to pacify Kurdish problem. He assented to our description of Algerians and Syrians as being the most extreme among Arabs.

In spite of some top-level speeches in the past which Riad admitted had caused trouble in US, Riad maintained UAR had over past years generally exercised moderating influence among Arabs and with Syrians in particular in Israeli problem. Said they had specifically told Syrians El Fatah-type activities were not good themselves nor good for general Arab cause when Arab world was not sufficiently strong.

Riad reflected real concern that Israelis might cross Suez Canal and even take Port Said. Thought presence Israeli mil boats at canal was evidence of this possible intention as well as of desire to be on canal itself. He volunteered that in spite of new equipment UAR air force was no match for Israelis. Said they had even heard Israelis might try to open canal and offer to put some of revenues in banks for UAR as they were doing on some of Sinai oil wells.

Goldberg

New York, July 21, 1967, 0124Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to the White House and Moscow. Received on July 20 at 10:25 p.m. Passed to the White House at 11:10 p.m. Rostow sent a copy to the President on July 21 at 9:35 a.m. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis)

/2/Document 377.

Dobrynin (USSR) telephoned me this noon to say he wanted to check with me about the wording of the formulas I had discussed with Gromyko yesterday. We met at UN shortly after lunch.

Dobrynin showed me two texts. One "called for" Israeli withdrawal in one para and said renunciation of claims and acts inconsistent with existence of independent national states was "expected" in other. Second version used similar formulas on substance but used terminology "is expected" in both paras. Both versions used words "without delay" in each para.

After looking over text I told Dobrynin I had not used expression "calls upon" in conversation yesterday and further noted that he had used it only in para one and that this created imbalance between the two. He said his purpose was to clarify with me exactly where our position stood.

I then went over with him conversation of yesterday based on his notes (which were accurate) and my own. As a result the two versions attached at end of this tel were completed as accurately reflecting yesterday's intention. (Final drafting reflected two subsequent telecons as well.) Dobrynin confirmed by telephone that Gromyko agreed these texts, and not ones Dobrynin had explored with me earlier, represented what we had talked about. Version I is the text in which Dobrynin appeared to have greatest interest.

Dobrynin also told me Gromyko had been in touch with Fawzi (UAR) about these new formulas and that Fawzi thought he might need more time to consult his govt. Dobrynin therefore wondered if we would consent to two or three days more time. I told him we were suspicious that constant requests for delay were simply a bargaining tactic. Also that we had heard of possible efforts to bring Jerusalem into SC and wondered whether this request for a further delay was not simply effort to complicate issue with that of Jerusalem again. Dobrynin said USSR knew of no intention to have early SC meeting on Jerusalem, which he reconfirmed after talking to Gromyko. I told him we nevertheless had indication some Arabs were thinking of this. I told Dobrynin it was our view that session must be completed tomorrow afternoon as agreed or at latest on Saturday morning. Dobrynin said he would inform Gromyko of this reaction.

In separate conversation Riad (UAR) told Sisco and Pedersen UAR del had sent to Cairo today two variant formulas given them by USSR, indicating one of them used "is expected" phrases in both paras and that second para was based on "independent national state" concept. Riad implied Fawzi thought text had some merit but Cairo would take decision. He also foresaw difficulty with Algerians and Syrians. We are uncertain exactly what texts he referring to, as conversation preceded agreement between Dobrynin and me as to what proper texts were.

In separate conversation Sov Couns Shevchenko told a Belgian Sovs could see no reason not to accept res calling for withdrawal of Israeli forces and recognition Israeli right to exist, both "without delay". When queried whether Sovs would be prepared to break with Arabs in agreeing such res, Shevchenko reportedly made fuzzy reply, main point of which seemed to be they would not necessarily be breaking with all Arabs.

Nevertheless our assessment is proposals will be unacceptable to Arabs, that Sovs will not be willing to break with Arabs, and that we are most likely to end GA shortly with procedural res along lines being discussed by Finland, Sweden and Austria.

Fol are the two texts:

The GA,

Having examined the grave situation in the ME,

Considering that the crisis in the ME merits the attention of all member states and indeed requires the full participation of all members to achieve a just and lasting peace,

1. Declares that peace and final solutions to this problem can be achieved within the framework of the Charter of the UN;

2. Affirms the principle under the UN Charter of:

A. Without delay withdrawal by the parties to the conflict of their forces from territories occupied by them in keeping with the inadmissibility of the conquest of territory by war;

B. Without delay acknowledgment by all member states of the UN in the area that each enjoys the right to maintain an independent national state of its own and to live in peace and security, and renunciation of all claims and acts inconsistent therewith;

3. Requests the SC to continue examining the situation in the ME with a sense of urgency, working directly with the parties and utilizing a UN presence in order to achieve an appropriate and just solution of all aspects of the problem, in particular bringing to an end the long-deferred one of the refugees and guaranteeing freedom of transit through international waterways.

The GA,

Having examined the grave situation in the ME,

Considering that the crisis in the ME merits the attention of all member states and indeed requires the full participation of all members to achieve a just and lasting peace,

1. Declares that peace and final solutions to this problem can be achieved within the framework of the Charter of the UN;

2. Affirms the principle that conquest of territory by war is inadmissible under the UN Charter, and consequently that the withdrawal by the parties to the conflict to the positions they occupied before June 5, 1967 is expected;

3. Affirms likewise the principle that acknowledgment by all member states in the area that each of them enjoys the right to maintain an independent national state of its own and to live in peace and security and renunciation of all claims and acts inconsistent therewith are expected;

4. Requests the SC to continue examining the situation in the ME with a sense of urgency, working directly with the parties and utilizing a UN presence in order to achieve an appropriate and just solution of all aspects of the problem, in particular bringing to an end the long-deferred one of the refugees and guaranteeing freedom of transit through international waterways.

Goldberg

Washington, July 21, 1967, 7:48 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. Drafted by Wolle and approved by Battle.

11414. 1. Ambassador Harman called on Assistant Secretary Battle afternoon July 20. Referred to current state of suspension in USG handling of routine GOI military requests for ammunition, spare parts, etc. Said Eban intended raise this with Secretary July 15 but had not gotten around to it, though he had mentioned it to Walt Rostow. GOI hopes suspension can be unscrambled soon as possible. It would hope these "routine" supplies could be viewed as normal replacement items and considered apart from question of new equipment requests. Battle replied he was well aware of GOI view. Noted that matter complicated for us by Congressional attitudes on worldwide arms sales. Told Harman we would try to unscramble this soon as possible.

/2/Reference is to U.S.-Israeli talks November 12-13, 1963; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Documents 359 and 360.

/3/Reference is to U.S.-Israeli talks October 12-13, 1965; see ibid., 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 246, footnote 2.

3. Harman said he wished underline point made by Eban at July 15 lunch that GOI would take very negative view of any U.S. arms supply to Jordan at this stage. Said GOI wants to make sure there is no misunderstanding in Washington as to its position. Battle responded that he wanted make sure GOI in considering this question has given thought to alternatives for Jordan. There is definite Russian offer of arms to Jordan. Consequences of no U.S. sale must be weighed very carefully. Harman reacted with general comment that GOI believes it will not know until some time has passed just what it is dealing with in Jordan. He added that GOI ready to talk with King Hussein or his people, preferably with King himself, at any time. There is strong feeling in Israel that it must deal direct with King or otherwise signals might be misread. Asked by Battle if that meant GOI rules out UN or other negotiator, Harman simply repeated that it is feeling of GOI that it must find "a direct route" to assess the situation.

4. Harman mentioned he expects return Israel for short period in week or so.

Rusk

Washington, July 20, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. Rostow sent the memorandum to the President at 6:20 p.m. with a covering memorandum of July 20 noting that the Rusk proposal was "designed to protect the U.S., while still permitting us to follow the negotiation closely; insert ideas; and throw our diplomatic weight at the right moment." A handwritten "L" on the Rostow memorandum indicates the President saw it. A handwritten note of July 21 by Saunders on a copy of the Rostow memorandum states that the President had approved and asked that McNamara be briefed. It continues: "He was a little jumpy about the American lawyer but said OK." (Ibid., Saunders Files, Jordan, 4/l/66-10/31/67)

Hussein has asked us to intervene to achieve a possible settlement with Israel and to discover their terms of settlement and their willingness to negotiate. He says he has Nasser's blessing (which we would have little confidence in) as long as he does not engage in direct negotiations or conclude a peace treaty. He clearly would like us to lean on the Israelis to secure an agreement with which he can survive.

The Israeli Government is prepared to discuss a settlement with the Jordanians and has suggested we convey to Hussein their willingness to engage in private talks with Hussein or with his representative. Our estimate of their position, which is not yet formal, is that there could be agreement on various elements of a viable settlement except with respect to Jerusalem where the two sides are very far apart indeed on an issue which both regard as crucial. The Israelis do not wish to deal through an intermediary, and clearly do not wish the intermediary to be the U.S.

While the prospects for settlement are not particularly good, everyone--the U.S., Jordan and Israel--has such enormous stake in success, that it may be possible to achieve. While time might moderate positions, Hussein's present political status is such that we cannot risk delay in starting the process.

We do not believe we can achieve a satisfactory foreign mediator or that the U.S. should presently play this role. Despite danger to Hussein from his Arab colleagues, we believe direct negotiation is the most feasible and productive course and one which would permit the U.S. to use our influence at appropriate stages to promote agreement without direct U.S. involvement in the total process.

We therefore propose that we respond to Hussein's request along the following lines:

1. The Israelis tell us they are prepared to discuss a settlement on a confidential basis. They wish direct discussions and suggest two on each side.

2. We do not know the Israeli terms for a settlement and doubt that they have been formulated as yet.

3. We are inclined to believe that the possibility exists of working out a settlement of most of the issues and problems that would be involved. Jerusalem, however, will be very difficult and we do not know if there is any flexibility in the Israeli position except in respect to the direct administration of the Holy Places by religious authorities.

4. We do not know if an overall settlement will prove feasible, but we believe it would be worth the try. In any event, we are confident that the Israelis would protect the secrecy of their contacts with Hussein and the Jordan Government.

5. Hussein should keep in mind, however, that we do not trust Nasser, Boumediene and Atassi who are aware of Jordan's intentions and we doubt that Hussein should trust them.

6. Finally, Hussein would be asked how he contemplates staffing-out the negotiations. If he expresses uncertainty, as we expect, the suggestion would be made that private legal counsel would help. If he desired, we would assist him in finding a competent and discreet American firm. While this would marginally increase our involvement, it would lessen the imbalance of negotiating talent that would otherwise exist and permit us to make appropriate inputs at the staffing level throughout the negotiating process.

You will note that Paragraph 6 involves the use of a private American. This seems to us constructive since it provides a method for us to be involved in the process which is controllable and which allows us both a private and public role. The American lawyer will not be acting as an American official, but would be a person in whom we had great confidence.

I have discussed this approach with Mac Bundy, who agrees with it.

Dean Rusk

Washington, June 12, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files l967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. No classification marking. The note is a revised version of Document 267. The note is filed, together with Document 352, and a covering memorandum of July 20 from Walsh to Walt Rostow stating that they constituted the true, corrected versions of the exchange and that all other copies should be destroyed.

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to refer to the Secretary of State's note of June 10, 1967 concerning the attack by Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats on the United States naval vessel, the U.S.S. Liberty.

The Government of Israel has instituted a full investigation into this accident and has already announced the establishment by the Chief-of-Staff of the Israel Defense Forces of an Enquiry to make a full investigation of all the facts and circumstances. The Government of Israel will make available to the Government of the United States the findings of this investigation, and, for its part, hopes that the Government of the United States will make available to the Government of Israel the findings of its own investigation.

Pending the results of its investigation the Government of Israel feels it is premature to draw conclusions.

The Government of Israel recalls that as soon as it became aware of the tragic error which had occurred it immediately informed the Government of the United States of what had taken place. The Government of Israel immediately assumed responsibility for this error and conveyed its apologies and deep regret for what had occurred and for the grievous loss of life.

Subsequently, as mentioned in the Secretary of State's Note of June 10, 1967 the Government of Israel took the initiative to offer to make amends for the tragic loss of life and material damage. Further, all assistance was offered by the personnel of the Israel Defense Forces to the U.S.S. Liberty. The area around the U.S.S. Liberty was immediately searched by Israel Defense Forces personnel, by plane and boat, and subsequently search efforts were renewed.

The Government of Israel has standard instructions of the most stringent nature to all its military personnel that the personnel and property of the United States, as of all other countries not involved in hostilities, shall not be endangered. These instructions have been renewed.

The Government of Israel notes that the incident occurred in an area which the United Arab Republic had warned neutral vessels to avoid, as it was an area of hostilities. It would be appreciated if the Government of Israel could be given timely information of the approach of United States vessels to shores where the Israel Defense Forces are in authority.

The Government of Israel renews its readiness to make amends and has instructed the Ambassador of Israel to reiterate its profound regret for the consequences of what was admittedly a tragic error.

The Ambassador of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Honorable the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest regard.

A.H.

New York, July 22, 1967, 0207Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Also sent to the White House and repeated Priority to Moscow.

314. Re: Middle East.

Dobrynin (USSR) came to see me this morning to talk about status substantive text. Said USSR was prepared to vote for res we had worked out. On other hand some Arabs would probably vote against it and rest would abstain. He wondered in circumstances what our assessment would be of prospects and desirability of going ahead and what Israeli attitude was. I told him I thought Israel would probably also vote no.

Said I could not give him assessment of voting prospects without consultations with my staff and suggested we talk again at 2:30. I agreed with him that prospects of active opposition to reses by parties directly concerned raised questions which needed to be examined.

/2/Telegram 343 from USUN, July 26, transmitted the texts of the two versions of Soviet-U.S. compromise language in the form "in which we believe Sovs gave them to Arabs." In Version I, Section 2.A. reads: "Without delay withdrawal by the parties to the conflict of their forces to the positions they occupied before June 5, 1967, in keeping with the inadmissibility of the conquest of territory by war". In Version II, Section 2 reads: "Affirms the principle that conquest of territory by war is inadmissible under the U.N. Charter, and consequently that the withdrawal by the parties to the conflict of their forces to the positions they occupied before June 5, 1967, is expected".

I told Dobrynin we had just received word from Indians that substantive res was "off" and that they wanted to talk again about procedural res. Dobrynin said Indians were not acting on their request but indicated Sovs still thought text of yesterday was satisfactory.

It was obvious from this conversation that Sovs wanted to disengage from substantive text and to revert to procedural ending of GA. About noon time Dobrynin telephoned back to say Gromyko would like to see me at 2:15 to talk about the procedural res.

/3/For text of a draft resolution introduced on July 21 by Austria, Finland, and Sweden, and revised later that day, see UN documents A/L.529 and A/L.529/Rev. 1.

I said that if there were no substantive conclusions of GA it would be my view that US and USSR should continue to put our heads together in SC and work cooperatively for peaceful conditions in area, recognizing difficulties involved.

Gromyko said he took note of what I had said. Sov position had been fully outlined, notably in Kosygin statement. USSR would see what position US would take in next stage "or stages". Said reference of issue to SC was acceptable to USSR provided GA continued to be in session. Said USSR had nothing definite in mind at this point. It had nothing against referral to SC and besides there was no other place for it to go. Whenever any member requested SC meeting, of course, USSR would not be opposed. He noted Arabs did not like first para of Scandinavian res, which dealt with SC, but USSR did like it and agreed to text as it stood. Reiterated that there was no other place to go.

I said we agreed to text with one understanding. Previous version had included with respect to reconvening of GA by Pres that this should be done after appropriate consultations. We understood USSR had objected to that. We did not insist on these words but we did insist on consultations. These should be with perm members of SC, sponsors of reses which had been put before GA, and with the parties concerned. We also had no objection if he wanted to speak to heads of groups as well. These consultations were not a veto but were necessary as a minimum for timing, convenience and appropriateness. I told Gromyko I had said to Jakobson (Finland) that we would agree to removal of words if we were agreed in private on such consultations and if Pres would say he would convene GA after appropriate consultations. I noted that was process in SC and that it should be followed in GA, and that we had had difficult experiences during this session where Pres had done things without consultations. I observed that not being a member of a group we were sometimes not consulted by GA Pres and that unlike USSR, which was member of a group, US was only non-aligned member of UN. Gromyko smiled and asked when we had become non-aligned, last night?

Gromyko said recognized this as following normal processes and that USSR would neither encourage nor discourage GA Pres.

Gromyko then said he would make a brief statement after adoption of procedural res, which he agreed should go forward today. Said some of Arabs also might make statements.

In closing I alluded to his comment Arabs were still in session and said I would be willing to bet 100 to 1 that they would be opposed to substantive text. Gromyko asked where I found the one.

Goldberg

Washington, July 21, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, U.S. Position-Discussion. No classification marking. Sent through and initialed by Walt Rostow. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates it was received at 4:45 p.m., and the President saw it.

SUBJECT
The Middle East as we Approach the Weekend

/2/July 24.

/3/See footnote 1, Document 382.

The Israelis are now telling us that they are not ready for serious talks (though they can handle opening feelers), and it looks as if it would take a little time to get this thing going in any event.

/4/On the evening of July 21, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by Austria, Finland, and Sweden, by a vote of 63 to 26 with 27 abstentions, with the United States voting in favor. Resolution 2256 (ES-V) asked the Secretary-General to forward to the Security Council the records of the fifth emergency special session to facilitate the Council's resumption of its consideration of the Middle East situation, and decided to adjourn the fifth emergency special session temporarily and to authorize the President of the General Assembly to reconvene it as and when necessary. The text is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, August 14, 1967, p. 218. Rusk commented to Goldberg in a telephone conversation the next day that it was an extraordinary result that the United States and the Soviet Union voted together against the Arabs, with Israel abstaining. Goldberg thought they were "off stride in the Kremlin", and Rusk thought "we came out of this very well". (Notes of telephone conversation July 22, 9:43 a.m.; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

3. As you may remember, we have a tentative plan (as we told the oil men, Nickerson and Rambin) to make a new statement after the General Assembly. If you agree, I think the best time for such a statement would be early next week, perhaps in the context of a press conference if you plan to have one. The State Department and I will be drafting over the weekend and we will hope to have a fresh draft for you on Monday.

4. With the end of the Assembly, we shall also wish to look again at the arms registration proposal. As you may remember, the first step in that scenario will probably be a letter to the Secretary General. The Department is slowly making progress toward acceptance of your decision for a plan which could include a unilateral U.S. decision to register shipments if others will not play ball. We all feel strongly that no move should be made until the General Assembly is out of our hair, and there are other diplomatic subtleties in the draft scenario, but it does look as if we will have such a scenario for your consideration early next week.

One element in this problem that you can judge better than the rest of us is whether an arms registration initiative limited to the Middle East would help or hurt in the arms sale row on the Hill. Some think that it might simply lead Reuss or McCarthy to try to extend the principle worldwide. Others think it would show us moving in a useful direction on a specific problem. Dean Rusk holds the latter view, but he and I agree that your judgment is best on this question, and you do not have to decide it until you see the full scenario and the opening shot to the Secretary General next week.

5. The next really tough issue may be arms for Israel. Wally Barbour reports that their losses are more serious than they are telling us on other channels, and there are some intelligence reports which suggest that Nasser or the Syrians may be tempted into some act of folly like a sudden air attack some time in the next weeks. We think the odds are against such an action, and still more strongly against any real Arab victory, but we all remember the lessons of May and June, and if the Israelis really come in hard for early airplanes, we would be right up against the hard set of bargaining questions which I have mentioned before.

The immediate problem is to get a clear fix on the situation (as well as our own available supplies). The Israelis still seem less concerned than some of our own people. Rusk and McNamara will be concerting a recommendation to you on this in the next few days. It may take the form of a proposal that we let the Israelis send a top air officer over here some time after Bob's military assistance testimony.

As a matter of information, I might add that the Israelis are now telling us that they could not support any U.S. arms shipment to Jordan in the current mood of their country. If and when we send the Israelis some stuff, we shall at a minimum have to move them off this new hard line.

Finally, I should report that there are a number of other signs of hardening Israeli positions up and down the line. Their intemperate reaction to Goldberg's skillful round with Gromyko, their edginess about the Jordanian negotiations, their increasing interest in solutions that would not return the West Bank to Jordan, and the evidence of political jockeying among their leaders (each tougher than the other) make me think that the time is coming for American words and actions which will have at least a constructive effect in knocking you off the top of the Israeli polls. The trick will be to achieve that result without any parallel impact at home.

Washington, July 21, 1967, 7:10 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Sandstorm. Drafted by Houghton, cleared by Battle and Walt Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to London for the Ambassador.

11347. For Ambassador Burns.

A. We have developed following position in response to Hussein's request that we help him achieve a possible settlement with Israel and to discover their terms of settlement and their willingness to negotiate. Our position is based on our knowledge that the Israeli Government is prepared to discuss a settlement with the Jordanians. The Israelis have suggested that we convey to Hussein their willingness to engage in private talks with him or with his representatives. Our informal estimate of their position is that there could be agreement on various elements of a viable settlement except with respect to Jerusalem, where the two sides are very far apart on an issue which both regard as crucial. The Israelis do not wish to deal through an intermediary and even if they did, do not wish the intermediary to be the United States.

B. While the prospects for a settlement are not promising, our belief is that everyone--the US, Jordan and Israel--has such enormous stake in success that it might just be possible to achieve one. We realize that time might moderate positions, but Hussein's present political status is such that we believe he should not risk delay in starting the process.

C. We do not believe that we can find a satisfactory foreign mediator, or that the US should presently play this role. Despite the danger to Hussein from his Arab colleagues, we believe that direct negotiations between Jordan and Israel is the most feasible and productive course and one which would permit the US to use our influence at appropriate stages to promote agreement without direct US involvement in total process.

D. With the above in mind, you should therefore respond to Hussein's request along the following lines:

1. The Israelis inform us that they are prepared to discuss a settlement on a confidential basis. They want direct discussions and suggest that there be two representatives on both sides.

2. We do not know the Israeli terms for a settlement and doubt that they have been formulated as yet.

3. We are inclined to believe that the possibility exists of working out a settlement of most of the issues and problems which would be involved. Jerusalem, however, as the King is aware, will be very difficult and we do not know if there is any flexibility in the Israeli position except in respect to the direct administration of the holy places by religious authorities.

4. We do not know if an over-all settlement will prove feasible, but we believe it would be worth the try. In any event, we are confident that the Israelis would protect the secrecy of their contacts with the King and his Government.

5. Hussein should keep very much in mind, however, in making his final decision that we do not trust Nasser, Boumediene and Atassi, who are aware of the King's intentions. We doubt if the King should trust them either.

6. In view of the foregoing, we believe that at least in the preliminary meetings with the Israelis, the King should consider whether he should become directly engaged. He should review carefully the possibility of using a special Jordanian representative who should obviously be selected most carefully.

7. We believe that you should raise with Hussein how he contemplates staffing out the negotiations. He is undoubtedly aware that Israeli negotiators will be well prepared and will be supported by highly competent staff. If he expresses some uncertainty on this score, you might suggest that he consider obtaining private legal counsel. If he desired, we would assist him in finding a competent and discreet American firm to provide staff support. FYI. While this would to some extent increase our own involvement, it would lessen the imbalance of negotiating talent that would otherwise exist and permit us to make a contribution at the staffing level through the negotiating process. The American lawyer would not be acting as an American official, but would be a person in whom we had great confidence. End FYI.

Rusk

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 72A 2468, Israel 400. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Received in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on July 24 at 9:29 a.m.

Washington, July 22, 1967.

Dear Bob:

The Israelis, as you know, have asked to send a high-level military team to Washington to discuss their security concerns and their needs, as they see them, for additional military equipment.

I believe we are all agreed that a decision on providing new arms to Israel must be looked at most carefully in the context of the over-all situation in the Middle East and of Congressional views on the shipment of arms to areas of conflict. At the same time, there are several factors which make protracted inaction worrisome, including the Soviet resupply of the radical Arab states and the vociferous militancy of the Algerians and Syrians. Even assuming that the Soviets do not want their clients to become involved in a new round with the Israelis, I do not believe we can completely rule out the possibility of an early military strike against Israel by one or a combination of radical Arab states. A related possibility is that the Algerians and Syrians may attempt to carry out their threat to launch guerrilla attacks against Israel.

/2/The draft memorandum is attached but not printed. Katzenbach sent a slightly revised memorandum to the President on August 8. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. IX)

/3/Nitze replied on July 29 agreeing with the recommendation and suggesting that the Israeli team should be invited to come to Washington in early September. He had requested a USIB assessment of the Arab threat to Israel and USIB and JCS analyses of Israel's ability to withstand such a threat, and he recommended that they should not receive the Israeli military spokesmen until they had those assessments and had time to reflect on them. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-ISR)

Sincerely yours,

Dean

Washington, July 24, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII. Secret.

/2/No record of the conversation has been found.

We thought you ought to see Wally Barbour in order to get first hand his picture of how much negotiating room the Israelis may have. He came back feeling that they are prepared to make reasonable arrangements on the West Bank--in the context of an overall settlement--but show very little give on Jerusalem.

It is important for him to take away (a) your feeling that the Israelis will have to show some imagination and give on Jerusalem and (b) a sense of just how deeply you see us getting involved in the Jordan-Israel talks. You may want to begin by asking him how he sees these negotiations working out.

As you know, Wally did an outstanding job during the June crisis, so you may want to give him a pat on the back.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, July 24, 1967, 12:30 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Kohler and approved by Walsh.

SUBJECT
Middle East

Ambassador Dobrynin called on the Secretary at 12:30 p.m. in response to the latter's invitation. The meeting lasted through luncheon and broke up at 2:20 p.m.

Ambassador Dobrynin opened by reading from handwritten notes the following oral statement which Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had asked him to make to the Secretary:

"We have reviewed the results of the last period of work of the United Nations General Assembly. Our statements at the Assembly set forth the position of the Soviet Union. If the American press tries to interpret that the position as it was expressed in the statements of the Soviet representatives at the General Assembly, at the final meeting in particular, was too rigid, then we must disagree with such an assertion. One cannot deny the fact that Israel unleashed the war, that she was the first to launch an attack and that she has subscribed to this at the General Assembly. This is the main thing.

"Defending the Arabs and insisting on the necessity to adopt recommendations on an immediate withdrawal of the Israely (sic) troops we, the Soviet Union, were trying to make the situation easier in certain sense for the Americans too, that is to work out such wordings of the recommendations which would be mutually acceptable, though possibly being not completely to the liking both of Israel and of the ultra extremist circles in the Arab countries which cannot reconcile to the very fact of Israel's existence.

"This is what we proceeded from in our latest talks with Amb. Goldberg and other U.S. representatives in New York.

"We noticed that the latest wordings which were suggested from the American side were somewhat different in form from all the previous ones on respective questions and we gave the American side understand this.

"We hope that this would be taken note of. But we also have noted that the U.S. Government if it indeed does not want a resumption of the war in the Middle East and does not push development of events in that direction should have displayed greater flexibility.

"Under these circumstances it would be also easier for the Soviet Union to take steps in the direction of finding of mutually acceptable solutions corresponding to the lawful interests of the Arab States as well as to all countries of the Middle East.

"You, Mr. Secretary, know the position of the Soviet Union toward Israel as a state. Thus, what was said on our side during the last two meetings with Amb. Goldberg and other American representatives in New York with regard to the need of more flexible approach on the American side as well as what was said by the American side concerning Soviet-American relations and the link of the entire problem with the relations between the USSR and the US, all this still holds its significance.

"Noting the importance of the question of Israeli troops withdrawal we must emphasize it once again that if the American side are prepared to keep consultations going as a continuation of the latest talks then we shall be also ready for this to find formulas--fully acceptable to both sides--of the recommendations of the General Assembly which has not completed its work yet. It would facilitate the settlement of question concerning the liquidation of the results [of] Israeli actions; and in our opinion the US must have no interest in resumption of the war in the Middle East if the US Government is indeed guided by long range fundamental interests but not by the present day interests and does not follow conjuncture demands by Israel which are being dictated rather by spirits of military success today than by the care for tomorrow."

The Secretary said that he appreciated Mr. Gromyko's statement and would probably have an oral statement in response which Foy Kohler would transmit to the Ambassador before his prospective departure for Moscow on leave. Meanwhile, he commented that in his view both the United States and the Soviet Union have an interest in not having military solutions in the Middle East. We must face the fact that both of us have some "crazy people" to deal with in this area. We had been hopeful but not optimistic on the formula of a resolution worked out between Ambassador Dobrynin and Ambassador Arthur Goldberg in New York last week. We had thought the moderate Arab representatives might accept the formula, but we knew they were intimidated by Cairo, Algiers, and Damascus. He had even thought it possible in the light of his conversation with UAR Foreign Minister Fawzi in New York that the Egyptians might be reasonable. However, they were apparently impressed by the more extreme positions of Algiers and Damascus. The dynamics of the situation among the Arabs were that the most extreme position tended to become the common position. If there could have been a secret vote of the Arabs he felt that many would have accepted the agreed formula. Dobrynin interjected, "Yes, 8 or 9".

The Secretary continued that the United States has no interest whatsoever in inflammation of the situation on the Middle East or in maintaining Israel in the territorial positions it occupies. However, it was clear that Israel would be difficult and that the question of Jerusalem in particular would be a severe issue.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked why the United States had abstained on the Pakistani resolution on Jerusalem. This was hard to understand in view of the statements on the subject issued by the White House and the Department. The Secretary replied that we had tried to negotiate with the Pakistanis to get reasonable language to which we could agree but they had refused to talk with us since they had the votes required for passage. Dobrynin commented that nobody knew about our attempts to negotiate with the Pakistanis so that the result was that the whole Assembly had been very surprised by our abstention.

The Secretary resumed, saying that we were now looking ahead and felt it was important soon to take some first steps. We were considering what this might be. We had no Government positions yet but speaking personally he thought it possible that if UN observers were placed at Sharm-el-Sheikh, it was then possible that Israel might withdraw well back into the Sinai Peninsula, perhaps half way. Dobrynin asked why not the whole way. The Secretary responded that Israel was not likely to be persuaded to go that far. He repeated that what we needed in the near future was some demonstration of movement. Sharm-el-Sheikh was a simple and uncomplicated problem. The Suez Canal would be much more complicated. In any case, he felt that the atmosphere might be improved in the Middle East by some such step as partial Israel withdrawal in the Sinai Peninsula. Dobrynin asked from what point the Israelis might withdraw. In response, the Secretary repeated that he was speaking personally and unofficially simply in order to illustrate his point. He then referred to a map and speculated that if Sharm-el-Sheikh were taken care of the Israelis might pull back to a point about half way up the Peninsula.

The Secretary then said that Syria was another point where something might be done. For example, if it could be agreed that for some distance on both sides of the Syrian-Israeli border there would only be police forces. Dobrynin interjected that he hesitated to use the term but would the Secretary mean a "demilitarized zone"? The Secretary replied that he had in mind essentially that, i.e., a zone in which there would be no heavy equipment and guns. He reiterated that he was only thinking aloud and searching for some practical steps, that there had been no consultation and that these were not U.S. Government positions or proposals. However, he felt that he would like to keep in touch with the Soviets as to what could be done. On the whole, he said he was optimistic except on two points: First, how to get the Arabs to accept non-belligerence and, second, Jerusalem. Ambassador Dobrynin asked why Jerusalem was so difficult. The Secretary responded by recalling that the United States has never recognized rights of any one to control Jerusalem, but commented that there were some very strong feelings involved and that there would be great difficulties with Israel on this point. Ambassador Dobrynin wondered why the Secretary had not mentioned Jordan. The Secretary said that in the case of Jordan the principal problem would be that of Jerusalem.

He wanted to mention another thing; he felt that when public discussion focused on Israel this tended to conceal another basic problem, that is the fear which other Arab Governments feel of the so-called progressive Arab States-Egypt, Algeria, and Syria. It would be useful if these three could give assurances that they had no hostile intentions against the moderate Arab States. Ambassador Dobrynin professed some surprise that these States should need assurances. He commented that it would be very difficult for the Soviets to talk to the Egyptians in such terms. The Secretary resumed, recalling that U.S. relations with the UAR have been good sometimes in the past and with the other Arab States as well, but at other times difficult. He cited the instance when U.S. planes had been sent to Saudi Arabia when that country felt threatened. He commented that the Arabs seemed able to unite only against Israel. When one talked to an individual Arab alone he might seem reasonable, but if another were present, he became crazy. He then remarked that the Soviets had probably learned this in connection with their own consultations with the Arabs and cited as an example of what he meant the Saudi Arabian representative Barodi, who in public made very violent speeches. Dobrynin replied that the Soviets had not even tried to consult with Barodi. The Secretary then repeated he felt a number of Arabs would have accepted the UN resolution had it not been for the extreme positions of Algeria and Syria. He had the impression that even Fawzi would have accepted the compromise language.

Ambassador Dobrynin then noted that the head of the Department's Egyptian Desk was going to Cairo. The Secretary confirmed this and said that this move was in accordance with our stay-behind agreement with the Egyptians.

Later at luncheon Ambassador Dobrynin returned to the subject asking how the United States intended to proceed with respect to the Arabs. He commented it was evident from Soviet contacts with the Arabs in New York that the latter harbor some very hard feelings towards the United States. The Secretary responded that he felt some of the Arab States would be quite willing to make peace with Israel. However, they were all afraid of Radio Cairo which was able to stir up their people and bring them out into the streets. We had once felt that Nasser would exercise a moderating even restraining influence in the Arab world but this time had apparently gone. Ambassador Dobrynin observed that there had been some "ultra-extremists" pressures on Nasser (by implication which he had resisted). Then had come the Israel surprise attack. The Secretary said it was very important that Soviet Chairman Kosygin believe the assurances which President Johnson had given him at Glassboro. He must understand that there had been no double dealing. The United States had made every effort to restrain Israel and we had felt that we had an assurance that they would not move while we tried to find a solution for the question of passage through the Strait of Tiran. We had simply been unable to control them and had had no advance information whatsoever about their move. He himself had been awakened at 2:30 in the morning to receive this information.

Washington, July 25, 1967, 0139Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Sandstorm. Drafted by Eugene Rostow on July 24; cleared by Katzenbach, Kohler, Battle, and Bundy; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to London.

/2/Document 386.

/3/Telegram 11928 to Amman, July 24, states the British Charge had confirmed that the British and U.S. positions were basically the same; both wished to stress that the King had to make his own decision on the question of direct talks with the Israelis. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM)

/4/Telegram 11929 to Amman, July 24, provided instructions concerning King Hussein's request for resumption of U.S. arms shipments. It states that the U.S. Government hoped to resume an arms supply relationship with Jordan, and a Defense Department representative had been sent to London to discuss the subject with General Khammash, but the situation in Congress on the general question of military assistance precluded immediate action. On the subject of economic aid, Burns was authorized to tell the King that the $6 million budget support payment which would fall due during the summer would be released on time and that the other aid projects discussed between the two governments before the outbreak of hostilities were under active review. (Ibid.)

/5/Telegrams 12559 and 12560 to London, July 25, which transmitted messages from Rusk to Foreign Secretary Brown and Ambassador Bruce, were repeated to Amman. Both messages stated that the proposed reply to King Hussein was an interim reply, to be supplemented as more information about the Israeli position became available. (Ibid.)

You should now proceed to carry out instructions in reftels, substituting following text for Para D(3) of reftel 11347.

/6/Burns reported in telegram 502 from Amman, July 25, that he had seen King Hussein that evening and carried out the instructions in telegrams 12561, 11928, 11929, and 11347. The King's reaction was one of deep disappointment. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM)

Rusk

President Johnson held his regular weekly luncheon meeting on July 25, 1967, with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Walt Rostow, and George Christian. Tom Johnson's notes of the meeting state that there was a discussion of the Middle East and that the President told Rostow "to tell Bundy to channel future requests by leading Jewish leaders to Bundy and not to the President. The President said he was seeing too many." Rusk said that Israel "has won a battle and not a war." Rostow discussed conversations he had had with David Ginsburg and Abe Feinberg. The President said "many of the Jewish leaders want us to make the Arabs sit down and talk with the Israelis." He commented, "We know no mediator who is going to set himself up" to handle this situation. (Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings)

A July 26 memorandum from Bundy to the President states that he had been "well filled in" by David Ginsburg the day before and he thought Ginsburg and Feinberg had a clear signal on two points:

"(1) that they should make their contacts with me and not bother you for a while, and

"(2) what Israel most needs now is not to have our whole overseas arms program knocked apart by the Congress. David assured me they understood this point and would do everything they could with Symington and their other friends."

Bundy continued:

"I think in fact your visit with them was helpful simply because it reassured them that you will always listen. That wise man, Wally Barbour, made a good comment the other day: that since the Israelis and their friends cannot possibly help using every channel they have got, we have to accept that fact and make use of it ourselves. This is what you did yesterday and I think they understand that enough is enough for a while." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Special Committee #2, July 1-31, 1967)

No other record has been found of the conversation to which Bundy referred.

Washington, July 27, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Kohler. The memorandum is part II of IV.

SUBJECT
Middle East

PARTICIPANTS
Amb. Anatoliy Dobrynin, USSR
Deputy Under Secretary Kohler

I had lunch with the Soviet Ambassador today at his invitation and talked with him from approximately 12:30 to 2:20.

/2/The text of the oral statement was cleared by the President. (Memorandum from Walt Rostow to the President, July 26 at 7:30 p.m., with Johnson's handwritten "L. OK"; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin/Kohler Conversations, Vol. I)

"We welcome Foreign Minister Gromyko's message of July 24, indicating that the USSR is willing to continue bilateral discussions on the Middle East situation.

"Though the United States had reservations regarding the utility of the emergency General Assembly session, it sought earnestly to reach agreement with the Soviet Union and with others on a general resolution which would contribute to a stable and durable peace in the Middle East. The position taken by Ambassador Goldberg with Foreign Minister Gromyko and members of your delegation was intended to bring about a productive result; our objective was to find words which would provide a solid base for constructive solutions to Middle East problems without offense to any party.

"We were pleased that it was possible to reach common ground with you in New York on a draft text which envisaged the withdrawal of Israeli troops and at the same time recognized the right of Israel and all other states in the area to maintain an independent national existence and to live in peace and security. We hope you agree that Ambassador Goldberg cooperated fully, and in a spirit of accommodation, with you and with others in working out language which would be broadly acceptable. In our view, the principles stated in that resolution are basic and inseparable elements in building of a lasting peace in the Middle East.

"Assuming as we do that you would not wish to encourage intransigence among the Arabs, it is possible to envisage further conversations which may help stabilize and improve the situation in the area. Our purpose, like your own, is to curb irresponsible extremism with respect to the Middle East dispute from whatever quarter it may arise.

"We consider that as permanent members of the Security Council with special responsibilities it would be useful and desirable in the spirit of Article 33 of the UN Charter for the USSR and the US to carry forward their discussions looking toward a stabilization of the situation in the Middle East. In particular, the conditions for settlement would naturally be improved if the US and the USSR, together with other Governments with interests in the area, could find ways and means to bring about restraint in the arms race in the Middle East. This is a matter we would like to discuss further with you.

"I will be glad to have your thoughts on how further discussion on Middle East questions can be pursued with your government.

"In the meantime, we hope both our governments can exercise their influence on the parties concerned to help maintain the cease-fire proclaimed by the UN and, in particular, to urge cooperation with the efforts being made by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to this end. We would be deeply concerned about a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East and will do everything we can to move the situation promptly toward a peaceful settlement."

After listening to and then reviewing this statement, the Ambassador asked whether this meant we would envisage action in the Security Council. I replied that we would be quite prepared to have the Security Council adopt the resolution which had been discussed between him and Ambassador Goldberg during the Special General Assembly. He commented that the Arab position would probably remain the same and that the Arabs would still probably not accept the resolution. I responded that we were open-minded as to tactics, provided that the basic principles embodied in the resolution were preserved. Speaking personally, it seemed to me that if we consulted we might well agree that it would be better to let a little time pass and allow Arab passions to cool before acting. From the US point of view, we were certainly not interested in a repeat of the acrimonious debates and the impasse characterizing the last special session of the General Assembly.

/3/Rusk commented on this at a news conference on July 19; for the transcript see Department of State Bulletin, August 7, 1967, pp. 159-167.

He then inquired about the reference to supporting the efforts of General Bull, referring to the differences between the Israelis' claim that the cease-fire line ran through the middle of the Suez Canal and the Egyptians' claim that the Suez Canal was theirs. I replied that as long as the Suez Canal was closed, this was certainly a hypothetical question. We are not talking about a legal settlement of the boundaries between Israel and Egypt; these could only be determined at a later stage and in another context. As far as we were concerned, the Sinai Peninsula was still within UAR sovereignty, but we recognize that they would have some difficulty in exercising this sovereignty at the present time. Consequently, our present interest was limited to the question of establishing an effective cease-fire line wherever that might be and having that line accepted by Israel and the UAR.

In reply to his inquiry, I told him that we had purposely left the question of venue for further discussion vague. As far as we were concerned, this could take place in Moscow or Washington or New York. However, we had realized that they might have more of a problem than we had in this respect, so we had left the decision to them. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation, indicating that he was not at all sure what Moscow would prefer. In this connection, he referred to his own hopes to go on leave (though adding that he has not yet received specific approval). He also said that while there had been some rumors that Fedorenko would be replaced, there had to his knowledge been no decision on it.

In conclusion, the Ambassador expressed appreciation for the message, saying that he now fully understood it and that he would report to Moscow.

Amman, July 28, 1967, 1512Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Sandstorm. Received at 2:32 p.m.

/2/Telegram 547 from Amman, July 27, reported that Burns had seen King Hussein that day. (Ibid.)

/3/Telegram 519 from Amman, July 26, elaborated on the report in telegram 502 (see footnote 6, Document 390) of Burns' July 25 conversation with King Hussein. It states that the King asked Burns whether the U.S. guarantee of territorial integrity applied in the current situation. Burns said that he had no choice but to indicate that the United States could not undertake unilaterally to guarantee a return to the pre-June 5 lines. Hussein expressed deep disappointment. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM)

/4/See Document 365.

3. I told the King that his statement to me on July 25 to the effect that it was now apparent America had made its agonizing choice and had chosen Israel disturbed me greatly because it simply was not correct. I said that we had an enormous stake--motivated by the most compelling of all incentives, self-interest--to preclude an East-West confrontation from developing in the Middle East. For this reason we desired to retain our position in the Arab world, and we wanted peace.

4. I then told the King I was such an unsubtle being I was going to have to ask him to tell me exactly why the instructions from Washington I had read him on July 25 represented such a deep disappointment to him.

5. The King replied that when he was at the White House last month, during private conversations with the President, Mr. Bundy, and Mr. Katzenbach, he had gained the impression that if he were prepared for a settlement with Israel, the US was prepared to lend him the strongest possible support. The subsequent indications of our support had struck him as being on a descending curve.

6. When FonMin Touqan returned to Amman, he reported to the King on the discussions he had had with American officials. From this briefing, said the King, he detected what he considered to be a weakening in American support for Jordan.

7. The instructions I had read him on July 25 appeared to him to be a yet further retreat from the degree of support he had concluded from his talks at the White House he might expect. On arms, for example, he said, he appreciated our Congressional problem, but the net result for him, no matter how valid our reasons, was that we were not going to be able to move as fast in that direction as the King desired and felt necessary.

8. I said that he should have no doubt about US support and that what the President, Mr. Bundy, and Mr. Katzenbach told him at the White House still very much obtained. The King said he appreciated my returning to see him and what I had said to him was reassuring. In sorting out his own thoughts during the past 48 hours he, too, had figured that the US would support him to the extent that the overall situation permitted. He only hoped our support would not prove to be too little too late.

9. Hussein said that, taking all considerations into account, he had concluded his own position was too weak to try to undertake bilateral negotiations with the Israelis at this moment. For one thing, he said, he agreed with US that Boumediene and Atassi, and Nasser probably, could try to pull the rug out from under him during the course of his trying to negotiate a bilateral settlement with Israel or just afterward. Nasser, he suspects, wants to see how far Jordan can get in reaching an accord with Israel as an indicator of how Nasser should go about doing the same thing, but Hussein doubts that Nasser could resist the temptation somewhere along the line to try to overthrow him.

10. Secondly, said the King, his security situation is too weak for the risks that would be involved in pursuing a settlement course at this moment. The Syrians, he reminded me, retain intact the greater part of their military establishment, whereas Jordan has lost a tremendous amount of equipment and has an air force consisting of one Hawker-Hunter. He noted, too, that until he could do something about replenishing some of his equipment losses he was in a difficult position vis-?-vis Jordanians and others in justifying the withdrawal of the 15,000 Iraqi troops.

11. A third reason, said the King, was that the Jerusalem problem at the moment looked insoluble and that before he undertook the risks of bilateral negotiation with Israel, he would have to have some indication that the Israelis have more flexibility on Jerusalem than would now appear to be the case. The risks to the regime of bilateral negotiations with Israel are so great, he said, that it would be folly to undertake them unless there was at least a chance of his being able to bring back a settlement that would be accepted. He said he guessed his position was similar to that of former President Eisenhower who was reluctant to attend summit meetings with the Russians unless there were some prospect of success. The King then quoted an Arab proverb to the effect that everyone acclaims the rainmaker who makes rain but that rainmakers who try but fail to bring rain are quickly disposed of.

12. I asked him how long he thought he could hold his position on the East Bank without forward motion in some direction. He replied "three or four months, assuming all the breaks do not go against me. Who knows, Nasser may crack before then and be forced to reach a settlement with the Israelis, in which case the danger of my doing so would be immeasurably reduced." (Comment: By the "breaks" the King has specifically in mind two things: (a) that refugees would start moving from east to west, and (b) that we would furnish him with a certain amount of military equipment.)

13. The King said that during the next three-to-four month period he was much more concerned about the West Bank than the East Bank. He said that the euphoria that had appeared in the immediate wake of hostilities had vanished and that friction was developing between the Arabs and the Israelis. He said that if the Israelis react to this friction by repressive policies, this would have two results: (a) it would convince the Arabs that the Israelis are not serious about a settlement and of living in peace with the Arabs, and (b) it would transmit great agitation to the East Bank. He said that the indications were now that the East Bank would support him on a settlement, but this support would disappear quickly if the Israelis follow a repressive policy on the West Bank, fail to facilitate the return of refugees to the West Bank, or let the West Bank fall into worse economic straits. "Please tell the Israelis," said the King, "that if they want peace, they must be patient and exercise self-restraint." I reminded the King that the GOJ, too, must use self-restraint and not take actions which have the result of exacerbating Arab-Israeli relations on the West Bank.

14. I asked the King if he thought Nasser might resume hostilities in the foreseeable future against the Israelis in Sinai. The King said that Nasser was in no position to undertake major hostilities against the Israelis, though he retained, of course, the capacity to stage minor clashes along the Suez Canal. Nor did Hussein think that the Syrians would undertake major hostilities against Israel.

15. Hussein said that he expected to leave Amman this weekend for Tehran, there to meet with the Shah and the President of Turkey. He said he hoped that somehow a grouping could be worked out to include Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq and Jordan. This would put him in a stronger position vis-?-vis the Arab radicals in trying to reach a settlement with Israel.

16. Hussein also intends to try to visit the moderate Arab states, and prior to Aug 10 in the event an Arab summit is held. Hussein said he felt that the Arab moderates could be on the verge of a break-through if they could only band together. Nasser's fangs had been loosened and now was the time to move. If he were successful in this endeavor, this, too, would strengthen his position vis-?-vis the Arab radicals.

17. Hussein said he was still expecting to meet with President Aref in Amman although he did not know exactly when Aref would come. The question of the removal of Iraqi forces from Jordan had, at Aref's request, been postponed until Hussein and Aref meet.

18. I asked the King was he by any chance toying with the idea of some sort of confederation with Iraq. The King replied that his head was full of ideas of every conceivable description, but before he was prepared to formulate any particular idea he would have to do a lot of probing first. The King noted that Iraq was the only Arab state to provide him with any substantial assistance (other than monetary) during the past two months. Hussein said that if some sort of arrangement could be worked out with Iraq, then perhaps the Saudis might be interested in joining.

19. I concluded the interview by saying to the King that I wished to revert to the subject of Jerusalem and want to put to him a purely hypothetical question which I assured him was of my own devising. The question was this--"Supposing Jerusalem were made an international city, incorporating the major parts of the Jordanian and Israeli sectors, though omitting the suburban areas . . ." the King had already started to shake his head. I said, "permit me to finish sir . . . and the United Nations headquarters were transferred to this international city of Jerusalem?" The King took a long time answering and finally said "I guess in that case we would all have to accept it, wouldn't we?"

20. I asked the King that in the event Jerusalem might be internationalized along the line I had hypothetically posed, would he still want the West Bank back. He answered in the affirmative. He said he would never be forgiven by the Arabs if the West Bank were left to Israeli control, either direct or through a puppet state. He said that the Palestinians have caused him a great deal of trouble in his lifetime, but they would cause him, and indeed all of us, even more trouble if they were not rejoined to Jordan.

21. Comment follows by separate telegram.

22. Please repeat this telegram to London and Tel Aviv.

Burns

Washington, July 28, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Bovis on August 3 and approved by Battle.

SUBJECT
The Situation in Egypt

PARTICIPANTS
His Excellency The Marquis de Merry Del Val, Spanish Ambassador
NEA--Ambassador Lucius D. Battle
EUR/SPP--George W. Landau
NEA/UAR--H. Eugene Bovis

The Spanish Ambassador said that he had received two letters, the contents of which he wished to convey to Ambassador Battle. The first letter concerned the difference of views between the US and Spain on the present Middle East situation. The Spanish Ambassador in Cairo, Angel Sagaz, thought the Spanish saw the issues more clearly than the US. He feared that the US was alienating the Arabs and opening the door wider to increased Russian influence.

The second letter reported the views of various groups in Cairo with which Ambassador Sagaz had come in contact. The first set of views were those of El-Zyyat. As a result of events in the UN, Mr. Zyyat apparently has arrived at the conclusion that the US is now the foremost political power as well as the foremost military and economic power in the world. Ambassador Angel Sagaz viewed Mr. Zyyat's remarks as an admission that the USSR was unable to retrieve the situation for the Arabs.

Ambassador Sagaz reported the views of two groups that thought that there should be a dialogue between the US and Egypt. The first group said that the dialogue must begin now and that it must be through Nasser, since he is the only leader capable of putting the brake on the Russian advance in the Arab World. The other group believed that a US-Egyptian dialogue was possible only after the disappearance of Nasser. This group thought that a coup d'etat was not far away and that it was likely to be bloody.

Ambassador Sagaz also reported an interview with Dr. Drubi, the Syrian Ambassador to the UAR. The Syrian Ambassador felt there was only one solution to the present crisis, and that was a resumption of open war by whatever means the Arabs could muster, including guerilla activity. Dr. Drubi said the boycott, the cessation of oil shipments and the closing of the Canal had not been sufficient to bring the West around. In any event, Saudi Arabia and Libya were not willing to go along any longer. Nasser had told Dr. Drubi that the Egyptians had lost 20,000 troops during the hostilities. Ambassador Sagaz said this had been a revelation, since the previous figure on Egyptian dead had been given as 5,000.

Ambassador Battle thanked Ambassador Merry Del Val for conveying to us Ambassador Sagaz' analysis. He thought our analyses did not differ substantially. We were aware that the Soviets were making increased inroads in the Near East. The question was now how far the USSR was willing to go in backing up the UAR militarily, economically, and politically. Mr. Battle said that while we were concerned about the Soviet maneuvers, there was little we could do in the UAR at the moment. After all, it was the Egyptians who had broken relations and it was up to them to make the first move for a resumption of relations. Nevertheless, we were willing to talk to Egyptians any time and any place. There have already been numerous meetings in private channels. There were three prerequisites for the resumption of relations:

1. Compensation for the damage to American property in Egypt.
2. Retraction of the "big lie".
3. A quiet period in which statements about the US and President Johnson were restrained.

Mr. Battle said that in the meantime Spain and other European countries could help by maintaining a Western presence in Egypt.

Washington, August 1, 1967, 0030Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret. Drafted by Eugene Rostow's Special Assistant Alan R. Novak on July 29, cleared by Battle and Popper and by telephone by Sisco, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Also sent to Moscow and USUN and repeated to Copenhagen, Monrovia, New Delhi, Oslo, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

14537. Subject: Middle East.

/2/A paper entitled "Middle East," July 28, set forth Brown's questions. (Ibid., POL UK-US)

2. Rostow stated he had discussed matter with Secretary Rusk who shared Brown's view that matters not be allowed to drift. The US had no objection to the UK talking to the Russians; indeed, encouraged it. Stressed coordination between US and UK important to keep actions on the same track. On substance of resolution Rostow stressed US attached great importance to preventing any erosion whatever of substance of draft agreed between US and USSR. In our view, Soviet would probably seek weakening of agreed formula which we would regard as disastrous. Dean said HMG fully agreed it was indispensable to stick firmly to position we had held together throughout UNGA, as noted in talking points he had given Rostow previous evening. Rostow added that it might be difficult to obtain appropriate SC res in August. Soviets do not seem interested in immediate SC action now; the three top Soviet reps were all on vacation during August. Rostow suggested raising question with French, SC Chairman during August. He agreed UK approach to Indians could be useful. Battle suggested that UK also talk to other important users of Canal such as Norwegians, Danes and Liberians as well as Indians and French. They are countries who should carry load on this matter. After all, UAR now in flagrant violation of international obligations.

3. US had doubts about reconstitution of UNEF in view of recent history. Perhaps agreement to demilitarize Sinai could be obtained at an early stage in exchange for troop withdrawals if rights of passage in Canal and Aqaba for all vessels could be assured through UAR acceptance of SC resolution embracing renunciation of belligerence by Arabs.

4. We would take up draft letter to SYG with USUN. We liked idea of UN rep in area but our present thinking we prefer a mediator cloaked with authority of SYG rather than SYG himself. In a phone call after visit, Rostow added suggestion that letter request SYG to consult with US, USSR and France about possibility of his sending representative to the area as mediator.

5. Amb Dean stated that Sir Lesley Glass, DCM UKUN, would come to Washington on Tuesday (8/1) to discuss possible action on res in SC.

6. Comment: As indicated above, we share UK view that matters should not be allowed to drift. However, we must proceed carefully in preparing any next round in the Security Council and coordinate closely since Soviet objective still remains to get a withdrawal resolution out of UN while paying a minimum price for it. As Rostow made clear in above conversation, we attach great importance to preventing any erosion on substance of draft agreed between US and USSR. UK was very wobbly throughout entire Special General Assembly; in fact, we had to keep at Caradon constantly in order to avoid an erosion in our position. While we could not disagree that they should talk to Soviets, we would be very concerned indeed if such talks led to reopening of resolution agreed to between US and USSR. This point will be reaffirmed to UK representatives Tuesday, who are coming into Dept for follow up conversation. Coalition we put together at UN will take constant nurturing and consultations in order to maintain necessary solid front in any SC round. While we have no objections in principle to UK going to capitals in support of early opening of Suez Canal, important there be prior clearcut understanding through fullest possible consultations between us to assure that approaches made in capitals are directed toward mutually shared objectives. In particular, we think it unrealistic to contemplate early opening of Canal except in circumstances where all vessels including Israeli, go through.

7. We already have indications through further informal consultations with UKRep here that UK has in mind weakening of US-Soviet agreed draft by moving principal operative paragraph into preamble.

8. Full prior consultations with Israelis would be essential on above moves. UK has in mind to assure them we do not intend erode position and so that there be full understanding re any next round in SC.

Rusk

Washington, July 29, 1967, 1847Z

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton; cleared by Battle, Barbour, Sisco, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Rusk. The President approved the draft cable on July 29. Rostow sent it to him on July 28 with a covering memorandum noting that it stated U.S. policy for Israeli consumption and for internal guidance. He concluded, "Barbour participated in the drafting of the cable and he and I think it is consistent with your own thinking, though perhaps less pungently phrased than you would do it. Since a cable that is used for external and internal distribution has fairly wide distribution, this is probably just as well." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis)

14236. For Ambassador from Secretary.

Following is for your guidance in discussions with GOI following your consultations Washington. We will take same line with Israelis here, as well as in New York and elsewhere:

1. USG commitment to and support of Israel's statehood remains firm as ever. We believe our role in recent Security Council and General Assembly sessions clearly attests to our steadfastness in this regard.

2. Public mood in US is one of widespread sympathy for Israel's cause in recent war and admiration for Israel's demonstrated courage and determination.

3. Underlying this mood is strong "pro-peace" sentiment coupled with sense of uneasiness that somehow, despite setback suffered by Soviets and their friends in area, Arabs will come back for second round.

4. It is of utmost importance to maintain momentum towards a political settlement. The longer the present situation remains frozen, the greater will become the danger that Israel's military victory will not produce commensurate political results.

5. We are convinced that achievement such results justifies some risk and large measure of flexibility on part of GOI. United States has from own experience in recent wars learned long range benefits of being magnanimous in victory. We think Israel will similarly benefit if it take similar approach. American people would not understand effort turn military victory into territorial gains. We appreciate the assurances of GOI in this respect, recognizing, of course, the need for security arrangements and the peculiarly difficult problems of Jerusalem. What is important is to emphasize continuously that the objectives are peace and security, not territorial gains.

6. This is consistent with our own basic commitment to seek Arab renunciation of state of belligerency, to assure freedom of navigation, and to uphold territorial integrity of all states of area. Within this framework there are number of issues on which USG and American public will be closely watching Israel's actions for evidence that GOI seeks truly magnanimous and stable peace which will not contain seeds of future conflict. Two areas in which Israeli policies over the years have occasionally troubled this country are Jerusalem and refugees. Should Israel now appear inflexible on these issues to point of jeopardizing constructive political settlement, there could be gradual erosion of broadly based sympathy and support which Israel now enjoys in US.

7. We fully recognize that achievement of a settlement does not depend on Israel alone. Recent Arab intransigence at UN does not reflect any serious facing up to realities of situation. Should settlement efforts fail, however, it is imperative that Israel have demonstrated its willingness to make every reasonable effort avoid that outcome. Dangers in such a failure are obvious, including inter alia further consolidation Soviet position in area, inability of US to recoup losses it has suffered, further decline of moderates in area and ultimately renewed threat of further hostilities. Israel and USG must make every effort to avoid this path.

8. One hope we now see for breaking out of vicious cycle lies in settlement with Jordan. It is essential, however, to recognize dangers this involves for Hussein, for Western position in Jordan and for Israel itself. We realize Israel disillusioned by Hussein's role in recent war. Whatever one's views of Hussein, however, we see no alternative which would not be infinitely worse. It is difficult envisage how moderate regime could survive in Jordan in absence settlement which respected the principle of Jordan's territorial integrity. Disappearance of moderate Jordanian regime would open vast new area for Soviet influence with correspondingly increased threat to Lebanon and Arabian Peninsula-Red Sea Basin-Persian Gulf bastion.

9. While Arab military defeat was blow to Soviets, it could backfire against Israel and the West unless a blow is now struck for peace. It is for this reason that we urge Israel to be flexible, patient, discreet and generous, particularly with respect to refugee problem and question of arrangements for Jerusalem which will take more than pro forma account of Jordanian and international interests in that city. Only such an approach will assure continued broad US and international solidarity with Israel as it pursues legitimate goal of stable national existence in difficult and dangerous days ahead. As Prime Minister Eshkol wrote to President Johnson on first day of war, "the hour of danger can also be an hour of opportunity." We urge Israel to rise to challenge of this opportunity for peace, as it did to challenge of war.

Rusk

Washington, July 30, 1967, 1638Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files l967-69, POL 7 SUDAN. Confidential. Drafted by Houghton on July 28; cleared in draft by former Ambassador to Iraq Robert C. Strong, Ambassador to Libya David D. Newsom, and Country Director for North Africa John F. Root, and by Eugene Rostow and Battle; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, Tripoli, Tunis, and Rabat. The handwritten revisions on the telegram noted below appear to be Rusk's.

/2/A meeting of foreign ministers of Arab States was held in Khartoum August 1-5 in preparation for an Arab summit conference.

2. Excellency:

"Now that the Special Session of the UN General Assembly is behind us, I thought I should share with you some of my thoughts regarding the future. I am particularly anxious to discuss these thoughts with you on the eve of the Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference which should have an important influence on the evolution of Arab policy and the course of our relations in the days and weeks ahead, as well as on the future well-being of the entire Near East. I shall be frank and hope you will receive my frankness as coming from one who wants peace and who is sincerely and deeply interested in the welfare of (host country) and of the Arab world as a whole.

3. "In these critical days the Arabs should have a constructive position if it is to elicit world support and meet their diverse problems. I think that you would agree that the meetings at the United Nations over the past weeks confirm the validity of this point. If the coming meeting, in which moderate representatives will be more numerous, can reach realistic common ground, the position of the Arab world will be much improved.

/3/The original text "required" was changed to "indicated".

/4/The original text "peaceful coexistence with Israel" was changed to "peace throughout the area".

/5/The original text "historical and emotional impediments" was changed to "deep-rooted impediments".

/6/The original text "recognition" was changed to "acceptance".

/7/The original text "cannot" was changed to "it is difficult".

7. "The US values its relations and long friendship with (host country). This friendship requires that we make together an earnest search for understanding. This is essential if we are to overcome the problems that confront us.

8. "Excellency, I hope this frank exposition of my views may be helpful in your own further consideration of these issues. I realize naturally that we do not look at all problems in the same light. I am sure, however, that you and your colleagues, in your deliberations of these difficult and complicated problems, will make sure that the course you take is truly in the long-term self-interests of the Arab world. In your endeavors you have my sincerest best wishes. With warm regards, Sincerely,"

9. We would hope that the Foreign Minister would consider the message as confidential. You should also confidentially inform the Minister that the Secretary has written in similar vein to the Foreign Ministers of those Arab States which have maintained relations with us.

Rusk

Washington, July 30, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII. Confidential; Sensitive; Very Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rostow on July 31. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that copies were sent to Bundy and Saunders. A copy was sent to the Department of State with a covering memorandum of July 31 from Rostow to Benjamin Read.

Mr. Ephraim Evron, Minister, Embassy of Israel, called me yesterday [July 30] and asked if he could drop by at my home on his way back from the airport where he was leaving his wife at 10:00 p.m. I agreed.

His points were these.

/2/Saunders commented in a July 31 memorandum to Bundy that the main Congressional threat to the military aid program as it related to Israel was the Church amendment to eliminate the revolving fund for military credit sales. He noted that Israel would by no means be the only country affected by the amendment and commented that Evron made a fair point in saying that they should not be trying to save the whole program by arguing Israel's case alone. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Military Aid) The amendment to the foreign assistance authorization bill (S. 1872) proposed by Senator Frank Church would have terminated as of December 31, 1967, the special Defense Department military assistance credit account used to guarantee loans by the Export-Import Bank for arms purchases by underdeveloped countries. On August 9 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted the amendment and reported out S. 1872.

/3/Evron told Battle in a luncheon conversation on July 31 that the Israelis were convinced that "time is on their side and that the longer the Suez Canal is closed and the greater the economic problem in the UAR, the better chance that Nasser will be the first Arab country to come to peace terms with them." (Memorandum of conversation, July 31; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

At the present time the criterion of security was overriding in Israeli government discussions--security in the literal short-run sense. From that perspective, holding the West Bank was quite attractive, although, in the long run, it might well be judged less attractive.

3. Evron then told me he had put into the Israel government, when he was home, a proposal to initiate soon some action on the refugees, starting in Gaza. The proposal would be for the Israelis to pay an indemnity to Arab refugees if they moved out and settled in other countries. The West Bank could take some but not many. Others could go to Iran, Western Europe, etc. About 100,000 would be left in Gaza.

4. I confined myself to observing that we were now in an interval of re-thinking. We did not know where Israel government thoughts were tending. Nor did we know what the outcome would be of Hussein's talks with the Shah or the meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers in Khartoum. We did not know what Nasser's position was or Nasser's thoughts on when and how to proceed towards a settlement. Time would evidently be required; but there was danger for all if there was no forward movement in the direction of a settlement in the weeks ahead. Degenerative forces were at work as well as forces making for increased realism and moderation.

His only response was to probe as to whether we had any information on Nasser's thoughts or willingness to move towards a settlement. I said: No.

Walt

Washington, July 31, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, U.S. Position--Discussion. Secret. Sent through Walt Rostow.

SUBJECT
The Middle East at the End of July

/2/The President met at luncheon on August 1 with Rusk, Nitze, Walt Rostow, Bundy, and George Christian. No record of the meeting has been found. The agenda for Middle East discussion includes the question of naming a new coordinator on Israeli and UAR desalting plants, progress on the military aid fight, what to say to King Hussein concerning his planned trip to Moscow, and the difficulties "of getting a statement that can help the moderate Arabs without arousing the Israelis and their friends." (Ibid., Files of Minutes and Notes) For documentation on U.S. policy concerning possible cooperative desalting projects, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIV, Documents 130 ff.

1. The Israeli position appears to be hardening as the Arabs still resist all direct negotiations. The Israelis have great confidence in their short-run political and military superiority. I think the evidence grows that they plan to keep not only all of Jerusalem but the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, too.

2. Unless the Arabs make a drastic change in their bargaining position, we have no practical way of opposing this Israeli position. We can insist on the principle of "withdrawal from danger" but as a practical matter the Israelis will continue to confront the Arabs--and us--with small accomplished facts (today they put in their currency in much of the occupied territory), and we will find it unwise to take any practical action in reply. When the Israelis come to us for major military supplies, we shall need to have serious talks, but I begin to think that our bargaining power even on this issue is not overwhelming. I think we can trade hard on such matters as nuclear policy and perhaps even get them to back off from the French missiles they have had on order, but as long as the Arabs are adamant, I doubt if we can or should make the Israeli view of Jerusalem or the West Bank into a federal case. We can't tell the Israelis to give things away to people who won't even bargain with them. We may well be heading toward a de facto settlement on the present cease-fire lines, and we do not want to play King Canute if that is the flow of the tide in the Middle East. We want it to be Nasser's fault, not ours, if the Israelis decide to stay where they are. I think the Secretary may have a slightly different view--and you may want us to go around the alternatives a little tomorrow.

3. The Arab Foreign Ministers meet tomorrow in Khartoum. I think the odds on an eventual Arab summit are a little less than even; the odds on friction between the Arab right and left are pretty good. I see no current opportunity for us to take any important initiative with any of the Arabs--moderate or radical. We should wait until they come to us.

In sum, I think the current short-run position should be one of quiet watchful waiting. The most we might want to do this week is to get out a low-key statement which would offer some encouragement to responsible Arabs and yet not affront the Israelis. I have a new scheme for such a statement, namely, that it might be made in an exchange of letters with some outstanding American who is favorably known to the Arab world. Such a man might ask you if we still love the reasonable Arabs and you would then have an excuse to tell him that we do, without too much repetition of other points which they don't like. I hope to have a draft of such an exchange tomorrow. I also hope to have a further report on arms registration, which still takes lots of time in the Department. (It really is complex, though you don't believe it!)

As Hussein draws back from negotiation, a lot of us find ourselves looking once again at Nasser. Egypt remains the key country on the Arab side, and sooner or later Nasser is likely to put out stronger feelers toward us--he still hasn't come near solving his economic problems. I have commissioned a major intelligence estimate of just where Egypt now stands--especially in relation to the Soviets. I don't think a full Soviet "takeover" is imminent, nor do I think the Egyptians are going to re-open the war tomorrow, but these are the two dangers which we need to be alert for, even if the odds are small.

/3/On July 31 President Johnson announced Ginsburg's appointment as Executive Director of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book II, p. 726)

Washington, August 1, 1967, 1638Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco and Popper on July 31; cleared in draft by Stoessel (EUR), Kohler, and Battle; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to USUN.

14613. Subject: Middle East Bilateral Talks with Soviets. For Ambassador Thompson.

/2/Document 389.

/3/Document 392.

2. You will note Soviets have in effect suggested continuation of bilateral talks which took place in New York and have indicated desire to "find formulas--fully acceptable to both sides--of the recommendations of the General Assembly which has not completed its work yet." In our reply we have indicated willingness to participate in further consultation on a number of Middle Eastern problems. It seems apparent from language quoted above and Dobrynin's inquiry of Kohler regarding further SC action that Soviets are probing to determine whether there is any give in language of resolution agreed to by the US and USSR in closing days of UNGA. We wish to avoid renegotiating that resolution since it is hard to see how its language could be changed without risk of unraveling all that has been accomplished by our firm stand at UNGA.

3. Subject to foregoing, we see every advantage in pursuing broad consultations with the Soviets on Middle East problems both from the standpoint of trying to work out a peaceful settlement and from the standpoint of bilateral relations. Present situation in Middle East is so disturbing and ceasefire so precarious that it is desirable to carry forward exploration of possible approaches to peace settlement with Soviets and others. At the same time, in the short term, there are certain procedural difficulties in the way of progress through UN organs, particularly on basis Soviets desire.

4. Following points will help to give you additional flavor of our thinking:

(a) You will note that we have invited Soviet views as to when and how discussion should be pursued. Discussion of modalities would gain us a little time which would be useful from procedural standpoint in New York. Situation there indicates that barring unforeseen developments a Security Council meeting is unlikely much before middle August, if by then.

(b) You will note that while Sovs suggest discussions which in effect would carry on those we held in the final stages of the emergency General Assembly, our response is pitched in much more general terms. Sovs have obvious interest in trying to whittle away at agreement they reached with us on terms of GA Res on troop withdrawal and belligerency. We have very strong interest in not going beyond terms of agreed Soviet-American draft, which is rock-bottom formula from our standpoint. We do not contemplate any compromise of fundamental linkage between troop withdrawal and end of belligerency.

(c) Correspondingly, we would resist any Soviet effort to resume the emergency GA session, even though we recognize that door for resumption was left open in final procedural resolution which led to "temporary adjournment" of session. Further discussion of ME problem in GA all too likely to lead to erosion of strength we helped to mobilize against Soviet and non-aligned proposals which represented Arab views.

(d) Our reply indicates that we have a special interest in subject of arms limitation in ME. We would be encouraged by any sign that Soviets willing to exercise restraint in arms supply.

(e) We will also want to impress on Soviets need for them to exert their influence on Arab extremists against any resumption of hostilities and in favor of serious consideration of reasonable settlements. Ending claims of belligerency should enable all parties with interest in Middle East to establish normal political relationships and resume normal economic activities, including free maritime passage in international waterways.

(f) One procedural proposal we would regard as useful to permit further cooling off in area and to explore prospects for agreement, would be appointment of a mediator under UN auspices to explore possibilities with parties directly concerned. We tried unsuccessfully to float such an idea during emergency GA, but Arabs would only accept it if mediator's terms of reference were focused on troop withdrawals. We would be interested in anything you might pick up with respect to Soviet attitude regarding a mediator.

Rusk

Washington, August 1, 1967, 1901Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Whirlwind. Drafted by Battle on July 31; cleared by Eugene Rostow, Kohler, and Saunders; and approved by Katzenbach. Saunders sent a draft of this telegram to Walt Rostow with an August 1 memorandum recommending clearance and stating that Bundy agreed; a handwritten "OK" appears on the memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind)

/2/Telegram 350 from Geneva, July 31, reported that Siddiqui had informed Tubby of a message from Hafez saying that Nasser agreed to meeting with the President's representative at any time but preferred it to be in Cairo. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US) A message for Siddiqui transmitted in telegram 12837 to Geneva, July 25, stated that Anderson could not visit Cairo at that time but was frequently in Europe and would be available at a later date if desired. (Ibid.) This replied to telegram 296 from Geneva, July 25, which reported that Siddiqui had shown Tubby a message from Hafez in Cairo that Nasser said Mohieddin could not leave Cairo at that time but would welcome Anderson in Cairo. Siddiqui said he would accompany Anderson to Cairo and felt sure he could arrange a meeting with Nasser. (Ibid.) Telegram 12837 to Geneva relayed to Tubby that the Department was reluctant to have Anderson make a trip that appeared to be at U.S. initiative and wondered whether the fact that Siddiqui was not sure he could arrange a meeting with Nasser meant that Siddiqui and Hafez were acting on their own initiative. (Ibid.)

Please inform Siddiqui as follows:

1. US continues believe that communication between US and UAR through various channels may be helpful toward removing those obstacles which have clouded relations between two countries. It is impossible, however, at present time send personal representative of President to Cairo. If there are envoys of President Nasser available in Europe from time to time, US will endeavor provide suitable representative for discussions.

2. Mr. Anderson will be returning Europe in few weeks and there are other Americans, who could serve as channel, available from time to time if President Nasser wishes utilize them.

/3/Telegram 366 from Geneva, August 2, reported that Tubby had given this message to Siddiqui. (Ibid.)

Rusk

Washington, August 1, 1967, 2236Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Atherton and cleared by Grey. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, USUN, Beirut, Jidda, Tunis, Tripoli, Rabat, Kuwait, Rome, Rawalpindi, Tehran, Kuala Lumpur, Djakarta, and London.

/2/Dated July 31. (Ibid.)

State 13222 was addressed to Jerusalem but apparently not transmitted due communication error. Following is text, slightly modified in Para 1 d., to correct inaccuracy in original version:

1. In process of considering possible solutions to Jerusalem problem that might be acceptable to all parties, we have attempted to identify assumptions upon which any workable plan must be based. They are:

a. Our overriding objective is to achieve peaceful settlement between Israel and Jordan and settlement of Jerusalem problem should be within this context.

b. Israel will agree to no settlement which involves return of Old Jerusalem to exclusive Jordanian rule.

c. Jordan will agree to no settlement which fails to take into account Jordanian interests in Old City.

d. Jerusalem should not again become Middle Eastern Berlin, divided by barbed wire, no-man's-land and virtually complete ban on movement from one part of city to another. The only theme the Israelis state about Jerusalem is that it must be a unified city under single administration, which now includes Jordanian personnel previously employed by Old City government. They propose that Holy Places be placed by agreement with religious authorities under religious "sovereignty" and be given diplomatic status.

e. There should be guarantee, satisfactory to the three religious communities with special interests in Jerusalem, that Holy Places will be safeguarded and members of three faiths will have access to them.

2. We would appreciate comments of all addressees as to soundness and completeness these assumptions. Tehran, Rawalpindi, Djakarta, Kuala Lumpur, requested comment as to whether approach based on these hypotheses is likely satisfy local Muslim interests concerning Jerusalem. Rome comments requested re probable Vatican reaction.

Rusk

Washington, August 1, 1967.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, ISA Files: FRC 330 76-140, A/I/S, 2-12-6, 1967 Crisis Special File. Secret. Drafted by Townsend Hoopes. Copies were sent to Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul C. Warnke, and Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Regional Director for Near East and South Asia in Warnke's Office.

SUBJECT
Israel

/2/July 28.

Bundy told me that he has subsequently reached an agreement with Evron which had the President's endorsement. The agreement is that the US will accept and act upon Israeli purchases (cash and credit) amounting to $3 million of military equipment during the first 15 days of August or until the arrival of the Israeli military team.

I told Bundy that we had recommended to Nitze a more deliberate pace with regard to the team's arrival: namely, a meeting in early September which would give US officials time to digest the JCS paper (due 25 August) and the DIA paper (due at an earlier date). Bundy expressed the view that this would cause political problems, and that he did not quite see the need for "diddling with small things" while we were at the same time refusing to provide Israel with requested military equipment.

I checked with Nitze who had signed out the letter to Rusk on Saturday. Nitze said however that he had done so on the assumption that the situation involved neither political nor military urgency. He said that, if the White House considers that we faced a political problem, DoD was willing to be flexible. I then called Bundy again who said that he would like to make an agreement with Evron for the US to receive the Israeli team some time during the week of 21 August. He said he would confirm this with Rusk and would represent this date as being acceptable to Nitze and DoD. I concurred in this.

TWH
Principal Deputy

Washington, August 2, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR/US. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Battle on August 3. Rusk's initials with a line drawn through them appear on the memorandum indicating that he read it; and a note on the memorandum states that Battle had reported the conversation briefly at the staff meeting the previous day. Saunders sent a copy to Bundy with an attached note stating that Battle regarded this "as more serious than other feelers, but still doesn't think it comes from Nasser." Since Battle "doesn't think we can offer much" he was not eager to talk, but Eugene Rostow had sent a memorandum to Rusk recommending an expression of willingness to talk in Geneva. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Whirlwind)

SUBJECT
Talks with Egyptians

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Walter McDonald, Pan American Oil Company
Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary, NEA

1. I had a lengthy lunch today with Mr. Walter McDonald of Standard Oil of Indiana of which Pan American Oil is a subsidiary. I have known Mr. McDonald for about three years. During the time that I was in Cairo, he was a frequent visitor in connection with the oil finds of Pan American. He is on excellent terms with senior officials in the UAR Government. Mr. McDonald has just returned from the UAR and has seen a number of the top officials of the Government. He informs me that these officials and a number of private individuals with whom he talked convey the following impressions:

(a) Nasser has had it. The UAR is, however, better off with him for a few months than without him. If he goes now, there will be chaos and serious inroads by the communists. He must stay until some real plan exists for a governmental structure without him.

(b) The pro-Western elements in the country all believe that there must be a clear sign that the West will still deal with the UAR. This signal must come very soon or the absence of an alternative will drive the UAR completely into communist hands as the pro-Western elements will give up any hope of restraining the situation.

(c) There is general despondency throughout the country, particularly over the economic situation which is acutely serious.

(d) The desire of the USSR for an air base in Yemen and a naval base either in the UAR or in the Red Sea area is widely discussed.

2. Mr. McDonald said that he had been asked by Vice President Mohieddin, Mahmud Younis, and Aziz Sidki (former Ministry of the Treasury) to convey the following to me and through me to the U.S. Government.

(a) Either Zakaria Mohieddin or a senior representative of the UAR would like to come to the U.S. in the very near future. If Mohieddin comes, he would have to be received by the President or the Vice President. While he would not expect any aid, he could not go back to Cairo empty handed politically. The object of his trip would be to give evidence of an alternative relationship with the West to the only relationship apparent now; i.e., Russia.

(b) If the Israelis will withdraw 25 miles from the Suez Canal, the UAR will begin work immediately on clearing the Canal. While the UAR will not agree to Israeli shipping transiting the Suez Canal, it will publicly agree to the Straits of Tiran being open to Israeli shipping.

(c) The Israelis might be able to accept such an arrangement as a concession to world commerce with the possibility that the Suez might in time be open to them even though not initially.

(d) Time is of the essence if the remaining pro-Western elements in the country are not to give up any hope of Western help. While these elements all recognize that Nasser is a major stumbling block, they prefer to have him in office temporarily to having the alternatives available. While no one will suggest that a plot is underway against Nasser, almost all pro-Western elements refer to the need for a leader who reflects the changing times. While Nasser served his purpose as a revolutionary leader, that need is finished and he will ultimately have to be replaced.

(e) Most of the pro-Western or non-aligned elements are aware of the fact that the U.S. cannot grant government aid directly. They hope for an IMF agreement, rollover of credits, private business activity, etc. sufficient to keep them going until ties with the U.S. can be reestablished.

(f) Somewhat inconsistent with the view that the Russians are waiting to take over is the fact that they appear to have told the Government of the UAR that the Russians can give only token food assistance.

(g) The message regarding the visit of Mohieddin or another senior representative is a serious message, the reply to which is to be passed through the Pan American representative in Cairo as soon as possible.

Washington, August 4, 1967, 0001Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Battle, and approved by Rostow. Repeated to Amman and London.

15897. 1. During Evron call August 2, Under Secretary Rostow reported that Ambassador Burns, on basis his recent talks with King Hussein, thought Hussein still wanted settlement and was attempting strengthen his position as preparatory step.

/2/Burns commented in telegram 668 from Amman, August 4, that he hoped all the caveats of Hussein's position on Jerusalem, as contained in telegram 554 from Amman (Document 393), had been spelled out to Evron. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM)

/3/Burns commented in telegram 668 from Amman that the Jordanian Government rejected the refugee questionnaire because the form appeared to it to constitute an affirmation of Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and it feared use of the questionnaire would lead to a strong reaction and perhaps riots from the refugees. He commented that the Jordanian Government was "clearly ambivalent" about how to handle West Bank resistance, but he thought it was not necessary to hypothesize outside encouragement to explain the continuation of resistance on the West Bank.

4. Evron continued that further changes on Jerusalem not now on agenda. Eban had made clear that Israel prepared find role for Hussein as custodian of Moslem Holy Places. In Evron's view, dual sovereignty idea and other such proposals were not negotiable. However, these were matters for Ambassador Barbour to discuss with GOI.

/4/Burns pointed out in telegram 668 from Amman that Hussein had told him he had been in contact with the Israelis only when Burns asked him directly.

6. Re Iraqi troops in Jordan, Rostow said our latest information was that Hussein had requested their removal but was now awaiting Aref visit to discuss question. Evron commented that Hussein was not a free agent so long as foreign troops remained in Jordan. Furthermore, Hussein-Nasser military pact still in force. If Hussein serious about wanting settlement, he should renounce pact with UAR.

Rusk