U.S. Department of State

Washington, August 3, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. IX. Secret.

SUBJECT
Israeli Military Visit

As part of his bargain last week to stave off a public outcry against our clampdown on military shipments to Israel, Mac Bundy agreed to try to arrange for the visit here of a top Israeli military officer to explain Israel's current and future military requirements. Secretaries Nitze and Rusk have agreed to the week of 21 August and recommend we go ahead. The purpose of this visit would not be announced, and we would again ask the Israelis to keep this low key.

We have known for some time that we would have to go through another exercise like this. It is impossible to reconcile Israeli requests with our military's view of Israelis actual needs without this sort of confrontation between the experts. Whatever we decide later on political grounds, talks like this are an essential first step.

/2/See Document 403. A memorandum of August 10 from McNamara to the Secretaries of the Military Departments approved the release to Israel of $3 million in minor items of military equipment as an exception to his June 8 memorandum (see footnote 2, Document 225). (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 71 A 4919)

/3/A note on the memorandum in Johnson's handwriting reads: "I seriously doubt wisdom of this visit now. Let's get for[eign] aid further along--ask Mc call me--L." An attached memorandum of August 4 from Rostow to the President reported that Bundy was convinced that if the visit did not take place, pressures would grow to expand military aid to Israel in the wake of Soviet military aid to the Arabs. An attached memorandum of August 11 from Bundy to Rostow states that the President had never approved the visit, now planned for September 11, but "the painful fact is that I told Evron we could plan for it." Bundy stated that he saw no way they could avoid discussion of military questions with the Israelis and concluded: "I think we have a bargain and I sure hope that the President will let us keep it. Otherwise, I'll have to move to Cairo."

Walt

Washington, August 4, 1967, 2208Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 US-UAR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Eugene Rostow and Battle, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Rusk.

/2/Telegram 460 from Ankara, August 4, reported that Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office Kuneralp had told the Charge that Turkish Ambassador Gunver in Cairo had reported that El Zyyat had expressed pleasure that the United States wanted to keep the door open for friendship in the future. He referred to Fawzi's contacts with Rusk in New York and said Rusk had never given Fawzi a clear indication of U.S. views. (Ibid.)

1. Suggest you thank Kuneralp for his initiative. USG appreciates close and helpful relation with Turkish Government throughout ME crisis and believes Turkish influence will be constructive force in helping to bring situation to a sound and peaceful resolution. You may pass the following comments to him for transmittal to El Zyyat. For the sake of clarity, you may transmit these thoughts as an unofficial memorandum./3 / Such a paper should be transmitted by the Turkish Government as their own summary of USG views not as a direct communication of the USG.

/3/Telegram 613 from Ankara, August 9, reported that the Ambassador had given the unofficial memorandum to Kuneralp, who said they would transmit it to the UAR in the manner requested. (Ibid.) Telegram 249 from Cairo, August 14, reported that Foreign Office Counselor Riad indicated on August 12 that he was fully aware of the contents of telegram 16257 to Ankara. Bergus commented that this confirmed his view that "Zyyat approaches typical Egyptian feeler made in time of stress with full knowledge GUAR." (Ibid.)

2. Before any constructive steps can be taken to bring about an improvement in UAR-US relations, there are several things that need to be cleared away. The US did not break relations with the UAR. This action was taken by the UAR. We regret that decision. We believe diplomatic relations are particularly necessary during periods of strain. UAR took this step on the ground that the US had engaged in an attack upon the UAR and other countries with which the US had friendly relations. These charges were untrue. We believe they were known by the UAR to be untrue. Either the original charges or variants thereon continue to be made, including those stated by President Nasser in his recent speech. In addition, personal attacks on President Johnson are not in keeping with a desire for better relations.

3. It is difficult to see how a nation that wishes friendly relations with another can make such charges and continue to make them knowing that they are false, can slander President Johnson, and at the same time profess through various channels to wish an improvement in relations. If the UAR really wishes to rebuild its relations with the US, it could begin by ceasing to make charges it knows to be erroneous and by ceasing to attack President Johnson. This would be only a beginning but would be a good beginning. At some stage thereafter it would become necessary for the UAR to request resumption of diplomatic relations if it wishes their reestablishment.

4. The degree to which US-UAR bilateral relations can be improved is heavily dependent on constructive and responsible steps by the UAR, in its own interests, to deal (a) with the realities of relations between the nations of the Middle East which were engaged in the recent Arab-Israeli hostilities and (b) with problems of UAR relations with other states of the area heightened by the conflict in Yemen.

5. Regarding the Arabs and Israel, the fundamental principle of non-belligerence is at the heart of the present crisis. The US strongly favors withdrawal of Israeli forces to permanent national boundaries for Israel at the earliest possible time. What is required to achieve this is Arab acknowledgment that the state of war is over. The UAR can be influential in bringing this about. It is only in the above context that US weight can be brought to bear effectively on Israeli withdrawal.

6. Regarding the Yemen conflict and its outgrowths, we note with hope the report from Khartoum that initiative has been taken to return to the idea of the Jidda agreement. Deterioration in our relations prior to the recent Arab-Israel conflict stemmed largely from differences over the course followed by UAR in Yemen, in South Arabia and toward other Arab countries.

7. The US seeks good relations with all Arab countries and has played an active role in development programs designed to improve stability and promote economic growth. We continue to seek a means toward these ends. There is a basic desire for friendship with the Egyptian people and a strong hope in the USG to join with the UAR in efforts to make that friendship viable and lasting despite damage which recent events and charges have done to our bilateral relations. The USG respects the right of each state to organize and conduct its internal affairs as it chooses. Steps along foregoing lines might permit UAR and US to move in a direction helpful to both.

Rusk

Cairo, August 7, 1967, 0946Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret. Received at 1534Z.

186. I had two hour conversation with FonOff Counselor Mohamed Riad evening Aug 5. Wide-ranging, many topics covered but main thrust was what lay ahead in current ME crisis. I said I had received fragmentary report from USUN to effect Indians and others were working toward some kind of SC resolution embodying quasi-consensus reached between Goldberg and Dobrynin/Gromyko in closing days July ESSGA.

I said that if at UN there could be legislative act clearly affirming Israel's right to exist adopted as result understanding between world's two greatest powers and accepted by Arabs, this would open new vistas for just and honorable settlement. Otherwise picture very gloomy indeed. In absence some such development, present situation could well harden.

Arabs, I continued, seemed presently bemused by concept of "pressure". In Arab view, US "pressure" had facilitated Israel military victory, stymied UN action favorable to Arabs, and continued be exercised for purpose humiliating and dismembering Arab world. This erroneous concept seemed to be guiding present exercises in Khartoum. Evidently Arabs felt they had only to develop sufficient "counter pressure" through oil, Suez Canal, etc. force US and West to "pressure" Israel return to June 4 situation. This unrealistic to extreme. Guar had learned during April-May US-UAR crisis over Yemen that one country's "pressure" on another, even in situation of almost total dependency YAR on UAR, could not be applied preemptorily. So long as Israel could plead her very existence at stake, Arabs would be foolish count on Arab "pressure" on West to generate decisive "pressure" on Israel. Much more likely probability was interminable stalemate and increasing risk situation would again blow up in our faces.

I concluded by saying that even with acceptable UN action soonest, complications of present crisis made it likely that comprehensive sorting out would take considerable time. Therefore need for early start imperative.

Riad seized on final point to convey at some length that UAR would be much more interested in conceding Israel's existence if some quick and tangible development would follow. Could, for example, UAR be put in position say to its own people and to other "more radical" Arabs that acknowledgment Israel's existence would in fact begin process Israel withdrawal? Would "ironclad" arrangement re Aqaba make it possible for Israel forego claims to use of Suez Canal for time being? (I pointed out US position re Israel rights Suez Canal went back to 1951.) Would Israel really accept meaningful UN presence on its side as well as Arab side of frontiers?

GUAR and other Arabs were genuinely concerned, concluded Riad, lest any gesture made to acknowledge Israel's existence would only be read by US and Israel as sign of Arab weakness. He asked if I were sure USG did not aim at overthrow of Arab "nationalist" regimes. He cited stream of pointed questions re UAR internal stability which had been posed to him and other UAR reps by Americans in New York. I said USG interested in peaceful stable NE, not personalities.

Finally he said I should know our meeting was taking place with full knowledge and consent Guar authorities who hoped this contact would flourish in full frankness. He indirectly but clearly cautioned me against discussing these matters with Spanish or other diplomats or "others of US."

I said we had covered a lot of very high ground and raised a lot of difficult questions. He should understand my comments had been largely personal. Under present US set-up in Cairo I could not take hourly pulse of USG and was operating very much out of my hat. Would report highlights our conversation, await USG reaction, and in any case, stay in close touch.

Bergus

Tel Aviv, August 7, 1967, 1030Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Received on August 9 at 0759Z.

391. Subject: August 4 Discussion with Foreign Minister Eban.

/2/Telegram 385 from Tel Aviv, August 4 (ibid.), reported briefly that Barbour had carried out the instructions in Document 396.

/3/Document 396.

2. UN matters.

A. Conversation commenced with my remark that we still could not understand why GOI became so jittery in latter stages of UN Emergency Assembly meeting when it appeared that US and USSR were finally getting together on text which contained essentials of our position with which Israel agreed. Eban instantly produced from his pocket copies of US text of June 20 and subsequent US-USSR draft (indicating, I suppose, he had either expected to bring up subject himself or anticipated my approach). He contended that latter text was erosion in that it did not talk about negotiated political settlement and first place went to troop withdrawal, leaving second emphasis only on permanent settlement and security. Eban said that term "negotiation" was omitted in latter text as though it were an "impolite word." Eban and I agreed that there was little chance that Arabs would have accepted US-USSR text anyway, but when I stressed that this was chance for US to get together with Soviets, he claimed that Soviets had not been persuaded to accept US objectives but were merely attempting to erode US position. Eban went on to comment that in UN context symbols too were important and US-USSR draft omitted terminology about ending "state of belligerency." He advised that in future discussions with Soviets we should talk about policies and not drafts. I agreed on basis of ideal desirability but pointed out that discussions in UN context naturally center around drafts.

B. Later in conversation Ambassador Harman raised point that Arabs had also insisted on removal of word "peace" from late version of draft resolution indicating that they still were not willing to face up to end of state of belligerency with Israel. I indicated that Security Council was much wound up in its own particular procedures and that meanings of words took on different significance there and stressed again that if we looked broadly at our relations with Soviets since end of World War II, contrast was impressive. Our interests coincide now more than ever before, I pointed out, citing Chinese Communist problem and general significance of Soviets becoming "have" nation. To be sure there was not yet real meeting of minds but we do talk together more now and seem to be making progress towards actions in our mutual interest. I referred also to pre-Six-Day War Israeli statements that peace would only come to Middle East if US and Soviet Union could get together. Eban admitted that he had agreed to "harmonization" of great powers as requirement for peace but added that he had always meant by it that USSR should accept US policies. He remarked that in fact Soviet Union had not closed the "hole" when it should have during the last five or six years if it had genuine interest in settling world problems. When he referred to current Nuclear [Non-]Proliferation Treaty negotiations, I interjected that Israel's signature would help too. After acknowledging this remark with short laugh, Eban continued that if Soviets had been afraid of Communist China, they would have made settlement in Vietnam. I told him we were not becoming starry eyed but gratifying change had occurred. Eban advised "don't leave well fortified positions and go into no-man's land at this point." In GOI opinion, he stated, US position in UNSC should be based on restatement of President Johnson's five points and original June 20 draft resolution. He pointed out in that draft freedom of maritime passage was treated as something absolutely required so that no question could be raised later regarding Canal, I asked him pointedly whether this meant that GOI had no apprehensions about taking up freedom of transit in Security Council. Eban said in his opinion our original draft was so worded that this right would not have been vulnerable to Soviet veto. He mentioned that perhaps he should make a statement of Israeli attitude on essential points for UN consideration but I cautioned him against making any public statements about alleged changes in our position. Eban praised Ambassador Goldberg's handling of Emergency Session which he said showed great skill but reiterated importance which Israelis see in symbolism involved in retaining reference to "belligerence." He warned again that Soviet objective to get Israel out of occupied territory remained unchanged to which I replied that Soviets would not have gone so far with us if they had still thought they could get Israel out unconditionally, which was object of original position they had abandoned.

C. Eban recommended that we try to persuade Soviets to concert with us in limiting arms supply to which Harman remarked we have tried this often. Eban agreed that US had tried it often and Soviets had always declined. If we bring it up again, it would show whether Soviets have an international interest in peace in this area rather than desire achieve local advantage. I pointed out that we could not go that far yet with Soviets but our common interests were growing broader.

D. Regarding UN tactics Eban said GOI felt it would be helpful not to resume public discussions until September. He reported that he had found in talking with Seydoux that nobody was enthusiastic including Arabs and Soviets who, to French distress, were "more interested in a duet than a quartet." When I remarked that George Brown did not appear so happy about waiting, Eban replied that UK thinks Canal closure weighs more heavily on it than anyone else but GOI believes best way to be diplomatically effective in immediate future is in traditional channels. I told him we agreed it would probably be best not to resume discussion until sometime around end of August.

E. Concerning Jerusalem Eban remarked that as we may have noticed there has been some domestic political difficulty here but GOI will accept someone coming over to look around on behalf of SYG provided he is well balanced in his outlook.

3. Movement Towards Settlement.

A. Eban expressed opinion that present tactical situation might be more important now than examining broad area objectives. He believed what we need most is "obdurate patience." He recalled that outcome of UN Emergency meeting shut door on unconditional withdrawal and that Arabs now must realize that they cannot get what they want without coming to Israelis directly. Choice, Eban added, was between "cease fire or peace." He cautioned strongly against becoming jumpy, nervous and running around excitedly in Washington. Some people, he added, appeared patient but others claimed things were getting worse thus demonstrating loss of nerve. He quoted one LA delegate as saying that free world is so unaccustomed to victory that when they get it, they just run around trying to give it away.

B. I told Eban that there could be two trends of thinking in regard to tactics. On the one hand it could be argued that time favors Israel and US in efforts towards achieving settlement; on the other, time may not necessarily be on our side. Perhaps Israel has too good nerves after nineteen years of conditioning. They reason that due largely to GOI restraint early in crisis (something for which I said I claimed a little credit, thus enabling Eban to say he had had something to do with it too), it was made clear to world that Israel was ringed around with enemies who were harassing it. Hence, when one last Egyptian incitement occurred and Israel pushed all buttons, in world estimation it was victim of aggression and gave good account of itself militarily. Now, however, this "victim" is sitting on territory of its neighbors in improved security situation. Under these conditions its status as "victim" will to an extent tend to be forgotten and will be replaced by image of Israel as "top dog." Any apparent reluctance to move toward reasonable solutions now will react against Israel. I pointed out that refugee problem including early return of those on East Bank is very important in this. Ideally, I added it is possible to see advantages of just sitting until Arabs forced to talk but with world made up of human beings this may not be best course.

C. Eban stated he agreed that victim concept is fading internationally as illustrated by vacillating UN and disappearing French and Canadian support. Yet, he emphasized, GOI must have nerve to let time pass and refuse to make known its peace terms. Eban did admit, however, that much research was now going on as to possible conditions of settlement, including matters such as economic, demographic, and political factors in Israel-Palestine equation. He said that GOI was conducting exercises as though they were real negotiations with Arabs. I interjected that danger is if present situation is crystallized with Israel as only real power in area, it will take on all attributes of former so-called imperialism and all its troubles. Eban responded by statement that I was authorized to say GOI was not just sitting but that "a certain solidity is now required." He said that very fact I felt so strongly on this matter showed problem is arising. Yet, he commented, Arabs are just now coming up against realities which they would not have done before July [June] 4. He expressed hope that after another few weeks or months more progress could be expected from them. I told him few weeks or months might be all right but not to let it go too far. Eban countered with view that changes required in Arab outlook are so fundamental that more time might be needed for them to make necessary adjustment. Harman said he admitted need for movement towards peace but that quick movement could bring us to conclusion short of full change which [garble] would be self-defeating. In his opinion things are moving in right direction as result of Assembly [garble]. He referred to possible Yemen settlement and withdrawal of Egyptian troops now there. I told Harman that I personally accepted much of what he said but to be realistic, vis-?-vis Soviets US had lost a lot. I observed that now it was clear we were not looking for love and esteem of Arabs, perhaps relationship based on mutual interests such as oil could be re-established on more realistic basis, but present situation certainly was not favorable. Eban interjected that it would have been much worse for our relations with Arabs if Israel had not helped us out on June 5. I told him with some vehemence not to press me on what might have happened if Israel had not won victory. As result, I said, now we have to wrestle with peace problems. Returning to charge on refugees I pointed out that image made great difference, and right now question arose whether Israel did not appear to be more interested in holding real estate than in solving basic problems. Bitan interjected that Israel's preference for sticking to essentials over images was like ours in Vietnam. I said it seems to me that action on refugees would show whether Israeli image was like ours in Vietnam. I said it seemed to me that action on refugees would show whether Israeli image was becoming that of an obstinate victor or remained that of victim of aggression. As to refugees going to East Bank, their motives were multiple which was all more reason to show everyone there were no road blocks to returning them. Eban remarked that Jordanian willingness to meet for discussion on problems of returning refugees showed they accepted necessity of coming to agreement. I told Eban that frankly Israeli requirements regarding meetings, forms and so on did not add to Israel's credit in face of great humanitarian problem. Eban commented that he had been attracted by idea of making some refugees "non-refugees" and that he had talked to Horowitz about it who thought that they might get some outside assistance for such move. Then I recalled lunch I gave for Nixon on June 22 when Allon and other ministers appeared enthusiastic to get started on refugee problem. I said that although I might be speaking out of turn, if GOI could find projects which would really move towards solution, I felt sure we could find ways of helping. Harman added that limited specific project on refugees brought to West Bank would set wheels in motion but would "cost x millions of dollars" for equipment and other essentials. I repeated that we would be sympathetic to project involving final solution to human problem. Eban observed that maybe transition time between cease fire and peace could be used to move forward on refugee problem but important thing was not to become impatient. Certain processes could only occur with "time plus firmness," especially on part of those who set high value on Soviet behavior. He admitted that progress was less apparent on Arab side but claimed that something was happening there too and reiterated GOI position that it had no favorites and would talk to anyone.

4. Arms Supplies.

/4/Telegram 15900 to Tel Aviv, August 4, conveyed information concerning an August 2 conversation between Eugene Rostow and Evron. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

B. Eban commented that he had impression some minds in Washington were attached to idea of withholding arms as form of pressure on Israel. If so, he stated firmly, there should be no misunderstanding. GOI feels present situation is its fundamental chance for peace and security and that Israelis would lose by giving anything away before proper time. Here, he added, it was problem of Arabs and not of Soviets. I reminded him that we could not agree that sitting on occupied territory would be enough and concluded with admonition "don't start digging in."

Barbour

Washington, August 9, 1967, 0103Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Eugene Rostow; cleared by Battle, Sisco, Harriman, Stoessel, Meeker, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated Priority to London, Tel Aviv, Moscow, and USUN.

17945. Please deliver following message to appropriate level Foreign Office for conveyance to President Tito. Make presentation orally but leave copy for convenience Foreign Office:

/2/Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick met with Tito at Brioni on July 29 and delivered a message from President Johnson, which stated that the U.S. position on the Middle East was based on the five principles Johnson had announced on June 19 and centered on the conviction that each nation of that area must accept the right of its neighbors to peaceful and secure existence. It also expressed the hope that the United States and Yugoslavia could work together in the interests of a just and durable settlement in the Middle East. (Telegram 13567 to Belgrade, July 27; ibid.) Tito discussed the Middle East situation with Elbrick and told him that he expected to visit the UAR, Syria, and Iraq after the middle of August and would do everything possible to work toward a peaceful solution. (Telegram 292 from Belgrade, July 30; ibid.)

The United States agrees with President Tito that a Middle Eastern settlement now should be realistic and long-term. The world cannot accept an indefinite continuation of the risks of the precarious armistice regime which exploded on June 5th. The United States agrees also that the settlement should not humiliate the Arab states, or require them to give up any rights or interests they may legitimately claim. President Tito may be assured that in approaching the problem of a settlement the United States will take fully into account the rights and interests of the Arab states, along with those of Israel and of other nations with interests in the Middle East.

The United States has long standing ties of friendship and interest in the Middle East. It wishes to have friendly and cooperative relations with all the nations of the region. Its concern for these fundamental factors in the situation, and its respect for the true long-term interests of the Arab states, led the United States from the outbreak of hostilities on June 5th to adopt the policy of seeking not another armistice, but a solution of peace.

In our view, the dispute over Israel's right to exist is the root of the trouble in the Middle East. The United States agrees with President Tito's comment that most of the countries represented at the United Nations accepted the legitimacy of the existence of Israel in the course of the recent session of the Assembly. This fact, as he rightly remarked, should now have its impact on the Arabs themselves.

While the United States agrees that the Arab States should not be humiliated, the United States does not feel that it can be regarded as unreasonable for one member of the United Nations to acknowledge the existence of another, or to state that it is not engaged in a war to destroy that state, or that it is not free to resume hostilities against that state at will. The continuance of the dream of destroying Israel has become a burden to world peace, and a threat to the interests of the Arab states as well. The Arab states can hardly claim rights of belligerency for themselves, and object if Israel exercises the same claims reciprocally.

The United States hopes that the Government of Yugoslavia agrees that the time has come for every member of the United Nations in the area to acknowledge that each enjoys the right to maintain an independent national state of its own, and to live in peace and security, and that all claims and acts inconsistent with this should be renounced.

There has been some misunderstanding of what the United States means by belligerent rights. In the view of the American Government, an abandonment of claims of belligerency would not require the United Arab Republic, for example, to extend recognition to Israel or to establish diplomatic relations with it, normal and desirable as both our governments regard this to be. It would, however, among other things, assure the right of all nations to use the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal, and eliminate any claim of a right to threaten or to use armed force on the part of one Middle Eastern state against another.

There are many ways in which a movement towards peace can begin. In view of the United States, one simple first step would be for the United Arab Republic to accept the Draft Resolution upon which the Soviet Union and the United States reached agreement during the final days of the General Assembly. This Resolution would have broad support in the Security Council. It could become the basis for a general settlement which deals constructively with all the other elements of the problem mentioned by President Johnson in his speech of June 19: the tragedy of the refugees, the protection of international rights in Jerusalem, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces to agreed and secure national boundaries.

In this process, there can be no substitute for the responsibility of the states of the region. Others can help. But these problems cannot be solved unless they take responsibility for dealing with them directly and realistically.

The Yugoslav delegation to the United Nations has discussed with American representatives the possible appointment by the Secretary General of a prominent individual who could undertake the important process of mediation between the parties, within the framework of the principles mentioned above. The United States hopes President Tito will explore this possibility in the course of his trip since the United States believes the appointment of a mediator could be a constructive next step towards a durable and stable peace in the Near East.

The United States notes the concern of President Tito about any attempt on the part of Israel to extend the territories it now occupies. In this connection, the United States considers it essential that the ceasefire be respected by both sides and that every member of the United Nations support General Bull's efforts to this end until such time as conditions of peace are established that permit a permanent withdrawal.

The United States Government is giving careful study to President Tito's thought that the great powers of the Security Council undertake direct responsibility for guaranteeing the agreements reached by way of settlement, including a possible guarantee of Israel against future attack.

President Tito's suggestion is worthy of most serious consideration. In the first instance, however, it would be necessary to consult the parties directly concerned, and, subsequently, other parties in interest. The United States Government knows that President Tito appreciates that for any security arrangements and guarantees to be effective, they must not only reflect undertakings by both Israel and the Arabs, but must be in the context of durable and stable peace in lieu of the state of war which has existed in the past.

The United States Government is not in accord with a statement about arms shipments made by President Tito in his talk with Ambassador Elbrick; the United States Government does regard Soviet arms deliveries in the Middle East with concern. These arms deliveries since 1955 have been on an excessive and provocative scale. While it is true, as President Tito remarked, 'arms do not fight by themselves,' there are many Arab leaders who say they wish to resume hostilities in one form or another. Therefore, the risk remains. The United States considers an effective practical agreement on arms limitation in the area as an important aspect of any plan for durable peace in the region.

The United States notes with approval and agreement President Tito's determination to make every effort to help the Arab countries economically. The United States deplores the state of affairs whereby economic gains labored for by Arab leaders are being dissipated. With the state of belligerency removed and a permanent peace established, the United States would foresee economic progress quickly resuming in those countries. Since the end of the second World War, successive United States administrations have pledged their support for economic progress and for the political independence and territorial integrity of all states in the Middle East. This position has not changed. The United States will do its part in any such effort.

/3/Telegram 421 from Belgrade, August 9, reported that the message had been delivered to Acting Foreign Minister Dimitrij Vosnjak that morning. (Ibid.)

Rusk

Washington, August 9, 1967, 0134Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Sandstorm. Drafted by Eugene Rostow on July 31; cleared by Battle, Walt Rostow, Kohler, and Katzenbach; and approved by Rusk. Repeated Priority to London and Amman. The telegram includes handwritten revisions, apparently in Rusk's handwriting. Bundy sent the draft telegram to the President on August 1, with a memorandum stating that Rusk wanted him to see it and that it was designed "to keep the attention of the Israelis on the need not to freeze the status quo either in fact or in their bargaining positions." Rostow forwarded it to the President with an August 2 memorandum, concurring in Bundy's recommendation and commenting that he thought "we shall have to find a way not merely to get a reasonable Jerusalem position out of the Israelis but also a way of letting Hussein know such a position exists, before he will put his stack into a negotiation." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol IX)

/2/Document 396.

/3/In the original draft, the last part of the sentence reads: "we believe we should use our influence in Israel to encourage a favorable outcome." The following paragraph was crossed out: "In this process, if it develops, we shall consult with leaders of the American Jewish community. We believe they may favor a compromise solution between Israel and Jordan, even if it involves concessions on Jerusalem."

The political advantages of an understanding between Israel and Jordan are highlighted by considering the probable consequences of not having such an accord: the possible partition of Jordan; a radical, highly armed state on Israel's Eastern frontier; a status for Jerusalem which would permanently affront large parts of the Muslim world; and continued agitation to liberate the Palestinians throughout the Middle East.

We are aware of the revival of interest among some Israelis, Jordanian West Bankers, and Saudis in the idea of a semi-autonomous Palestinian state on the West Bank, possibly with Gaza. On the whole we rate its chances for success as less than that of a Jordanian-Israeli agreement. We prefer trying latter course first in any event.

2. We do not agree with the view often expressed here by representatives of GOI that time and immobility will produce results favorable to peace. The influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East is far greater today than in 1956-57, both through Egypt and more directly. Weak countries like Libya and Jordan could succumb, thus imperiling several other governments. The level of arms in the Middle East is an autonomous threat to peace.

To counter Soviet efforts, to strengthen Arab moderates, and in simple interest of peace itself we therefore seek a succession of steps towards peace at this time, small or large, agreed or unilateral. We believe that such a process could favor such chances of progress as there may be in our talks on the Middle East with the Soviet Union.

3. You should stress to GOI that our central commitment is to support the territorial integrity and political independence of all the states of the Middle East. It is as much in the interest of GOI as it is in our interest to maintain the credibility of that support. As applied to Jordan, as King Hussein understands, the issue of territorial integrity raises problems not present in the case of Syria or Egypt. The Jordanian and Israeli boundaries include armistice lines, which have a legal status somewhat different from that of definitive international frontiers. While King Hussein has remarked that the armistice lines "make no sense" and will require revision, it is in our view nonetheless highly probable that no peace settlement between Israel and Jordan would be accepted by the world community unless it gives Jordan some special position in the Old City of Jerusalem. We assume that Jordan would receive the bulk of the West Bank, which is equally regarded as "Jordanian territory".

Against this background, it is a matter of high importance that a settlement between Israel and Jordan respect our commitment to support the territorial integrity of all the states of the area. If in the end negotiations between Israel and Jordan fail for any reason, and we face an indefinite continuation of the status quo, it is necessary that both we and GOI be in a position to show that every reasonable effort towards an agreement has been made, and made in good time and good faith.

4. We understand the strength of the Israeli attachment to Jerusalem. Other peoples also have strong feelings with regard to the Holy Places of Jerusalem, equally rooted in history.

Taking the political stakes into account, we cannot conclude at this early point that it will be impossible to find a formula for the Old City and its environs which could satisfy (a) the Israeli interest in an open city under unified administration; (b) the Jordanian and Muslim interest in an acknowledgment of Jordanian sovereignty for a section of the city; and (c) the Christian interest in the status of the Holy Places.

We could probably accept any solution on which GOI and Hussein could agree. We continue to believe that the issue will not be faced realistically except in the context of actual negotiations.

/4/In the original draft, the last two sentences read: "Before such a negotiation can begin with any chance of success, GOI must agree to face issue of Jerusalem with far more flexibility than they have yet displayed. At a later point, we could perhaps assist in the articulation of plans for the Old City, if necessary, to prevent a breakdown of negotiations."

Rusk

Cairo, August 10, 1967, 0858Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Exdis.

214. US-UAR Relations.

/2/Telegram 216 from Cairo, August 10, reported that the main thrust of Presidency Adviser Hassan Sabri al-Khouli's remarks during his conversation with Bergus the previous day was the urgent need for withdrawal of Israeli forces, while Bergus stated and restated the "absolutely essential link between withdrawal and recognition Israel's right to exist." (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Khouli had before him seven page memcon of my August 5 conversation with Mohamed Riad of FonOff. He referred to my comments on "big lie" as obstacle to US-UAR relations. He said Nasser was personally convinced that he had been subject deceit by President Johnson.

I said it might be useful for us to sit down together with a day-by-day chronology on both sides and argue this thing out point by point. He warmly accepted this suggestion. I said I would consult Washington. (Comment: Recognize this is handing Dept pretty tall order in requesting that somebody bring together the many highly restricted messages which flew back and forth during crisis period and summarize them in chronological order. At same time feel this device might give Nasser excuse in his own rather complex mind crawl off his present anti-US posture.)

/3/See Document 34.

/4/Telegram 213 from Cairo, August 10, reported that during Bergus' conversation with al-Khouli the previous day, the latter said Nasser had authorized him to say that all "special messages" between the U.S. and UAR Governments should be sent through Bergus. The latter had the trust and confidence of the UAR Government and no other intermediaries were required. He also said that two high-ranking CIA officials were trying to contact Nasser. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Cairo) Telegram 20412 to Cairo, August 14, replied that the U.S. Government was unaware of any such initiatives and intended that its views should be conveyed through Bergus. It stated that the CIA had indicated that reports alleging CIA officials were trying to contact Nasser were not true. (Ibid.)

Khouli said I should resume all my old contacts here. He specifically suggested that I get in touch with Heykal. He indicated that I should resume seeing Muhyieddine and other old friends but that I should do it "gradually".

Khouli said GUAR hoped it would be possible for ex-Ambassador Badeau to visit Cairo during his upcoming visit to NE. Nasser had indicated he would be happy see Badeau.

Khouli said it essential we maintain cultural ties during this difficult period. He had succeeded reversing PriMin's decision call back all UAR students in US on grounds dollar shortage. He had kind words for Cairo American College and AUC.

Khouli said his attitude towards Russians had not changed and their role in touching off crisis by false allegations of imminent Israel invasion of Syria was fully appreciated by Nasser.

Khouli said we should meet at least once weekly. I agreed. I told him I planned return Washington for week's consultation in mid-September. He thought this good idea.

Bergus

Washington, August 11, 1967, 0104Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco on August 10. Cleared by Battle and James W. Pratt (EUR/SOV), approved by Eugene Rostow, and repeated to Moscow and Tel Aviv.

/2/The approach by fourth-ranking Soviet representative N.P. Kulebyakin to Pedersen was reported in telegram 413 from USUN, August 8, which summarized his main points as the desire to clear the Suez Canal for traffic through a partial Israeli pullback, with Israeli traffic to go through the canal, the desire to have a U.S.-Soviet agreement before the next Security Council session and to ensure it dealt with broad Middle East issues or with the Canal rather than with Jerusalem, and an expression of approval of a resumption of U.S.-UAR diplomatic relations. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

We are interested in fact Kulebiakin approach seems to indicate Sovs concerned about opening canal and may be willing accept necessity all vessels, including Israeli, going through canal as the price. Whether this is Sov policy or simply a feeler is not yet clear.

However, we do not want to shift from res discussed with Gromyko at end of GA, under which canal opening would be included among much wider objectives. Consequently suggest reply be conveyed to Kulebiakin along following lines:

(1) Dept has noted with interest Kulebiakin indication Sov recognition opening of canal would have to involve freedom of navigation for ships of all states, including Israel. We wonder whether Sovs have any indication UAR views on this point. (We will be especially interested, without showing interest ourselves, in Kulebiakin's reaction to such comment, e.g., whether he backs away, or gives any indication Sovs may in fact be thinking of something less, such as cargoes and not flagships, etc.)

(2) We also note with satisfaction indication Sov interest in continuing consultations with US in interests maintaining peace in area. As Sovs aware our objective remains to establish a permanent peace in ME, not to revert simply to an armistice or absence of war, which has not been a success, and hope Sovs will also work for this objective.

/3/See Document 392.

/4/Pedersen reported in telegram 449 from USUN, August 11, that he met with Kulebyakin that day. He commented that his impression was that the Soviets were thinking about the possibilities of solving specific issues, possibly because of Arab opposition to a broader approach, that they were not thinking of moving ahead on anything unless they had substantial Arab support, and that they were not clear how far they could bring the Arabs along either on a generalized approach or on specific issues. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Rusk

SNIE 30-3-67

Washington, August 10, 1967.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on August 10. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and National Security Agency participated in its preparation. The CIA, State, Defense, and NSA representatives on the USIB concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

THE SHORT-TERM ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY BALANCE

The Problem

To assess the military capabilities of Israel and the Arab states, and to estimate Arab military intentions toward Israel, particularly over the next few months.

Scope Note

For the purposes of this estimate, we assume that the Arabs will not abandon their claim that a state of belligerency with Israel exists, and further that Israel will continue to occupy Arab territory taken in the war.

Conclusions

A. UAR, Jordanian, and Syrian military forces were badly mauled by Israel in the recent war. Soviet resupplies have restored much materiel to the UAR and Syria, but Israel's margin of superiority is even greater than before. We believe that the Arab states will be unable to launch an effective attack against Israel in the next few months, and indeed for a considerable time thereafter.

B. We believe that Arab leaders are generally aware of these realities and that no Arab state intends to engage Israel military in 1967. A surprise Arab air attack cannot be completely ruled out, but it is unlikely and would probably be anticipated by Israeli intelligence.

C. Arab sabotage and terrorist activities may occur, but a major guerrilla warfare campaign against Israel is unlikely. Even if attempted, it could not pose a serious threat to Israel's security.

Discussion

/2/Iraq played a minor role in the war. It lost some 19 fighters and one bomber; its infantry was only slightly engaged and suffered few losses. Though Algerian and Saudi units were dispatched to the area, none of them participated in the fighting. [Footnote in the source text.]

/3/On 2 June 1967, France imposed an embargo in shipments of military items to the Middle East, but the embargo does not apply to spare parts previously contracted for. In addition, there probably has been some evasion of the ban. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. Since the war, Syria has received some replacements of its losses; Jordan has received nothing except some obsolescent tanks from Iraq and some radar from the UAR. Neither Syria nor Jordan poses a serious military threat to Israel in the near term, and they are not, either by themselves or in concert with the UAR, likely to do so for some time to come. Of Israel's immediate neighbors, only the UAR has gotten substantial replacements of lost equipment. These include at least 60 percent and perhaps as much as 90 percent of the fighter aircraft, between 20 and 40 percent of the bombers, and about 50 percent of the tanks it lost in the war. Most of the planes were acquired in an emergency airlift from the USSR and Algeria in the three weeks following the end of the war. Since then, resupply has slowed notably; most equipment in being brought in by sea, and at a pace approximately that of prewar days.

/4/See SNIE 11-13-67, "Probable Soviet Objectives in Rearming Arab States," dated 20 July 1967, for an assessment of Soviet policy and objectives toward the Arabs. [Footnote in the source text. SNIE 11-13-67 is not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files)]

5. As for Arab intentions in respect of military actions against Israel, the views in Arab capitals vary. The most belligerent statements come from Syria and Algeria; those Arab leaders whose forces suffered the greatest losses are least inclined to press for renewed fighting. Jordan has made it clear that it wants no further fighting, and it is trying to get Iraq to withdraw its troops from the East Bank. Cairo appears to be aware of its military weakness vis-?-vis Israel. In fact, it appears to be afraid that the Israelis might renew the attack. The tone of its public statements is one of determination to rebuild for the long haul, not one of encouragement to war. The present deployment of UAR, Syrian, and Jordanian forces is clearly defensive. There is a possibility, though a very slight one, that some Arab leaders might ascribe their loss of the war to the success of Israel's preemptive air strike and draw the conclusion that Arab forces, if they destroyed the Israeli air force in a surprise blow, might win at least a limited victory on the ground. It is far more likely, however, that Arab leaders--especially those in the UAR, whose air force would have to be used--are aware that Israel's aircraft are well protected and that the Israelis would be likely to detect Arab plans for preemption and strike first, or at least retaliate quickly and effectively. In addition, the last two months have demonstrated to the Arabs that there are clear limits on what they can depend on in the way of Soviet support, and this awareness almost certainly works to discourage them from serious thoughts of another round in the near future. In these circumstances, we believe that any major Arab attack on Israel is highly unlikely in 1967, and indeed for a considerable time thereafter.

6. Algerian and Syrian leaders, as well as Ahmed Shuqairi, chief of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, have publicly demanded that the war against Israel be converted into a large scale and sustained guerrilla campaign. If attempted, this would, in practice, be less likely to take the form of classical guerrilla operations than of terrorist and sabotage raids. Since the early 1950's, terrorist activities have been carried out in Israel by Palestinians infiltrated from Syria, Jordan or Egypt. These raids have on occasion caused casualties and some physical damage, but they have done little or no harm to Israeli military forces. Instead of weakening the Israeli will to resist, they have strengthened the hand of those Israelis who advocate a hard line against the Arabs.

7. Recent Israeli victories have made the renewal of such terrorist activity more difficult in some ways, easier in others. Arab infiltrators can no longer operate from bases in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank within close range of targets in Israel. Infiltration of terrorists and saboteurs across the Jordan River, at least in small numbers, could probably be accomplished despite the efforts of Israeli and Jordanian security forces to prevent it. As before, such infiltrators would probably be trained Palestinian terrorists who know the people and the area in which they would operate. (Algerians, or even Syrians, whatever their skills, would probably be much less effective in unfamiliar territory.) Palestinians would probably receive considerable protection and aid from a sympathetic Arab populace. They could be particularly effective in the West Bank and Jerusalem in punitive operations against other Arabs, e.g., those who were collaborating with the Israelis.

8. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the Arabs are capable of mounting irregular operations in such numbers or strength as to have military significance. The present lines between Israel and its Arab neighbors are easier to defend and patrol than before; the infiltration of any significant number of guerrillas into Israeli territory from Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan would be difficult. Infiltration from the UAR is virtually impossible except for isolated commando raids against communications routes in Sinai. The effectiveness of such tactics in Israeli populated areas (in contrast to those inhabited by Arabs) has been and will continue to be very limited. At best, the Arabs can hope to carry out isolated, small-scale harassments.

9. Further, irregular warfare of even small proportions would be likely to evoke Israeli countermeasures which Arab leaders wish to avoid. The Israelis have consistently, vigorously, and sometimes brutally retaliated against raids in the past. Recent victories have enhanced their capabilities to do so, by enabling them to inflict such blows deep within the Arab states themselves. Fear of Israeli retaliation would tend to inhibit occupants of the West Bank from giving support to infiltrators. Finally, a major guerrilla effort would probably be seen, by the UAR and Jordan at least, as damaging to the international support which the Arab cause needs. Given all these factors, we believe that Arab irregular activity will offer no real military threat to Israel over the next several months, and probably over the next several years, though a certain amount of harassment is probable.

Washington, August 11, 1967, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary. Secret. The memorandum is marked to be sent through Walt Rostow, but Rostow did not initial it. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

SUBJECT
The Middle East on August 11

I have spent the enormous amount of time of one morning here catching up on the cables and memoranda and as I leave to take the family to Expo 67, I am impressed by how much better things go when I am out of town. Given the very difficult facts, I think your policy and its execution are in good shape.

/2/No other record of this meeting has been found but according to the President's Daily Diary he met with Rusk, Goldberg, and McNamara for lunch on August 12. (Ibid.)

/3/A copy of telegram 19238 to Tel Aviv, August 11, is attached. It states that Goldberg, Rostow, Sisco, Battle, and others met August 10 with Evron to fill him in on the U.S.-UK talks and to discuss a possible future course in the United Nations on the basis of the tentative draft resolution. The record copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN.

The situation in the Middle East and among the major interested powers moves very slowly--if at all. Each party seems to be waiting for something to turn up, and none is yet taking the lead in serious negotiations. George Brown is jumpy about Suez but he has no solid scheme for getting it open. Nasser is making feelers and is perhaps a shade more reasonable, than in June, but he has such a long experience of seeking something for nothing that there is nothing of substance in his moves so far.

Our most complex problems, as usual, are with our friends the Israelis, but even these are not urgent. I have briefed Walt separately on the small but touchy issue of a visit by General Weizman and I assume he will discuss it with you this afternoon. In essence, the problem is that we simply cannot refuse to talk to the Israelis on these matters, and the fact is that I agreed in principle to a meeting (and even an August meeting) before the matter was first reported to you. So I think I had pretty good reasons for taking this course, but I will leave them to Walt to explain. Obviously, I can always be overruled, but quite aside from my own sentiments, I really don't think we would gain from such a decision. We have real things to strike bargains with the Israelis and the timing of one subordinate visit is not one of them. Those real issues are now being studied in State and Defense and they should be ready for your consideration toward the end of August. In essence, they all come down to one question: How much influence can we really have with the Israelis and how far do we want to use it? I find myself more and more cautious about the limits of what we can or should do, and I am quite sure we all need the time for reflection which the present stalemate gives us.

I will be back here early in the week of August 21, and of course can be reached by the White House operators in the time in between.

DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Security Council,

Having further considered the grave situation in the Middle East, bearing in mind the resolutions adopted and proposals considered at the 5th emergency session of the General Assembly and having taken note of the records of that session,

Considering that the crisis in the Middle East merits the attention of all member states and indeed requires the full participation of all members to achieve a just and lasting peace,

1. Declares that peace and final solutions to this problem can be achieved within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations;

2. Affirms the principle under the UN Charter of:

A. Without delay withdrawal by the parties to the conflict of their forces from territories occupied by them in keeping with the inadmissibility of the conquest of territory by war;

B. Without delay acknowledgment by all member states of the United Nations in the area that each enjoys the right to maintain an independent national state of its own and to live in peace and security, and renunciation of all claims and acts inconsistent therewith;

3. Determines to work directly with the parties and utilize a United Nations presence in order to achieve an appropriate and just solution of all aspects of the problem, in particular bringing to an end the long-deferred one of the refugees and guaranteeing freedom of transit through international waterways;

4. Requests accordingly that the Secretary General appoint a personal representative to assist him in seeking implementation of the present resolution in agreement with the parties concerned.

5. Decides to continue examining the situation in the Middle East with a sense of urgency and requests the Secretary General to keep the Security Council advised of the progress and results of the consultations by the Personal Representative with the states concerned.

Washington, August 12, 1967, 0051Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Lambrakis on August 11; cleared by Atherton, Houghton, and Grey; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Jerusalem, Amman, Beirut, and London.

/2/Neither printed. (Ibid., POL 27-9 ARAB-ISR)

1. Department believes it useful to remind GOI authorities of interest with which world is following their actions as occupying power particularly where large concentrations of Palestinians involved. USG well aware from own extensive experience as occupying power that it is impossible to prevent all friction under conditions of military rule. Dept. also aware that GOI record on this score on balance quite good so far. Nevertheless this is subject requiring constant alertness, as occasional incidents show. Embassy should take early opportunity to approach Foreign Ministry and perhaps IDF contacts in low key citing recent examples of allegedly rough handling given local population by IDF. Examples should be specific but suitably sanitized to avoid compromising source, or indicating too clearly that they were reported by Jerusalem.

2. Destruction of villages near Latrun (Jerusalem's A-5) cannot forever be hidden from public knowledge, as witness mimeographed account put out by Israeli group and Alfred Friendly articles in Washington Post. It could be pointed out to Israelis that, whatever may have been IDF's reason for depopulating this area, act itself and manner in which it carried out likely to linger in memories of wide Arab audience much as do few cases of Israeli brutality and destruction of villages during war of 1948-49.

3. Department officers undertaking parallel low-key approaches here in hope the reminder will help prevent recurrence of such acts.

Rusk

Washington, August 12, 1967, 2118Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco and Brown, cleared by David L. Gamon (NEA/ARN), and approved by Sisco. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, and Moscow.

/2/Telegram 18566 to London, August 10 (ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR), states that Goldberg that day gave British representatives the text of the draft resolution attached to Document 415 on a restricted and exploratory basis as the tentative U.S. idea for a possible next round in the Security Council and as a way to get at the Suez problem. He stressed that it was only a working paper not yet cleared in the U.S. Government.

/3/See footnote 3, Document 415.

1. British Ambassador Dean informed Assistant Secretary Sisco that London agreed with draft res discussed here, subject following comments:

a) British believed in para 3 word "ensure" definitely preferable to "guarantee" because it was "stronger" and carried meaning of obligation. Urged we try this out at appropriate time on Israelis and Soviets. Should it prove non-negotiable further consideration would be required.

b) London support based on assumption that resolution also permitted partial settlement approach at some stage in event this proved best way to proceed. This reflects UK continuing concern over Suez.

2. After indicating we would consider British comments Sisco said he wished recall several points. First, draft not fully cleared in USG and discussions continuing here at high level. Second, we still were awaiting response from Soviets as to how further discussions on Middle East should be pursued. Informal contacts in New York between USUN and Russians yesterday gave us impression Soviets awaiting results of Arab summit and not interested in any early UN move. Third, we had prepared draft res as tentative working paper in order be ready for another UN round, but we did not anticipate this was likely before some time in September; much stock-taking remained. Fourth, we were awaiting Israeli reaction which likely to take some time.

3. Ambassador Dean again noted British interest in finding way to get at Suez, which we took to mean that if it proved impossible to proceed on basis draft res British may seek to revive idea of separate move on Canal. Dean again reiterated hope some UN action take place at least some time before opening GA; it clear UK continues feel sooner the better.

4. Ambassador Dean said Foreign Secretary Brown extremely pleased with results US-UK consultations and fact we finding ways to cooperate even though there may be differences of view between us on certain aspects of policy. Sisco agreed to convey this message to Secretary.

5. In conversation August 11 with Israeli Minister Evron Sisco got impression Israelis likely to react very negatively to move along lines we have in mind. Evron agreed we probably will face SC initiative in September and anticipatory preparations necessary and desirable. However, Israelis feel time on their side and no early move should be made in SC. Furthermore, if we must move in SC starting point in Israeli view should be US res previously submitted and containing five principles rather than draft based on US-USSR agreed language because they fear erosion if starting point is this language. On basis Evron's remarks Sisco believes Israelis likely suggest language changes to highlight objective of "agreed arrangements" and "direct negotiations," as well as to insist on specific mention of "belligerency."

6. Sisco asked Evron what he meant in his conversation other day with Battle that separate solution of Canal is possible on condition there no violation of rights of two parties stemming from cease-fire. Evron said he meant that provided the Canal was open to all vessels, including Israeli, and parties abided by arrangements made by Bull (which provide for neither side putting military ships on Canal), Israel would be willing consider separate arrangement regarding Suez. Sisco asked what would happen to Israeli troops? Evron said "Of course, they would remain right where they are along Canal, UAR troops would remain where they are, and Israel could not agree to disengagement or withdrawal of Israeli forces." Sisco said such proposal likely to be a non-starter.

Rusk

Washington, August 15, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel, 6/1/67-10/31/67. Secret; Nodis. The memorandum is filed with a covering memorandum of August 17 from Saunders to Battle stating that Bundy "did not want any papers to circulate on the arrangement he made with Evron on the $3 million release" but that Saunders thought Battle should "have the flavor of the attached and then throw this memo away."

SUBJECT
Discussion with Israeli Minister

Following up Mac Bundy's recent conversations with Israeli Minister Evron, I saw him today to tell him of Mr. Bundy's feeling that the USG should not release more than $3 million in arms aid for Israel at this time. I said we had discussed this in detail before reaching this decision, but that we did not feel we should re-open the question right now while the aid bill is on the floor of the Senate and will be uncertain until the House/Senate conference is over.

/2/An August 9 memorandum from Saunders to Bundy summarizes a conversation between Saunders and Evron in which Evron "professed not to be reopening your gentlemen's agreement on the $3 million release" but indicated that he felt U.S. bureaucrats were interpreting the terms of the U.S. aid suspension too narrowly. Saunders advised Evron against reopening the issue with the President but agreed to pass on his request to Bundy. (Ibid., National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Suspense)

His argument rests on two points:

(a) Crudely put, there are some in Israel who argue that if there is to be a U.S.-Israeli confrontation, the arms embargo is the issue to have it on. Their case is excellent given Soviet resupply of the Arabs, and Israel's friends could exert a good deal of pressure. They feel Evron should have turned down the $3 million in order to preserve this issue. He does not want a confrontation on anything and is trying to take the wind out of their sails by offering proof that our hearts are in the right place.

(b) He believes that helping Israel would support--rather than endanger--the military aid bill. He feels that enough Senators support Israel's cause--not only because of the Jewish vote, but out of broad sympathy for the underdog--that we could argue from Israel's case outward to broaden understanding of our purpose in selling arms.

I told him it was the judgment of those responsible for getting the Administration's bill through Congress that now was not the time to rock the boat. While the friends of Israel may have usefully argued their case, we did not feel certain enough of our position to justify going further at this point. On the one hand, there are those in Congress who generally oppose arms supplies anywhere and who are particularly concerned when the U.S. ends up supplying arms to both parties in a war. On the other hand, some of these same people admittedly recognize the legitimacy of Israel's cause. Given the contradictory nature of the arguments and emotions involved, no one could guarantee which sentiment would dominate. Therefore we chose not to throw any new issues into the forum at this time. (Comment: Try as I did with my questions, I could not figure out how another $1 million would break the back of resentment over our military aid suspension.)

Turning to other issues, Evron voiced his Government's increasing disillusionment with King Hussein. He felt the King was trying to bring together an Arab summit meeting mainly to show us that the Arabs could not produce a solution and confront us with responsibility for finding one ourselves. He felt Jordan's recent efforts to stir up resistance on the West Bank fitted this picture of trying to build an eventual case for U.S. intervention to produce a pro-Jordanian settlement. I thought he over-stated the situation considerably and felt that while we did not fully understand Hussein's motives, it was quite reasonable to assume that Hussein would have to have some general Arab support before he came to terms with Israel. I did not feel, as Evron had argued, that Hussein was free to settle with Israel entirely by himself.

I expressed concern that Israel seemed to be digging into its present position more solidly every day. Each new headline painted a darker image. Without even arguing the merits of letting the dust settle, I saw a problem for both of us in the rapidly sharpening image of Israel as the intransigent victor holding onto its spoils. Evron said it was inevitable that Israel (and we) would have a hard time in the coming UNGA. I suggested that there are two ways of dealing with the inevitable. One is to sit on your hands and accept all its consequences; the other is to see whether you can't do something to face it with some dignity instead of just sticking your head in the sand and letting the brickbats fly.

At the end of our conversation he cited an interesting report from Israeli Ambassador Eytan in Paris. Eytan, on the basis of recent conversations with members of the French military who were party to some remarkably free remarks of De Gaulle, made on his recent sea voyage to Canada, reports that De Gaulle's position vis-?-vis Israel is based on two points: (a) At the heart of De Gaulle's American policy is the feeling that America's strength will lead to war. Therefore the U.S. must be weakened. Since Israel and the United States have grown closer, the U.S./Israeli alliance must be weakened in order to undermine the U.S. position in the Middle East. (b) De Gaulle is just plain annoyed with Israel for not having followed his advice in May and June. De Gaulle's idea then was that Israel should test Nasser's blockade by sending a ship of its own into the Gulf of Aqaba.

H.H.S.

Washington, August 15, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-NEAR E. Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
Exceptions to the Military Supply Freeze to the Near East

/2/Neither the approve nor disapprove option was checked.

Since the outset of hostilities last June we have maintained very tight restrictions on the shipment of military equipment to the Near East and North Africa. This policy was correct at its inception from both a military and political viewpoint. With the passage of time, however, it has become increasingly difficult to justify its rigidity in terms of our national interest in helping certain countries to meet their legitimate defense needs, and thus contain the spread of Soviet-Nasserite influence. The Soviets have conducted a large-scale rearmament of the radical states and have indicated clear intent to influence both Jordan and Morocco through offers of cheap and extensive arms supplies. This is in sharp contrast to our restraint in the supply of arms. As indicated below, we feel the time for some relaxation is at hand.

--With the exception of the $3.0 million cash sales authorized in early August, sales and deliveries to Israel have been blocked. The Israeli Government can be expected, as a minimum, to press for early release of their remaining requests for items on the Munitions Control List which were pending as of June 5. Since the value of this material is less than $1 million, we would like to be in a position, if Israeli pressures should mount, to authorize the remaining release this month. We would, however, continue for the time being to hold up the $14 million spare parts credit sales program and the 100 APCs authorized by you on May 23. We would contemplate discussing these, as well as subsequent Israeli arms requests, with General Weizman during his proposed visit next month.

--In the case of Jordan, there is a clear military and political requirement for an early resumption of limited arms supply. Jordan is the most vulnerable of the moderate Arab States in terms of internal security and pressure from radical Arab neighbors and is the key to a satisfactory Arab-Israeli political settlement. Failure to obtain some arms from the West would increase the dangers to Hussein's fragile regime and might force him into a supply relationship with the Soviets. This, in turn, could have serious consequences in the highly volatile situation in the area.

/3/Telegram 20137 to Amman, August 12, transmitted the text of a talking paper on this subject prepared for Colonel Amos Jordan for use in August 12-13 talks in London with General Khammash. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) Telegram 853 from Amman, August 14, reported that Burns had read the message to the King and had made every effort to reassure him of continued U.S. support for Jordan. (Ibid.)

--Our inability to proceed with the Arms Sales Program with Morocco agreed with King Hassan last February has been a contributing factor in his decision to purchase tanks from Czechoslovakia and, if continued, may lead him to turn to the Soviets.

--Small sales programs to Lebanon remain blocked even though the equipment involved would strengthen the ability of the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their important role in maintaining internal security.

--In the case of Libya, our agreement of last May to provide ten F-5s on a cash sales basis remains blocked, as does our ability to ship materials under the small existing grant and sales programs. Yet these are significant elements of our negotiating approach in respect to Wheelus.

--Comparable problems exist in respect to Saudi Arabia where the on-going air defense and transportation communication supply programs have been blocked. These are not only significant to the future security of Saudi Arabia and our relations with the Saudi Arabian Government but are also lucrative contracts totaling about $130 million which we would not wish to lose.

--Our offer to supply $5.2 million in training and material to Tunisia is the cornerstone of the Tunisian armed forces modernization program. President Bourguiba believes that he must possess a deterrent capability in view of the large-scale Soviet arms deliveries to Algeria.

/4/On August 15 the Senate passed S. 1872, including the Church amendment; see footnote 2, Document 398. The House version of the bill (H.R. 12048), reported out by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on August 11, did not include any equivalent of the Church amendment. It was passed by the House on August 25. The Senate-House Conference on the bill began September 14.

/5/The enclosures are attached but not printed. The recommendation was on the agenda for discussion at the President's August 22 luncheon meeting. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Tuesday's Luncheon--Suggested Agenda) Unsigned, informal notes of that meeting include the following:

"Middle East Arms. No. Don't do a thing until after the conference.

"Keep Cabot Lodge working on the Hill. Get out there until you have got it organized. I want our position heard. Get our people to defend it. Get 15 key questions and get answers to them--the way Bunker answered three questions about the elections. Keep at it, organize it, and make sure it goes. Pres. said he is just not getting enough help from his Cabinet." (Ibid., Files of Walt W. Rostow, Meetings with the President, July-December 1967)

/6/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk and McNamara signed the original.

Robert S. McNamara

Tel Aviv, August 16, 1967, 0945Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to London, Moscow, and USUN. Received at 1042Z. Saunders sent a retyped copy to the President with an August 18 memorandum noting that it was the Israeli answer to Goldberg's discussion of a possible UN resolution. He commented that a notion of impending confrontation was creeping into U.S.-Israeli conversations and added: "Some Israelis remember 1957 when we eventually put the heat on them to withdraw, and they see our military aid suspension as evidence that we may be preparing a similar move this time. The ugliness of the threat in paragraph 12 [paragraph 11 in the original telegram] suggests that they expect the worst." A handwritten note from Rostow on the memorandum recommended that the President read the full text of the telegram. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis)

/2/See footnote 3, Document 415.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 417.

1. Bitan (FonOff) at behest of Eshkol and Eban gave me August 15 substance of instructions which have gone to Evron to respond to remarks re U.S. thinking on further steps in UN as put to Evron in conversation August 10 with Amb. Goldberg, Under Secretary Rostow et al. I had given Bitan for Eshkol and Eban close paraphrase of State's 29238 [19238] reporting that conversation which I considered particularly clear and convincing exposition our views. It was my hope that in thus supplementing Evron's report strength and logic our position might be enhanced with GOI and helpful reply stimulated.

2. Unfortunately, GOI position not helpful. As anticipated, Israeli reaction is definitely negative.

3. Bitan expounded to me Israeli thinking, which, he said is largely reflected in Evron's instructions but, he added, Prime Minister and Eban wanted him to make doubly sure depth of their concern is understood.

4. As he put it, Israelis are prepared to discuss with us at this time, in UN context, principle but not tactics. If principles are agreed, tactics are relatively easy to devise as developments occur. They particularly feel necessity we keep each other informed and Bitan expressed some unhappiness that they had not been told at outset of exchanges with Tito. I protested that both Under Sec. Rostow and I had filled Israelis in on Tito as soon as possible. He did not pursue matter. Continuing, he said that as to principles the U.S. and Israeli positions coincide. Israel agrees with the five principles set forth by the President on June 19. However, we seem to be deviating from those principles in our interpretation of them. As to withdrawal, President's statement refers to recognized boundaries and Israel security. There no mention of recognized boundaries in draft resolution. In talking to Tito, we referred to possible consideration of international guarantees of Israel's security. No consideration should be given to such guarantees as it not in Israeli or U.S. interest to do so. International guarantees were in effect in May 1967 and were violated. To return to that situation is not to progress toward new situation of peace. Israel should be in position to take care of its own defense without UN presence or great power guarantees which would not be useful.

/4/See footnote 3, Document 332.

6. Bitan then expatiated on Israeli estimate of more fundamental change he alleged is taking place in U.S. attitude. He referred to Tito's comment that Arabs would be humiliated by being forced to recognize Israel. It is basic to U.S. and Israel policy that Israel is recognized and recognition is accepted. It symptomatic of degree of slippage that has taken place in last 19 years that such acceptance should be questioned at this time. Israel insists that this situation change and is prepared to sit in its present positions for 10 years if necessary to accomplish this end. Recognition is the only choice to avoid another war.

/5/See the attachment to Document 415.

8. Turning to specifics of current US-USSR draft, Bitan particularly referred to para two and the phrase relating to the "inadmissibility of conquest of territory by war, etc." He challenged this language. States aggressed against, like Israel, had in the past held territory conquered by war where it necessary to do so to defend themselves against further aggression. GOI considers it has right to hold such territory which was used as a base for attack on Israel until it is assured such aggression will not occur again. Also, President's statement as to "recognized boundaries" not included in language present resolution nor is there any reference to security against territory destruction and war which likewise part of June 19 declaration. Again Bitan referred to draft's mention of UN presence, a further difference from U.S. draft of June 20. Perpetuating UN in area, he said, is not perpetuating a bridge to Arabs but a wedge between Arabs and Israel. The PCC, he claimed, has shielded the Arabs from the necessity of agreeing to Israel's existence and has perpetuated Arab intransigence. In short, insofar as next steps in UN concerned, Bitan reiterated that if we must discuss tactics rather than principles we should stick to U.S. June 20 resolution. It is in U.S. as well as Israeli interest to do so. Soviets are talking to U.S. as result of GOI's victory. Soviets are in trouble in Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere. Hussein may also in time see it in his interest to talk to Israel.

9. Israel, Bitan summarized, is not in better military position than it has been before, is not asking for guarantees nor for massive armaments, only enough of latter to keep things as is, and will withdraw when it is convinced there will be no further aggression from the territories it occupies and not before.

10. Incidentally as to possible mediator, GOI considers it too early to consider at present. If at outcome of SC or GA, a mediator is appointed, he should be without terms of reference but merely with mandate to do what he can to bring parties together.

11. In conclusion, and with some diffidence, although nonetheless forthrightly, Bitan said he instructed to say on behalf Eshkol and Eban that in their view, if we persist along what they regard as our current line, we could be on collision course. They attempting current discussions with us to "persuade, not to argue," but if necessary, prepared to pull out all the stops available to them to prevent erosion of principles enunciated in President's five points and statement therein that solution on all five indivisible.

12. I remonstrated at this attitude, noting that outcome of Israeli collision with U.S. should not be very attractive to GOI but adding that, in any event, there no intention on U.S. part deviate from principles expressed by President regardless how GOI might interpret course our efforts implementation. I also said I hoped Israelis would not consider it in their interest, despite presently favorable situation they enjoy, to sit in Olympian grandeur and immobility in mountains of Jerusalem in expectation they could dictate settlement in Middle East without taking into account interplay of interests other powers in world. No power, great or small, can operate in the complete isolation it might regard as optimum to its national concerns in the world today. Israel cannot expect to call tune on Middle East settlement as if its interests were only factor involved in area and problem could be sealed off from wider world influences.

Barbour

Cairo, August 17, 1967, 0901Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Received at 1451Z.

288. 1. What was to have been very brief call on Presidency Adviser Khouli August 16 turned into another ninety minute marathon covering a lot of ground. Will endeavor reproduce highlights in chronological order.

/2/Bergus reported his August 12 conversation with Mohamed Riad in telegram 248 from Cairo, August 14. (Ibid.)

3. Khouli then referred to US press and other indicators of USG hopes for overthrow Nasser regime. Perhaps this was USG desire. Perhaps this is why US was insisting on Israel right use Suez Canal. USG was welcome to try overthrow regime. It would be a gamble. Khouli did not think it would succeed, but he might be wrong. If US thought that successor to Nasser might make for more stable Egypt, it might be wrong. He continued: "People used to say that our power base was the army. If this were ever true, it is not true now. We have no army any more. Our army was defeated. No, our power base is the people."

4. Khouli then said, "Let's put aside technical questions of diplomatic relations and the like. Let's ask people think of the relations between the American people and the Egyptian people. We have a chance to write a new chapter." He then reiterated deeply felt conviction of all Egyptians that US could order Israel around. He accepted this might not be true but said conviction was political fact which had to be dealt with.

5. I said that wide UAR suspicions of US intentions towards UAR had beclouded our relations for well over a year. I reviewed concern high levels USG at these suspicions and sincere efforts we had made to overcome them. We simply had to face up to this problem. I had not asked to return to Egypt to mastermind a plot against the government. I had come precisely because I believed in the ties between the two countries, despite present difficulties. I said there were enough very open and very serious differences between our two countries. We did not need to invent more. I repeated previous arguments re USG lack control over Israel.

6. He said USG should not underestimate patriotism and resilience of Egyptian people. GUAR economy was in desperate shape. Middle classes who used to better things of life would suffer and they were complaining. But the majority of people who had always been poor anyway were not.

7. He said he now thought there would be an Arab summit. He felt Hussein's peregrinations would lead to this. If everyone came except Faisal then Faisal would be isolated. He said Faisal did not want UAR withdrawal from Yemen but UAR humiliation. "But enough of this Arab stuff," he said. "I'm not going to talk about the US and the Arab world. I'm talking about the US and Egypt. We think the Suez Canal issue is not an Israeli issue, but an American issue."

8. I recalled that USG had labored patiently for five long months in 1956-57 create rather shaky modus vivendi which had worked for ten years. During those ten years Israel had used Gulf Aqaba (with no harm whatsoever to UAR national interests) and had muted its Suez Canal claims. Who, I asked had upset these arrangements? Khouli did not deny responsibility. Said that if Muhyieddine visit to Washington had come off, latter would have offered "moratorium" on Aqaba issue and pullback of UAR troops from Sinai including Sharm Al-Shaykh.

9. I then said I too had respect for Egyptian people and thought some might be underestimating their pragmatism and practicality. I did not see how occasional appearance, in conditions of peace, of Israel flag at Suez would be spark setting off mass uprisings. Seemed to me that Egyptians, more than any other Arabs I knew, would be relieved know that twenty year burden of Arab-Israel hostility, burden which in great part they had carried, was now off them and that Egypt could now turn its attention to better things. I recognized that Suez transit was not an easy issue for Egypt but it was up to us both continue our discussion in search of any conceivable glimmer of light. He agreed.

Bergus

SNIE 36.1-67

Washington, August 17, 1967.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on August 17. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and National Security Agency participated in its preparation. The CIA, State, Defense, and NSA representatives on the USIB concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained, because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. The title on the first page is "The Situation and Prospects in the UAR"; the title used is from the cover sheet.

THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN EGYPT

The Problem

To assess the situation in Egypt and the domestic and foreign factors affecting Egyptian policy, and to estimate probable developments over the next 6 to 12 months.

Conclusions

A. Shock waves from the UAR's humiliating defeat are still spreading, but no drastic political changes have occurred. The top command of the armed forces has been ousted, some senior commanders are reportedly on trial for treason, and there is discontent among many younger officers at their elders' incompetence. Nasser has, however, been confirmed in office and apparently still enjoys the support of his long time associates.

B. The war has placed additional strains on an already troubled economy. Food supplies are assured until early in 1968, but an adequate supply thereafter will require some expenditure of scarce foreign exchange. The loss of foreign earnings will begin to have severe internal effects about the end of 1967. There is unemployment in the cities, and this will probably get worse. A stringent austerity program has been adopted entailing higher taxes, stricter rationing, and reduced availability of consumers goods; pressures for relaxation of these controls could lead to some inflation. Such circumstances are likely to cause some discontent in the cities, but are unlikely to erupt into unmanageable problems of public order.

C. Most Egyptians are probably not ready to envisage the UAR without Nasser. Yet economic and political stresses, as well as the difficulties of making progress on a resolution of the Israeli problem, may erode Nasser's popular appeal and perhaps encourage the growth of opposition, or even weaken the prospects of his remaining in office. All things considered, however, we believe the chances are better than even that he will remain the dominant influence in the regime for at least the period of this estimate.

D. The UAR is more than ever dependent on the USSR for military and economic aid and for political support. This gives Moscow a substantial degree of influence, which is partially offset by Egyptian suspicion of foreign advice and a certain resentment of Soviet attitudes. There are increased numbers of Soviet military advisors, though we do not know how far their functions go beyond the technical level. In its political organization, the UAR may develop a sort of regimentation resembling Soviet and East European models. In part at Moscow's urging, Cairo seems to be following a relatively moderate policy toward Israel.

E. Nasser probably believes that the closure of the Canal acts as a lever on the big powers to force Israel to make concessions. Accordingly, the present confrontation along the Canal is likely to persist--perhaps beyond the period of this estimate--despite the economic loss to Egypt and pressures for resolution from both Communist and non-Communist countries.

F. In essence, the Egyptians are attempting to regain a degree of flexibility in their foreign policy. They must, in the interest of security, demand and accept Soviet military resupply, but in so doing they will seek to avoid Soviet domination. Nasser is attempting to restore his position in the Arab world, while keeping open the option of making some concessions to Israel. In his dealings with the US, he will remain distrustful and to some degree inhibited by his dependence on the USSR; yet he will not foreclose some improvement in American-UAR relations. Because of these conflicting objectives and the narrowness of the available options, it will probably be some time before he feels able to undertake any very firm policy initiatives.

Discussion

1. The shock waves from Egypt's defeat are still spreading, and the country's prospects, both domestic and foreign, are clouded by a number of uncertainties. Many of these uncertainties are inherent in the situation itself; a number of difficult dilemmas have still to be resolved, and longstanding relationships within the regime have almost certainly been strained and unsettled by the traumatic experiences of this summer. Additional uncertainties arise from the fact that the policies of foreign powers--especially the USSR--will inevitably affect Egypt's outlook, and these external factors are still far from clarified. Finally, some uncertainties arise from the paucity of our information concerning the state of affairs in the UAR.

2. In the weeks immediately prior to the fighting, Nasser was riding high in the Middle East. The efforts of the US and other Western Powers to lift the blockade of Eilat had gotten nowhere. Other Arab states were rallying to the UAR's side. Jordan had signed a defense pact; Kuwait had sent troops to Egypt; an Iraqi force was on the way to Jordan. There was mass enthusiasm within Egypt for the confrontation with Israel. Then, within four days, the Egyptian air force was destroyed, the Egyptian army shattered and routed, and the entire Sinai Peninsula in Israeli hands. Today, the Israelis sit on the east bank of the Suez Canal and have a voice in deciding its future.

3. Despite the profound humiliation and shock of defeat, the war has apparently brought no drastic political changes within Egypt. Nasser has been confirmed in office and apparently continues to rely on the same group of senior officials, including two close collaborators of many years standing, Zakariya Muhi al-Din and Ali Sabri. No new blood has been introduced, nor has Nasser recalled any of the half dozen former members of the revolutionary command council who had been edged out of the inner circle in the past decade. Only one of Nasser's inner circle of advisors, Field Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amir, formerly chief of the armed forces and the senior Vice President, has resigned.

4. Beyond this, our information on the political situation in the UAR is very limited. We do not know whether senior officials have a controlling influence on Nasser's major decisions or circumscribe his authority. Nor do we know in any detail the thrust of their advice. In a general way, Sabri is more doctrinaire and more disposed to work with the USSR, while Muhi al-Din is more comfortable dealing with Westerners and Western concepts. Nonetheless, both of them support Nasser's Arab socialism at home and his foreign policies of anti-imperialism and Arab nationalism, though they differ in their opinion as to how far and how fast socialization should go, and the extent to which compromise with socialist doctrine and "anti-imperialism" is required by economic and political realities. Both have over the years displayed consistent loyalty to Nasser and neither has shown signs of aspiring to displace him. In the postwar government, Muhi al-Din and others like him have a more prominent role.

5. In the military establishment, the changes have been more far-reaching. Not only has Abd al-Hakim Amir departed, but the War Minister and most of the top command of the armed forces have been ousted. The air force chiefs and a number of other high-ranking officers are reported to be on trial for treason, and several hundred officers further down in the military establishment may have been retired. There is severe criticism of those officers with upper and middle class backgrounds for spending more time feathering their own nests than attending to their military duties. Many of the officers who came into the military establishment during the 15 years of the Nasser regime are reported to be unhappy with the wartime performance of their elders. The morale of the armed forces has been impaired, and discipline may be more difficult to maintain.

[Omitted here are Sections II-IV on the economic situation, the domestic outlook, and foreign policy.]

Washington, August 19, 1967, 0108Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Popper, cleared by Battle, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Also sent Immediate to London, Moscow, and USUN.

23795. Subject: US-Israeli Talks on Proposed ME Resolution.

1. Goldberg, Rostow, Battle and Popper had long talk late August 17 with Israeli Charge Evron, Israeli UN Ambassador Rafael and Cahana of Israeli UN Mission to continue talks begun Aug. 10 on tentative US-UK draft resolution.

/2/Document 420. Barbour commented in telegram 526 from Tel Aviv, August 21, that the tone of the conversation in Washington was milder but that the substance was largely identical. He noted that Bitan had talked to him "from extensive notes which he said closely reflected Eshkol and Eban's comments." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

3. Goldberg and Rostow warned against underestimating Soviet potentialities for consolidating their influence in Arab world at expense of Israel; denied new draft resolution departed from our principles; refused to accept view that direct Arab-Israel negotiation was the only road to peace; and emphasized the need for close and candid Israeli-US consultation in handling tactical problems at the UN.

Rusk

/3/Telegram 23821 to Tel Aviv, August 19, states that Goldberg began the discussion by stating that Barbour's report of his conversation with Bitan indicated Israeli misconceptions concerning their discussions. U.S. thoughts concerning tactics in the United Nations had been put forward only to the British and the Israelis. The terms used in the Israeli response were "not appropriate and hardly acceptable. We were seeking a decent peace settlement, probing for ways to reach it, and we expected frank and sympathetic response from them." He stated that the President's statement of June 19 remained the basis of U.S. policy, and U.S. relations with Israel would continue to be based on full and frank consultation. When Rafael stated that the Israeli assessment was that it was best to sit tight and do nothing in the United Nations, Rostow "disagreed profoundly", stating that the best way to a settlement was to use the draft resolution as a means of facilitating agreement, otherwise "we would be faced with greater pressures to accept less palatable solutions." (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

Washington, August 18, 1967.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, Middle East, 385.3. Confidential. Drafted by Wehmeyer; cleared by Macomber, Deputy Legal Adviser Murray J. Belman, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Dixon Donnelley, and Eugene Rostow. The draft, which is a copy sent to the Department of Defense for clearance, is filed with an August 22 letter from Nitze to Representative George H. Mahon of Texas, sending him on a confidential basis a copy of the report of the judge who presided over the preliminary Israeli inquiry into the attack on the Liberty. Also attached are a note to Nitze stating that Defense clearance on Battle's memorandum was requested, an August 21 memorandum from Nitze's military assistant, Commander C.A.H. Trost, USN, to Warnke saying that Nitze had no objection to the proposal but wanted Warnke to look at it, and an August 21 memorandum from Warnke to Nitze questioning recommendation (6) but otherwise approving the proposal. A handwritten comment by Hoopes on Warnke's memorandum suggested deleting recommendation (7) but otherwise concurred.

SUBJECT
The "Liberty"--Handling of Israeli Inquiry
Report and Release of Diplomatic Correspondence

/2/The tabs are ibid. A copy of the decision of the examining judge in the Israeli Defense Forces preliminary inquiry, issued July 21, is attached to an August 15 memorandum from Rostow to Walsh that states Evon had given it to him the previous day.

We have considered the practical aspects of dealing with the Israeli report. Several factors are involved, including the fact that the Israelis made the report available through several channels. (DOD received it via the Defense Attach? in Tel Aviv.) It seems unrealistic to assume that the report or elements thereof will not begin to leak at some stage.

Further, the deep interest of the families of U.S. personnel killed or injured in the incident has been reflected in the keen Congressional questioning we have been exposed to on the hill as well as in Congressional letters received requesting information. We must anticipate that once there is an intimation that the Israeli report had been received in the Executive Branch it will be exceedingly difficult to withhold it from members of Congress.

A related problem has existed with reference to the diplomatic notes exchanged with the Government of Israel concerning the Liberty (Tab B). As you know, we have been under considerable pressure to make available the text of the U.S. note to confirm our oral assurances that the Department was diligent in pursuing the matter with the Israeli Government. On July 28, Bill Macomber sent Chairman Fulbright a classified report on the incident (Tab C), which included a brief narrative description of the notes exchanged between the two Governments.

/3/Assistant Secretary Hughes sent a copy of the decision to NSA Director Carter on August 22. In a handwritten note of August 26, NSA Deputy Director Louis W. Tordella commented, "A nice whitewash for a group of ignorant, stupid and inept xxx." (National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History Historical Collection, Series VII, Crisis Files, Box 16)

While there are numerous details which invite comment, the following appear to be those most likely to receive critical attention:

(1) The Liberty was seen and reported at approximately 0600 hours by an Israeli patrol aircraft with a naval observer abroad, reportedly 70 miles westward of Tel Aviv. At 10:55 "the Naval Liaison Officer at Air Force HQ reported to Navy HQ that the ship about which he had reported earlier in the morning was an electromagnetic audio-surveillance ship of the U.S. Navy, named Liberty, whose marking was GTR-5." (Report, para. 11.)

(2) The Liberty was displayed on the "Combat Information Centre Table" at Navy HQ for a time, first as an unidentified target (red), later as "a neutral ship" (green). At about 1100 hours (i.e. shortly after it had been identified and presumably marked in green), the Acting Chief of Naval Operations "ordered its erasure from the table, since he had no information as to its location at the time of the report." (Report, para. 12.)

(3) The report emphasizes that the attack on the Liberty was pressed in response to reports from the Southern Command in the Sinai that between 1100 and 1200 hours El-Arish "was being shelled from the sea." "Reports about the shelling continued to reach G.H.Q./

Operations, and pressure was exerted on the Naval representative, on the lines that 'the coast has been shelled for hours, and you--the Navy--are not reacting.'" (Report, para. 5.)

No explanation is offered as to why neither the Navy nor the Air Force were able to assure the Southern Command on the basis of the air reconnaissance which had been going on in the area since 0410 hours, that no military vessels capable of carrying out a significant "shelling from the sea" had entered the area. In short, both the Air Force and Navy reacted to the reports of shelling as if they had no information regarding potential enemy targets just off the coast in the El Arish area.

(4) Efforts to "identify" the Liberty immediately prior to attack by Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats were apparently cursory at best.

/4/Brackets in the source text.

The report elsewhere indicates that the torpedo boat commander apparently reported that "the target . . . was moving at a speed of 28 knots" (Report, para. 6), "towards Port Said" (Report, para. 23).

(b) It is clear therefore that even in the eyes of the Israeli military forces the vessel was not considered in a menacing posture immediately prior to the attack. "During the last run, a low-flying aircraft observed the marking 'GTR-5' on the hull of the ship." This was apparently about 1400 hours. No explanation is offered as to why this observation was possible after the attack when the Liberty was afire and smoking but not visible at the time of the pre-attack identification runs over the ship.

(c) Torpedo boats. Upon receipt of the information about the markings, so observed by the pilot, an order was transmitted to the torpedo boat division not to attack the ship, "since its identification might not be correct." (Report, para. 8) The Division Commander was ordered to approach the ship in order to establish visual contact and to identify it but the effort was apparently confined to exchanges of signals which the Israeli commander considered unsatisfactory. "Meanwhile the Division Commander . . . came to the conclusion that he was confronting an Egyptian supply ship by the name of El-Kasir." At 1436, the Division Commander authorized the Division to attack with torpedoes "only at a later stage, when one of the torpedo boats approached the ship from the other side were the markings GTR-5 noticed on the hull

. . . ." (Report, para. 8.)

The Israeli Judge construed his task as a narrow, technical function, specifically "to decide whether any offense has been committed by any military personnel involved in this incident." (Report, para. 16.) He concluded that "there is no sufficient amount of prima facie evidence, justifying committing anyone for trial." (Report, para. 26.)

At such time as the report becomes public, Congress, the press and the public will want to know what we have said to the Israeli Government after receiving the report. We believe that the report warrants a strong reiteration of the position originally set forth in our note of June 10 and an indication that whatever limitations the Judge may have considered he was under from the standpoint of Israeli military regulations, the report clearly reflects a failure on the part of the Israeli military establishment to exercise normal precautions before launching an attack. We cannot, therefore, accept the report as exonerating the Israeli Government from our expectation that Israel will take the disciplinary measures which international law requires in the event of wrongful conduct by the military personnel of a state. Neither had the U.S. received any assurance that Israel has issued instructions to ensure that U.S. personnel will not again be endangered by the wrongful actions of Israeli military personnel.

That you call in Minister Evron and inform him

1) We have reviewed the report and consider that it confirms that the negligence on the part of the Israeli military establishment was even greater than we were aware at the time of our June 10 note;

2) The United States accordingly reiterates the position expressed in the June 10 note that the attack must be condemned as an act of military irresponsibility reflecting reckless disregard for human life;

3) The United States cannot accept the report as exonerating the Israeli Government from taking the disciplinary measures which international law requires in the event of wrongful conduct by the military personnel of a state. The entire incident cannot be construed in any light other than as one involving such wrongful conduct;

4) The United States further expects to receive some specific assurance that the Government of Israel has issued instructions necessary to ensure that United States personnel will not again be endangered by the wrongful actions of Israeli military personnel;

/5/On May 27, 1968, the Israeli Government paid $3,323,500, the amount of compensation claimed by the U.S. Government on behalf of the families of the 34 men killed in the attack on the Liberty. (Department of State Bulletin, June 17, 1968, p. 799) On April 28, 1969, the Israeli Government paid $3,566,457, representing payment in full of 164 claims totaling $3,452,275 on behalf of members of the crew of the Liberty who were injured in the attack, and claims for expenses incurred by the U.S. Government in providing medical treatment for the injured and in reimbursing crew members for personal property lost or damaged in the attack. (Ibid., June 2, 1969, p. 473) Documentation on the negotiations concerning these claims is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, PS 8-4 US-ISR. On December 17, 1980, the Department of State announced that the U.S. Government had accepted an Israeli proposal to pay $6 million as final settlement of the U.S. claim for compensation for damage to the Liberty. (Department of State Bulletin, February 1981, p. 55)

6) We believe there is a real possibility that the report or portions thereof will leak out either here or in Israel and that in any event it will be exceedingly difficult to withhold the report in the event of Congressional requests which are likely;

7) We believe the Government of Israel should give urgent consideration to whether it would not be beneficial from its standpoint to take the initiative in releasing the document at an early date;

/6/The draft memorandum does not indicate whether the document was approved or disapproved, but see Document 433.

Tel Aviv, August 21, 1967, 0900Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jerusalem, London, and USUN.

/2/Telegram 23385 to Tel Aviv, August 18, states that the Department had noted with increasing concern recent statements by Israeli public figures about long-term Israeli policy on the West Bank and other occupied areas and was concerned that they might indicate increasing Israeli determination to occupy permanently the territories currently under military occupation. (Ibid.)

/3/Airgram A-109 from Tel Aviv, August 15, reported a discussion with several Knesset members concerning the occupied territories and refugees. (Ibid., POL 28 ARAB) A-113 from Tel Aviv, August 16, reported a talk by Minister of Labor Yigal Allon concerning the West Bank and refugees. (Ibid., POL 1 ISR)

/4/Telegram 479 from Tel Aviv, August 15. (Ibid., POL 15-1 ISR)

3. I doubt whether any formal approach to GOI at this time would be productive. It would probably draw simple retort that such statements do not reflect GOI policy and GOI cannot limit freedom speech. My staff and I have left no doubt in minds our Israeli interlocutors our view permanent Israeli possession of occupied territories would foreclose indefinitely any chances of Arab-Israel peace.

4. Low key Dept. approach to Israeli Embassy in similar vein pegged to recent statements would I think be helpful in indicating we do not discount these statements as empty political rhetoric but recognize they could eventually have undesirable consequences.

Barbour