U.S. Department of State

Washington, August 24, 1967, 0132Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 SUDAN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Eugene Rostow, Sterner, Davies, and James E. Akins of the Office of Fuels and Energy and approved by Eugene Rostow. Sent to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, and Kuwait and repeated to Cairo, USUN, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem.

/2/Foreign Ministers of 13 Arab states met in Khartoum August 27-28 in preparation for a summit conference of the leaders of those states in Khartoum August 29-September 1.

/3/Document 397.

3. We believe there has been an improvement in the general atmosphere insofar as a disposition is concerned to work realistically toward a resolution of the crisis. Your statesmanship at the last Khartoum Conference, and at subsequent meetings, has helped materially to bring about this change in atmosphere. We fully appreciate the difficulties of maintaining a moderate and responsible course in present circumstances. For this reason, it has been encouraging to see a greater willingness on the part of the moderate Arab states to assert leadership in Arab councils. If this momentum can be maintained at the forthcoming Foreign Ministers' and Chiefs of State conferences at Khartoum, I feel sure the road to peace will be appreciably shortened.

/4/The majority of paragraph 4 was crossed out on the telegram. Circular telegram 26320, August 24, transmitted a revised paragraph 4 that reads: "Shortly before President Tito left on his recent trip to several Arab states we took the opportunity to have a full exchange of views with him on Near East problems. President Tito informed us of his view that the political settlement of the crisis must be fair to the Arab States. He also told us that he believed the General Assembly proved that most countries of the world now agreed that Israel's right to exist had to be accepted. We told him that we agreed entirely with both of these views. We stressed that in approaching the problem of a settlement, the United States would take fully and sympathetically into account the rights and interests of the Arab States, as well as those of Israel and of other nations with interests in the Near East and North Africa. We have as yet had no report of his conversations." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 SUDAN)

5. In our view the coming meetings at Khartoum will be critical in determining whether movement toward a settlement can be achieved. As time goes by it will become more difficult to bring about those changes that will be necessary to reach a mutual accommodation. If matters are allowed merely to drift, they might well drift toward a consolidation of the present unsatisfactory and insecure status quo. I know your government does not see this to be in its interests.

6. We do not underestimate the difficulties of finding a way out of the present impasse, but we do believe there are a number of ways, fully ensuring Arab rights and interests, in which the movement toward peace could be started. One step could be for all the states of the area to accept positions expressed in the Draft Resolution upon which the United States and the Soviet Union reached agreement during the final days of the General Assembly. Another might be for the Arab states to assert, on their own initiative, a policy of non-belligerence and acceptance of agreed international boundaries in the area. I am impressed by the reasoning of some Arab statesmen that an end of belligerence would in no way mean a surrender of Arab principles.

7. Two concepts all too prevalent in Arab thinking should be corrected. The first is that the United States can determine Israeli actions or the actions of any other Near Eastern state. The second is that oil can be cut off without permanent damage to the Arab states. While there can be no denying that the consuming state would be hurt by a total boycott, there are alternate sources which would be developed rapidly if necessary, and once the Arab countries decided to resume production the consumers would continue looking to their new sources as more reliable and more secure. As for the Suez Canal, the new supertankers now under construction can transport oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe via the Cape for considerably less than Suez tolls.

8. As you know, the United States has been reluctant to advance specific formulas concerning a settlement to the present crisis believing that these will be most effective if they stem from the states directly concerned. That is why we are hopeful that at the Khartoum meetings the full range of possibilities can be explored in a constructive atmosphere. We are confident a start can be made if a sufficient number of states determine not to be deterred from this purpose. It may be a long time before all the issues which lie at the heart of the Arab-Israel problem can be fully and justly resolved. In the meantime there is no reason for the Arab states to place unnatural obstacles in the path of their own progress and growth. The vital tasks of social and political development, the exploration for mutually advantageous cooperative arrangements among the Arab states, and above all economic development must proceed. None of these tasks can be effectively pursued under the present unstable conditions in which even Arab states far from Israel's borders are exposed to the constant danger of being drawn into crises over which they have little control. It is obvious, we believe, that the creation of peaceful and stable conditions is very much in the interest of the Arab states themselves.

/5/Telegram 26856 to Tunis, Tripoli, and Rabat, August 25, transmitted identical messages to the Tunisian, Libyan, and Moroccan Foreign Ministers. (Ibid.)

10. In delivering the above message, please stress that our purpose is to exchange views and if possible to concert our diplomatic influence in the days and weeks ahead. Follow up the first talks as far as you can with respect to the themes in the letter, and in other recent policy telegrams. We should like to elicit the views of the government to which you are accredited on the Soviet-American resolution. From here, that document seems the simplest and most promising starting point, both in the area (Suez Canal) and in the United Nations.

Rusk

JCSM 474-67

Washington, August 25, 1967.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, Israel, 400. Secret.

SUBJECT
Analysis of Israel's Military Capability (U)

/2/See footnote 3, Document 387.

a. Whether Israel can defend itself in the near future against both the conventional and guerrilla threats it faces with its present military equipment; and

b. If additional equipment is necessary, the types and amounts of such further equipment.

/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 387.

/4/See footnote 4, Document 414.

/5/Document 414.

3. (S) The possibility exists that the United Arab Republic and/or Syria, with support from Iraq and Algeria, might launch a surprise air or ground attack on Israel. However, it is doubtful that a preemptive air strike by Arab forces would be successful. The Israelis have an excellent intelligence organization and would be likely to detect Arab plans for preemption and strike first or at least retaliate quickly and effectively. Additionally, Israeli aircraft are well camouflaged and dispersed in revetments.

4. (S) Though there have been public statements by Arab leaders suggesting guerrilla-type actions against Israel, it is doubted that the Arabs are capable of planning, organizing, and executing an effective guerrilla campaign against Israel. The present lines dividing the Arab countries from Israel are much easier to defend than the prehostility boundaries, and Israel is fully capable of countering and coping with any guerrilla effort which might be mounted by the Arabs.

5. (S) In consideration of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that Israel has the military capability to defend itself in the near future against both conventional and guerrilla threats with its present military equipment and that additional equipment is not needed for this purpose.

/6/Appendix A, "Discussion," and Appendix B, "Selected Armaments and Forces, Middle East Countries," both undated, are attached but not printed.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Harold K. Johnson
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, August 26, 1967, 0153Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 SUDAN. Secret; Priority; NATUS; Limdis. Drafted by Betty-Jane Jones in the Office of United Nations Political Affairs on August 25, cleared by Popper and Davies, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Also sent Priority to Beirut, Jidda, and Kuwait and repeated to Cairo, USUN, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem.

/2/Document 426.

1. With respect to reftel, some further clarification is desirable re discussions with Arabs of US-USSR draft resolution (para 10 reftel). Such discussions should not be in terms specific wording of res. We would prefer that there not be widespread discussion of such details at this time. Rather we had in mind obtaining clearer indication of Arab attitude toward a resolution embodying general concept of US-USSR draft and seeking encourage Arab acceptance such approach.

/3/For text of Goldberg's speech before the International Platform Association at Washington, D.C., on July 27, see Department of State Bulletin, August 28, 1967, pp. 262-265.

3. Agreed res included para which, in speaking of solution all aspects Middle East problem, specifically referred to "guaranteeing freedom of transit through international waterways." In discussions with Soviets Goldberg made clear this essential part of res, but here again we do not know whether Sovs showed this para to Arabs. We also made clear our agreement on draft res was based on our understanding that it to be interpreted to mean: 1) Israeli withdrawal had to be based on end to all claims of rights of belligerency, which includes inter alia rights of passage in both Strait of Tiran/Gulf of Aqaba and Suez Canal, and 2) withdrawal to state of peace necessarily implies agreement on boundaries.

Rusk

Washington, August 26, 1967, 0204Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Parker and Eugene Rostow on August 25; cleared by Davies, Battle, and Popper; and approved by Rostow.

/2/Telegram 316 from Cairo, August 21, transmitted the text of an oral message from Foreign Minister Riad that Mohamed Riad had given Bergus the previous day. (Ibid.)

/3/Telegram 333 from Cairo, August 23, commented that the message transmitted in telegram 316 contained little new in terms of substance. (Ibid.)

/4/Telegram 247 from Cairo, August 14, conveyed the text of an oral message on Yemen and South Arabia that Riad had given Bergus on August 12. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)

2. We appreciate hearing Riad's views and are pleased that he has been frank with us. We would like be equally frank in return. First of all, with regard to his apparent belief that US has applied double standard in its respective attitudes toward Egypt and Israel, we do not believe it useful for us to trade recriminations. Neither we nor Israelis provoked last June's crisis, which we did our diplomatic best to avert. Nor do we now have any plan for imposing a solution. We hope however that parties concerned can take positive and constructive steps to repair the damage which has been done. In this connection we note with interest Riad's reported view that a negotiated solution is called for. We agree.

We have no desire and no capacity to impose a solution against the will of the parties. We shall of course do everything possible to facilitate negotiations should the parties wish us to do so.

Our position is that one possible first step toward such a solution is Egyptian acceptance of draft resolution on which we and the Soviets agreed. President Tito told us that as result of Special Session of General Assembly it evident in his view that most countries of the world now clearly support the right of Israel to peaceful existence, and that this fact should have a constructive impact on Arab thought. The premise of our approach therefore is not the Israeli position, as Riad charges, but a position we have upheld for many years--a position with which the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, India, France and most other countries now agree. To support this position is not to depart from objectivity or to seek impose a settlement along Israeli lines.

3. UAR should note that the word "waterways" is in the Draft Resolution agreed between the US and the USSR. The end of all claims of belligerent rights necessarily opens the Suez Canal to all flags under the Convention of 1888. We are aware of political problems this creates for UAR, but the essence of a negotiated solution such as Riad mentioned is a willingness to examine the modalities as well as principles of a settlement. We have no detailed proposals however and do not intend to put any forward at this time.

/5/Paragraph 11 of telegram 316 stated that Tito had a "pragmatic platform" which he would be conveying to Johnson and that its main points were withdrawal, restoration of UNEF, and a four-power guarantee of the lines, preferably through the Security Council.

5. USG of course fully agrees on need to solve problems of refugees, Jerusalem, security, and other issues. And it places particular stress on importance of arms limitation agreements.

6. We are pleased to note Riad's assurances contained in your 247 regarding UAR intentions in Yemen and South Arabia. We continue hope these two vexing problems can be settled peacefully without further loss of life or destruction of economic and social life.

7. We welcome reports of an agreement on Yemen between the UAR and Saudi Arabia. Resolution of this long-standing problem to permit the Yemenis to determine their own future would contribute substantially to easing area tensions.

Rusk

Tel Aviv, August 28, 1967, 1520Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London, Moscow, and USUN.

/2/See footnote 3, Document 423.

/3/Telegram 604 from Tel Aviv, August 28, reported that Eban had given Barbour details of an Israeli decision to remove an August 31 deadline for refugees to return to the West Bank from the East Bank. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, REF ARAB) Eugene Rostow had urged extension of the deadline with Evron on August 25, and Barbour had made a similar approach to Argov on August 26. (Telegram 27794 to Tel Aviv, August 26, and telegram 594 from Tel Aviv, August 27; ibid.)

2. By way of general observation Eban commented that he feels it important that the onus for initiative towards a Middle East solution remain with the other side. He believes this position to be the effect of the rejection by the United Nations in the last General Assembly of various resolutions which would have provided for Israeli withdrawal under particular circumstances. Unless there is a fundamental change among the Arabs toward Israel he sees no reason to expect Israel to do something. As to the pace of movement in the current situation, Eban recognizes that there has been some movement on the part of the Soviets but he believes there has also been considerable exaggeration as to the extent thereof. In public the Soviets continue to take line that the only course is unconditional Israeli withdrawal. Furthermore the Soviets do not appear to be tied to the US-USSR resolution which arose from tactical considerations. Additionally, Eban doubts the extent to which the Soviets may be helping the Arabs towards realism. Eban finds even less movement among the Arabs themselves, except for statements by Bourguiba and the possibility that Hussein may do something after the summit meeting, Eban concludes that this situation confirms the wisdom of the Arabs having to continue to confront a wall. If in fact something is growing he thinks it important we not pluck it before it has reached maturity.

3. Eban went on that the purpose and objective to which we must continue to be dedicated is recognition by the Arabs of Israel's right to coexist with them in peace. It is not in his view time to seek agreed UN text or in fact texts covering specific language of possible settlement. In this connection Eban's concrete views may be summarized under three headings:

(A) We must still wait for time to exert pressure on the Arabs which will result in their coming to Israel.

/4/Document 420.

(C) Apparently the operative section of the proposed resolution is the appointment of an emissary. Israel has as yet no firm position on the desirability of such an appointment. In any event, Eban is convinced that it is tactically unwise to tie the hands of any such emissary by specifying particular positions which both parties oppose. He should be left entirely free. Otherwise he will become the advocate of each side to the other.

4. Eban added that he is also concerned as to where we stand on the "working paper," that is the draft of a possible resolution. It was his understanding that the draft had been circulated only to the British and Israel but he now is informed by a message today from Washington that it is also being distributed among some Arabs. He very much hopes the US will adhere to its own position as indicated in the President's policy declaration of June 19 and as set forth by US speeches in the special General Assembly which he considers as apt at this time as they were then.

/5/The text of an aide-m?moire that Rafael gave to Goldberg on August 31 was transmitted in telegram 644 from USUN, September 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN) Additional text was transmitted in telegram 745 from Tel Aviv, September 8, in which Barbour reported that Bitan had given him the full text the previous day with the explanation that, through error, part of it had not been transmitted to New York. (Ibid.) The full text of the aide-m?moire, marked "New York, 30 August 1967, with addendum dated 6 September 1967, 7 September 1967," is filed with a September 27 covering memorandum from Saunders to Walt Rostow noting that Eban had given it to Goldberg the preceding week. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII) The aide-m?moire states that in May and June, the "external factors" on which Israel had been urged to rely for its security had proved "fragile or illusory" and that Israel could not be required or expected to yield its current security advantages for anything less than a stable peace settlement.

6. I urged Eban to make a particular effort to be forthcoming and forward looking despite GOI's essentially negative attitude towards timing. I reiterated my previous comment to the effect that Israel cannot enjoy splendid isolation and that it essential we both concentrate on ways to contribute to progress towards settlement.

Barbour

Washington, August 29, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. IX. Secret. Rostow sent the memorandum to the President at 4:45 p.m. A handwritten "L" on the covering note indicates the President saw it. Copies were also sent to McPherson, Saunders, and the Department of State.

Minister Evron came in, at his request, to make two points on direct instruction from Foreign Minister Eban.

/2/The August 15 letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations William B. Macomber to Senator Fulbright set forth the Department's replies to questions concerning U.S. commitments to foreign powers. For text of the letter and its attachments, see U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Ninetieth Congress, First Session (Washington: 1967), pp. 49-71.

/3/Question 2 asked whether the United States had a commitment to come to the military or economic aid of Israel or any of the Arab States in the event of an attack. The letter replied: "President Johnson and his three predecessors have stated the United States interest and concern in supporting the political independence and territorial integrity of the countries of the Near East. This is a statement of policy and not a commitment to take particular actions in particular circumstances. Unrest and conflict in the Middle East have been of serious concern to the United States for a long time. The use of armed force in the Middle East can have especially serious consequences for international peace extending far beyond that area. We have bent our efforts to avoid a renewal of conflict there. Thus, we have stated our position in an effort to use our influence in the cause of peace."

--the U.S. should continue its support for Israel in its search for a secure peace settlement as the only realistic and safe alternative to the present situation; and

--the U.S. should accept a responsibility for insuring a flow of necessary arms to Israel.

Evron also noted that the narrowness of this statement of the U.S. commitment to Israel could prove "pernicious"; that is, it might encourage the Arabs and the Soviet Union to engage in future aggression against Israel.

The heart of the Israeli objection to the joint U.S.-Soviet resolution is its implication that Israel must return to the territories occupied on June 4. Even in exchange for a peace treaty Israel is not prepared for a simple return to the June 4 boundaries. What Israel will seek by agreement with the Arabs are "secure" boundaries, in addition to maintaining the unity of the city of Jerusalem. When I noted that we had not accepted the June 4 date in the UN resolution, Evron said the resolution still contained the language: "withdrawal from all occupied territories." He said that the Israeli Government was quite content with the carefully designed language used by the President with respect to boundaries, most recently in his communication with Tito; but it was essential that the U.S. position in the UN not clash with the President's formula of "secure and agreed borders."

In the course of a general conversation on events in the Middle East over the last month, Evron noted that their information about the political situation in Cairo was not very good. It was his feeling, however, that three forces were at work, all pushing Egypt towards a more moderate position:

--the economic situation;

--a growing feeling among Egyptians that they were becoming excessively tied to Moscow and losing their independence; and

--a deep struggle for power which Nasser could not or would not control--evidenced by open polemics in the Cairo press usually tightly controlled.

WR

Washington, August 30, 1967, 7:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 71 D 287, Middle East Crisis (3). Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Battle. Filed with a covering memorandum of August 31 from Battle to Walsh.

SUBJECT
Call of Yugoslav Foreign Minister Nikezic on the President

PARTICIPANTS
President of the United States
Foreign Minister Marko Nikezic of Yugoslavia
The Honorable Bogdan Crnobrnja, Ambassador of Yugoslavia
Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President
Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick, U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia
Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of NEA

The President received the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia at approximately 7:15 p.m. for a conversation that lasted just under one hour.

The President greeted the Foreign Minister warmly, expressing gratitude for his visit to the United States. The President indicated his pleasure at President Tito's interest in the Middle East and at his willingness to involve himself with these problems of concern to both countries.

The Foreign Minister expressed satisfaction on the part of President Tito with the message from the President and joined with President Johnson in stressing the value of good relations between the United States and Yugoslavia.

With respect to the reference in the message referring to Israeli aggression, the President stated that it was difficult to be certain who really committed the aggression. There had been extreme provocation in the movement of troops and the manner in which Arab actions had inflamed the situation. The Russians had made a great mistake in stirring up the situation--an act that was difficult for us to understand. The United States considered that the problem had to be dealt with at its root, and the causes of the difficulties that had led to war must be removed. It was not adequate to take an aspirin to deal with a major illness. Causes must be faced. A call for withdrawal alone was no answer.

/2/Tito's August 24 message proposed: withdrawal of all troops from the territories they had occupied since June 4, under the control of UN observers; guarantee of the security and borders of all states in the region by the Security Council or the four great powers, pending the definitive solution of questions under dispute, with the possible stationing of UN forces on both sides of the borders; free passage for all ships through the Strait of Tiran pending a decision by the International Court of Justice; navigation in the Suez Canal as before June 5; and steps by the Security Council, with the direct participation of the parties concerned, for the resolution of other questions under dispute, including the problem of Palestinian refugees and the question of passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal. (Johnson Library, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Yugoslavia--President Correspondence)

The President took exception to the statement in President Tito's message with respect to the possible "disassociation" of the United States from the occupation policy of Israel. The President noted that it was impossible to disassociate oneself from something one had not been associated with. He then reviewed the very serious efforts he had made to prevent hostilities, recalling his own conversations with Foreign Minister Eban in which he had urged that the Government of Israel exercise restraint in this situation. Similarly, the United States had urged restraint on the Egyptians in the hope that neither side would engage in hostilities.

The President referred to the reference in the communication from President Tito that indicated that the Arab countries consider the attitudes of the United States as "one sided". He agreed that some Arab countries did in fact feel this way. This attitude is unfortunate and does not reflect United States attitudes. The United States has great, in fact vital, interests in the Arab world. We seek a solution to the basic issues. In each talk the President has had with Arab leaders or Ambassadors, he has reaffirmed United States interest in the Arab world and a deep hope that a road to peace can be found.

The United States is in a difficult position with respect to arms races in various parts of the world. In the case of Jordan we had sold planes and arms with a guarantee that they would be used for defensive purposes only and not directed at Israel. It is difficult to explain to the American people a circumstance in which we have sold arms to both sides of a conflict.

The Foreign Minister then commented that the Yugoslavs had heard from the Egyptians that they considered that the United States had obtained promises that Israel would not engage in war and that the Egyptians had because of this refrained from opening hostilities.

The President replied that we had in fact urged restraint on both sides and had believed that each side would refrain from initiating hostilities. It is difficult, however, to place fault in view of the barrage of propaganda threatening the very existence of Israel in a very tense situation.

In commenting on the message from President Tito, the President noted with respect to the statement concerning passage through the Suez Canal that there must be an understanding that international waterways are open to all and noted that the Israelis would not accept opening the Canal and excluding themselves.

The President noted the statement in the letter that statesmen of the Arab countries cannot accept the Soviet-American resolution. He then indicated that the Israelis would not accept this resolution either.

The President also commented on the paragraph stating that the present situation in the Near East is untenable and extremely dangerous to peace in that region and in the world. The President expressed his strong agreement with this concern. Each day is more dangerous, particularly in view of the continued actions of the Russians in replacing military equipment including aircraft and tanks. Such action does not contribute to a solution to the problem. We understand the need for a solution that does not humiliate the Arabs, and we seek no such solution.

The President then completed reading the text of the message, commenting that the United Nations forces had disappeared pretty quickly when they were particularly needed in the period before the recent war.

The President then stated he would, with his advisers, study the message from President Tito, giving it careful consideration. Some aspects were, he thought, manageable and constructive. Others would not be acceptable. The exchange had been useful and the fact that President Tito prepared the letter and sent the Foreign Minister to see President Johnson was most encouraging.

The Foreign Minister then asked if he might add a few words. President Tito's trip had, the Foreign Minister thought, been constructive and useful and Arab leaders had found it so. President Tito had not asked these leaders to endorse his proposals. They were, however, very close to the views expressed by the Arab leaders. The Foreign Minister acknowledged that his government connected withdrawal with the other issues in the area and expressed the opinion that progressive steps must be found which could lead to de facto (if not de jure) recognition.

President Nasser is probably closest of all the Arab leaders to a realistic approach to the situation. If he attempts to be moderate, he does so at great risk as he is under pressure from all quarters, particularly from the left. Everyone is trying to be a "better Arab than Nasser is."

President Tito believes we must not make the situation more difficult for President Nasser than it already is. He has problems that are real and difficult to overcome, particularly in light of what his people have been told in the past. President Nasser is, in President Tito's opinion, the only hope for peace and real and permanent guarantees with perhaps a de facto recognition of Israel that exists in the Arab world today.

President Johnson said that he had had some hope of improving relations before the war with President Nasser. President Johnson had hoped to approach the area in its entirety with a humanitarian plan based on need of food and water by all. He had considered sending the Vice President to the area. All of these plans had been set back by the war.

The President then referred again to President Tito's message saying that while we cannot accept the formula, there were some basic things that were acceptable. Everyone must deal with realities. The Israelis cannot be asked to put down guns and then have their throats cut. Withdrawal, therefore, alone was no answer. There must be answers for maritime rights, for Jerusalem, and for the refugees. There must be an answer to a permanent peaceful existence for Israel. It would take all the pressures, powers, and wisdom of all concerned to work out answers to these problems, but we must try to find them.

The Foreign Minister replied that three months had passed since the war and that the world must attempt to deal with the issues. He admitted the connection between these problems and withdrawal. He reaffirmed, however, the need to work with those who could try for a solution. If those who existed today were removed from office (regardless of whether from the left or the right), those who came after would find the same dilemmas in the situation and the world would be no nearer a solution.

The President thanked the Foreign Minister for his visit and expressed again his pleasure that President Tito was taking an active part in finding solutions to the Middle East. He reaffirmed warmly a desire for friendship between Yugoslavia and the United States.

Washington, August 31, 1967, 2107Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Lambrakis on August 30; cleared by Bahti, Wehmeyer, and Davies; and approved by Katzenbach.

30382. Subj: U.S.S. Liberty.

/2/See Document 424, and footnote 2 thereto.

2. Evron said he would refer matter back to his government. He speculated it might be possible for his government to acquiesce in such publication of the notes, in which case it could be done jointly. He wished to express GOI's deep appreciation of restrained manner in which entire affair was handled by USG.

3. On substance of report, Under Secretary said he personally had been very surprised with the ending. Report was obviously candid since any such confusion could not possibly have been invented. Examining judge laid out point after point confirming negligence on part of various Israeli officials in affair, yet ended up finding no deviation from normal conduct. Surely, Under Secretary said, one cannot believe such conduct was consistent with normal Israeli practice and did not involve culpable negligence on part of officials involved.

4. Evron was subdued in manner and said there was little he could add. He had raised matter with GOI when in Israel in July and had spoken personally with COS Rabin. Rabin had stressed that investigation being entrusted to impartial military judge, and COS would have to abide by judge's findings. Affair had obviously been very damaging for GOI, Evron continued, and everything will be done to avoid repetition of such incident if ever similar circumstances arose, which he devoutly hoped they would not.

5. Under Secretary reiterated his surprise at judge's findings though he assured Evron he did not intend publicly to express these personal conclusions. If GOI should ever decide to publish the report, he added, we would appreciate identification of Liberty as US communications ship, in keeping with manner in which it identified in our own public utterances.

6. Evron agreed this manner of identification should present no problem but thought GOI would not publish report at all.

Rusk

Cairo, September 11, 1967, 0741Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limdis.

502. 1. Two and one-half hour session with Presidency Adviser Khouli September 9. It hard after these talkathons separate gold from dross but will try best.

/2/Telegram 34112 to Cairo, September 8, authorized Bergus to express U.S. pleasure with the constructive attitude reportedly taken by Nasser at the recent Arab Summit meeting in Khartoum but to point out that a settlement would require the Arabs to renounce belligerency in a manner sufficiently convincing to the Israelis. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

/3/The Conference of Arab Heads of State met in Khartoum August 29-September 1. Resolution 3 adopted by the Conference states that the participants had agreed to unite their political efforts on the international and diplomatic level "to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the 5 June aggression." This was to be done "within the framework of the main principles to which the Arab states adhere, namely: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and adherence to the rights of the Palestinian people in their country." For texts of the resolutions, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 590-591.

3. Khouli went back to argument re importance US-UAR "relationship." He again distinguished between "relationship" and "relations." He said Nasser had at Khartoum encouraged Arab states having relations with U.S. to intensify such relations for total Arab cause. As for UAR, it would for time being prefer deal with me, who was known rather than "some strange ambassador we don't know." He felt US-UAR relationship more important than Arab-Israel conflict, although FonMin would probably not agree with him. He said Nasser realized that only U.S., because of its "control" Israel, could establish durable peace in NE ("not Podgorny or Kosygin"), that only U.S. had scientific and technological know-how help NE become a happy and prosperous area. Nasser had meant what he said when he had referred to U.S. as most powerful nation on earth.

/4/On August 25 UAR authorities arrested former Vice President and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Field Marshal Amer on the charge that he was preparing a coup. At least 50 other persons, including Saleh Nasr, the head of the General Intelligence Department, were also arrested. Bergus commented in telegram 442 from Cairo, September 5, that the episode had the appearance of a personal power struggle. He wrote, "Feeling around town is that Nasser has won this one. There is less certainty that there won't be a next one." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 UAR) An Intelligence Note of September 13 from Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research George C. Denney, Jr., to Rusk states that there was no evidence that Amer was conspiring to overthrow Nasser. (Ibid., POL 29 UAR)

5. On issue of commitment, Khouli was surprisingly relaxed and frank. He said President Johnson had been right when in pre-hostilities correspondence with Nasser, LBJ had in effect stated that UAR had broken "gentleman's agreement" re Aqaba. Khouli admitted that such "gentleman's agreement" had existed. He recounted Nasser's desire in early June reestablish "gentleman's agreement" by sending Zakariyah to Washington. He looked forward opportunity joint review of chronology May-June events as soon as U.S. was ready. He recognized need for meaningful Arab commitments but felt, too, that this would be fairly simple problem if only Arab confidence in U.S. impartiality could be reestablished.

6. Other bits and pieces:

A. Memcons my conversations with Mohamed Riad being restricted to FonMin personally and Presidency.

B. Nasser has been in Alexandria, in better health than he has been in months, "He swam two hours straight on Friday."

C. GUAR would like see return U.S. dependents as indication USG desires normalize relations. If, say, by October 15, I can tell him U.S. in principle favors return dependents, he will take care of such matters as necessary GUAR assurances and quashing of Ministry Interior expulsion order.

D. He would like see TWA resume flights to Cairo and I could count on him for any necessary support this connection.

E. My travel plans to U.S. well-known to Presidency and he thought I should stay as long as necessary make GUAR viewpoint known to powers that be. I cautioned him this was routine consultation.

F. He sees Nasser again 12th. He will get in touch with me 13th if anything further I should take to Washington.

Bergus

Moscow, September 12, 1967, 1403Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to USUN and Tel Aviv. Received at 2150Z.

1033. 1. In course my conversation with Gromyko today, I raised Middle East situation, expressing hope US and USSR could reach understanding on problem. This connection, I recalled US-Soviet draft resolution of last July, and wondered if Arabs still opposed to it.

2. Gromyko recalled Kosygin had said to President, and he himself to Secretary and Goldberg, that US position too one-sided although they had transmitted it to the Arabs. Soviets had given Goldberg list of considerations which should be taken into account in seeking solution. He said that the Soviet Govt would like very much to find a solution, and attaches great importance to this matter. Soviet Govt believes neither US nor USSR interested in tensions in Middle East; this, of course, based on assumption Soviet reading US position accurate. Gromyko continued that any solution must be sought on realistic basis. Israel claims not realistic and pull rug from under search for solution. It must be realized that 100 million Arabs must be allowed to live. As to Israel's existence, Soviet position well known and should not raise doubts in anybody's mind. Yet, Israeli ultimata did not help. Gromyko maintained that key to solution was in US hands. If withdrawal Israeli troops can be secured, solution can be found. He said he would be glad hear US views on problem in New York and elsewhere; USSR prepared not only to listen but also to take certain steps to facilitate solution.

3. I said we did not think July draft resolution was pro-Israel, stressing that withdrawal must be connected with recognition Israel's right to exist. On other hand, I noted we regarded Yugoslav proposal as being one-sided and unrealistic in that it separates the two problems. I said I was sure Secretary would want discuss this matter with him and noted solution should be sought on urgent basis since situation might deteriorate.

Thompson

Washington, September 12, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII. Top Secret.

/2/Saunders' notes of General Weizman's presentation on September 11, with a covering memorandum of that date to Rostow, are ibid. A joint State-Defense message of September 15 to Tel Aviv is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 7 ISR. A transcript of the proceedings is ibid., NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 304.

General Weizman today wound up two mornings of formal talks in the Pentagon on Israel's aircraft requirements for the next five years. The first reaction of all who attended was that, while details of any such presentation are debatable, his requests and tone were both modest.

/3/Attached but not printed.

He rests his argument on these main points:

1. Airpower will continue to be the decisive factor in Israeli strategy. Israel with its small population has mustered about all it can manage in ground forces.

2. If there is another war, Israel will face a tougher enemy: There will be greater Arab cooperation, and Israel won't be able to count on the luxury of fighting one enemy at a time. Arab airfields will be better defended, more numerous and more widely dispersed and hardened. The Arab air forces on Israel's borders alone will number around 900 combat aircraft by 1970, against a planned Israeli force of 350.

3. Israel still believes that it must maintain a force that will deter aggression. Weizman feels that one cause of the June war was that Israel's force was so close to the margin of visible superiority that it lost its credibility as a deterrent and allowed Nasser to miscalculate his chances.

4. If there is a next time, Israel will have to be prepared to absorb a first strike, since the Arabs are now painfully aware of the advantages of this strategy.

We told Weizman he could expect no answers while he was here, and staff work will now begin grinding out a recommendation for you. But I wanted you to have immediately the flavor of Weizman's presentation.

Walt

Washington, September 12, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII. Secret. Drafted by Saunders.

SUBJECT
Evron on the Arms Deal

While riding back from our second session with General Weizman, Evron informally suggested we consider handling the arms deal (if any) as follows.

There are two possible approaches. One would be to exact conditions for aircraft. The other would be to meet Israel's arms request without formal conditions but simultaneously to say through some informal channel that we were doing this at some political cost and would therefore expect something from them in return. They fully expect this, but the way we do it will be important.

Evron feels we'll get more out of the Israelis by taking the second tack. He feels that the President understands that the way to deal with Israelis is to treat them as close friends and to expect them to respond in kind, rather than treating them like bazaar hagglers.

This strikes once again at the heart of our relationship with Israel. The Israelis have always tried to get close to us and to build the kind of relationship we have with the British. We have--at least at the professional level of our government--kept them at arms length, and they have been deeply hurt. Evron and I have discussed this aspect of our relationship before, and it's no surprise that he sees here a chance for a new start.

Comment. Taking Evron's tack would be a noble experiment as well as a calculated risk. I recall saying when we were debating our military aid package for Israel before the war that the argument had nothing to do with dollars or numbers of APCs--that the real argument was over what kind of relationship we should have with Israel. In my mind, there is no question, so I'm tempted to take the risk Evron suggests. This is not to rule out a pretty blunt dialogue on what we expect of the Israelis. But as Evron suggests, the real leverage we have is not a specific number of aircraft but our total relationship. In a situation such as we face today nothing short [apparent omission] is big enough for the kind of stakes we're talking about, but I'm not sure we're in a position to bargain with it. In any case, Evron's idea warrants serious consideration since our decision on tactics will set the tone of our relationship with Israel for some time.

Hal

Washington, September 13, 1967, 12:32 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, NSC Meetings. Secret. Prepared by Assistant to the President Jim R. Jones. The President joined the meeting at 12:32 p.m. and departed at 12:58 p.m.; the notes record only that part of the meeting. Notes of the entire meeting by Bromley Smith are ibid., National Security File, NSC Files, NSC Meetings, Vol. V, Tab 57; and by Nathaniel Davis are ibid., Agency File, United Nations, Vol. VIII.

SUBJECT
National Security Council Meeting in the Cabinet Room
Wednesday, September 13, 1967

ATTENDING WERE
The Vice President, Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Katzenbach, General J.P. McConnell, Leonard Marks, Ambassador Goldberg, Under Secretary Paul Nitze, CIA Director Dick Helms, Secretary Henry Fowler, Joe Sisco, Bromley Smith, Walt Rostow and George Christian

The President opened the meeting calling on Under Secretary Katzenbach.

Katzenbach pointed out that Secretary Rusk will be going to the United Nations for the usual meetings of Foreign Ministers. He said these are very helpful and useful to have these bilateral discussions, although it is very wearing on Mr. Rusk. Katzenbach said that the Africans are better than they used to be. They held together well, and they are more realistic than they used to be. Katzenbach said the President's announcement of the U.N. Delegation with new and different people is very helpful politically both to the United Nations and to this Administration domestically. Katzenbach said that Joe Sisco briefed the NATO people on the Middle East and this was helpful, but he is not sure that they will stay considering the pressure the NATO countries are under. On Vietnam, Katzenbach said Goldberg has been having discussions with the U.N. delegates.

The President said he appreciated what Katzenbach said about the United Nations delegation. The President then called on Goldberg for discussion of the major issues facing the United Nations General Assembly.

Goldberg said there are about 100 items on the General Assembly agenda, many of these are repetitious. The principal issues listed by Goldberg were Middle East, Vietnam, non-proliferation, Chinese representation, oceanography and African problems.

/2/Davis' notes state, "In conclusion, Goldberg noted that the other side had badly misplayed its cards in the special General Assembly and we could, perhaps still count on the stupidity of our adversaries. The President laughed and said that in other cases as well this sometimes proved an asset indeed."

[Omitted here is discussion of other subjects.]

Washington, September 13, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII. Secret.

SUBJECT
Weizman's Position on Missiles

As you know, we have been after the Israelis and the Egyptians since about 1964 to persuade them not to introduce more sophisticated weapons into the Middle East arms race.

We decided before General Weizman came that we ought to use his visit as an occasion for continuing this dialogue. We had Wally Barbour warn him that we wanted to hear his views on this subject, and Weizman presumably cleared his position with Eshkol before coming.

In sum, his answer to our probing was that Israel is merely keeping itself in a position to go into missiles, if it has to, to counter a similar Arab move. But Weizman insisted that "nothing is imminent."

We tried to find out whether there was any specific Israeli contract with France for the delivery or serial production of the missiles France has been developing for Israel. He answered that Israel's contract with France is "quite flexible" and repeated that nothing was imminent.

Weizman does not see the surface-to-surface missile as a militarily important weapon. He made quite clear that aircraft would rank ahead of missiles on any Israeli priority list. Missiles, in his view, would only have value as "deterrence in kind." If Nasser acquired this kind of weapon, it might be essential for Israel to have a similar weapon simply to frighten Nasser from using his.

Despite more of an exchange on this subject than we were able to have with Weizman in 1965, his statement was obviously guarded. Our discussion was a significant one, but I would not regard it as the last word on the subject. I simply want you to be up to date on this aspect of our arms relationship, since some people in State are strongly inclined to make a prohibition against missiles a condition for our selling aircraft.

Hal

Washington, September 15, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Yugoslavia--President Correspondence. No classification marking. Telegram 38996, September 18, which transmitted the text of the letter to Belgrade indicates that it was drafted by Arthur R. Day (UNP). (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Telegram 917 from Belgrade, September 20, indicates that the Charge delivered the letter that day. Tito stated that he had visited the Middle East in the hope of convincing the Arabs of the necessity of seeking a political solution. He thought he had succeeded, although it was "no easy task" to convince Arab leaders on this point. He further stated that he had told the Arab leaders that Israel was a reality from which one must proceed. (Ibid.)

Dear Mr. President:

/2/See footnote 2, Document 432.

It appears to us that the key to the situation is that both sides agree on principles and conduct which provide conditions for a durable peace. It is in this light that we have studied your proposals. The relationship of withdrawal and the cessation of the state of belligerency is obviously fundamental. Withdrawal without accompanying actions by those concerned which ended the state of belligerency and acknowledged Israel's right to exist in peace and security would only reestablish the situation which existed prior to the recent war. What is now needed is acceptance by the parties that each nation in the area is entitled to live within accepted, recognized and secure state boundaries--a principle to which we all subscribed in signing the UN Charter.

We believe a useful expression of this principle is embodied in the US-USSR draft resolution, and that the Yugoslav proposal falls considerably short of it. Here there is both equivalence and a simultaneity of action. We do not claim that withdrawal should come last any more than we believe it can come first. It must come together with an actual end to belligerency. There must be real and effective progress in both respects at the same time so that fulfillment of the objectives of both sides may be guaranteed.

You note that the Arabs feel the US interprets the draft resolution to imply a change of frontiers to their detriment. We have no preconceptions on frontiers as such. What we believe to be important is that the frontiers be secure. For this the single most vital condition is that they be acceptable to both sides.

It is a source of regret to us that the Arabs appear to misunderstand our proposal and misread our motives. It would be a real contribution to the cause of ultimate peace in the area if you, with your close contacts in the Arab capitals, could help dispel such misunderstandings.

The second point of your approach is a guarantee by the Security Council or the four great powers. We have given careful study to this proposal. We inevitably come back to the central point which is that the essential element is agreement by the parties themselves. The device of having the Security Council declare no belligerency has been tried before and has not been effective. Guarantees could serve as auxiliary insurance as necessary. In themselves they cannot meet the need for an acknowledgment of Israel's right to exist, and for renunciation by the Arab States and by Israel of any claims of belligerent rights. We do agree with you, however, that the Arabs would not need for this purpose to recognize Israel formally.

/3/The Constantinople Convention of 1888; see footnotes 4 and 5, Document 271.

/4/A Security Council resolution of September 1, 1951 (UN document S/2322), called upon Egypt to terminate restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. V, pp. 848-849.

You report in your letter that as a result of your trip you are further convinced that the Arab countries must have adequate defense capabilities. We believe both the Arabs and the Israelis should have the capacity to defend themselves but that arms should not be maintained at such a level as to be a source of tension and danger. It is our firm conviction that it would be in the interests of all countries in the area and would advance the cause of lasting peace if the flow of arms to all those countries involved in the recent hostilities were to be restricted; we hope that the suppliers of arms to the region will exercise due restraint in this regard.

In the weeks and months ahead, which will be so critical for the future of the Middle East, the United States will continue to work for solutions designed to advance the long-run interests of all people of the area, Arabs and Israelis alike. I would again recall to you the statement I made on June 19 which reflects the policy of my government and which I am firmly convinced is in the interests of peace.

In conclusion, let me again express my appreciation for this frank contact with you concerning your discussions with Arab leaders.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Washington, September 18, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Copies were sent to Katzenbach, Kohler, Harriman, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Joseph Palmer II, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs John M. Leddy, Battle, Hughes, Sisco, Meeker, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council Henry D. Owen, Julius C. Holmes, who was heading a special State-Defense Study Group on the region, Walt Rostow, Goldberg, and pouched to London, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, and Paris NATUS.

SUBJECT
Reflections on my talks about Middle Eastern Problems in Europe between

September 10-16, 1967

This memorandum is an attempt to see the forest through a TWA window en route home.

Except in England, discussion of the Middle Eastern crisis as we are accustomed to see it--as a prolonged "Cuban missile crisis" with the Soviet Union, not primarily an Arab-Israeli affair--provoked interest and surprise, but not resistance or dissent. All were agreed that Europe failed to meet its responsibilities, and to protect its own interests during the crisis, and that the lessons of this mistake, on our part and theirs, should be taken into account now in devising more effective methods of political consultation and crisis management, ad hoc and through the Harmel exercise report. The cream of the jest was Schuetz' question to me last night: "Why didn't you press us to act?"

In general, most people agreed that the political situation with regard to the Middle East is moving, and moving on the whole in the right direction. But they also agreed that there are risks. There is no sign yet of action. It will take a number of steps to minimize the risks, and maximize the opportunities, both in the field and in the UN.

The Soviets seem to have decelerated. They are not so conspicuous as they were in Egypt and Algeria. Manifestly, Nasser is not following their suggestions slavishly (i.e., the Canal, the opening to the West, Alexandria). On the other hand, the Soviets seem to be disengaging from their tentative agreement with us at the end of the Assembly. Arms shipments continue, with their implicit menace, accentuated by Heikal's threat that war is inevitable unless a miracle occurs. And there are reports of Soviet advisers, arms offers in the Yemen, etc.

For the moment, like nearly every other player on the stage, the Soviets are saying, "It's your move", in the context of the tentative hypothesis that we both want a relaxation of Middle Eastern tensions. Like the others, too, they seem to have forgotten that we tabled a Resolution in the Security Council--a Resolution still on the agenda, and still unvoted.

The British are talking less about the Canal, but they are still pressing for quick action, and hinting that if we fail to obtain either the US-USSR Resolution or its equivalent in their Security Council, they, like other middle powers, may change their position in quest of a deal.

/2/Rostow's luncheon meeting with Evron on August 22 was reported in telegram 25406 from Tel Aviv, August 23. (Ibid., POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM)

Everyone who professed to have an opinion about the trend in Egypt had roughly the same opinion: (a) that Nasser was still in charge, and was not yet quite a complete Soviet prisoner; (b) that on the whole the signs from Khartoum are pretty good--they surely could have been worse with regard to the West, and to relations among the Arabs--although there was less agreement about their implications for a peaceful settlement between Israel and the Arabs. (It may be, some thought, that the purpose of Khartoum was to separate us and the British from the Israelis, or in any event to separate the British from us and the Israelis); and (c) that Egypt has not yet made a single clear step.

It is hard to tell whether the Egyptian position is "hardening", since Egypt has never taken an official position. We don't even know whether Egypt would support the Tito draft. But so far the Egyptian posture is largely atmosphere, without a clearly defined statement of terms or of procedures for reaching them. We are told that Egypt prefers a "political" solution, although it warns that war is "inevitable" unless we obtain Israeli troop withdrawal. But the substance and the scenario for such a result are unstated. Here again, their question is, what do we propose?

There is an aspect of the Egyptian position we might be able to use as an opener with them: they say it would be humiliating for them to negotiate with Israel and that they will not do so. We might ask them in reply how they imagine reaching a political settlement without negotiating, at least through third parties. They negotiated, after all, in 1948 and 1956.

Assuming that the cease fire holds, there are two possible roads forward: (a) more United Nations debates and votes or (b) negotiations, bilateral or multilateral, secret or public, in New York or elsewhere. The two procedures are not necessarily alternatives. The goal of the United Nations after all, is peace, not the production of Resolutions. Thus far, at least, the sessions of the Security Council and the General Assembly have had the effect of preventing, not encouraging the process of negotiation.

I believe all our weight from now on should be to promote negotiation, and to direct UN votes and debates to that end.

II

Now let me turn to the more specific issues discussed at one or another capital during my trip.

(a) My interlocutors agreed that all of us should keep talking with Tito, in order to move him as rapidly as possible and as far as possible from his five points, and towards our five principles, in which the Yugoslavs profess to believe. Some people think we shall face another Yugoslav Resolution in the Assembly; others think Tito will not sponsor a Resolution unless he is sure it can win, and probably not unless it has our support in advance. All agree there is a risk, however, that he will sponsor a bad resolution, and that there is some risk of erosion in the Security Council or the Assembly, where the yearning for a settlement is strong, and frustration, boredom, impatience and worse are increasingly evident. The British carefully articulated that risk as to themselves. The sense of frustration is likely to be translated into pressure on the Israelis to do something they won't do, and we won't want to ask them to do since it is so hard to get a concession from the UAR.

There are some positive potentialities as well as risks in Tito's activities. He does have influence in Egypt. He might be able to accomplish something.

In any event, the people I met (a) affirmatively wanted not to shut the door in Tito's face; (b) hoped an orchestrated dialogue with Tito would move him to a position of utility, or of less disutility, thus hopefully preventing a rough round in the UN. I said in this connection that we hadn't yet altogether made up our minds on how to handle Tito; but that I should be inclined to recommend the effort, on prudential grounds. But I added that we all ought to remember that it might be harder to hold off a more "moderate", plausible but still unsatisfactory Tito Resolution than one which is visibly unfair and unrealistic.

/3/Ambassador Ernesto A. Thalmann of Switzerland was named by the Secretary-General as his Personal Representative to obtain information on the situation in Jerusalem as a basis for the report requested by General Assembly Resolution 2254 (ES-V) of July 14, 1967.

/4/For text of the Secretary-General's report of September 12 on the situation in Jerusalem, see UN document S/8146 (A/6793).

We shall face pressure at home to vote "with the Arabs for once" if a Jerusalem Resolution does come up. The Europeans are not very staunch on this subject, although they are sympathetic, and some of the Dutch at least are knowledgeable.

I recommend that we pursue low-level talks about possible texts with the Pakistanis, as a precaution. It ought to be possible to get a text we might approve tactically, for purposes of such a Resolution.

There was general--though not universal--agreement that the West should move forward soon in the Security Council to obtain the best possible Resolution calling for the appointment of a Special Representative to talk to the parties.

Everyone thought that on the whole we should probe the Soviets well before the Assembly to ascertain whether they would go back on our understanding about the Draft Resolution. Even the appearance of a Soviet-American front should nudge the process forward.

If that draft fades, what do we do? The Israelis, of course, would prefer doing nothing in New York, until they reach Hussein and Nasser. The British urge Security Council action as soon as possible, preferably on the basis of the US-USSR draft, otherwise on any basis that might open the Canal.

/5/The Constantinople Convention of 1888; see footnotes 4 and 5, Document 271.

/6/September 16.

Clearly, the British put a higher priority on getting Nasser started than on Hussein. They are probing Nasser's recent trial balloon about opening a dialogue with them.

There was very little talk about what concrete suggestions could or should be made to stir Nasser into action, either by us, by the British or by the Yugoslavs. I told the British simply that we were thinking about how to answer Cairo's request for "modalities", but hadn't yet decided what to say, and with what degree of formality. We want to avoid "creeping recognition".

Problems in connection with the possibility of negotiation between Israel and Jordan are discussed in a separate memorandum.

And I shall shortly circulate a rough sketch of a memorandum or talking points we might use in responding to the requests of the Soviets, the Saudis, the Egyptians, and others, as to what we think might be done now.

New York, September 23, 1967, 1711Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated Priority to Tel Aviv. A retyped copy of this telegram was sent to the President with a covering note from Walt Rostow commenting that it was "a pretty full portrait of Israel's frame of mind at the moment." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII)

950. Re: Israeli Views on Middle East.

/2/Telegram 949 from USUN, September 23, reported that Eban also said that Israel was uncertain about the prospects for a settlement with King Hussein, since what had emerged from the conference at Khartoum was a call for a common policy which seemed to have tied the King's hands. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM)

Eban said most important thing was that they had decided to take current stands on position of security principle rather than on territorial basis and to keep their options open for future negotiations. Implications that their position had hardened since last June was not true, he said. However, if Israel were compelled to state its specific policy publicly at this time they would have to be stated in a maximalist position. Israel's general position was that in the absence of a situation of peace Israel would have to maintain its positions on basis of considerations of national security but in a peace agreement with Arabs they could be in a flexible negotiating position.

With respect to Egypt, Eban said their idea was that border would follow the international frontier. There would be an international presence in Straits of Tiran to assure freedom of navigation, possibly of major maritime powers in Gulf or something on the shore. There would be a demilitarization of the Sinai. Suez Canal would be open to ships of all nations on basis of "declaratory" assurances (i.e., without some external presence). Demilitarization of Sinai would be assured by some sort of international presence, possibly an enlarged UNTSO type of operation, and possibly including UAR and Israeli troops. Idea of demilitarization of Sinai was difficult to achieve if UAR stayed in Gaza Strip.

/3/Eban and Dulles discussed Gaza a number of times during the months after the Suez crisis; for records of those conversations, see Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, volumes XVI and XVII.

On Syria, he said it was hard to contemplate an early peace agreement as long as Syrian Govt retained its present complexion. There had been a discussion of a demilitarization arrangement on Syrian Heights similar to idea re Sinai. Conclusion, however, which he shared, was that this would not be safe and that some territorial adjustments would have to be made.

Re Jerusalem, the Holy Moslem quarter would create perpetual emotional religious problems as long as it under Israeli control. GOI therefore had in mind arrangement which would put it under Moslem control and sovereignty. Rest of city was now united, and Arab inhabitants were free to travel throughout Israel. There could be some arrangement which would insure free Jordanian access to and participation in economic life of city.

West Bank presented particularly difficult problems. Incorporation of West Bank into Israel, with its large Arab population, would completely transform Israel's national existence and reason for being. An Israeli demographic expert had estimated that at present rate of population growth this would produce an Arab majority in Israel within 15 years. In any case it would cause a total reshaping of Israeli politics, as Arab votes were sought, and thus produce alterations in structure of Israel that they did not desire. Neither could Arabs be incorporated into Israel without granting them Israeli citizenship. This would not be permitted by international community nor would it be acceptable to Israeli people themselves.

Eban said they had also given thought to establishment of separate, autonomous Palestinian state on West Bank. This also has serious drawbacks. Days of autonomous dependent regions had really passed. Creation of Palestinian state might simply increase irredentist desires. There would be yet another Arab state on Arab scene. In a year or two it would ask for UN membership, and it would be admitted. Such prospects did not look attractive. On the other hand, now that Israelis for first time had opportunity to visit areas of historic significance to them, it would be difficult for their citizens to understand govt simply turning the area back. Sort of thinking they were therefore thinking of would include two elements: (a) demilitarization of West Bank, with a UN inspection system; and (b) some form of economic, customs or travel arrangements which would permit access to and larger cooperation with the area. He referred to possibility of a free port on Mediterranean for Jordan as a move in same direction. I believe he also had in mind some border adjustments for security purposes, as he referred to Israeli security psychosis resulting from fact entire population was in range of Arab guns but he was not precise about what they might be.

Re refugee problem, Eban made clear Israel was deliberately opening up travel from Gaza to the West Bank in hopes it would relieve population pressures in Gaza. He also said Israel was issuing a few small pilot projects for economic resettlement for a few refugees in order to demonstrate feasibility of doing this within reasonable length of time. He implied Israel would welcome external international help for a much larger effort.

Re General Assembly, Eban thought there would be a substantial Arab effort to obtain political backing for their position requiring Israeli withdrawal without compensating actions on their side. If this failed, possibilities of direct settlement would be enhanced. He thought objective in Assembly should be to insure that no such decision were taken. He said specifically that appointment of a UN rep without any precise terms of reference would be acceptable, but indicated GOI does not want to play this card yet.

In explaining Israel's insistence of a settlement directly committing parties in the area, Eban expounded Israel's considered assessment of events leading up to current outbreak of fighting. One of their basic conclusions from this was that external restraints, including both the UN and direct support that could be expected in the interests of its security by Israel from various countries including France and US and from maritime powers with respect to maritime rights, were weaker than both they and UAR had calculated. In future, therefore, security guarantees had to come from the area and to a much lesser extent from external forces.

Their appreciation of sequence of events was:

(A) In middle of May Nasser's objective was to apply pressures on Israel to prevent Israel from retaliating against Syrian Al Fatah raids. He had been spurred on to this by Sov Union which wanted to protect Syria and which gave UAR false intelligence about Israeli troop concentrations on Syrian border. Nasser's intention was to hold a corridor to Israel so that his troops were in direct confrontation with Israel. Israel knew as a fact that he was prepared to have UNEF stay in Straits of Tiran, Gaza, and Quintella.

(B) Nasser expected that UN and other external pressures, particularly US, would prevent him from going further. When UN proved unexpectedly weak, both in SC and in saying UNEF would have to be pulled out entirely, he changed his objective to restoration of the pre-1956 status, i.e. including blockade of the Gulf. He again expected international pressures to restrain him at that point. Inability of maritime powers to agree on an effective course of action and general weakness of resistance to his moves then caused him to make the next decision.

(C) From about 29th May, UAR objective changed to one of open [illegible]-- against Israel. He began to create the alliances with Jordan and to obtain the support of Iraq and countries as far away as Algeria for a final assault. Eban described UAR policy from this point on as moving forward in a drunken fashion. Messages to troop commanders indicated clear offensive indications, and UAR began to reconnoiter by air Israel's key industrial and other facilities suitable for aerial attack. (He implied that Israel had a great deal of firm intelligence on this period both from captured documents and from intercepted telephone conversations at the time.)

Amb Harman expressed considerable sensitivity about arms supplies from US, saying he had been able to obtain the delivery of only about $700 thousand of equipment out of the $3 million total which they had already paid, and that there were considerable uncertainties about future plane sales. He said they would need 79 planes but not for delivery before end of 1968. He stressed importance to their logistics of "nuts and bolts" and said military value of captured Sov equipment had been considerably exaggerated in the press.

/4/The Sisco message has not been found. A draft telegram to Barbour instructing him to see Eban before his departure for New York to express concern at "indications Israeli objectives may be shifting from original position seeking peace with no territorial gains toward one of territorial expansion" was sent to President Johnson for clearance on September 15. His reaction was that they should not send the telegram but "let Goldberg do it." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII)

/5/Rusk expressed the hope that the Israelis would resume permitting the refugees to return to the West Bank without political conditions in a letter to Eban transmitted in telegram 3l492 to Tel Aviv, September 2. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, REF ARAB) Eban replied in a letter transmitted in telegram 37827 from Tel Aviv, September 15. (Ibid.)

Goldberg

Washington, September 20, 1967, l p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XVI. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Rostow. Walt Rostow sent the memorandum to the President on September 22 along with the memorandum of the portion of the conversation concerning Vietnam.

SUBJECT
The Middle East

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Yuri N. Tcherniakov, Minister Counselor, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Mr. Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Under Secretary Rostow lunched with Counselor Y. N. Tcherniakov at the latter's invitation on September 20, 1967, at the Residence of the Soviet Ambassador.

The conversation concerned several topics, and is reported in separate memoranda of conversation.

After preliminary amenities, Mr. Tcherniakov asked what prospects we saw for a peaceful solution in the Middle East. Rostow answered that we thought the strongest base for going forward was a Security Council resolution based on the principles and ideas on which we had agreed at the end of the General Assembly. This had been the tenor of our recent talks with Tito and the Arabs, and with other governments. Mr. Tcherniakov said this was also the view of his government.

(At this point Mr. Tcherniakov switched the conversation to Vietnam. He led the way back to the Middle East at a later point.)

Mr. Tcherniakov enquired broadly about Israeli views on a settlement. Rostow commented that while we could not speak or negotiate for Israel, it was our impression that their official position on these matters had not changed in either direction--that the Israelis would make great sacrifices for a condition of peace. Both men agreed that at this point the parties were in a state of negotiating from a distance--making signals in their speeches and actions, and naturally quite strong ones. So far as Egypt was concerned, we did not think the problems of settlement should present serious difficulties, once the principle of the resolution on which we had agreed in July was accepted. There was the Gaza Strip of course, but that had never been Egyptian territory. Security arrangements would certainly be necessary. Nodding, Tcherniakov asked whether we thought a solution for Syria would be difficult. Rostow said we had originally thought not, but that the Israelis had been shocked by the fortifications they found on the Golan Hills. We were not clear whether demilitarization would be enough. Both men agreed that the armistice lines between Jordan and Israel would present serious problems.

Tcherniakov hoped that we would use our influence with Israel to obtain concessions in the process of peace-making. He said he was glad that both our governments were agreed that the starting point was to link troop withdrawals with an end of the claims of belligerency.

Rostow said he hoped we could begin on that general footing in the Security Council, and soon. The world was beginning to think that nothing could be accomplished through the U.N. It would be electrified if we sponsored a resolution together in the Security Council. Tcherniakov said that some period in the Assembly might be necessary, but he agreed that the nations had had a sufficient opportunity to express themselves on the Middle East in the General Assembly. "They have talked enough," he said.

Tcherniakov referred to the Gromyko-Goldberg agreement between the two governments at least four times, and concluded, referring back to the conversation about Vietnam, that if we succeeded in acting together in one place, it could help elsewhere. None of these local quarrels in small distant countries, he said, were worth a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, but such episodes kept recurring.

/2/See Documents 380 and 384.

Washington, September 21, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Copies were sent to Katzenbach, Rostow, Kohler, Sisco, and USUN. Rusk's initials on the memorandum indicates he read it.

SUBJECT
Ambassador Pachachi's Conversation with Mr. Robert Anderson

Mr. Robert Anderson called me to report that Ambassador Pachachi of Iraq had called on him Thursday/2 /for a full review of the Middle Eastern situation. During the special session of the General Assembly, Mr. Pachachi was the spokesman for a group of moderate Arabs with Mr. Anderson and others.

/2/September 21.

Mr. Pachachi, basing his comments on a meeting of his group (although UAR and others are not yet in New York), said that there was general concern because the Arabs did not believe they knew the position of the United States. The United States has not been explicit, they felt, in describing that position. There is some concern that this stems from U.S. support of the Israeli desire that nothing happen for a time since the Israelis are convinced that time is on their side. The moderate Arabs hope that our position is not also one of inaction as they consider that there must be an early settlement to the difficulties. If there is not an early settlement, U.S.-Arab relations will suffer considerably.

The moderate Arabs do not consider that their dialogue with the U.S. is adequate. They believe that there should be more contact with Ambassador Goldberg (which I urged during the last Assembly and urged today). Representatives of the group would like to meet with me, and I have agreed to get together with them the early part of next week in New York.

Ambassador Pachachi was asked how far the Arabs were prepared to go at this time. He replied that they were willing to accept "almost complete rights of passage" in the waterways. There is no problem on Aqaba, and the Suez Canal could be opened to all but Israeli flagships. When Mr. Anderson expressed doubt that the Israelis would accept such an arrangement, Mr. Pachachi replied that, while he could not speak for Nasser, it was even possible that the Canal could be opened to Israeli flagships if necessary to obtain a settlement.

The Arabs are willing to guarantee all borders, but they must have retreat from occupied territories.

Withdrawal from Sinai could be coupled with a demilitarization arrangement.

They would accept demilitarization of the Syrian Heights under United Nations direction.

They will accept a unified Jerusalem provided there is some kind of administration by the Arabs (presumably the Jordanians) over the old Arab quarter.

Mr. Pachachi remarked that the Russians will "go as far as the Arabs want them to go provided the United States will join." The Eastern Bloc is, according to Pachachi, largely pro-Israel in attitude and the Russians cannot ignore this feeling on the part of satellite countries.

The Arabs are willing to accept a declaration of the end of a state of belligerency in some form.

They cannot accept direct negotiations alone with the Israelis. They will accept, if necessary, negotiations with a third party in the room. They would prefer to have the Arabs in one room, the Israelis in a second room, and a representative of the third country in a room between the two. They admit, however, that there is some precedent for them to sit at the same table provided a third party is present.

Comment: The foregoing is the most forthcoming offer yet reported. As I told Mr. Anderson, it is possible that Pachachi will be more open with him than he would be with a Government official. I would suspect that Pachachi's position with Mr. Anderson will not be fully reflected in an official talk, but I will try to find out during the next few days. If the Arabs are willing to make a deal along the foregoing lines, this is very encouraging.

Washington, September 22, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII. Secret.

/2/A memorandum of September 20 from McPherson to the President reporting on a conversation that day with Evron is attached. A notation in President Johnson's handwriting on McPherson's memorandum reads: "Walt. Give me your reaction & comment. L."

On Evron's first point--suspicion in the Jewish community about our position before June 5--I should think these straightforward comments would suffice: (1) There was no question at any point before or during the war that we would have let Israel be seriously hurt or destroyed. (2) We made a serious effort to prevent the war. (3) Israel in the end did not ask us for help; it is to Israel's advantage and ours that it handled this problem entirely on its own. (4) These statements fairly represent thinking at the policy-making levels of our government and far outweigh all the later talk at professional levels about what our commitment to Israel was or wasn't.

/3/The attached chronology, undated, begins with the NSC Special Committee decisions of June 8 and 14 on the suspension of all military shipments to the Middle East and continues with points at which aspects of this issue were considered.

It is admittedly true that we do not want to make decisions on any new major military sales to Israel until we've worked out a comprehensive arms policy for the whole area. The Senior Interdepartmental Group has already requested a recommendation for you by 1 November. But I feel that is a separate issue beyond the freeze on past programs because you could not approve any recommendation that reneged on past promises to Israel. However, others may not agree with me, and if I'm wrong Evron may have a point.

Two things have irked the Israelis: (1) that our freeze applies to all items with a military application--even those which they want to buy commercially for cash like the Piper Cubs Evron mentioned to Harry; and (2) that no one in the USG will promise that the freeze will end when the aid bill passes.

As I see it, the way to dampen Israeli suspicions would be to do now some combination of the following: (1) quietly to lift the freeze on items to be bought for cash from commercial suppliers (probably less than $20 million); and (2) to say secretly but officially that we will lift the suspension on other items from past deals in which USG money is involved as soon as (a) the aid authorization bill becomes law or (b) the aid appropriation is passed. Even (1) by itself would help. At the same time I would relax the suspension on a few comparable items for a couple of friendly Arab states.

This action would in no way pre-empt the basic policy study of our longer-term Mid-East arms policy. That would continue to concentrate on future arms transfers. This decision would affect only a limited number of long-approved transactions now frozen. Nor would this action undercut our line with the Congress that we continue to act with the utmost restraint.

You wouldn't want to do this without talking again with Bob McNamara. If you are concerned enough about mounting Israeli feeling, I would suggest putting this subject on our next Tuesday lunch agenda. I had planned to re-open the question at the first Tuesday lunch after the Congressional conference on the aid bill ended. But now that is going to hang over until early October, and the appropriations process will reach into November. We held the Israelis off with the $3 million in early August on the assumption that we might be able to raise the freeze some time in early September (although we made no promises). Now that the pressure is mounting, it might be worth taking another reading.

Walt

/4/This option is checked.

P.S. I think Evron's mention of the "hold-up" on licenses for the $3 million we have released is unfair. Actually, the Israelis themselves in making up their own list put on some items with a long lead time and have since asked to shift to some that are more immediately available. Whatever delay that may have caused is their fault since Defense accepted their list just as they wrote it.

New York, September 25, 1967, 12:15 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by United Kingdom Country Director J. Harold Shullaw, and approved in S on October 3. The memorandum is part 3 of 3. The meeting took place in the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York, where Rusk was attending the 22nd Session of the UN General Assembly.

SUBJECT
Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

UK Side
Foreign Secretary George Brown
Lord Caradon, UK Permanent Representative to the UN
Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador
P.T. Hayman, Assistant Under Secretary, Foreign Office
Sir Harold Beeley, Deputy Leader UK Disarmament Delegation, Geneva
Donald Murray, Counselor, Foreign Office
T.F. Brenchley, Foreign Office
D.J.D. Maitland, Principal Private Secretary to Foreign Secretary

US Side
The Secretary
Ambassador Arthur Goldberg
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary, IO
J. Harold Shullaw, Country Director, BMI

Foreign Secretary Brown said that he got the impression from talking with Gromyko last week that the Soviet Government wants to see some movement on a Middle East settlement but does not want to get out in front. Ambassador Thompson said the Soviet interest in the Suez Canal was substantial, that approximately 1400 Soviet ships used it in a year. Foreign Secretary Brown, in response to a question from Assistant Secretary Battle, said that the resumption of oil shipments following the Khartoum Conference would not have much effect on the British balance of payments. The Canal closure is costing about ? 200 million per annum in foreign exchange. The Foreign Secretary emphasized the importance of some progress on the Canal question by at least securing the opening of the southern end to release the trapped ships. This action, he said, would not necessarily involve the question of Israeli access to the Canal and for that reason should be easier.

The Foreign Secretary said that he had been impressed by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister who appeared to have some authority and to be willing to consider amending the original Tito proposals on a Middle East settlement. The Yugoslav Foreign Minister had pointedly remarked that Tito's proposals had been formulated before the Khartoum Conference. Foreign Secretary Brown thought it might be possible to amend the Yugoslav proposals in the direction of the balanced formulation of the earlier Goldberg-Dobrynin draft.

Sir Harold Beeley said that a solution in the Middle East had to be based on both Israeli withdrawal and acceptance by the Arabs of Israel and an end to belligerency. The Foreign Secretary strongly supported the idea of a UN representative going out to the area to assist in finding solutions. He emphasized that this representative should not be referred to as a mediator. Sir Harold Beeley said the Soviets would not accept the appointment of a UN representative unless the appointment of such a representative were coupled with specific proposals for a Middle East settlement. Lord Caradon agreed with this view.

The Foreign Secretary asked Mr. Battle how he read the situation in the UAR. Mr. Battle replied that he thought Nasser's days were numbered, perhaps six months to a year. Economic problems facing the UAR are tremendous. Foreign Secretary Brown said the question was who would succeed Nasser. A moderate regime might wish to turn to the West in an effort to obtain help in bailing itself out of its economic difficulties. On the other hand if a Leftist regime were to succeed Nasser it might be followed by a Soviet decision to increase arms supplies to the UAR. Foreign Secretary Brown said there is a danger that the Arabs may have learned the value of a preemptive air strike from Israeli actions in the June war.

The Foreign Secretary said that he realized the importance before proceeding in the UN of being certain there was enough agreement on the terms of a solution with the Soviets so that they did not torpedo it. He said, however, that he did not believe we had to be assured in advance of agreement on exact details of a settlement. Mr. Sisco pointed out that the Arab emphasis is still on withdrawal in the first instance and that the Khartoum Conference had rejected recognition of Israel and an end to belligerency.

Washington, September 25, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Saudi Arabia. No classification marking. Walt Rostow sent a draft of the letter to the President with a covering memorandum of September 19 stating that the Arab leaders at Khartoum had commissioned Faisal to write to him, and the draft letter was thus "our response to Khartoum." He commented that at Khartoum the Arabs had taken "a first short step toward realism and, while it isn't enough, we don't want to throw such cold water on it that we discourage further efforts or cause our friends to give up all hope of sympathy from us." (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 43) A copy of the draft was sent to Bundy with a September 21 memorandum from Saunders that states the President had written Rostow a note asking him to be sure Rusk and Bundy were "on board on this one." Bundy's handwritten revisions appear on that copy of the draft. (Ibid., NSC Special Committee Files, Saudi Arabia) Telegram 45719 to Jidda, September 28, transmitted the text to Jidda for delivery. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 SUDAN) Telegram 1356 from Jidda, October 5, reported that Ambassador Eilts had presented the letter that day. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Your Majesty:

/2/For text of the King's letter, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXI, Document 301.

I agree that the recent Khartoum conference marked notable progress for the forces of Arab moderation. Your Majesty's own statesmanlike role at these meetings was a major contribution to this result.

I am especially encouraged by the decision to liquidate the longstanding Yemen problem. It will, I hope, mark the beginning of a return to stability in Southwest Arabia in which both your country and mine are so deeply interested. I congratulate Your Majesty warmly on this happy result of your long efforts, as well as on the progress already discernible in implementing the decision.

The decision to lift the oil embargo was also welcome. This action has removed a complicating factor in relations between the Arab countries and the West which was not of our making. American public opinion has reacted favorably to this evidence of Arab desire to return to business as usual.

The Khartoum decisions regarding an Arab-Israel settlement are more difficult for us to evaluate. The final communiqu? states what the Arabs will not do but, except by indirection, is silent on what the Arabs may be willing to do. The Arab decision to turn away from a military solution is most welcome. But the absence of any statement on the key issue of belligerency leaves a major obstacle to settlement unresolved.

Frankly, we do not see how one party can continue to invoke rights of belligerency while attempting to impose on the other obligations of a state of peace. An Israeli withdrawal, unaccompanied by appropriate assurances from the Arabs, would seem to us prejudicial to Israel's territorial integrity, in which we are as interested as we are in the integrity of each Arab state. Return to the unstable armistice existing before June 4, 1967, can hardly be in anyone's interest, since this very instability led to such grave consequences.

I believe what is needed is a more permanent settlement to which all governments in the area would in some manner be committed. Only this result will assure peace and progress for the region in which both the Arabs and Israelis must live together.

The draft resolution tentatively agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Emergency Session of the General Assembly, linking troop withdrawal to an end of belligerency and renunciation of attendant rights or claims by all the parties, could in our view be a useful basis for such a settlement. The United States Government has, however, no fixed position as to exactly how a settlement may be achieved. In this connection, when I spoke on June 19 of the need to recognize rights of national life, I of course meant the acceptance by each state of its neighbor's right to exist free from any menace of belligerency. I was not prejudging the question of formal recognition.

The United States Government played a central role in bringing about Israeli withdrawal in 1957, but at that time no such mutually accepted basis for coexistence was established. Those arrangements accordingly did not endure. I do not think it possible to travel the same road again. In our view, those who inhabit the area must themselves take the primary responsibility for finding a mutually acceptable basis on which coexistence is tolerable. This naturally applies to both sides, and we are, of course, ready to help when it is clear what concrete steps are envisaged.

I cannot stress too strongly to Your Majesty that our principles--which I outlined publicly on June 19--are designed to be both even-handed and beneficial to all parties concerned. We oppose threats or use of force by both Arabs and Israelis. On the basis of those principles, we favor Israeli withdrawal and an end to military or paramilitary actions by either side. Above all, we see a vision of the better life which peace would bring to all the people of the Middle East.

Our position is not based on transient considerations, such as the attitude towards us of certain Arab states, but rather on an assessment of what we believe is required to prevent yet another round of warfare at some later date. We naturally hope that those Arab states that have broken relations with us will soon manifest an attitude towards us that will permit relations to return to normal. It is hard to have understanding without contact, and restoration of our relations with these Arab countries would be helpful. But we believe that realism and willingness to compromise by the parties directly concerned are the basic ingredients needed to end the present Arab-Israel impasse.

In closing, I should emphasize to Your Majesty that I continue to value highly our close and friendly relations with you and your government. We will try at the coming session of the United Nations to help find some way to resolve the current difficulties. Meanwhile, I welcome our continuing personal exchanges as a means of strengthening our mutual understanding of the great difficulties which still lie ahead.

All best personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

New York, September 25, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files l967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Battle on September 26. Copies were sent to Walt Rostow, Sisco, Goldberg, Eugene Rostow, and Davies.

SUBJECT
Middle East

PARTICIPANTS
Adan M. Pachachi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iraq
Lucius D. Battle, Asst. Secretary of State for NEA

I received Mr. Pachachi on September 25 in my room at the Waldorf. He remained for approximately one hour and twenty minutes. The meeting grew out of Mr. Pachachi's conversations with former Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson.

After a brief exchange of pleasantries, Mr. Pachachi launched vigorously into a discussion of the Middle East. He said that the current session of the United Nations must not let an opportunity go by to solve the Middle East problem. Action through either the General Assembly or the Security Council during this session was imperative. The Arabs had accepted a moderate course at the Khartoum meeting and this must be built upon and as soon as possible or moderate leadership would give way to more radical influences. The United States had been very general in its pronouncements and it is imperative that we define carefully and precisely what we mean by the principles we have enunciated. The Israelis, in Mr. Pachachi's opinion, want no action at the present session and he feared the United States was supporting them in this course. Moreover, he detected in Ambassador Goldberg's statements an erosion of the US position which he found alarming.

I replied that the Middle East presented problems for the world and that a dangerous situation continued to exist there. Clearly we hoped for as early a solution as possible and we felt that the United Nations General Assembly offered one opportunity to come to grips with difficult problems. However, many levels of conversation and discussion were necessary and every forum should be utilized to the fullest extent. While speed of solution was important, it was equally imperative that we have a just and lasting solution as the world could not afford to risk a war every ten years or so.

I said that the United States position had been stated in the President's speech of June 19 and that there had been no change in our position. We still sought a lasting and just peace and to us an obvious starting point was for both sides to agree that the war was over and the state of belligerency ended.

We had refrained from defining what we would find acceptable in terms of a solution. What was acceptable to us was a solution the parties themselves could agree upon. We had no magic formula and had offered no overall plan. The general principles we had stated remained our position and we were reluctant to attempt to define a solution the parties themselves might reject. In this connection I pointed out that contrary to some opinion we had neither the right nor the power to dictate a solution.

Mr. Pachachi then spoke at great length on the need for the United States to define its views either privately or publicly. Private discussions should come first and reflect what the parties would agree to which could then be stated publicly.

I asked Mr. Pachachi whether a UN Representative could usefully, by exploring the issues in detail with the parties, give a sense of direction which might lead to peace. Mr. Pachachi said that a mediator was impossible unless the outlines of peace had already been agreed to in a UN context. To send a mediator first put the Arabs in a position of negotiating with Israeli troops on their soil. This was an impossible situation and the Arabs could not be expected to negotiate while occupied by foreign troops.

We returned to the possibility of finding a formula to end the state of belligerency. I told Mr. Pachachi that it was difficult indeed for us to encourage the Israelis or anyone else to believe the Arabs wanted a political settlement when statements continued to emanate from Arab countries indicating the war would go on.

I tried to draw Mr. Pachachi out on specific issues such as the Suez Canal, the Straits of Tiran, and refugees without much success. He returned each time to the need for the United States to say what it wished to see happen after which there could be discussion leading to General Assembly or Security Council action. He reaffirmed Arab unwillingness to negotiate directly or to recognize Israel.

Mr. Pachachi urged that the United States keep in touch with the Arabs and do all possible to prevent increasingly hostile attitudes from developing in the Arab world toward the United States. I told him that we were willing always to talk. Ambassador Goldberg with whom he had had a friendly relationship for some time was always willing to see him, Ambassador Meyer would be here for several weeks, and I was available in Washington and occasionally in New York if conversations with me would be helpful. Mr. Pachachi said he would try to see Ambassador Goldberg and also keep in touch with Ambassador Meyer.

I found very little latitude in Mr. Pachachi's discourse. None of the moderation evident in his talks with Mr. Anderson was repeated to me. He adamantly insisted that it was up to the United States to do something but gave little evidence of desire on the part of the Arabs to do anything except continue a dialogue. The conversation was friendly although fairly firm on both sides.

New York, September 26, 1967, 0250Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Priority to Tel Aviv. Received at 1808Z.

989/Secto 3. Following based on uncleared memcon, and subject to change on review, Noforn and FYI:

FonMin Eban accompanied by Ambassadors Harman and Rafael called on the Secretary September 25. Ambassador Goldberg, Sisco and Battle were present.

In reviewing current situation General Assembly, Eban said it too early to assess situation. Vietnam involves loss of life, and Middle East therefore secondary issue at moment. In preliminary conversation other delegations, Israel noted no major changes in basic convictions, although some tactical change evident. Secretary reaffirmed US position rests on President Johnson's June 19 speech.

Secretary asked whether Israeli public opinion so frozen that it would be difficult for Israel to make peace. Eban replied that press more chauvinistic than actual public opinion. When opinion of Israeli people assessed, it is always more rational and responsible than press would lead one to believe.

Eban then assessed prospects for peace with UAR and Jordan respectively. He stressed there were no territorial issues with UAR, it was principally question of peace and natural results of peace, such as right to navigate international waters. Problem of Jordan more difficult, involving territory and history. Eban noted there were several points of view on this question in Israel.

First, there is group that sees security in terms of territory.

Second, this view balanced by those concerned over future character of Israeli state. Arab majority in Israel. At present only 3 or 4 members of Cabinet of 21 would vote for annexation in Eban's opinion. There has been, however, no need to vote since positions to be taken on these issues are not before Cabinet as long as there are no negotiations with Arabs. Economic Ministers are all against.

Third was possibility making deal with new Palestinian state which would be 14th Arab state. West Bank leaders have given evidence of desiring to discuss their future. Mayor of Hebron, for example, has evidenced interest perhaps because he sees an opportunity to exert leadership in a sovereign new state. Gleam of sovereignty among leaders in West Bank similar to attitudes evident in communities in Cyprus. This only an incipient movement, but some "state personality" could emerge on West Bank.

Fourth, which had broad support, was to make best possible deal with Hussein. Hussein must recognize that he can make better deal sooner than later. If Hussein said he was ready to negotiate tomorrow, majority of Israeli people would support such move. However, Jordan cannot get back to June 4 situation. Emphasis in Jordanian settlement, however, would not be on territory but on security. Possibility exists for a free port, economic integration of Jordan. Eban also mentioned possibility of a demilitarization of West Bank with some kind of Israeli military presence.

Later in conversation, Eban made point that Iran and others had suggested more pressure be put on UAR to negotiate in first instance than on Jordan. Secretary acknowledged issue with UAR less difficult than with Jordan: availability of Voice of Arabs radio to support Egyptian decision to negotiate is of importance. Eban indicated Israel has passed message to UAR but not sure UAR understands clearly relationship between end of belligerency and territorial problems. Eban gave impression that Israel has tried to and will try again to make it clear to Egyptians that they could get substantial part of territory back in return for what Eban called a "juridical definition of relations between Israel and Egyptians". Peace was issue with UAR, not primarily territorial problem. Israel must have relationship on a "contractual basis", which includes recognition of Israeli sovereignty and "total non-belligerency".

In response Ambassador Goldberg's question whether some form armistice agreement precluded basis from which peace can be fashioned, Eban replied armistice cannot be intermediate step between war and peace. Eban made clear he was less concerned over "form or semantics" of peace, but more in substance of it.

Secretary asked Eban assess current attitudes British and French. Eban replied he had conversation with Couve in which latter gave evidence great despair. At beginning and end of any discussion with French is an opinion re US, that US is inordinately powerful and therefore under French reasoning ready "to make war". French believe whatever happens in area must be within framework of Israeli recognition. Eban believes French may be moving away from position in last GA toward more reasonable position. He attributed this to two reasons: (a) adverse public opinion reaction in France; and (b) French pragmatism. Eban said French finding ways to continue delivery spare parts through commercial channels to Israel. Delivery planes less certain but French do not find it easy not to honor contracts. Eban opined French will probably be less active in UN, an instrument they never looked upon with favor. Present French representative to UN has leeway and does not share obsession re US.

In discussing UK attitudes, Eban stated Britain concerned with problem of Suez Canal and have probably exaggerated its economic importance to UK. Eban recognized Suez was a political issue in UK. He said UK fundamentally with US but wished to appear publicly more congenial to Arabs than is US. UK recognizes impossibility return June 4 and supports privately, though not publicly as yet, recent US statement on ME in GA. Eban said support of US is more than tactical problem and some delegations see substantive differences between US and UK. Expressed concern UK posture weakens solidarity and influences other Europeans. Eban referred to documents captured which indicated one reason UAR permitted situation get out of hand before war is conviction there was lack of coordination between Western powers. Expressed hope UK would make policy decision to support US, which would permit better tactical coordination.

In response to Secretary's inquiry as to whether Israel expected initiatives at UN, Eban responded there would be some from extremist delegations which would not be troublesome. We should watch Latin Americans carefully, he said, and we could expect a UN move along lines of Tito proposal. Secretary also noted he and Amb. Goldberg would be talking to the Soviets on three separate occasions this week and there would be opportunity to ascertain their current position. Eban said Tito proposal so far below minimal acceptance level, he would not expect too much trouble dealing with it.

In discussing Suez Canal, Eban indicated FonMin Brown had possible separate solution in mind. Eban said Israeli requirements regarding Canal are equality and no discrimination. If UN ran the Canal, this would be a form of internationalization. Eban suggested to Brown that UK ascertain whether UAR would accept this position which would be a major shift for UAR. At same time Eban made it clear no proposal relating to Canal would be acceptable unless it included freedom of passage for Israeli ships from outset.

With respect current flareups along Canal, Eban stated Bull had not been able to define accepted movements of respective parties. Such definition imperative when two countries are as close together physically as UAR and Israel. Any moves in Canal area in such circumstances became troublesome and dangerous.

Secretary asked whether Israel would object to steps UK might take to clear Suez Canal. Eban replied that Israel did not close Canal and would not wish to get in position being responsible for difficulties caused Western friends. Any plan reopen, however, must include use by Israeli ships, and mutuality between Egypt and Israel. Eban also said UK would not need to get Israeli approval to get its ships out of Canal. Eban has indicated to Brown Israel's belief that UK should reduce its reliance on Suez rather than retain past mystique regarding it.

Eban discussed current arms shipments of Russians to area stating they have apparently slowed down resupply and were being more selective, apparently based on desire not give aggressive capacity to UAR. Harman mentioned however, Russians have stepped up SU-7 deliveries. Israel believes UAR has more than twice number fighter bombers than pre-war, which suggests Arabs and Russians have drawn strategic conclusions from war. These conclusions similar to those drawn in Heikal article and is reflected in comments made Khartoum. In connection arms shipments Harman expressed hope US could act release pending shipments to Israel. Eban hoped US arms supply of Israel would be "pragmatic, normal, and commercial". Secretary explained current Congressional difficulties, and said we could not know what US could do until Congressional action on aid bill is final.

In this connection Secretary Rusk asked whether Israel had dealings with Cuba, to which Eban replied negative. Secretary called attention paragraph in OAS resolution regarding action by "other friendly countries." Suggested Israel let Latin American countries know directly that it had noted this paragraph and already fully complied.

Regarding strategy at UN, both Secretary and Goldberg indicated we had made no final determination and will discuss this matter over days ahead. Eban indicated that Middle East item would probably not be considered before mid-October. Eban agreed with Secretary's observation that Soviets would probably not be leading pack in the regular session.

Rusk

New York, September 26, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus.

SUBJECT
Middle East Crisis: US-UAR Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Mohamed Riad, Counselor, UAR Foreign Ministry
Mr. Hassan Sabri al-Khouli, Personal Representative of the President of the UAR

Donald C. Bergus, Principal Officer, U.S. Interests Section, Cairo

I lunched for two hours with Mohamed Riad at the Waldorf. He was eager to know the results of my consultation in the Department. I reviewed various conversations and said it all boiled down to the conclusion that the United States Government hesitated to play a more active role in seeking a resolution of the crisis as long as the Arabs were unprepared to face up to the problem of belligerency. He was keenly disappointed at this.

The conversation continued but we kept coming back to this point. He said that the US attitude made it hard for those in Egypt who were doing their best to improve US-UAR relations and cited his efforts on behalf of the American University, Cairo American College, etc. I said that the future of these institutions and other cultural relations would be meaningful only if they were jointly recognized as worthwhile. He agreed.

He was not responsive to questions as to how far the Arabs intended to push the Tito proposals. He waffled as to current Arab and Russian attitudes toward the Dobrynin-Goldberg resolution. He did say that as a result of his recent visit with his boss to Moscow he could assure me that the Soviets were not interested in continuing the present situation. They had made it clear that they would like a settlement. The conversation ended on a friendly but rather mournful note. Mohamed was sure that his government would be very disappointed.

I then repaired to USUN where I reported the foregoing to Ambassador Meyer and Mr. Thatcher. Ambassador Meyer asked me to accompany him to the General Assembly. In the Delegates' Lounge we encountered several members of the UAR Delegation including Ismail Fahmy and Hassan Sabri al-Khouli. Ambassador Meyer talked with Ismail Fahmy. I had a fairly lengthy private discussion with Hassan Sabri.

Hassan Sabri said that Mohamed Riad had briefed him about our luncheon conversation. He would not pretend to be pleased but neither was he particularly disappointed. He recognized that it would be a long time before the Middle East crisis was resolved. He said that the Israelis could occupy Sinai for months, years, even decades. He felt that over the long run world public opinion would turn against Israel as it continued to expel people, blow up Arab houses, etc.

Hassan Sabri returned to his theme that US-UAR relations were more important than the Arab-Israel problem. He said he wanted normalization as quickly as possible. He said he had full authority from President Nasser to work for normalization and that I should not hesitate to raise any problem with him in this regard. He said that Nasser's victory over the forces headed by Field Marshal Amer would facilitate the improvement of relations. He said that relations among peoples overshadowed political crises. He cited in this connection the lasting impact that Ambassador and Mrs. Battle had made on the Egyptians. He said the UAR wanted the return of dependents, resumption of TWA flights, and as much cultural exchange as possible. For the first time since the crisis, he spoke favorably about a resumption of diplomatic relations. He came as close as an Egyptian can to requesting assistance in arranging a meeting between the UAR Foreign Minister and Secretary Rusk.

I said that in Washington I had had a couple of meetings with an Israeli friend. The Israeli position was that while they would insist on recognition of Israel's rights as a full-fledged member of the Near East, they had no desire to humiliate Egypt. They would not accept a settlement which did not include their right to use the Suez Canal. They felt that in direct conversations with the Egyptians, modalities could be worked out whereby this could be done without threatening the existence of the Cairo regime. The Israelis had no fear about their capability for defending themselves from their Arab neighbors. At the same time, they were tired of war and wanted something better. Hassan Sabri asked regarding the source. When I said it was the Minister-Counselor, he said, "Why not the Ambassador?" I said the Ambassador had a slipped disk. Hassan Sabri said that improved US-UAR relations were essential to creating confidence between Israel and the UAR.

Washington, September 29, 1967, 1952Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Lambrakis, cleared by Atherton, and approved by Battle. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Moscow, Paris, and USUN.

/2/Rusk met with Jordanian Foreign Minister Muhammad Adib Al-'Ameri on September 26 in New York. A memorandum of the conversation is ibid., POL JORDAN-US.

3. Touching on outcome of Khartoum, Harman stressed GOI need to get "nothing less than contractual relationships" with Arab states. He asked for US assessment, in light recent Heikal articles. Battle said original nebulous reports of growing moderateness after Khartoum have so far not been borne out by any concrete Arab steps. Would appear that pledges of financial support made Nasser at Khartoum have helped him to put off facing realities again. Heikal articles and other recent talk on Arab side of continuing the war are extremely disturbing.

/3/Press reports that Eshkol had announced plans for establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories near Baniyas in the Golan Heights, at Etzion between Bethleham and Hebron, and at Beit Haarava on the northwest shore of the Dead Sea are summarized in telegram 43163 to Rio de Janeiro for Eugene Rostow, September 25. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

/4/Telegram 44390 to Rio de Janeiro, September 27, recorded an exchange at the Department press briefing that day between Department spokesman McCloskey and New York Times reporter Hedrick Smith, who asked about the reports of plans for Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. McCloskey replied that the U.S. position on territorial matters in the area remained as stated by the President on June 19. He stated that if the plans to establish permanent Israeli settlements had been accurately reported, they would be "inconsistent with the Israeli position as we understand it--that they regard occupied territories and all other issues arising out of the fighting in June to be matters for negotiation." He replied to a further question that the United States had not been informed officially of any change in that policy but was attempting through diplomatic channels to clarify the Israeli position. (Ibid.)

5. Harman adverted briefly to NY Times story that morning alleging serious US discussions are underway with Soviets on area arms limitation. He thought he saw implication in article that Soviets had not provided Arabs much new equipment, thus Israel needed none. Battle said he thought that story fell wide of the truth in many respects. He expressed reservations about possibilities for even a tacit agreement with Soviets on area arms limitation in near future. Harman and Evron concurred.

Katzenbach

Washington, September 29, 1967, 2039Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Miscellaneous Material. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Sandstorm. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Katzenbach and Saunders, and approved by Battle. Repeated to USUN as Tosec 52. A September 29 memorandum from Saunders to Walt Rostow, attached to the source text, states that Saunders had made revisions, which he had cleared with Davies. A handwritten note by Rostow indicating his approval of the revised telegram is on Saunders' memorandum.

/2/Telegram 1256 from Amman, September 4, reported that on the previous day, Burns had relayed to King Hussein a proposal from Eban for a direct meeting. The King replied that he did not think the time was ripe; the Israeli attitude on refugees, as well as indications of the Israeli attitude concerning a settlement, made direct negotiations appear unprofitable for the time being. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM) The proposal under reference has not been found, but in a message that Evron conveyed to Eugene Rostow on August 25, Eban recalled that in a recent talk between him and Rusk, the latter had expressed willingness to consider ways in which a secret meeting between Israeli and Jordanian representatives could be arranged; Eban thought the time was approaching when such a step would be useful and requested U.S. views on how it could be accomplished. Rostow said he would take this up with Rusk at once. (Ibid.)

1. Believe it would be useful on eve King Hussein's visit to Moscow for you to give King our understanding current Israeli position on negotiations and our general reaction to Arab position taken at Khartoum.

2. We have recently been reassured in categoric terms by Israelis that their position on settlement with Jordan remains flexible including point of negotiating some status for King Hussein in Jerusalem. They also noted they had no recent indication of further Jordanian interest in exploring settlement although King had reason to know that it was possible to establish contacts with utmost discretion. They questioned whether in view of King's public commitments to common policy evolved at Khartoum he had changed his approach and was no longer interested in an early agreement with Israel. Israelis, of course, adhere to basic position that any agreement must lead to genuine state of peace.

3. Aware of the considerable political and personal risks involved, we cannot in full conscience tell King what we think he should do with regard establishing contacts with Israelis. We do, however, wish to share our feeling there is real danger that Israel's position on the ground may become even more entrenched and public pressure within Israel move GOI from position of maximum flexibility if some hope for movement toward settlement not maintained. Therefore, time not necessarily on Jordan's side.

/3/Burns reported in telegram 1692 from Amman, October 2, that he had met with the King on October 1 to convey the points in telegram 46230. He reported that the King had not commented directly concerning this, but that he had referred to a conversation that Jordanian Minister of National Economy Hatem Zu'bi had had with Eugene Rostow in Rio de Janeiro, in which, according to Zu'bi, Rostow had made a statement that the King interpreted as pressure for direct negotiations. Burns assured him that this was not the case. (Ibid.)

/4/Document 447.

Katzenbach