U.S. Department of State

Washington, October 3, 1967, 6:10-9:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, October 3, 1967. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Tom Johnson. Filed with a covering memorandum from Johnson to the President. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH

Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Mr. Rostow
CIA Director Helms
George Christian

The President called on Secretary Rusk to review the discussions at the United Nations.

Secretary Rusk: While at the United Nations I had sessions with the editorial boards of Newsweek, McGraw-Hill, and the Wall Street Journal. Those meetings were most profitable.

On the Middle East question, Gromyko had no taste for going through the General Assembly again. The provisional draft is still the basis for talks.

There is considerable movement on the Arab side but not enough. Egypt is not close to settling the Suez problem. The Arabs want our views on territory. I told them it was not for the United States to come up with a blueprint made in Washington. I referred them to our five points.

In my opinion we are going to have to wrestle with Israel.

The President told about the New York State poll which shows strong Jewish support.

Secretary Rusk: We still have a good deal of time to work out a formula on the Middle East. It is my feeling that we should put it in the Security Council rather than in the General Assembly. We do not have enough votes to go to Israel and say that this proposal is something that you should accept.

The Turkish Ambassador said something which was very disturbing. He said Moscow sent a message to Egypt that the Arabs should take a very modest stand. And if Israel does not respond to this position, the Soviets say they will give aid to the Arabs going far beyond economic aid.

Some of the members--India for example--said that we should be a mediator. For the moment we are working on the basis of the President's five points.

[Omitted here is discussion of unrelated matters.]

New York, October 3, 1967, 2240Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Received on October 4 at 0144Z. Another copy of the telegram indicates that the memorandum of conversation was cleared in S on October 19. (Ibid., POL UAR-US)

1174/Secto 44. Following is uncleared memcon.

Secretary met with FonMin Riad (UAR) at latter's request for about one and a half hours to review Middle Eastern situation. Sisco only other person present.

Conversation opened by both Secy and Riad confirming desire for better relations. Riad said there had been mistakes made in past by everybody, by UAR, US, and others. He was not attempting to exonerate UAR, for main responsibility for past mistakes rests with it. Stressed a strong desire to work towards better relations between UAR and US and recounted some of his efforts in past to this end.

Secy said we have over years supported principle of political independence and territorial integrity for all in area. He recalled our action at time of Suez, support of the government during the Lebanese crisis, support of certain countries who sometimes felt themselves under pressure from UAR, and affirmative vote last year in SC censuring Israel. We made major efforts in all capitals during pre-June 5 period in order to avoid hostilities. When we invited Vice Pres Mohieddin to visit US, we thought we had commitment from Israel they would not resort to hostilities. Should Riad or anyone in UAR Govt be under impression we acted in bad faith, this would be a fundamental misunderstanding of our position. There was no deception on our part and we were astonished at events as were a good many others.

Moreover, Secy expressed regret that after beginning of hostilities it was not possible to achieve a cease-fire promptly; this would have prevented many headaches for a number of us. Crucial problem ahead, said Secy, is how conditions of peace get established in ME.

Secy said when Nasser announced closing of Gulf, we knew Israel regarded this as a casus belli. This action by Nasser also cut our throats by undermining our credibility with Israel. If we were today to ask Israel to withdraw on basis of an informal indication that everything would be all right, they would laugh in our face. This approach was tired in 1957 and failed. Secy said it is important to bear this background in mind to understand why we attach fundamental importance to question of renunciation of belligerency, ending the state of war, and bringing about a state of durable peace in area. Too often, Secy said, Arabs have been too late in seeing, determining, and acting on basis their own national interests.

/2/Telegram 1127 from USUN, October 2, reported the meeting on Saturday, September 30, between Goldberg and Riad. (Ibid., POL 7 UAR)

/3/See footnote 4, Document 53.

/4/The Lausanne Protocol, signed separately at Lausanne on May 12, 1949, by Arab representatives and Israeli representatives with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, provided that an attached map showing the 1947 UN partition plan for Palestine would be taken as a basis for discussion during negotiations then underway at Lausanne. The text is printed in the Commission's third progress report, UN document A/927; also printed in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-49, p. 198; also see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. VI, pp. 998-999.

/5/The UN partition plan was set forth in Resolution 181 (II), adopted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947. The text is printed in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947-48, pp. 247-256, and in A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, pp. 695-709.

Riad also seemed to imply, though he was not explicit, that giving expression to non-belligerency should not be a problem. However, no UAR Govt could accept Israeli vessels going through Suez Canal. This is not a practical question but one of prestige for both UAR and Israel. He said Israel is presently destroying installations along canal.

/6/Resolution 194 (II), adopted by the General Assembly on December 11, 1948. The text is printed in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-49, pp. 174-176, and in A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49, pp. 719-720. Paragraph 11 stated that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date and that the compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property.

Riad felt time was not in favor of peace. There was need for prompt peaceful settlement. He has pointed out to other Arabs that if Arabs had won war there would still have to be a peaceful settlement. In such circumstances, maximum Arab objective would have been implementation of UN partition plan.

Secy said we need a handle in order to move towards a peaceful settlement. Secy agreed on importance of refugee problem and regretted that solution had been frustrated because of political factors. He had always thought that if refugees could be given a private opportunity for choice, results would be acceptable to all. Trouble has been that if such an opportunity was given to refugees, Shukairy would indicate to them their throats would be cut unless all voted for return to Palestine. Riad interjected if it came to that UAR could remove Shukairy. UAR policy has never been to place any impediment on any Palestine refugees if they should want to leave.

Secy agreed time was not on side of peace. He said some in Israel realize basic problem is how Israeli people are to live in peace with 200 million Arabs in area. Riad should not conclude from Israeli press that Israel is not in position to make necessary decisions which would facilitate peace. Our present consultations with other dels are intended to ascertain what is possible in terms of peace. Five principles stated by President Johnson on June 19 remain our basic point of departure. We have no interest in supporting Israeli territorial expansion, but we cannot write a blueprint or impose on Israel a settlement. Our objective is to help find a way to peace with understanding of parties. Riad expressed doubt understanding could be built in circumstances where Israel is occupying UAR territory. He expressed regret us seemed to be on sidelines. Secy said we were doing more than that. Riad said if we can get understanding on principles involved, UAR could concern itself with a UN rep.

Turning to Soviet policy, both Secy and Riad agreed that it is neither in UAR nor US interest for a confrontation to take place in ME between major powers. Riad expressed concern regarding our view that two parties must work out understanding. He insisted it is too late for that, US is involved. If US remains on sideline, it would result in a settlement imposed on UAR. Riad then ticked off principles he believes essential: withdrawal of Israeli forces; freedom of passage; no territorial gains from use of force; and respect for UN resolutions on refugees. He said SC should endorse these principles, and practical implementation could take place subsequently with assistance of a UN rep. Secy said when US announces support for certain principles, this has practical consequences, and we are asked what we are going to do about them. If resolution is passed by SC which does not ask parties to take specific acts, there will be no peace in area. Riad said again if there is no understanding and a solution is imposed on UAR "this govt or some other UAR Govt" would sign surrender, people would be told this, and elimination of "surrender" would become an objective of UAR policy. Secy agreed surrender is not path to peace. Riad said any Israeli territorial gains means surrender, though not a change from a state of war to a state of peace.

Secy said he wished to raise a procedural point. From time to time he has received reports that attempts have been made by this or that Egyptian to make contact with US, and that we had made it difficult to achieve this contact. We are not clear as to who such Egyptians are, and whether they are authentic representatives. Could Riad give us any guidance on this matter since US does not want to get involved in an internal UAR matter. Riad said he did not know why US and UAR should discuss matters in any mysterious way, there is no need for third parties between us, and that he hoped that discussions and contacts made could be continued. Secy made clear that for our part Don Bergus in Cairo is a most official contact for US, that Amb. Goldberg available, and that if there was need he himself could come back to New York at some future date. Riad was vague about his future plans, saying he would probably stay in New York to see whether something can come out of SC. He stressed that contacts should be continued and a SC resolution would be a starting point towards peace.

Secy emphasized there must be great precision and clear understanding regarding any UN resolution. US-USSR resolution was a constructive approach, but both Arabs and Israelis objected to it. Secy said we have had enough resolutions which mean different things to different people. It may take some time to assure that there is full understanding of what any resolution means. We need "something" to move toward peace, but we do not see that "something" in detail.

Secy asked whether Riad believed that concept of a "holy war" is primarily in propaganda field or whether this is a policy question. Riad did not answer question directly, but said "holy war" approach achieves nothing, that UAR propaganda had been a mistake, and that UAR is presently suffering as a result. Nasser tried to face up to public opinion problem at Khartoum, and this is why a number of Arabs said he had been very courageous. Riad agreed that Nasser is probably still only Arab who can lead public opinion in area. Riad said Cairo Radio has been changing its approach in recent days.

Meeting concluded on note that both sides would maintain contact.

Rusk

Washington, October 3, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, President's Appointment File, October 4, 1967. Secret; Nodis. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

SUBJECT
Your Talk with Arab Ambassadors--Wednesday, October 4

/2/Special Assistant to the President E. Ernest Goldstein.

/3/None of the attachments is printed.

I. The situation, in a nutshell, is that the key Arabs have just about agreed to the US-USSR draft resolution linking Israeli withdrawal with the end of belligerency. Now the focus is shifting to defining what practical steps would be needed to carry out such a resolution. Neither we nor the Israelis want to settle for mere words. As we begin to spell out possible follow-up steps, this comes as a new shock to the Arabs, who see it as further evidence of our backing Israeli demands. In detail:

A. The Arabs decided at Khartoum to try regaining their lost territories by political rather than by military means, and they turned Nasser and Hussein loose to see what they could get. As a group, they showed no real change of heart about Israel and not much realism about the kinds of concessions they might have to make to get a settlement.

/4/September 30.

B. The USSR. Foreign Minister Gromyko confirmed to Secretary Rusk that our joint July draft resolution is still the basis of their position, but he felt we were interpreting it differently on (1) the type of follow-up we expected from the Arabs and (2) Suez Canal passage for Israeli ships. Gromyko left the impression that he could support any solution Nasser would accept. He agreed that the trick is to find a formula for ending belligerency that the Arabs won't find humiliating.

/5/Telegram 1124 from USUN, September 30, reported that Caradon had suggested this to Goldberg that day. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

D. The Israelis are generally satisfied with our cautious strategy in New York, though they've repeated their serious reservations about the US-Soviet draft. They recognize that the Arabs at Khartoum faced up to the reality of their defeat and believe that letting more time pass is the only way to force them to face up to the further steps they must take to reach a real settlement. They object strongly to the US-Soviet draft resolution because they believe the Soviets and Arabs would read it as requiring withdrawal to 4 June borders. This would not give them latitude to negotiate the "reasonable and secure boundaries" you spoke of on June 19.

II. Our position is still evolving. In New York, Secretary Rusk and Arthur Goldberg have been saying that the US-Soviet draft is a good starting point. We've also been pointing out, however, that any such resolution is only half of the equation. It's no good unless everyone agrees in advance how he will follow up. These are the questions we will be answering for ourselves in the next days:

/6/No other record of this conversation has been found.

B. Where should we focus the UN discussion--in the General Assembly or the Security Council? The Arabs may push for a Security Council resolution so they won't be forced to vote on it. The bleakest interpretation of their motives is that they would then feel free to ignore it. The best is that Nasser and Hussein want to avoid voting so they can make a private deal free from Arab scrutiny. We're still undecided, but Goldberg told Caradon we favor going to the Security Council only if there is prior agreement among the parties involved on what it means. Eban agrees.

C. Whose side does time serve? Should we push? Right now, we're waiting for the Arabs to play out their negotiations with the Russians and to come to us. This squares with Eban's approach. However, we don't think time is on our side. Time will make it harder for any Israeli government to give up the security which present borders provide. Time works against us in the Arab world because the longer Israel sits on occupied territory, the harder it will be to convince friendlier Arabs that we're not reneging on our commitment to territorial integrity. Therefore, we've hinted to the Jordanians that they ought to get serious about working out a deal with the Israelis that could carry out any UN resolution.

III. What's on the Arab Ambassadors' minds boils down to one big question: Will we make good on our pledge to support the territorial integrity of all states in the Middle East?

/7/Rusk met with Foreign Minister Nikezic on August 30. According to telegram 30825 to Belgrade, September 1, which summarizes the conversation, Rusk said the key to a settlement was to end the state of war and belligerence and that if a way could be found to deal with this, other things would fall into place; the difference between pre-June 5 positions and secure national boundaries was an important difference. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Jerusalem is an equally important but separate issue. Our basic position is that we won't go along with unilateral changes and the people on the ground are best able to work out practical arrangements. Beyond that, these principles make sense:

--No one wants Jerusalem divided by barbed wire again.

--All religions must have access.

--It's logical for Jordan to resume a role as custodian of the Islamic Holy Places.

--It's also logical that Jordan should continue to share the economic gains from tourists in Jerusalem.

IV. Our purpose at lunch. The most important thing you can accomplish is to give these Ambassadors the feeling that you haven't closed your mind to them and that you honestly feel our position serves their long-term interest in peace.

Walt

Washington, October 4, 1967, l p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Middle East, 9/l/67-10/31/67. Confidential; Exdis. This copy of the memorandum is filed with a copy of an October 5 memorandum from Saunders to Battle enclosing the original for Battle's approval. According to the President's Daily Diary, the President arrived early in the luncheon, accompanied by Vice President Humphrey, Secretary Rusk, and Secretary McNamara. After introductions were made, the President, Rusk, and McNamara departed, while the Vice President remained and joined the group for lunch. The President returned after lunch.

OCCASION
Luncheon Hosted by Mr. Goldstein in the Fish Room at The White House, 1:00 p.m., 4 October 1967

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Abdul-Hamid Sharaf, Jordan
Ambassador Talat Al-Ghoussein, Kuwait
Ambassador Ibrahim Hussein El-Ahdab, Lebanon
Ambassador Ibrahim Al-Sowayel, Saudi Arabia
Ambassador Rachid Driss, Tunisia
Ambassador Fathi Abidia, Libya
Ambassador James W. Symington
Mr. Walt W. Rostow
Mr. E. Ernest Goldstein
Assistant Secretary of State Lucius D. Battle
Mr. Harold H. Saunders

The Vice President came in part way through the luncheon

The President joined the group at the end of the meal for twenty minutes

Before the President came in, there was a general conversation with the Vice President and Mr. Rostow striking generally the following themes:

[Omitted here is discussion concerning the possibilities of technology, communications, and regional cooperation.]

When the President entered, he explained--because he had just come from a session with Secretary Fowler--his problems with the Congress over budget cutting. This introductory part of the discussion ended when the Ambassador of Kuwait responded by thanking the President for giving the Ambassadors an opportunity to meet with him. The Ambassador concluded by suggesting to the President that now is a time of great opportunity in the Middle East for the US to make an important move for peace. In the ensuing discussion, the President made generally the following points:

1. He felt he understood the problems and positions of the Arab countries and welcomed hearing the Ambassadors' ideas and suggestions. He said he continues to be deeply immersed in the problem of achieving peace in the Middle East and pledged the continuing concern of Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Goldberg, Mr. Battle and other U.S. officials in the search for peace.

2. In response to Ambassador al-Ghoussein's point, the President described our difficulty in arranging a peace settlement:

--He cited the advice he had received from an older man early in his career: "You can tell a man to go to hell, but making him go there is different thing entirely." He said he had tried in May to persuade President Nasser not to go to war, but that didn't work. He had pleaded with Foreign Minister Eban not to go to war, but that didn't work. Now making Israel pull back is easier said than done.

--He had found in situations like this again and again that one party to a dispute urging a third party to become involved always assumed that the third party had influence over the second party that the third party did not have over the first party itself. For instance, the President said Senator A asks him to use influence with Senator B that Senator A knows the President doesn't have over Senator A himself. The same is true in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

--There is some similarity to a marriage. Once it gets into trouble, a third party may be useful in salvaging it but that third party risks the worst kind of abuse for meddling.

3. In response to the Ambassador of Jordan, he said he continued to support strongly the territorial integrity of all states in the area. However, he repeatedly linked this with the other four principles stated on 19 June. By way of analogy, he noted that he was having iced tea with the Ambassadors but that he did not consider this his whole lunch but would have a hamburger and some ice cream later on. Similarly he could not talk about the territorial integrity without returning to the other four principles of peace which he had stated over and over again. He implied further that he could not make the Israelis withdraw no matter how much he believed in territorial integrity.

4. He did not see how a settlement could be reached if the parties to the dispute could not "reason together." He said he had spent most of his life trying to get people to reason together and find areas of agreement, but so far he had not succeeded in this case.

5. He reiterated our desire for peace. Alluding to charges by some Arab governments that we had attacked them on 5 June, he recalled the Russians saying to him at one point that one problem in Vietnam is that no one believes us when we say we will withdraw and we have no long range intention of staying. The President said it is absolutely true that we have no such intention but the problem was making people believe that. Similarly, in the Middle East, he had found it difficult to convince people that we are sincere in our desire for peace and have no other motives.

6. The President concluded by quoting a story about Charles Lamb who, on reading a distasteful story, threw the book on the floor and said of its author, "I hate that man." His wife retorted, "How do you know? You don't even know him." Lamb replied, "If I knew him, I'd like him." The President said his purpose in wanting to visit with the Ambassadors was for everyone to get to know each other a little better in the hope that "when we know each other, we will like each other."

In the course of the conversation, the Ambassador of Lebanon picked up one of the President's analogies. The President had said he couldn't tell his daughters whom to marry and when. In fact, he said with a smile, he couldn't even pick the preacher for the wedding. The Lebanese Ambassador said that the West had been the preacher at an earlier marriage in the Middle East and that what the Arab countries were asking for was for the preacher to return as a counselor now that the marriage was in trouble.

The Jordanian Ambassador made the most articulate--and most moving--Arab presentation. He began by saying that the problem, of course, had its roots but he did not want to argue history. His main concern was that the Government of the United States over the years had solemnly reiterated its support for territorial integrity to all the states in the area. The Arab governments feel they have a right to expect the Government of the United States to honor that pledge. They have been deeply hurt that we have not. He pointed out that half of Jordan is occupied and that, while the Government of Jordan is willing to discuss the elements of peace, it is impossible for it to negotiate while its territory is occupied. All this was said in the most moderate and inoffensive way possible and it was in response that the President responded that we continue to support strongly the principle of territorial integrity but that the problem of putting that support in practice was a difficult one which we had not yet solved.

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, October 4, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII. Secret.

/2/No record of this conversation has been found.

/3/Harman's conversation with Battle on this subject on October 3 is recorded in telegram 49692 to Tel Aviv, October 6. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR) His conversation with Katzenbach on this subject on October 6 is recorded in telegram 51187 to Tel Aviv, October 9. (Ibid.)

/4/A memorandum of October 3 from Walt Rostow to the President states that Senator Stuart Symington had called him that day. Symington said there was great "anxiety, vexation and deep bitterness" in the Israeli Government over U.S. military aid policy; the Israelis were convinced that the United States was holding things up to put pressure on them. Rostow commented that the situation was "political dynamite." He said Symington intended to take the floor of the Senate soon to insist on resumption of military aid to Israel and that Symington said there would be no opposition to military aid to the moderate Arabs. Rostow concluded that Symington said he could, if necessary, easily get a special bill passed supporting military aid to Israel in the face of the continuing shipments of Soviet arms. Rostow sent copies of the memorandum to Rusk and McNamara. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XII)

Luke told Harman that there are all kinds of people against our sending any arms to the Middle East--those who don't want war, those who don't want a fuel and arms race, and those who don't like either Arabs or Israelis. One reason for the continuing freeze has been the feeling that we could not move on Israel alone and that Israel's friends would oppose our moving anything to any Arabs.

Then Luke went down the list of things being held up for the Arabs and asked whether the Israelis have any objection to our moving them. Harman said that, except for Jordan, he didn't think they would, but he would let Luke know if he was wrong.

Luke feels likewise that Senator Symington does not object to moving with the moderate Arabs. Therefore, it looks as if we have established a point that we can move some things to both Arab and Israelis without upsetting some of our main problem people on the Hill.

Unfortunately, there is enough evidence around town that (a) Congress is not a problem and (b) some people in the Executive Branch are thinking of keeping the freeze on until the Israelis change their position toward the Arabs to create suspicion in Jerusalem which we have been unable to breach with all of our assurances.

/5/ No record of this conversation has been found.

1. It has been the judgment of the men responsible for getting this legislation through Congress that having a big headline to the effect that we were resuming military assistance to the Middle East would do great damage to the aid bill. We have reviewed this a couple of times at their request and as recently as last week that was still our judgment.

2. We are willing to pursue the matter along the lines he and Luke discussed because we have no ulterior motive in maintaining the freeze.

3. We are sorry that our solemn assurances have been thrown aside so lightly in Jerusalem.

/6/Printed from a copy that indicates Saunders signed the original.

Washington, October 7, 1967, 0118Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Atherton on October 5; cleared by Grey and Battle, and in draft by Arthur R. Day (UNP); and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to USUN, Amman, Jerusalem, and London.

50528. Following are highlights of conversation during call by Israeli Ambassador Harman on Under Secretary Rostow October 4:

1. Middle East Settlement. Harman described recent "movement" on Arab side as tactical, designed present moderate face but without real substance. Essential goal remained agreement between parties which Harman said Israel considered central to President's five points of June 19. Rostow said problem remained of finding route to settlement and emphasized importance of UN as backdrop for this effort. It was still our thinking that we should seek resolution linking withdrawal and non-belligerency and calling for UN mediator. It was essential to have someone talk seriously to both sides in order to get parties focusing on realities. We have been doing what we could in this direction and felt there were some signs that Arabs becoming more realistic. In response Harman's expression of concern at UK pressure to "rush into Security Council," Rostow said we had been discussing tactics with British and believed U.S. and UK were working together closely, and that reports of differences in approach were exaggerated.

Harman warned against dangers of seeking UN resolution at any cost, arguing that resolution subject to different interpretations would be worse than no resolution at all. Israel prepared accept UN mediator, although it not particularly enamoured of this idea, but thought USG agreed he should have no mandate other than to seek achieve agreement between parties. Difficulty with resolution linking withdrawal and non-belligerency was that "withdrawal" required precise action by Israel while "non-belligerency" was imprecise term which left open question of what was required of Arabs. UAR Foreign Minister Riad's discussion of General Armistice Agreements in his UN address, which Harman described as "amazing performance," underscored pitfalls in seeking "form of words" as substitute for direct agreement between parties. Such attempts to gloss over basic issues weakened UN. Despite its image of opposition to UN role, Israel in seeking true peace in spirit of Article 33 of Charter was in fact contributing to strengthening UN. (Without pursuing point, Harman wondered if totally new UN resolution could not be devised referring simply to Article 33.)

2. Israeli Settlements in Occupied Territory. Responding to Rostow's query, Harman said two areas involved: (a) Baniyas, in DZ on Israeli side of international border; this was vital from security point of view, inter alia because it commanded Baniyas tributary of Jordan River; (b) Etzion area between Jerusalem and Hebron on West Bank; this was also strategic location. Harman emphasized that Israel described these projects as "strongpoints," not "settlements"; they were being manned by Nahal units--military formations within Army which also engage in some agricultural work. Rostow asked whether these "strongpoints" could be evacuated if settlement reached. Harman replied he could not make prediction in this respect but would hope any settlement would not leave borders sealed, so that there could be Jews in Jordan as there were Arabs in Israel.

3. Refugees. In response Rostow question whether there had been progress on refugee problem, Harman said GOJ not interested in progress but only in scoring propaganda points. Hussein's handling of West Bank situation as well as refugee return question did not contribute to resolution of problems. This connection Harman cited specifically Amman radio and other incitement for school strike on West Bank and GOJ criticism of Israeli action to excise anti-Israeli material from text books.

Rostow noted that Israeli position on refugee return was raising question in Arab minds whether Israel really wanted political settlement. It would help clear atmosphere in this respect if Israel offered take back all refugees who have left West Bank. It was important recognize that Khartoum Conference had changed matters; other Arabs now had stake--in form of financial subsidy--in seeking settlement. In response Harman's comment that Israel does not agree with this interpretation of Khartoum and considers Hussein more inflexible than before, Rostow said our private contacts with Jordanians did not support Israeli interpretation.

Without responding directly to Rostow's point re refugee return, Harman said with census occupied areas now completed, Israel may soon have something to say on overall refugee problem in context of peace settlement. Rostow stated we were ready to discuss refugee problem at any time with Israelis.

/2/See footnote 3, Document 457.

Rusk

Washington, October 6, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII. Top Secret; Nodis. Walt Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President at 7:35 p.m. with a covering memorandum briefly summarizing it and commenting, "My inclination is that we go ahead."

SUBJECT
Robert Anderson's conversation with Foreign Minister Eban Wednesday, October 4, 1967

Foreign Minister Eban had a conversation with Robert Anderson yesterday in New York. Eban had asked several times to see Anderson, who checked with Gene Rostow and me before he accepted the invitation.

/2/The memorandum, headed "Sandstorm," a report of an October 4 telephone conversation between Robert Anderson and Eugene Rostow, is attached to the source text but not printed. A copy is filed with a memorandum from Eugene Rostow to the President stating that he had told Walt Rostow about Anderson's telephone call and that Rostow wanted a copy of the memorandum of conversation to show the President. It also states that McNamara, Katzenbach, Kohler, Battle, and Sisco all agreed "we should go ahead on this line." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM)

In essence, Mr. Eban asked for Mr. Anderson's advice about how to initiate private, secret, and indirect contacts between Israel and some of the Arab states of the Middle East. The implication is that Israel would like Anderson to act as a mediator. Mr. Eban must have had Egypt in mind, because of Mr. Anderson's long connection with that country, and perhaps other countries in the Middle East as well.

Our advice is that we should encourage the possibility of Bob Anderson's undertaking to continue his talks with Eban, and undertaking also to act as a go-between on a private, secret, and informal basis. In this connection, you should also know that in Rio, the Egyptians approached Anderson about a possible visit to Nasser. His response was that he would discuss the matter with the government, but that he could not consider going without a direct invitation from Nasser.

This could be the break in the Middle Eastern impasse we have been seeking for a long time. It could be a crucial development--to start a real exchange going on real questions, while we continue to work away on Resolutions in the United Nations.

There are risks of course in our undertaking even this limited responsibility for having an American act in this capacity. But I believe the risks of refusing to participate, and allowing the situation to drift, are definitely greater.

/3/Neither the approve nor disapprove option is checked. An attached typed note, dated October 6 at 9:05 p.m., contains the President's reaction: "Find out through Harry or somebody else how Evron, Eban, and Israel would look upon this."

Dean Rusk

New York, October 10, 1967, 0235Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

/2/Telegram 1302 from USUN, October 10. (Ibid.)

/3/Telegram 1278 from USUN, October 9, transmitted the text of an earlier version of this document, which it called "our version of 'agreed minute' of Goldberg-Caradon talks on Middle East, October 6, 1967." (Ibid.)

(A) He remains of view that, in any effort agreement on SC res, it best not to go beyond principles set down in US-Soviet draft of July or US-UK Washington working paper, without seeking to get agreement on specifics of those principles;

(B) Caradon is not satisfied with language in para 6 of text stating "withdrawal must be understood to mean withdrawal from occupied territories of UAR, Jordan and Syria . . .". Hope said Caradon realizes this language is not meant to include Jerusalem and Gaza and would have preferred language such as "withdrawal from all occupied territories" (one of possible formulations which [emerged] during USUN-UKUN staff consultations of Oct. 7 and 9).

2. While Caradon has these reservations, we are convinced UK del as whole fully understands problems which would be involved in going ahead with effort to formulate principles for SC res such as those in US-USSR draft without agreement on their specifics.

3. Text of "draft summary" agreed to ad referendum to capitals as follows:

"1. It is preferable to deal with ME item in the SC rather than in the GA, and as soon as agreement is reached on a common course of action.

2. Before we go to the SC the US, UK, USSR and France should have a uniform understanding of the meaning of the principles to be laid down by the SC and of the specific actions they envisage in accordance with these principles.

/4/Concerning the two versions of the U.S.-Soviet draft resolution, see Document 380 and footnote 2, Document 384. Telegram 1226 from USUN, October 5, reported that USUN had received the text of the U.S.-USSR resolution in the form it had been given to the Arabs by the USSR. The telegram states: "As we had previously speculated, USSR gave out version I and only para 2 thereof, without including preamble, op para I or op para 3. In para 2A they gave out words 'to the positions they occupied before June 5, 1967' instead of words 'from territories now occupied by them.'" It also reported that C.P. Hope of the British delegation had told Pedersen that the Soviets had indeed given the Arabs the wrong version, but that they now had the full text. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

4. An agreed text of version one of the US-Sov draft of late July, with the addition of a UN ref and adjusted to fit the SC (such as the UK-US Washington working paper), is an appropriate basis for discussions as to SC action. In addition to consultations with the USSR, Israel and the Arab states would have to be consulted to determine the acceptability of the proposed course of action, and their suggestions be given consideration.

5. It must be understood, both among the permanent members and among the parties, that para 2B of the US-Sov draft envisages in implementation affirmative actions to acknowledge Israel's right to live in peace and security and to terminate belligerence, details of which would have to be worked out along the lines of para 9 below, but that such termination would mean, inter alia, that both Tiran Strait and Suez Canal would be open to ships of all states, including Israel.

6. Para 2A of that text referring to withdrawal must similarly be understood to mean withdrawal from occupied territories of the UAR, Jordan and Syria, details of which would have to be worked out along the lines of para 9 below, taking into account the peace and security problems mentioned in para 2B. (In discussing this with the USSR, the US would elucidate that demilitarized zones, possibly with UN supervision, and other possible arrangements and agreements are envisaged, and that it is anticipated that the armistice lines would be replaced by international boundaries.)

7. Desirable as it would be, it is not likely that the parties in the Middle East will commit themselves to specifics in advance of SC action; however, they must have the same understanding of the SC resolution as do the big four.

8. In addition to the private understanding by the parties of the meaning of the resolution, they would be expected to signify their commitment to it by publicly 'accepting' it after its adoption and agreeing to cooperate with the UN representative in its implementation.

9. The implementation of the principles in the resolution, and the details thereof, would be worked out between the parties with the

assistance of a UN representative.

10. It is not at all certain that such an approach will be successful; if not, there should be a diligently pursued attempt to produce a resolution laying down more generalized Charter principles and an even-handed mandate for the dispatch of a UN representative to consult with the parties concerned, with a view to assisting in establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East (or even simply such a mandate)."

Goldberg

Moscow, October 9, 1967, 1445Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Limdis. Received at 1838Z.

1388. For Secretary. Subject: UN Resolution on Near East.

/2/Reference is apparently to a September 27 conversation between Rusk and Gromyko, at which they discussed a number of subjects, including the Middle East. Telegram 1055 (Secto 16) from USUN, September 28, in which Rusk reported the conversation, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIV, Document 247.

2. I said I would of course inform you promptly of his remarks but I wished to point out it was necessary to get agreement of both sides. The Israelis would surely ask us if this meant that the Suez Canal would be open to their ships.

3. Gromyko replied that this would be discussed on the basis of the resolution as would also the question of refugees. He indicated however if this had to be dealt with specifically by an interpretation in advance, there would be no progress.

Thompson

Washington, October 9, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Jordan, 8/1/67-7/31/68. Secret.

/2/The text of the October 7 letter was transmitted in telegram 1777 from Amman, October 8. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) A retyped copy is attached but not printed.

Attached is a long letter from King Hussein (key passages marked) reporting his view of the Middle East situation following the Khartoum Conference and recent trips to Cairo and Moscow. He hopes to visit the U.S. toward the end of the month.

/3/October 4; see Document 456.

/4/The quoted language is from telegram 1797 from Amman, October 9, which reported a conversation with the King that afternoon. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

He feels the Arabs at Khartoum reached a reasonable and responsible position. He says even Israeli passage through the Canal is negotiable if linked to redressing the wrongs inflicted on the Arab people of Palestine since 1948. Now he says it's up to the great powers to act, since they were responsible for creating Israel in the first place.

He put two questions to Burns: (1) Will we support a resolution moving UN debate from the General Assembly to the Security Council? He fears that Assembly debate would cause some Arabs to take positions that would tie his hands. (2) Will we support a slightly revised version of the July US-Soviet draft resolution? He says the Soviets will but told him our position had hardened. What he refers to is Arthur Goldberg's effort to work out a more precise understanding of what specific steps would follow such a resolution.

/5/The following comment in President Johnson's handwriting appears on the memorandum: "Ask Mc Bundy to read & comment. Could we see him soon? L." Another handwritten note in Rostow's hand states that the message was telephoned to Saunders on October 11.

Walt

Washington, October 9, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders File, Middle East, 9/1/67-10/31/67. Secret.

/2/No record of the meeting has been found.

First, he probably wants to discuss our Mid-East aid freeze. After getting a rocket from Eshkol last week, Harman did the rounds, including getting Senator Symington steamed up. As a result, Secretary McNamara took another look at the problem and is considering a formula for moving ahead that he will probably wish to discuss at our Wednesday lunch.

The Israelis have two concerns: (a) Our freeze is beginning to hurt their production lines. (b) More important, they are deeply suspicious--despite our contrary assurances--that our freezing past aid means we're going to use it as leverage to force them to terms with the Arabs. They well remember 1956-57 when we froze their assets here and then forced them back to the armistice lines.

/3/Rostow elaborated on this in a note to the President at 6:50 p.m. that day. It states that McNamara was "most seriously worried about further Soviet penetration of the Middle East via arms" and therefore wanted full Israeli cooperation in going forward when Secretary Rusk thought the time was appropriate with the sale of arms to Israel and moderate Arab countries, including Jordan. Rostow concluded that McNamara wanted Johnson to explain to Feinberg why he needed support for alteration of the Church amendment and support for selling arms to moderate Arabs when this appeared to be in the interest of peace and stability in the area. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII)

You may want to warn him that we want to go ahead with a few things for moderate Arabs (except Jordan) when we release military shipments for Israel. You believe this is in our national interest--as well as Israel's--and hope Israel's friends will agree that this makes sense.

Second, Abe may want to support General Weizman's request for 77 new jet aircraft. Harman told me he hopes you can give Eban an answer on 24 October. Our staffs are working full time on this, but big questions are involved--such as Israel's nuclear intentions--and we may not want to answer so quickly. While you'll want to sound sympathetic, I don't think you'll want to hem yourself in by promising not to bargain with these planes or raising hopes for an answer on the 24th.

Third, he may want to encourage you to stick to your June 19th principles throughout the UN negotiating season. We know (he probably doesn't) that Hussein, Nasser and the Soviets will soon be trying out on us a revised version of the US-Soviet draft resolutions worked out in July. Since we will be renegotiating language which the Israelis didn't like to begin with, you may want to pre-empt by assuring him we won't do anything we don't honestly believe serves the interest of achieving a permanent peace.

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, October 10, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 45. No classification marking. Rostow sent this memorandum and the attachment to the President with an October 10 memorandum noting that the proposed Anderson mission was out and adding, "I suspect Eban did raise it with Anderson, very cautiously; checked with Jerusalem; and was turned down." He commented further: "I do fear the Israelis will overplay their hand; but, then, I don't live in the Middle East." (Ibid.)

/2/The attachment, headed "Notes of a meeting between Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Mr. Robert Anderson in New York, Monday, October 10, 1967," is not printed. A memorandum of an October 10 conversation between Battle and Anderson contains Anderson's summary of his meeting with Eban. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR)

When he delivered them today, Eppie said that the one thing the notes do not convey very well is Anderson's sense of disappointment over the "chill" Eban put on the intermediary idea. Eppie says the Israelis did not intend at any time in the first or second meeting with Anderson to ask him to be an intermediary. Eban did not even report his first conversation with Anderson to Jerusalem, and my call to Eppie was the first indication the Israelis had that we were seriously interested in the matter.

I asked Eppie in all candor whether Jerusalem had in fact suggested intervening between the first and second meetings and he said absolutely not.

The Israeli policy line--for waiting, for looking to direct negotiations, against talking with Nasser, whom they believe is weak and indeed tottering--is as you described it to me on the telephone.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, October 10, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Vol. II. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

/2/For President Johnson's September 25 letter to King Faisal, see Document 447.

/3/See Document 462.

/4/Eilts said this in telegram 1357 from Jidda, October 5, commenting on the meeting with Faisal the previous day at which he presented the President's letter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Faisal is sensitive about our intimating that the Arabs didn't go far enough at Khartoum. He feels we don't understand the risks Arab leaders are taking by any show of moderation toward Israel.

He, like Hussein, clearly sees Israel as the aggressor. He's no longer willing to admit that Arab provocation played a role in bringing on the June war.

Significantly, he says he'd be willing to end the "state of belligerency" provided Israel recognized such Arab rights as the refugees' right to go home. He, like Hussein, feels we're asking them to give up their hole card--ending the state of war--in return for Israeli troop withdrawal but not for settlement of their main long-term grievances. (This same theme creeps into Hussein's report that Nasser now links opening the Canal with a refugee settlement.)

At the root of Faisal's reaction are 20 years of frustration beginning with the UN resolution creating Israel, which he believes came about only as a result of US pressure. He was at the UN himself in 1948 and speaks from deep personal conviction. Ever since, with the exception of 1956-57, he believes we have leaned toward Israel. He just doesn't believe--no matter how many times we say it--that we can't influence Israel.

Jerusalem is his most sensitive spot. As guardian of Islam's holy places, he believes he has a special obligation. Our abstention on the Jerusalem resolutions in July hit him especially hard--as it did most Moslems.

Eilts did his best to calm Faisal, but he was clearly upset. He may relax a little when he has time to reflect.

Walt

Washington, October 12, 1967, 1902Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Parker on October 11 and approved by Battle. Repeated to USUN, London, Tel Aviv, Amman, Jidda, Beirut, Tripoli, Rabat, Tunis, and Ankara.

52853. 1. Battle met with UAR Fonmin Riad at latter's suite in Waldorf Oct. 10. Conversation relaxed and friendly but somewhat inconclusive. Following items of particular interest.

/2/An October 10 memorandum of conversation contains the details of Riad's remarks on this subject. He said there was great confusion on the day of the attack, and "the wrong information had been given even to the President." The military command had "deliberately misled Nasser in order to cover up its own errors." On June 4 and 5 the air force generals were quarreling with each other; furthermore, the radar and anti-aircraft facilities were shut down the morning of June 5 because Amer and Air Force Commander Sidqi Mahmoud were scheduled to depart for Sinai at 9 a.m. When the Israelis came over, "there was not a single UAR fighter in the air." The air force generals, unwilling to admit their unpreparedness, had invented the story that the Israelis had twice as many planes as they actually had and therefore must have had outside help. (Ibid.)

3. Riad said UAR drawn into confrontation with Israel by chain of circumstances starting when Kosygin or Brezhnev told Anwar Sadat in Moscow that the Israelis were concentrating troops and would attack Syria on a specific day. This was not idle speculation at military attache level but appeared to be solid and well-based information. A similar report was given by Soviets to Jordanians. Egyptians had no alternative but to take it seriously and therefore move troops into Sinai. Army Commander in Sinai found UNEF between his forces and Israelis in central sector. He therefore asked for withdrawal UNEF from that sector, but there had been no thought of asking for withdrawal UNEF from Gaza or Sharm ash-Shaykh. U Thant had given all or nothing reply, however, and Egyptians had found themselves in difficult position. One thing led to another and they found themselves at Sharm ash-Shaykh. Once there, as reaction to constant needling from Saudis and Jordanians on subject, they closed Straits, not thinking passage through them very important to Israelis. Then they realized that Straits were used for oil tankers. "I forgot Israel's oil pipeline." Everything connected with Sinai operation and closure Straits had been done without prior planning and without study. Army had not been ready. Its troops were not trained and did not know how to use their equipment. Equipment itself was not ready. Troops had been placed in Sinai like toy soldiers in a shop window.

4. Battle said all our efforts had been toward preventing outbreak of war. He had been very glad Zakaria Muhi al-Din was coming to Washington and had been immersed in plans for visit. He had hoped once we began talking something could be worked out. We too had been in difficult position. Basis for Israeli withdrawal in 1957 was USG assurances regarding freedom navigation in Straits of Tiran. Egyptians had pulled rug out from under us. This was past history, however, and we had to look at future, which was not going to be easy. All of us had obligation to find a more permanent solution to problem. Middle East must be allowed develop peacefully and could not face prospect of war every ten years. A permanent solution was imperative. We did not know the answer but we knew it was imperative.

5. Riad said UAR was facing aggression and must remove traces. Main problem, Palestine, continued to exist. If not solved it will always be a case of future troubles. He had been working on this problem for 20 years already and another 20 years were as nothing in terms of time. Israelis after defeating Arabs were not ready compromise. Why should they?

6. Riad said settlement meant (an Israeli) state with borders. Question was where borders were. Quarrel was not about existence of Israel but about its borders. It had been a mistake for the Arabs to talk of Israel's destruction. They should have concentrated on refugees and partition, because Arabs even if they defeated Israeli army would not be able to destroy Israeli people. Arabs were prepared for a settlement. Shukairy himself had endorsed the principle of settlement when he signed the Lausanne protocol and when he called for an implementation of the partition resolution at the UN after 1948. It was difficult to discuss a settlement, however, while Israeli forces were on UAR territory. We must remove them. It will be difficult but we must do it.

7. Battle commented that hostilities offered no solution. There was, however, more flexibility in the Israeli position than Arabs seemed to think. Israelis want to find contractual basis for their existence. While we want Israelis to withdraw it very awkward for us to press them on this issue until participants can come to terms on belligerency. Such an agreement would be beginning. At least it would create the basis for a settlement. Suez, Tiran and the refugees were all tied to belligerency.

8. Riad asked if we thought a single word would change things. German/Soviet non-aggression pact did not prevent aggression. No word or a piece of paper would create peace. Starting point was not non-belligerency. Arabs had found word "belligerency" in book on international law and used it as a basis for political stand. UAR could not expect USG to create miracles or to force any country to do something against its will. But UAR did expect USG to make correct analysis of situation and to have clear stand on question of refugees and aggression. It was not question of dictionary definitions but question of US attitude. If US had position on Canal, it should state it. Maybe Egyptians would accept, maybe they wouldn't. Point was USG should make its attitude clear. For Egyptians' part they had to make clear determination to get Israelis to withdraw. "There is war today; there is firing on our cities and soldiers. Security Council does nothing. We do not expect it to, but must control our nerves and do our best to solve situation. Resolution in UN is not a solution. It is a start, but no UAR government can grant passage through Suez to Israeli ships and survive."

9. At this point Battle asked whether Egyptians were talking about Israeli flag shipping only or whether they meant Israel cargo and Israel-owned ships as well. Riad obviously had given no thought to this question and seemed puzzled by it.

10. Riad said he had told Goldberg UAR accepted five points of President Johnson. If something could be done about refugees then there would be no problem between Israel and UAR.

11. Battle said it was heartbreaking to see what was happening to the Canal. Super tankers were making it obsolete. Denial of the Canal, however, was not hurting the world but was hurting Egypt. Riad said UAR not trying to hurt anyone. Closure of Canal was a political measure. Riad said UAR had no territorial designs on anyone. Just let Israelis withdraw and they could have peace.

12. Battle said this appeared to be a welcome change in the UAR attitude. Riad said previous Arab propaganda had been in error. It was in UAR's interest to settle Palestine problem.

13. Riad said we needed to restore and normalize relations. There were many things to settle, he was not talking in terms protocol. (Implication was restoration relations must await some progress on settlement crisis.) UAR knew US could not give orders to Israel and should not be angry if we did not do so. At same time US should not be angry at UAR if it stood up for its rights. Battle said that with regard to relations we had a problem in the formal sense of the word. We were ready to have that problem removed, but we had not sought the break in relations. Initiative up to UAR. UAR had its problems of dignity and we had our own dignity. There would have to be compensation for property and something had to be done about Big Lie. We did not want to be legalistic or difficult but in some way history had to be corrected. We had no fixed ideas on this score and wanted to be fair. We also wanted a fair, just and permanent solution to Middle East crisis. We should not have to face a nightmare there every ten years.

14. In closing, Riad said he had hoped to return to Cairo in mid-October but did not know now when he would be going. Battle said he would be at Riad's service if the latter wished to see him or others in Washington at any time.

Rusk

Washington, October 12, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 8. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

SUBJECT
US and Soviet Positions on Mid-East Resolution

/2/Telegram 51942 to USUN, October 11, recorded an October 10 conversation between Goldberg and Dobrynin. It states that the principal impressions to emerge from the conversation were that the Soviets wanted to negotiate down from the tentatively agreed U.S.-USSR draft and that they wished to avoid a specific interpretation of the resolution which would require affirmative acts by the Arabs to recognize Israel and renounce belligerency. Goldberg said the United States had been flexible but was not interested in negotiating down from the U.S.-USSR draft. Both sides would want to consult the parties concerned, and therefore talks should be on an ad referendum basis, but the negotiations had to be open-ended both ways; if one side could suggest changes, the other side must be free to do the same. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN) Under Secretary Rostow and Soviet Minister Tcherniakov also discussed the Middle East at lunch and again later in the afternoon on October 11. (Memoranda of conversation, October 11; ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

A more detailed rundown of issues and positions is attached, but the key question is whether we make any concessions in order to revive the US-Soviet draft resolution of July.

The problem is that, despite our July agreement on the wording of that resolution, we and the Soviets were interpreting it differently. They want a loose resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal which states Arab obligations loosely enough that they can be disregarded.

/3/October 10.

The question we haven't solved yet is whether there's a half-way position between Arthur's hard line and moving to our fall-back position of a general resolution using language from the UN Charter and appointing a UN representative to see what he can work out.

/4/A comment in Bundy's handwriting next to this sentence on his copy of the memorandum reads: "Nothing in it." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, UN Resolutions)

I will be having breakfast with Secretary Rusk and Arthur tomorrow, and we will try to report to you later in the morning.

Walt

ISSUES AND POSITIONS ON A MID-EAST RESOLUTION

/5/Rusk made this comment at his October 12 news conference. (Department of State Bulletin, October 30, 1967, p. 561)

/6/A comment in Bundy's handwriting next to Section I on his copy of the memorandum reads: "U.S. need not be in a hurry. Agree with Eban." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, UN Resolutions)

A. The Arabs and the Soviets now want to change the language to be tougher on the Israelis. For instance, they'd like to call for withdrawal to lines of June 4th rather than to negotiated final boundaries.

/7/A comment in Bundy's handwriting next to paragraph II.B. on his copy of the memorandum reads: "Goldberg is no longer the ideal negotiator." (Ibid.)

/8/A comment in Bundy's handwriting next to paragraph III.A. on his copy of the memorandum reads: "This won't happen." (Ibid.)

/9/A comment in Bundy's handwriting next to this paragraph on his copy of the memorandum reads: "Nonsense--refugees and Canal were not [illegible--tied?] till Nasser tied them." (Ibid.)

A. We and the British currently agree that the necessary follow-up to pre-agreed interpretation would be some affirmative act by the Arabs to show that they were really renouncing belligerency. Among other things, Goldberg would require pre-agreement that Tiran and the Suez Canal would both be opened to Israeli shipping. Gene Rostow has indicated to the Soviets that we would consider a two-step process by which there was general acceptance of the principles of withdrawal and the end of belligerency as guidance for negotiation but no actual withdrawal until negotiations ended.

/10/A comment in Bundy's handwriting next to paragraph IV.B. on his copy of the memorandum reads: "Nonsense." (Ibid.)

11 A comment in Bundy's handwriting next to paragraph V.A. on his copy of the memorandum reads: "U.S. and USSR cannot come to terms." (Ibid.)

/12/A comment in Bundy's handwriting next to paragraph V.B. on his copy of the memorandum reads: "Correct." (Ibid.)

Washington, October 12, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII. Secret.

/2/The words in parentheses were added in Rostow's handwriting.

/3/A memorandum of McNamara's October 12 conversation with Eban is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US.

1. We will proceed immediately on the items which Israel now has on order and which have been held up by our military aid freeze. At the same time, we will proceed with parallel shipments to moderate Arab states (excluding Jordan).

/4/For information concerning the 1966 agreement to send Skyhawks to Israel, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 283.

/5/McNamara's October 12 letter to Eban states that the United States was able to release the existing backlog of spare parts, components, and other items and would be able to proceed on schedule with the shipment of the 48 A-4H aircraft on order together with the requisite support materiel. It notes that the ability to respond to Congressional inquiries was crucial to U.S. efforts to preserve the legislative authority to make future credit sales and continues: "In response to such inquiries we plan to state that we have reviewed with officials of your Government our intention to resume some arms shipments in discharge of existing commitments to the moderate Arab states. We will also state our understanding that your Government does not regard as contrary to its interests the resumption of such arms shipments to moderate Arab states that were not participants in the recent hostilities." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR)

In addition Bob made a hard pitch to the Israelis to get to work on the aid bill conferees.

This is for your information. I will send you the formal recommendation from Secretaries Rusk and McNamara (they did not want to sign until after today's meeting) spelling out the equipment we would be moving. They will presumably want to consult on the Hill once they have your tentative OK to this course of action.

McNamara warned Eban that, while we are not moving shipments to Jordan now, we may well in about a month.

Walt

/6/This option is checked.

/7/This postscript appears in Rostow's handwriting.

No. 1392/67

Washington, October 12, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UAR, Vol. VI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only; No Dissem Abroad/Controlled Dissem. Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Clandestine Services. Copies were sent to Bromley Smith, Walt Rostow, Saunders, and the White House Situation Room.

NASIR'S CURRENT STATUS WITHIN EGYPT

Nasir's hold on Egypt has been weakened considerably as a result of the Arab-Israeli war, but it appears that he will remain as Egypt's leader at least for the immediate future. Following the Sinai debacle and the arrest and subsequent death of the former military chief, Abdul Hakim Amer, Nasir's stock with the military has dropped. Nasir still has the support of the masses but some civilians--both in and out of the government--reportedly would not be unhappy to see him go. Nasir himself is said to be depressed over recent events, and this together with health problems reportedly caused him to contemplate at least a temporary semiretirement. No likely successor appears willing to assume the responsibility of attempting to work out a settlement with Israel and this circumstance will act to support Nasir's tenure.

1. Recent reporting from Egypt indicates that Nasir's once undisputed hold on Egypt has been seriously undermined and that he may be on the way out as the effective leader of that country.

2. Since the end of hostilities with Israel, factors have been at work in Egypt which appear to have eroded Nasir's position and to have paved the way for his eventual departure from the center of the Egyptian power structure. Until the Arab-Israeli war, Nasir could almost unreservedly count on the allegiance of the military. In the wake of the debacle in the Sinai, however, much of this loyalty has been lost.

3. Originally Nasir himself publicly accepted the blame for Egypt's defeat, but this was soon shifted onto the military, reportedly causing no small amount of bitterness among those officers forced to take the rap for a situation which many probably viewed as Nasir's doing. The subsequent wholesale cashiering of large numbers of military officers alienated those directly involved. Still other elements of the military, already unhappy with the corruption and inefficiency prevalent among the officer corps, are reportedly dissatisfied because the postwar shake-ups did not go far enough.

4. The arrest of former deputy supreme commander of the armed forces Abdul Hakim Amer probably embittered the large bloc of Amer supporters in the military, which Nasir had previously counted on as the mainstay of his own military support. Amer's subsequent suicide deepened the resentment of this group which, in all likelihood, blamed Nasir for his death. Amer's death and the ensuing purges of those working with him have probably eliminated the immediate threat of a military move against Nasir, but the possibility of a sudden coup attempt by some relatively unknown junior officer remains.

5. Nasir still appears to hold the allegiance of the masses, but there are reports that some civilian elements--middle and upper class--would not be unhappy to see him go. For some time there have been indications that certain Western-oriented business and intellectual groups have been unhappy with Nasir's policies. Recently, even some medium-grade government officials have reportedly expressed the opinion that Nasir must be replaced. A number of reports allege that contending factions are vying for dominance in the government, but there is no comprehensive picture of the situation.

6. There seems little doubt, however, that some form of maneuvering for predominance is in progress. This factional maneuvering appears to be a further indication that Nasir's control over the situation has weakened. The falling out among some members of the ruling clique is the most vivid illustration of the current disarray in the Egyptian leadership. The arrest of Salah Nasir (one of the clique) and other members of General Intelligence may have undermined President Nasir's control of one of the country's primary security mechanisms and thus contributed to the loosening of his hold on the country.

7. Nasir himself, according to a number of recent reports, has indicated a desire to step down, at least temporarily. His depression over the military defeat and the death of Amer, his long-time friend, seems to be genuine. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] He also is said to think and even talk from time to time of retiring altogether.

8. Many details of the state of affairs in Egypt remain obscure, but there does appear to be a distinct possibility that Nasir's days as Egypt's functioning head are numbered. Although a military move against him appears unlikely at present, the political and physical pressures facing Nasir may in time produce a situation in which he feels forced to step down. It has been reported a number of times, however, that he is reluctant to do so until he is able to work out at least an Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory. Furthermore, it is unlikely that any of his prospective replacements would be willing to assume responsibility for working out a settlement with Israel. At present Deputy Prime Minister Zacharia Mohieddin appears to be the front runner among possible successors. The potential of Ali Sabry, the alleged leader of a left-wing faction said to be vying for predominance, to stage a take-over at this time is doubtful.

9. In light of these considerations, Nasir probably will continue as Egypt's leader, at least until the question of Sinai is resolved. Nasir's prestige and influence, nonetheless, are likely to continue to decline.

Tel Aviv, October 13, 1967, 0755Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to London, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, and USUN. Received at 0829Z.

/2/Telegram 971 from Tel Aviv, September 28, states that the Charge was trying to arrange an early approach to Eshkol to obtain his reactions to the points raised in telegram 44235 to Tel Aviv, September 26. (Both ibid.) Telegram 44235 to Tel Aviv states that information obtained during the Weizman talks was fragmentary. Despite some U.S. intelligence indicating that MD-620 development might have reached the stage where a decision on production would seem to be required in the very near future, Weizman said an Israeli decision was "definitely not" imminent and the thinking about missile deployment was "not very serious." The telegram requested that Barbour approach Eshkol and ask him to confirm U.S. understanding of several points.

1. After pondering our questions PM provided his reaction in form of following points which, in view of approaching Yom Kippur holiday, he asked Bitan to pass to me.

A. GOI is engaged in a missile research and development program in conjunction with France.

B. This program is not expected to be completed for at least another two to three years.

C. As to evaluation of UAR missile program there may be different views. As an example, within past month UAR has rebuilt its air force with some 250-300 planes. They have 25 COMAR rocket-carrying boats which are capable of shelling Israel's coastal towns. It is in fact not possible to determine when and how UAR will achieve a ground-to-ground rocket capability.

2. Prime Minister would not be drawn out on more specific answers to our questions. In his opinion it is premature to get into that much detail.

3. Bitan commented that there is "no reason for anxiety" on our part as regards Israeli-French missile program. He indicated that progress had been so slow that whenever PM asked for report from his experts, reply was invariably that program would not be completed for "two to three more years."

4. When I pressed for additional info on domestic missile development activity I was referred again to point 1-A above. (This may carry inference that GOI is making contribution to joint effort in ways other than financial.)

5. FYI. Although Prime Minister was relaxed when I was discussing our request with him personally, Bitan did remark subsequently that PM believes we are carrying our inquiries in this field too far. Although this is not new feeling, it is at present strong, according to Bitan, due to PM's irritation over US suspension of arms shipments since Six-Day War. End FYI.

Dale

Washington, October 13, 1967, 10:15 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 7. Secret. The handwritten notation "For 11 a.m. meeting" appears at the top of the page. The President met from 11:05 to 11:32 a.m. on October 13 with Bundy, Rusk, Goldberg, Rostow, Battle, Sisco, and Pedersen to discuss a possible draft resolution on the Middle East. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found.

Mr. President:

/2/In addition to the attached draft resolution, an unsigned, undated memorandum from Rusk to the President is also attached. It recommended that he authorize Goldberg to initiate consultations with the United Kingdom and with other delegations on the basis of the draft resolution.

The reasons are the following:

1. The Soviet Union has been trying to achieve an interpretation of our earlier Joint Resolution which would lean heavily favorable to the Arabs, unfavorable to Israel; that is, it would lean heavily on troop withdrawals and will have everything else fuzzy.

2. Arthur, on the other hand, has been trying to get everything so clear beforehand that in fact it would pretty nearly constitute a settlement.

3. In the face of this situation, Sect. Rusk and Arthur want to put in the attached new resolution which calls for no act at the beginning; reiterates your 5 points; contains basic language incorporating Arab as well as Israeli principles; but throws the work into the hands of a mediator.

4. The resolution would be introduced not by the U.S. but by some other party; perhaps the Finns and Swedes would float it, or the British.

5. Arthur would have the task of talking with the Russians about this and explaining that this resolution, in effect, is a way of doing what they have urged; namely, to have a resolution which each party could, for the time being, interpret in his own way until they became gripped of a negotiating process via an intermediary.

6. Your 5 principles are put into this draft because Riad, the Egyptian, has said that they "have no objection" to your 5 principles. We think the Israelis will buy this; and it may be that the Arabs will also, because they have been saying that the U.S. position has been hardening;" but we shall see.

My own feeling is that if we were to pursue the US/USSR resolution on Arthur's track of making it explicit, this could only be done if the US/USSR were, in fact, the mediators in this crisis, getting into all details, and especially into the sequence of negotiation of the various issues in the Middle East. It may be the part of wisdom to get the U.S. and USSR out of that position, working on the flanks of a mediator, if we can get a consensus on this procedure.

With respect to detail, it is unlikely that the "arms race" phrase will survive; and the paragraph on the second page beginning with "affirming" may be either modified, or go.

Walt

Having further considered the grave situation in the Middle East,

Affirming that the Security Council has an obligation to bring about a just and durable peace in which every state in the area can be assured security,

Bearing in mind the resolutions adopted and proposals considered by the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, and the resolutions adopted and actions taken by the Security Council in considering this matter.

Considering that the Charter calls upon all member states to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors;

Recalling the Charter requirement that a member state act in accordance with the following principles:

1. That the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members;

2. That member states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;

3. That they shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any states or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the Charter;

Declaring that these principles require for their full implementation a context of peace, based on the recognized right of national life for all states, justice for refugees, free and innocent maritime passage, limits on a wasteful and destructive arms race, and political independence and territorial integrity for all,

Affirming, in light of the foregoing, that none of the states in the area should maintain forces on the territory of another state against its will or persist in refusing to withdraw them, or claim the right to assert or pursue a state of belligerency against another state or persist in refusing to recognize its sovereign existence and right to live in security.

1. Requests the Secretary General to designate a special representative to work with the parties concerned with a view to assisting them in the implementation of this resolution and establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

2. Requests the Secretary General to keep the Security Council advised of the progress and results of the efforts of the representative.

Washington, October 13, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum by Deputy Executive Secretary John P. Walsh reads: "Approved by Secy Rusk, Secy McNamara, & the President, 10/13/67. JPW." An October 16 memorandum from Saunders to Rostow with an attached copy of the memorandum indicates that the President approved it at the 11 a.m. meeting on October 13. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I)

SUBJECT
Exceptions to the Military Supply Freeze for the Middle East

/2/Neither the approve nor disapprove option is checked.

It has become increasingly difficult to maintain the very tight restrictions on the shipment of military equipment to the Near East and North Africa, which we imposed during the June hostilities. Great pressure is being put on us by Israel as well as the Arab states which maintain--and want to continue to maintain--friendly relations with us, to ease the freeze so they can meet their legitimate defense needs. The Soviets have slowed down in the pace of their rearmament of the radical Arab states, including the UAR, but are continuing their arms shipments to them. The Soviets are also undoubtedly interested in a possible breakthrough by arms sales on easy terms to some of the moderate Arab states which have hitherto resisted buying arms from them. Our arms freeze has served a useful purpose, but with the passage of time, we feel a need now for some relaxation.

--The Israeli Ambassador has made a very sharp plea for our lifting the suspension on shipments to Israel. The $3 million exception which you authorized in August helped for a brief period. Now Israel's arms maintenance facilities and defense-support industries are severely hampered by lack of parts and other supplies needed from the United States. The Israelis fear that a continued U.S. suspension could encourage the French not to go ahead with delivery of fifty Mirage V aircraft scheduled to begin in November, as well as other equipment. Sharp concern over the effects of our arms freeze to Israel has also been voiced to us by a number of Senators and Representatives, as well as in correspondence from the public. We believe the time has now come to confirm to the Israelis that we will go ahead with the previously agreed delivery schedule on our 48 A4H aircraft, for which agreements were signed in 1966, beginning with delivery of the first four in December. We should also now approve pending Israeli requests for the delivery of a variety of spare parts, components, and miscellaneous supplies (involving no major combat end-items); these items may total in the neighborhood of $30 million, mostly in cash sales but some on credit previously extended. We would, however, continue to defer for the time being on the new $14 million spare parts credit sales program and the 100 APC's authorized by you in May, as well as the recent Israeli request for further deliveries of new aircraft which we are now studying.

--As we relax our freeze to Israel, we should also take steps to protect our important interests in the moderate Arab world. Our failure to meet insistent demands to carry out agreements previously concluded for the supply of military equipment would be particularly dangerous if word gets out on our deliveries to Israel. We have in mind nothing that we have not already agreed to, and nothing involving any further new USG credit at least until Congressional uncertainties on this score are resolved.

--For the countries in the vicinity of Israel, we recommend going ahead with: (a) deliveries of communications gear and some air navigation equipment to Lebanon (totaling under $4 million in cash sales); and (b) with the existing air defense and transportation-communications supply programs in Saudi Arabia (contracts totaling about $130 million over a number of years, which we would not wish to lose), plus cash sales of pistols for the Saudi police and miscellaneous spares and support equipment (involving no major end-items) for the military. The equipment involved for these two countries does not have a high political "visibility" from the outside but its supply would be an important confirmation to the Lebanese and especially to the Saudi government that we want to continue our good relationship with them.

--Jordan is a special case. We remain intensely interested in having Jordan retain its general pro-West orientation. But its active participation in the fighting against Israel, together with King Hussein's seeming interest in keeping open an option to get Soviet arms, involves policy and Congressional problems for us. We will recommend no action on the arms freeze to Jordan at least until the results of Hussein's recent visit to Moscow, become clearer.

--For the North African countries also affected by our arms freeze, we see a need to proceed with previously agreed programs in Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya. The Moroccans and Tunisians believe they must have a deterrent capability in view of the large-scale Soviet arms deliveries to Algeria. For the Libyans, our making good on our supply commitment is a vital factor in the negotiations over Wheelus. These countries are following a relatively moderate policy with respect to a possible political accommodation with Israel. The key items involved are six F-5's to Morocco remaining under a 1965 agreement (combination of grant and sale) and the cash sale of ten F-5's to Libya under a contract, signed on May 1, 1967. We would begin an F-86 training program for Tunisia, anticipating the delivery at a later stage of twelve aircraft under a MAP program agreed to in April 1967.

In recent discussions initiated by Ambassador Harman on Israel's requests, our officials have indicated to him what we were thinking of as necessary exceptions on our arms freeze to the Arabs, as outlined above.

Ambassador Harman stressed that his primary concern is in lifting the suspension for Israel; expressed particular concern over arms shipments to Jordan--which he pointed out were not being considered at this particular moment; and said he would convey to us any comments the Israeli Government might have. It is our belief the Israelis will not seek to cause any trouble for the Administration if you approve the exceptions for the Arabs which we recommend.

/3/Separate pages with recommendations for Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Libya follow. All include options to check approval or disapproval; none is checked.

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

Washington, October 13, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII. Secret. Rostow sent this memorandum to the President that afternoon with a covering memorandum stating, "Herewith an account of my lunch today with Minister Evron. Harry [presumably McPherson] tells me that after lunch Evron feels a bit easier." A handwritten "L" on the covering memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Minister Evron asked to see me today. The only time available was lunch, so we dined together at my office.

/2/See footnote 5, Document 468.

2. He described the "shock" of their discussion yesterday with Sec. McNamara in which they had understood him to be requesting formal Israeli support now for the shipment of military spare parts to Jordan. He said this was politically impossible and explained why.

3. I explained at length Sec. McNamara's position, underlining that he was not insensitive to Israel's political problems but was laying before Minister Eban a situation and a fact which Israel could not ignore or evade:

--The Russians had given Hussein a most attractive offer for military equipment on the basis of a "single supplier";

--The U.S. could not accept sole responsibility for dealing with this problem when it arose.

He said he now understood the problem and the proposal made by Sec. McNamara.

I took the occasion of lunch to make as strongly as I could the point that it would be impossible for the U.S. to have an Israel policy without a Middle East policy; and a Middle East policy without having a global policy including a policy of seeing our commitments through in Southeast Asia. I underlined that I had heard nothing more dangerous in recent months than the doctrine that we could somehow look after Israel's arms requirements while living with the Church amendment and all it implied.

Evron agreed that this was correct and then went on to say the following: If we are to work together, as we must, on issues like Middle East arms supply, we ought to try to work out a more lucid common strategy for the whole region. He did not mean we would always agree in detail. Israel did some things with which we disagreed and vice versa. He underlined the beginnings of Israel's uneasiness as starting with the Goldberg-Gromyko draft resolution, which they saw and on which they were "permitted to comment only at virtually the 12th hour." He suggested that we use the occasion of Eban's presence in the country for the frankest possible talks so that our tactical problems could be handled within the framework of a fairly lucid common strategic approach to the Middle East and Middle East settlement.

/3/See footnote 5, Document 430.

He noted these comments with some sympathy.

He concluded by saying that he was sure that in the week ahead the friends of Israel in the U.S. would make a maximum effort to get the Church amendment removed.

WR

New York, October 17, 1967, 0101Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv and Amman. Received at 0206Z.

1478. Re ME res-SC.

Amb Goldberg met with Riad to discuss SC situation. Sisco also present for US and Mohammed Riad for UAR.

Amb. Goldberg filled in Riad generally on his discussion with Dobrynin pointing out that differences over interpretation of US-USSR draft have been encountered. Soviets do not agree that under para 2 of res renunciation of belligerency means opening of Suez Canal for all vessels, including Israeli. Moreover, it was not our view that refugee question was linked to opening of Canal. Riad indicated he was prepared to discuss a draft res and how to proceed in the SC or alternatively, to discuss the various problems relating to a settlement one by one. He once again reiterated his principal interest is what general policy of US is since UAR is looking for better relations with US and stability, and UN operation is secondary. He said he willing to discuss settlement problems by going back to beginning, or be prepared to consider a new approach at UN.

Amb. Goldberg indicated that Dobrynin conversation had not clarified what Sovs had in fact distributed to various dels at end of Essga. Net result of Dobrynin conversation was to underscore differences between us as to meaning of US-USSR res and what affirmative acts would be required by parties in connection with such res. Goldberg said our policy is clear as stated by the Pres on June 19th. We welcome friendly relations with all countries in area, and seek a durable peace. We believe SC could be helpful in making a start towards peace in area. We have listened with great care to Riad's observations in previous conversations and have noted in particular that UAR has said categorically it politically impossible to take certain steps in connection with a SC res. For example, Riad has said no UAR Govt could now agree that Israeli flag ships could transit Canal. In view of the difficulties which Riad has previously indicated, perhaps best way to proceed would be for the SC to develop broad guidelines. Such an approach would not exact from either of the parties any affirmative acts at the time of the adoption of the SC res. Such SC res might call upon the SYG to appoint a rep whose task would be to assist parties in effectuating purposes of guidelines. Such approach would also avoid need for common interpretation by sponsors, and call upon the parties would be limited to a call to cooperate with SYG's rep. Throughout Goldberg stressed need for balance in any SC res. If a UN res could help make a start, US would be prepared to use its influence to help achieve a permanent solution. Our objective is to help establish honorable conditions of peaceful co-existence. Goldberg then indicated very generally to Riad kind of charter principles that might be included as part of a broad mandate for a UN rep. In recounting principles to Riad, latter noted avoidance of mention of refugees. Goldberg pointed out that we could not accept linking of refugees with opening of Canal. Riad stressed one principle--the political independence and territorial integrity for all in area.

Riad focused on desirability of achieving a final settlement, viewing SC operation as a beginning point, and expressing belief that various problems relating to a settlement would take time to work out. He did not seem to preclude territorial adjustments as part of a settlement. He then focused on quest of who "should put something down on paper" in form of a res so that UAR, SC members, and Israelis could make a judgment based on a specific text. In response to Amb Goldberg's query, Riad said that non-permanent members are scheduled to meet on ME and they might be asked to put something down on paper. Amb. Goldberg said we have no objections to having non-perms see what they could develop.

Since Caradon this morning seemed to doubt our view of UAR unwillingness to interpret renunciation of belligerency to mean opening of Suez and had suggested that explicit language regarding free and innocent passage thru international waterways should be added to para 2-B of US-USSR draft, we tried this out on Riad. As expected, Riad did not think such language would be helpful.

Conversation concluded with both Goldberg and Riad stating that any UN rep appointed should be agreeable to principal parties. In response to Goldberg's inquiry, Riad agreed that US and UAR should discuss directly with each other any text developed by non-perms.

Comment: Amb Goldberg will meet with Danes, Canadians and two LA members of SC early Tues AM before non-perm member mtg scheduled later in morning. We will be giving them our views re kind res which might be constructive next step for SC, and ascertain whether they willing to take initiative.

Goldberg

Washington, October 17, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII. Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates it was received at 6 p.m.

SUBJECT
Nasty Situation on Israel-Jordan Border and Your Talk with Eban Next Tuesday

/2/October 15.

/3/Telegram 1158 from Tel Aviv, October 15, reported that Bitan had asked an Embassy officer for U.S. assistance to convey a message in the Prime Minister's name to Amman suggesting that the Jordanians designate a senior military commander to meet as soon as possible with a senior Israeli commander to discuss ways in which Israel and Jordan could coordinate their efforts to prevent Fatah crossings of the Jordan River. Bitan pointed to incidents that morning and the previous day and said he did not have to dwell on the dangers of "escalation, et cetera." He expressed the hope that something could be done "before nightfall." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

/4/Telegram 1893 from Jordan, October 16, reported the King's reply. (Ibid.)

The Israelis consider Hussein's answer evasive and claim they know he's allowing the terrorists to operate openly in Jordan. They've answered that they have nothing more to say to Hussein. Publicly they've indicated they may have no choice but to strike at the roots of terrorism.

/5/Telegram 55494 to USUN, October 17, conveyed instructions to Goldberg. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN) Telegram 1567 from USUN, October 20, reported that in a conversation with Rafael, Goldberg had urged against Israeli retaliatory action against Jordan. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Telegram 54810 to Tel Aviv, October 16, records a similar conversation between Davies and the Israeli Counselor. (Ibid.)

/6/October 24.

We think Israel is pursuing a policy that's more likely to lead to another explosion than to a peace settlement. While we appreciate their desire to let time make the Arabs more realistic, once the UN gets a mediator in the field they are going to have to show some give in their position or kill all chances for a settlement.

/7/The attachment, dated October 17, headed "Possible Line With Eban," is not printed.

Walt

Washington, October 17, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII. Secret.

SUBJECT
Defining our Position on "Territorial Integrity" in the Mid-East

I have spent some days in discussions of what our commitment to territorial integrity in the Middle East means today. We still are not agreed.

This is not just an academic exercise because the answer will eventually determine how hard we lean on Israel if and when a territorial settlement is negotiated. We need a tentative view soon because Eban sees the President 24 October. As Evron told you, now while Eban is here is the time to understand each other, disagreements and all. If we say nothing about how our commitment relates to the West Bank, Eban will go away thinking it's not important to us.

In the slightly longer term, we will need to know where we stand because any UN representative will need US muscle behind him. If we're serious, it may be the time to begin showing Eban a little of this muscle while he's here.

The policy question is: Do we think the pre-war map of the Middle East is about right and will we work to restore it? Or do we accept the seeming Israeli argument that it would be better to have the West Bank than to rely again on an unreliable King Hussein?

The tactical questions are: Will we lean on Israel and, if so, should we lay the groundwork with Eban to avoid later misunderstanding? Or do we want to avoid facing this issue until the situation is riper and we have to?

There is a wide gap within our ranks over how we should interpret our past commitment in the wake of the June war. Since the argument is neither open nor sharp, there's some value in trying to sort out what's behind the contending positions.

Secretary Rusk has told several foreign ministers now that we had no trouble with pre-June boundaries and would work to restore them if we could do so in the context of permanent peace. Without ascribing the following arguments to the Secretary, those who take a similar position have these considerations in mind:

a. This position is the logical extension of the President's re-commitment to territorial integrity on 19 June and his statement that "certainly there must be withdrawal."

b. It also reflects the strong feeling, which the Secretary expressed movingly last week in speaking of Vietnam, that it is important to preserve the credibility of the "pledged word" of the US. Though the Senate has not formally committed us to defend territorial integrity in the Middle East per se, we cannot dismiss lightly the word of four Presidents backed by Congressional support of the related Truman Doctrine, Eisenhower Doctrine and CENTO.

c. It reflects some sympathy for the Arab case. Our Arab friends and oil executives argue persuasively that we can't let them down by breaking our word.

d. We seem to be signed onto the principle that the conquest of territory by war is "inadmissible." Many people argue that this is unrealistic because Israel's pre-June boundaries were themselves determined in battle. But though we shied away from this in the 19 June principles, we accepted it in the US-Soviet draft resolution, and a lot of people feel strongly about it.

e. It is hard to dispute that, for 17 years, our commitment referred to 1949 Armistice lines. The Tripartite Declaration (1950) specifically referred to them, and in 1956 we pressed Israel back behind them.

Others are more cautious about going that far. They feel, for one reason or another, that the drastically changed post-June situation requires some redefinition of past positions. Their position stems from these considerations:

a. Anyone who fully appreciates Israel's position knows how hard--maybe impossible--it will be to force Israel back to 4 June lines, especially in Jerusalem. We got a foretaste of their position in their sharp reaction to the US-Soviet draft resolution in July. The professional levels of our government frankly doubt that the President will be willing in an election year to exert the kind of pressure on Israel that would be necessary to restore armistice lines, even as permanent boundaries.

b. The President himself feeds this view when he tells all his Arab visitors that he can't influence Israel to do what it doesn't want to do.

c. The 19 June statement itself says territorial integrity can only be defined "on the basis of peace between the parties." That is read almost everywhere as qualification of our earlier commitment. In essence, it says we'll settle for whatever the parties can negotiate. As the President's last letter to Tito said, "We have no preconceptions on frontiers as such."

d. In all fairness, this is more than weaseling in the face of Israeli intransigence. It's belated recognition that our pledges to oppose aggression are sometimes not intended to cover provoked aggression. We've always told the Saudis this about our commitment to their territorial integrity. But we never got around to qualifying our general pledge similarly. One of the main differences between 1956 and 1967 is that we honestly feel that the Arabs asked for what they got by pulling the rug out from under our 1957 peace settlement.

e. Some may instinctively feel that the Israelis are right in saying that the Arabs will only get serious about working out a settlement when they realize no one else will do it for them. If we are ready to act on the basis of past commitment to territorial integrity, the Arabs will go on expecting us to pull their chestnuts out of the fire. Therefore, we're better off redefining our commitment in terms of the 19 June principles and dragging our feet.

So here we are: The Secretary of State intimating that we are honor-bound to go back to 4 June lines if only we can establish conditions of peace. The Secretary of Defense saying we have to stick by Jordan in Israel's interest as well as our own. Israel disagreeing violently. The President saying, at least for effect, that we can't get back to June 4 lines. Ambassador Goldberg opposing any further public effort to define our position because it will just get us in further trouble with everyone. The professionals remembering sadly that Israel is Israel, believing the President and trying to build a position that bridges these two contradictory positions.

IRG/NEA has been working steadily on these issues, as well as on the related problems of Jerusalem and where we go with Jordan. Secretary Rusk will have his own meetings on them later this week. But since both you and the President will be seeing Eban next week, I want to let you begin mulling these questions over well in advance.

Hal

Washington, October 18, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII. Secret; Sensitive. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President with a brief covering memorandum. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

/2/Concerning McNamara's October 12 letter to Eban, see footnote 5, Document 468. An October 16 memorandum from Rostow to the President states that the Israelis had been pressing Goldberg, and Goldberg had been pressing McNamara to change two sentences in his letter to read: "In response to such inquiries we plan to state that we have advised officials of your Government of our intention to resume some arms shipments in discharge of existing commitments to the moderate Arab states. We will also state our conviction that such action is not contrary to Israel's interests." The Israelis proposed to reply stating their appreciation for the resumption of shipments and for the consultation and would merely "note" the above paragraph. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII)

Harman asked, as he did yesterday, whether they could be assured of further consultations on U.S. arms deliveries to Arab countries. I said the future would have to take care of itself and our action would depend upon the circumstances existing at the time, including the support we had had from the Israeli Government between now and then.

Harman also asked whether we would agree now to accept in the future orders from Israel for spare parts, ammunition, and similar kinds of military equipment and supplies. I stated, as I had yesterday, that we would examine lists of whatever they wished to buy and promptly give our answer with respect to each item on the list.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

New York, October 18, 1967, 2215Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London and Tel Aviv. Received at 2323Z.

1521. Dept pass Cairo. Middle East.

Following further preliminary consultations between Hope (UK) and Pedersen, Caradon (UK) called on Goldberg for further ME discussion this morning. Discussion was most fruitful one we have had in two weeks, and we believe we have gotten over, for moment at least, main difficulties between two delegations.

Caradon said SC Pres was calling on him today following meeting of non-perm members, and he understood he had called on us last night. Goldberg said this was correct and we had authorized him to report to SC members we were not in agreement with USSR but did not wish to discuss details, that we concurred in effort on non-perm members to seek new approach, and that we thought consultation with parties was important.

Caradon said he thought it was very important US and UK not speak with different voices to non-perm members. Caradon said he planned to make similar points, i.e. approval of non-perm members efforts, importance of consultations with parties, desirability of producing an early draft, and interest in general and balanced statement of principles followed by appointment of special rep. Goldberg said this was quite satisfactory.

/2/See Document 474.

Goldberg replied that on this matter we thought it was very important not to be more Catholic than the Pope. Every effort to produce agreement in past had floundered over relationship between wording of withdrawal and of non-belligerence. It was now our impression that Arabs were stressing more strongly terminology referring to territorial integrity and political independence. We had previously conveyed this reaction to him after conversation with Riad, and subsequent info, including conversation with Rifai (Jordan), tended to confirm this. Goldberg said we could of course not be sure until people began to look at actual texts. Caradon said he would be extremely surprised if this proved to be correct but indicated he had no objection to possibility being explored.

/3/Telegram 1504 from USUN, October 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

Goldberg observed that consensus in that group had been that best approach was to start with shorter version, i.e. without para containing language on withdrawal and non-belligerence and then see what developed.

Caradon expressed appreciation for receipt of texts, said he would respect our confidence, and reiterated agreement to continuing on course outlined.

Comment: There is still difference of assessment of chances of progress along lines we have outlined. There also continues to be difference of opinion between US and UK which could re-appear at subsequent stage, on proper balance of wording between withdrawal and non-belligerence. However for moment we are operating in coordinated tactical fashion.

Goldberg

Washington, October 18, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Exdis; Eyes Only. Drafted by Battle.

SUBJECT
Mr. Robert Anderson's Talk with Foreign Minister Riad of the UAR

Mr. Robert Anderson called me today. He wanted to report on a conversation he had with Foreign Minister Riad of the UAR preceding a dinner Mr. Anderson gave for a group of Arabs last night.

/2/A handwritten note in the margin reads as follows: "Sir: The memcon (at clip) does not bear out this flat Moroccan assertion." The memorandum of Rusk's conversation on October 16 with Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki is not attached to the source text. (Ibid. POL 7 MOR)

Mr. Riad said that the opinion of the group which he met was that if the U.S. gave military assistance to Israel while it occupied Arab territory, the result would be "fatal" in terms of U.S. relations with Arab countries. Mr. Riad remarked that while the UAR was getting equipment from Russia, it was not as good as Skyhawks and was not in the quantity widely reported. Moreover, the Egyptians have no one to operate such equipment effectively. Mr. Anderson said that Riad was more vehement than he had ever seen him and that later Pachachi of Iraq had called Mr. Anderson making similar statements in the same tone.

Mr. Riad also told Mr. Anderson that Secretary Rusk had asked several people who spoke for the UAR. Riad wanted Secretary Rusk to know that Riad had greater authority to speak now for President Nasser than he had had before the war. There would have been no Yemen settlement except for Riad's advice. He had shaped President Nasser's policy on Yemen as well as on other subjects and could say that he represented President Nasser totally and completely.

Mr. Riad said that he had had a message yesterday from President Nasser asking when Robert Anderson would be visiting Cairo. Nasser considers these talks essential and to be conducted as soon possible. Mr. Anderson will be in Iraq in connection with a sulfur project from October 27 to October 29. He could go to Cairo before or after the pending trip to Iraq.

I told Mr. Anderson that I had hoped to hear from Mr. Eban before a decision was made as to the wisdom of Mr. Anderson's going to Cairo. It would be impossible for us to know were we stood on the Israeli side of the equation until after we talked with Eban the first of next week. Since this did not give Mr. Anderson much time, I could understand his need to make a decision quickly. If he had to decide now, I would recommend that he agree to go.

/3/Rusk initialed his approval.

Moscow, October 20, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, USSR, Kosygin Correspondence, Vol. I. No classification marking. The copy printed here is headed "Translation." Two copies of a slightly different translation headed "Unofficial translation" are ibid. Dobrynin called Rusk at 3:30 p.m. on October 21 and told him he had just received the letter and that Kosygin wanted him to deliver it in person. (Notes of telephone conversation, prepared by Mildred Asbjornson; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls) Dobrynin called on the President from 7:30 to 8:03 p.m. that evening and evidently delivered the letter at that time. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found.

Dear Mr. President,

The Soviet Government feels concerned over the fact that so far there has been no progress in the matter of a political settlement in the Near East.

Although as a result of the known resolutions of the Security Council which were supported by our two states, it was possible to halt military actions in the Near East, the occupation of the Arab territories seized by Israel in the course of the aggression, still continues. Israeli leaders are putting forward more and more openly plans for the annexation of these territories, or at least parts of them, and are even undertaking practical steps for their colonization.

Information is available about concentrations of Israeli forces in positions which can hardly be viewed otherwise than staging areas for the organization of new military actions against Syria and Jordan. The government of Lebanon shows concern over the threats directed at it as well. There is a growing evidence of increasing arms supplies to Israel from abroad.

In such an atmosphere of growing tension during the recent period one cannot exclude serious complications in the Near East, the possibility that the armed incidents provoked by Israel which continuously occur along the Suez canal and along the Israeli-Jordanian and Israeli-Syrian frontiers, will turn into a broad military confrontation.

All states, with the exception of the aggressor, stated during the Emergency Session of the UN General Assembly that the use of force should not result in any benefits and advantages, and that Israel should withdraw her forces from the seized Arab territories. You also spoke in the same sense during the meeting last June.

In continuing to behave in such a provocative and defiant manner the leaders of Israel seem to rely, first of all, on aid and support from the USA.

As is apparent from contacts between Soviet representatives and responsible officials of your government, and from the whole course of events during the present session of the General Assembly of the UN, Israel's expansionist ambitions find on the American side a benevolent attitude.

After the opening of the present session we were greatly surprised to learn that the American side not only has not moved forward in the search of a political settlement in the Near East but has shown a somewhat different attitude even toward her own proposals which had been proposed by her during the Emergency Session of the UN General Assembly.

One gains the impression that the American side is actually trying to abandon her own proposals, judging by the statements made by her representatives in New York. Under the pretext of an interpretation of these proposals, substantially new and additional conditions are being put forward in the spirit of the aggressive demands made by Israel. Attempts have also been made to steer the negotiations along a twisting and swampy path with many stops and retreats.

Meanwhile it should be made completely clear that: if the question of speedy withdrawal of Israeli forces is not solved then there can be no peace in that area. The unstable, explosive situation will continue and will introduce complications into international relations as a whole.

Where would lead the reliance of the leaders of Israel on US assistance? Some will help one side, others the other side. And thus, link by link, the chain of events will follow. Is this the way to strengthen peace in the Near East? Will this be of benefit to states?

The Soviet Government proceeds from the position that it is necessary to eliminate without delay the after-effects of aggression and, at the same time, to prevent the breakout of a new military conflict in this area in the near or more distant future.

The Soviet Government firmly believes that now there exists an objective opportunity to put an end to further dangerous protraction of the political settlement in the Near East. This can and must be done by means of a speedy adoption, let us say, in the Security Council of a resolution which was discussed at the end of the Emergency Session of the UN General Assembly and which provides for the withdrawal of troops without delay from the occupied territories to the positions as of June 5, 1967, at the same time recognizing the principle of independent national existence of all states in that area and their right to live in peace and security. Each side would be bound to observe such a Security Council resolution.

Of course, in addition to those mentioned there is a number of other questions awaiting a solution. There is the question of free navigation. We are convinced that these questions, too, should be solved in the interest of all countries on the basis of the aforementioned resolution, if adopted by the Security Council.

References to the effect that the Arab states are allegedly not agreeable to recognize Israel's right to independent national existence are groundless. You are also undoubtedly aware that the Arab states, at any rate, those immediately concerned, have adopted a sound and realistic position.

The time has come to take resolute steps to put an end to the present dangerous situation in the Near East. One must not allow the political settlement be wrecked because Israel would like to realize her extreme claims behind which hides an unrestrained drive towards expansion. It appears that the Israeli leaders are little concerned with how this state will live tomorrow, without thinking of the consequences their political short-sightedness may bring about.

We are convinced that the overwhelming majority of states, perhaps all of them, will support every positive step in the direction of a settlement. And hardly anybody could come out against the decision of the Security Council which reflects the interests of states and is dictated by the desire to relieve tension and to bring lasting peace to the Near East.

In the positive results of such efforts nations would see not only a contribution to the strengthening of peace in that area but also a ray of hope in the cause of solving other problems facing mankind and, not in the least, by our countries.

I hope, Mr. President, to receive your early reply. One would like to believe that this reply will help to remove from the agenda a problem which has become a source of friction and conflicts.

Respectfully,

A. Kosygin