U.S. Department of State

New York, October 24, 1967, 0151Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Moscow Priority and to Tel Aviv and Amman. Received at 0338Z.

1676. 1. Amb. Goldberg, accompanied by Sisco and Pedersen, had a long and friendly two and one-half hour conversation October 21 on ME with Kuznetsov, Fedorenko, Mendelevich, and Shevchenko. Principal points which emerged are:

/2/In a meeting with Rusk on October 19, Dobrynin gave him two pieces of paper, both dated July 20, headed "1st version" and "2nd version." The first consists of paragraph 2 of the first version of the U.S.-Soviet draft resolution, as transmitted in Document 380, except that in sub-paragraph 2.a, the words "to the positions they occupied before June 5, 1967" are substituted for the words "from territories occupied by them." The second consists of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the second version of the draft resolution as transmitted in Document 380. The two pieces of paper are attached to a memorandum of October 20 from Read to Rusk, which also forwarded a copy of Version I as transmitted in Document 380 and states that the first version text Dobrynin had given Rusk the previous day was clearly an altered form of the July version. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR) No record of Rusk's October 19 meeting with Dobrynin has been found.

/3/See Document 380.

B. Goldberg said in response to question US supported version I (without date) subject to common interpretation at time, and on ad referendum basis subject to consultation with principal parties concerned.

C. Kuznetsov maintained Sov support for version I (with date), but without common interpretation subject Arab approval and "as basis" for current action. He also avoided confirming Sov support for version II (we also avoided this). Kuznetsov said, if any other res submitted, paras 2A and B of USUSSR text should be included.

D. With above underbrush having been gone over Amb. Goldberg and Kuznetsov agreed we would await efforts of non-perm members to see what they develop. Goldberg having Kuznetsov to dinner Wednesday.

2. Ambassador Goldberg said he had requested meeting Kuznetsov for two reasons: To discuss two versions of US-USSR ESSGA text; and review where we are and where we wish to go on Middle Eastern question at UN. Goldberg said it important in our bilateral relationships to avoid misunderstandings and recriminations. We attach considerable importance, as we know Sovs do, to privacy and confidential nature of our discussions. He realized we both operating under pressure in last days of ESSGA, but whatever difference there may be regarding interpretations, there should be no disagreement about documents or drafts on which common ground achieved. We understand Dobrynin gave Secretary on Oct. 19 two versions, both containing June 5 date, and Fedorenko gave these texts to SC Pres. (Tsuruoka) with indication that USSR did not consider these confidential documents. If this is case, we would like to know since we have refused to reveal to SC Pres such private information.

3. We note that version I left with the Secretary and with SC Pres contained June 5 date. This is not what was agreed to between US in July: There was no date in version I. Two versions were written out by hand by Amb. Pedersen at meeting with Dobrynin and handed to him. We suggest therefore that Sovs check own files to find hand-written texts Goldberg gave Dobrynin, and later confirmed telephonically as correct by Amb. Dobrynin after checking with Gromyko. Goldberg made clear we not charging bad faith, but expressed hope matter could be clarified since he did not believe it was dignified for US to reveal documentation and charge that texts given out are falsified.

4. Goldberg said he also wished to raise question on ground rules of discussions between us. When each of us had reviewed texts, does this mean they become non-confidential and public in character? For example, SC Pres asked us for these documents, but we refused to give them to him. As Kuznetsov knows, we and they have had confidential discussions within context of US-USSR relations, and for our part, we do not recognize competence of SC to cross-examine us on them.

5. Kuznetsov, speaking slowly and deliberately through an interpreter, noted with satisfaction opportunity for exchange of views on this important problem. He considered it absolutely right that our meetings and others of this character should be carried out in business-like and frank manner. Sov experience in negotiations shows results can be obtained only when discussions are frank and business-like, and where no side seeks to outflank other and play with arguments. Regarding Middle Eastern question, USSR, its government, and its delegation have been trying and will, by all necessary steps, continue to take measures in order to achieve solution corresponding to interests of parties concerned and directed toward consideration of peace in Middle East and lessening of tensions elsewhere. Sov ready to unite with other states, fully understanding importance of US role, to seek solution of ME question. This, in large measure, will depend upon extent to which there is mutual understanding and a mutual approach between US and USSR. During three or four days he has been in New York, Kuznetsov has tried to understand atmosphere and mood of delegations. He wished to share his impressions with Amb. Goldberg. He has had meetings with Arabs, primarily with UAR, which have provided him with belief UAR approach is now characterized by more understanding and realism than at end of ESSGA. He has same impressions from his conversations with Jordanians and Iraqis and believes this would be a positive factor which should be considered when attention is given to best way to settle ME problem. His impression, objectively and candidly, is that there is a more favorable possibility for a solution acceptable to all parties concerned and for preparation and adoption of an SC or GA res.

6. Kuznetsov continued he had second impression. While Arabs were taking more realistic approach, other side moving toward more unacceptable requirements leading away from a peaceful solution.

7. Kuznetsov said he would be as open and frank as Amb. Goldberg had been regarding two versions discussed at end of session. Sovs also have certain documents and info from which they derive certain impressions. He was aware that some called it an American draft, others an LA draft, and others a Sov-American draft. He confirmed their acceptance of US-USSR [draft] had been subject to Arab agreement. Draft (Kuznetsov at times used word "draft" in singular and other times in plural) contained balanced provisions. He said first version contained provision for withdrawal of Israeli forces to positions occupied before June 5 and a second provision called for discontinuance of the state of war, and a provision for settlement of questions by peaceful means in accordance with international law, including freedom of shipping, and solution of refugee problem. Unfortunately, that draft did not command support, and he need not dwell on reasons. He said now Arab states are more interested in a solution, agree to support this draft, taking it as a basis for a solution and for resolution to be adopted by SC or GA. If now other side, and above all US, remains at same point as it was at end of ESSGA, it would not be difficult to reach agreement on that text and make a contribution to a solution.

8. From what Amb. Goldberg had said, Kuznetsov understands US has problem with June 5 date. Without going into details, Sovs have two versions and both mention June 5 date. US did not deny fact that in one version date is included. Sovs had to think why US attached so much importance to date, what lay behind this: maybe US seeking to go back on its position. If both of us proceeded from fact that Israeli forces should be withdrawn to positions occupied before June 5, then there is no problem. Dropping date Kuznetsov argued could only create opinion that US favors solution not requiring full liberation of Arab territories and leaving certain territories under Israeli occupation so that withdrawal would be incomplete. This position would not contribute to settlement in spirit necessary for ME solution. It would be dangerous step. ME situation would not be conducive to lessening of tensions, good neighborliness, establishment of peace. In passing, he would point out that all resolutions put to vote at ESSGA stated definitely that Israelis should withdraw troops to positions they occupied before the aggression.

/4/Document 384.

10. Goldberg also reviewed in detail discussions between Gromyko and himself to highlight joint character of Sov and US participation in development of draft res and contributions each made. He informed Kuznetsov that Gromyko himself suggested some of ideas in draft and that "there were two parents to language," though admittedly, he did not know who father was and mother was. Goldberg recalled first meeting with Dobrynin in early July. Dobrynin said USSR could accept basic concept of LA res but asked whether other words could be used for belligerency. Nothing more happened until US meetings with FonMin Gromyko. At that time, US made clear that we were firm in concepts, though flexible re language, and wording and ideas contained in 2(B) were discussed between Goldberg and Gromyko. At one point, Gromyko had asked whether the word "guarantee" could be replaced by word "consider" in para 3. Amb. Goldberg rejected this suggestion on ground that renunciation of belligerency in para 2(B) opened waterways as matter of principle and that under para 3 of draft res, SC role formula, came primarily from LA-Soviet talks and was largely LA formulation. Second version, unlike first, contained date, but did not have such strong words as "without delay" as contained in version I. Finally, Amb. Goldberg said at no time during those conversations was there ever asserted by Sovs a linkage between opening of Suez Canal and solution of refugee question. This was new factor Sovs had subsequently introduced.

11. Goldberg recalled that discussion with Sovs also focused on how and what "affirmative acts" would be required by parties. We had asked what renunciation of belligerency and recognition of Israel would encompass. In one of our conversations Gromyko had referred to a document which had been signed by Japanese and Sovs in which state of war was renounced. In later conversation with Dobrynin, Goldberg discussed such a document as an example of a possible declaration and affirmative act by parties that could be taken in connection with renunciation of belligerency.

12. Amb. Goldberg then reviewed last conversation he had with Dobrynin in October at which time latter confirmed negotiations between us in future were ad referendum, subject to Sov check with Arabs, and US consultation with principal parties concerned. In this same conversation with Dobrynin, Goldberg had indicated that what he had said constituted US reply to Gromyko's questions.

13. Question was, Goldberg said, how we make progress. US had met with UAR FonMin and Jordanian Dep FonMin, on several occasions. Riad had asked whether we objected to non-perm SC members making an effort to develop SC res; our response had been that we had no objection on understanding, of course, that we would be fully consulted by them. On timing, we said we were ready to go ahead in SC promptly, provided there was an understanding on a constructive course of action. In these conversations we had stressed need for precision in SC res and had asked whether non-belligerency would include opening Suez; Riad's response had been no UAR Govt could last if it took this step. He had indicated, however, that UAR would be willing to consider res which included principles based on June 19 statement of President and which called for appointment of a UN rep. Our impression from these discussions was that UAR willing to consider general statement of principles in SC res for mandate of UN rep. We had impression from Riad that it would be less difficult for them if they were not called upon by SC res to do specific things. We stood ready to approach SC res from point of view of appointment of a UN rep with broad guidelines. Such statement of principles would not require interpretation or acceptance by parties other than expression their willingness to cooperate with UN rep. We were now waiting to see what emerged from non-perm members discussions.

14. Kuznetsov, referring to history and drafts of July 19 and 20, stated USSR had carefully examined that question and wished to assure the US it was not Sov intention to distort or display what was agreed to in wrong light. He said we have all the records, and what we have given you are genuine versions. Sovs agree, of course, that drafts include preambular and other points. On basis question of June 5 date, Kuznetsov repeated USSR continues to support version I (with date) and asserted that draft remained good basis for a consequent solution and is position to which USSR adheres. He asked whether US supporting that draft and if not, what was US position. Sovs did not feel they had answer to this question.

15. Amb. Goldberg responded very precisely: US supports proper formulation of version I, with common interpretation discussed with Sovs and on understanding it is ad referendum in relationship to parties. US could not support version I in a vacuum.

16. Kuznetsov asked if US supported any version that contains a date and asked again if US refused to support it. Goldberg replied no, US supported proper version of I on agreed basis; there was never a date.

17. Fedorenko then asked about version II. Amb. Goldberg said this academic since Kuznetsov has just said that the Sovs support version I with a date. Amb. Goldberg asked for Sov position on version II. Kuznetsov smiled and said he had asked first. Fedorenko interjected that version II was US draft. Amb. Goldberg responded that it was not and that it was largely LA draft.

18. Kuznetsov said Sovs could now see from discussion that US is taking steps to depart from draft agreed to on July 20. US wants to hamper carrying out a constructive solution and Sovs still adhere to position that drafts of July 19 and 20 are and can be good basis for a solution; if other side (meaning US) retreats from that position then we have to consider what can be done now. USSR also aware non-perms trying to prepare something and would welcome any steps and measures towards a solution which would be acceptable to all parties. If another draft res is developed, formulation contained in July 19-20 draft should be included.

19. Amb. Goldberg replied that we did not want to get into polemical argument. However, we do not accept concept that we have re-treated from anything; there were common understandings as to meaning. We agree that we should now await results of Sov efforts.

20. Kuznetsov again returned to question of date and asked why US against date. Amb. Goldberg replied this has long history. Date being used to roll everything back to conditions existing before war. If you revert to pre-June 5 situation, you return to unstable conditions of armistice agreements; Canal and Straits can be closed at whim of UAR; armies confront one another on frontiers; and there are no demilitarized zones.

21. Kuznetsov said that date refers only to territory occupied and not to other problems. He asked if US favored Israel retaining territory. Amb. Goldberg said US not in favor of territorial aggrandizement or restoration of old conditions. Question where forces would withdraw would have to be cleared up in discussions among parties. Kuznetsov said if no date included in res, other side may not withdraw from all Arab territories. This would aggravate situation and become permanent source of discord. Amb. Goldberg asked whether Kuznetsov agreed withdrawal should take place in context of peace. Kuznetsov did not respond directly but said Sovs support July 19-20 draft. He said there should be withdrawal of Israeli troops to pre-June 5 positions and other problems should be considered in accordance with this res.

22. Amb. Goldberg asked Kuznetsov for his interpretation of para 2(B)-what did it mean and what did it require the parties to do. Text called for acknowledgments and renunciations, which were positive actions. What did Sovs conceive these meant? Kuznetsov refused to interpret it. Amb. Goldberg said it is important we know what US and USSR understand is meaning of such para. For example, FonMin Gromyko had made clear even though word "belligerency" was not mentioned, para 2(B) did in fact mean renunciation of belligerency. Kuznetsov said question of interpretation was a new problem and a complication. Amb. Goldberg said all he was asking was confirmation of understanding achieved.

/5/October 25.

Goldberg

Washington, October 23, 1967, 11 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XII. Secret. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting was held in Rostow's office at the White House. Rostow sent the memorandum to the President on October 24 with a brief covering memorandum. A handwritten "L" indicates the President saw it.

PARTICIPANTS
Abba Eban, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs
Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel
Ephraim Evron, Minister of Israel
W. W. Rostow
Harold H. Saunders

/2/The Israeli destroyer Eilat was sunk on October 21 off the Sinai coast by UAR missile-equipped patrol craft.

Eban said the Israelis had felt the Egyptians were pursuing a "conservative policy" on the cease-fire. However, there could be no question that the sinking was a "classic act of war." Israel would prefer to deal with this incident as a matter between them and the Egyptians.

Mr. Rostow reminded Mr. Eban that this was not the first Egyptian-Israeli military engagement since the cease-fire and that there had even been a previous naval engagement. Mr. Rostow said that our intelligence suggests that the Israeli destroyer was within ten miles of the Egyptian coast. Mr. Eban said his information was that it was more like 13.5 or 14 miles away. Mr. Evron, who had been called out to the phone momentarily, returned with the word that the Soviet Deputy Defense Minister had just arrived in Cairo. Mr. Rostow concluded this part of the conversation by saying he hoped that the Foreign Minister's discussion with the President would range more widely than the weekend's naval engagement.

Moving on to Soviet intentions, policy and position, Mr. Rostow said we had some intelligence reports which suggest that the Soviets have urged the Arabs to try for a political settlement but have said the Arabs could count on some unidentified Soviet support if the Israelis made a political settlement impossible.

Mr. Eban characterized Soviet policy as follows: The USSR is not looking for peace, although it is not looking for war either. It uses the Middle East as an arena for pursuing its global interests, many of which relate to the U.S. Its objectives are to make the Arab-Socialist countries more Socialist, to draw other Arabs away from their Western ties and to divide the Western allies.

Speaking on the Soviet position in the Middle East, he felt that the Soviets have lost ground in the last few months. They did not come through on their commitments in June. The Arabs are now more interested in the U.S. (and the UK) than before because they see the West as essential to their own development and to their ability to arrive at a settlement with Israel. The total result has been a weakening of the Soviet position, despite all the superficial difficulties that the West suffers. Mr. Rostow agreed in general except for the weakening of the British pound. Mr. Eban said that even the British Foreign Minister tended to down-play this. Mr. Rostow agreed that in general we had been drifting in a positive direction.

With that, the conversation shifted to the question of who gains from the passage of time. Mr. Rostow agreed that some time had been on the side of a basic settlement but that our Government differs with the Israelis in feeling that the continued passage of time is not in a linear sense on the side of permanent peace. Mr. Eban felt that time "in the sense of weeks and months--not in the sense of years--is on the side of a realistic settlement."

Mr. Eban, commenting on how time's passing had affected Egyptian attitudes, said he believed that Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad now understands the need for a stable peace structure, is prepared to distinguish between Gaza and Egyptian territory and feels that the range of problems between Israel and the UAR is relatively limited and boils down to the question of an Israeli flag through the Suez Canal. One question he said the Israelis are not quite sure of is whether the UAR could conceive of a bilateral settlement with Israel or whether it would have to link its settlement with others this time.

Mr. Eban said he hoped we could soon move from the "tactical to the strategic plane." He saw the discussions in New York as a "watershed to be got over without prejudice or damage to future positions." He felt that if the Arabs could see that no one else would make a settlement for them, they would be face to face with a sharp picture of their alternatives: (1) to accept the present situation with a vague vision of one day being able to eliminate Israel; or (2) to settle down and find out what terms are available to them. If they chose the second course, the UAR "has reason to know" that they could get back Egyptian territory under the right circumstances.

Mr. Rostow felt that the Arabs at Khartoum had moved broadly in the direction of political settlement and were mainly struggling for modalities. Mr. Eban said he was certain that what we and the Israelis meant by "political settlement" was somewhat different from what the Arabs meant.

Speaking of settlement terms, Mr. Eban said that, while the Israelis were not unanimous on the way the map should look after a settlement, they were unanimous on two points:

1. Juridically, this settlement must move from the impermanent arrangements of the past twenty years to a permanent basis.

2. Since they hoped to draw the map "with finality" this time, they must be sure that it is drawn to "maximize territorial security."

"We can not go back to June 5 lines in peace or war," Eban said. Israel has not decided how different the new lines should be. That will depend on how arrangements on the West Bank work out. Israelis are sure, however, that they can not tolerate a "divided jurisdiction" in Jerusalem, although they can go a long way toward accommodating non-Jewish interests there. Israel would hope to eliminate Egyptian influence in Gaza.

When Mr. Rostow said our Government feels there is a great difference between "minor and major modifications" in the lines, Mr. Eban came back with, "What your Government may consider minor may seem major to us." He spoke of the Syrian Heights and Gaza as "major."

On the West Bank, he said that Israel still had not decided what the proper relationship between "security and demography" should be. They had not decided whether to deal with the Palestinian Arabs "from within or from without." If Hussein presented himself for a settlement, Israel would have to decide. The nature of the settlement will depend on whether there is a context of negotiation and peace. The longer Hussein stays away, the greater will be the pressure in Israel to explore with the leaders of the West Bank the possibility of a separate Palestinian existence. He cited the example of Cypriot leaders who have given up their interest in enosis now that they have tasted independence. He said the same forces operate on the West Bank, but before West Bank leaders aspire to an independent existence, they insist on knowing whether Israel feels Hussein will be coming back or not.

Mr. Rostow asked whether the dialogue with Hussein had continued. Mr. Eban said the main discussion had been over whether and when to meet. Israel would like to discuss such things as the benefit of long-term economic relationships but found this impossible until the two sides could talk.

When Mr. Rostow asked how the Israelis view the situation in Cairo, Mr. Eban described it as the characteristic Middle Eastern one of "stable instability." However, whereas he had thought earlier in the summer that Jordan's position was worse, now he felt that the UAR is suffering more heavily than Jordan, both politically and economically.

Mr. Eban said we should not forget that things are not standing still in Israel There are numerous "wildcat committees" studying the "integrity of the homeland." He mentioned a convention beginning tomorrow and consisting of a good portion of the Weizmann Institute and Hebrew University. These groups are suggesting to the Israeli Government that it should not discard lightly the possibility of retaining all of Palestine and working out some dignified relationship with the West Bank Arabs. Taking the long view, they felt this would be more to Israel's advantage than any agreement calculated to improve the short-term atmosphere. When he was asked whether this would not mean that some time is working against the Israeli Government, he concluded by saying that, despite these pressures, if Hussein were to present himself for a settlement today, the Government of Israel would probably decide to give the West Bank back.

The discussion turned to King Hussein's intentions. Ambassador Harman interjected that Hussein's posture had been one of "active belligerency." When Mr. Rostow asked him how Israel viewed Hussein's position on infiltration, Harman said that either Hussein knows what is going on and does not stop it, or he can not. He says Israel has evidence that infiltrators have "wandered around openly in Jordan and have received help from Jordanian soldiers." Mr. Evron said that even the Jordanian Director of Military Intelligence had been involved. In the same vein, Ambassador Harman said that King Hussein must know what his representative in New York is doing.

Mr. Eban said that "Hussein no longer evokes the same feeling from Israelis" as he did before the war. Israelis blamed the Jordanians for three serious developments: (1) It was Jordanian gibes that provoked the Egyptians to move into Sharm-el-Sheik; (2) it was the defense pact of 30 May that "made the war inexorable", (3) it was Jordan's actions on June 5 that killed all faith in him.

/3/The Saudi Government had complained to the Embassy in Jidda on August 19 that an Israeli detachment had occupied Tiran Island, an island in the Red Sea at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. (Telegram 675 from Jidda, August 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Documentation concerning discussions with the Israelis and the Saudis concerning Tiran Island is ibid., POL 32-6 TIRAN and POL 27 ARAB-ISR.

/4/For information concerning the Egyptian aide-m?moire of January 30, 1950, containing the Egyptian assurances, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. V, p. 711. Evron told Saunders on November 2 that the U.S. Ambassador had passed the aide-m?moire to the Israeli Government. (Memorandum for the record by Saunders, November 2; Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Israel)

/5/For information concerning Eban's August 30 aide-m?moire, see footnote 5, Document 430.

Mr. Eban said that his only concern in the recent discussions over our military aid freeze was that his government not be put in a position of endorsing American military shipments to governments like that of Saudi Arabia which we might consider moderate but which had just called for the destruction of Israel.

On the broader point, Mr. Eban noted the "harsh facts" Israel faced in May and June. He acknowledged "fully and gratefully" the US ability to "neutralize the USSR." But Israel found that, on questions involving Israel and the Arab states, the US operated under certain inhibitions, both domestic and international. He felt he was only expressing a US interest in Israel's ability to defend itself so the US would not have to answer the question of what to do if Israel were overrun.

Mr. Rostow asked about plans for the refugees. Mr. Eban said that his government hoped to have a "blueprint" in November and hoped to consult with us on it. He said Israel had found out that the numbers of refugees were not so great as had originally been imagined. Also, resettlement was not just an agricultural matter because many of the refugees envisioned themselves as moving into an industrial job. Nevertheless, he said the problem is so vast that it would require an international and regional solution in which Israel would participate. He felt it would be essential to involve a consortium of interested countries to supplement UNWRA. He noted the irony that this year's UNWRA report had for the time "confessed" that many of the refugees had already been integrated into Arab economies.

Mr. Rostow suggested that the refugee problem offered a focus for regional cooperation. He mentioned that the financial arrangements made at Khartoum were a start on regional Arab economic cooperation and said he felt it was important to link this somehow to the refugees as a stepping stone to more permanent regional development cooperation.

In concluding, Mr. Eban stressed the importance of our making a decision on Israel's aircraft requests soon because the production line for the peculiar configuration of Skyhawk Israel is interested in

closes down early in November.

H.S.

Washington, October 23, 1967, 1:05-3:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, October 23, 1967, 1:05 p.m. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent to the President with a covering memorandum from Johnson of October 25. Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms was also present. (Ibid., Daily Diary)

NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH

Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Walt Rostow
George Christian
General Wheeler

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of demonstrations against the Vietnam war.]

The Israeli response to the sinking of a ship was discussed.

/2/Barbour reported in telegram 1285 from Tel Aviv, October 23, that he raised the subject with Bitan that day and expressed the hope that the Israelis would not feel constrained to embark on a course of retaliation, the outcome of which was unpredictable. Bitan said the Israeli Government had taken no decision to retaliate. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Mr. Rostow: I would not ask Eban. Our intelligence shows that the ship was 10 miles off shore. CIA feels they will retaliate against the Egyptians' fleet. CIA says Egypt wanted to show its power.

Mr Helms: This ship was doing the same thing the Liberty was. It is strange that the Israelis didn't do anything about the attacks. There were no planes or ships. We will try to find out where they intend to retaliate.

Secretary Rusk: They will equate this with the Gulf of Tonkin. But our vessels were 50 miles from shore and there was no cease fire in the Gulf of Tonkin. I think we should leave this matter to the U.N. and recommend prudence and hope for a long-term settlement.

/3/See Document 484.

/4/October 20; see Document 480.

Mr. Rostow: We knew about the ship before we knew about this letter.

The President read and suggested changes in the proposed Kosygin letter.

[Omitted here is the text of the draft letter.]

The President: I want Goldberg to make sure that we have documented evidence of all of the statements made in this message.

[Omitted here are comments by Helms concerning Vietnam.]

Mr. Rostow: Should the President see Abba Eban?

The President: I wish all of you would try to keep so many of these visiting dignitaries off me.

Secretary Rusk: Abba Eban's own position is one of moderation. I am inclined to tell him that the last time you were over here we advised you not to get into a fight. Now you're in a fight. We're not anxious to come over there and fight the Soviets for you.

[Omitted here is discussion concerning Vietnam.]

Washington, October 23, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Nodis. Filed with a memorandum of an October 24 conversation between Dobrynin and Kohler at which Kohler handed the letter to Dobrynin. The memorandum of conversation includes the text in translation of an oral message in Russian that Dobrynin gave Kohler. It reads as follows: "The Soviet Government believes it would be beneficial now to have a confidential [Note: also carrying the sense of authoritative] exchange of views concerning a political settlement in the Near East. We proceed from the assumption that such a confidential exchange of views would better assist the task of settlement. In this we see purpose in possible consultations between representatives of our two states. The aim of our approach is to find a path leading to the settlement of the Near East crisis through common efforts on the basis of respect and due regard for the lawful rights and interest of all states of this region. Of course, such a course of action can only be successful in circumstances of appropriate mutuality of efforts undertaken." Brackets in the original quote.

Drafts of the letter to Kosygin, along with related materials, are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, USSR, Kosygin Correspondence, Vol. I.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I fully share the concern expressed in your letter of October 20 about the continued tense atmosphere in the Near East and the lack of progress toward a political settlement in that area. I cannot, however, subscribe to your assessment of the causes or to your inaccurate description of United States policy.

The explosive nature of the situation was dramatically underscored by the news of the sinking of an Israeli destroyer in the eastern Mediterranean by an Egyptian patrol boat equipped with surface-to-surface missiles. This act of war was the most serious of a series of threats and counter-threats, acts of terrorism, and hostile deployments of armed forces during recent weeks. The situation calls for the best efforts of both of us and of others to secure strict observance of the existing cease-fire and to exercise restraint in the provision of arms to the countries in the Near Eastern area.

Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States has for many years followed a policy of restraint in the arms field, a policy which has been even more restrained since the hostilities of last June. However, the continued flow of massive quantities of Soviet arms to certain States in the area has created a situation very difficult for others to ignore. While we have sought and will continue to seek to limit the arms race, the continued flow of Soviet arms will necessarily bring about some response by various countries in and out of the region. We may well have to resume shipments of arms ourselves to some of the Arab countries as well as to Israel. In these circumstances I would again propose that the Soviet Government agree with us that arms supplies to the Near Eastern countries should be registered with the United Nations. I would be glad if we could go on from there toward an agreement on an effective arms limitation program which would diminish the dangers and permit the countries of the Near Eastern area to use their limited resources for their much needed economic development. I assure you that we are prepared to undertake immediately serious discussions towards this end.

As for political settlement, my Government has been doing its part for peace in every forum, at every level and at every hour, both before and since the outbreak of hostilities. We have consistently upheld the principles which I stated publicly and repeated to you at Glassboro:

First, the recognized right of national life;
Second, justice for the refugees;
Third, innocent maritime passage;
Fourth, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race; and
Fifth, political independence and territorial integrity for all.

/2/In the text of the draft letter included in Document 483, this sentence and the following sentence read: "We were prepared to have either of those drafts presented to and adopted by the Emergency General Assembly when, because of objections from certain Arab countries the Soviet side withdrew its support. We would still be prepared to go ahead with those drafts which we considered joint ones and not, as you state in your letter, the United States 'own proposals.'"

/3/In the text of the draft letter cited above, this sentence reads: "We should ascertain whether we do not in fact agree on underlying policies and determine whether we can achieve agreement promptly on a Security Council resolution which would help move the parties toward peace."

I believe that the opportunity is before us to move forward. Recently representatives of some of the Arab States have stated to our representatives that an acceptable resolution of the Security Council can be formulated on the basis of the five principles of peace set forth in my statement on June 19. This could be implemented by a special United Nations representative working with the parties on the basis of such a framework. My representatives in turn have made it clear that this would be an acceptable way to make progress toward peace in the area.

/4/In the text of the draft letter cited above, this sentence reads: "My representatives assured the Arab states concerned that while we continue to adhere to our understanding of the provisional agreement we reached with your government in July, we should of course also cooperate wholeheartedly in their effort."

Mr. Chairman, I stated to you at Glassboro that the first and greatest principle of peace is that every nation in the area has the fundamental right to live free from claims and acts of war and belligerency and to have this right respected by its neighbors. I welcome your statement of belief in this principle. Equally, there need be no doubt of the United States position that troops must be withdrawn. But there must also be, as I made clear in my statement of June 19 and again directly to you at Glassboro, recognized rights of national life, guarantees of the freedom of innocent maritime passage in international waterways, limitation of the arms race, a solution to the refugee problem and respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of all states in the area.

Mr. Chairman, in a context of peace, no state is justified in either refusing to withdraw its forces from the territory of another state or claiming the right to assert or pursue a state of belligerence against another state.

On this common basis, which we believe is acceptable to the great majority of the world community at the United Nations, there should be no difficulty in fashioning a resolution which will promote negotiations through the good offices of the United Nations in order to bring about a just and durable peace in which every state in the area can be assured security.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

New York, October 24, 1967, 0223Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Repeated to Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Ottawa, Copenhagen, New Delhi, Tokyo, London, Moscow, Paris, Amman, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Lagos, and Addis Ababa and passed to Cairo.

1671. Dept pass Cairo. Re: Middle East.

1. At his request, Rifai (Jordan) called on Goldberg Oct 23 to review current situation regarding consultations on possible SC res on ME. Rifai said some non-perms have formulated group of principles as basis for res. As Arabs pressed for time "before we come again to GA", Rifai had called to discover US views.

2. Goldberg reaffirmed basic US postulate that ME question should not be settled between US and USSR, but rather principally by parties themselves. Goldberg said US certainly supports non-perms taking initiative and that, in reply to their question, he had told UAR FonMin and SC pres this. US not [now] awaiting results of non-perm effort.

3. Rifai said consultations have moved past stage of US-USSR discussions, because Arabs now in direct contact with US which "shortens distance and brings us closer to positive results". Rifai then referred to several initiatives for res of which he aware: (1) US-USSR draft of July; (2) a res linking withdrawal and non-belligerency and sending UN rep to area (with other matters such as free navigation and refugees to be taken up subsequently); and (3) current Indian draft which incorporates "larger group of principals". Rifai identified (2) as a text shown Jordanians by Caradon (UK) and asked if US had ever seen this text. Goldberg said we had seen no such text and that Caradon had told us he had no text. Rifai said Caradon text was balanced and he (Rifai) did not know why it had not further materialized. (Pedersen subsequently raised question of this text with Hope (UK), indicating Rifai had asked Goldberg about this text and we were in embarrassing position of having to say we had not seen it. Hope said he sure UK had not shown Jordanians any such text; that Rifai must be talking about correct (as opposed to unilaterally modified by USSR) US-USSR text of July. Hope agreed check matter with Caradon and let us know.)

4. Re Indian text, Rifai said he thought it "could in a way be considered as general and as specific at same time". He said it contains larger group of principles enunciated by various dels, including those contained in Goldberg's General debate speech, and should provide some sort of basis for further SC considerations.

/2/Telegram 1702 from USUN, October 25, reported that Goldberg had asked Indian representative G. Parthasarathi on October 24 about the Indian draft. Parthasarathi told him there was no such thing as an Indian draft, but "only a working paper which is being discussed in a group of six non-perm members." The telegram commented, "We are convinced and he did not deny that he has put forward Indian draft for discussion with non-perms only after full consultations with Arabs and Sovs and without any attempt to get our views." (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

6. Rifai further pursed question of grouped principles. Goldberg said his guidelines remained President's June 19 statement. Rifai noted President's statement included "withdrawal of troops" and that withdrawal "primary" among principles for GOJ. Goldberg said withdrawal obviously tied into Charter principle of territorial integrity and that territorial integrity and non-belligerence were parallel concepts tied into the principle of renunciation of force. Rifai said Jordanians would like withdrawal to be "given prominence", adding he "doubted" it could be covered by territorial integrity. (He said this however in such a way as to indicate that, while Jordanians would not be happy about it, withdrawal might be covered by concept of territorial integrity. Also notable that Rifai at no point mentioned June 5 date, but did refer to need for recognized boundaries.)

7. Rifai said he thought Indians and non-perms should conclude their discussions on a possible text today or early tomorrow with some positive results. Goldberg reiterated our support for the non-perm effort and our feeling that they ought to get on with the job rather than dealing with collateral questions, particularly in light of events in area over weekend. Rifai agreed as to seriousness of weekend developments which he said might lead to a series of events which could get out of control. Rifai and Goldberg agreed this new factor increased urgency of early moves for res in SC and toward ME settlement.

Goldberg

Washington, October 24, 1967, 1759Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Houghton; cleared by Macomber, Schwartz (DOD), and Katzenbach; and approved by Battle.

/2/Telegram 58793 to Beirut and other missions, October 24, set forth U.S. military supply policy for the Middle East. (Ibid., DEF 19-8 US-NEAR E)

2. Problem lies in large body Congressional opinion that GOJ attacked Israel in face (a) legal conditions U.S. provided military equipment for defensive purposes only and (b) Israel appeal (which well known here) to Jordan for mutual restraint. Although we think we understand reasons for Hussein's Moscow visit, it did not help our public or Congressional problem. Our previous discussions with Khammash were based on belief that Congressional situation would improve as AID bill progressed. Unfortunately, opposite has happened and situation has become aggravated as Congressional debate continued. Such is depth of feeling that to proceed at this juncture could seriously endanger Administration's military assistance program.

3. These are facts of problem but we leave to your discretion which of these you use in approach GOJ and whom you approach. In your approach, you should emphasize that question of resumption of military shipments to Jordan remains open. We are continuing to keep matter under very close review. We expect arms supply question will be discussed during King's visit here in November.

Katzenbach

Washington, October 24, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 7/l/67-2/28/68. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

SUBJECT
Your Talk with Eban--5:30 p.m. Today

Our original plan was to tell Eban frankly that we've been disturbed by Israeli actions that make Israel look as if it is being so hard-nosed that it doesn't care whether it kills chances for a peace settlement or not. While we had no intention of lowering the boom and provoking a sharp reaction, we did not want Eban to go away feeling that our silence amounted to a blank check.

/2/For Eban's conversation with Rostow, see Document 482.

/3/The attachment, not printed, is a draft of telegram 58735 to Tel Aviv, October 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

/4/The attachment, not printed, is a draft of telegram 58955 to Tel Aviv, October 24. (Ibid.)

/5/The message from Eshkol was transmitted in an October 23 note from Harman to Rusk, sent to the President with an undated memorandum from Katzenbach stating that it had been handed to him that morning by Eban. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 7/1/67-2/28/68)

/6/Dated October 24; attached but not printed.

1. Nobody knows better than we how hard it is to make peace. We also know it takes a lot of restraint to avoid escalation.

2. But, as you said on 19 June, we can't afford to lose this real opportunity to build a permanent peace. Hard as it is, we have to find the way to peace this time.

This is where Nick's recommendation stops. If you feel you can go a step further, I'd recommend adding this: We don't kid ourselves about what the Arabs are trying to do (make Israel withdraw without paying the price of a permanent settlement). But we're frankly afraid Israel will take such a hard position that it will kill chances for a settlement. We don't believe time is indefinitely on the side of Israel or of peace.

/7/Israeli forces shelled Egyptian refineries and installations at Suez on October 24. A memorandum Rostow sent to the President at 5 p.m. on October 24 informed him of this and commented, "This gives you a chance not only to lean on Eban on the necessity of their struggling for peace, but letting it be known quietly that that was your message to him: there is no future for Israel or the Middle East in this kind of mutual violation of the cease-fire." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII)

Walt

Washington, October 24, 1967, 5:44-6:32 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files l967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Battle on October 25 and approved by the White House on October 27. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The time and location of the meeting are from the Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary. Copies were sent to Rusk, Katzenbach, Leddy, Battle, and the Embassy in Tel Aviv. George Christian's notes of the meeting are ibid., Meeting Notes File.

SUBJECT
The Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

The President of the United States
Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President
George Christian, Press Secretary to the President
Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for NEA

Foreign Minister Abba Eban of Israel
His Excellency Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Ephraim Evron, Israeli Minister

President Johnson received Foreign Minister Eban at the latter's request for a meeting lasting approximately one hour. After an exchange of pleasantries, the President stated that he had been informed of Mr. Eban's discussions with Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Katzenbach, etc. and that it was unnecessary to review the items taken up in those meetings.

Mr. Eban said that he brought the President warm greetings from Prime Minister Eshkol as well as a letter from him. The President acknowledged that he had received the letter and would study it immediately and reply in due course.

Mr. Eban said that Mr. Eshkol might visit the United States in early 1968 and that he hoped, if circumstances brought him here, he would be able to renew his acquaintance with President Johnson.

Mr. Eban then dealt at some length with the current situation in the Middle East. He remarked that the events of yesterday and today had underlined the essential need to move away from armistice arrangements and cease-fire arrangements and to move to a condition of peace. Of the alternatives available to the Arabs, the most attractive by far is peace; and it is the only alternative not tried. The Israelis cannot go on with a jerry-built structure. What is needed both politically and juridically is peace with mutual recognition of countries' rights. Peace is needed in a legal sense, not an emotional sense. Frontiers, permanent and agreed to, must be accepted by both sides. The ideas of the Israelis are very close to those stated in President Johnson's June 19 speech. Three points are particularly attractive to the Israelis. The first is the recognition in that speech that we cannot go back to the June 4 situation. The second point is the recognition that there must be a durable peace, and the third is the need to supersede fragile armistice lines with something more permanent. That really is all there is to the basic problem.

It is essential, Mr. Eban continued, that in the next weeks the Russians and the Arabs not use their voting strength in the United Nations to prevent a forward-looking policy. There can be no withdrawal without peace. The Israelis accepted that arrangement in 1957. To do so twice in one decade would be ridiculous. National suicide is not an international obligation.

The Government of Israel hopes that the United Nations will say it wants the Israelis and the Arabs to work out their differences with United Nations help. If we are able to "knock down some things" in New York in the next weeks, Mr. Eban believed that the Israelis could become very active beginning in January in an effort to bring about a solution. There was, he felt, a chance of forward motion with the UAR and Jordan. There was not much chance with Syria. Even the Russians admit that the Syrians are unpredictable and irresponsible. The problem for the UAR should not be great. Gaza is the only territorial issue, and the Egyptians have never claimed that it was their territory. Each Arab state would get a good deal if it moved forward now. Moreover, the Israelis are willing to work with anyone who can bring the two sides together. They consider that direct negotiations are important, but they are not rigid about techniques. The important thing is that they not move from the cease-fire lines to "a wilderness of anarchy". The United States and the Israelis are close together on principles, but there may be more difficulty on details.

Regarding arms supply, the Minister said that he had been surprised at Russian speed in replenishing Arab losses, particularly in planes. The United States must remember that the difference for Israel between survival and extinction in the last war had been 100-150 planes. The Israelis are happy to have had the understanding with regard to the 48 planes reconfirmed. General Weizman has reviewed Israeli needs for the future. They are not excessive and represent an emphasis in quality rather than quantity. The total force would consist of 250 planes which would require delivery of 77 by the end of 1968. Secretary McNamara has agreed to talk with Mr. Eban a week or so before he leaves the United States.

Mr. Eban continued that it was not Israeli policy to sit and wait for Arab action. Israel will be active and try to accelerate progress. The Israelis are "not entirely without contact" with the UAR and Jordan.

With respect to Jordan, the Israelis were deeply disappointed in the King. They had hoped he would avoid war with Israel even though pressed by Nasser. Nevertheless, the King is there. If he wants peace, the Israelis would be willing to reach an understanding with him which would make Jordan better off economically and politically. They hope the King can be made to understand this and be encouraged to move towards peace. Also, the Israelis hope that he understands "he can't get a good deal without talking". Some Arabs on the West Bank are telling the Israelis that they wish Israel would forget Hussein. They point out that the population of the West Bank is greater than many states in the United Nations. The Israelis have not encouraged this, however, because they have not given up hope that there can be a peace arrangement with the King of Jordan.

Mr. Eban expressed his appreciation for the great help the United States has been to the Israelis. He said, however, that the Israelis were glad they had relied on themselves and had not expected others to shed blood in their behalf.

President Johnson repeated that he saw no point in reviewing the matters discussed in conversations with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Katzenbach, etc. He had nothing to add on the matters discussed.

United States objectives and Israeli objectives are much the same in general. We share the feeling of need to fashion a peace structure for the Middle East and will do all possible to help bring it about. It can be best done, however, by those in the area, and we look to them to move in that direction.

/2/See Document 77.

With respect to the Middle East, the President said the Israelis should not forget what we had said about territorial integrity and boundaries. We could not countenance aggression.

The Russians think we have great influence with the Israelis which is perhaps not the case, and the Israelis consider that we have great influence with the Russians which is no more true than the first statement.

With respect to arms sales in the area, the President said he was more concerned than anyone in his Administration about the arms build-up in the area which is a difficult and dangerous development. He was worried about the ultimate situation. It is essential in considering the attitudes of the countries in the area not to overlook the humiliation the Arabs suffered and their own need to recoup their loss of prestige. The United States must try to maintain its position throughout the area to keep the USSR from putting its tentacles on other nations. We shall do all possible to pursue vigorously a peace structure for the area. The President wished to caution the Israelis that the further they get from June 5 the further they are from peace.

With respect to the specific items raised, the United States will do what it can in the arms field. The Israelis must recognize the extreme difficulty we faced in proceeding with sales given the current atmosphere. As to acceleration of the delivery date of the planes, we would have to work that out with technicians, and anything that we did would have to be consistent with our own needs and our own schedules. We will try to live up to earlier understandings unless Congressional action limits our ability to do so. Arms sales are a more serious problem than when the President last met with Mr. Eban. The President had hoped to get a Congressional endorsement of programs which had not been forthcoming. Nevertheless, we would do the best we could within the limits of our own situation. It is essential that we maintain the maximum influence that we can throughout the area. Our policy there will be a just one. The President said he looked forward to seeing Mr. Eshkol and would study the letter from the Prime Minister with interest.

In conclusion Mr. Eban said that he believed that the United States had considerable influence with the Russians. He believed that the Glassboro meeting had kept the Russians from being more unreasonable during this period than they might have been. He pointed out that the Israelis did take the President's counsel. The meeting with the President was May 26. Without that meeting, there might have been action the following day. The situation did, however, reach a state where the military authorities refused to be responsible if a prolonged stalemate occurred. That had led to the June 5 war.

New York, October 26, 1967, 0142Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv Priority, and to Jerusalem, Amman, London, Copenhagen, Ottawa, Moscow, and Paris.

1742. Middle East.

1. Goldberg reviewed current situation with Eban and Rafael morning Oct 25. Eban began by expressing great pleasure at his reception in Wash and gratification US stood by five principles announced by Pres July [June] 19. Sisco, Buffum and Pedersen also present.

2. Without mentioning precise source of info, Goldberg said USSR told us directly they understood Israel deploying forces for attack on Jordan and Syria. We had indicated US had no such info. Eban said it is significant such reports coming directly from Sov Union but added mil attaches in Israel cld provide answer to this.

/2/Telegram 1708 from USUN, October 25, reported a conversation on October 24 between Goldberg and Danish representative Tabor and conveyed the text of Tabor's draft resolution. (Ibid.)

A) Sit by quietly and let LAs and Indians proceed; this wld not produce good res. Difficulty is that we cannot make LAs understand importance assuring that withdrawal clause wld be described "in context of peace", which is the great protective phrase for Israel.

B) Permit Tabor continue his efforts and hope he can achieve reasonable draft.

C) Another possibility might be for US to take initiative and put in res. while keeping language on recognition of Israel's right to exist as contained in earlier drafts, reasonable formulation on withdrawal in our view could be reference, in context of peace, to withdrawal from all territories occupied by it. We believe such formula would not prejudice Israel's position and would not exclude boundary adjustments. Our policy on this matter has not changed.

4. Eban said he would like to see what happened with the Danish effort. He had talked to Tabor this a.m. and felt he had properly inspired him with the need to have a draft that both sides could accept. While Goldberg said he did not want an immediate answer to the question about Israeli reaction to a possible US move along lines described, in para 3C, Eban commented that Israel would want to be absolutely sure that no action taken would prejudice her position on withdrawal, which was simply and clearly that they will not withdraw from all the territories they had occupied. He said that it was particularly important to Israel that the US should not support a proposition that prejudiced her position. He claimed that pressure by UN to get Israel back behind the June 5 lines would strengthen the hands of those in GOI who want to create fait accompli by annexation.

5. It was left that Eban and Goldberg would consider matter further in light of progress made by Tabor.

6. Later in morning Rafael informed Sisco that if SC res was passed which unacceptable to Israel on territorial-withdrawal point, he under instructions from cabinet to announce Israeli unwillingness to cooperate with UN rep.

Goldberg

New York, October 26, 1967, 1816Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 7. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Walt Rostow forwarded this telegram to the President with an October 27 covering memorandum.

1754. Dept pass to White House and Moscow (Immediate).

At dinner given for Kuznetsov by Amb. Goldberg following significant points emerged. Sisco, Buffum and Pedersen also present on US side; Fedorenko and Shevchenko for USSR. Dobrynin bowed out during course of day giving as reason pressing business with State Dept. Conversation was friendly, business-like, avoided entirely past differences over text and interpretation, and focused exclusively on where we go from here.

1. Kuznetsov stressed Sov concern over situation in the area, as reflected in incidents of the last few days, and Sov desire to cooperate with US in SC action that will move matter towards peaceful resolution. In discussing dangers current situation he said Sov Govt seriously concerned Israelis are planning to take further military action against Arabs, and in particular that they might make attack across Suez Canal. (Interesting that his concern related to UAR while in July it related to Syria.)

2. Goldberg pointed out that US even before hostilities broke out and at all times since has been using its influence to counsel restraint on part of all concerned. Goldberg said that it would be helpful in this connection if Sovs in their public declarations were as even-handed as US had been in calling upon all parties to discontinue all military activities. Goldberg made specific reference to SC meeting of last few days. In this meeting US said that violation of cease fire could not be countenanced by any of parties. On other hand Sov statements in SC would seem to ignore military activities on part of UAR which undoubtedly contributed to tension in the area. It was helpful for Sovs to vote for the res but in addition to voting for res it is necessary for both USSR and US to use their respective influences publicly and privately in interest of maintaining peaceful conditions. Kuznetsov did not reply to this presentation although he implied acceptance of validity of our argument by emphasizing that USSR had voted for a res which encompassed violations by both sides.

3. Kuznetsov then inquired as to what our thoughts were about facilitating progress at UN towards a resolution on ME problem. In response to Kuznetsov inquiry Goldberg stated that there was no point in reviewing or renewing past differences as to Sov and US discussions at ESSGA. Goldberg said that Sovs knew our position on this matter but that the important consideration now was how to proceed at present juncture in pursuit of what should be common objective, namely just, durable and permanent peace in the Middle East. Goldberg emphasized that problem was not merely getting words into UN res but rather obtaining cooperation of parties without which such peace could not be maintained. Kuznetsov agreed and then renewed his inquiry as to what our views were now as to how we should proceed at UN. Amb Goldberg then made principal pitch in favor of US and USSR getting together promptly on basis of Danish text, which he felt was even-handed and consistent with US and USSR common views expressed last July and would achieve objective which we assumed we and Sovs share in common, to get both sides to cooperate in efforts of UN rep to achieve a peaceful settlement.

4. Kuznetsov in turn said that he believed that US and USSR could use Indian draft as basis for discussion and possible SC action. He also almost by way of passing added that US-USSR draft of ESSGA (and this time he described it in terms of version one) could be discussed but touched on this only lightly and concentrated on Indian draft. Kuznetsov referring to recent high level exchange between us, saying that whatever differences of view there were, their letter and our response were mutual indications that we both wished to work together in trying to achieve a constructive result in SC. He made no real pitch to retain June 5 date mentioning possibility of reference to Israeli withdrawal "from territories it had occupied." In response to Goldberg statement that UAR had not recently talked about date to us, Kuznetsov replied that UAR had "mentioned" date to them. Our impression is that while Sovs and Arabs will seek its inclusion, Sovs would agree to its exclusion. We also believe UAR would not make this breaking point, although Jordan feels much more strongly.

5. Goldberg's response was affirmative and positive but explicit that Danish draft rather than Indian should be basis for joint discussion on ground that it most closely approximated President's five points and also past joint conversations. Kuznetsov did not preclude consideration of Danish draft, though expressed what is unusual for Kuznetsov, a strong personal dislike for Tabor, whom he said he distrusted because he had on several occasions misrepresented his position to other dels, particularly Arabs, in last few days.

/2/October 26.

7. Kuznetsov said his instructions were to work closely with us to achieve constructive solution in interest of peace in ME. Said these instructions had just recently been renewed. Goldberg said our instructions were to make every effort consistent with American position as stated by President on June 19 and expressed at Glassboro to agree with Sovs on basic policy and to achieve agreement promptly on SC res which could help move parties toward peace.

8. Goldberg stressed problems which existed in Arab group and necessity paying attention principally to states directly concerned, notably UAR and Jordan. Kuznetsov agreed.

9. We found the meeting a very satisfactory one, and importance attached by Kuznetsov to exchange at high levels came through loud and clear.

/3/The conversation took place at 9:25 a.m. on October 26. (Notes of telephone conversation prepared by Mildred Asbjornson; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

Goldberg

New York, October 26, 1967, 1740Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Tel Aviv.

1753. Goldberg first raised two points with Eban in conversation Oct 26 at which Rafael and Sisco also present.

/2/The Secretary-General transmitted reports from UNTSO Chief of Staff General Bull to the Security Council on October 24. (UN documents S/7930/Add.48-49)

Second, and much more important point which Goldberg wished to make is that we feel strongly that no further military action should be taken by Israel in retaliation for Elath sinking. He under instructions to convey this to Eban in very strong terms and wished Eban to convey this to Prime Min. We now at critical stage at UN on ME discussions. While we have surmounted in last 48 hours diplomatic difficulties which have ensued as a result of military action in area, he wished Eban and Prime Min to know very confidentially that Sovs through Kuznetsov expressed great concern last night to us that Israel is planning to take further military action against Arabs in Suez Canal area. We responded to Sovs that we have no such info, that we have and are urging restraint and the Sovs should do same on Arabs.

Eban's response was assuring and he said he understood need that no further military action be undertaken by Israel. He wld report Goldberg's strong demarche promptly and confidentially to Eshkol. He said that when cabinet cmte considered matter of Israeli counter action, propositions calling for Israeli forces to cross Canal or Israeli planes to take action were turned down. Decision was that whatever military action would be taken in the circumstances would come from Israeli side of Canal. He recalled that in July Israel had received message from Sovs, through Swedes, that if Israelis crossed Canal Sovs would no longer consider this merely an Arab-Israeli matter. Israel therefore viewed with seriousness info given Amb. Goldberg re Sov concern. If Sovs really believe this it would be serious, or if they are building up an alibi for possible Sov action, it would be serious. Eban said he would convey message to Eshkol, and both he and Rafael urged Dept instruct Barbour to tell this directly to Prime Min for his ears alone. (Eban and Rafael obviously both want help.) Goldberg once again reiterated that we expressed to Sovs greatest necessity for exercising restraint and avoiding provocation.

Conversation then turned to current status of matters re SC and Goldberg and Eban both agreed it was important for LAs to hold line and to try to get Danes put forward their draft. Goldberg told Eban we did not enter into any negotiations in our discussions with Kuznetsov last night, but made him understand that if non-perm effort fails we likely be discussing matter further with Sov Union. Eban did not show nervousness re US-USSR talks which evident in late stages of ESSGA. Goldberg then checked following fall-back preambular language with Eban in event we need it in negotiations:

"Affirming, in light of the foregoing, that these Charter provisions require for their just implementation a context of peace in which the sovereign existence, political independence, and territorial integrity of all states in the area should be respected and Israel should not, in derogation of this principle, persist in refusing to withdraw its forces, nor should any Arab state in derogation of this principle claim the right to assert or pursue a state of belligerency against Israel or persist in refusing to recognize its sovereign existence and right to live within secure national frontiers."

Eban found it acceptable, saying if this formulation adopted Israel as well as Arabs could adapt their positions to it. Eban said it was important that either party be able to take refuge in its own interpretations. He assumed Arabs would interpret language to mean withdrawal to pre-June 5 positions, whereas Israel could say language embraces concept of agreement on effective frontiers. In this connection, he felt it important US say in connection with its vote that language was not incompatible with June 19 statement of Pres. Eban stressed there are two critical points in SC res in their view: (a) the context of peace and that withdrawal could only take place within this context; and (b) that formula on withdrawal be sufficiently flexible that it does not tend to foreclose substance of negotiations. Goldberg assured Eban that we would be in a position to say in connection with our vote that such a formulation was consistent with June 19 statement.

Then discussion focused on our efforts to maintain solidarity of LAs, the Israelis having been active with Brazilians and Argentines both here and in capitals. At their request, we agreed to consider desirability of making further approaches in both capitals, depending on results of Indian-LA consultations today.

In a further comment regarding above language, Eban and Rafael both agreed Jordanians could find some sustenance in it because of emphasis on sovereign existence and call in operative para asking UN rep to cooperate with "member states". This gave assurance to Jordanians, Rafael said, that Israel did not have in mind dealing with Palestinians in West Bank for some separate existence.

Rafael said their impression is that UAR has been shaken as result of military events in Suez area and are looking now for a "life belt". He believes the time is ripe for prompt SC action (this is first time such positive statement made to us) since Arabs believe SC res with acquiescence of both sides will have a tranquilizing effect on the area. He found it significant that Fedorenko yesterday in SC said twice there must be a political solution. Rafael said if SC can act promptly on acceptable basis, we may be reaching a "turning point" and can move towards a solution. Eban then commented on his discussions in Washington. He said impression which emerged in his discussions with Secretary and Katzenbach, and to lesser degree with Pres, perhaps we might have impression Israel is immobile and that Israel believes if we "sit on our behinds" for months and years a satisfactory result can be achieved. This is not the case, Eban said quite categorically. Once UN rep is appointed Israel envisages extremely active period of discussion and negotiation. He expects a very busy November and December. They expect to have full contacts both with UAR and Jordan, and there are variety of ways to do this. He therefore hoped officials in Washington understood Israel's views and plans in this regard. Rafael chimed in that when negotiating stage is reached there would be "completely new landscape", implication being they would take a flexible attitude re settlement.

Eban asked for our views re Jarring and both Goldberg and Sisco indicated our favorable impression of him. Israelis seem to have a similarly good impression. Eban said that a man such as Jarring would not be willing to take on job unless res adopted has at least acquiescence of both sides and offers some hope that both sides intend to cooperate with UN rep's efforts.

/3/Telegram 60511 to Tel Aviv, October 27, instructed Barbour to make the points made to Eban by Goldberg to Eshkol, underlining the gravity of the situation that could emerge from further Israeli retaliatory action. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Telegram 1328 from Tel Aviv, October 27, reported that Bitan had told Barbour that the Israelis intended no further military retaliation for the sinking of the Eilat. (Ibid.) Telegram 1351 from Tel Aviv, October 29, reported that Eshkol had confirmed Bitan's assurances. (Ibid.)

Goldberg

Washington, October 26, 1967, 11:40 a.m.-12:12 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4. Secret. Drafted on October 27. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
NSC Meeting 11:30 a.m. October 26, 1967, on Economic Elements of a Middle East Peace Settlement

THOSE PRESENT
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretary of the Treasury
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Interior
Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator of Agency for International Development, William Gaud
Director, U.S. Information Agency, Leonard Marks
Director, Office of Emergency Planning, Gov. Price Daniel
Assistant Secretary of State, Lucius D. Battle
W. W. Rostow
Bromley Smith
Harold H. Saunders

Secretary Rusk, at the President's request, opened the meeting with the following presentation of the problem:

For the moment, "politics is queen." We do not expect that economic steps will solve political problems. On the other hand we feel that there could come a stage soon where injection of potentially attractive economic arrangements could encourage the parties to reach satisfactory political agreements. Therefore, we have pursued staff work urgently in several areas.

First, and most urgent, is a solution to the refugee problem. Some of us believe the situation is more fluid now than it has been for years. If the refugees could be given some private choice on where to settle permanently and some help, it is possible we might dissolve the problem. This might cost as much as $1 billion over ten years. However, the international mood is such that considerable help is likely from other nations, and Congress would probably be reasonably forthcoming on any program that promised a permanent solution in place of the year by year drain on US resources that has characterized the past patchwork arrangement.

The second category of studies falls under the heading of Israel's relations with its immediate neighbors.

It is possible to paint a fairly attractive picture of Israeli-Jordanian economic relations. It is too early to inject this into the negotiating scene, but it is important to hold this picture in reserve. Such arrangements would not necessarily involve heavy US resources. Meanwhile, we have a problem of how much aid to give to Jordan pending a political settlement.

If the UAR comes to terms with Israel, we may want to review the West's interests there and perhaps even reconsider some surplus food sales at some stage. However, until there is movement toward a political settlement, we should stay out of the aid business.

Third, there has been some setback to our water and fertilizer planning as a result of the war. It will probably not be possible to move ahead until there is a political settlement. The Secretary had discussed with several Arab foreign ministers the possibility of setting up a Middle East water authority as a way of proceeding toward indirect relations with Israel, but he had not received much encouragement. He suspected we would go ahead with the Israeli desalting plant as soon as it was politically feasible. This would cost $80-$100 million. The World Bank is working on plans for developing the fertilizer resources of the region and we will stay in step with them.

In conclusion, we meant to pursue our studies urgently in order to reinforce the political dialogue when the occasion offers. The Secretary wanted the President to have this report of staff work in progress.

The President asked the Secretary to spend a couple of minutes discussing action in the UN the day before.

The Secretary misunderstood briefly and launched into a discussion of whether or not we should press for Security Council action on Vietnam, but then returned to explain the developments on the Middle East in New York since July. He concluded by indicating that the non-permanent representatives of the Security Council are now considering a resolution which would state general principles and then appoint an intermediary to go to the Middle East. He said that the Soviets appear interested in seeing what the non-permanent representatives produce. In the next two or three days, we should know whether such a resolution will succeed. He noted, by way of background, that Israel's position has deteriorated since mid-summer.

At the President's request, Secretary Udall reviewed possibilities for water development in the area. The Secretary said he had come to the subject initially with one big concern--that we would have to do the first big desalting plant here in the U.S. Now, however, the Los Angeles plant is underway and he felt we were free to move ahead elsewhere.

"As a resource man," he would prefer not to talk about desalting separately but to talk about the total water picture. He felt we could increase the run-off of the Jordan River by 20% with weather modification. He felt that water must be keyed in with the refugee problem and hoped that in moving ahead on the Israeli plant we could extract some concessions from Israel that would tie the plant into greater Arab use of the Jordan River water. He felt that nothing could be a stronger force for peace than linking vital public utilities--canals, power grids, etc.--across national boundaries. We must think on a regional basis and, insofar as possible, ''make'' local governments plan together.

/2/S. Res. 155, introduced August 14 by Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., of Tennessee and 52 cosponsors, called for the construction of nuclear desalting plants to alleviate the chronic shortage of fresh water in the Middle East.

/3/Reference is to a proposal by former Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis J. Strauss for the creation of a public corporation to assist in the construction of nuclear desalting plants in the Middle East. For a memorandum Strauss sent to former President Eisenhower on June 23 setting forth his proposal, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIV, Document 166.

The President asked how much money the Strauss Plan would cost.

Secretary Udall said that the Plan envisioned three large desalting plants, which would produce so much power that the region could not use it now. He said we might do something like this in thirty to forty years, but the best thing to start with was the Israeli plant which is already on the books. The Strauss Plan would cost something like $1 billion.

The President asked whether there was any disagreement within the Administration on the Strauss Plan.

Secretary Udall said he thought not. However, he thought that the State Department's letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was a bit pessimistic and made the Administration look more negative than necessary,

At the President's request, Mr. Gaud commented on water development. He pointed out that AID had some question about the economic feasibility of the Israeli desalting plant. Moreover, as far as he could see, this looks like an Israeli and not a regional project. One virtue of a larger desalting plant would be that Israel would not have to take any water out of the Jordan Valley, but the "pick and shovel question" was that AID had no money in its budget for the Israeli plant.

Secretary Udall said he assumed that if a desalting plant were to become part of a political settlement, we would want to handle this outside of normal AID programs. He felt that tactically this was a better way to work with the Congress anyway.

The President asked whether there is any merit in the Republican position that water will solve the Middle East political problems.

Secretary Udall said, "That's the panacea approach." Secretary Rusk said he thought not. Mr. Gaud said he felt that the Republican position was "too simplistic."

[Omitted here is brief discussion concerning Vietnam and foreign aid legislation.]

The meeting adjourned.

Harold H. Saunders

Washington, October 27, 1967, 3:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind. Confidential. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates it was received at 3:42 p.m. The memorandum is not signed, but an October 27 memorandum from Saunders to Bundy indicates that it was from Walt Rostow. (Ibid., Saunders Files, Middle East, 9/1/67-10/31/67)

Mr. President:

/2/The President met with Anderson on October 25 and talked to him by telephone on the morning of October 27. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

/3/A memorandum of October 27 from Rusk to the President with these recommendations is attached.

I think this is a fair position for us to take. We obviously don't want to rush headlong into Nasser's arms. On the other hand, we still have an interest in giving him a window to the West. We could maintain a minimal relationship by just having a Charge in Cairo for the time being.

Anderson leaves New York at 10:00 a.m. tomorrow.

/4/Rostow told Rusk in a telephone call at 7:05 p.m. on October 27 that the President thought it was inappropriate to approach Cairo through a private citizen on the question of recognition. When Rusk replied that the idea was to say nothing unless Nasser raised the matter, Rostow said the President was uneasy about a "Texas businessman handling this." (Notes of telephone conversation prepared in Rusk's office; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

Washington, October 31, 1967, 4:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VII. No classification marking. McPherson forwarded the memorandum to Walt Rostow on November 1.

For the President

I had lunch with Eppie Evron today. These points emerged:

/2/Excerpts of Eshkol's October 30 statement in the Knesset are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 603-605.

--What the Israelis mean is, until Hussein talks with us about the West Bank, we're sitting still. If Hussein or his representatives will talk with us, our position will automatically change.

--Though they differ on many other points, Eban and Dayan are pretty much together on this.

--They are both willing to give up the West Bank to Jordan if it is demilitarized.

/3/A note in the margin in President Johnson's handwriting reads: "No, no, no! This starts trouble with Russia." No further documentation concerning a move by the Sixth Fleet at the time of the Eilat sinking has been found.

--Fulbright, through Carl Marcy, let it be known that he is "burned up" about Israeli efforts to eliminate the Church amendment to the foreign aid bill.

/4/A note in the margin in President Johnson's handwriting reads: "Not Xmas week. I'll be in Texas."

--He hopes some practical step forward can be arranged for the Eshkol visit, such as a desalination offer that would include "such other states as desire to join with us."

--Eppie himself has pretty much had it here. The stresses on policy between the Israeli embassy and Jerusalem have been severe. (He said he and Abe would have written a "very different" speech for Eshkol yesterday. The one real benefit of Eshkol's visit here, he said, would be to "expose the Prime Minister to the world of Washington--to let him see and feel reality as Washington sees it. They have a very insular view--a very narrow, parochial view of the world in Jerusalem. A conversation with the President should open his eyes.")

At any rate, Eppie will leave next summer, after he helps Gen. Rabin get started as Ambassador. He has been offered the American desk in the Israeli foreign office, but will probably decline it and leave the government for a while. Between now and next summer, he plans to speak to Jewish groups most weekends, helping you wherever he can.

Harry

Washington, October 31, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

/2/Telegram [text not declassified] to the White House, October 31, attached but not printed, transmitted the text of a message from Anderson. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US)

/3/November 2.

--They believe the US is entirely aligned with Israel. They cite our close coordination with Israel in the UN and our resumption of military shipments as evidence. They believe Israel will do whatever we say. They admit charges of our involvement in the June war were mistaken.

--They want a political peace but the terms have to be acceptable to the Arab people, not just to the leaders. The alternative is long and continuous warfare.

--No Arab leader would survive direct negotiations with Israel. No Arab government would settle until all agree.

--They would prefer the great powers to impose a settlement.

--They could accept only these terms: (1) the restoration of all territory that had been taken by the Israelis, (2) the settlement of the refugee question, and (3) the auspices of some international body which would obviate the necessity of direct negotiations between the Israelis and the Arabs. A single mediator at the table would not be adequate cover. Nasser could not allow Israeli annexation of the Gaza Strip. He would allow an Israeli flag vessel through the Canal if the refugee problem were settled, although he couldn't guarantee that some radical wouldn't shoot at it. He thought demilitarization of some territory possible.

--They think it important to restore diplomatic relations with us "as soon as things are a little better." They were "prepared to go more than halfway."

In conclusion, Bob judges that Nasser is still master of the political situation and that there is little committee rule. Nasser appears in good health.

Walt

Washington, November 1, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. VII. Confidential.

SUBJECT
The Situation in New York November 1

"withdraw from all territories occupied by it as a result of the recent conflict."

/2/See footnote 4, Document 340.

"None of the states in the area should retain forces on the territory of another state against its will or persist in refusing to withdraw them."

/3/Telegram 1873 from USUN, November 1, transmitted the text of the revised Canadian-Danish draft. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

Ambassador Goldberg is having a working lunch with the Danes, Canadians and Japanese to try to figure out where we go from here. The alternatives seem to be further efforts by the non-permanent members or US-Soviet talks. The feeling in New York is that the danger of the Indians getting nine votes in the Security Council for their draft is receding. As a result of our vigorous efforts to push the Argentines and Brazilians back on to the reservation, at this point they could probably muster about eight votes. However, the Argentine continues to argue for points in the Indian draft and is pretty shaky.

We are making some headway with our argument that a UN representative can make real progress only with some degree of cooperation from both sides.

According to New York, Bergus may not be too far off in his guess that the Indian draft might get a healthy GA majority. The main thing standing in the way of this is the considerable realization in New York that one more GA resolution-to-be-ignored might not be helpful. There is also less than total enthusiasm for a repetition of last summer's acrimonious and fruitless GA debate.

The non-permanent members of the Security Council meet again at 3:00 p.m.

ND

New York, November 4, 1967, 0342Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

1969. Dept pass to Cairo Priority.

Goldberg accompanied by Sisco and Pedersen had long session November 1 with FonMin Riad, accompanied by El Kony and Mohamed Riad. There were two principal questions discussed.

1. Resumption of UAR-US relations. Riad said UAR wants to normalize relations with US. There had been statements by Secretary and Goldberg that US wants better relations with UAR, but Riad had not seen any specific signs of this. He wanted to know when and how to get into specifics, and just how this can be achieved. In response, Goldberg reiterated June 19th statement in which President said US wants good relations with all states in area. Goldberg expressed disappointment that Nasser had not been as explicit as Hussein in making clear publicly that US has not been involved militarily in recent conflict. Goldberg said US prepared to talk about how and when better relations with US can be achieved and invited Riad to take initiative to request such discussion in Washington. Goldberg said we did not break off relations, and if Riad wished to discuss resumption this a bilateral matter which should be raised in Washington.

2. Second part of discussion related to peaceful settlement and what steps SC might take to this end. Riad, describing basic problem as one of Israeli aggression, asked whether US intended to take a clear stand re Israeli withdrawal. He had asked this question and had gotten no answer from US. He was under instructions to do something about this and improvement of relations, and he would have to go back to Cairo reporting failure. In discussing this second aspect, Riad reinterpreted what he had told Goldberg in one of our past conversations regarding UAR willingness to accept five principles contained in June 19th statement as basis for settlement and possible SC res. He said UAR could accept five points (he later pointed out impracticality of arms limitation point) provided territorial integrity principle meant withdrawal of all Israeli forces from UAR, Jordan and Syria to pre-June 5 position. Riad complained that we are giving economic and military support to Israel while its aggression continues, latest evidence being Skyhawks. As to our attitude on withdrawal, US has said to him we are against territorial gains. He said this is very vague and we do not know what exact stand of US is regarding withdrawal. He continued that he has been here 41 days and he is tired of merry-go-round of discussions. He said it is essential that we be clear as to what SC is trying to do, and critical question is whether US is for or against territorial gains. For its part, UAR's prime objective is not SC res that gets 9 votes, it is not looking for political gains, it wants something practical done. UAR wants to talk about this in detail specifically. From all of discussions he does not know with whom he can do business. He said we need to talk about details of the solution as well as specifics of res.

Goldberg, after pointing out ways in which Egyptian press had been misinterpreting Goldberg/Riad discussions and telling Riad we are not revealing to press substance of our conversations, detailed our views regarding a settlement. He said we do not believe that forces should be stationed on UAR territory, that UAR territorial integrity and political independence should be respected, and that a stable and durable peace should be achieved. We are prepared to use our influence to this end and for a solution of the basic problems of area. Riad had raised question of what we meant by the context of peace, and we meant all of these things, including recognition of existence of Israel, renunciation of belligerency, and freedom of passage of international waterways as stated by President on June 19. He then read to Riad certain parts of June 19 statement relating to need for secure boundaries and asked Riad whether he agreed with this, to which Riad responded affirmatively.

Goldberg also spent a good deal of time reviewing our proposals designed to help bring under control arms race in area, and stressing need for an agreement among all of suppliers. He underscored we cannot do this unilaterally, that Soviets had poured back a substantial amount of arms into area. Goldberg said we attach importance to maintenance of balance of arms in area in light of fact it has not been possible to achieve an arms limitation agreement. Goldberg countered Riad's contention that Skyhawks were a new dimension, since UAR was getting planes of comparable capacity from Soviets.

As to present activities in UN, Goldberg agreed with Riad that present efforts of non-perms have been extended and drawn out. Goldberg told Riad we are prepared to discuss with him specific language of a res which would not prejudice either side's position. Our approach is to find an SC res which will assure that both sides will cooperate with UN rep on basis of mandate which would not prejudice either side's position. As to withdrawal, we have made it clear that we favor withdrawal in context of peace. We believe an appropriate res can be drawn up which meets situation, and we are ready to talk about it specifically with UAR. Riad readily agreed to talk specifics and meeting concluded with the understanding that we would get together with them in the next day or so.

Goldberg

Washington, November 2, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel, 11/1/67-2/29/68. Secret.

PARTICIPANTS
W.W. Rostow
Ephraim Evron, Minister of Israeli Embassy
Harold H. Saunders

/2/Eban declared in his November 1 letter to Goldberg that for Israel to move away from the cease-fire lines except to stable agreed and secure frontiers, embodied in a peace settlement, would be so irrational and unjust that Israel would be willing to incur any consequence rather than to agree to such a course. He urged that the United States make known its opposition to any resolution calling for restoration of the June 4 situation. Some non-permanent members, he declared, were engaged in prejudicial formulations on the issues of withdrawal, permanent frontiers, and peace, which would have the effect of creating a conflict between Israel and the Security Council. If necessary, he declared, Israel would not recoil from such a conflict, but he urged the United States to use the full weight of its influence to prevent such a situation. Telegram 1910 from USUN, misdated October 2 but received on November 1, transmitted the text of the letter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

1. Israel does not want a resolution which in effect defines and negotiates positions before actual negotiations begin. Any resolution referring to withdrawal will give the USSR and the Arabs a whip to use on Israel, and they will conveniently forget other balancing points in the resolution as they have in the past.

2. The Arabs--particularly Nasser and Hussein--are still grasping for a third-party solution. But the Egyptians seem to realize their own economic weakness, and the passage of time will work in the interests of further realism in Cairo. The US has a chance to inject realism into the thinking of Hussein, who may have his head in the clouds after his numerous summit talks.

Mr. Rostow concluded by saying, "You just want everybody to go home without a resolution or mediator, run out of money and then come to you." Evron just smiled.

Comment: It appeared that the Israelis' motive in writing and presenting this letter was to stiffen our spines against a repeat of our "sudden" bilateral agreement with the USSR in July, which they regarded as a dangerous erosion of our position.

H.S.

Washington, November 3, 1967, 1-3:15 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Toon on November 3. Approved in S on November 8. The memorandum is part I of IV. The time is from Rusk's Appointment Book, which indicates that the conversation took place during luncheon at the Department of State. (Johnson Library)

SUBJECT
Middle East

The Secretary said that he understood the non-permanent members of the Security Council were still engaged in trying to work out a resolution. If they should not succeed he assumed that our two delegations may have to meet over the week-end to ascertain if they could be of some help.

Kuznetsov said he would like to sum up his impressions from discussions in New York of the Middle East problem. It is clear that the Arab countries, and especially those most directly concerned with the problem such as the UAR, have adopted a more constructive realistic position. They now are ready to agree to substantial forward steps in the spirit of resolutions already adopted or agreed to by our two delegations. This is encouraging; we should recall, for example that the position of the UAR differs considerably now from the position taken during the emergency session. Kuznetsov went on to say that six non-permanent members (India, Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria, Mali, Ethiopia) have worked out a draft resolution which has come to be known as the Indian draft. Kuznetsov had held the impression, perhaps naively, that this resolution had some chance of acceptance. He had met with the U.S. delegation and had discovered that the delegation was not prepared to cooperate and in fact was not even willing to support resolutions that it had helped draft at the end of the emergency session. Kuznetsov felt that so long as the U.S. delegation took this attitude the prospects for agreement were not bright. He doubted that India, Argentina and Denmark, which had been assigned tasks of working out still another resolution, could succeed unless there should be a change in the position of the U.S. delegation.

The Secretary suggested that there might be a possibility of merging the Danish and Indian drafts, but Kuznetsov said this was impossible since the Danish draft makes no reference to the June 5 date. It was his view and that of a good many other delegations at the UN that the Danish draft would simply amount to rewarding Israeli for aggression. Kuznetsov said the crucial question for his government was to ascertain why the United States had retreated from the position it apparently held early this summer when it supported the Latin American resolution and the two draft resolutions prepared and agreed to by the U.S. and Soviet delegations.

The Secretary said that the basic problem was not whether Moscow and Washington can agree on the elements of a settlement but rather whether a resolution can be worked out which would be acceptable to the countries directly concerned. In the Secretary's view there are two alternative roads we can follow: the first is to settle all problems in the area; the second is to work out general principles for the settlement of these problems. The Secretary pointed out that he did not wish to engage in negotiations on the Middle East problem since these should properly take place in New York. He did, however, wish to make a few general observations. Reverting to his point that there are two approaches we can follow, he pointed out that some delegations tend to apply one approach to the problems of particular interest to them and the other approach to problems of direct concern to the other side. For example, both the Arabs and Israelis seek a formula which would be precise on what they seek but imprecise on what the other side seeks. A resolution drawn along these lines would cause real trouble; a formula for example that would be precise on withdrawal but imprecise on the use of the Suez Canal was simply unacceptable.

Kuznetsov again asked why the United States is not prepared to support the draft resolutions worked out at the end of the emergency session which, in his view, were in accord with the principles stated by the Secretary.

The Secretary said that he did not wish to discuss in detail the controversy over the draft resolutions which was well known to both sides. The important thing was to ensure that we have agreed understandings of any draft resolution that may be developed. This had not been the case with the earlier draft resolutions. The Arabs, for example, had subsequently taken the position that the clause "freedom of international waterways" did not apply to the Suez Canal. In any case, the Secretary felt that we should now focus on how we should proceed from here.

Kuznetsov again said that he could not understand why we were not prepared now to support the draft resolutions worked out earlier. Does the problem concern only the date? He would remind the Secretary that both drafts contained the June 4 date; the only difference between the two was that one draft was expressed in precise terms and the other reflected general principles. There was considerable suspicion at the UN as to the motive for omitting a date relating to withdrawal. Kuznetsov himself wondered about this. He had noted the recent speech by the Israeli Prime Minister and had also noted that there had been no statement by any U.S. official publicly disagreeing with that speech. If this should mean that the United States now favors awarding Israeli aggression with territorial gains the situation is indeed dangerous. It was understandable, therefore, that Kuznetsov should seek a straight answer to the question: Does the United States favor withdrawal of Israeli forces to the positions held before June 5?

Dobrynin interjected at this point that there is a feeling among the Arab delegation that the entire question should be aired publicly in the General Assembly. The Soviet delegation would be reluctant to see this happen since this would give rise to a polemical atmosphere which would not facilitate agreement. Thus it is vital to clarify the question raised by Mr. Kuznetsov if we are to have a clear understanding between our two governments.

The Secretary said that the U.S. position from a national point of view was clear; we had no interest in nor did we favor territorial changes in the area. He would point out that if the Arabs had cooperated in bringing about an early cease fire the question of territorial gains would never have arisen since Jordan and Syria would not have become involved. The fundamental question, however, in the Secretary's view is how is peace to be secured in the area. Peace cannot be ensured if we are to be precise only on withdrawal and imprecise on such vital questions as belligerency, the right of Israel to exist as a state, freedom of navigation, etc. A formula which suffered from this weakness would leave open the possibility of a request for immediate sanctions against one party's failure to abide by precise conditions but would not provide for any enforcement measures in the event the other party should choose to ignore imprecise conditions. The Secretary felt strongly that either we move with precision on all points or we move on the basis of general principles.

Kuznetsov agreed that any formula for settlement should incorporate the basic peace measures cited by the Secretary as well as provision for withdrawal. The two draft resolutions worked out by the U.S. and Soviet delegations incorporated both elements. If the United States should agree to support either of these draft resolutions a solution can be found. It was Kuznetsov's impression that both drafts were acceptable to the United States, and this impression was reenforced by the following passage contained in the President's letter to Kosygin of October 23:

/2/Document 484.

The Secretary asked Kuznetsov if he were convinced that the two governments had the same understanding of the two draft resolutions.

Kuznetsov said that it was precisely to clarify this point that he sought an answer to the question of whether the United States favors complete withdrawal or not. He would like at this point to cite the following passage from Kosygin's letter to the President of October 21:

/3/Document 480.

The Secretary observed that it was important that we not be more "Israeli" in our attitude than Israel and that the Soviets not be more "Arab" in their position than the Arabs.

Kuznetsov completely agreed with this.

The Secretary again observed that if the non-permanent members of the Security Council should not be successful in working out a formula our two delegations should resume their discussions. He wished again to stress the distinction between our mutual national views and the positions of the states in the area. For example, we have disagreed with Israel for almost 20 years over the questions of Jerusalem and Jordan; other territorial problems in the area present less difficulties. It would be useless for us to agree to a resolution which would be unacceptable to the states directly concerned.

Kuznetsov said he assumed from the Secretary's remarks with regard to differences between the United States and Israel that Gaza could remain under UAR control. In any case, he felt strongly that if the United States could support the Indian draft a solution could be found. The Arab delegations are now in a bad mood; they fear that the tabling of the new Danish draft, which deviates from previously agreed principles, would mean that all the efforts made and work done so far would go down the drain. It is important to recognize that there is a limit to how far the Arabs can go; they cannot risk humiliation or support any action which would be interpreted as an infringement on or diminution of their national sovereignty. The situation will become more dangerous as time goes on and if the Arabs should feel that the other side does not want peace in the area.

The Secretary said that it was unfortunate that India had worked out a draft which incorporated the essence of the Tito plan.

Kuznetsov said that this was simply not true. The Indian draft was much easier on the Israelis and imposed more obligations on the Arabs than the Latin American draft.

The Secretary said that he had the feeling that the Indians were trying to be more Arab in their outlook than the Arabs themselves, possibly because of their problems with Pakistan. Beyond this the Indians had not bothered to consult with us in the preparation of their draft, and we did not feel that this was a proper way to proceed. In any case, the Secretary would have an opportunity to discuss the problem further with Ambassador Goldberg this afternoon and he would assume that Ambassador Goldberg and Mr. Kuznetsov would be meeting over the weekend.

Washington, November 3, 1967, 1516Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind. Secret. Also sent to the Department of State. Rostow sent the telegram to the President at 2:30 p.m. with a covering memorandum, in which he commented that the Nasser-Anderson conversation was important and interesting. Citing paragraph 25, he noted that Anderson was "wholly correct" in his conversation and in dealing with the press, and he added that he had "talked firmly" to the Chief of the United Press International Washington Bureau, "who promised to try to kill the story." The handwritten note "PS, 11/3/67" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

[document number not declassified]. Eyes Only to Secretary of State and White House for the President:

Following is text message dictated (but not read) by Anderson in presence [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], and edited and in parts reorganized by latter at specific Anderson request, early evening 2 November. For the Secretary of State attention of the President from Anderson.

1. This will be a somewhat difficult message because of the circumstances under which it is being dictated at the Beirut airport en route between Cairo and Baghdad.

2. I met today with President Nasir at 1230. He advised me that he was leaving later today for a vacation in the desert near Al Almayn, and that this would be the first real vacation he had taken in fifteen years. He was looking forward to swimming, sitting in the sun and having time to think and relax. He opened the conversation by saying, "above all else, try to make clear to your government and your people that we are eager for a political settlement, for a political peace." He stated that this had not been true in the very beginning, after the cessation of hostilities on 9 June, because "we were in a state of confusion, uncertainty and doubt. We did not know, but we feared what the Israelis were going to do." Now, he said, "we know that our interest lies not in war, but in peace."

3. He then said, "Please try to convince your people and your government that any question of direct negotiation, or even of negotiations with a third party mediator present, would be an act of suicide. It would be so for me, and it would be so for any other Arab leader." He further said that even if he attempted this or agreed to it, it would be suicide on the part of any other Arab leader not immediately to denounce it and to demand to resume hostilities against the Israelis. Nasir said, "under these circumstances, let us try to be practical and, if we all want peace, and we do, then let us find a way to settle our differences and live in peace." He said we did not believe that the details of an agreement could be worked out in public, or that anything could be effectively begun by negotiations by a committee or any mediator appointed by the U.N. until some formal action had been taken by the U.N. "as a first step." He then suggested that a resolution be offered to the Security Council which would involve as its basis the five points that President Johnson had made, and which he described as follows:

A. The right of Israel and of all other nations in the area to live;

B. Free movement of "innocent" shipping in the waterways of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez;

C. Full withdrawal by the Israelis from the territories which they had occupied at the time of the hostilities;

D. A declaration of non-belligerence between Arab states and Israel; and

E. Finally, settlement of the problem of the refugees.

4. Nasir stated that after the adoption of this type of resolution, which he thought we should accept because it was based on the principles announced by our President, the resolution should direct the Secretary General to appoint one or more persons to consult with the Arab nations involved and with Israelis and, from these negotiations, to draw up "a declaration for detailed implementation, which would then be submitted again for adoption or ratification by the Security Council.

5. At this point, I told him that as I understood it, the Israelis professed they would not be satisfied with any declaration made by third persons, even including the Security Council, and that they wanted some contractual undertaking between them and the Arab countries which would ensure non-belligerence and the other ideas he had referred to. Nasir said that he could not speak for all the other Arab countries, but as for himself, he would be willing to sign such a (Security Council) declaration "after it had been agreed to," or, as an alternative, write a letter or other document to the Secretary General or to the Security Council undertaking to carry out the details and implications contained in the declaration. He felt that the other Arab countries would be willing to do the same thing, but reiterated that "he could not speak for them." It is quite clear that he is willing to undertake contractual obligations, just so long as they are not incorporated into a simple treaty jointly made and signed between the UAR and Israel. This point he made from time to time, referring always to the fact that even such an agreement would be suicide.

6. Nasir then said that the most difficult problems were going to be the Suez Canal and Jerusalem. I said that obviously I could not speak on any of these topics, but could only explore his own thinking. In this connection, I asked if he could agree to let any ship, including the Israelis, transit the Suez Canal if such ships carried not the flag of the country involved, but the U.N. flag. Nasir said, "I do not rule this out but there is still the question of logs, manifests and trouble with the people. On the other hand, if you will settle the refugee problem then I can allow Israeli ships to transit," he said. I told him I was skeptical that the Israelis would ever negotiate for a resettlement in Palestine. At this point, Nasir said, "All right, then, let us settle with them by agreeing to pay them compensation." In order to clarify this point, I stated again that I wanted to be quite sure that he would agree to a mutual settlement of the refugee problem without giving the refugees the alternative choice of resettlement (comment: in Palestine) or of taking money instead, and he again said that if resettlement is not possible, we can agree on a mutual compensation. He continually links the free passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal with the settlement of the refugee problem.

7. He then brought up the question of territory. Here, Nasir said that the key point is that Israel cannot be allowed to expand, that for every Muslim nation, regardless of whether or not it borders on Israel, the consuming fear is that Israel plans territorial expansion. He said this is one of the basic problems in trying to unite the New and the Old City of Jerusalem. It is regarded by everyone of the Muslim faith as a violation of their religious rights and as Israeli expansion.

8. He then stated this, that again he would speculate that certain territory surrounding the state of Israel might be regarded as essential to their own security. Nasir said that if this is so, let us demilitarize it. Again he said, "I cannot speak for all others, but as for me, I will withdraw permanently all forces 10 miles, 15 miles, or any agreed number of miles from the borders." I asked him what he would think about the complete demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula. He said, ("This I cannot do, because it is too big and extensive a land for me to say that no military personnel can ever be placed there. I can agree that no military personnel will ever be placed in Sharm al Shaykh, or within 10 or 15 miles of the Israeli borders, if they or their state will agree not to place troops within the same distance." He said again, "I cannot speak for Jordan or Syria, but I believe that the same principles would be agreed to by them."

9. Nasir said that except for territory, most of the Arab nations are leaving other details of the Arab settlement to him. He said, "It is a task I do not want, but one which others have asked that I undertake. It, however, must be expected that each will decide with reference to his own territory, and each of the neighboring states must agree on the final settlement." I told Nasir that obviously I was going fully to communicate his views to my government, and he said, "This is exactly why I am telling you, and I hope we will be getting a response that is favorable from your government. You are going to Iraq. If you get any kind of response, please advise my Ambassador in Iraq, and I will be glad to receive you at any time you want to return." Nasir stated, "Please try to explain to your government that however desperately we want peace, we cannot have it at the price of destroying ourselves or any other Arab leader, when you can be absolutely sure that anybody who succeeds me or any of the other Arab leaders will be much more radical against the Israelis than we are."

10. Nasir said that some of the Arab states, notably Syria and Algeria, had been very vehement with him in stating, "You cannot agree to a resolution or a declaration which includes the right to live for Israel." Nasir said, "I merely pointed out to them that we are no longer talking about Israel's right to live. We are talking about our own right to live." He repeated this two or three times. He also said he believed the Israelis had in mind his economic destruction, because at present he had no revenue from the Suez Canal or from tourism, and now they had destroyed his refineries. He said, "Therefore, my task is now to build a strong economy within my own country. This is the best way I can retaliate."

11. I asked Nasir if he would give me his own version of the sinking of the Israeli ship Eilath. He said he would be glad to. He said this ship had been patrolling in and out of UAR waters for a number of weeks, "just on the border." On or about 11 July, this same ship had attacked and sunk two Egyptian torpedo boats and killed their crews. This, he said, attracted no world attention. "Also, they sank them in our own waters." He said then General Rabin issued a statement saying that the Israelis were looking for the Egyptian navy, but the navy was hiding. He said that in addition to this, an Israeli plane sank another Egyptian torpedo boat in the Suez. As far as the actual sinking of the Eilath was concerned, Nasir said, "It was all finished and done with before I even heard about it. I was first informed about 6:30 in the evening. At that time, I was not dealing with what should or should not be done. I was dealing with a fact that had already happened. I am sure that military commanders in other parts of the world do not ring up their presidents and ask them what to do every time there is an invasion of their territory." Nasir ended the conversation by saying, "I want nothing but peace. I want to go as far as humanly possible to achieve it. But I must not be asked to do the impossible. I must not be asked to do something that would be condemned by every other leader and by my own people. I am willing to go as far as the facts of life will allow me, and I hope you will make this clear to and get a favorable response from your government. Surely, they can support the principles of your President, and surely we can find ways to work out the details of implementation. Surely, peace must not depend both on circumstances and procedures, upon the demands of the Israelis, some of which they themselves know are impossible for us." Nasir again asked me to stay in touch with his Ambassador in Iraq and be prepared to return if a response for his government was forthcoming.

12. I asked Nasir whether all of the difficulties concerning Yemen had been finally settled and if his agreement with the Saudis was going to be carried out. Nasir replied, "Our relationships in Yemen have been settled for good. We are going to carry out our agreements. The same goes for all of the other states in the Southern Arabian Peninsula. My concentration is going to be on the development of the UAR."

13. Note that in my talk on the first day I arrived, I told Nasir we were still puzzled as to why he had massed troops in the Sinai and we believed this was why the whole issue had come about. Nasir did not refer to the Gulf of Aqaba, but said, "Whether you believe it or not, we were in fear of an attack from Israel. We had been informed that the Israelis were massing troops on the Syrian border with the idea of first attacking Syria, there they did not expect to meet great resistance, and then commence their attack on the UAR." I said to him that it was unfortunate the UAR had believed such reports, which were simply not in accordance with the facts. Nasir said that the information had not come to him from sources he would suspect. He added that among other signs "your own State Department called in my Ambassador to the U.S. in April or May and warned him that there were rumors that there might be a conflict between Israel and the UAR." I told him that so far as I knew, I had never heard this report before.

14. Nasir observed that the U.S. must remember that Jerusalem presents a special problem for all three faiths. He commented that "In this country, we are Muslims, but we are not Islamic." I asked Nasir if he would consider permitting both the Old and New City of Jerusalem to come under a single Israeli administration with respect to such things as public utilities, etc., but with each faith to have custody and supervision of its Holy Places. Nasir replied that even if he agreed to this any such solution would leave Israel ultimately confronted with war or resistance so far as anybody could see into the future. He said that nothing he or any other ruler in the world could do would prevent that people will do things in the name of religion that they would not consider doing in the name of politics. On the other hand, he thinks Jerusalem could be zoned so that each faith would have the administration of its own sector. "My country is Muslim, Christian and Jewish, and I expect it always to be so. Each has his own particular interest in how we settle the issue of Jerusalem." We had no further discussion on this subject, because Nasir said this was obviously a matter of such importance that it would have to be the subject of negotiations, and one or more persons should be appointed by the Secretary General pursuant to the Security Council resolution discussed earlier above to manage such negotiations.

15. Concerning the shelling of the Suez refineries, Nasir commented that he recognized it as retaliation for the sinking of the Eilath, and that he thought the Israelis had done this because it would hurt the UAR economically. He said, "We could have attacked their refineries, but we decided that this had gone far enough, and we should have peace and not escalation."

16. Nasir's willingness to sign an agreed UN declaration or writing a letter to the UN agreeing to the terms of such a declaration is, of course, conditioned on Israel's willingness to do the same.

17. On conclusion of our meeting, Nasir thanked me for coming and expressed the hope that he would receive a favorable response to the suggestions incorporated in the foregoing.

18. After leaving Nasir, I proceeded to see Zakariyah Muhyi Al Din at his home. Zakariyah began by asking me to brief him on what had taken place between Nasir and me, and I did so. Zakariyah asked whether we had gotten into discussions of details concerning the territories involved, especially the Gaza Strip. I told him Nasir had said other nations must be consulted insofar as their territories were concerned, but that the Gaza Strip had not been mentioned today. Zakariyah said that relinquishing the Gaza Strip could not be decided on by the UAR or the Israelis. The UAR had never annexed Gaza formally because it is territory belonging to the Palestinians, as is some of the territory on the West Bank of the Jordan. I asked that if this is true, who speaks for the Palestinians. Zakariyah smiled and said he did not know. I asked whether it would be Ahmad Shukayri, and Zakariyah again smiled and commented that Shukayri was an appointed, not an elected official, and that there might well be some other political voice who could speak for the Palestinians. He seemed disappointed that the issue had not been discussed by Nasir. I take it as Zakariyah's implication, and only that, that he does not believe the fate of the Gaza Strip should be a determining factor. He is, however, concerned about the people in the Gaza Strip, as to whether or not they could be incorporated into the State of Israel, and perhaps more importantly, as to whether the Israelis would allow them to stay. He said, "The real problem is not the land but the people, and whether after we make peace the natives would be ejected as undesirable." I told him that these were the sorts of things I had gathered from Nasir, and that they would be the subject of discussions by one or more persons who might be appointed by the Secretary General pursuant to the resolution cited above.

19. Zakariyah said that he thought so far as he knew I had clearly outlined Nasir's views. He said, "We want to go as far as we can, because we know that war can only destroy us both, and that peace can allow us to fulfill our obligations as a nation. But please do not ask us to do the impossible, and please try to tell your people that regardless of what others might say, direct negotiations or negotiations with a mediator could not be possible, and even the Israelis know this as well as we. I asked Zakariyah if it were not possible to change public opinion on this subject, and he said, "No. Neither in this country nor in other Arab countries. We might change their opinion on other topics, but not on this."

20. I asked Zakariyah if there were anything he would like to add to the review of Nasir's views. He said, "Yes. First of all, we would like to have a new start in relationships between our two countries. We have been through a period of confusion. We know beyond all doubt that it is not in our interest to have any misunderstandings with the U.S. We hope that your country feels the same way. We are fearful that your government just does not understand us and that your people do not understand us. We are fearful that they do not know what is possible and what is impossible. Please explain that above everything else, we are nationalists. We are Egyptians and we are not trying to rule the Arab world. You may not believe that Nasir from time to time has felt that he has been put into a corner. He feels he has been personally disliked at high levels of your government." I said that this was not so. Zakariyah went on, "He has great respect for your President and for your people. He knows he has made mistakes, but he thoroughly wants, as we all do, the friendship of the United States and their help in making peace--but within the framework of what is humanly possible. We do not think we can accomplish this. We do not think our public relations are good, and we would like to be able to depend on someone to get our point of view across. I hope that you get a favorable response from your government along the lines of your talks with President Nasir and that we can move to peace. We will be anxiously awaiting the response that is made as the result of our conversations."

21. Zakariyah made the point that prior to the Khartoum meeting, the feeling for continuation of some form of hostilities against Israel was very strong. He said in fact that only on this aspect has there ever been Arab unity. But at Khartoum, Nasir took the initiative in seeing that the UAR must have political peace, correct its own errors and settle its own problems with Yemen and the other states in the Arabian Peninsula.

22. Regarding Jerusalem, Zakariyah made essentially the same points as had Nasir. He noted that this problem was of concern not only to the Arab countries, but also to a great many of the African and other countries where there were high concentrations of the Muslim faith.

23. I was advised that if the UN Secretary General were to appoint an individual or group to draft a resolution along the lines noted above, Zakariyah might well be sent to join Foreign Minister Riyad in the discussions in New York. Like Nasir, Zakariyah thanked me for coming to Cairo and expressed his hopes for a favorable response.

24. I suspect the only way for me to be advised of the response to the foregoing is to return to Beirut. When I return will depend on how far we get in contractual discussions with the Government of Iraq. I can and will, however, interrupt those discussions and come to Beirut to communicate with you [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. We have devised a method so that he can discreetly request me to return here. I assume there is no great hurry about getting back to Nasir, since he told me he was going on vacation. I gather this is to be a short vacation, but Nasir did not specify the number of days. I also suppose he would want to be in touch if you consider the response a matter of urgency. I will do nothing until I hear further from you. If it is decided for any reason that I should not communicate a response to Nasir, I will return to Beirut after conclusion of the conversations in Iraq and from Beirut proceed home.

25. I was asked by Pace of The New York Times and Carruthers of the Los Angeles Herald whether I would visit with them. I only spoke to Pace on the telephone and told him that I was discussing commercial fertilizer and land reclamation as I have been doing for some years. I would not give him the names of anybody with whom I had had conversations. I did say that I was acting entirely on my own, discussing commercial matters of long standing and was not in the UAR with any official status.

26. I have dictated this [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Beirut and will not have time to have it transcribed for reading before I depart for Baghdad. I shall read it and make such corrections as may be necessary on my return to Beirut.

27. One final point from discussion with Zakariyah: While he spoke of making a new start in our relationships, he said that of course at some point, we must renew formal, diplomatic ties. I said only if this were the wish of President Nasir and that they should then instruct their Foreign Minister to be in touch with our Secretary of State. I noted it was they who broke relations, and they who would have to take the necessary steps to discuss their resumption.

New York, November 4, 1967, 0513Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated Priority to Amman. Received at 0709Z.

/2/November 4.

/3/Telegram 1507 from USUN, October 17, reported a conversation that day with Deputy Foreign Minister Rifai and Ambassador Sharaf. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

This set the stage for Goldberg's subsequent comments re where we go from here at UN. Recalled that we, Riad and Rifai had agreed to give non-perms opportunity and these efforts have now been exhausted. Goldberg affirmed we are ready resume dialogue and wish take advantage of King's presence to carry on dialogue. Informed King that Nasser had indicated to Anderson a willingness to accept SC res based on five points and that he envisaged UN rep who would produce a declaration, based on consultations with both sides, for subsequent ratification by SC. Goldberg indicated that this was only a brief provisional report on this discussion and if this is approach UAR had in mind this offered some hope. It should not be difficult to find right form of words for res in such circumstances, Goldberg said.

Goldberg continued time is running out, time has come for peace. We are ready to help, we do not wish to go back to fragile Armistice Agreements. We are committed to principle of political independence and territorial integrity and we are ready to reaffirm it bilaterally and publicly in SC res. US believes in territorial integrity, withdrawal, and recognition of secure boundaries. Principle of territorial integrity has two important sub-principles, there must be a withdrawal to recognized and secure frontiers for all countries, not the old armistice lines, and there must be mutuality in adjustments. If Jordan makes an adjustment along the Latrun salient there ought to be some compensatory adjustment for it. We wish to work to this end so that equitable agreement can be achieved. We believe, Goldberg said, that "He who seeks equity must do equity." As to Jerusalem this is a tough one in light of our historical position with which His Majesty is familiar. But even here we are prepared to be helpful. We are willing to use our influence to see what arrangements can be worked out for an appropriate Jordanian role in Jerusalem, and do not accept Israel's contention that Jerusalem is not negotiable. We are anxious to use our influence if given a chance, but we are not able to do so as long as protracted haggling continues on res. We recognize there are genuine security problems and West Bank part of Jordan, for example, should be settled as security matter with compensating adjustments. We attach great importance to principle of freedom of waterways. In our judgment this was the prime cause of 6-Day War. We want to see refugee problem solved and we have been surprised that its solution has been linked to opening of Canal. We stand firm in support of 1951 SC res which linked opening of Canal with ending of belligerency, not with solution of refugee problem. Must be real efforts to settle refugee problem. We also want to see something done on arms limitation since this is a principal source of tension in area.

Goldberg said with some disdain that what has been going on at UN is exercise in rhetoric not in solving basic problems. US wants to engage UN in peace making process at a pragmatic level and we wish to participate in this in important way. While non-perm members have disagreed on specific language they did agree on three important points: appointment of special rep; and SC res should be within framework of Chap 6 and not Chap 7; and that UN rep should have specific mandate. We have some thoughts regarding specific language in SC res. We believe UN should send out a rep to seek "political solutions," to "work with parties" and seek to solve the problems of "withdrawal, boundaries, waterways and refugees" and report back to SC. The notion of instant peace which is embraced in Indian res is nonsense. Time is running out, and there is need to get UN rep out promptly. The objective should be for him to get at fundamental problems and nobody's position should be prejudiced by any SC res adopted in the meantime. We are ready to carry on dialogue with King. He is the chief of state and has the authority to do business. With all due respect to Riad, he is not in same position. We would have no hesitancy to put some of these ideas down on paper if His Majesty wished.

King, very solemnly and systematically and with a good deal of feeling, recounted difficulties facing his country. He opened by saying this is matter which concerns Jordan and US, probably greatest power in world. The problems in area are of interest to world community and of interest to US since finding solutions would help lessen tensions. He wished to speak as frankly as did Amb Goldberg. He has been in close contact with Cairo throughout. Jordanian policy has never been one of extremism and despite 6-Day War it continues its policy of moderation. He intends to continue this policy so long as there is distinction between moderation and giving away the rights of his people. We appreciate friendship of US. There are today many stresses and strains in Arab family due in part by outside pressures. Principal difficulties arise in the failure to solve Palestine problem. This has been at the root of the trouble. Jordan has tried to help refugees, to give them dignity, and its main resource has been its people and their determination. Now Jordan is in ruins again, and 15 years of his own efforts have been involved. His sole interest is Jordan, its people and the Arab world; any attempt to differentiate among these is not in Jordan's or anybody else's interest. The King said he felt deeply that Arabs must communicate with rest of world and present their case as reasonable, the more reasonable the stronger its case would be. He feels that there is now a chance to do something, the opportunity is right, and it is essential there be a just and peaceful solution of the Palestine problem. He sought to counsel his Arab colleagues to meet and tackle their responsibilities. He characterized Khartoum as a "turning point" and believes Arab position has become reasonable. He said we haven't much time, pressures are building up inside and out, and there are still a number in the Arab world who believe that attempt at political solution will not succeed. He saw the self-criticism at Khartoum as a positive factor. He believes Arab people do not understand the Western world since they feel they have been wronged. Regardless of fact that some believe political solution is not possible, the King said we must try very hard to find a just solution. He went on to describe in some detail the human misery of 200 thousand refugees to document his belief that there is not much time left to find a political solution. He maintained that his armed forces are under control, that he has given strict orders, though he admitted that when armed forces are close together there are bound to be incidents.

He described withdrawal as serious problem and key to any solution. Question was where to. To Israel as it was now or where. Jordan could not accept results of war but was not adverse to fair territorial adjustments on both sides. As to Jerusalem, Jordan had been custodian of Holy Places for last 20 years, it is not Jordanian or Arab but a Moslem and a world problem. Jordan is not against rights of any religious group to visit Holy Places. As to arms, King said he would be discussing this matter in Washington. The question of old arms balance has become un-realistic. Had the 6-Day War not occurred balance might have been achieved about "a year and 2 months from the date of the 6-Day." However war has altered this situation and no balance exists or will exist for a long time. Israel has acquired a substantial amount of arms from UAR, from Jordan, and is secure. Soviets have supplied Jordan with some definite "requirements". Unless he meets military needs of his own troops better, Jordan will have to continue keep Arab troops on its territory. His Majesty said he cannot get the Arabs out from his territory unless he can stand on his own two feet. He realized he received US arms on conditions they would not be used against Israel. As member of Arab League he could not back away from this fact when the war came. He had no other way than to face up to situation. While he is not asking for arms, as long as there is not a political solution he will have to find arms and equipment wherever he can, particularly if pressures continue. He wanted the US to understand this.

As to SC, basic difficulty has been what mandate should be given to UN rep, question was what principles was UN rep to discuss. Arabs do not wish to return to GA since this would cause difficulties among them. GA was only a platform. In his discussions with US and Sovs in Moscow he has found misinterpretations on both sides.

Then King described succinctly agreement which he and Nasser reached on October 17 in Cairo. (In view of fact that Jordanians have been pressing very hard in connection with SC res in favor of Indian draft, this description seemed to make both Rifai and Sharaf nervous.)

King said that he had proposed to Nasser that:

1. Arabs would all declare end of state of belligerency;
2. Recognize right of every state in area to live in peace and security;
3. Waterways would be open to vessels of all nations, including Israel.

In turn Israel would be expected to:

1. Declare an end to state of belligerency;
2. Recognize the right of every state in area to live in peace and security;
3. Withdraw its forces "from territories it had occupied";
4. "Cooperate toward finding a permanent solution of refugee problem" (which King described as a part result of state of war and an element of state of belligerency).

King said it was "decided" by himself and Nasser that Jordan and Egypt were ready

(1) to "declare" an end of state of belligerence,

(2) "recognize" right of every state in area to live in peace and security and (3) open Suez Canal and other international waterways on condition and understanding

Israel would declare its acceptance of end of state of belligerence, as described above.

King said once this was understood there should not be any trouble with SC res. He then stressed firmly that this was limit as far as Jordan was concerned. There was no question of bargaining, that they had gone a very long way. Time was running out, and they wanted a political solution. He stressed need for a UN umbrella and by this he meant a mandate for a UN rep that could get on with job of implementing a solution.

/4/Reference is to the UN Security Council Resolution of September 1, 1951 (UN document S/2322); see Department of State Bulletin, September 17, 1951, p. 479.

His Majesty stressed that world organization must deal with problem since it played such major role in creation of Israel. He did not feel solution had to be dealt with on piece-meal basis. Since Goldberg had read to him the press ticker today coming out of Cairo severely criticizing American policy, King said he appreciated misunderstandings that such things caused, but that we must deal with them patiently, particularly as one takes a look at the press all over the world. His impression is that Nasser wants good relations with US though Nasser feels Washington is trying to humiliate him. He said many Arabs feel that US wants to rub their noses in the dust.

His Majesty let Rifai carry the ball regarding discussions re SC res. Rifai first said that he was much surprised to read in New York Times that Anderson was on official mission. Rifai was present when Anderson spoke to Riad and that the contents of New York Times article had astonished him. He noted that reports mentioned "joint declaration," and he recalled in this connection that this was idea contained in Brazilian text which Arabs did not consider very seriously. He contended that Indian text used the five principles as starting point (with exception of arms limitation). He stressed that first order was to end the military occupation of the territories; once this achieved one could move on to solution of other matters. He stressed that Jordan has gone as far as it could by accepting changes in 6-power draft. This draft was drawn largely from texts which US had previously supported. If LA text were re-introduced in GA unchanged, the Arabs would go with it. Rifai then made effort to try to get US to focus and negotiate on basis Indian text. In process he stressed what he considers to be one basic essential--withdrawal of Israeli forces and need to be absolutely clear on this point. He argued that respect for territorial integrity should come after withdrawal. Goldberg rebutted this by saying that Charter of UN does not envisage withdrawal in circumstances of state of war.

Conversation concluded by King responding affirmatively to our suggestion that we put down something on paper which takes into account agreement on principles achieved by Nasser and Hussein in Cairo on Oct. 17.

Goldberg

New York, November 5, 1967, 0233Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Tel Aviv. Received at 0401Z.

1992. Goldberg brought Eban and Rafael (Israel) up to date on consultations of last few days.

/2/See Document 499.

/3/Telegram 1972 from USUN, November 4, reported a meeting on November 3 between Goldberg and Foreign Minster Riad. Sisco, who was also present, told Riad that according to a preliminary report from Anderson, Nasser had suggested three steps: (1) adoption of a Security Council resolution containing the President's five points; (2) appointment by the Secretary-General of one or more individuals to talk to the Arabs and Israelis, after which a declaration would be drawn up; and (3) submission of the declaration to the Security Council for ratification. Riad said he did not have any report in these terms. He was ready to accept the President's five points provided that they were given the "right interpretation"; a reference to territorial integrity and political independence should mean that Israel had no right to territorial gains and must withdraw from territories occupied. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

/4/See Document 501.

/5/Telegram 1989 from USUN, November 5, reported a conversation between Goldberg and Caradon on the morning of November 4. Goldberg told Caradon that U.S. representatives had begun a new effort based on UAR and Jordanian intimations that they preferred dealing directly with the United States rather than through the Russians. He told Caradon of his meeting the previous day with King Hussein and said that the United States planned to develop language to submit to the King. He asked Caradon to refrain over the weekend (November 4-5) from making British views known in order to give the United States a chance to work something out. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

Eban had received cable from Israeli Amb in London that King was saying similar things there, but with the addition that Israel should "restore June 4 situation". Eban said this difference was crucial. Furthermore, there was no indication that other Arabs would even "nod assent". Eban gathered that King thought only matter to negotiate was question of borders. This was clearly unrealistic.

In response Goldberg pointed out that he was not reporting to Eban something Hussein had said but what had been read to Goldberg from the minutes, and that what was read bears out Nasser-Anderson consultations.

Goldberg informed Eban that he had told King if King would take leadership for "Arabs" we would give him some of our ideas on res and would be in touch with him. At this point Rifai said that if we were unsuccessful, they would go to GA on LA res, "unchanged".

/6/Telegram 1829 from USUN, October 29, conveyed the text of a possible compromise resolution prepared by Pederson and a Canadian representative based on the Danish-Canadian resolution and the modified Indian draft. (Ibid.)

/7/Not found.

Goldberg said that if Caradon's combined res goes to SC, it would get all votes except US. If US blocks SC, the July LA res would be taken to GA.

In effort to avoid both these developments, US wanted to try out some ideas for a res. First version Goldberg read to Eban said in part:

"Considering that the time has come, in the context of respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereign existence, territorial integrity, political independence and right of every state in the area to live in peace and complete security from threats or acts of force, to move from the cease-fire to a state of just and lasting peace:

1. Accordingly requests the SYG:

(A) To designate a special rep to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with all the states concerned with a view to assisting them in working out a political solution to the problems of the withdrawal of all forces from territories occupied by them, the termination of the state or claim of belligerence, the guarantee of freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area, the ensuring of secure and recognized frontiers, the just settlement of the refugee question, the guarantee of territorial inviolability in the area through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones, and the limitation of the wasteful and destructive arms race in the area."

Goldberg viewed this as non-prejudicial to both sides since formulation does not settle matter but merely identifies problems of which SYG's rep would assist parties in working out "political solution". Eban rejected this version commenting in particular on phrase "withdrawal of all forces from territories occupied by them," and absence of "within a context of peace," and criticizing order of presentation.

/8/Document 504.

Goldberg told Eban he might be able to get British support for this res. Eban was doubtful, implying Caradon was not just recipient of instructions but influenced their tenor to some extent by nature of his reporting.

Goldberg recommended that privately Israel should stay out of things for a while, this is US initiative. Sisco asked Eban what he thought of US sponsorship, noting advantage that US could then supply interpretation. Eban said in some respects it would be a disadvantage since US could work better behind scenes if it were not the sponsor. However, US res would not be viewed in Israel as retreat if approach was that res based on five points of LBJ's June 19 speech. Goldberg concluded that best sponsorship would be SC Pres, on behalf of SC, or as SC consensus.

In response to Eban's request, "mutual acknowledgment and respect for the right of every state in the area, etc.," of "affirms" para was changed to "mutual recognition and respect," and, in same para, "secure and recognized borders" was changed to "secure and recognized boundaries."

In subsequent telcons Rafael also sought deletion of words "in achievement of" in the "affirms" para and of "agreed" before solutions. Late in evening also called to say Eban wished him to make clear to us again that Israel would not be considered "subscriber nor co-sponsor" of the text.

/9/Goldberg told Rusk in a telephone conversation at 1:37 p.m. that he had just finished talking to Eban and had a text which he could present to the King. He thought it was "not bad; they moved a little bit." (Notes of telephone conversation prepared in Rusk's office, November 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

Goldberg

New York, November 4, 1967, 2345Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to London Immediate. Received on November 5 at 0022Z.

/2/Document 504.

/3/Telegram 1991 from USUN, November 5, reported the meeting with King Hussein on the afternoon of November 4. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

/4/November 5.

We believe this res has reasonable chance of getting cooperation of both sides with UN rep and should be well received by UK in light fact it based on formula expressed by Brown in GA general debate. Formulation used by Brown: "Britain does not accept war as a means of settling disputes, nor that a state should be allowed to extend its frontiers as a result of a war. This means that Israel must withdraw. But equally, Israel's neighbors must recognize its right to exist, and it must enjoy security within its frontiers. What we must work for in this area is a durable peace, the renunciation of all aggressive designs, and an end to policies which are inconsistent with peace."

Goldberg said he had emphasized to Hussein that this text designed to take account of stress King had placed on having principles in operative section of res and on need to refer to Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. UK has expressed similar view. He said he had not asked for Hussein's reaction, since he considered it unfair to ask for reaction on such short notice.

After reading text, Caradon said he warmly welcomed its general framework and layout, and its use of affirming language in operative section. He also said text Goldberg had given him was very close to text UKUN had itself worked out during past two days. He questioned whether res left adequate role for UN to play. Goldberg pointed out references to demilitarized zones and guarantees re freedom of navigation and solution refugee problem, all of which leave room for UN role. Went on to stress main thrust of res is to have UN express itself on essential points and designate UN representative whose job will be to get parties themselves to move as far as possible toward these points.

Caradon said UKUN would have preferred to include language re inadmissibility of territorial conquest by force. Goldberg said this would raise great problems with Israelis. Went on to stress "withdrawal from occupied territories" in present res would be bitter pill for Israelis to swallow and, thus, he not inclined make pill even more bitter.

Caradon raised point of most effective role UK might play at this point. Said he not sure it was to make text Goldberg had given him into joint US-UK text. Expressed view it might be best for him, assuming London's reaction favorable, to inform Hussein that he (Caradon) had seen text prepared by US and that UK felt it contained essence of points UK supports; he could then urge that Hussein give it sympathetic consideration.

Goldberg indicated this would be most helpful and again expressed hope Caradon would get immediate reaction from London so that UK could speak to Hussein along above lines tomorrow afternoon before Goldberg calls on Hussein.

Goldberg

New York, November 5, 1967, 0057Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Amman, and to Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Copenhagen, London, Ottawa, Rio de Janeiro, and Tel Aviv. Received at 0133Z.

1988. Dept pass Cairo Immediate. Middle East-New Draft Res.

Fol is US compromise draft res which Goldberg made available to Hussein today. We expect to receive King's reaction Sunday afternoon, when Goldberg will meet with him again. Text has been made available to Israelis, UK, Danes and Canadians. Text not yet made available to LA's and Embassies should refrain from doing so unless advised otherwise.

"The Security Council

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the ME,

/2/June 6; see footnote 2, Document 183.

/3/July 21; see footnote 4, Document 385.

Emphasizing the urgency of reducing tensions and bringing about a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all member states in their acceptance of the Charter of the UN have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of the above Charter principles requires the achievement of a state of just and lasting peace in the ME embracing withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territory, termination of claims or states of belligerence, and mutual recognition and respect for the right of every state in the area to sovereign existence, territorial integrity, political independence, secure and recognized boundaries, and freedom from the threat or use of force:

2. Affirms further the necessity

A. For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

B. For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

C. For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

D. For achieving a limitation of the wasteful and destructive arms race in the area;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a special representative to proceed to the ME to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned with a view to assisting them in the working out of solutions in accordance with the purposes of this resolution and in creating a just and lasting peace in the area;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the SC on the progress of the efforts of the special representative as soon as possible."

Goldberg