U.S. Department of State

Washington, November 5, 1967, 2154Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59 Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Amman Priority, and to USUN Immediate.

/2/Part II, Rostow's summary of Anderson's conversation with Nasser, made in response to a query by Harman, was conveyed in telegram 65128 to Tel Aviv, November 5. Rostow said the U.S. reading of the talks was "not discouraging." (Ibid.) Part III, Rostow's brief summary of Rusk's November 3 meeting with Kuznetsov, made in response to a query by Harman, was conveyed in telegram 65129 to Tel Aviv, November 5. Rostow said the meeting had "not been very satisfactory." Kuznetsov had "spoken in threatening tones about risks of renewed hostilities." (Ibid.)

1. At his request Ambassador Harman called on Under Secretary Rostow, requesting information about the Anderson talks in Cairo and Ambassador Goldberg's talk with King Hussein in New York.

Begin FYI: Rostow's object was to reiterate to Harman the strength of U.S. interest in the success of possible negotiations between Israel and Jordan, and to elicit firm Israeli statements about GOI interest in the negotiations, and their willingness to deal with Hussein, and to negotiate about Jerusalem, conveying a general encouraging sense of the situation without entering into negotiation positions or the negotiating process. End FYI.

Rostow started, referring to conversations during Eban visit, by emphasizing vital US interest in success of negotiations between Jordan and Israel, which we thought was equally in interest of GOI. This connection he noted our concern that Israeli doubts about Hussein's policies may be leading Israel to turn its back on negotiations with Jordan. Rostow said we feel negotiations can make major contribution to peace, leading to solution of refugee problem, resolving Jerusalem issue to satisfaction of Christian and Moslem interests, eliminating Palestine problem as curse on Arab world, opening Middle East to Israeli economic cooperation, and ending Arab boycott. Successful negotiations with Jordan would also enable USG fulfill its territorial integrity pledge. We considered that any alternative to Hussein would be worse for both US and Israel and intended to make major effort to convince Hussein that he should enter negotiations.

2. Harman replied that Israel had not given up hope of settlement with Hussein. He recalled recent Eshkol statement offering to meet with King Hussein. What troubled Israel, however, were indications in Jordanian press and elsewhere that present Arab posture purely tactical, designed achieve return to pre-June 5 situation at minimum cost and by political rather than military means. Israel feared that Arabs, having achieved that aim, would return to earlier posture, claiming they retained freedom of action to solve Palestine problem in their way at the right time. He mentioned alleged Hussein statement in Germany that Arab mistake was to stick to original D-Day of August, 1968. In Israeli view, Arabs had made conscious decision to improve their international posture by avoiding talk of "destruction of Israel"; they were willing to pay price of words, which were cheap, to achieve that end. For these reasons, Israel considered it critical that any solution be "in context of peace," that UN language and actions make this clear and that any UN resolution not prejudice final solution, especially with respect to territorial settlements which essential to Israeli security. There was question in Israeli minds whether there had been any real change in Hussein's policy, and this was principal source of current doubts.

3. Rostow said we had made clear our view that there should be movement from General Armistice Agreements to conditions of peace and that this would involve some adjustments of Armistice lines as foreseen in Armistice Agreements. As we had stressed to Foreign Minister Eban, however, we expected thrust of settlement would be toward security and demilitarization arrangements rather than toward major changes in Armistice lines. We recognized that Jerusalem presented special case. Our position was that it should be open city, that is, a city without walls, with access assured to all. We had told everyone we would not enter into the negotiating process although our good offices would be used in the interest of helping to achieve a settlement compatible with our national interest in peace in the Middle East, and our historic policies towards the separate issues. We took note of Israeli position that Jerusalem should be an open city under unified administration but that the Jordanian interest in Jerusalem could be met through arrangements including "sovereignty". We assumed (and Harman confirmed) that despite public statements to the contrary, the GOI position on Jerusalem was that which Eban, Harman, and Evron had given us several times, i.e., that Jerusalem was negotiable. Taking Israeli position and willingness to negotiate into account, we thought that with good will arrangements should be possible which would be consistent with interests of Jordan and international community.

4. Harman said Israel saw number of positive developments in recent weeks as result US position: (a) UAR was now saying that USG was decisive factor; (b) both Arabs and Soviets were now coming to USG rather than UN; (c) group of ten non-Perms including Bulgaria had agreed that context of SC resolution was chapter 6 of Charter; and, (d) in recent Israeli talk with Mali representative, latter had agreed any resolution must be acceptable to all parties. Important thing now, Harman said, was to resist attempts in New York to devise language prejudicial to direct contractual arrangements. Rostow said our view had been clear that Resolution must not be a substitute for negotiations, or a "solution", but a framework for negotiations. To Rostow's comment that there were many ways of concluding a contract, Harman said direct negotiations were basic principle; Israel interpreted President's June 19 speech as recognition that contractual arrangements necessary. It also important that settlement be in "context of peace;" it must have this positive aspect rather than negative aspect implied by such concepts as non-belligerency. There could be no solution through verbal gimmicks, even if latter went further than Arabs had been willing to go for past twenty years.

/3/Document 501.

(a) Goldberg remarks on territorial integrity, withdrawal, adjustments in Armistice lines (but omitting reference to principle of mutuality) and Jerusalem;

(b) Goldberg assurance that our influence would be available to help assure fair settlement;

(c) Hussein's comments on withdrawal and Jerusalem;

(d) Hussein's description of his October 17 agreement with Nasser;

(e) Rifai's discussion of UN negotiations.

6. Harman said Israel had impression from recent moves by Hussein that, if King did not get what he wanted from present efforts, he would be prepared to go it alone. In response to Rostow's query whether Israel had direct indications to this effect, Harman said this was "more than general impression." It possible that Arabs had concluded they would have to retreat from Khartoum line of no negotiations, no peace and no abandonment of Palestine cause. This underlined importance of resisting pressures generated by threat of renewed hostilities and of giving up nothing in UN. Any ambiguity in language of SC resolution would permit Arabs to hide behind divergent interpretation of that language and would make Arab-Israeli dialogue impossible.

7. Rostow summarized US position as follows: we now see opportunity to move toward conditions of peace. Whether or not Arabs enter settlement with mental reservations and see language of resolution as mask for future aggressive intentions, our goal should be to devise arrangements, for which parties assume responsibility, that create conditions in which peace can be achieved over time. We have never doubted depth of Arab feeling on Palestine question. Common effort of all who seek peace in Middle East should be to transform this environment over next decade or so in such ways that Arab dream of future victorious war will vanish. We do not view Security Council resolution as negotiations but only as providing basis for negotiations. For this reason we have adamantly resisted inclusion of June 4 withdrawal date. We need resolution which GOI, GOJ and UARG can accept as basis for negotiations, and this is focus of our present efforts in New York.

8. In response to Harman's query about when we envisage next round with Soviets, Rostow said this not yet fixed. We do not want to talk to Arabs through Soviets and are therefore talking directly to Arabs as well as others in UN.

Rusk

Washington, November 30, 1968, 0126Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by UNP Deputy Director Arthur R. Day and Jordan Country Director Talcott W. Seelye, and approved by Davies.

/2/Telegram 6157 from Tel Aviv, November 20, 1968. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

/3/No other copy of the memorandum has been found.

/4/In telegram 7409 from Amman, November 11, 1968, Ambassador Symmes reported a November 9 conversation with King Hussein. Symmes stated that in accordance with the Department's instructions that he could repeat the assurances given Hussein in New York a year earlier, he had read to him verbatim the assurances contained in the memorandum dated November 6, 1967. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR) For the instructions, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XX, Document 312.

2. "On instructions from Ambassador Goldberg King Hussein was told the following on the afternoon of November 5 just prior to the King's meeting with Ambassador Goldberg:

3. 'The draft resolution which Ambassador Goldberg has presented is the best language vis-?-vis the Arabs which the United States Government can support. A resolution which the United States Government cannot support will be a meaningless document, since it is going to require US influence on Israel to achieve the objectives of any resolution. Furthermore, the resolution which Ambassador Goldberg has presented is the best the United States can do today. There is no guarantee that the United States could support such a favorable resolution next month or the month after. The Arabs have consistently made the mistake of rejecting resolutions which they later wished they had accepted. By rejecting this resolution they may be making the same mistake again. The United States as a matter of policy does not envisage a Jordan which consists only of the East Bank. The United States is prepared to support a return of the West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary rectifications. However, the US would use its influence to obtain compensation to Jordan for any territory it is required to give up. For example, if Jordan is required to give up the Latrun salient, the USG will use its influence to obtain in compensation access for Jordan to a Mediterranean port in Israel. Finally, although as a matter of policy we do not agree with Jordan's position on Jerusalem, nor do we agree with the Israeli position on Jerusalem, we are prepared to use our influence to obtain for Jordan a role in Jerusalem. In short, we are prepared to make a maximum effort to obtain for Jordan the best possible deal in terms of settlement with Israel. We can only do this under the United Nations resolution and the present resolution is the maximum that we can support. Therefore, the best advice that the United States can give Jordan at this time is to accept this resolution and to rely on our promises that under it we will help Jordan get the best possible settlement.'

4. The King asked whether this could be viewed as a commitment by the United States. He was told that the exact language as to what this was should be obtained from the Secretary or the President. Whether it was a commitment or a promise should be left for someone else to specify. Later the Jordanians stated that they were prepared to accept this advice, but they pointed out that what they were doing by accepting it was to sacrifice previous Arab insistence on certain resolution language which they felt protected their position in return for a promise from the USG."

Rusk

New York, November 6, 1967, 0350Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Amman Priority. Received at 0806Z.

1999. Goldberg met with King Hussein again this afternoon (Nov. 5) at King's request. Also present were Abdul Monem Rifai, Said Rifai, Sharaf, and Sisco, Buffum and Pedersen.

King initiated conversation. Said his position was as follows. Jordan was interested in substance not words. This was why he had encouraged US to seize opportunity that might be last one for all of us. Jordan's interest was laying foundation for just and lasting peace. We should not waste more time on details and on words.

Problem was in US hands. He realized US objectives were to exercise its rights in attempting to solve problem which affected all of us. A just and peaceful settlement was US and his purpose as well. Without US help he could not get very far.

/2/Document 504.

King concluded by saying he looked forward to his visit in Washington.

Goldberg replied that King had correctly summarized situation. He had also been correct in understanding US had not offered res in bargaining context but as best and most appropriate step we could make to facilitate settlement within umbrella of UN. We hoped we could get on with job of restoring peaceful situation in area and being of assistance to Jordan.

Goldberg noted he had in previous conversation made reservations about our policy position on key words (occupied territory). He had since discussed them at appropriate levels and could say they had US approval.

King had appropriately said issue was now in our hands and that of SC. On this he had some important observations. Time was not working in favor of peace.

Before fighting had commenced in June US had put proposal forward in SC that might have prevented the war. This had been rejected by USSR and by Arabs. Rejection of this proposal, which involved only freedom of transit through Gulf, had been a great mistake.

After fighting broke out in early days US in SC had offered [proposal] including withdrawal and opening of Straits of Tiran in discussion with Sovs. They had said we should show it to Arabs. This also had been turned down. Then in GA we had supported proposal (LA text) which we thought had been appropriate to that time. This also had been turned down. Then we had worked out new texts with USSR. These too were turned down. ]

Goldberg said let us not make same mistake again. What is available today often is not available in future. Events often take over for themselves. Three months from now may not offer same opportunities for progress as today. We knew he was reflective on that himself.

/3/Telegram 2001 from USUN, November 6, reported that Goldberg spent an unproductive 2 hours with Kuznetsov on the evening of November 5. The Soviets strongly urged acceptance of the 6-power draft resolution as a basis for negotiations. Goldberg refused. He gave the text in Document 504 to Kuznetsov, but the latter refused to accept it as a basis for discussion. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

King replied that "Prior to my reaching my very clear understanding with Nasser as to how far we could go" he had gone to Moscow. In Moscow he had encouraged Sovs to carry on conversations with US. He believed this should continue and we should feel no compunction about what we discussed with them.

Goldberg expressed appreciation and meeting adjourned.

/4/Telegram 1987 from USUN, November 5, reported that Foreign Minister Riad had told Goldberg on November 4 that he had decided to go ahead with the "India/Argentine, etc." He requested U.S. support and cooperation. Goldberg told him he could not expect U.S. support of such an effort as a fait accompli. He noted that the United States still had not been officially consulted or given a copy of the text of which Riad spoke, which had been developed in consultation with India, the UAR, and the Soviets. (Ibid.) Telegram 1990 from USUN, November 5, reported on the conversation in more detail. It stated that the meeting was disappointing, and that Riad had backed away from his willingness the previous day to negotiate on the resolution language and in effect insisted on U.S. acceptance of the 6-power resolution without change. (Ibid.)

This assessment later confirmed by information conveyed to Caradon by Said Rifai in which he reported that subsequent to this conversation King had talked to Riad and given him very favorable reaction to US text.

Goldberg

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Houghton on November 7, cleared by Symmes and Battle, and approved by Walsh. Also sent to Amman and Tel Aviv.

Washington, November 8, 1967, 1521Z.

/2/Not printed. (Ibid., POL JORDAN-US)

1. On November 6 the Secretary hosted a working lunch for King Hussein, who was accompanied by the Jordan Ambassador Sharaf and Chief of Royal Cabinet Rifa'i. The Under Secretary, Assistant Secretaries Battle and Sisco and Harrison Symmes, Ambassador-Designate to Jordan also attended.

2. The meeting covered three main subjects--refugees, US Middle East arms policy, and a Security Council resolution on the Arab--Israeli crisis. Discussion on refugees uncovered no new ground. Hussein emphasized that Jordan continued to need relief assistance for the refugees, but that real need was return of refugees to their homes on West Bank. Hussein explained on his own initiative the tie-in between the refugee problem and Israeli transit of the Suez Canal. He said Israeli transit could begin before a complete solution of the refugee problem was reached. What was required was a start towards a solution.

3. In discussing arms problem, Secretary expressed keen disappointment at Soviet refusal to cooperate with us in effort restrain arms race in Middle East. Our decision sell aircraft to Israel directly related to influx Soviet arms as we are concerned with arms balance in area. Hussein replied problem was meaning of word "balance". There was no balance before June 5. Had there not been a war, the Arabs might have reached a balance with Israel within 14 months from last June. Jordan, however, was not only worried about conventional arms, but also about reports Israelis would have atomic weapons in one year. Jordan faced currently with arms requirements which it had not yet been able to satisfy. In interim Jordan compelled retain Iraqi forces its territory for own defense. Jordan had to have arms from some source which definite and continuous.

4. Secretary hoped Hussein could understand our problem re arms supply. Problem was to avoid all-inclusive legislative prohibition against supply of arms. He could not exaggerate effect India-Pakistan situation had in this respect. Many legislators upset that American arms being used by both sides conflict. Congressional attitudes persisted and therefore we had to move slowly. Secretary emphasized it would be disastrous if nuclear weapons introduced in Middle East. Our policy absolutely firm. King could leave it to us because we were very serious on this issue, which we regarded as fundamental.

5. Rifa'i indicated Jordan's understanding of problem explained by Secretary. He could not understand, however, why US gave Israel arms and not its ally Jordan. Ambassador Sharaf added that what had shocked Arab world was that decision sell aircraft to Israel made at same time Israel public position towards settlement current crisis hardening. Secretary understood Arab feelings, but other elements had to be considered. We did not believe it in interest US or Arabs for major powers become involved militarily in Middle East.

6. On broader problem UN resolution, Secretary indicated he was not pessimistic and that he hoped we could get started along present lines. Mr. Sisco told Hussein that Ambassador Goldberg and US Delegation very impressed by their talks with His Majesty over the weekend. He emphasized that time was of essence and it important to get a UN representative into the area. Once this done, as Ambassador Goldberg had noted, US could play strong supporting role. Secretary remarked that we are now making some headway. We see shape of possible solution and are prepared use our muscle in supporting a permanent solution that corresponded to sober, reflective judgment of responsible leaders in area.

7. In discussing results of Khartoum Conference, Mr. Sisco commented that there appeared inherent limitations on freedom of action given Hussein. In recent days we had wondered if Arab group en masse had not been making decisions in New York rather than individual countries. The Jordanians confirmed again that Khartoum Conference had decided that other Arabs would go along with what King Hussein and President Nasser could work out. Mr. Sisco emphasized that this was a crucial point. An early resolution in July which seemed acceptable to Jordan and the UAR had been killed by other Arabs. It was therefore important that countries primarily concerned should make up their minds and not worry about group psychology. We hoped therefore Jordan could have dominant voice.

8. Mr. Sisco then stressed that resolution discussed with King over weekend was crucial. If King and Nasser agreed, everything would be all right. King responded that only difficulty had been matter of withdrawal and how it should be defined. Jordan could accept statements with regard to withdrawal, but what was important was meaning of those statements and Jordan needed a commitment as to their meaning. Ambassador Sharaf commented that Jordan would need to know in its bilateral negotiations with the United States how latter stood with regard to matters such as withdrawal. The Secretary commented that key question of reciprocity did not involve the US. The United States had not closed the Tiran Straits and if Tiran had not been closed, there would have been no June war. The United States would certainly work to support a settlement that had prospects of success, but the United States was not in complete control of all parties. Our answers alone could not settle problem. Neither Arabs nor Israelis would take our answer as final.

9. In summarizing UN situation Mr. Sisco said consultations were continuing. Ambassador Goldberg was discussing draft that was discussed with the King, with other key delegations and in next day or two we should know whether there reasonable chance of success. While Israel not yet signed on, draft provides good starting point. The positive views of Jordan and the UAR would of course be crucial.

Rusk

Washington, November 6, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis.

SUBJECT
Hussein Visit and Security Council Situation

/2/The messages were sent in telegrams 65690 to Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro and 65691 to Addis Ababa, all dated November 7. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) A message from Rusk to Indian Foreign Minister Indira Gandhi, urging India's support for the U.S. draft resolution was sent in telegram 65734 to New Delhi, November 7. (Ibid.)

/3/Reference is to Goldberg's November 3 conversation with the King; see Document 501.

/4/The attachment is a copy of a November 6 memorandum from Sisco to Rusk stating that Goldberg wanted Rusk to confirm to King Hussein the essence of what Goldberg had said to the King and summarizing what Goldberg had said. The summary states that the United States did not visualize a Jordan limited only to the East Bank and believed a settlement should involve the return of a substantial part of the West Bank to Jordan. It states that the United States could not guarantee the return of everything to Jordan but was prepared to give political and diplomatic support to a UN representative and that even with respect to Jerusalem, on which the U.S. position had differed from both Jordan and Israel, the United States would be prepared to do what was possible diplomatically to assure an appropriate role for Jordan.

/5/Reference is apparently to Goldberg's November 3 conversation with the King. Their November 4 discussion, summarized in telegram 1991 from USUN, November 5 (see footnote 3, Document 503), was primarily concerned with the U.S. draft resolution, but the telegram states that at one point Goldberg referred to their conversation the previous day:

"Goldberg continued that we had tried to create terms of reference to move in two directions King had emphasized as requisites--specific withdrawal reference and operative provisions for guidance of special rep. Said that apart from res with such text, U.S. would do best it could to achieve these objectives, having regard to what he had told King about our views toward Jordan."

The Secretary then summarized his private talk with the King along the following lines. The King, who was in a good mood, did most of the talking, touching on the basic problems in the area, such as refugees. The King's reactions to the US draft resolution were favorable. The Secretary responded in general terms about the situation in the Middle East and in New York, incorporating Goldberg's assurances on November 4 within the framework of his own comments. No details were discussed.

The Secretary was informed that Goldberg was leaning toward the tabling in the Security Council of the draft US resolution and the group could see advantages in such a course of action. This step might be taken as a preemptive move if it became likely that the Indian resolution would be tabled. It would be designed to show the Arabs what we stand for instead of merely what we oppose. It was pointed out that, since Goldberg may have to move fast, it would be desirable to obtain the President's prior approval of such action. Joe Sisco assured the Secretary that the resolution, which is an amalgam of the Indian, Danish and other drafts, had been carefully reviewed with the Israelis and that he and Arthur Goldberg were confident that they would go along with it. The Secretary then authorized the transmission of a memorandum on this subject to Walt Rostow for discussion with the President.

John P. Walsh
Deputy Executive Secretary

Washington, November 6, 1967, 7:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 7. Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates it was received at 7:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have talked with Nick Katzenbach; and he tells me that he and Sect. Rusk wish you to be brought up to date on the following:

/2/"Indian Draft Resolution," November 6; not printed.

2. On the face of it, the Indian resolution looks not unreasonable; but it is unacceptable to the Israelis because it gives priority to a call for withdrawal of Israeli forces to the pre-June 5 positions, and it is much less precise on the question of the recognition of Israel and the termination of belligerency.

/3/"Draft U.S. Resolution," undated; not printed.

4. Secretary Rusk and Nick, therefore, wish your clearance, on a contingency basis, for Arthur to proceed if the tactical situation demands it.

/4/Memorandum from Walsh to Walt Rostow, November 6; not printed.

Walt

/5/This option is checked; a handwritten note on the memorandum states that Katzenbach was notified on November 7.

Washington, November 7, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 7. Secret. A copy was sent to Saunders.

SUBJECT
The Situation in New York, November 7-11:00 A.M.

The following table may help explain the tactical situation in New York:

/2/Telegram 2027 from USUN, November 7, transmitted the text of the Indian draft resolution as most recently revised. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN) The draft resolution, with additional revisions, was submitted on November 7 by India, Mali, and Nigeria. (Telegram 2034 from USUN, November 7; ibid.) For text, see UN document S/8227.

The last three on our side have varying problems. Last weekend the British--who are hurting economically from the closing of Suez and have their oil interests much on their minds--were in a mood to go along with the Indian resolution. USUN tells me they are now firmer, but there is still a danger of their becoming unstuck. China is acutely unhappy about alienating the Afro-Asians because of the Chirep issue, but USUN says she is with us if she must be. Brazil, like Argentina, is uneasy because the Indian resolution has virtually the same withdrawal language as the Latin Americans' own resolution last summer. Apparently she is also with us in a pinch.

Of the six on the Russian-Arab-Indian side, Nigeria is the least firm. Although Nigeria has agreed to co-sponsor the Indian resolution, they are generally anxious to seek consensus rather than ram the Indian resolution down the throats of the Israelis and ourselves.

The swing countries, Ethiopia, Argentina and Japan, could give the Soviets their nine-vote majority. Ruda, the Argentine representative, has personally been very active in favor of the Indians. Part of the problem is that he is a little out in the front of his government--although his government would obviously prefer to support the Indian resolution (with its similarities to the Latin American draft last summer). The Ethiopians will probably support the Indians if the matter is pressed to a vote. We are not sure about the Japanese. Several countries would like to support both drafts. If they did, the Indian draft would get at least nine votes.

One can explain the hardening Soviet and UAR position by the fact that they may well think they have the nine votes. It would put us into quite a box to have to veto. Going for us is the fact that quite a few countries are very anxious to work out some formula that will enable us to come along. Therefore, the pressures to seek an accommodation--even after the Security Council is convened--will be very considerable.

Even now, we are not likely to have things come to a head right away. When the Security Council meets there will be many speeches and much maneuvering--probably lasting several days. We shall have time to put more pressure on home governments if needed.

/3/The U.S. draft resolution was submitted on November 7. The text is identical to that in Document 504, except that "territories" was substituted for "territory" in the first operational paragraph. (Telegram 2035 from USUN, November 8; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN) For text, see UN document S/8229.

/4/Telegram 2027 from USUN, November 7, cited in footnote 2 above, also transmitted the text of the revised Danish-Canadian draft.

ND

New York, November 8, 1967, 1741Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to the White House and repeated Immediate to Tel Aviv, and to London. Received at 1835Z.

/2/November 9.

Eban, a bit chagrined for having been away in London while fast moving situation unfolded yesterday, reported that both Wilson and Brown felt that US draft helped situation and helped UK get away from embarrassing situation re Indian text. However, certain softening changes were suggested to Eban in US formulation but Eban resisted them in London saying that if UK were to open up res this would require Israelis to seek further changes since res does not include concept of direct negotiations. Eban reported that Hussein had conveyed a sense of urgency in his London discussions. Eban believes UAR position has hardened in last few days and that Cairo is more intransigent than position taken here by Riad up to last Friday, when the latter made a sharp shift in full support of Indian res. Eban said Brown's understanding of Hussein-Nasser agreement of Oct 17 is same as US. Eban found great speculation in London as to where Sovs fit into present situation, and what role they have played in change of position by UAR.

Goldberg said he found Riad a troubled man, that on the whole his tone has been moderate, but it seemed to change once we had talked to King and had been encouraged to put down on paper our precise ideas on a res. Goldberg speculated Sovs have exercised their influence in situation, and also Cairo. Rafael reported very confidentially that Kuznetsov had told Riad on Sunday that, whatever the outcome, UAR should go ahead on Indian res. Sisco interjected that we found Kuznetsov very sensitive Sunday night re any piece of paper with American label on it.

/3/Sisco told Rusk in a November 7 telephone conversation that Katzenbach had received White House approval to table the U.S. draft "but in circumstances where Israelis would say go ahead." After the UAR called for a meeting of the Security Council that morning, Goldberg talked to the Israelis, who said the text was acceptable as a final agreed solution but not as a text to table. Goldberg requested the President's approval to table it. (Notes of telephone conversation with Goldberg and Sisco prepared in Rusk's office, November 7, 1:45 p.m.; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls) Rostow told Rusk later that the President said Goldberg should use his judgment. (Notes of telephone conversation with Walt Rostow, November 7, 2:05 p.m.; ibid.) Telegram 2066 from USUN, November 8, reported Goldberg's November 7 discussions on this subject with Rafael. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

/4/Telegram 2027 from USUN, November 7, cited in footnote 2, Document 511, also transmitted the text of an informal Japanese draft.

Goldberg underscored UK problem. We know Caradon has sent a compromise text to London, and is anxious to come out as great compromiser. In response to Eban's query, Goldberg said he expected a great drive over next week to achieve a compromise res. Goldberg reported to Eban that both Rifai, Riad and Sovs have tried very hard to get us to negotiate on basis Indian draft, and we have categorically refused to use that text as basis. It was agreed that Eban would see Caradon promptly in order to keep the UK aboard and to discourage unhelpful initiatives and changes.

Rafael said American support would be greatest asset for any SC text. US therefore has enormous leverage since Arabs know that nothing can get done diplomatically without US prestige being engaged. Both Eban and Goldberg felt that this point must be made explicitly clear to King. Both Eban and Rafael urged that Pres say to King this evening, that if Hussein wants help he must get behind American res promptly, that he must direct his reps at UN to work within this framework rather than the posture they have adopted of undermining the King's efforts and giving impression to other dels that in effect Jordan is opposed to American text and in favor of Indian res. It was felt that if Pres could indicate that we are trying to get King the UN umbrella he wants in form of UN rep, as a means to starting dialogue, then word exercise going on at UN should come to a halt promptly and US res adopted. Important thing is that King know that US is prepared to help get him the best possible deal in any settlement, provided text is kind US can support.

Finally, it was agreed that Israeli efforts in capitals and at UN would be concentrated on preventing nine votes from being mobilized in favor of Indian text, but they would remain aloof from American draft as the best possible way not to prejudice support for it. Eban said they would do everything to create a "non-bandwagon psychology" for Indian res. It was agreed too that we would bore in with other dels on the idea that Arabs cannot be expected to achieve anything in way of reasonable settlement without having US aboard on a res.

Goldberg

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, President's Appointment File. Secret; Exdis. The Department of State record copy of this memorandum is dated November 8 and indicates it was drafted by Battle on November 7. An attached note states that Rusk took the memorandum to the President on November 8. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 JORDAN) He presumably took it with him when he attended the President's lunch meeting at 1 p.m. that day. The Middle East situation at the United Nations and plans for the meeting with Hussein were on the agenda. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President)

SUBJECT
Present Status of King Hussein's Visit

/2/See Document 508.

/3/See Document 509 and footnotes 3 and 5 thereto.

Following the luncheon, a member of the King's party inquired as to whether I had specifically meant to include a reference to the statements made by Ambassador Goldberg with respect to territorial integrity. I authorized a U.S. official to confirm to the King that I had by reference incorporated Ambassador Goldberg's assurances in my comments.

The net effect of this incorporation is to state that the United States as a matter of policy does not envisage a Jordan which consists only of the East Bank. The United States is prepared to support the return of a substantial part of the West Bank to Jordan with boundary adjustments. However, the United States would use its influence to obtain compensation to Jordan for any territory it is required to give up.

For example, if Jordan is required to give up the Latrun salient, the United States will use its diplomatic and political influence to obtain in compensation access for Jordan to a Mediterranean port in Israel. Finally, although as a matter of policy we do not agree with either Jordan's or Israel's position on Jerusalem, we are prepared to use our diplomatic and political influence to obtain for Jordan a role in Jerusalem. In short, we are prepared to make a maximum diplomatic and political effort to obtain for Jordan the best possible deal in terms of settlement with Israel.

The foregoing was conveyed to the King with a clear statement that we cannot guarantee that everything will be returned to Jordan since, of course, we cannot speak for Israel.

King Hussein's visit has so far gone quite well. During his visit, King Hussein will have made a number of public appearances in addition to meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. He appeared on the TV program "Face the Nation" on November 5. He also has delivered an address at Georgetown University and at the National Press Club.

The major theme of the King's public statements is the need for a permanent understanding between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In what he described as the "new and positive approach of the Arabs towards a lasting peace in the Middle East", he has stressed the willingness of the Arab world to consider a political approach to the Arab-Israel question.

Specifically, he has called on Israel to state what it proposes to do with respect to Arab lands it has occupied, Arab refugees it has displaced, and the future of the Old City of Jerusalem. He has stressed the Arab desire for peace and has pointed out that Israel has a choice of either living with the Arabs peacefully or of remaining an isolated outpost in the Arab world.

/4/An unsigned, undated memorandum from Rusk to the President with supplementary talking points for his meeting with King Hussein urging that he do everything possible to persuade the Arab delegations, especially the UAR delegation, to accept the U.S. draft resolution, is filed with this memorandum.

Dean Rusk

Washington, November 8, 1967, 4:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, President's Appointment File. Secret; Exdis.

SUBJECT
Talking Points for King Hussein, 5:30 p.m.

In brief, we recommend you make these points:

/2/A memorandum from Rostow to the President, November 8 at 3:15 p.m., contained a summary of Document 501. Other briefing memoranda from Rostow to the President and talking points prepared in the Department of State for his meeting with King Hussein are in the Johnson Library, President's Appointment File.

1. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg have told you in detail of their conversations with His Majesty.

/3/Document 513.

3. Our ability to make good on this reassurance will depend on what kind of arrangement comes out of the UN. We need a resolution that both sides will work with. Anything else would be no more than a hollow tactical victory.

4. We hope His Majesty can persuade his Arab colleagues to accept a workable resolution. (We do not think the Indian draft is workable. We think ours is.)

5. Time is not on the side of peace. What we can do today we may not be able to do 2 or 3 months from now.

If he asks about military aid, you might explain your tough problem in bringing Congress along. You have to say honestly that we can't resume military shipments now, but you hope the situation will improve if there's some movement toward a settlement. Meanwhile, you hope he'll be able to buy what he needs in Western Europe. His turning to Moscow at this stage of the game would just kill chances of progress toward a settlement and make it very hard for us to help.

Walt

Washington, November 8, 1967, 5:37-6:29 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV. Secret. Drafted on November 11. An attached note of November 22 from Saunders to Walt Rostow's secretary, Lois Nivens, instructed her to put a copy in her files, since it was the only record of the President's meeting with King Hussein that would be available in the White House. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. The time and place of the meeting are from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Meeting Between President Johnson, King Hussein and Secretary Rusk on Wednesday, November 8 at 5:30 p.m.

Following the meeting between the President and the King, Secretary Rusk gave me some of the highlights of the discussion.

The meeting was cordial and a few minutes were spent in pleasantries, including the presentation of a cigarette lighter to His Majesty by President Johnson.

Discussions centered on the U.S. resolution currently before the Security Council. The President pressed the King to support the U.S. resolution. He pointed out that the resolution is to be a compromise resolution. The Government of Israel is not happy with the text; the Arabs are not happy with the text. It is difficult to draft a resolution that makes both sides happy, but it is imperative that both sides accept the resolution if it is to be implemented.

King Hussein tried his best to get precision on the clause with respect to withdrawal of Israeli forces. The President replied that it was difficult to be precise in one part and not on the others. There were imprecise statements in the resolution in several respects. The King then said that if it was impossible to be precise as to when or where withdrawal should take place, he hoped that it would be possible to be precise with regard to the question of who was to withdraw. The phraseology of the resolution calling for withdrawal from occupied territories could be interpreted to mean that the Egyptians should withdraw from Gaza and the Jordanians should withdraw from the West Bank. This possibility was evident from the speech by Prime Minister Eshkol in which the Prime Minister had referred to both Gaza and the West Bank as "occupied territory".

The President agreed to talk with Ambassador Goldberg in New York and he and Secretary Rusk told the King that we would be back in touch with him by noon the following day with respect to his suggestion for inclusion of the word "Israeli" before the word withdrawal in the resolution.

The President urged strongly that the Jordanians support the U.S. resolution, and expressed the hope that Jordan would try to get the UAR on board also. The U.S. will use its leverage to bring about a settlement. We have to move one step at a time, however, and the King must understand that we too have problems.

/2/The King raised the question of arms with Secretary McNamara at dinner on November 8. According to a memorandum of the conversation, McNamara's reply was "along the lines we want to be as helpful as possible, have some problems at the moment, but would do what we could at a later date." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 JORDAN)

Lucius D. Battle

Central Intelligence Agency Information Report B-321/33403-67, November 9, 1967, summarized a report received from an unnamed U.S. citizen who said that on a recent trip to Tel Aviv, some Israeli friends had commented on the attack on the Liberty. According to the report, "They said that Dayan personally ordered the attack on the ship and that one of his generals adamantly opposed the action and said, 'This is pure murder.' One of the admirals who was present also disapproved the action, and it was he who ordered it stopped and not Dayan. My friends believe that the attack against the US vessel is also detrimental to any political ambition Dayan may have."

A note dated January 12, 1968, attached to a copy of the report, forwarded it to [text not declassified], who commented in a handwritten note: "Thank you. There is only one problem with the story and that is it's not true. Curiously, Dayan and Eshkol are finding themselves natural allies in the more important issues--whatever their personal differences." (Central Intelligence Agency, DO/NE Files: Job 85-01007R, Box 5, Folder 50, Israeli Attack on USS Liberty During 1967 Six Day War, Vol. I)

Chief of the Near East Division in the CIA Directorate of Operations Alan D. Wolfe commented on the report in a note of September 20, 1977, to the Deputy Director for Operations forwarding a transcript of a September 19 television interview with Director of Central Intelligence Admiral Stansfield Turner. In the interview, Turner had been asked about a published accusation, based on documents released by the Central Intelligence Agency under the Freedom of Information Act, that Dayan had ordered the attack on the Liberty. Wolfe commented that of four documents on this subject released under the Freedom of Information Act in 1977, three were "raw reports which in historical hindsight were garbage, but which appeared worthy of dissemination at the time." (Ibid., Folder 51, Israeli Attack on USS Liberty During 1967 Six Day War, Vol. II) The report cited above was one of the three reports to which he referred. The second was an Intelligence Information Cable, TDCS DB-315/02297-67, June 23, 1967, reporting that the general opinion in the Turkish General Staff was that the Israeli attack on the Liberty was deliberate. (Ibid.) The third was an Information Report dated July 27, 1967, summarizing a report by an unnamed U.S. citizen that an Israeli acquaintance had told him that Israeli forces knew the ship's identity and what it was doing. The Israeli had said, with reference to the Liberty incident, "you've got to remember that in this campaign there is neither time nor room for mistakes." (Ibid.)

In the 1977 note cited above, Wolfe stated that the fourth document was a sanitized version of an intelligence memorandum of June 13, 1967 (Document 284), which concluded that the Israeli aircraft and patrol boats attacking the Liberty were unaware of its identity. He noted that a June 21 memorandum (Document 317) re-examined the June 13 conclusions in the light of the Israeli court of inquiry findings and drew a distinction between Israeli Government knowledge of the Liberty's presence in the battle zone and the ignorance of the attacking force. Wolfe concluded, "All rational judgment thus supports the idea of gross stupidity and negligence but not malicious intent." (Central Intelligence Agency, DO/NE Files: Job 85-01007R, Box 5, Folder 51, Israeli Attack on USS Liberty During 1967 Six Day War, Vol. II)

New York, November 11, 1967, 1934Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Priority to London. Received at 2121Z.

2181. Subj: ME-UK Draft Res.

1. Caradon, in call on Goldberg November 11 am, said Brits have felt for past day or two that neither US nor Indian draft res likely to succeed in SC, not so much because of substance as because of circumstances in SC, allegiances and emotions of parties concerned, etc. Thus Brits have thought it best maintain independent position, commit UK to no text and leave way open for UK to come forward with helpful move or compromise.

/2/The text of the British draft, transmitted in telegram 2178 from USUN, November 11, was largely similar to that of Security Council Resolution 242, adopted November 22 (Document 542), except that (1) the second preambular paragraph reads as follows: "Emphasizing the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security," (2) the opening section of paragraph 1 reads as follows: "Affirms that in fulfillment of the above Charter principles a state of just and lasting peace in the Middle East should be achieved through action in accordance with the following principles:", (3) sub-paragraph 1.ii (1.II) includes the phrase "within secure frontiers" rather than "within secure and recognized boundaries", and (4) paragraph 3 includes the phrase "to promote and assist efforts" rather than "to promote agreement and assist efforts". (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

3. As preliminary comment, Goldberg said US has no objection such effort by UK in principle. Stressed that acid test we apply to any proposed text is whether it is acceptable enough to both sides so that they would cooperate with UN rep. Goldberg said our preference would be to have no SC res rather than res to which one side objects and therefore refuses cooperate with UN rep.

/3/Battle met with King Hussein on November 10 and told him the United States was prepared to make some revisions in paragraph 1 of the U.S. draft resolution, including the change of "withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territories" to "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from occupied territories", if this would result in a clear signal from the King to the other Arabs and Indians that the new text was acceptable. Rifai, who was also present, immediately proposed more changes. Battle told the King later that day that there was "great disappointment at high levels" at the Jordanian response and that further discussions should take place in New York. (Telegram 67603 to USUN, November 10; ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN) That evening Goldberg suggested to the King simply adding the word "Israeli" in connection with withdrawal with no additional revisions. The King indicated that this would be satisfactory to him and that he would present it favorably to the UAR and other Arabs, but he appeared to be pessimistic about the prospects. (Telegram 2172 from USUN, November 11; ibid.)

5. Turning to UK text, Goldberg said there are obvious points of difficulty from Israeli point of view. First would be wording of UK text regarding withdrawal. Noted we had pulled Israelis inch by agonizing inch to present wording US res and have been told it is Israeli Cabinet decision not to go any further. Noting Eban has insisted all discussions regarding texts be held only in New York, Goldberg said it our impression Eban staking political future on outcome negotiations regarding SC res and that he more forthcoming regarding withdrawal language than any member of Israeli Cabinet.

6. Second, Goldberg said, there would probably be even stronger reaction to wording of UK text dealing with frontiers (i.e. "right to live in peace within secure frontiers"). Said Eban clearly cannot tolerate language which is not within framework of envisaging established, recognized or agreed frontiers. Language in UK draft could mean return to armistice lines plus demilitarized zones. Noted Israelis had pressed us very hard to use "agreed frontiers" in our res but we had resisted and offered instead "secure and recognized boundaries." Even this accepted reluctantly by Israelis and they will resist strongly going any further, as in UK draft. Pedersen interjected that, in any case, Arabs have not focused on or objected to "secure and recognized boundaries" in US res.

7. Third, Goldberg said Israelis will be most vigorous and unyielding regarding op para 3 of UK draft. Said GOI, while prepared accept language which does not say there should be direct negotiations, will not tolerate language which would leave UN rep latitude to make recommendations to SC for settlement (such as was done by Galo Plaza in Cyprus dispute). Goldberg added this also not his concept of how UN rep should operate. Caradon said UK res does not preclude direct negotiations. Goldberg agreed; but recalled how strongly Israelis had pressed us to add phrase in our res such as "assisting parties in working out agreed solutions." Possibility of changing op para 3 of UK draft to read "promote and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and agreed settlement" was raised. Goldberg said he thought Israelis would accept this and perhaps find it preferable to our res.

8. Fourth point to which Israelis might object was raised by Pedersen. He noted op para 1 of UK draft gives impression that it is action in accordance with principles listed there which will bring peace. Israelis will resist this strongly, for they insist upon wording which conveys concept that just and lasting peace includes or encompasses or embraces certain principles, is not the result of specific action under those principles.

9. Caradon said he understood points we had made, that he would present UK text to Eban, and ask him directly what sticking points would be. This is purpose in consulting Eban. After securing Eban's reaction, Caradon said he will then have to decide how to go forward. Repeated belief that some new formulation is necessary in order to provide face-saving device on both sides. Thus, subject to assurance he not interfering with present US efforts, he would want to go forward very promptly. Noted he has authority circulate UK text and seek agreement on it. Also said UK not prepared permit SC failure without some further effort, that UK determined not to let SC just peter out. Also added that something like UK text is essential for UK's own position, since under present instructions UK "could" vote for either Indian or US res. He said that his present thinking is to circulate UK text so that UK then in position it would not have to vote for either or both Indian and US reses.

10. Goldberg told Caradon his effort would interfere with our efforts if he went ahead, even to discuss UK text with Eban, before we receive a definitive reply from King. Caradon said he understood and would anxiously await word from us regarding King's reply.

11. Just before meeting broke up, Pedersen sought clarification of UK instructions, asking whether Caradon's comment UK "could" vote for either or both Indian and US reses meant UK instructed vote for both. Pedersen also asked what effect would be in deciding how to vote on Indian and US drafts, where one of parties officially states that it will refuse to cooperate with UN rep. Caradon said he not saying anything to anyone else about UK ability to vote for either text. Avoided clear answers on both questions. Following meeting, Hope stressed to MisOff that he had pushed Caradon very hard to lay all cards on table with Goldberg; hoped US understood that it absolutely essential Caradon soon proceed with consultations re UK text so that situation thereby created in which UK can avoid voting for Indian draft res.

Goldberg

Washington, November 11, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Saunders Memos. Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "For 2:00 p.m. meeting." Rostow sent a copy to Eugene Rostow with a covering memorandum of the same date.

SUBJECT
Mid-East Terrorism

/2/James H. Critchfield, Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division in the Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency.

By and large, there were few incidents during the summer. They began to increase at the end of September, and since 1 October there have been 22. The situation was serious enough by late October that the Israelis asked us to arrange a meeting between the Israeli and Jordanian military to discuss ways to stop infiltration. Hussein's advisers talked him out of it, to the Israelis' disgust. The most serious incidents took place in the few days after 3 November, and on 7 November the Israelis wrote a note to the UNSC. Those incidents followed a week of relative quiet, which may have resulted from caution after the previous week's sinking of the Elath and shelling of the Suez refinery.

There are several possible explanations for this pattern:

1. The increase could just be part of the Arabs picking themselves up after the war and getting back to business, rather than the result of any particular decision in Damascus. After the war, the Arabs were so disorganized that they could mount only minor operations, and they weren't sure what they ought to be attacking. By September, they had recovered enough and the political situation had solidified enough to make conditions ripe for terrorism. On top of that, Arabs viewed the Israeli line as hardening and became increasingly disillusioned with the continuing stalemate.

2. The increase could be the hard-liners' answer to Khartoum. Having failed to persuade their brethren to continue the fight, they may have decided that this was their only recourse.

3. The Soviets may or may not have relaxed restraint. We have no clear recent evidence either of a strong restraining influence or of incitement. Nat Davis has confirmed his view in talking with State and CIA colleagues that the Soviets are unlikely to see their interests served by renewed hostilities at this time. While they no doubt see the risks in renewed terrorism, they have not acted very strongly to enforce restraint and have tended to underestimate the dangers from this sort of thing. Vinogradov in Cairo and the Soviet naval visits don't contribute to restraint.

Our view is that Hussein himself is doing his best to stop the terrorists who move across Jordan from Syria. The Israelis disagree and say that Hussein could not possibly be unaware of Jordanian military complicity. They cite such events as Jordanian artillery joining in one Jordan River fight between Israelis and terrorists, while we think the Jordanians were probably just replying to anti-terrorist shells that landed in Jordan. There is no question, however, that individual Jordanians are becoming involved, so this may be another case of the King not being in complete control. Officials, soldiers, police and people along the infiltration routes are becoming less and less inclined to interfere with the terrorists.

The Israelis have assured us that they won't retaliate in present circumstances but the British military attach? thinks a raid is imminent. What the Israelis do will depend partly on whether they think Hussein is being cooperative in reaching a political settlement and on how much they think we're backing him. I shouldn't think they'd do anything while the UNSC is still in session. No Israelis have been killed recently, and this has helped keep the Israeli popular cry for revenge manageable.

Our view is that #2 above is the most likely explanation. This is consistent with all the Khartoum and post-Khartoum evidence, and so far we lack any convincing evidence of a specific Soviet decision or encouragement. The Syrians have never needed encouragement in this field, and the Soviets have never been remarkably successful in restraining them, even when Moscow tried.

Hal
John

Beirut, November 10, 1967, 1256Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received on November 11 at 4:17 a.m. Rostow sent a copy of this telegram, along with telegrams 3901 and 3908 from Beirut (see footnotes 2 and 5 below), to the President on November 11 with a memorandum noting that Anderson reported that Nasser wanted to see him again. The memorandum stated: "We shall have a recommendation for you shortly--conscious of your grave reservations in this matter." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Lebanon)

/2/Telegram 3901 from Beirut, November 10, transmitted a message from Anderson, who had arrived in Beirut from Baghdad the previous evening. He reported that the UAR Ambassador to Iraq had told him on November 6 that he had received a message from Cairo asking that Anderson return to Cairo. Anderson stated that he planned to return to Baghdad no later than November 12, return to Beirut on November 14 or 15, and then return to the United States unless he was advised that he should go to Cairo. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR)

/3/UAR Ambassador to Lebanon Abdul Hamid Ghaleb.

2. I told him that Ambassador Metwally in Iraq told me that he would advise me through Ghaleb what the Egyptian attitude was toward the American resolution. I also stated that it seemed to me that the American resolution contained all the points covered in my discussions in Cairo with the possible exception that the representative of the UN instead of being required to go to the Middle East would consult with both sides in a less conspicuous manner, which might be more effective in getting results. He stated that he would either receive a wire from Nasser today or would inquire as to Nasser's attitude. I told him that it was going to be very difficult, if not impossible, for me to return to Cairo not only because I had been away so long, but because I wanted to have the opportunity of visiting with my old friend dating from Finance Ministry days, Japanese Prime Minister Sato, while he was in the States. I said I had been invited to dinner with Sato. I thought that I should cast considerable doubt on any possibility of returning to Cairo until I knew more about the Department's attitude. When I told Ghaleb that it was doubtful that I could return to Cairo he asked me if this would be true even though President Nasser considered it very important. I replied by saying that I would not foreclose any matter if Nasser thought it of sufficient importance although perhaps the same thing could be accomplished either by Nasser sending someone to meet me here or by communication through Ghaleb. He stated he would explore this possibility if Nasser thought it sufficiently important.

/4/Reference is to a procedural dispute in the Security Council on November 9 over whether Israel should be heard after the UAR, which had requested the meeting, or later in the proceedings. A U.S. motion to hear both the UAR and Israel as parties to the dispute before the Security Council members spoke failed of adoption by one vote. (Telegram 2138 from USUN, November 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

4. I said that since he had raised the question of the Security Council, I was at a loss to understand why UAR had suddenly demanded a meeting of the Security Council. I thought his President had felt, during my conversations with him, that more could be accomplished quietly and behind scenes, and that perhaps an agreed resolution (whether with US label or not) could be taken to the Security Council where the procedure would be more or less pro forma. He stated "I cannot speak officially, but it is my impression that we feared the outbreak of another Israeli attack either against us, Syria or Jordan and that this attack would be less likely if the Security Council were in session". I have no idea as to whether he is expressing a personal judgment, just offering an excuse, or whether he knows more than he is telling me. The rest of the conversation was rather academic in which he said that he thought Israel had initially been established as a cat's paw so that either we, the Soviets, or other major power could use this small country to our advantage in the Arab world but that the cat's paw was rapidly becoming the cat and they did not know where it would bite next.

/5/Telegram 3908 from Beirut, November 10, reported that Ghaleb had just notified Anderson that Nasser had indicated he was very anxious for discussions with Anderson in Cairo. (Ibid., POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR)

Porter

Washington, November 11, 1967, 2138Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, TRV ANDERSON, ROBERT B. Secret. A handwritten notation on the telegram indicates it was received at 2245Z. According to Rusk's Appointment Book, the Secretary was in Williamsburg, Virginia, to attend the Gridiron Dinner at the Convention Center. A notation on the telegram indicates Rusk read it.

CAP 67946. The following is from John Walsh for your information.

Memorandum for the President.

Subject: Robert Anderson Trip to Cairo.

/2/Telegram 65484 to Beirut, November 7, transmitted a message from Rusk to Anderson stating that it had been concluded that it was best for him not to return to Cairo at that time; his return would cast doubt on statements made in Washington about his private status and could cause confusion in New York. (Ibid., POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR)

However, after consultation with Ambassador Goldberg, I agree with him that Anderson should go to Cairo, as quickly as possible. We do not want it said that we did not do everything possible to bring about a settlement, and that we turned down a direct request from Nasser to engage in further talks. Moreover, since King Hussein has asked us to try to bring the UAR on board, a further talk with Nasser in a sense would represent a step to keep faith with Hussein. Since Hussein will be talking with the Arabs in New York until tomorrow night, prompt action is important.

We would ask Anderson while in Cairo to do the following:

1. He would make it plain to Nasser that there is no division within the U.S. Government. We cannot support an unworkable UN resolution.

2. We are continuing to try to work out a UN resolution with which both sides can live. Such a resolution would not in itself produce a Middle Eastern settlement, but it would open the way toward one which would be as fair and as helpful to both sides as possible.

Ambassador Goldberg is preparing talking points on the negotiating problem in New York for Anderson's use. In agreeing to return to Cairo, Anderson would tell the UAR Ambassador with whom he is in contact that we expect his return will not be followed by UAR publicity attacking the U.S. or the President for our attitude on the Middle East.

Recommendation:

That you authorize us to tell Anderson to proceed to Cairo.

Acting Secretary

Washington, November 12, 1967, 0130Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Popper, cleared by Battle, and approved by Acting Secretary Katzenbach.

68061. For Anderson from Under Secretary.

/2/Telegram 68058 to Beirut, November 12, for Anderson from Katzenbach, stated that the Department was sending him contingency instructions to be used if a high-level review of the desirability of his prompt return to Cairo resulted in an affirmative decision. (Ibid.)

2. You should tell Ghaleb that US move to hear UAR and Israel prior to members of SC was strictly in accordance with rules and practice of SC for 20 years. US move was to permit both to be heard, with UAR speaking first. That was course of equity. Failure SC to support this position set Arab cause back because it resulted in unusual and inequitable procedure and made Israel aggrieved party. It also created rancorous atmosphere instead of reasonable one. You should tell him that neither UAR nor Jordanian Dels had any objection to Israel speaking in customary position and that Sovs and Indians are to be blamed for producing such a bad result for Arabs. You should say US took initiative because we believe in equity, would have done so likewise if situation had been reversed, and because issue was sprung in SC one minute before meeting had opened, members previously having been informed that first two speakers would be UAR and Israel. (Preferable you get this issue out of way with Ghaleb so you do not have to raise it in Cairo.)

3. We would like you to tell Nasser that US res before SC is a serious proposal which we are convinced contains best prospects for peaceful solution in ME. Indians res on other hand is unworkable, cannot be made workable by tinkering, and would not produce real progress in area even if it had nine votes, which we doubt. You should leave him in no doubt that US would not use its influence in implementation of such a res.

4. You should also tell him that US has continued to give careful consideration to views of Arab Dels in New York as to their problems and concerns. While we have never thought we could produce text completely satisfactory either to Arabs or to Israel, we have endeavored to cover each important element of current situation. Taking into account legitimate Arab concerns and suggestions, Amb Goldberg yesterday told King Hussein that US would be willing to add word "Israeli" before "Armed Forces" in first operative paragraph. USG took this decision with considerable hesitation at strong Arab urging. You should also point out that US had previously made another significant change in text by substituting word "territories" for "territory," which we had also done on basis of concerns and advice of our Arab friends.

/3/Goldberg said this in a statement before the Security Council on November 9. For text, see the Department of State Bulletin, December 18, 1967, pp. 834-836.

6. Amb. Goldberg also made in SC on behalf of USG following significant statement with respect to method of achieving objectives of res and to positions of those directly concerned:

"How these objectives can be achieved in practice, what modalities, methods, and steps may be can only be worked out in consultations with parties, which special rep would undertake.

"In our view all objectives must be taken fully into account in concept and in practice in achievement of common aim. Furthermore, text of US res does not prejudice positions of those directly concerned."

7. USG feels it has now gone extra mile in meeting Arab concerns, taking into account that objective is not just a res but to set into motion a process of diplomatic action within framework of UN with which States in area would be expected to cooperate. Further efforts of verbalism will only endanger entire project and set back whole process of movement towards honorable peace. Much more significant for Arabs in current context is that this res contains basic principles critical to them, if not in exact words they would wish, while also having two major plus factors which would not follow from texts more perfectly worded from UAR point of view: commitment of US political backing and prospects of Israeli cooperation with reps in spite of its basic view that there should only be direct negotiations.

8. You should, therefore, strongly urge Nasser to instruct Riad to accept res as modified and in concert with Rifai (Jordan) seek to assure its passage in SC.

9. If Nasser objects to fact of US sponsorship you should say US had told Arabs when we first gave text to them that it need not have US sponsorship. We were compelled to move ourselves only when UAR suddenly called SC mtg and India submitted its text; we are not interested in credit but in results.

10. You should not negotiate on texts on grounds you have a message but no authority to discuss language. If Nasser should suggest any further changes you should repeat that your advice is to take res as it would now be modified, noting that it would be tragedy for opportunity now available with full US support to be missed, that same opportunity would not likely be there two months from now, and that we are convinced further verbal efforts will jeopardize everything. FYI Only. Israelis have said in New York that their Cabinet has taken policy decision against inclusion of words "all" or "occupied in the recent conflict" as applied to territories, words Nasser would be most likely to request. Our own assessment is that we have reached end of road with Israel on wording of any major importance to UAR. End FYI.

/4/The reference is in error; telegram 2305 from USUN is dated November 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

/5/Circular telegram 67978, November 10, transmitted a message from Rusk to all ambassadors instructing them to stress that the key to a political solution in the Middle East lay in the five principles in the President's June 19 statement and the U.S. resolution. It stated that the United States was convinced that the principal parties concerned could cooperate without insuperable difficulties with a Special UN Representative to work out a political solution on the basis of the U.S. resolution, that it had made it clear to the principal parties concerned that U.S. influence would be exerted under that resolution for a fair and equitable settlement, and that the Indian resolution was not workable, since Israel had already publicly rejected it. (Ibid.)

12. In summary the guts of the American position in the UN is simply that any solution of problems in the Middle East will have to be worked out in detail by the countries involved with the assistance of a special UN representative and cannot be negotiated in advance in the Security Council. Therefore, any resolution in the SC which attempts to tip the scales in such a way as to make the UN special representative unacceptable to Israel or to key Arab states will have no result whatsoever in terms of any solution of the basic problems. We cannot overemphasize that the USG will not support in the SC or subsequently any resolution with which the parties will not cooperate. You should know that the Israelis do not like the current US resolution and that it represents maximum with which they will cooperate. Our effort is to get a UN representative with whom the parties will talk and if this can be accomplished, we will give our full diplomatic support to his mission. The Indian or similar resolutions are sure non-starters in substantive terms and we will not be associated now or later with their failure to achieve peace.

13. Please report by Flash tel repeated to USUN any observations Nasser has. These will be very helpful and appreciated.

/6/Anderson was not authorized to return to Cairo. Instead, Bergus, acting on instructions from Washington, conveyed the substance of paragraphs 3-8, 12, and 13 in writing to Salah Hassan of the UAR Foreign Office and discussed it with him in detail. Salah Hassan later telephoned Bergus to tell him that the message had been delivered to Acting Foreign Minister Feki. (Telegram 950 from Cairo, November 14; ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Telegram 68090 to Cairo, November 13, had instructed Bergus to deliver the substance of the message. (Ibid., TRV ANDERSON, ROBERT B.)

Rusk

New York, November 13, 1967, 0118Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated Priority to Amman, and to London and Tel Aviv. Dated November 12 in error; received on November 13 at 0317Z.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 517.

1. In mid-day talk Nov. 12, Caradon told Goldberg he had seen King Hussein alone previous day. Said King had preferred not to talk about texts of SC reses, but had made it clear he recognizes both US support for and Israeli acquiescence in any res are essential. Caradon commented he found King greatly disturbed and that he (Caradon) was for first time beginning to fear entire situation too much for King. Caradon said King plans leave NY Nov. 12 pm, first for Paris, then London, and return to Amman in about one week.

2. Caradon also reported one-hour meeting with Riad earlier on Nov. 12, saying he had stressed to Riad it would be madness for Arabs to throw away what res offers them and US offer to put its weight behind such res. He said he seeing reps of India and Iraq later in day and would stress same point. Riad's reaction, according to Caradon, was that UAR could not sign blank check for Israel to draw boundaries wherever Israel wants them.

/3/Telegram 2196 from USUN, November 13. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

4. Caradon said it continues to be his feeling that there will be need for new draft res without any of present labels (US or Indian) by middle of week and he plans seek London's approval to consult with Arabs re UK draft res, as revised to take into account Israeli objections. His aim, Caradon said, is to have "winning horse" all saddled and ready to go so that, at appropriate moment, stable door can be opened.

5. Goldberg asked whether Caradon would propose, assuming he gets ok from London to discuss revised UK draft res with Arabs, to have further talks with Israelis. Caradon made no commitment, simply commented he would at least consult with us again before moving.

Goldberg

Washington, November 13, 1967, 8:45 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Lebanon. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten note "PS, 11/13/67" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Mr. President:

RE: Bob Anderson

/2/Telegram 68086 to Beirut, November 12, a copy of which is attached, transmitted a message from Rusk to Anderson stating that after a thorough review of all aspects of the situation, it was decided he should not proceed to Cairo.

2. Re contingency instructions: He said he took full responsibility for their despatch:

--the situation in New York justified raising with you again the possibility of Anderson's seeing Nasser;

--the lack of communications to Baghdad, where Anderson was going from Beirut, made it important that the instructions be available in Beirut, should you have agreed the trip would go forward.

Nick still believes the move was correct.

3. In general, he feels the national interest in doing all that is humanly possible to get a resolution--and a UN negotiator in the field--outweighs the common reluctance to use a private contact with Nasser.

Walt

Washington, November 13, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 7. Secret. A copy was sent to Saunders.

SUBJECT
The Situation in New York, November 13-4:00 P.M.

/2/The tabs are attached but not printed. Tab A is telegram 2200 from USUN, November 13. Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN.

/3/See footnote 4, Document 340.

It is pretty clear the Israelis won't buy the LA resolution. Its withdrawal phraseology is even worse from their point of view than the Indian one.

/4/Telegram 2178 from USUN, November 11; see footnote 2, Document 517.

/5/The relevant portion of telegram 2027 from USUN, November 7; see footnote 2, Document 511.

We expect to make one more effort to hold off the Latin Americans. The problem is that their resolution would have nine votes. Its weakness is that Israeli non-cooperation would make it extremely difficult for the UN representative to be useful and effective. If the members of the Security Council can be convinced of this, the LA's might be prevailed upon not to press their resolution to a vote and withdraw in favor of a modified British draft.

/6/November 15.

ND

Beirut, November 14, 1967, 1025Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 7:33 a.m.

/2/Telegram 3933 from Beirut, November 13, reported that Ambassador Porter had sent word to Anderson that he should not go to Cairo. (Ibid.)

1) Following message for Secretary [from] Anderson now in Iraq delivered to me morning November 14 by his business associate John McCrane. I quote verbatim text from Anderson's handwritten notes. This message covers conversation Anderson had November 12 with UAR Amb Metwally.

2) "Message of President Nasser to RBA through Ambassador Metwally.

Para (A)--The Americans did not mention clearly and frankly the question of withdrawal and the Arabs cannot accept a draft of withdrawal that is not detailed (Note: I think he meant explicit rather than detailed) and expressed with frankness. This would be against the principles and Charter of the UN which says that no profit or territorial gains are allowed to be secured by force.

Para (B)--The first part of the draft contains many subjects such as peace with justice and this means that all the subjects are connected and the timing for the execution of any subject is not known. The logical consequence to assume is that the withdrawal will not be completed unless all other requirements are executed such as peace with justice.

Para (C)--The statement in the draft concerning mutual recognition can be considered a new text not found in any previous draft. This is considered a new request by the US. This is different from US confirmation that mutual recognition would not be mentioned.

Para (D)--What is said about borders, for example 'the secured and recognized borders' is a new text. To execute this subject there would have to be mutual agreement on both sides and this would require a recognition prohibited by the Khartoum Conference.

Para (E)--The draft concerning refugees is very mild and contains nothing obligatory (Note: I am sure he means obligations by Israel) and takes no note of the UN resolutions on this subject.

Para (F)--The reference to demilitarized areas in the draft is considered an echo of the Israeli spokesmen who have spoken of 'greater Israel' and the disarmament of the Sinai. The latest statement on this subject is that made by the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Knesset on November 10 when he stated that Israel wanted to disarm Sinai. This would make the UAR very anxious and is one reason not to approve the US draft.

Para (G)--The draft in setting out the mission of the representative of the Secretary General of the UN gives the idea that direct contact is necessary between the Arabs and the Israelis and this has not been in any draft resolution before.

Para (H)--Generally, the US resolution is many steps backward when compared with other drafts offered in the UN or through contacts outside the SC or the GA up to now. It is a step backward from the draft the US and Soviets agreed to and which the UAR, after study, refused.

Para (I)--The offering of this draft cannot be final as it is. The chance is still open in front of the US to prove its desire to reach a just political solution to the Israel-Arab dispute.

Para (J)--Riad has said he is very keen to cooperate with the US representative in New York and has confirmed to Amb Goldberg that even if the SC could not reach any result this will not mean that the contacts between the US and the UAR will be stopped.

Para (K)--He (Nasser) is anxious to see me again and continue our talks.

/3/Bergus reported in telegram 961 from Cairo, November 15, that Acting Foreign Minister Feki had asked him to call at 5 p.m. that day to hand him a copy of Nasser's message to Anderson as translated by the UAR Foreign Office. Feki said the message had been sent before Bergus had given the substance of Anderson's contingency instructions to the UAR Government. Bergus gave Feki the substance of comments by Goldberg on Nasser's message. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN) Goldberg's comments are in telegram 2239 from USUN, November 14. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) The copy of the message given to Bergus, which he sent with a November 24 letter to Battle, is filed with a letter of December 8 from Battle to Bergus. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 71 D 79, 1967-1968) For Bergus' delivery of the substance of Anderson's contingency instructions, see footnote 6, Document 521.

3) Anderson's present plans, unless things go wrong in Iraq, are return Beirut tomorrow November 15, overnight Beirut, depart for US via London morning November 16, arriving NY either November 17 or 18.

4) McCrane reports Anderson feels he is going back on what Nasser will assume is personal commitment, if he does not visit Cairo. Anderson worried about implications and has no appropriate rationale for explaining to Egyptians why he not going. He had originally tried avoid return visit as his previous messages indicated, but now he understandably feels Nasser expects him.

5) He starting to spread thin excuse in Iraq that McCrane brought him news family illness in US where he may have to return quickly.

6) Anderson's concern will not be lessened by Cairo-NY Times November 12 article, carried Herald Tribune, November 13, which seems to be official UARG leak that Anderson planning revisit Nasser soon.

7) I do not know what if anything Anderson will tell Amb Metwally in Baghdad. Anderson informs me he already has had talk with Metwally in which he (Anderson) bore down hard on damage done by Heikal article and asked Metwally pass on to Nasser his strong feeling that it hurt Arab cause and cause of peace. Metwally reporting this to Nasser. Anderson describes Metwally as fairly strong individual who seems have good connections.

8) According McCrane, Anderson still prepared go to Cairo if Dept wishes, and if he can help. He could leave Beirut for Cairo morning November 16. Our recent experience makes it clear it impossible get messages to Anderson in Baghdad except through courier. Anderson tried send his son Beirut with message night November 12 but flights weathered in. He apologizes to Secretary for delay.

9) McCrane prepared return Baghdad tonight if we wish pass message. Otherwise I will see Anderson in Beirut about 1030 local November 15. Please advise.

Porter

Washington, November 16, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 9. Secret. A copy was sent to Saunders. Rostow sent this memorandum to the President at 4:50 p.m. with a covering memorandum commenting that it indicated that "we are the closest we have come in New York to movement on the Middle East" and that it posed an issue "which you may have to decide tomorrow--or even, less likely, today."

SUBJECT
The Situation in New York, November 16, 3:30 P.M.

/2/Not attached. The text of the draft resolution as introduced that day (UN document S/8247) is in telegram 2296 from USUN, November 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN) Caradon met with Goldberg at 10 a.m. on November 16 and indicated his intention to table the draft resolution. Goldberg told him the U.S. efforts to reach agreement with the UAR on the U.S. draft had apparently broken down, and Caradon could go ahead with U.S. support. (Telegram 2336 from USUN, November 17; ibid.)

The Israelis don't like the text--but it is better than the Latin American one (which the Latin Americans have not yet submitted and may hold off on). The real question is whether the Israelis will state their objections but agree to cooperate with the representative, or whether they will announce that they will not cooperate.

If the Israelis go into full opposition we shall have a difficult choice in deciding what to do ourselves--vote in favor, abstain or veto. It is possible that this decision could come as early as tomorrow, but we are not likely to be on the spot today.

Goldberg is seeing Riad at Riad's request right now. The Security Council meets at 4:00 p.m. (probably a half an hour late, so better say 4:30 p.m.) and Caradon is the only one presently listed to speak.

ND

New York, November 17, 1967, 0356Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received at 12:03 a.m.

2331. Middle East.

1. Goldberg saw Riad at his request at 3:15 this afternoon. Mohammed Riad, El Kony, and new person whose name we do not know, were present for UAR. Sisco, Buffum, and Pedersen with Goldberg.

2. Riad opened conversation by saying that he had seen Lord Caradon this morning. Understood Caradon was introducing res. Said he had given Caradon his comments. It was still his feeling withdrawal language was not specific enough in UK text, as was case in US text. Problem remained at same point. Question of withdrawal must be specific if we are to avoid problems in future. Are we to have full or vague withdrawal. If it is vague, nothing is being accomplished.

/2/The text of Goldberg's November 15 statement in the Security Council is printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 18, 1967, pp. 836-841.

/3/Telegram 2193 from USUN, November 12, reported on Goldberg's November 12 meeting with Foreign Minister Riad, in which Riad commented on the U.S. draft resolution. He argued that the withdrawal paragraph should refer explicitly to withdrawal to the June 4 line, and he questioned the term "mutual recognition," arguing that it was not clear whether this meant recognition of Israel's right to exist, which the UAR could accept, or diplomatic recognition, which he could not accept. Goldberg assured him that diplomatic recognition was not intended. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

4. Goldberg then said that if Riad was saying that his govt would be prepared to cooperate under US text with changes in only those two areas, he also prepared to give it constructive thought. Riad asked what were our ideas. Goldberg said he was talking about our text and he wanted to know if these (withdrawal language and word "mutual") were the sole two areas of UAR concern. Riad said there were no other problems, only these two. Goldberg then said that US of course would not send armies but that we would do our best to work out a peaceful settlement if we could come to an understanding. We had stated our position; UAR had stated its; Israel had stated its. If Riad thought it was worthwhile in this framework he had a personal thought not yet communicated to Washington. If in his view as FonMin he really thought we could come to terms he could advance this thought and if FonMin thought it was worthwhile he would put it to govt. But we could not start from beginning and could not deal with other words. Riad said yes, we should talk without record, without putting forward writing.

5. Goldberg then said we thought withdrawal language, which was what we had worked out with Soviets in summer, might be substituted for present withdrawal language. We would suggest picking up language from version one of that text exactly in words then used in following form: "Withdrawal by the parties to the conflict of their forces from territories occupied by them, in keeping with the inadmissibility of the conquest of territory by war." We said everything else in US res would remain the same.

6. Riad said so it is addition of this principle. My first reaction is that it is the same. Exactly the same as present US text. Goldberg replied that it was just personal thought and perhaps we should forget it. Riad then said it was of course good to add such a phrase and that it was of course an improvement. This was not time for arguments. He thought he would not repeat language to anyone else, not even other Arabs.

7. Goldberg said that for him to put the language to his govt would be a serious step. He did not wish to embark upon it unless Riad was receptive. We could not deal with parts of proposal. It would have to be dealt with as whole thing. Otherwise we should go ahead with discussions in SC. We would not circulate idea as it was a personal one.

8. Riad asked whether we could make any additional changes in US text. Goldberg said no. Riad said that we should keep in contact, and meeting adjourned.

9. Subsequently, Sisco told Mohammed Riad we had been greatly disappointed at Riad's reaction and that we thought there was no point in going further. Riad replied that they had not meant to terminate matter and that they would be giving suggestion very careful consideration. He subsequently came back to ask whether we would agree in these circumstances to deletion of word "mutual". Sisco conveyed back that he would reiterate again that these were personal ideas that would be put to Washington only if Riad found them agreeable. Mohammed Riad said they understood this entirely.

Goldberg

New York, November 18, 1967, 0336Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Also sent to Tel Aviv. Received at 0629Z.

2368. 1. At mtg with Eban Nov. 17 a.m. Goldberg said LAs appear to be running for cover in effort avoid US-UK-Israeli approaches to them in capitals. He said our Ambs have instructions to tell LAs as fols: UK draft res is quite tough on Israel. Nevertheless, if LA refrain from submitting own draft and give their support to UK draft, it is our judgment both Arabs and Israel will give grudging acceptance to UK draft.

2. Eban said he has instructions that moment LA draft is submitted, he must issue statement saying Israel cannot comply with or cooperate with UN rep sent under LA res. He said he had advised Ruda (Argentina) yesterday evening that he had recommended to Tel Aviv that Israel cooperate with UN rep sent under UK res. But recommendation conditional upon LAs refraining from submitting their own text.

/2/Telegram 2346 from USUN, November 17, reported that Mohamed Riad had called Sisco that day to give the UAR reply to Goldberg's proposal. (Ibid.) Goldberg reported the message to Rusk by telephone that morning. He commented that they were "left with the British resolution" and concluded, "We have now gone full circle." (Notes of telephone conversation with Goldberg prepared by Mildred Asbjornson, November 17, 10:22 a.m.; ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

4. Eban asked if LAs did not submit their res today whether Sovs would seek to amend UK draft. Goldberg replied this would undoubtedly happen and that, at minimum, it seemed likely effort would be made to insert "the" before "territories." Eban commented this would remove all flexibility from Israeli position.

/3/The text was transmitted in telegram 2344 from USUN, November 17. It stated the U.S. judgment that the UK draft had a good chance of getting the acquiescence of both sides and therefore a very good chance of beginning the peace-making process in the Middle East but that submission of the Argentine-Brazilian draft, which was unacceptable to the Israelis, would irreparably undermine the UK effort. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN) Telegram 2360 from USUN, November 17, reported Goldberg's meeting that day with Argentine representative Jose Mar?a Ruda. (Ibid.)

Department may wish to pass to Cairo.

Goldberg

New York, November 18, 1967, 0414Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to London, Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Tokyo, and Addis Ababa. Received at 0608Z.

2376. Subj: ME: Caradon-Goldberg Meeting.

1. Following adjournment of SC mtg PM Nov. 17 (until PM Nov. 20), Caradon and Goldberg met to review current tactical situation and prospects for UK res.

2. Caradon said SC Pres had told him he prepared go through night with mtg Nov. 20 if necessary. Caradon said he wanted to make every effort to assure that SC would in fact conclude with vote on UK res Nov. 20. To this end he seeing LAs AM Nov. 18. He said LAs were talking of "marrying texts", but that this clearly impossible for UK and he had given no indication to LAs that such marriage could be performed. He said he surprised LAs had instructions not vote today for UK text.

3. General discussion then developed on reasons contributing to current LA posture and extent to which LAs might or might not be satisfied with cosmetic changes in UK text. Sisco said Bernardes (Brazil) had said LAs committed publicly at home to LA text and that repeated requests for delays in its submission had irritated both govts. Sisco said Bernardes feels cosmetic changes would be sufficient and with them Brazil might be able co-sponsor UK text. If cosmetic changes possible, Bernardes said he prepared tell his govt result represents merger of LA and UK texts which will keep balance and get acquiescence both sides. If necessary, Brazil might then dissassociate itself from Argentina. Hope (UK) said Pinto, who played role in drafting LA text, partly responsible for firm Argentine line. He added that Gobbi, though not Ruda, had suggested cosmetic changes would be sufficient. Goldberg said problem with LAs was in NY, rather than in capitals, and Ruda (Argentina) primarily responsible for unyielding LA position.

4. To Caradon query on what to do to stop LAs, Goldberg replied this very tough problem since LA pride involved. He suggested UK be responsive if LAs really have only cosmetic changes in mind. Caradon said he did not himself think UK could change text to satisfy LAs. Once some changes made other attempts at changes would follow. If UK went back to SC Nov. 20 with new text there would be further delay. Caradon expressed hope he might convince LAs give UK text "clear run" first. Goldberg pointed out this would not be enough since UK must have LA votes. Caradon asked if LAs would not vote for UK text; Goldberg replied negatively and that this precisely the problem and reason that LAs must be nailed down. At same time, Goldberg suggested UK make strenuous efforts also with Japan and Ethiopia. Goldberg said he had requested of Tsuruoka that Japan support UK text, but that Tsuruoka had only replied he would meditate on question and decide. (Sisco said we would try to have Dept phone FonMin Miki who currently en route with Sato in US.) On Ethiopia, Pedersen said we had report from UK Amb Addis that Ethiopia instructed vote yes on India, abstain on US, and vote yes on UK text if Indian text fails. Goldberg urged Caradon make special effort with Makonnen since latter tends to waver and USSR would be after him. On France, Goldberg said Berard had said he still without final instructions. Caradon said he thought Nigeria would come along with UK.

5. Sisco conveyed to Caradon report from Rafael (Israel), who had just spoken to Gobbi (Argentina). Gobbi told Rafael Argentina under instructions to reach agreement with UK, that changes only in preamble would be satisfactory, and that LAs had no intention of touching UK language on rep's mandate, withdrawal, navigation, or belligerency. Goldberg said if cosmetics in preamble only point at issue, he thought Israel would not object. It would be far better to have such change in UK text--with possibility that LAs would co-sponsor--than be faced with tabling of LA text. Pedersen urged that UK get LAs signed on and firmly committed to text with cosmetic changes so as to head off any further amendments--particularly addition of "all the" before territories which USSR and friends will push and which will be attractive to LAs because it more like LA text than UK text. Hope asked if letter from FonMin Brown to FonMin Costa Mendez (Argentina) would be helpful. Goldberg said this would be very helpful and Pedersen suggested such letters be sent to both LAs after UK meets with LAs AM Nov 18 and gets them committed to cosmetically modified text.

6. Re Arab attitude toward UK text, Caradon said Pachachi (Iraq) and Benhima (Morocco) had urged him to stick to current text. Goldberg said we have told Ruda that we have hard info that both sides would acquiesce in UK res, but that he has remained unconvinced.

7. Sisco said it clear further delay in SC exclusively Soviet ploy. In reply Caradon query as to USSR motive, Goldberg and Pedersen said Kuznetsov seemed basically bitter and that it may be Sovs desire keep pot boiling in ME, as well as prevent either US or UK (which also would be Western) political success in SC. Caradon asked what USSR would do on vote on UK text. Goldberg said he thought USSR would go along reluctantly by abstaining.

Goldberg

Washington, November 17, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Drafted by Atherton and Lambrakis on November 16 and cleared by Davies. Copies were sent to Popper, Katzenbach, and Eugene Rostow. A notation on the memorandum indicates Rusk read it.

SUBJECT
Israel's Peace Aims

/2/Telegram 2191 from USUN, November 12, attached but not printed, transmitted the text of a communication of the same date from Eban to Goldberg, transmitting the text of a resolution approved by the Israeli Cabinet on November 8. A copy is also ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN.

Comparison of this Israeli position with earlier Israeli peace settlement objectives shows the evolution of Israel's position since the war. Specifically, the November 8 Israeli Cabinet resolution reflects a marked shift from Israel's earlier emphasis on the need for security from attack and acceptance by its neighbors to a pre-occupation with legalisms and an emphasis on the modalities of achieving such security and acceptance. In addition, freedom of passage for Israeli ships through the Suez Canal, which was not raised by the Israelis as a peace aim until some time after the end of the war, is prominently mentioned ahead of free passage through the Straits of Tiran, which was the immediate casus belli. Furthermore, paragraph 5 of the Israeli Cabinet resolution would appear to defer consideration of even a start toward solution of the refugee problem until after peace treaties are concluded.

The November 8 Israeli Cabinet resolution is in effect a prescription for "instant peace" entirely on Israel's terms. In our judgment it is patently unrealistic and a far cry from the goal recently described to Ambassador Harman by Gene Rostow. As Gene so eloquently put it, that goal as we see it is to devise arrangements binding on and accepted by the parties which, while safeguarding Israel's security, can create conditions that will transform the Middle Eastern environment over time into one in which true peace eventually becomes possible.

/3/Tab B, a column by Joseph Alsop from the November 13 Washington Post, is attached but not printed.

/4/Brackets in the source text.

/5/See Document 227.

We must, I think, assume that the Israeli Cabinet resolution of November 8 is not simply a bargaining position. Viewed in the context of growing Israeli territorial appetites, I find that resolution a profoundly disturbing development. If Israel insists on pursuing the "direct negotiations" and "peace treaties" course to the exclusion of all others, then I fear we do indeed face the prospect of permanent Israeli occupation of the Arab territories now held.

/6/No record of this conversation has been found.

Washington, November 18, 1967, 2003Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Walsh; cleared by Goldberg, Battle, Sisco, and Katzenbach; and approved by Rusk. Also sent Flash to USUN.

/2/Telegram 982 from Cairo, November 18, reported that Al Ahram editor Mohamed Heikal had told Bergus that morning that the UAR Government had studied with great interest the remarks Bergus had made to Salah Hassan on November 13 (see footnote 6, Document 521), and that Nasser had asked him to ascertain whether the U.S. Government would give the same measure of political and diplomatic support to the UK draft resolution that it had committed itself to do with regard to the U.S. draft resolution. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/UN)

You are authorized give Heykal for passage to Nasser categoric affirmative to his inquiry whether USG would give same measure of political and economic support to UK draft resolution presently before SC that it committed itself to do with regard US draft resolution.

/3/Telegram 989 to Cairo, November 18, reported that in a meeting between Bergus and El Feki, the latter discussed the "need for very minor adjustments" in the language of the UK draft resolution and told Bergus that it was essential that the UAR Government be assured that the U.S. Government would give the same support to the implementation of the UK draft resolution as it had promised to give to the U.S. resolution. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

/4/Telegram 992 from Cairo, November 19, reported that the substance of telegram 71775 had been delivered to Heikal and the Foreign Office. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

Rusk

Washington, November 18, 1967, 2155Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Walsh; cleared by Goldberg, Sisco, Battle, and Katzenbach; and approved by Rusk. Also sent Flash to Paris and repeated to Amman and USUN.

/2/The message was drafted in New York. Telegram 2384 from USUN, November 18, transmitted the text and requested that it be delivered to King Hussein. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

"1. We wish His Majesty to know of our appreciation for determined effort he made in New York to obtain successful outcome of negotiations on Middle East resolution. We regret it did not prove possible for agreement to be reached on US resolution. We wish King specifically to know that both in conversation with Riad and in public statement Ambassador Goldberg made in SC, US stated its willingness to make amendments to the US draft discussed with His Majesty. UAR, however, refused to agree to US resolution as so amended.

2. Since that time and largely as result inconclusive result those efforts, UK has presented another resolution, of which His Majesty no doubt fully informed.

3. We have concluded in circumstances that UK resolution should be adopted without change and that it can be basis for constructive action in area with assistance of a UN representative. US is correspondingly prepared to vote for UK resolution. We would also be prepared to extend our diplomatic and political support to UN representative under that resolution, inasmuch as we consider it to be consistent with President's speech of June 19, which remains our policy.

FYI: Ambassador Goldberg said in SC on November 9 with respect to US resolution:

'On behalf of my Government, I pledge to the SC and to the parties concerned that our diplomatic and political influence would be exerted under this draft resolution in support of the efforts of the UN representative to achieve fair and equitable settlement so that all in the area can live in peace, security and tranquility.'

We are prepared to give similar support to his efforts under UK resolution. End FYI.

/3/November 17.

5. We are, of course, aware that Prime Minister Talhouni has gone to Cairo. We consider this weekend to be a critical one. If UK resolution is not adopted Monday we foresee deterioration of diplomatic situation in New York from one of effort to achieve real action to one of political maneuver and argumentation. We would not see such development as being useful to Jordan or indeed to anyone.

6. Accordingly, USG would appreciate any further efforts His Majesty may be able to exert with Nasser this weekend. We are also conveying information regarding our support of UK resolution directly to Cairo, and urging UAR to cooperate with UN representative on this basis."

Rusk

New York, November 19, 1967, 1827Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Also sent to Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia and repeated Flash to the Department of State. Received at 1908Z.

/2/Telegram 2407 from USUN, November 19, reported the meeting that morning among Goldberg, Caradon, and Brazilian and Argentine representatives. Caradon urged Brazilian and Argentine support for the U.K. draft resolution but suggested as an alternative Brazilian and Argentine co-sponsorship of a revised resolution containing a few non-substantive changes from the U.K. draft. (Ibid.) Telegram 2403 from USUN, November 19, conveyed the text of the proposed alternative draft. (Ibid.)

1. We have firm evidence that while both sides still may try to get changes they will acquiesce in UK text unchanged and cooperate with UN rep. In this connection, as part of supporting evidence, please point out that UAR has had four full days to convey to UK its unwillingness to cooperate with UN rep on basis of its text, and it has not done so. Moreover, based on all info we have both sides will go along with UK res and receive UN rep based on this text.

2. There is no doubt that 9 necessary votes will be available in support of UK text if Argentina and Brazil go along. In fact, there is good chance of unanimous support for UK text. UK, which has been doing the lobbying in capitals for its text, can convey such voting info.

/3/See footnote 2 above.

4. You should point out that UAR has announced today resumption of diplomatic relations with UK and it is inconceivable to us that 24 hours later it would announce its non-cooperation with UN rep on basis UK text.

5. Very confidentially you should tell FonMin that Nasser has asked us in last 24 hours whether we are willing to commit our political and diplomatic support to implementation of UK text in same way in which we had made similar commitment to him on US text. We have sent Nasser categoric "yes" answer. LA reps were so told this morning.

/4/Telegram 3994 from London, November 19, reported the delivery to the King of the message transmitted in Document 532 and his reaction. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

7. You should also know that contrary to indication Quijano gave Amb that Ruda instructed to consult with US, he categorically denies he has any such instructions or indeed any instructions since Fri. Indeed he has taken great umbrage to fact we referred to your telegram indicating he is supposed to be in touch with us and that Argentina would accept UK withdrawal language. Emb should be aware that Ruda's personal involvement is increasingly interfering with discharge of what we understand to be Argentine policy and that he is sending home biased reports colored by his own personal views.

/5/Telegram 1317 from Buenos Aires, November 20, reported that the Foreign Minister had confirmed that Argentina would vote for the British draft resolution. (Ibid.)

/6/Telegram 3398 from Rio de Janeiro, November 20, reported that a Foreign Ministry official had informed the Ambassador that the Foreign Minister would recommend approval of the British draft resolution when he saw the President in the morning. (Ibid.)

Goldberg

Moscow, undated.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/UN. No classification marking but filed as an attachment to a Secret telegram, telegram 71851 to Moscow, November 20, which transmitted the text. The letter is marked "Unofficial translation." Telegram 71851 notes that Dobrynin had given the letter to Rusk that afternoon and that in his preliminary comments, Rusk pointed out that it presented certain problems of content and timing. A copy of the signed original and a translation prepared in the Department of State is filed with a covering memorandum from Read to Rostow, March 13, 1968. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, USSR, Kosygin Correspondence, Vol. I)

Dear Mr. President,

/2/Document 484.

You mention the question of the fundamentals of policy in this area. However, the latest events show that the crux of the problem is not only in the general principles but in concrete actions by one or another side in a given situation and how in fact these actions correspond to the declared principles. Nor do I think that the consideration of the position of the USSR by the American side in a distorted light can do any good.

/3/The attached draft resolution, not here printed, is similar in substance to the Soviet draft resolution introduced in the Security Council on November 20. (UN document S/8253)

Now about the general principles, that you especially stress.

The Soviet Union is vitally interested that the Near and Middle East be an area of stable peace. We are strongly opposed to turning this area into an arena of dangerous frictions and conflicts.

The Soviet Union further proceeds from the fact that the Middle East plays and will continue to play a great role in the system of world economics and in the international life. The fruits of national labor, natural resources of the Arab states and peoples, as well as services provided by them in the interests of international communications are of great importance to Europe, Asia and also to North America. We are convinced that proposals and decisions on the Middle East problem should be based first of all upon due respect to this contribution by the Arab states, irrespectively of their internal political systems. One cannot allow the aggressor to gain through his actions a prize in terms of territories which did not belong to him, or in any other form.

To take the route toward which the Israeli extremists, intoxicated by war chauvinism and wave of adventurism are now pushing, would mean to show benevolence for aggression, to defy the basic principles of justice and the U.N. Charter which bears not only our signatures but also that of Israel.

The Soviet Union stands for the acknowledgment of an undeniable right for independent national existence of all states of the Middle East, including Israel.

Political independence and territorial integrity for all the states, prevention and curbing of aggression--whoever launches it--this is the basic provision from which our policy proceeds, and in this area, too.

In this concrete situation the Soviet Government proceeds first of all from the necessity of elimination without delay of the consequences of the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries and of restoration of peace and first of all of the solution of the most acute and basic problem--the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the territories of the Arab states occupied by them.

The Soviet Union stands for peaceful and just solution of the problem of the Arab refugees on the basis of due regard to their legitimate rights and interests. The Soviet Government stands for a peaceful passage of ships of all countries through international waterways with due respect to the sovereign rights and territorial integrity of the states through which lands these waterways come.

As for the problem of limitation of the arms race in this area, its solution on the basis of elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression, naturally cannot be but welcome. We do not think, however, that the resumption of shipments of American arms to Israel--the country that has committed and is still continuing aggression against the Arab states--will contribute to the awakening of the sense of reality with the Israeli leaders. By her latest brazen war provocations Israel is obviously seeking to complicate the way to settlement, to cross out the work which is being done in the interest of arriving at some common platform. The Soviet Union proceeds and will proceed from the fact that states cannot live by a political calendar written to please Israel.

Our proposal is clear. It is necessary firstly, that the Security Council should adopt without any procrastination a decision on a withdrawal without delay of troops by the parties to the Middle East conflict to the positions they occupied before June 5, 1967, proceeding from the inadmissibility of conquest of territory by war, as well as on acknowledgment without delay of the right of all states in this area for independent national existence in the conditions of peace and security. Secondly, to proceed on the basis of such a decision by the Security Council to practical actions towards its realization.

The Soviet Government expresses its hope that within shortest period of time the parties will come from declaring the principles to their concrete implementation.

Sincerely,

A. Kosygin

[Omitted here is the text of a draft resolution.]

Washington, November 19, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, USSR, Kosygin Correspondence, Vol. I. No classification marking. The text was transmitted in telegram 71850 to Moscow, November 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/UN)

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have studied your message on the Middle East which Ambassador Dobrynin handed to Secretary Rusk this afternoon. I wish to comment immediately upon one point in your message because of its bearing upon the situation in the Security Council tomorrow.

Our delegation at the United Nations has, on instruction from me, tried to find a Security Council resolution with which both sides in the Middle East could cooperate. We attach great importance to this point since both you and we have learned that peace in the Middle East can not be imposed from the outside. We think it most unlikely that there could be a resolution which both sides would approve enthusiastically. But we have felt that it ought to be possible to draft a resolution which both sides could find tolerable. It was this purpose which lay behind the United States draft.

The United Kingdom Delegation has, however, made an additional effort and has combined several elements of various resolutions in an attempt to find a result which would enlist the cooperation of both sides. The UK draft could, we understand, obtain this cooperation. Under the circumstances, therefore, we hope very much that you can support the United Kingdom resolution in order that a UN Representative can begin the peacemaking process promptly. In our view, further delay would be highly undesirable and would prejudice chances for the peaceful solution which you and I desire.

The draft resolution which was appended to your message could not obtain the necessary cooperation of the parties. This present reply does not enter into various points raised in your message. Because of the urgency of time I am sending this immediate response to solicit your support of the United Kingdom draft. It would be our intention to use our influence in the capitals concerned to support the efforts of a United Nations Representative to find a peaceful solution in the Middle East. I am encouraged to believe that your and our views as to the general nature of that peaceful solution are not far apart.

Washington, November 20, 1967, 1916Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Popper and cleared by Battle and Kohler. Repeated to Moscow.

/2/Telegram 2408 from USUN, November 20, reported a meeting between Goldberg and Kuznetsov on November 19 in which Kuznetsov gave Goldberg a copy of the Soviet draft resolution, which he said he would table the next day. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

/3/Paragraph 20 stated Buffum's view that although the Soviets might hope to prevent adoption of the UK draft, they might also be prepared to let the Security Council adopt it with the minimal non-substantive changes required to get Latin American cosponsorship. Paragraph 21 stated Pedersen's view that the Soviet text was a platform from which the Soviets would seek to force changes in the UK text and that it might be capable of compelling change in the withdrawal paragraph; for example, the addition of the word "the" before "territories".

2. However, we see no alternative to proceeding as planned today and thereafter. Obviously, we would not want to force a vote in which UK Res would fail, but we do not believe, subject to your tactical judgment, that it is possible to bargain usefully with the Soviets over word changes at this juncture. In short, whatever the Soviet motivation turns out to be, we believe you ought to proceed as far as possible along lines already contemplated.

Rusk

New York, November 21, 1967, 1715Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 12:38 p.m.

2449. Dept pass to Moscow.

Goldberg, accompanied by Sisco, Buffum and Pedersen, had dinner with Kuznetsov Nov 20 who had with him Fedorenko, Mendelevich, Morozov, Shevchenko, and Kulebiakin. With exception of brief discussion at end of dinner, evening primarily social. Only brief reference in support of Sov position on non-use of nuclear weapons was made during evening and remainder focused exclusively on Middle East.

1. Kuznetsov, making very little reference to USSR draft, concentrated on Sov desire for "improvement in UK text." To this end, he suggested that at least word "all" be added to withdrawal para in UK text, if not "withdrawal to positions before June 5." Kuznetsov seemingly ran through his brief in a perfunctory and low key manner, made above suggestions within the context of statement that USSR and US are basically in agreement on general principles, and that USSR wants a peaceful settlement of the ME question. Stressed need for clear terms of reference and contended that question of "balance" in res depended on vantage point from which one looked at res.

/2/November 19.

3. Fedorenko told Sisco after dinner, and Shevchenko said same to Pedersen, that USSR expected SC action to be completed at Wed's meeting.

4. Comment: Our overall impression from above is that Kuznetsov, while getting a response he expected, is likely to discuss matter further with Arabs, and that whether he puts forward an amendment to withdrawal para will depend in considerable measure on Arab attitude. Fact that press report Kosygin has written to Nasser, if accurate, indicates we not out of woods yet, but we remain vigilant, active, and hopeful that we will be at our home rather than Security Council table for Thanksgiving dinner.

Goldberg

Washington, November 21, 1967, 10:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Israel, 11/1/67-2/29/68. Secret. Filed with a covering memorandum of November 24 from Saunders to Walt Rostow that summarized a portion of a conversation among Herzog, Davies, Atherton, Evron, and Saunders during lunch. Davies and Saunders pressed Herzog about Israeli attitudes toward a settlement, saying they saw two Israeli policies: one prepared to accept a compromise to get a settlement, and one that appeared designed to scuttle all chances of a settlement by hardening Israel's terms while paving the way for Israeli settlement of the captured territories. Herzog replied that the Israeli Government was deeply divided, and no one would know where the balance lay until the Cabinet had to accept or reject a specific proposal. He said his own guess was that in that moment of truth, desire for a peace settlement would be "overriding" and that those willing to gamble on a reasonable settlement would win over those who would rather bet on the physical security that they felt the current borders provided. Copies of the memorandum of conversation were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Nathaniel Davis, and Roy Atherton.

PARTICIPANTS
Yaacov Herzog, Director General of the Israeli Prime Minister's Office
Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel
Ephraim Evron, Minister of the Israeli Embassy
Walt W. Rostow
Harold H. Saunders

Herzog said he felt we could be on the road to peace in the Middle East provided three conditions were met: (1) that the Arabs be left in no doubt about the strength of Israel's military forces; (2) that the US continue to make clear to the Soviet Union that it will not tolerate further Soviet penetration in the Middle East; and (3) that the Arabs not be given the false hope of UN or other intervention on their behalf to force a settlement on Israel.

Herzog recalled his discussion with Mr. Rostow last March and noted that the June war may turn out to be the milestone in blunting the latest Soviet thrust into the Middle East. The Egyptians are backing out of Yemen and pose less of a threat in Aden. The Arabs are disillusioned with Soviet commitments. If the US stands firm in New York against the Soviet UN resolution, the Arabs will realize further that only the US has the power and influence to bring about a reasonable settlement.

Mr. Rostow said he did not disagree seriously with specific points Dr. Herzog had made, but said he would prefer a somewhat different formulation. Mr. Rostow said that, while the US obviously has an important role to play in the Middle East, what will really determine the future shape of the Middle East is more in Israel's hands than in ours. The moderates (we define them as those leaders who have rejected nationalist adventures and turned their attention to internal development) have gained ground in the Middle East over the past several years. Whether or not they continue on their course or are consumed in building for another round of Arab-Israeli fighting will depend on Israel's posture in the coming months. If these moderates find that they have no resource but to give in to popular pressures and prepare for another round of fighting, the door will be further opened to Soviet penetration. If, on the other hand, the moderates appear to have a reasonable chance of reaching an accommodation with Israel, the chances of their surviving and prospering increase markedly. This is in Israel's hands, not in ours.

Mr. Rostow went on to cite our experience in dealing with the Soviet Union elsewhere. We had found in the Berlin crisis, in Cuba and in Vietnam, that the way some of these problems get isolated is not by any direct US-USSR confrontation, but in the end by the local forces which build up around the problem area. In Latin America, for instance, Castro has been all but isolated because Latin Americans have turned their attention to bigger regional issues and have found hope in them rather than in going Castro's route.

When the conversation turned to the meaning of the Soviet introduction of its own resolution in the United Nations Security Council, Ambassador Harman suggested that the main Soviet motivation was to spoil the possibility of a settlement process getting under way and to keep the pot simmering in the Middle East. Mr. Rostow countered by saying that, although his mind remained open, two points kept him from accepting that view categorically: (1) If there is no possibility of a settlement, the Soviet Union would have to count on picking up the bill for UAR survival; (2) The USSR would have to assume that there might well be another round of fighting if there is no settlement, because of the rising trend of terrorism and likelihood of Israeli retaliation. Moscow should have learned in May and June that it can not control these forces in the Middle East and shouldn't count on being able to keep the pot just simmering without boiling over. The USSR is traditionally uncomfortable in situations it does not control.

/2/A conversation the afternoon of November 21 between Herzog and Harman and Battle is recorded in part in a memorandum of conversation and in telegram 72855 to Tel Aviv, November 22. Telegram 72855 states Battle raised the subject of recent Israel-Jordan shooting incidents, noting that in the U.S. view, they were disturbing and inherently dangerous, and that the Israeli posture before the world was "placed in jeopardy by such acts as shelling of refugee village and escalating to use of aircraft." He expressed the hope that Israel and Jordan would agree to accept UN military observers along the Jordan-Israel cease-fire line. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Further documentation related to these incidents and U.S. expressions of concern about them is ibid.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Moscow, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, USSR, Kosygin Correspondence, Vol. I. No classification marking. The letter is a translation. Dobrynin gave the letter to Kohler at 2:15 p.m. on November 21 and told Kohler that if the U.S. side could reply that day, the Soviet Government could get instructions to Kuznetsov in New York before the next day's session of the Security Council. Kohler referred to the Arab acceptance of the British resolution and "wondered why the Soviets were trying to be more Arab than the Arabs themselves." Dobrynin said he was sure that if the Arabs really did accept the British resolution the Soviets would not vote against it. Rostow sent the letter and Kohler's memorandum of his conversation with Dobrynin to the President on November 21 at 3:55 p.m. (Both ibid.)

Dear Mr. President:

We have received your letter of 19 November and have studied it attentively. I wish to remind you that in your preceding letter of 23 October it was stated in the name of the Government of the United States of America that the position of the United States on the Middle East had not undergone change in comparison with that which had been set forth at the end of the extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

If your last reply does not mean a change in your position to the detriment of the victims of aggression--the Arab States--then evidently it is necessary to reach a mutual understanding, above all on two questions:

A. The immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories of the Arab States seized by them, that is, to the lines which they occupied before 5 June of this year should be in fact ensured.

B. Israel should not make territorial claims on the other side and exploit the situation which has developed as the result of the war unleashed by them in order to take possession of foreign territories and change for its own benefit boundaries which actually existed before the conflict.

Without resolution of these problems there can be no permanent peace in the region of the Middle East in which both our countries should be interested.

It is understood that together with this there should be decided the question of immediate recognition of the rights of all states of this region to independent national existence in conditions of peace and security.

In the presence of such understanding we would not oppose the acceptance of the British Draft if, of course, it is acceptable to the Arabs. We would like to receive from you an urgent reply

.

Respectfully,

A. Kosygin

Washington, November 21, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, USSR, Kosygin Correspondence, Vol. I. No classification marking. Walt Rostow sent a draft letter to the President at 5:10 p.m. with a covering memorandum that referred to it as Rusk's draft reply, noted that the basic draft was Goldberg's, and added that Goldberg was "fully aboard." The draft is virtually identical to the letter as sent except that it did not include the second to the last paragraph, which was apparently added by the President. A paper with the text of that paragraph, with a note indicating that it was to be inserted before the last paragraph of the letter and a handwritten note stating that it was sent electronically to Ben Read at 5:40 p.m., is ibid. Kohler gave the reply to Dobrynin at 7 p.m. His memorandum of the conversation with an attached copy of the letter, identical to the one sent, is in Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Kohler/Dobrynin Memcons.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you very much for your prompt reply to my letter of November 19. I, too, am responding promptly since the Security Council is scheduled to meet tomorrow afternoon to vote on the United Kingdom draft resolution. It is imperative in the interests of early progress toward peace that a constructive result be achieved at that meeting.

The United States position on the Middle East has been consistent throughout. I explained our policy directly to you at Glassboro and I subsequently set it forth publicly in my statement of June 19. This statement continues to be the policy of the U.S.

/2/The text of Goldberg's statement in the Security Council on November 20 is in Department of State Bulletin, December 18, 1967, pp. 841-842.

Moreover, we have been informed that the key Arab States principally concerned and Israel are willing to receive a United Nations representative on the basis of the United Kingdom draft. I am sure you will agree, Mr. Chairman, that the special representative is entitled not only to cooperation from the parties but to the full support of all the members of the Security Council, permanent and elected, as he undertakes his arduous and difficult peacemaking tasks. We are prepared to extend our diplomatic and political support to the efforts of the United Nations representative under the United Kingdom resolution to achieve a fair and equitable settlement so that all in the area can live in peace, security, and tranquility. I hope that your government will be prepared to do the same.

/3/The copy of this paragraph cited in footnote 1 above contains a handwritten revision of this sentence, in which the words "in the corridors and meeting halls of the United Nations" are crossed out and the words "thousands of miles from the scene" are added. The revised language does not appear, however, in the copy of the letter Kohler gave to Dobrynin.

It is my considered view that we must not let pass this opportunity to initiate the peacemaking process. I therefore express the hope that you can join the broad consensus of the Security Council by voting for the United Kingdom resolution tomorrow.

Sincerely,

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

On November 22, 1967, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted the British draft resolution as Resolution 242 (Document 542). Before the vote the Indian representative made a statement declaring that the sponsors of the three-power draft resolution (see footnote 2, Document 511) understood the British draft to commit the Security Council to the principle of total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the June conflict, and that on the basis of that understanding, they would not press their resolution to a vote. Lord Caradon replied that the British draft resolution was a balanced whole and that to add to it or subtract from it would destroy that balance. All delegations might have their own views and interpretations and understandings, but only the resolution would be binding. The text of Caradon's statement was transmitted in telegram 2497 from USUN, November 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN) Excerpts from other statements made in the Security Council were transmitted in telegram 2518 from USUN, November 23. (Ibid.) The text of the statement made by Ambassador Goldberg after the vote is in Department of State Bulletin, December 18, 1967, pages 842-843.

Telegram 2496 from USUN, November 23, states that the U.S. delegation learned late on November 21 that the Indians planned to make a statement interpreting the British draft resolution to mean withdrawal of all Israeli forces from all Arab territories, to be specified by name, including Sharm El Sheikh, and that U.S. efforts on November 22 were directed primarily at preventing an unchallenged Indian statement of interpretation before the vote which might have upset the balance enough to prevent action. It states that in the early afternoon, the Romanians started passing the word that the Soviets would vote against the resolution unless the Indian interpretation went unchallenged, and that the U.S. delegation was not certain how the Soviets would vote until Soviet representative Kuznetsov finally raised his hand with all the other members in favor of the resolution. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

New York, November 22, 1967.

/1/Source: UN document S/RES/242. The resolution was adopted unanimously by the Security Council.

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.