Documents 26-54
26. National Security Action Memorandum No. 286/1/
Washington, March 12, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Cyprus. Confidential. A copy was sent to Komer.
TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
SUBJECT
United Nations Cyprus Force
The President has decided that the U.S. will provide troop airlift free of cost to the United Nations where countries contributing forces to the United Nations Cyprus Force are unable to furnish their own transportation. The President expects that this particular airlift will be absorbed within the airlift capability of the Department of Defense and that no additional funds will be required by the Department.
McGeorge Bundy/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
27. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, March 23, 1964, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE.
1015. During discussion this morning, Makarios reviewed recent political and military developments. Makarios thought that peak of crisis had passed, that worst difficulties were behind him and that, although further troubles could be expected, situation would improve from now on. Discussion of political and military situation revolved around three aspects:
1. Creation and establishment of PKF in Cyprus: PKF was now settled. It would become clear during next two weeks whether it would be successful or not. PKF cooperation with GOC and nature of its terms of reference were essential to success.
2. Mediator: Makarios said name of Sakari Severi Tuomioja had been suggested. Tuomioja was agreeable to GOC, Greece and Britain./2/ He had not yet heard whether he was acceptable to Turkey. Makarios said he was "pessimistic mediation would soon result in political settlement." It depended on whether Turkish Cypriots would be willing to return to their villages and not insist on some form of partition or federation. Success or failure of Mediator would begin to emerge within one month.
/2/Secretary-General Thant announced Tuomioja's appointment on March 25. For text of the statement, see U.N. Doc. S/5625 and Corr. 1.
3. Return of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to their homes and jobs: Some estimates were that there were now 6,000 displaced Greek Cypriots and 45,000 or 50,000 Turkish Cypriots and it was estimated former would increase to 20,000 and latter to 80,000 within next month or so. Makarios thought these estimates high, but nevertheless figures were substantial for Cyprus. It was important all Cypriots, especially Turkish Cypriots, have confidence in government and return to their homes and jobs. Makarios hoped those Turkish Cypriots who did not wish to do so might go to Turkey.
He said GOC would assist all Cypriots, including Turkish Cypriots, in various necessary ways to return to their homes and jobs. Cost of rebuilding homes would be formidable. Makarios hoped international financial assistance would be available. GOC had been losing one million pounds monthly in income during recent troubles and he hoped it would soon be possible resume development program.
I said attitude of GOC toward needy Cypriots, including Turkish Cypriots, was most statesmanlike and would indicate to world GOC was ready to take care of all of its people rather than only one segment.
I added I had been disappointed, following my return from US, to read articles in Greek Cypriot press indicating US activities were being curtailed and Greek Cypriots being let go for purpose of bringing economic pressure on GOC. This type of analysis was wholly inaccurate. I wished to assure him there had been no change in attitude of USG toward Cyprus and that we continued ready to help Cyprus with its economic development as we could within scope of our resources.
It had been necessary to suspend some programs such as Peace Corps and to curtail others such as technical assistance for time being because American staff could not function in many parts of Cyprus because of present difficulties and because Greek Cypriot press continued to foment anti-Americanism by charging that US was pro-Turkish. Fact of matter was US was not only friendly to Turkey, but also to Greece and to Britain and especially to Cyprus. I hoped Makarios would use his influence with press to explain true American attitude and thus bring stop to this unfriendly criticism which might have unsettling effect on friendly relations which had been built up between US and Cyprus over years.
Makarios said he understood true situation and realized US had always been friendly to Cyprus. Makarios ducked issue of Greek Cypriot press by saying American press (especially Christian Science Monitor) seemed to be unfriendly to Cyprus. I commented it was not exactly fair comparison. Greek Cypriot press might be expected to respond to suggestions from him more readily than American press would respond to suggestions from us.
Wilkins
28. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus/1/
Washington, March 28, 1964, 2:54 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Gordon D. King; cleared by NEA, UNP, and BNA; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Ankara and repeated to Athens, London, and USUN.
699. Ankara's 1254 to Dept; Nicosia's 1035 to Dept; Nicosia's 1039 to Dept./2/ Agree with Embassy Nicosia's conclusion reftel that Makarios' action in appointing acting ministers to replace Turks designed underscore Turk non-participation and strengthen formal GOC control Turkish-allocated ministries. This connection, Cyprus UN PermRep Rossides has informed SC President that civil servants who "deliberately refuse report to office" could not expect "continue indefinitely be paid out of public funds".
/2/Telegram 1254 from Ankara, March 27, reported Turkish press reaction to Makarios' refusal to permit Denktash to return to Cyprus. (Ibid.) Telegram 1035 from Nicosia, March 27, reported that Makarios' appointment of "temporary" ministers appeared to avoid violation of the Cypriot Constitution. (Ibid., POL 15 CYP) Telegram 1039 from Nicosia, March 28, reported negative Turkish Cypriot reaction to Makarios' actions. (Ibid.)
Timing these Greek-Cypriot tactics is interesting. Makarios apparently fully understands that (1) Turk-Cypriots could strengthen their case and weaken his by participation, (2) that such participation was not likely while security forces were primarily GOC and British, and (3) that formal establishment UNFICYP is strategic moment for Kutchuk to insist on participation. He appears to have made moves re Denktash and acting minister appointments to goad Turks into frittering away energies in protests and legal arguments until opportunity has passed. Makarios' tactics will probably succeed if Turk-Cypriots continue to sit on hands and feel sorry for themselves.
If Kutchuk would return to his office because of UN presence, he could be serious embarrassment to Makarios. Even if Makarios could insist successfully that all measures of GOC taken during Kutchuk's absence are legal and not subject to Vice-President's veto, he would have difficulty not forwarding future bills or measures to Kutchuk as required by constitution. His only effective alternatives would appear to be: (1) to maintain that Kutchuk was rebel who tried to set up separate Turk-Cypriot administration and therefore had lost authority in government (difficult argument to sustain if GOC has, as it claims, been sending invitations to Kutchuk and other Turk-Cypriot officials to attend scheduled meetings) or (2) to maneuver Turk-Cypriots into holding back from participation until too late.
He appears to be operating under second alternative. With each passing day that his tactics perpetuate Turk-Cypriots boycott of government, he increases general acceptance GOC as presently constituted, strengthens his contention that Turk-Cypriots are insurgents and weakens ability UN to remain neutral between two communities.
In this connection, British Embassy informs us GOT has asked HMG to intercede with Makarios and protest to UNSYG on behalf Denktash. HMG has informed GOT British forces Cyprus part of UNFICYP and they cannot make independent intercessions with GOC. (FYI. UKUN, however, has been instructed to call Denktash problem to attention SYG on humanitarian grounds. End FYI.) Turk Embassy informed Dept of GOT concern re Denktash but made no request for USUN action and Dept plans none.
For Nicosia: Explore problem with UK HICOM and in your discretion reiterate points made in Deptel 668/3/ to Kutchuk and Turk-Cypriot leaders as to advantage renewed participation government. Re Rossides claim regarding payments, would appreciate clarification on situation since other reports indicate Turks paying relief because no salaries paid by GOC to absentee Turk-Cypriots./4/
/3/Telegram 668 to Nicosia, March 18, stressed the need to get Turkish Cypriot support for UNFICYP. (Ibid., POL 23-8 CYP)
/4/In telegram 1051 from Nicosia, April 1, the Embassy reported the British believed that Turkish Cypriot leaders preferred partition as a solution and would avoid returning to the Cabinet. It also reported that Turkish Cypriot civil servants who failed to report to work were not being paid. (Ibid.)
For Ankara: In your discretion, discuss Turk-Cypriot non-participation further with GOT. We would be interested any indications GOT is planning or willing actively push Turk-Cypriot leadership into participation./5/
/5/In telegram 1278 from Ankara, the Embassy reported Turkish assurances that they were urging Turkish Cypriot Ministers to rejoin meetings of the Makarios government. (Ibid.)
Rusk
29. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, April 7, 1964, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN.
1078. Cyprus mediation. Deptel 707./2/ Department may recall that during 1959 Constitution-drafting period I was reporting from Nicosia that Rube Goldberg contraption could work, but only given magnanimity on part of Greeks and good will from all.
/2/Telegram 707 to Nicosia, April 1, stressed the Department of State's desire for a quick solution to the Cyprus problem and requested comments on the shape of a permanent political solution to the Cyprus question. (Ibid.)
So much has happened since then to show that neither quality has many exponents on this unhappy island that another attempt at a patchwork solution can only breed further trouble. Situation obviously calls for drastic action involving major effort by NATO allies to support solution based on security needs of area, but also recognizing generally accepted democratic principle of majority rule.
Our own ideas as to once-for-all (para 5 Deptel 707) solution somewhat like Alexander's approach to Gordian Knot, although without resultant "partition" as in myth. Our recommendations will require considerable selling to GOT since we are proposing recognize Greek Cypriot ascendancy and intransigence and their insistence on a solution in accord with generally accepted standards of self-determination based on majority rule. On this basis following proposals submitted as outline of plan designed achieve over-all peace and security in area.
1. Constitutional framework providing for one person-one vote majority rule, with elections on basis of proportional representation.
2. Adequate safeguards for minorities (perhaps as with Swedes in Finland).
3. Cyprus to be tied to Greece either by enosis or in some "associated" status such as Puerto Rico. Greece would at minimum control foreign policy and defense, perhaps leaving other facets of government to Cypriots.
Would seem that only through some such device could GOT be convinced that security interests being preserved and safeguarded. Do not see how independent Cyprus with strong Communist Party organization could be accepted by Turks. Cyprus could continue to be "used" in one way or another as shuttlecock in Soviet-Western cold war in the area. Only as part of Greece and thereby included in NATO security system could GOT fears be mitigated. Part of such concept could be transferring of Izmir joint Greek-Turkish headquarters to one of British bases (probably Dhekelia) and UK giving up sovereignty over all or most of area in favor of NATO base on sovereign "Greek" territory.
Whatever Mediator may propose that would be acceptable to Greek Cypriots in their present ascendant position will require major selling effort with Turks, and in this respect Greek Ambassador Delivanis correct in his statement to Ambassador Wilkins (Embtel 1070)/3/ that US must play major persuasive role--but this does not mean that efforts other NATO partners will not be needed.
/3/Telegram 1070 from Nicosia, April 5, reported that Delivanis appeared to be taking a harder political line after his return from consultations in Athens. (Ibid., POL 17 GR-CYP)
Further factor which Embassy considers essential to any lasting solution is some form of assisted emigration for Turks who are convinced they can no longer live with Greeks in Cyprus. This should involve setting up of commission to handle transfer of properties on equitable basis as well as other details of moves, including some provision for compensation for damages. Agree with Department's observations para 3 Deptel re best course of action for Mediator except with regards manner handling proposals once formulated. Experience with Cyprus "solutions" which presented publicly or leaked in some fashion not encouraging in past and no reason believe one or other side would not act same way now, particularly given existing inflamed and emotional situation.
At very least, believe proposals should be worked out and accepted by GOG and GOT (USUN's 3598 to Department)/4/ before being "surfaced" in effort bring international pressure on Cypriots. (This would require support of Erkin's desire for Greek-Turkish "summit" meeting--Ottawa's 1270 to Department.)/5/
/4/Telegram 3598 from USUN, April 2, reported USUN's belief that the mediation should be carried forward with a minimum of public comment. (Ibid., POL 23-8 CYP)
/5/Telegram 1270 from Ottawa, April 1, reported that the Canadian Government was interested in an active U.S. mediation role in Cyprus. (Ibid.)
We must bear in mind how sensitive is Cypriot pride and how convinced Greeks here are of right and justice their cause--and that they can win out eventually even if this means going to UNGA.
In summary, advantages we see in enosis or "associated" status would be:
1. Tie Cyprus firmly to West, thus eliminating security concerns of UK, Turkey and ourselves.
2. Reduce danger of further growth of Communism on island.
3. End nuisance of Cypriot "neutralist" foreign policy maneuvering.
4. Remove constant irritant in Greek politics and same time weaken Soviet ability exploit issue in Greece.
5. Effect set-back for Soviet (and UAR) policy in area, which is adamantly opposed to enosis.
6. Give us friendly government with which to negotiate satisfactory status for our communications facilities./6/
/6/In telegrams 1510 from Athens, April 8, and 1315 from Ankara, April 8, the Embassies reported similar conclusions: that either independence or enosis was the only likely solution to the Cyprus issue and that union with Greece would require political concessions to Turkey. (Ibid.)
Belcher
30. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, April 8, 1964, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN.
1085. In conversation yesterday with Acting FonMin Soulioti, she brought up role of Mediator. She said GOC had not as yet made any contribution in way of written draft, although she admitted that two statements by Makarios to govt mouthpiece Cyprus news agency (reported separately)/2/ could be interpreted as laying groundwork for Mediator's understanding of GOC position.
/2/In telegram 1084 from Nicosia, April 8. (Ibid., POL 15-1 CYP)
For instance, they had not prepared any new draft Constitution, although some thought had been devoted to this. She indicated her preoccupation with certain difficulties involved in persuading Turkish Cypriots and GOT accept Greek Cypriot line regarding "adequate safeguards for minority." She said it all very well to spell out minority rights including free access to government jobs on basis of merit, etc., etc., but when it came to describing method of guaranteeing application these rights, she ran up against seemingly insuperable difficulties. What recourse would Turks have in event they claimed discrimination? Constitutional Court had not proved effective under old regime and no reason believe it would necessarily be so under any new setup. International supervisory group for appeals would be distasteful infringement of sovereignty and difficult sell to Greek Cypriots. She admitted to sense of frustration, particularly since she recognized how vital this aspect of problem was.
I agreed that under present circumstances of distrust and consequent lack of confidence, it would be difficult persuade Turks that law would be administered impartially, but suggested that there must be numerous examples in other countries where experience of minority problems could be drawn upon. In fact, experience of Swedish minority in Finland might be instructive. I also took opportunity to play on old theme of restoration of confidence in Turkish community by cessation of harassment of Turks attempting to move in Nicosia area. I said I recognized there was harassment on both sides, but with UN here, surely government could assume posture of magnanimity and put onus for continuation of efforts keep two communities apart on Turks. Mrs. Soulioti agreed that this might be useful gambit, but that there had been a continued hardening of Greek attitude towards Turkish community in view of unwillingness see UN open Kyrenia Road and restore freedom of access Iozablesia itself. I commented that I too had noted an increasingly hard line in talking to Ministers and other leading members of Greek Cypriot community.
This took form of maintaining that until such time as there was political settlement satisfactory to Greeks or at least until Turkish community here recognized fact that GOC was undisputed government, there was no possibility of Turkish Ministers or even Turkish civil servants returning to work. Mrs. Soulioti said that she did not go this far, but that unless there was freedom of access for Greeks who have legitimate business in present Turkish-controlled areas. (i.e., area north of Nicosia and Kyrenia Road), she saw no reason why Turks should be allowed come back to work in government in Greek area. (This strong attitude reflects position taken by Makarios in farewell conversation with Ambassador Wilkins and me reported in Embtel 1060.)/3/
/3/Dated April 2. (Ibid., POL 1 CYP-US)
I find it very disturbing that Greek Cypriots seem determined push on with hard line. We note series of event such as refusal allow Denktash free access to Cyprus, appt of acting Ministers, treaty denunciation, pressure on Turk Army contingent all seemingly designed with some idea of "unconditional surrender" and thereby complicating already almost impossible problem faced by Mediator.
Both Ambassador Wilkins and I have preached rather forlornly a policy of moderation and restoration of confidence with Makarios as well as his Ministers.
Would it not be desirable do what we can to reinforce presumed GOG desires to do same when Archbishop visits Athens this weekend?
Following telegram gives our assessment reasons for visit at this time./4/
/4/In telegram 1086 from Nicosia, April 8, Belcher reported that Makarios' proposed visit was apparently part of a Greek campaign to pressure him into a more moderate line that would also meet the demands of more pro-enosis Ministers in his Cabinet. (Ibid., POL 7 CYP) Makarios visited Greece April 11-15.
Belcher
31. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, April 10, 1964, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia and Thessaloniki.
1527. 1. I called on PriMin today at his home to introduce Anschuetz, new DCM.
Conversation devoted largely to Cyprus. I expressed our satisfaction along lines of Dept's 1172/2/ for Papandreou's restrained reaction to recent Turkish moves (i.e. abrogation 1930 Treaty etc.)/3/ and stressed need continued moderation on Greek side, particularly since events moving in Greek favor. I said in order create conditions conducive to ultimate settlement it essential that damage to Turkish prestige be held to minimum and that his cooperation in restraining Makarios this regard would be essential. I pointed out that US had made conscious effort following Cuban crisis to spare Khrushchev as much humiliation as possible.
/2/Telegram 1172, April 9, instructed the Embassy to suggest that Papandreou extend an "olive branch" to Turkey in order to facilitate a favorable settlement of the Cyprus issue. (Ibid.)
/3/The 1930 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. (125 LTS 371)
2. PriMin agreed emphatically. He said that in his recent message to Inonu--which he said was verbal one--he had stated that he recognized Cyprus presented Turkish Govt with foreign and domestic political problems (as it did for Greece), that it was difficult for either country to retreat publicly from respective positions, but that two countries must think of overall general interests in reaching final settlement. Message emphasized importance to both countries of continued Greek-Turkish friendship and that it was essential to resolve Cyprus question in order that these relations could continue. Papandreou said that Inonu had agreed but had commented that Cyprus treaties must be honored.
3. I reiterated importance of preventing Makarios from following line which would only provoke Turks. In reply, PriMin said he agreed completely, and said that he now has established "complete discipline" over Makarios. He asserted he regretted Makarios' trip to Athens at present time,/4/ so soon after Makarios' denunciation of alliance treaties, since it might be considered "conspiracy" between two leaders. PriMin said his own prestige was now at high point in Cyprus itself. In response to question he expressed opinion that if vote for enosis were held in Cyprus now, it would be unanimously supported by Cypriot public, whereas two months ago--before his accession to power--Greece's position was such that majority would have opposed enosis.
/4/See footnote 4, Document 30.
4. I said I hoped he would caution Makarios about taking any action against Turkish unit on island. He agreed, and said he had already forbidden Makarios to do such thing and would reaffirm this warning when they met. Papandreou said he was holding Makarios responsible for the irregular Greek-Cypriot forces as well as the police. The PriMin said his plan was for Greek unit to remain in its camp (to which it had already retired) and then for the UN to pressure the Turks to do same--in this way, he pointed out, Turks would be isolated if they refused to follow suit.
5. PriMin in his frequent references to Makarios spoke disparagingly of Archbishop. He said laughingly that while Makarios was concerned with personal, temporal triumph, he preferred that Makarios be a sacrifice to "the cause of Hellenism," following which he would be prepared to accord Makarios a hero's role in Hellenic history. Papandreou continued that vis-?-vis himself Makarios had lost greatly in recent weeks. When Anschuetz noted that Makarios had met recently with Bishop of Kyrenia,/5/ PriMin said this was proof of Makarios' present weak position, since Bishop was Makarios' old rival, and never in the past would he have consented to meet with him.
/5/Bishop Kyprianos, a strong proponent of enosis.
Concerning role for Grivas, Papandreou said he preferred not to have General go to island since he would rally support against Makarios and thus divide Cypriot struggle. He said it was essential that unity be preserved.
6. PriMin then went on to discuss his policy for Cyprus. He said that in order not provoke Turks he would not push for enosis at this point, or even self-determination. Rather, he would press idea of "independence" which he felt was principle that no one could oppose. The new character of this independence would necessitate the abolishment of all recent treaties which had been proved unworkable. However, the final settlement should provide full and complete rights for minority, protected by international guarantees. Self-determination and enosis would follow naturally since independent state could take any action it wished. He noted that Krishna Menon, in UN, had spoken against enosis, and that world opinion would be solidly behind principle of independence but might balk at enosis with Greece as part of settlement. By demanding complete independence rather than enosis or self-determination defeat for Turks would be softened and victory for Makarios would be more modest. PriMin seemed to feel enosis would be even less palatable to Turks at present time than solution based on "independence."
7. Papandreou said he would cooperate with us in policy of "moderation" re Cyprus question. However, he stressed again need for quick settlement, since "time hurts." He said he had told Makarios, and he would repeat it, that Greek Cypriots must avoid all provocation and that, even if a Greek is killed, not to make reprisal but call upon UN. He emphasized that policy of Greek Govt was "peace" and he would make every effort to achieve that goal. PriMin said we must give full support to UN Mediator in his effort to find "democratic" solution.
8. PriMin then went on to stress importance for West of a quick end to Cyprus question. He said it was unfortunate that Cypriot crisis had occurred at all since it had given Khrushchev opportunity to pose as champion of people struggling for liberty, while US and Britain were cast in light of opposing it. He continued that Communists had exploited this fact to hilt, not only in Greece and Cyprus, but throughout world and had scored point in world ideological battle. He noted that Khrushchev in particular had increased his prestige by supporting the "peaceful way" against Chinese on one hand while posing as champion of liberation movement on other. The longer the Cyprus crisis remains unsettled the greater the gain to international Communism.
9. At this point Papandreou noted newspaper report of a possible Khrushchev visit to Cyprus. He said he was going to tell Makarios such a visit was completely out of question.
10. PriMin said he was deeply pleased by fact Greek public opinion undergoing change for better in recent weeks regarding Americans due to report about change in UN policy towards Cyprus. He said he understood perfectly difficulty of US position, which was to steer impartial course between two trusted allies and he could understand our reluctance to take sides. However, as between two friends this policy could only be determined on basis essential merits of case and justice of cause. In case of Cyprus it was impossible for 18 percent of population in Cyprus to run country at expense of majority 82 percent.
11. PriMin said he was concerned about position Greek communities in Turkey, but he did not think it fruitful to talk of exodus of Istanbul Greeks. Concerning Patriarch, he said he personally would not mind transfer of the Patriarchy to Mt. Athos, but that the Communists were pushing for the expulsion of the Patriarch, so that Moscow could lay claim to world leadership of Orthodoxy. This, he said, made him uneasy, since religion was one of main stakes in world ideological battle between Communists and democracy.
12. PriMin then launched attack against British policy in Cyprus. While he understood US position, he could not understand British, which had been "frantically" pro-Turkish. When I noted Turks were criticizing British also, he said that was because Turks wanted even more support. He referred in passing to newspaper reports that British had undermined MacArthur position against Chinese in Korea and added that British policy could not be trusted.
Comment: PriMin was in great form and did most of the talking in 75 minute session. His optimistic mood reflects the feeling here that the Greek cause is winning out. We believe we must take with a grain of salt his assertions about his control over Makarios until we have more proof of it than we have at the moment. He seemed acutely aware of the domestic Turkish problem regarding Cyprus which I think explains moderation of Greek responses up to present point. On other hand, it seemed clear that he had done little thinking about ways to sweeten pill for Turks if final settlement goes against Turk interests.
We have reservations about Papandreou's estimate of preference for solution based on independent Cyprus rather than on union with Greece. His policy seems designed more to satisfy Afro-Asian bloc and exigencies of UN tactics rather than to appease Turks. We interpret his solution as meaning that under circumstances, "independence" solution would be enforced by weight of UN opinion and thereby hopefully avoid direct confrontation between Greece and Turkey which would be provoked by solution based on self-determination or enosis.
Labouisse
32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey/1/
Washington, April 11, 1964, 4:27 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Helseth, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Nicosia and USUN and repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Oslo, and Athens.
1076. Acting Secretary Ball gave following response to Turk Ambassador's request for US views on Turk Government's intention request SC consideration recent developments on Cyprus:
1. Question of calling SC meeting essentially GOT decision. USG would not oppose meeting if GOT decides call SC. However, we do not see constructive results; in fact, we see risk discussion might be turned against Turks and in particular focus on position Turk contingent. In that event, we are not sure SC action would be a good one, since SC might insist on Turk contingent's returning to barracks.
2. We have considered whether there are ways in which we could limit SC consideration to debate and airing of issue. We doubt SC consideration can be limited to this. Our Embassy in Ankara indicates your Government has in mind a simple res making it clear Makarios is offending party. We doubt such res could be obtained. At best, res would be even-handed exhortation to both sides and, more likely, res would seek to pressure GOT move its contingent to barracks.
3. As result careful study and appraisal, we suggest following steps as alternatives:
a. that GOT send letter for circulation to Members SC stating its views and reserving right to call meeting at later date;
b. that GOT continue its informal d?marches with SYG in New York and with Gyani, with view to bringing end to incidents and pressing UN take action to find ways give relief to some localities where Turk-Cypriots find themselves in difficult position;
c. in view indications that SYG appreciates Turk concern over pullback to barracks, perhaps GOT should make counter-proposal to UN which might be suggestion that Turk contingent move into encampment near road rather than into barracks;
d. USG will increase our consultation efforts both in New York and in Nicosia to be as helpful as possible. In particular, USG prepared press UN see what further it can do with respect Turk localities and villages under siege and to urge UN have its force interpret its mandate as vigorously as possible. In addition, we would consider any other steps that GOT might develop.
4. We see certain encouraging signs, perhaps because we in position get more accurate information than Turk Ambassador in Nicosia and perhaps because of our close relations with Gyani. These include:
a. while it true UN plans use joint patrols employing Greek-Cypriot policemen in Greek quarters, UN also plans use Turk-Cypriot policemen in Turk quarters;
b. UN seeking increase number its forces and to get them in place as well as develop a non-Cypriot police contingent which should contribute further to stabilizing situation. (specific mention was made of Austrian police increment);
c. UN has stated its readiness to provide adequate security for Turk members of Government so that Vice President and Ministers can attend meetings, although we recognize impediments Makarios has placed in this regard;
d. we understand your Government has now received confirmation that UN force, and not Cypriot police, has taken over one road.
Menemencioglu responded he pleased hear about international police contingent. Police force currently monopoly Greek-Cypriots. Constitution provides for 2,000 police force, of which 600 should be Turk-Cypriots. Turk-Cypriots no longer in force, and Makarios had illegally increased size of police force by 5,000 without consultation with Vice President. Ambassador understood Gyani had said he could accept as legitimate police with appropriate authority only those persons who had card identifying themselves as such issued by Makarios. Ambassador said it obvious no Turk-Cypriots could obtain such a card from Makarios and that, therefore, no Turk-Cypriot could be recognized by Gyani as policeman, even former 600 Turk policemen.
Talbot said he assumed UN would not have told us they would use Turk police unless they had plans to do so. (Would appreciate USUN and Nicosia comment on question UN acceptance of cards issued by Makarios as evidence member of police force. If this is system envisaged, how can Turk-Cypriot police obtain card?)
Menemencioglu said his Government very unhappy and worried about Makarios' visit Athens. GOC seeking Greek assistance in getting Turk contingent off island. In response Acting Secretary's question, Ambassador said his Government views possibility Grivas return Cyprus as serious. Ambassador continued he personally very unhappy with Greek Government's actions. He said GOG had at no time condemned Makarios' actions; in fact, Papandreou had encouraged Makarios by saying Greeks would stand with Cypriots to the end. No Greek has said anything against the bloody actions of Makarios. It is Papandreou, he continued, who brought Makarios and Grivas together. Situation would be grave if Grivas went Cyprus since it would mean encouragement of military action. GOG should emulate GOT action following anti-Greek riots Istanbul 1955 when GOT condemned these riots, paid damages, passed parliamentary res against action, and had Greek flag, which torn down during riots, raised with military honors by Cabinet Minister. GOG has not acted this way, and has instead closely associated itself with Makarios with result that situation in Cyprus now out of hand. In conclusion, Ambassador said emphatically that Makarios should not do anything rash about Turkish contingent.
Ambassador said he would convey USG views to his Government, which he was sure would be most appreciative. In particular, GOT would appreciate our increased activity at the UN and in Nicosia. He would also hope this would include Athens. Acting Secretary said we have in mind further consultations with Greek Government.
Acting Secretary stated that Belcher arriving Ankara Monday for two-day visit. He believed Belcher should have opportunity discuss current situation with GOT. (Ankara please arrange appropriate meetings with Turk officials for Belcher.)
Comment: While we agree final para Ankara's 1335,/2/ unlikely, as indicated above, SC meeting could be limited and directed in order obtain results GOT wants. You may wish convey above position to Erkin. All addressees may use appropriately with respective Foreign Offices or in event Turkish d?marche.
/2/Telegram 1335, April 10, reported Erkin's views on the possibility of successful Cyprus negotiations. The final paragraph reads: "In this context, projected SC meeting, despite our reservations, might be used to advantage if properly directed and also afford appropriate opportunity for us to reassert our interest." (Ibid.)
Menemencioglu seemed gratified receive alternative proposals.
Ball
33. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/
Washington, April 14, 1964, 7:08 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Buffum and Moffitt, cleared by Jernegan and Sisco, and approved by Sisco. Also sent to Ankara and Nicosia and repeated to London, Athens, Stockholm, Dublin, Ottawa, Helsinki, Copenhagen, and to USDOCOSouth (Naples) for POLAD.
2670. Re Cyprus. For USUN: Following aspects of Cyprus situation give cause for concern. In view seriousness of problem, including current reports Turkish contingent under fire, request you raise matter directly with SYG. (Nicosia's 1114/2/ just received reinforces this concern.)
/2/Telegram 1114 from Nicosia, April 14, transmitted the "terms of reference" for UNFICYP. (Ibid.)
1. While Dept considers Aide-m?moire (S/5653)/3/ issued by SYG generally good directive to UN Force, we both surprised and concerned by that section which deals with reaction of UNFICYP when unit arrives at scene of actual conflict. As we understand para, it would in effect give both parties veto over effective UNFICYP action in circumstances described. Either side could refuse interposition of UN Force, and whoever enjoyed advantage at time likely do so, thereby nullifying UN's peacekeeping potential. We disagree with Narasimhan's view that UNFICYP mandate less broad than that of UNOC. March 4 Resolution calls upon UN Force prevent recurrence fighting and contribute to restoration and maintenance law and order and return normal conditions. Certainly this mandate sufficiently broad permit UNFICYP unit commanders insist on cease-fire and, if this refused, interpose force between combatants or take any other action necessary end fighting. We recall that Bunche explicitly envisaged this possibility in conversation with Yost March 16. (Urtel 3400)/4/
/3/Dated April 10; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 573-575.
/4/Telegram 3400 from USUN, March 16, reported the intention of U.N. officials to interpose UNFICYP troops between the factions in Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
We understand, of course, that document having been made public, it not feasible get it modified on public record in near future. We would hope, however, that in actual practice UNFICYP will exert every reasonable effort in stopping violence. Perhaps this could be accomplished by insuring that Gyani encouraged interpret liberally phrase interposition should not "normally" be done if not acceptable to those involved in conflict. It is for him to determine what is norm for situation. At minimum he should be given to understand he has broad flexibility in interpreting force directive. Should be emphasized to Thant that, if UN Force action limited as in para cited above, this would practically give Greek Cypriots carte blanche to bring Turk Cypriot community to its knees since they enjoy such numerical superiority. Clearly this is not intent of SC res.
(Dept notes Rolz-Bennett statement UNFICYP directives stronger than those of UK Force. This does not appear to square with our understanding of role UK troops during Limassol and Ktima episodes and explicit UK authority to fire on individuals crossing truce line in Nicosia. You may wish check this with UKUN.)
2. Dept disturbed also by almost daily eruptions fighting in Cyprus and fact that Greek Cypriot forces apparently continue move about at will in their campaign against Turk Cypriots. These forces today estimated to number 15,000, or more than twice planned strength of UNFICYP. (Rolz-Bennett assertion UN Force now at 7,000 does not agree with our figures which place operational strength at less than 5,500.) We recognize impracticability seeking disarm Greek Cypriot forces. We believe, however, that unless they are soon disbanded or otherwise stopped from continuing their campaign against Turk Cypriots, UNFICYP will not be able successfully carry out its mission. We believe Makarios cannot be permitted flout SC res and intent by continuing maintain or utilize what amounts to small army of armed guerrillas. GOC accepted terms of SC res and should be held to them. We think that Thant should make an appeal to Makarios, either publicly or privately. There is urgent need as deterrent, lest situation get out of hand, for some concrete step by UN demonstrating its intent take vigorous action.
As you note (USUN 3719),/5/ Ankara becoming disillusioned with UN role in Cyprus, and we can expect further protests from GOT unless UN acts effectively re guerrilla force. Dept would make same points re Turk irregulars but would be unrealistic call for their disbandment while numerically superior Greek Cypriots move about with impunity. We recognize number of recent incidents actually provoked by Turk Cypriots, but feel burden of evidence makes clear Greek Cypriot intention bend Turk Cypriots to their will.
/5/Telegram 3719 from USUN, April 13, reported the U.N. estimate of the military situation on Cyprus and on subsequent discussions of Yost with Turkish officials. (Ibid.)
3. We note (USUN's 3719) that SYG is continuing his efforts bring Greek and Turkish contingents under Gyani's command and Eralp statement GOT would accept this provided Turk contingent not ordered to return to barracks. We see immediate problem as need to move Turk contingent from Kyrenia road area making it possible open this road to regular traffic. We understand UN prepared assure GOT that road, which runs through Turk business and residential areas, would be patrolled by UN Force and not Greek Cypriot police. We can appreciate SYG's unwillingness publicly accept any conditions to placing contingent under UN command. We feel might accomplish this through suggestion you have already made, i.e., that contingent not be asked return to barracks but be permitted encamp in location which would clear Kyrenia road without forcing GOT lose face by appearing bow to UN request which essentially same as that made by Makarios on March 29 prior to repudiating Treaty of Alliance.
Dept feels it important that problem of Turk contingent be resolved quickly. Ankara has put Makarios on notice that any move against contingent would bring vigorous response. Although GOG appears understand serious consequences any incident involving contingent and has probably made this clear to Makarios, there is always possibility fractious Greek Cypriot irregulars who not completely controllable may provoke situation to which Ankara would feel called on react.
Please also suggest that SYG defer publication next report to SC if possible until GOT responds to our suggestions re putting its contingent under Gyani.
Request you inform Eralp of efforts we making with UN and urge he strongly recommend to Ankara that GOT adopt liberal attitude toward placing Turkish contingents under UN command.
For Ankara: You authorized inform GOT we making repeated demarches with UN in effort assure that SC res of March 4 equitably implemented and that Turks on Cyprus given fair play. With GOT suggest you stress generally satisfactory nature of force directive, which Eralp has also recognized (see USUN's tel 3719).
In addition to standard urging that Turks do nothing rash now that UNFICYP nearing full effectiveness, you should strongly urge GOT agree give serious consideration to making counter proposals re location of Turk force which mentioned to Turk Ambassador Saturday by Acting Secretary Ball./6/ There may be other ways that Turks can develop to put force under Gyani without requiring it return barracks.
/6/See Document 32.
For Nicosia: Request you maintain particularly close contact with Turkish Ambassador in effort improve his reporting to Ankara.
Would also appreciate your evaluation of performance of UN Force during most recent incidents.
Ball
34. Telegram From the Military Attach? in Turkey to the Department of the Army/1/
Ankara, April 16, 1964, 1645Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to DIA, USCINCEUR, USAREUR, USDOCOSouth (Naples), USDOCOLandSouth (Izmir), Nicosia, Athens, and the Department of State. The source text is the Department of State copy.
C-92. No foreign dissem except Canada and UK. DA for ACSI. Pass to State. On occasion Turkish party for US National War College students, ARMA had following conversation with General Sunalp, TGS Operations Chief. Resuming where he left off in conversation reported my C-84 airgram,/2/ Sunalp stated Turks not concerned about Cypriot real estate and although they abhorred continued killing Turk Cypriots, their major preoccupation danger from highly effective Cypriot Communist organization. GOT policy now to be that this essentially a Turk-Greek matter and that GOT approach will be put all possible pressure on GOG. When I protested that this likely drive the two nations farther apart rather than facilitate mutually acceptable solution Cyprus, he replied that to contrary due centuries of experience with Greeks, Turks regard this as only method force Greeks collaborate. He likened Greece to house cat which would defy man until forced in corner from which no escape where man could pin it down and if necessary kill it. Current series of GOT anti-Greek actions designed force Greece into this corner. He protested that from the outset Turks had tried to get the Greeks to solve the problem jointly with Turkey without avail and present measures seem only solution. I remarked that Turkey's much publicized preparations for amphibious operations had seemed to me to have exactly the opposite effect and that in fact, the Greeks had shown no indication of willingness cooperate but rather favor a withdrawal even when they expressed greatest concern over reported exchange of Turkish troops for border guards in Thrace. He replied that Turkey would not move into northern Greece in any case as such an operation would have no value for them. He said he felt that should the Turks undertake a military operation, it might very possibly be against one of the Greek islands. In further development of the theme that Turks must have some sort of a face saving solution before too long and that if the US does not take steps to assist in the realization of such a solution, Turkey will do so herself, he said somewhat ominously "I tell you that there will be action--maybe tomorrow, maybe next week, maybe next month, but there will be action".
/2/Not found.
Comment:
1. General response Turkish senior officers (notably Admiral Eyiceoglu, J-2) (General Atalay, J-3) to queries War College students on Cyprus situation was one of continuation Turk military feeling close affinity US military, nor was there any indication this feeling would diminish despite political developments. One gets the impression that all briefed and reiterating same party line and that in fact, Turks desperately seeking any measures reach solution to the problem without too much loss of face and still hoping against hope US will be able assist. Sunalp's remarks probably part of larger design scare us into doing something to keep Turks from taking action inimical to NATO interests. We assessed earlier threats to conduct amphibious operation on Cyprus as same technique and they may be trying it once again.
2. Both Atalay and Sunalp depart Ankara 19 April for CENTO conference Washington. Both speak excellent English and this might provide good opportunity further exploitation these sources.
35. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, April 22, 1964, 9 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN.
1133. Tuomioja told me yesterday evening UN mediation effort is at "impasse" following his discussions at Ankara April 18-19 and his first working meeting with Makarios April 20.
Both Turkish Cypriots and GOT have told Tuomioja federation is only acceptable solution. Federation they have now defined as division of island into Turkish area in north and Greek area in south with compulsory population exchange. Tuomioja lent me in confidence copy of memorandum from Kutchuk setting forth "Principles of Federal Constitution of Republic of Cyprus." Text in next following telegram./2/ Tuomioja said he received very similar communication from GOT. GOT adamant that Turkish Cypriots are "separate community" and not "minority."
/2/Telegram 1134 from Nicosia, April 22. (Ibid.)
Tuomioja sounded out GOT views on enosis as lesser evil than independent Cyprus ruled by Greek majority. GOT refused contemplate enosis under any circumstances. GOT argued continued presence of Turkish troops on Cyprus essential for security of Turkey although there no objection to presence of Greek troops also.
Visit to Ankara gave Tuomioja more vivid realization of Turkey's interest in Cyprus. He seems to have been very much impressed by Turkish military strength and readiness to intervene and twice commented that Greek Cypriots did not know what great risks they were taking and that Turkish forces could sweep island in two days. He also commented favorably on Inonu's political wisdom and restraint.
Re possible "summit" meeting of Inonu and Papandreou, Tuomioja said Inonu was not opposed in principle but thought way would have to be prepared by meetings at lower level. Tuomioja himself thought such meeting might eventually be useful or even necessary, but felt he should first have more time to explore possibilities of mediation.
Tuomioja discussed Turkish federation proposal with Makarios showing latter copy of Kutchuk's memorandum. Makarios rejected Turkish proposal out of hand, evidently arguing federation identical with partition and insisting Turkish Cypriots had to be satisfied with normal minority rights.
Present situation Tuomioja described as "total impasse," with "no light at end of tunnel." While he admitted all concerned might be starting at beginning positions from which they might retreat as mediation progressed, he appeared seriously concerned about rigidity of Turks and Greek Cypriots and by their apparent willingness to run risk of war not only on island but also between Turkey and Greece. Tuomioja professed to be at loss to understand how there could be such bitter animosity between nationalities who had every interest in maintaining friendship and who have no basic ideological differences. He added that pessimism would not, however, be consistent with his role as Mediator. Citing as his motto for present situation Finnish saying that "the pigs will come home with the frost," he expressed hope that decline of island's economy and increased difficulties of living would gradually make Cypriots on either side more tractable. He thought there might be moderate elements in both communities whose voices are yet to be heard. He furthermore took note of value of UNFICYP political staff's efforts to restore some normality to intercommunal relations.
Tuomioja confirmed that he will go to Athens for talks with GOG next weekend. He thought he might find more divergence between Greek and Greek Cypriot views than between Turk and Turkish Cypriot. He will also go on to London and to Paris, where he will report to U Thant April 29.
He was expecting his political advisor Robin Miller (New Zealand) to arrive last night.
At end of our conversation I asked Mediator whether there was anything we could do to help. He replied "no, not yet" and then added wryly "except to have your government keep persuading Greece and Turkey not to go to war."
McKiernan
36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/
Washington, April 28, 1964, 5:38 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Sisco and cleared by Jernegan. Also sent to Athens and Nicosia and repeated to Ankara, London, Ottawa, and Paris.
2779. Our sense of the situation in Cyprus based on reliable intelligence is:
(a) That the Greek Cypriots are undertaking the attack on St. Hilarion Castle as a systematic operation designed to test the strength and will of the UN Force. If this attack succeeds it will almost certainly lead to a series of systematic attacks in order to achieve a fait accompli to present to the Mediator.
(b) At same time there is a developing Gotterdammerung spirit among the Turkish Cypriots that may at almost any moment result in a widespread and suicidal violence which could quickly lead to civil war throughout Island.
(c) We believe that events can rapidly get out of hand unless: First, the UN Force moves quickly and vigorously to take all necessary steps to stop St. Hilarion action. Second, SYG issues strong and unambiguous statement calling on Makarios to call off Greek Cypriots. Third, SYG sends strong private appeal to Papandreou urging him exercise necessary restraint on Makarios.
(d) The consequences of failure to act definitively would not only be tragic and dangerous situation in Cyprus; it could discredit UN peacekeeping for future and could well lead to Turkish intervention with all frightful consequences which that would entail.
We suggest you also make following additional concrete suggestions:
1. Urge SYG to send instructions to Gyani to have UN Force exercise greater initiative;
2. If UN Force needs more equipment to increase mobility and cope with situation, it should seek such assistance;
3. Reiterate strongly our interpretation of the mandate based on Security Council Resolution of 4 March 1964; and
4. Make two suggestions contained in paragraph 6 and penultimate paragraph of Nicosia's 1161, repeated USUN 386./2/ You should fill in Bunche confidentially, particularly on Nicosia's comments re immediate need of high-level political adviser who can be helpful to Gyani. We are glad to learn that SYG's report indicates UN desires to go ahead in this regard.
/2/Telegram 1161 from Nicosia, April 27, reported on the difficulties UNFICYP faced in trying to enforce a peace settlement in Cyprus. (Ibid.)
Confirming Ball-Sisco-Plimpton telecon,/3/ you should support Canadian initiative and urge strongly that SYG go to Nicosia. While we doubt SYG will feel he can go at this time, it should help convince him at least take kind of actions cited above./4/
/3/No record of this telephone conversation has been found.
/4/Telegram 3928 from USUN, April 29, reported that Yost had raised with Bunche the issues outlined in this telegram. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
Rusk
37. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, April 29, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Turkey, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Komer. The source text is marked "Draft."
SUBJECT
President's Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin
PARTICIPANTS
Foreign Minister F. C. Erkin
Ambassador T. Menemencioglu
The President
Asst. Secretary P. Talbot
R. W. Komer
The President, after greeting Erkin cordially, said with emphasis that he wished to commend the Turks on how they had acted with such great restraint and statesmanship in recent weeks. He knew what a trial the Cyprus crisis was to Turkey and how lucky we all were to have so great a man as Inonu at the helm during such a period. "So don't lose your heads now," he said to Erkin. "It's always darkest just before the dawn. Give the UN a little more time to work out a solution." Erkin agreed that Turkey had acted with "great restraint" but "we must avoid that the bill should now be paid by Turkey." Erkin said he had told his Prime Minister the previous night how very pleased he was with his talks here and with the US attitude.
The President came back to the theme of how it was important to avoid a shooting war over Cyprus. War, as he put it, solves nothing. Our experience has been that the UN can finally work something out which will be acceptable to all parties in situations like these. But if people start shooting, the whole situation is changed. Other powers are drawn in and a new and far graver problem is created.
Erkin pointed out that so far Turkey had refrained from exercising their undoubted right of action in this case. Now that the UN was there, it was "not possible for us to intervene any more."
"Inonu is a hero", the President said. We applaud him and his policies. We will do anything we can to support the UN in working out a peaceful solution. Let's try everything to avoid a clash. Some solution can and must be found. The President analogized to the problem of our railway settlement. It had taken five years but we finally settled it last week. We salute Inonu and were tremendously grateful that he had acted with such statesmanship at a time when others did not display the same qualities. Erkin interjected that "our antagonist took advantage of our moderation and is seeking to inflict humiliation on us." The President granted that they were bullies but world opinion would know what they had done. He wished Erkin to tell Inonu that the President was his friend; he, the President, remembered extremely well his visit to Ankara and how he and Inonu had been waylaid by the crowds.
Returning again to the importance of avoiding a shooting war, the President commented that we are worried about some signs of Turkish preparations, for example, the cancellation of leaves. Erkin explained that "we have to be prepared." The President replied that he should tell Inonu right away of our admiration for him and how we count on his continued restraint. "Tell Inonu", he said, "I haven't got a better friend. And I'm proud of your people. We are always going to be stout allies." Erkin again assured him that the Turks would not intervene.
The President then told Messrs. Talbot and Komer to see what we could do with the Greeks and Cypriots. When Senator Fulbright was in Athens we could send him to Papandreou and tell him how concerned we were./2/ Talbot mentioned that we had just urged restraint on the Greek Government the previous night. The President's view was that we should be as tough as necessary. The Greeks must not humiliate the Turks. We should go in and press Makarios as well. When Talbot commented that we had used up most of our leverage with Makarios, the President's reaction was that we should use up whatever was left if necessary.
/2/On May 2, President Johnson asked Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to visit Athens and Ankara for the purpose of "reinforcing" U.S. efforts to preserve peace in the Aegean region. The President outlined his objectives in sending Fulbright in a May 6 press conference statement; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 577.Fulbright visited London May 4-6, Athens May 6-7, Ankara May 7-8, The Hague and Copenhagen May 8-13. He reported to the President on his trip on May 15. In telegram 1304 to Athens, May 2, the Department of State informed the Embassy that in addition to "fact finding," Fulbright would seek in talks with Papandreou and Inonu, "To move GOG to restrain Greek Cypriots more effectively and to assure GOT that its policy of restraint is appreciated and will prove fruitful. He will avoid any impression that USG has preconceived plans for ultimate solution." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/FULBRIGHT) Documentation on the Fulbright mission is ibid., Greek Desk Files: Lot 67 D 192, POL 7-Visits, Fulbright.
Foreign Minister Erkin expressed his great appreciation for the President's words and assured him that his message to Inonu would be sent immediately. Ambassador Menemencioglu mentioned that the Turks had a second bit of good news while here--they had been assured by the Department of State that the US would not support any solution which would humiliate Turkey. The President fully agreed.
As Foreign Minister Erkin left, the President gave him two medallions, one for the Prime Minister and one for himself, as a token of his admiration for Prime Minister Inonu and for the Turkish nation.
R.W. Komer/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
38. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, May 4, 1964, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN.
1189. Saw Makarios and after exchange of pleasantries regarding my confirmation by Senate,/2/ I raised points set forth in Deptel 807./3/
/2/Belcher's appointment as Ambassador to Cyprus was confirmed by the Senate on May 1.
/3/Telegram 807, April 30, instructed Belcher to inform Makarios of both the U.S. concern about the situation on Cyprus and its support for U.N. peacekeeping and mediation efforts. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
I explained that during my stay in Washington I had been particularly impressed by fact that very difficult situation in island was a matter of great concern at highest levels USA. I said President himself was kept fully informed of developments on day-to-day basis and that he had taken personal interest in events in Cyprus. Said we were pledged to support UN efforts find solution and added that one of most difficult events to place in proper perspective had been fighting around St. Hilarion which appeared to have been deliberate use of force to gain purely military objective during time when all govts concerned had been pledged to carry out terms of SC res.
The President said he could appreciate fact that fighting at St. Hilarion might not be fully explicable to people abroad but that in his view this was defensible objective on part of his govt (Gen Pantelides, Comander of Home Guard, had made similar presentation to me just before going in see President). He claimed that Turks had been extending their positions both to east and west of Castle and that UN had appeared unwilling or powerless to stop them. He added that UN appeared to be acting as "conciliatory commission" rather than peace-keeping force. He asked what might be expected on the part of Greek Cypriots in face of this sort of "provocation" which was not so easily identifiable as gun fire. Quiet infiltration by Turks in effort to consolidate their hold on northern range was more difficult pinpoint than outright hostility involving gun fire. Having accomplished objective of rolling back Turkish forward positions, he had issued the statement claiming Greeks had reached their objective and they had no need to take the Castle itself.
He added that something had to be done about continued harassing indiscriminate fire from Castle into Karmi village. Roll-back helped but probably would not completely stop. (Comment: Turks were extending positions and have been firing into Karmi but Greeks have accomplished more than mere roll-back. They now command Turk airfield at Krini as well as Aghirda and other villages on south slope.)
I said that everyone in Washington had been much relieved and encouraged at recent statements by both himself and Dr. Kutchuk of renewed determination to cooperate with UN in creating a situation which might be more conducive to finding of a political solution.
In discussing need to avoid further violence and take steps restore confidence among Turk Cypriots I raised question of SecGen's report./4/ President said that he felt that this was a very useful report and that his govt was ready to cooperate in every possible way toward achievement of UNSYG's objectives. He did say that there would be great difficulty with some of items mentioned, in particular reintegration of police force and the opening of area north of Nicosia. With regard to Kyrenia Road, I said I hoped that some compromise might be worked out whereby his govt would not necessarily insist on Greek Cypriot patrols but might as first step agree to merely UN patrols. His Beatitude said he was prepared cooperate on this point but that he felt UN presence would not be sufficient to permit Greek community to use road. He pointed to fact that the road through Kokkina area was presently being patrolled by UN but there were many new Turkish fortifications and Greeks were most reluctant to use it.
/4/For text of this report, dated April 29, see U.N. Doc. S/5671. Annex I to the report is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 576-577.
We discussed arrival of Gen Karayannis/5/ and Archbishop indicated that there were two purposes in bringing him here. First was establishment of discipline among various fighter elements in hope of avoiding undirected and dangerous action by irresponsible elements within armed groups. Second was to create disciplined, well-trained and well equipped force which could meet at least for time the external threat posed by possibility of Turkish invasion. He said Karayannis was not needed for purpose of bringing Greek Cypriot force efficiency up to enable it control Turkish Cypriots. They were already in position to do so.
/5/Newly-appointed Commander of the Cypriot National Guard.
We discussed briefly question of General Grivas with me expressing opinion that it was perhaps better that objective be accomplished through Gen Karayannis because of predictably adverse Turkish reaction to Grivas' return. The Archbishop agreed but added that in his own opinion General would not have directed his energies against Turks but on contrary would purposely have asserted restraining influence on those elements in fighter group who were particularly anti-Turkish.
Archbishop said he had had very interesting talk with Mediator after his return from Ankara confirming that he had received from Mr. Tuomioja written copy of Turkish position as given in Ankara. He said that Turkish position was so far from anything which could be considered by Greeks that he feared Mediator's job would require much longer time than anyone had at first expected. He was seeing him Monday or Tuesday when he returned from his trip to Athens, Paris and London and he hoped there might be something more encouraging to tell me when he next saw me. President reiterated his oft-repeated pledge that he hoped work with Mediator Gyani in spirit of cooperation and in atmosphere of peace and tranquillity.
Conversation concluded with reference to my looking forward to an early opportunity present credentials once signed copy arrived from Washington.
As usual, Archbishop was pleasant, witty and the soul of reason. However, I have no reason be encouraged believe he will keep his word to the letter, although I doubt we shall see more such direct actions as that at St. Hilarion unless there is direct provocation.
Belcher
39. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, May 6, 1964, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Ankara, Nicosia, and Paris for USRO.
1663. DCM, who prior to my return last night acting as Charge, called on FonMin Costopoulos yesterday evening at latter's request. Pilavakis, Director Fourth Political Division (including Cyprus affairs), was also present.
Conversation, which lasted almost three-quarters of an hour, was dominated by highly emotional recapitulation by Costopoulos of well-established GOG theses on Cyprus question.
Costopoulos began by saying that he was speaking as friend and that he would like to know what is real mission Senator Fulbright. It must be clearly understood that Greece cannot be expected to make further sacrifice with regard to Cyprus problem. Greece had received the visits of Ball, Tuomioja, Stikker and now Fulbright; Mr. Rusk and the Canadian Minister for External Affairs had only that morning requested to see Costopoulos at The Hague--obviously in connection with Cyprus. There is no reason in justice why Greece should be called upon to abandon the basic principles of democracy in Cyprus because Turks are obstructing self-determination and exerting unjustifiable pressures in other areas of Greek-Turkish relations.
DCM replied he was certain FonMin appreciated personal stature as well as key position of Senator Fulbright in conduct American foreign relations, that Fulbright was coming principally reflect deep concern felt at highest levels of USG with regard possibility increasing deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations and to inform himself at first hand with regard to views of GOG. He emphasized Senator Fulbright not coming to propose a solution and that USG strongly supports role of UN Mediator in evolving political solution.
Costopoulos spoke with considerable heat and bitterness regarding recent emergency session of NAC and Birgi's attack/2/ during session. He said he wanted USG clearly to understand Greek-Turkish confrontation during forthcoming Ministerial Meeting would be catastrophic and that precise consequences might be difficult to anticipate. History of Greek-Turkish relations did not begin only in December 1963, and in the event that this question became a matter of debate in the NATO Ministerial Meeting, Greeks would be forced open long dossier of grievances against Turks. Costopoulos was particularly bitter in his references to Stikker. GOG had been shocked hear NATO SYG say that in event of a Greek-Turkish conflict it would be difficult for NATO allies to intervene and that foreign aid would likely be terminated./3/ Costopoulos said GOG had impression Stikker's activities were encouraging Turks pursue an intransigent policy, and that even though as a legal proposition there might not be an obligation for NATO allies intervene, it was impossible to consider that the allies (by inference the US) could stand aside indifferent to the moral obligation support Greece in event of Turkish attack.
/2/At a May 2 special meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Turkish Permanent Representative Nuri Birgi read a long statement attacking Greece's support for Makarios. Polto 1593 from Paris, May 2, reported on Birgi's statement and the Greek response. (Ibid.)
/3/Stikker made this point to both Greek and Turkish officials. (Telegram 1651 from Athens, May 2; ibid.)
DCM said that he was confident NATO SYG not encouraging Turks adopt more aggressive attitude but that Stikker expressing personal point of view based on his own responsibilities to the Alliance. Moreover, Stikker was personally convinced that GOT on verge of military intervention at moment of attacks on Saint Hilarion. US is well aware that open debate during NATO Ministerial Meeting might well not be constructive but that we do hope that it might be possible during forthcoming meeting to create situation where Greek-Turkish discussions on bilateral issues might be contemplated. Visit is precisely in order to avoid intolerable circumstances in which US would be placed in event of Greek-Turkish hostilities that US bending every effort to encourage restraint on respective parties and wholeheartedly supporting efforts of UN Mediator. US believed enhanced effectiveness of UNFICYP, the recent statements of Makarios, and Papandreou's recent intervention with Makarios would produce circumstances in which more rational atmosphere would prevail in Cyprus and make more rapid rehabilitation of situation possible. USG had been gravely concerned at moment of Greek-Cypriot attacks in Kyrenia Road area that Turkish military intervention might occur. Because of impossible situation which would have been created in event of Greek-Turkish hostilities USG had intervened with Papandreou and Inonu and President Johnson had asked Senator Fulbright to visit Athens and Ankara. Moreover, although GOG quite naturally separates Cyprus problem from other Greek-Turkish bilateral problems, it is perfectly apparent that GOT possesses capability of exercising tremendous pressures on Greek interests in Istanbul and elsewhere. Consequently, we must proceed in full recognition of tactical situation as it exists and in such a manner as to limit damage to Greek interests, to Greek-Turkish relations and to Alliance.
Costopoulos alluded to recent Khrushchev statement regarding Cyprus,/4/ pointing out Soviets are very skillfully taking position which would commend itself to Greek opinion. DCM acknowledged GOG faced with delicate political problem in attempting to prevent Communists and extreme leftist elements in Cyprus and in Greece from monopolizing strong nationalist role and exploiting deep-seated popular emotions on this issue. Costopoulos suggested that if Greece were abandoned by all of her allies in her search for democratic solution to the Cyprus problem, it would be only natural for the Greek people to look with increasing favor on those who were prepared to support them, i.e. USSR. He also observed that if the situation deteriorated further it would not be British, concerning whose policies all Greeks are cynical, but the Americans who would be held responsible in public mind.
/4/In a May 4 interview in Izvestia, Chairman Khrushchev supported Makarios' position.
Comment: Although courteous, Costopoulos was so deeply emotional that comprehensive, rational discussion would not have been possible. GOG obviously suffering from deep-seated apprehension that Greece will be called upon to make unacceptable sacrifices (exchange of populations, territory, etc.) as price for Cyprus settlement. There is little question Fulbright visit following that of Stikker and recent more cheerful utterances of Erkin following Washington talks present themselves in Greek eyes as preliminaries to such a maneuver. In light volatile quality Costopoulos' presentation, we concur Department's effort (set forth Paris Topol 1695)/5/ encourage discussion Greek-Turkish problems through bilateral conversations rather than in plenary NAC session.
/5/Topol 1695, May 4, cautioned that continued discussion within NATO forums could further exacerbate tensions between Greece and Turkey and suggested instead that Stikker encourage a direct meeting between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers during the NATO Ministerial Meeting at The Hague May 12-14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
Labouisse
40. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of Statez
Nicosia, May 7, 1964, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN.
1201. Embtel 1136./2/ Tuomioja called on me yesterday evening and gave quite discouraging account of mediation efforts to date.
/2/Telegram 1136, February 2, reported on Cypriot student demonstrations against "NATO intervention" in Cyprus. (Ibid.)
In Ankara Tuomioja had found GOT adamant on "federation" which would separate Greek and Turkish communities. In Athens GOG had said it would accept any solution acceptable to other parties and had talked "nonsense" about "majority rule" and "self-determination" while professing to reject enosis. In London HMG had "no policy", and this seemed to be position of USA as well. Turkish Cypriots repeatedly refused discuss, even on hypothetical basis, anything but their "federation" proposal. Makarios had not yet furnished promised written proposals re guarantees of Turkish Cypriot rights, but would probably do so within week.
Since mediation getting nowhere, Tuomioja said he plans proceed wrap up activities here, at least for present. He intends, without waiting for Makarios' proposals, to put to both Makarios and Kutchuk certain written questions re measures to guarantee Turkish Cypriot rights. He believes Turkish Cypriots may well not reply. He will give them two weeks and then will submit his report to UNSYG. He is determined return to his post in Stockholm, where he can "meditate in comfort", in mid-June. There he will remain available if developments warrant further intervention by Mediator.
Tuomioja had little to say about contents of his report, probably because he has not yet finished putting his thoughts in order. He did say that as international lawyer he condemned repudiation of international agreements "whether by Russians, Hitler, or Makarios" and would so state in report. He also seemed be pondering idea of recommending proposal for solution which would proceed from Constitution of 1960 but would give Greek Cypriots more in way of majority rule while assuring greater protection of Turkish Cypriot rights and security by providing for (1) quasi-federal system under which "five or six" areas with predominantly Turkish population would have certain measure of autonomy in communal matters, (2) long-term UN observer role, and international participation in or supervision of court system.
Since he had not yet decided whether he should do so, I urged Tuomioja make concrete recommendation for solution in his report, as this would at least provide impetus for further discussion of negotiated solution. Tuomioja said he saw advantages of specific recommendation.
Asked for his views on possibility of progress on "UN Program for Cyprus" annexed to UNSYG's April 29 report to UNSC,/3/ Tuomioja again expressed pessimism and said he would like to be able give UNFICYP Commander Gyani at least some moral support but could not.
/3/See footnote 4, Document 38.
Comment: I believe Tuomioja would give considerable weight to any proposal for solution to which USG was prepared lend its support, but I recognize complexity of our interests in this area make it very difficult commit ourselves to such proposal in time to influence mediation. Failing this, we can best assist Tuomioja by redoubling our efforts to make clear to GOT that one cannot in Cyprus, any more than in other former colonial areas, successfully impose any solution--especially an undemocratic one--on population which is prepared to fight, is assured of assistance from outside, and believes it can mobilize world opinion on own behalf in UN. Turkish position on island is being steadily weakened, in comparison to growing Greek Cypriot resources, as present situation continues, and Turkish community's best hope is to cut its losses by reasonable compromise. Continued smuggling of arms to Turkish Cypriot forces would seem at best futile effort and one which can only lead to bloodier clashes as time wears on with no solution.
I urgently recommend Secretary make these points in meeting with Erkin May 11 and attempt persuade Erkin be more responsive to Mediator's honest efforts find some middle way. If Tuomioja fails, next round of discussion of Cyprus question will undoubtedly take place in atmosphere even less conducive to reaching political settlement and will probably find Turkish position further eroded while that of Greeks strengthened through inevitable appeal to UNGA where Afro-Asian and Communist support probably assured./4/
/4/In telegram 837 to Nicosia, May 8, the Department of State expressed concern regarding Tuomioja's plans for the mediation and instructed Belcher to discourage any public statement by the Mediator of his findings. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
Belcher
41. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at The Hague/1/
Washington, May 10, 1964, 3:25 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Ball and cleared by Talbot and Bracken. Repeated to London, Nicosia, Ankara, Athens, and Paris for USRO. Secretary Rusk was attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting May 12-14.
Tosec 27. For Secretary from Acting Secretary. Disturbing developments in the Cyprus situation lead me to think that you should probably have some talks in The Hague with key NATO Foreign Ministers, looking toward possible common action at the appropriate point. In this telegram I shall try to sum up the situation as I see it.
1. Tuomioja, the Finnish Mediator, while a reticent man, has given some vague foreshadowing of his thinking. Proceeding from the Constitution of 1960, he is considering proposals that would give the Greek Cypriots more in the way of majority rule. In order to assure the Turk Cypriots of their rights and security, he is toying with the idea of (a) a quasi-federal system under which five or six areas with predominant Turkish populations would have a certain autonomy in communal affairs and (b) a long-term UN observer and international participation in or supervision of the court system.
2. While this represents progress over what appeared as his first thoughts, I am confident that the Turks would not presently be prepared to accept a solution along these lines.
3. While it is not entirely clear what his plans are (and there are conflicting stories) Tuomioja has indicated to us that he intends to put both to Makarios and Kutchuk written questions regarding measures to guarantee Turkish Cypriot rights. He will give the parties about two weeks to respond. He believes Turkish Cypriots may not reply. He intends then to submit his report to UNSYG. Thereafter he will return to his post in Stockholm where he can "mediate in comfort" until mid-June and remain unless developments warrant further intervention by the Mediator.
4. Tuomioja's proposed course of action could result in a gravely dangerous situation. Makarios might well make the heroic gesture of agreeing to accept the Mediator's proposals. Kutchuk would almost certainly reject them. Makarios would then go into the Security Council and demand that they be given effect. The GOG would almost certainly have to support Makarios and the USG and other NATO governments would face the discomfort of having to vote against the proposals of the UN Mediator.
5. The Soviet Government would presumably seek to play a double game of supporting Makarios while at the same time exploiting the growing disenchantment of the Turks. What the Soviet Union is most afraid of is "enosis" which could lead to the presence of NATO in Cyprus.
6. Under the circumstances we have instructed Belcher to emphasize to Tuomioja that he should not put in a non-agreed report. If he feels it necessary to make a report in the near future, he should simply state his inability to reach an agreed solution and indicate his determination to continue the effort. USUN is also making the same representations to the SYG.
7. Even if Tuomioja goes along with this formula, we shall face serious problems in the SC. There are only six weeks to go until the present resolution runs out. Makarios will use the occasion of the further extension of UNFICYP in June to try to put further hamstringing conditions on the use of the UN force. We shall have great difficulty getting the members contributing forces to agree to supply further financial support and we shall be hard put to scratch around and find the necessary money. Troops will be difficult to hold and replacements even more difficult to find. A number of countries will wish to withdraw their units and there is a danger that the SYG will have to reach farther out to less desirable suppliers. We shall have difficulty holding Tuomioja to a longer term than the initial three months.
8. All of this confusion is made to order for Makarios, who has already shown a notable ability to do mischief in the SC. He may make an effort to get a special meeting of the UNGA called in order to achieve an even better forum.
9. Meanwhile time is not running on our side. The GOT is getting in a mood of greater moroseness and despondency and the Turk-Cypriots are capable of a kind of Gotterdammerung psychology that could lead to a blow-up all over the Island.
10. There seems to me only one sensible procedure and that is for the Greek and Turkish Governments to move into the situation and take charge of it. From Papandreou's talk with Fulbright and from other sources there are indications of an increasing Greek Government disenchantment with Makarios. I find Papandreou's repeated references to "enosis" a healthy sign. From the point of view of all of NATO, we should regard "enosis" as a useful component in any final solution since it would mean that a NATO government would have charge of the Island rather than the wolf in priest's clothing. Obviously, "enosis" would be possible only if some provision were made for those Turk-Cypriots to leave who wanted to leave. In order to make this palatable to the GOT there would have to be some kind of territorial concessions by Greece.
11. I doubt that there is much efficacy in trying to get Erkin and Costopoulos together in The Hague. But I do think that you might wish to have talks with some of the other Foreign Ministers in order to prepare their minds for possible joint pressure on both Papandreou and Inonu directed at persuading them to take matters in their own hands and work out an agreed solution somewhere down the line. Papandreou seems confident that he can bring off "enosis" by providing some kind of a plebiscite on the Island. While a Greek Cyprus would be hard for the Turks it would certainly be better for their interests than Cuba off their shores.
12. I have talked with both Harlech and Charles Ritchie about these matters and have told them that I would suggest to you that you have some conversations in this spirit with some of the other Ministers. I think you will find both Butler and Paul Martin prepared for this.
13. Meanwhile you might suggest to some of the other Foreign Ministers that Tuomioja's role is to be that of quiet mediator and that they should make this clear to him. Nothing could be worse for our purposes than a report by the Mediator that would give the initiative to Makarios and drive the Turks into a greater sense of isolation and despondency.
Ball
42. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
The Hague, May 11, 1964, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
Secto 12. For the Acting Secretary. In my talk with Costopoulos this morning/2/ he said that he planned to make a statement this afternoon on Cyprus which would call for a stronger UN role in keeping the peace in Cyprus. I have not seen an advance copy of his statement but will relay it as soon as one is available. I asked him what President Makarios would think about such a stronger UN role and he replied "it doesn't matter what President Makarios thinks about it." There may be many hookers in his statement when actually made but it might provide some leverage for further strengthening of UN Force operations of a sort which would reassure the Turks. I leave it to you to follow up with UN if the Greek statement offers a further handle to take hold of./3/
/2/Telegram 1136, February 2, reported on Cypriot student demonstrations against "NATO intervention" in Cyprus. (Ibid.)
/3/In the statement, Costopoulos stressed the desire of the Greek Government to contribute to a solution of the Cyprus problem that would provide "Cypriots of Turkish origin" with every protection of law. He also stated that Greece would support any U.N. body that would provide long-term guarantees of the rights of Turkish Cypriots. The text of Costopoulos' statement was transmitted in Secto 21, May 12. (Ibid.)
Costopoulos confirmed that Greece considers the Treaty of Guarantee to be still in effect but insisted that Article IV does not authorize unilateral Turkish intervention. He offered to have this point adjudicated. From Turkish point of view I would suppose adjudication would be interpreted as an attempt to throw doubt on Turkish rights during protracted period. On the other hand, it is just possible that some form of general adjudication as to the continuing validity and interpretation of the treaties might provide a means to put certain prestige factors on ice for a period if adjudication were to be applied to issues of interest to both sides. This is a very long shot but I mention it for Department's consideration.
Reporting officer's account of my talk with Erkin will be sent separately./4/ After that conversation Erkin drew me aside and affirmed Inonu's interest in talks with Greek Government although there seemed to be a strong implication that such talks would have to be on the basis of recognizing the validity of existing treaties. Erkin then expressed dismay over the prospect of a greatly deteriorating situation in Cyprus at the end of the period of UN responsibility and said that Turkey may be forced to intervene. He asked me whether, in that event, the US will support Turkey. I reminded him that the President had referred to intervention as a "last resort" but that, in any event, a direct answer to his question could only be given by the President. I said that situation would constitute no solution and would be the very catastrophe which all of us should now work to prevent. I added that it might be necessary for the UN forces to remain beyond the period of their initial engagement in order to forestall the deterioration he feared. I did not get the impression that he was warning me of imminent military action by Turkey.
/4/Transmitted in Secto 19, May 12. (Ibid.) A memorandum of the conversation regarding Cyprus is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2397.
Rusk
43. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, May 12, 1964, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, London, and USUN. Passed to the White House.
1517. At informal family lunch today with only the Inonus, Metin Tokers and ourselves present, for which invitation only extended yesterday and which obviously intended to afford occasion discuss Cyprus, Inonu was model of courtesy and hospitality but burden of his remarks constituted heavy fare indeed.
Inonu began by saying everything had been tried to no avail and future dark. He was at wits end to know where turn. As far as he knew conversation of Erkin with Secretary/2/ had not brought out anything new and Greeks opposing discussion Cyprus in NATO Council. It was dismal business. He had done his best explain situation as seen here but still wondered if Washington really understood. At times we had seemed lose interest. I said that, referring first to his last comment, I could say Washington did understand matter but action must of necessity be suited to circumstance. If we had been less active for a time it had been in order give UN opportunity function effectively but when its performance seemed lagging we had not hesitated renew efforts.
/2/See the last paragraph of Document 42.
Regarding what to do next, I said had always been my conviction that mistake to think of Cyprus as just thing in itself and that closer consultation in past between Ankara and Athens might have spared us much of present grief. I realized that consultation now more difficult but, difficult or not, it seemed necessary step in seeking solution. Could Inonu tell me if Erkin might be seeing Greek FonMin in Hague?
Inonu said he too had always favored direct talks with Athens and there had been some hope under previous Greek govts but Papandreou had now elected identify himself completely with Makarios. Talking with one would be same as talking with other. Regarding Erkin, no reason why he shouldn't talk with Greek counterpart but Greek officials very high and mighty these days and didn't know whether would be possible.
I said all this seemed be getting nowhere and asked if Inonu as man of great experience could not identify certain areas where effort might be made break through present barriers.
It was at this point that Inonu delivered what he apparently intended be punch-line of conversation by saying that time for persuasion now passed; no longer any role for "the old statesman," as matter now stand there are only two alternatives, either submit to Makarios or beat some sense into his head by force.
At this point we were called to lunch but afterward I asked what Inonu meant by using force to bring Makarios to see reason. He said he meant military force; it wouldn't be necessary to invade all of island, merely occupy part of it. This was something Makarios could understand.
I said needless point out this would probably result in Greek intervention, clash between Greek and Turkish forces and possible escalation of conflict to full-scale war between Greece and Turkey.
Inonu replied decision would be up to GOG. GOT prepared in either contingency.
I observed that, if only possible think of matter in terms of surrender or war, obvious that Turkey's friends could support neither but I had gained different impression in conversation with Fulbright in which I had understood Inonu to have endorsed idea of strengthening peacekeeping function in order establish security which would in turn permit quiet negotiation.
Inonu said this correct and he still felt that way but doubted it would work. Must look facts in face. Service which USG might render would be to make Turkish determination clear to Athens.
I said this still opened no path toward solution and in this connection questioned accuracy of Inonu's assumption in equating Makarios and Papandreou so completely. Information available to me did not indicate that situation so monolithic but rather that there were various aspects which might be exploited to advantage with Athens if communication could just be established. Furthermore there seemed to be certain change in pattern of Makarios' behavior recently which might be more hopefully interpreted. Addressing himself to Makarios first, Inonu said he too had noted certain recent changes but now clear from bitter experience that Makarios is crafty schemer and that such changes merely for tactical deception.
Regarding Athens he was also dubious but, if it wished make contribution, it could announce clearly its recognition of validity of existing treaties. If this done and given several years time eventual solution could be worked out. Such an announcement would completely clear atmosphere.
Adverting again to our attitude, Inonu said he had been greatly troubled by apparent falling off of our interest following Ball Mission and also by persistent reports that USG favoring enosis as solution. This now cleared up but he still felt Washington not fully aware of depth of Turkish despair in finding road out of Cyprus imbroglio and its determination to use force if necessary. If I could convey this depth of feeling to Washington and it, in turn, could convince Athens our conversation would have served useful purpose.
Comments: As is usually case, much of foregoing repetitive and even punch-line re time for persuasion being passed and preparedness intervene by force was reformulation of standard theme. However, when this latter evaluated in terms of emphasis on strategic importance of Cyprus during Fulbright talks and of insistence that GOT could not allow Cyprus slip away as had other coastal islands, regardless of whether Cyprus became unitary state or devolved to Greece, there would seem to be strong indication that policy decision has been reached or is in making in accord with which GOT will insist on some form of Turkish presence on Cyprus or right of custodianship as essential ingredient in any solution involving abrogation of present treaties. As of now this is still somewhat dim shape emerging from mist but its outline has seemed to have become increasingly clear of late. If this correct and if--if such policy rigidly held, it is obvious that certain mixes which have been tentatively considered to meet Turkish requirements would no longer fill bill. Admittedly, this still somewhat "iffy" but trend seems increasingly strong.
In so saying I am also mindful that Inonu may have correctly assumed that his remarks would be promptly reported to Hague as background for discussions there. Even so, I should still hesitate to discount them on that score, given Inonu's reputation for multiple purpose action./3/
/3/In telegram 1563 from Ankara, May 26, Hare commented that while Inonu's statements were intended to maintain Turkey's international bargaining position, they were not intended for domestic consumption. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
Hare
44. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, May 18, 1964, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara.
1722. 1. In rereading recent telegrams on Cyprus I have observed that whereas serious thought is being given by us to an eventual solution involving enosis as preferable to "unfettered independence", this possibility has been linked at time with the suggestion of some kind of territorial concession to Turkey by Greece. As has been reported from here, I consider that question of territorial concession is out of the picture not only for Papandreou govt but for any other Greek Govt. All Greek politicians, govt and opposition, stand as one on this issue. It is difficult to envisage Greek politicians being brought to agree to what could be termed a partition of Greece when all are so dead set against a partition of Cyprus.
2. On the other hand, Papandreou and some other influential Greeks have expressed their awareness of the importance of trying to find something which might avoid or at least minimize feeling of "humiliation" on part of GOT, but none of them have been very helpful in pointing way. Unfortunately, so long as the Greeks are convinced that "justice" is on their side and that the UN will support their view of justice, there is precious little initiative to be expected from them to date. The only proposals to this end which Papandreou has advanced have been (a) his suggestion that enosis would meet Turkey's security worries by having Cyprus become part of NATO; (b) that a formula be devised for continued UN presence on island to ensure minority rights; (c) that adequate compensation be paid to all Cypriots who wish to leave island; and (d) that GOT be helped financially.
3. This would doubtless be considered cold fare by the Turks, even if an enosis solution should include establishment of a NATO base in Cyprus, manned in part by Turkish soldiers. The only other thing which I believe to be in the realm of realism so far as the Greeks are concerned relates to Greek interests in Istanbul. The sacrificing of those interests, which is in fact already going on, might help salve Turkish feelings as well as providing ways of life for such of the non-rural Turk-Cypriot population as may leave Cyprus. The Greeks would, in first instance, certainly oppose a population move, but this would not be the determinant, particularly as GOT can throw the Greek population out at any time. Moreover, I believe that many Greeks are already reconciled to elimination of the Greek community.
4. The removal of the Patriarchate would present much more serious problem, but should not be ruled out if, in fact, it would help assuage the Turks for loss of position in Cyprus and lead to settlement without more bloodshed. One important politician not in the government has suggested to me the possibility of establishing the island of Patmos as sovereign seat of the Patriarchate, with cession of island by Greece and adequate international financing to create proper facilities. A few Greeks are privately talking of these terms, but this is highly unpopular concept for most. Any settlement involving removal of Patriarchate would have to be most carefully and quietly developed and suggestions should definitely not come from us.
5. I recognize that foregoing does not meet GOT desiderata and may not greatly advance prospects of a Cyprus solution. However, I feel it important that the Department appreciate that in our view concession of territory to Turkey would not be acceptable as element in any solution. Furthermore, in view of increasing tensions within Center Union and strong nationalist line on Cyprus taken by extreme left, it is doubtful whether Papandreou could make any meaningful concession to Turks at this juncture.
Labouisse
45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/
Washington, May 21, 1964, 7:44 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Moffit; cleared by Jernegan, Buffum, and L/UNA; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Nicosia, London, Athens, and Ankara.
3018. Cyprus--Hostage Problem. Ref: Nicosia's 1244, 1254./2/ Dept agrees with Emb Nicosia that increased hostage taking by Greek Cypriots, and particularly likelihood that sizeable number those taken recent days are dead, has serious implications for efforts restore law and order on Cyprus and establish conditions under which rational efforts resolve basic political problem could be undertaken. We fear that when news breaks, as it doubtless will soon, that sizeable number of Turk Cypriots abducted have been killed, Turk Cypriot forces in Cyprus may respond by abducting and shooting Greek Cypriots or otherwise lashing out with acts of violence. Hostage taking and executions also fodder for militant elements Turkey and could stimulate further GOT moves against Greek community Istanbul and lead to renewed threat of intervention.
/2/Telegram 1244, March 15, reported the shared concern of U.S. and British officials in Cyprus about a renewal of the fighting. (Ibid.) Telegram 1254, May 20, reported that the issue of hostages "has been brought to head" by the announcement that 74 of the 91 Turkish Cypriots taken hostage by Greek Cypriots were unaccounted for. The telegram outlined efforts of U.N. officials to secure the release of the hostages. (Ibid.)
To try head off or blunt these ominous possibilities, we believe would be desirable for SYG call in Rossides and Bitsios and impress on them serious view which he takes of abductions. SYG could launch his d?marche by stressing that SC resolutions March 4 and 11 call on all UN member states, including GOC, take no action likely to worsen situation in Cyprus and requests GOC in line its responsibilities for maintaining law and order in Cyprus to take "all additional measures necessary" stop violence and bloodshed. SYG could state forthrightly that large scale abductions which have thus far gone unpunished reflect clear failure GOC live up to its responsibilities under resolutions.
Since we could not be sure Rossides would faithfully reflect seriousness of SYG d?marche, we believe it would be extremely important that Thant impress on Bitsios grave implications of hostage taking and probable killing of hostages. SYG could emphasize to Bitsios that, given support for Greek Cypriots by GOG, abductions and probable killings can only lead to further deterioration in Greco-Turkish relations and play into hands militant elements on all sides. We would hope Bitsios would get message and that GOG would in turn drive home to Makarios that abductions must cease and that hostages still living must be released.
As Galo Plaza will presumably be returning Cyprus next few days,/3/ we feel would also be useful that he carry strong message from SYG to Makarios along lines suggested d?marche in New York and adding, in accordance last paragraph Nicosia 1254, that GOC has obligation to take whatever steps necessary prevent further abductions. Message might refer to reports that some or all those abducted have been executed, and ask that Makarios effect release of hostages still in hands Greek Cypriots. In light Makarios sensitivity foreign criticism and his vanity re personal image, such message might infer that, unless Makarios acts, SYG may feel compelled make public statement condemning abductions.
/3/On May 11, Secretary-General Thant informed the Security Council that Galo Plaza was going to Cyprus as his Special Representative.
You requested suggest foregoing course either directly to SYG or through Bunche and urge that SYG act upon it while Galo Plaza in New York. Suggest you indicate we find abductions and potential trouble stemming therefrom particularly disquieting since through efforts of UNFICYP number and scale of incidents has been significantly reduced and gratifying progress being made on civil side particularly harvesting scheme. We believe would be desirable for Galo Plaza, with his on-the-spot knowledge, sit in on SYG meetings with Rossides and Bitsios; in case of former to ensure that Cyprus Rep does not attempt gloss over this serious matter, and with Bitsios to put in perspective seriousness abduction problem for UN peacekeeping effort and work of mediator. We have been impressed by Galo Plaza's quick grasp of Cyprus situation. Statements made by him both public and in meetings with Cypriot leaders have, we feel, struck just the right note.
Rusk
46. Letter From the Ambassador to Cyprus (Belcher) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jernegan)/1/
Nicosia, May 21, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 67 D 412, Letters from Post--1964. Secret; Official-Informal.
Dear Jack:
The Greek Cypriot leaders have made clear they intend to use the UN as a forum to press their case both in the Security Council in June and in the General Assembly in the autumn, by which time they expect Tuomioja's mediation efforts will have failed. They expect to have adequate support not only to get the item on the agenda but also to secure endorsement of the general principles they espouse: an independent, unitary state; majority control; minority safeguards; right of self-determination. If this is secured, they will proceed, with or without Turkish Cypriot cooperation, to draw up a new constitution, have it endorsed by plebiscite, and implement it.
The Cyprus problem would remain, but in an altered state. The Greek Cypriots would have international moral endorsement of their efforts along the above lines, and conversely, justification for continued Turkish Cypriot legalistic opposition to these efforts would be thrown into doubt, particularly if convincing security guarantees were provided.
It appears inevitable that the GOC will seek General Assembly endorsement of the above principles, which underlie our own system and which command the obvious dedication of the overwhelming majority of the Cyprus population. The vote on some such resolution will obviously pose a difficult problem for the USG. The Soviet Union and East Europeans will have no such scruples as we and can pose as the "true supporters of democracy" unless we can find some way to appear on the positive side of the debate and the vote. While recognizing the very difficult problem this may pose vis-?-vis Ankara, we believe it would be harmful to our overall interests here and elsewhere for the US to oppose such a resolution or abstain. To prepare for this likely eventuality, we believe the United States should commence now to plan a policy evolution which would permit positive endorsement rather than awkward abstention. It might be well for us to coordinate such an effort with the British, who will presumably be in a similar position at the General Assembly because of the need to protect their Sovereign Base Areas.
I realize this will have to be undertaken with considerable finesse in view of the assurances given Erkin that the United States will exert maximum effort in the UN and among the parties concerned to see that justice is done and that Turkey does not suffer humiliation. The obvious problem here is the interpretation of what constitutes "humiliation." The GOT can be expected to interpret this as broadly as possible. For our part, I believe we should from the first make clear that the key word is justice, and in our view a just solution must accord with the political facts of the situation in Cyprus. In this context, we should exert our maximum efforts to see that the wording, specific details and manner of presentation of any specific proposals are such as to avoid offense or humiliation to the GOT. Aside from the proceedings at an early Security Council meeting, I have in mind of course, the probability that Tuomioja will, as a minimum, make a report of his views on settlement to U Thant. As suggested in my tel 1235 to the Department,/2/ the use of his report by SYG is something we would want to influence.
/2/Telegram 1235 from Nicosia, May 14, reported Tuomoija's views of the likely contents of his report to the Secretary-General. (Ibid.)
Aside from considerations of face, the principal fears of both the GOT and the Turkish Cypriot Community appear to revolve around the question of security. To win even reluctant Turkish acquiescence to a Cyprus solution, some promise of security must be held out to Turkish Cypriots and Turks alike. Specific discussion of ways to cope with Turkish Cypriot and GOT security problems would demonstrate our appreciation of their legitimate concern in this area and should at the same time lead their thinking into more productive and realistic examination of practical problems rather than the present immobilism of extreme and adamant positions which ignore the political, economic and arithmetical realities of this Island.
Sincerely yours,
Toby
47. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, May 22, 1964, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, USUN, and Cairo.
1265. Deptel 860./2/ Arms procurement. There is little doubt that GOC is determined to obtain substantial armaments. Most contacts here, including Swedish and Finnish Charges, agree with our assessment that UAR will be principal source, but financed by Soviets. We have received information (ARMA tel) that UAR-trained Greek Cypriots will be flying UAR-supplied aircraft. In addition, British-trained ground control parties were also trained to fly so they are available at least for light aircraft already purchased. Information received today [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] indicates Soviet Ambassador's two calls on Makarios this week concerned arms to be purchased on long-term credits. Shopping list reportedly being prepared by General Karayannis and our informant says "anything goes".
/2/Telegram 860 to Nicosia, May 20, stated U.S. opposition to the introduction of armaments on the island and speculated that Makarios was maneuvering to lay the groundwork for an agreement with the Soviet Union on arms supplies. (Ibid.)
We agree UN cannot allow this problem go unnoticed and believe best course would be to suggest SYG at least issue strong statement condemning not only GOC and Turkish Cypriots for action in attempting build up forces at this time, but also condemning those nations which furnish arms.
In practical terms, however, we doubt he would get far with such an "appeal". (Gyani tells me he has urged SYG go further, having placed arms control question at top priority. He says Plaza agrees and will pre-sent forceful case to U Thant.) In first place, smuggling can probably continue largely undetected. Secondly, GOC is apt to argue that as legal government it has authority and responsibility to secure arms needed for national defense. We expect they may put this argument in connection with demand that SC resolution not only instruct UNFICYP to help GOC put down "rebellion", but also state UNFICYP will be used to defend Cyprus in case Turkish "aggression" unless, of course, GOT will give further guarantee of no intervention while UNFICYP here. When SC does not comply, GOC will probably cite lack of guarantee against Turkish intervention as justification for continued arms acquisition.
Of course, arms acquired under this rubric can also be used against Turkish Cypriots. Swedish Charge Bundy fears this is real purpose of armaments and believes problem cannot be ignored by SYG.
In connection with SC consideration of arms problem, GOC is certain to raise question of Turkish clandestine arms and personnel shipments through Mansoura-Kokkina area, west of Morphou Bay area. Minister of Labour Papadopoulos told me yesterday that GOC was about to insist UNPKF do something to stop smuggling or GOC would be forced to take action. Said both arms and men coming in from Turkey in increasing numbers and UN unable or unwilling to stop. I pointed out UN efforts to stop it would mean clash with Turkish Cypriot fighter groups and I doubted Swedish contingent would take such action. (Swedish Charge later confirmed this.) Papadopoulos was insistent GOC could not permit traffic to continue. He went on to say that Minister of Interior Georkadjis had documentary evidence of complicity Turkish Ambassador in smuggling arrangements and that this might be used in UN proceedings.
Despite these complicating factors, I do not see how we can sit idly by and take no notice of GOC plans to exacerbate situation with extensive arms purchases. Therefore, come what may, we should urge SYG to make representations GOC, as well as to Greece and Turkey, to cooperate in stopping arms race on island. Naturally, appeal should be addressed to other nations as well, and if additional, usable information re UAR and Soviet implication in deals can be developed, statement can be directed at them specifically. (Eventually, of course, as equipment begins arrive, source will be obvious.)
We might also consider utility of requesting NATO embargo on arms to island as in keeping with SC resolution of March 4. This would embarrass Greece and Turkey, but would at least dry up certain other sources. In this connection, Israeli Ambassador says there is blanket prohibition by his government.
Have also spoken to British HICOMer Bishop and Finnish Charge Kawin, both of whom have sent strong reports their governments along foregoing lines.
All this is something which can be discussed with Plaza in New York on his return from Quito./3/
/3/Topol 1822 to Paris, May 26, instructed the Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to avoid any discussion of a NATO arms embargo since it would cause further deterioration of relationships with Greece, Turkey, and the Greek Cypriots without affecting Makarios' ability to procure arms. (Ibid.)
Belcher
48. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, May 28, 1964, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN.
1282. During call on President made at my request, following observations worth reporting:
1. UN SC meeting. GOC will favor three months' extension of UNFICYP and, despite rumors to contrary appearing in press will request no changes in terms of reference. (Min Labour told me later this latter point still not finalized.) Possibly due to recent unfortunate incidents involving individual British soldiers as well as considerable anti-British feeling current on island, GOC may request reduction in number UK soldiers in PKF. President has hopes that by concentrating British UN troops in Limassol and Larnaca areas where situation much more [worse?] than elsewhere any further incidents can be avoided.
2. Arms procurement and conscription. Makarios said reports of GOC plans to obtain arms grossly exaggerated in press. Obviously GOC has no need for "heavy bombers, etc." He had need, however, for fast patrol vessels, but so far was unable to obtain torpedo boats by purchase in West; therefore might have to turn to Soviets. Pointed out that he had now five planes in Air Force, including two helicopters. Said "all but one are yours, none are from the Soviet." (This confirmed in previous reports from Embassy and ARMA.) We did not discuss possibility of jet fighters or already-reported arrivals of light arms. With regard to conscription bill, President said that bill basically designed to establish control and discipline and would incorporate and break up various private groups such as Lyssarides' and Sampson's under over-all control of General Karayannis. Training program would include initially 16,000, but present plans did not provide for eventual army of anything like that size.
Said they had considered expanding police force, but had rejected this as being more expensive than creating small standing army. Said he had in mind force of 3,000 to 5,000, but this might be somewhat larger, perhaps as high as 8,000, and hoped that there would be no need for more in order control situation here vis-?-vis Turkish Cypriots. When I mentioned hostage problem and my encouragement at recent editorials calling on Greek Cypriots to use restraint and not take vengeance on innocent people, Archbishop said he had instigated press items and added further strong condemnation such acts. Said he hoped conscription and new armed forces would put stop to such irresponsibility. Noted also that no further acts committed since his appeal. Added that Red Cross had now found another 30 of those allegedly taken prior to May 11 incidents in Famagust. Said he had asked Kutchuk to issue statement on 30, but reply negative and he now would put matter on public record. (We checking this out with ICRC reps.)
3. Apparent growth of Soviet influence. I said we could understand GOC looking with favor on Soviet offers of assistance when country apparently in danger. However, I recalled that on previous occasion he had said that basic orientation of GOC and majority of people of Cyprus was and would remain with West.
Bearing this in mind, I said number of recent developments appeared to be pointing in other direction: Aside from arms question, there had been Aeroflot agreement, recently completed temporary air agreement with East Germany, establishment here of Cuban Mission, and possibility that Soviet petroleum products would be entering island through contract with electricity authority. President said he considered these were minor developments, and he could assure me that he would continue to act with utmost caution re possible entanglements with USSR. (This obviously means one thing to him and another to us.) With regard to Cuba, he gave me same argument as FonMin (previously reported) and he described air agreements as of little significance except that he was hopeful that East German agreement might possibly involve development in tourism. He said he was hopeful that contract for electricity authority would go to already established private firm here, but he thought it would be difficult to exclude low bidding firm simply on basis that their source of supply was Soviet Union. (It was apparent that he was reluctant to see electricity authority used as means to introduce sizable amounts of Soviet petroleum products, but he was at loss to see just how this might be prevented except perhaps through interpretation of bids based on price, experience and service.)
4. Easing of tensions in Nicosia. President said that in discussions yesterday with UNFICYP POLAD Flores re withdrawal of Greek and Turkish Cypriot positions from demarcations along Green Line, he (Markarios) had made radical proposal as follows: instead of 100-yard withdrawal by each side, if UN would take over several posts which he had designated on map, Greek Cypriots would dismantle all their positions. I said this was most encouraging development and expressed hope it would work out. President said he did not see how Turks could refuse UN offer to take over their posts as long as Greek side withdrew completely. (We shall follow this up with Flores.)
Our meeting was in private, extremely cordial and it was agreed we should meet at least every fortnight for general discussion.
Belcher
49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus/1/
Washington, June 1, 1964, 6:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Moffit, cleared by Jernegan and Buffum, and approved by Cleveland. Also sent to USUN and repeated to London, Ankara, and Athens.
885. We seem to detect just the beginnings of thinking in both Athens and Ankara that a territorial quid pro quo might be an ingredient in an eventual settlement of the Cyprus problem. We are anxious that these very fragile seeds be permitted to germinate and nothing be done which would interfere with process. This connection, we would want to be certain of UN Mediator's plans.
For Nicosia: Your 1221/2/ cited Tuomioja as saying he felt two months be required for him to prepare report to SYG. Your 1235/3/ seemed suggest that Tuomioja's report, when submitted, would include his ideas on solution but that substantive part of report would be confidential and it would be for SYG decide whether make that part public. If you believe there any prospect Tuomioja will submit report before SC meeting, you requested urge that report (1) either contain no recommendations for solution, or (2) any such recommendations be in confidential section of report and report for public record be along lines suggested in penultimate para Deptel 2890./4/
/2/Dated May 11. (Ibid.)
/3/See footnote 2, Document 46.
/4/Telegram 2890 to USUN was also sent to Nicosia as telegram 837; see footnote 4, Document 40.
For USUN: Your tel 4096/5/ indicates Bunche appears understand danger of surfacing any recommendations re solution unless there were agreement among parties that such recommendations could serve as basis for negotiations, and that, in absence such agreement, Tuomioja should not attempt submit report for some months. We note also that SYG at meeting with representatives of troop contributing countries May 22 expressed view that mediator should give himself six months and said he would discourage Tuomioja from producing report too soon. SYG also said he felt an early report might prejudice prospects for extension UNFICYP mandate. We assume from this that SYG would not pre-sent substantive report on mediation efforts to SC or, in any event, not a report with recommendations or proposals for settlement. You requested to confirm this assumption with Bunche or SYG. If you feel there is any doubt on this, or any change in their thinking, suggest you again emphasize to them dangers of surfacing even vague outline Tuomioja's thinking re solution as expressed Deptel 2890 and your 4029./6/
/5/Dated May 13. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
/6/Telegram 4029 from USUN discussed and analyzed Tuomioja's proposal. (Ibid.)
Ball
50. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, June 4, 1964, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Received at 12:19 p.m. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, and Paris. Passed to USUN and to U.S. Intelligence Board agencies.
Critic 2. Immediately on receipt info transmitted [document number not declassified]/2/ I asked see Erkin urgently and was received at once.
/2/Dated June 4. It reported a Turkish official statement that following Makarios' rejection of his June 3 request for a Cabinet meeting to find ways to end the bloodshed, Vice President Kutchuk would proclaim the independence of certain Turkish Cypriot enclaves and request a Turkish intervention that would occur on June 5 or 6. (Ibid.)
Without revealing knowledge CAS report I said that as result constant association with Cyprus problem one tended develop certain sensitivity to situation and I somehow had feeling something out of ordinary might be in wind. Could he give me reading since I would not wish be caught unaware. Also referred our understanding his assurance to President.
Erkin said in talks with Tuomioja latter had said Makarios intent on pursuing his objectives regardless consequences. Fault lay with USG and UK for not having been sufficiently active and Turk cause lost unless two governments did something.
Erkin then added present situation on island very critical and Cabinet meeting at 8:30 (local time) tonight to decide what to do. I asked if intervention might be decided. Erkin said that possible.
I then said it was understandable but definite instructions warn most seriously against intervention and I gave reasons, adding that I had also been somewhat encouraged recently by reports from Athens indicating Papandreou was pondering some formula which might meet Turkish needs.
Erkin said he had heard nothing of more encouraging nature from Athens but, if there was anything firm, it could have important effect on decision of Cabinet tonight and he would endeavor postpone meeting for an hour in order to afford opportunity for us to communicate anything which we might have.
I then asked what Erkin meant by indicating agreement that we and British should have been more diligent. Erkin said support in Athens of Turkish demand for federation or "double enosis." This essential and such ideas as exchange of population or giving Turks "some small island" out of question.
Erkin also said he had thought our attitude toward enosis had been clarified in Washington but he alleged have information that American official sources in Nicosia were in fact stating enosis was our approved policy.
Hope you or Athens can give me something urgently which I can convey to Erkin in effort deter precipitate action.
On leaving FonOff I by chance ran into Inonu and approached him in similar manner but Erkin apparently got wind that we were talking and joined us to say he had explained situation to me and would fill in Inonu. I told him make sure stress gravity our concern of intervention contemplated. He said he would.
I have never seen Inonu more relaxed, even jovial.
He did however confirm that situation critical.
Contents this tel must in no circumstances be revealed to other than Americans.
Hare
51. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation/1/
Washington, June 4, 1964, 12:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bracken and approved in S on June 15.
SUBJECT
Possible Turkish Government Decision on Intervention in Cyprus
PARTICIPANTS
Turgut Menemencioglu, Turkish Ambassador
The Secretary
The Secretary apologized for taking up a matter over the telephone with the Ambassador but since time was of the essence he was taking the liberty to do so. He said that the President had asked him to call the Ambassador most urgently and say that the President is gravely concerned by a statement which the Foreign Minister made to our Ambassador to the effect that a cabinet meeting was scheduled for approximately 8:30 p.m. at which the question of intervention in Cyprus could be decided. We have considered we have had a flat assurance through the Foreign Minister such a step would not be taken and that there would be full consultation with allies. We would find this a very, very grave departure from our understandings and would have a serious effect on the problem of our security commitments with our allies. The President asked most urgently that we urge in the gravest terms that we have an opportunity for consultations on these matters.
The Turkish Ambassador responded that it was very difficult for him to get through quickly to Ankara and asked if the Secretary was also sending a message to Ambassador Hare. The Secretary replied in the affirmative, adding that he was requesting the Ambassador to exert every effort as well./2/ Intervention would create most serious difficulties and we consider it cannot be done without consultation with allies. The Ambassador said he would attempt to get in touch with Ankara immediately.
/2/Telegram 1285 to Ankara, June 4, 1:15 p.m., instructed Hare to see Inonu immediately, "calling him out of cabinet meeting if necessary" to express U.S. opposition to a military intervention in Cyprus and to "use all arguments in your arsenal to pull them back from any such decision and to insist upon consultation." (Ibid.)
52. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Embassy in Turkey/1/
Athens, June 4, 1964, 9:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Flash. Repeated to the Department of State, Nicosia, London, and Paris for USRO. Received in the Department of State at 3:44 p.m. and passed to the White House. The source text is the Department of State copy.
336. Ref: Ankara's 500./2/
/2/Critic 2 from Ankara (Document 50) was repeated to Athens as telegram 500.
1. We have nothing "firm" from Athens to offer Erkin. Embtel 1812 (333 to Ankara)/3/ contains confidential report Tuomioja-Papandreou meeting yesterday, which indicates Papandreou still holding to line of enosis. We continue to believe there is no chance of Greek support partition or federation of Cyprus, as apparently demanded by Erkin, although there could likely be guarantees for Turkish minority of Lausanne Treaty type. Other possibilities are those suggested Embtels 1722 and 1759 (318 and 325 to Ankara),/4/ but even these cannot be put forward as having Greek approval.
/3/Dated June 4. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
/4/Telegram 1722 is dated May 18. (Ibid.) Telegram 1759 has not been found.
2. Required action for moment seems to me is for Turks to tell Kucuk firmly not to attempt establish de facto partition. I must emphasize that if Turks move to intervene on island, Greeks will react promptly and in force. GOT should be left under no misapprehension on this score.
Labouisse
53. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, June 5, 1964, 1 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Flash; Limdis; Noforn. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, and Paris for USRO. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and USUN. The time of transmission on the source text is 1 p.m., which is incorrect.
1598. Have just completed three hour conversation with Inonu while Cabinet waited. From start it was made clear that decision firm as far as Inonu concerned. Only thing wanted from us was understanding attitude on grounds that purpose was to move into only part of island as only way to reduce problem to manageable proportions. We would see and agree once operation carried out. Argument was tough and sometimes got on very sensitive ground with Inonu holding ground firmly and saying not only Cyprus but our relationship could hinge on agreement with Turkish decision. When Inonu made another move to join Cabinet I said was certain what I had been told would be great disappointment to President who has stressed importance of consultation and was only being given opportunity to agree or disagree on single proposition. This could hardly be called consultation.
Inonu and Erkin said that failure carry through as planned would cause great let down and results could be disastrous. Why hadn't we put questions which could be answered? What would I suggest?
I said what we needed was time make our views known. Inonu asked how much time. I said twenty-four hours in belief that request for longer delay would be refused. Inonu agreed, saying would be difficult call off plans at this stage but that he would do so. He must however stress importance of strict secrecy. This I assured. Longer tel follows/2/ but this is guts of discussion and is being sent as preliminary report so you can get wheels turning since we shall need strongest and most forthcoming assurances and arguments possible if we are to head Turks off.
/2/Telegram 1599 from Ankara, June 5. (Ibid.)
Although we didn't finish till eleven o'clock they asked for our reply by nine o'clock (local time) tomorrow night.
Hare
54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey/1/
Washington, June 5, 1964, 12:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Turkey, Prime Minister Inonu. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Bundy for the White House. Repeated to London, Nicosia, Athens, and Paris, also for USRO.
1296. Deliver Inonu soonest following message from President:
"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through Ambassador Hare from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far-reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your Government to consult fully in advance with us. Ambassador Hare has indicated that you have postponed your decision for a few hours in order to obtain my views. I put to you personally whether you really believe that it is appropriate for your Government, in effect, to present an ultimatum to an ally who has demonstrated such staunch support over the years as has the United States for Turkey. I must, therefore, first urge you to accept the responsibility for complete consultation with the United States before any such action is taken.
It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I must call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of supporting an attempt by Turkish Cypriot leaders to partition the Island, a solution which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. Further, that Treaty requires consultation among the Guarantor Powers. It is the view of the United States that the possibilities of such consultation have by no means been exhausted in this situation and that, therefore, the reservation of the right to take unilateral action is not yet applicable.
I must call to your attention, also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Rusk declared at the recent meeting of the Ministerial Council of NATO in The Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as 'literally unthinkable.'/2/ Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; nothing less can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO Allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies.
/2/For text of the May 12 statement, see Department of State Bulletin, June 1, 1964, pp. 850-852.
Further, Mr. Prime Minister, I am concerned about the obligations of Turkey as a member of the United Nations. The United Nations has provided forces on the Island to keep the peace. Their task has been difficult but, during the past several weeks, they have been progressively successful in reducing the incidents of violence on that Island. The United Nations Mediator has not yet completed his work. I have no doubt that the general membership of the United Nations would react in the strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey which would defy the efforts of the United Nations and destroy any prospect that the United Nations could assist in obtaining a reasonable and peaceful settlement of this difficult problem.
I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947,/3/ your Government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your Government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.
/3/For text of the agreement on economic and technical cooperation, signed in Ankara on July 12, 1947, and entered into force the same day, see 61 Stat. 2953.
Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel obligated to call to your attention in the most friendly fashion the fact that such a Turkish move could lead to the slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots on the Island of Cyprus. Such an action on your part would unleash the furies and there is no way by which military action on your part could be sufficiently effective to prevent wholesale destruction of many of those whom you are trying to protect. The presence of United Nations forces could not prevent such a catastrophe.
You may consider that what I have said is much too severe and that we are disregardful of Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation. I should like to assure you that this is not the case. We have exerted ourselves both publicly and privately to assure the safety of Turkish Cypriots and to insist that a final solution of the Cyprus problem should rest upon the consent of the parties most directly concerned. It is possible that you feel in Ankara that the United States has not been sufficiently active in your behalf. But surely you know that our policy has caused the liveliest resentments in Athens (where demonstrations have been aimed against us) and has led to a basic alienation between the United States and Archbishop Makarios. As I said to your Foreign Minister in our conversation just a few weeks ago,/4/ we value very highly our relations with Turkey. We have considered you as a great ally with fundamental common interests. Your security and prosperity have been a deep concern of the American people and we have expressed that concern in the most practical terms. You and we have fought together to resist the ambitions of the communist world revolution. This solidarity has meant a great deal to us and I would hope that it means a great deal to your Government and to your people. We have no intention of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the Turkish Cypriot community. We have not been able to find a final solution because this is, admittedly, one of the most complex problems on earth. But I wish to assure you that we have been deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriots and will remain so.
/4/See Document 37.
Finally, Mr. Prime Minister I must tell you that you have posed the gravest issues of war and peace. These are issues which go far beyond the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States. They not only will certainly involve war between Turkey and Greece but could involve wider hostilities because of the unpredictable consequences which a unilateral intervention in Cyprus could produce. You have your responsibilities as Chief of the Government of Turkey; I also have mine as President of the United States. I must, therefore, inform you in the deepest friendship that unless I can have your assurance that you will not take such action without further and fullest consultation I cannot accept your injunction to Ambassador Hare of secrecy and must immediately ask for emergency meetings of the NATO Council and of the United Nations Security Council.
I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of this situation. Unfortunately, because of the special circumstances of our present Constitutional position, I am not able to leave the United States. If you could come here for a full discussion I would welcome it. I do feel that you and I carry a very heavy responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to delay any decisions which you and your colleagues might have in mind until you and I have had the fullest and frankest consultation.
Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson"/5/
/5/The letter was released by the White House in January 1966 and printed in Middle East Journal 20 (1966), pp. 386-393
.Rusk
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