Documents 55-77
55. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, June 5, 1964, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Flash. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Athens, and Nicosia and to the White House, OSD, CIA, and JCS.
1609. Deptel 1296./2/ Have just returned from presenting President's letter to Inonu who read carefully, said disagreed with certain points which he would explain later but that he agreed with final sentence to effect that GOT would delay any action on understanding there would be full and frank discussion with view reaching peaceful solution of Cyprus problem. Added would present this for Cabinet approval tonight but seemed regard their acceptance as taken for granted.
/2/Document 54.
Said considered it important let public know that intervention postponed at our request and that American Government would assume active role in effort settle problem between allies, and asked my approval. I said unable give carte blanche but would be glad submit to Washington such text as GOT might propose./3/
/3/The White House released a statement before the Turkish Government could provide suggested language. The text of the U.S. statement was transmitted in telegram 1460 to Athens, June 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP) In telegram 1617 from Ankara, June 6, Hare reported that Erkin had unsuccessfully sought a joint follow-up statement. (Ibid.)
Further details in separate tel but gist is GOT agrees forego intervention on condition we take active interest in seeking solution./4/
/4/Telegram 1616 from Ankara, June 6. (Ibid.)
General Lemnitzer was seeing PriMin immediately after I left./5/
/5/Lemnitzer reported on his meeting with Inonu in an unnumbered telegram to the Department of Defense, June 5. (Ibid.)
Hare
56. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, June 6, 1964, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, USUN, and Paris for Under Secretary Ball and USRO. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, and CIA. Ball visited Paris and London for meetings with President de Gaulle and senior British officials, and Geneva for a speech to the International Trade Conference June 4-7.
1322. Ankara tel sent Dept 1609./2/ Latest Turkish invasion threat may well be climax of Cyprus crisis. Our acceptance of larger measure of responsibility for efforts find solution can be significant new element in problem. Whether our deeper involvement was precalculated objective of Turkish exercise or only way Turks could find out of impasse is not yet clear, but in either case we should seize resulting situation as opportunity to be exploited to fullest in effort achieve lasting settlement.
/2/Document 55.
In planning role we are to play, I would hope Dept shares our belief it essential we keep eye on political, economic and demographic facts of life and avoid being drawn into quid pro quo with Turks which would involve our support of a Turk Cypriot solution in exchange for their agreement not to intervene.
June 5 exercise in Ankara may have been designed in part to take Inonu off hook politically and shift blame for Turkish inaction to us. In itself, this is not bad. We can accept that onus, but we must be wary of dangers of going beyond this possibly becoming involved in support of an unrealistic plan for federation or in giving some general assurance of support which could be interpreted as guaranteeing Turkish satisfaction in Cyprus.
GOT has called for us to become substantively involved. In so doing we must play it straight with GOT, pulling no punches in our analysis that the facts clearly require an essentially Greek solution, that partition or federation is anathema to 80 percent of population and therefore politically and practically infeasible, and that the prime problem will be to devise arrangements to give maximum protection to Turk Cypriot and GOT security interests. This is moment to grasp nettle and tell GOT plainly we believe security interests would best be insured by association of Cyprus with Greece--a NATO ally, a more mature and responsible state, and one whose interests are in no way served by perpetuation of difficulties with Turkey.
We can no longer remain on sidelines, expressing hope for solution satisfactory to both sides. There is no such solution. Unitary, Greek-run state, closely associated with Greece (perhaps with defense, foreign affairs and guarantees of minority rights left in hands of GOG) would offer following palpable advantages:
1. It should be acceptable to majority of Cyprus population.
2. It would allow us at least in Security Council and elsewhere to displace solution as defender of justice on Cyprus (c.f. my letter to Jernegan), thus stemming dangerous slide to the left here.
3. It would provide best guarantee available for security both of Turk Cypriots and Turkey, bringing island within NATO sphere and removing motive for further equivocating GOC role re East and West which has so encouraged growth of Communist influence on island.
4. It should contribute to improvement of Greek-Turkish relations, as GOG would have every reason to assure Turk Cypriot rights and reestablishment law and order on Cyprus. Partition, federation or hermaphrodite London-Zurich type solution would only guarantee continuing trouble on Cyprus.
Would seem that situation resulting from most recent crisis gives opportunity for new initiative in effort end once and for all this problem so fraught with danger to US and our allies, not to mention people of Cyprus.
If Inonu accepts invitation or if UK-US consultations considered advisable, I believe situation on island such that I could be available for consultation in connection therewith.
Foregoing dictated prior to Tuomioja meeting reported following telegram, but substance that meeting only supports above thesis./3/
/3/Belcher reported on his meeting with Tuomioja in telegram 1323 from Nicosia, June 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
Belcher
57. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, June 8, 1964, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, USUN, the White House, CIA, JCS and OSD.
1844. 1. In absence Prime Minister in Crete I had talks with FonMin Costopoulos on Saturday and again Sunday evening and covered points mentioned in Deptels 1446, 1456 and 1464./2/ I started by saying the events were causing USG to play more active role in Cyprus matter, observing that Turks wanted this and I understood Tuomioja and Greeks also did, provided this done within framework UN. We wanted to be helpful but needed help from parties themselves--and particularly Greeks and we must work closely together in finding way out of morass. I then made entirely clear how deeply concerned we were about recent developments, and stressed once more deadly seriousness situation to Greeks as well as to Cyprus and West. I recognized that, for political reasons, Papandreou felt himself in difficult position to oppose Makarios publicly at this time, but pointed out that GOG's open support of Makarios coupled with such things as its failure publicly to protest at time of Saint Hilarion and in connection with hostages following Famagusta had left bad impression and that GOT seemed justified in assuming Makarios calling tune and Greece willingly following. It was therefore most important that something be done which would indicate an atmosphere of reasonableness on part of Greek Govt. I mentioned possibility of GOG influencing Makarios to have talks with Kucuk, delay in introducing conscription, and suspend reported importation heavy armaments.
/2/Telegram 1446 to Athens, June 5, instructed the Embassy to urge the Greek Government to relieve pressures in the region through action with the Greek Cypriots and gestures toward Turkey. (Ibid.) Telegram 1456 to Athens, June 5, instructed the Embassy to urge Papandreou to press Makarios for some concessions toward the Turkish Cypriot community in order to reduce tensions. (Ibid.) Telegram 1464, June 6, instructed the Embassy to reiterate that the United States had less leverage with Turkey after restraining it and urge that Greece take concrete actions to lower levels of tension. (Ibid.)
2. Costopoulos expressed great appreciation for what USG had done. When I said this wasn't the point, he replied that Greece would like to do something to help, but Turks made it very difficult. Latest Turkish threats were justification for Makarios' worries and his actions. However, Costopoulos assured me Greeks had urged Makarios to talk with Kucuk--not under conditions set by Kucuk but just to have general discussion. Makarios had refused, saying it would serve no purpose with Kucuk and Turk Cypriots in present frame of mind.
Costopoulos then referred to alleged heavy armaments imports and assured me that as of present time no deals had been made and the main thing Cypriots wanted was torpedo boats ("possibly three"). He believed Cypriots would stop at that and we could pass this on confidentially, but he added he could not guarantee what Makarios might do in future. He shied away from conscription issue. He then referred to an earlier conversation and said Cuba not setting up establishment in Nicosia.
3. Concerning the current Turkish threat, Costopoulos was of two minds. I believe he understands seriousness of situation, but he also harbors theories re GOT motivations which have somewhat offsetting effect. In first place, he believes--as do many Greeks--threat was timed for Senatorial elections--"it would not be first time they have done this."
But in his opinion, even more important motivation was probably related to Turks' "spoiled child" complex in which they seek to obtain concessions from USG to support GOT in return for latter's better behavior. I acknowledge that these might be factors in matter, but that GOG would be making frightful error in judgment if it underestimated Turkish feelings and deadly reality of Greece's danger. It was only President Johnson's very strong message and Inonu's statesmanship that had saved terrible catastrophe so far. I spoke of Inonou's internal problems and repeated need to find some way of preventing Turkish humiliations. I also strongly urged that GOG caution press against playing "bluff" theme it has used in past. He said he agreed with what I had said: his govt has been trying to influence Makarios along reasonable lines but there was not much it could effectively do in circumstances.
4. Costopoulos reverted to my remark about internal political considerations curtailing Papanderou's freedom of action re Cyprus. He said this was entirely true but was only part of story. More important was fact that if GOG did not go along publicly with Makarios, then game might well be lost to the Soviets who were smartly supporting nationalistic aspirations, both here and in Cyprus. Situation was becoming more and more dangerous and only choice was between "a Mediterranean Cuba and NATO" (i.e. enosis). There was no hope of handling the Communist threat through partition or federation. This would only aggravate matters and play into hands of Communists. It was much better for Turkey's security interests, as well as for Greece and Cyprus, to have Cyprus part of Greece with NATO base and with "Greek Govt monarch rather than someone like Lysarrides or worse in control." Latter was only realistic alternative to enosis./3/
/3/In telegram 1845 from Athens, June 8, Labouisse reported that based on his talk with Costopoulos and others he believed that a limited possibility of a Greek-Turkish accord based on enosis and a strictly controlled Turkish base on Cyprus existed. (Ibid.)
5. I said it would be very difficult for Inonu and Turks to swallow such a proposal and pressed again for some other Greek suggestions. He acknowledged problem, but repeated there was only one sensible and effective solution in Western interests. It was useless to expect Greece to cede territory to Turkey to achieve this end. He did volunteer, however, that a population movement might be possible, although he asserted that movement of Greek population and of Patriarchate from Istanbul would cause extreme agonies for Greek people and it was possible that no govt could approve it.
6. I again asked about possibility of talks between Greeks and Turks to which Costopoulos replied that talks between Papandreou and Inonu or between him and Erkin should not be held without proper preparation. On his return from The Hague, he had suggested to Papandreou that Greek and Turk Ambassadors meet in some unspecified spot for discussions but Papandreou had turned this down at the time. I obtained impression that there was possibility of making some headway on this front and I shall continue probing./4/
/4/In telegram 1851, June 10, Labouisse reported that the Greeks were ready to begin secret Ambassadorial-level discussions with Turkey. (Ibid.)
7. It came out during talk that Greeks believe that Tuomioja leaning toward Greek concept of satisfactory solution. Costopoulos had received report that USUN opposed to Tuomioja filing report of his own views with Security Council. He asked if this was USG position. I replied in the affirmative, saying that I understood Tuomioja's job that of a mediator and that if he could not find agreed solution, he should keep on trying and should not come out with a personal opinion favoring one extreme or the other; this could only serve to cause trouble at this juncture.
8. At end, Costopoulos said that Greece had been informed during day (Sunday) that Kucuk was about to assert sovereignty over certain areas of Cyprus in expectation that Turkey (and possibly Pakistan and Iran) would support his action by some sort of recognition. His intelligence was that this would take place during Inonu's absence in the States--probably in next couple of days. I said we had heard rumors about possible Kucuk action few days ago and this had given rise to some of our concern. I hoped new rumors were just old ones catching up. Costopoulos said that Greek Cypriots would have to react forcefully against Turkish Cypriots if Kucuk took such action. I strongly urged that in any such event GOG should use every possible influence to have Makarios refer matter to SC without resorting to force. He agreed and was to talk to Kyprianou about it.
Labouisse
58. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/
London, June 9, 1964, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, Ankara, USUN, and Geneva for Ball.
6120. Deptel 7854./2/ In as much as Under Secretary Ball did not have opportunity raise subject of reftel with British during his crowded visit to London, Jernegan, Sisco and Eilts raised it today with Dodson (Counselor, Central Dept) and Wood of FonOff. We stressed that while appreciating great difficulties under which British soldiers are laboring in Cyprus, US is convinced that British element in UNPKF is key to success of peacekeeping effort. Any suggestion therefore of reduction of size British component creates greatest misgivings in US. We believe 7,000 man UNPKF needed to carry out mission and are concerned that UNPKF troop strength is slipping below this minimum level.
/2/Telegram 7854 to London, May 29, instructed the Ambassador to stress U.S. concern regarding plans for British troop reductions in Cyprus. (Ibid.)
Dodson said HMG is operating on premise that UNPKF is essential to peace of Eastern Mediterranean and acknowledged that British element is major factor therein. Same time HMG has been concerned about treatment meted out to British troops by Cypriots and at suggestion that Makarios may attempt blackball further British military participation in UNPKF. In this connection, he cited Georgatizis statement following arrest of RAF Airman Marley that latter's activities called into question further utility of British element in UNPKF, and more recent comment of Kyprianou to UK HICOM that GOC has not yet decided whether British should remain in UNPKF. Dodson pointed out HMG would not wish public rebuff by GOC re British participation.
Dodson said British element is now some 1800 strong. He claimed reduction of British element has in past been geared into availability other units from elsewhere. He said HMG has now taken policy decision that it is willing to continue in UNPKF, but for tactical reasons connected with its unwillingness incur GOC rebuff, has told SYG continuation UK participation depends entirely on him. By playing reluctant, HMG believes SYG more likely make clear importance British element to success of UNPKF. Re numbers, Dodson claimed Gyani came up with suggestion only 1200 British troops needed, e.g. one infantry battalion, two armored scout car squadrons and supporting troops. This estimate based on Gyani's apparent belief additional Irish or Danish troops will become available. HMG now awaiting word from SYG re his wishes on British participation.
We stressed to Dodson that Dept has no information to suggest GOC might seek to blackball British participation. We reiterated great importance USG attaches to such British participation. We recalled two British troop reductions had taken place without our being consulted. We emphasized our strong hope that before any further reductions are decided upon, HMG consult with us. We also emphasized any further British reductions should be phased into availability other units and noted our impression SYG not likely obtain any substantial increase in other national contingents.
Dodson claimed British troop reductions arranged by UK military officer (Bailey) working with Rikhye in New York and seemed to assume matter should have been discussed with us there. He took note our point, however, and we are hopeful British now appreciate more fully great importance we attach to matter and will in future keep in closer touch with us on this one.
Bruce
59. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, June 9, 1964, 6:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary Rusk, June 9, 1964, 6:30 p.m., Tape 64.31, Side A, PNO 2 and 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
Operator: Hello.
O: Secretary Rusk, please.
O: Yes, who's calling?
O: The President.
O: Thank you.
MF: Miss Fehmer.
O: Miss Fehmer, Secretary Rusk for the President.
MF: Thank you.
LBJ: Get me Secretary Rusk.
MF: He's on the phone.
LBJ: Hello? Mr. Secretary?
DR: Hello?
LBJ: How'd you get along?
DR: Alright with Fulbright, Hickenlooper, and Dirksen./2/ I was not able to get a hold of Halleck, who is out of town, and Bill Bundy was up with the House Foreign Affairs Committee. And I will check with them. I haven't been able to reach them this afternoon.
/2/According to Rusk's Appointment Book, he met at 4:45 p.m. with the three Senators at the New Senate Office Building. (Ibid.) There was no indication of the topic of the meeting.
LBJ: Alright.
DR: But, uh, but the others were alright. They had no problem.
LBJ: Uh-huh, alright, now--
DR: Now, I've got a call in for George Ball. Mr. President, I think the problem here is that we need to get him back to be sure that we are all on the same track here and to see where we are going. That's my concern about that. If he goes to Athens at this point, it could stimulate a good deal of excitement without putting one foot forward. I don't think Ball is in a position yet to begin to move toward a solution to this thing. And, uh, we, our talks in London have not produced, ah enough agreement between us and the British about how we proceed here./3/ I just think that since he now is not planning to stop off in London but he was planning to come right on back, that we've got to let him do it even though by the weekend we might want to send him out to the area.
/3/See Document 58.
LBJ: Alright. Now what's the, if you can't produce it while he is over there, how is he going to produce it here?
DR: Well, I think that . . .
LBJ: With the British?
DR: I think, the point is that we--that you and he and I and our people working on this should come to a final conclusion on what we ought to shoot for. And there is not a conclusion on that at the moment, and the conclusion that they have been talking about in London is something that will almost guarantee the Turks would intervene and this is what concerns me.
LBJ: Uh-huh.
DR: We're not giving the Turks enough of a break here in the kind of solution that they have been talking about--in London.
LBJ: Well, is it necessary for him to get back here to do that? Is he an integral part of our--?
DR: Oh, I think that it would be extremely helpful to me because he is our most experienced man on this problem.
LBJ: Uh-huh.
DR: And he could take a real leadership on it.
LBJ: I think it's a lot bigger problem to send him after he gets back over there than let him go while he's there, don't you?
DR: Uh-huh, well--
LBJ: It looks like it's just a routine thing, if he's there now. He's been touring all over the continent./4/ But ah--
/4/See footnote 1, Document 56.
DR: There's another piece of information on this. The Greek Cypriot Prime Minister/5/ has just arrived in New York to ask for a Security Council meeting on this subject, so that is likely to take the play away from other matters here for a brief time.
/5/Foreign Minister Kyprianou.
LBJ: Uh-huh. Well, is that good?
DR: Ah, I think so, sir. I--
LBJ: Looks like we need some time to get some solutions, don't we?
DR: I think we do need some time here. This is one of the most--
LBJ: I'll defer to your judgment. If I were Secretary of State, I'd send him to Greece and say, "Now, Mr. Prime Minister, here is what happened. We were notified that they were going in and invade that night. We prevailed on them not to do it. We don't think that things are going as they ought to there and we are very concerned about what's going to happen so we--our people are concerned. And we appeal to you to exercise whatever influence you've got with Makarios to try to let the United Nations work this thing out for you instead of shooting at them and arresting them and capturing them and running off with them. And we just think that if you don't take some leadership here and move in, as we had to move in with Turkey, that this is going to be a very bloody bath." And now I don't know what other specific proposals other than urging him to do that, but it seems to me, then that would give us something to say to the Turks that we've made an appeal to them and personally sent our man. Now if you think that he ought to come back before he does that, why--
DR: I think that if you said that to the Greek Ambassador when he brings you that message,/6/ that would be, that would have the greatest weight and influence in Athens. But let me talk to George Ball and get his judgment on this point.
/6/See Document 62.
LBJ: Alright. Ok. That's good. And I don't think, though, that Inonu is going to think that's much--for me to talk to this little ambassador here.
DR: Uh-huh.
LBJ: I think that if he thinks that this man has crossed the waters and gone to Athens and put the heat on them just like we put the heat on the Turks, that he'll think we are sincere and genuine and we're really working at it and not going to sleep on it.
DR: Yes. Now there is a press report out of Ankara that Inonu is replying and conditionally accepting your invitation.
LBJ: Uh-huh.
DR: I don't know what that kind of press leak means, but if he were to come here in the next few days, I think that would be an important step.
LBJ: Well, I look at it the other way. I think that the last thing we want him to do is let me be the peacemaker and later wind up on my lap. I think we ought to carry it right to Ankara and Athens. Now that's my country-boy approach to it.
DR: Alright.
LBJ: And I think that we got in trouble the other night when we suggested to him that if he--I couldn't come over there, but I'd be glad to see him but we were absolutely desperate and I let that go./7/
/7/See Document 54.
DR: Right.
LBJ: But when I got home and thought about it a little bit, I thought, "Now what in the hell is Lyndon Johnson doing inviting this big mess right in his lap?" Bad enough for George Ball to go to them and see him without the President calling him over here. Because I have no solution. I can't propose anything. He'll come over here looking for heaven and he'll find hell.
DR: Well, his message--if it's a conditional message--will probably have that kind of thing in it and would be the basis for deferring until we get some further feeling out of it.
LBJ: Well, my feeling is--and I don't want to be arbitrary and I won't be a bit disappointed if he comes on--but I think you ought to let him know--
DR: Yeah.
LBJ: --that I think that, in the light of this strong message I sent to the Turks--
DR: Right.
LBJ: --that I need to follow through with the Greeks, and the easiest and simplest and least-noticed way to do it is while he's there to spend two hours doing it.
DR: Right.
LBJ: Then I wouldn't hesitate the slightest to say to them, "Now, we're going on and appeal to the Turks to hold this thing in abeyance," and he can go tell the Turks what he'd done--
DR: Uh-huh.
LBJ: --and although you wouldn't have any final solution or division, you would have at least kept faith and made an effort and followed through on what I told them in this wire instead of saying we went off and went to sleep.
DR: Right. Well, let me talk to George and see./8/
/8/No record of this conversation was found.
LBJ: Ok.
DR: Thank you.
LBJ: Bye.
60. Letter From Prime Minister Papandreou to President Johnson/1/
Athens, June 9, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. No classification marking. The source text is a copy of the letter given to Secretary Rusk by the Greek Embassy on June 9; it is typed on Greek Embassy stationery. Rusk passed it to the President at lunch the same day. Ambassador Matsas formally presented the original of the letter to President Johnson at a June 11 meeting; see Document 62.
Dear Mr. President,
The Honorable Henry Labouisse, Ambassador of the United States in Athens has imparted to Mr. S. Costopoulos, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, the concern of the American Government in view of information about an imminent Turkish landing in Cyprus. He also informed Mr. Costopoulos of the action taken by the American Government with the Government of Turkey, in order to avert the landing.
The Greek Government wishes to express its warm thanks for this appropriate and wise initiative of the President of the United States, which agrees with the tradition of the American Nation as well as with the mission of the United States as leader of the Free World.
We do not know if the above step has been decisively effective. Information is reaching us that Turkey persists in the policy of landing and is preparing for it; and that, in order to justify the landing, she is staging the proclamation, by the very small Turkish minority of Cyprus, of a federative or an independent State./2/
/2/In telegram 1848 from Athens, June 9, 5 p.m., the Embassy reported that a "revived atmosphere of crisis gripped Athens" as a result of renewed reports of Turkish preparations for an invasion of Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
The Greek Government has repeatedly declared and reasserts today that its policy is peace; but, in case of aggression, it will be defense.
The Greek Government most assuredly regards a Turkish landing in Cyprus as an aggression; because the resolution of the Security Council of the 4th of March would thus be violated and also because such an action aims at the strangulation of the rights of the great Greek majority of the island.
This will be one of the consequences of an eventual Turkish landing: a Greek-Turkish conflict and the dissolution of the Southeastern flank of NATO. But this will not be the only consequence. Communism will become omnipotent within the island of Cyprus; and, we unfortunately fear, within Greece, where, with our policies, we have reduced it to 12%. Besides, it is inevitable and human that the Greeks of Cyprus, threatened by a Turkish invasion tolerated by the Allies, should seek help wherever they can find it. And it is known, under the present circumstance, whence this help will be offered. An objective assessment of the future, unfortunately leads to the certain forecast that, under these conditions, Cyprus will end into another Cuba and that the Greek Government will no longer be in a position to exercise any restraining influence.
We feel that a critical hour has struck and we regard it our duty to define responsibilities before the Greek nation, before the Free World to which we belong, as well as before History. And this is the meaning of the present message.
Yours sincerely,
George A. Papandreou/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
61. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, the White House, JCS, CIA, and OSD.
Nicosia, June 10, 1964, 1 p.m.
1347. Embtel 1346./2/ Greek and Turkish Cypriots look on forthcoming SC meeting on Cyprus as crucial test of US attitudes, influence and abilities. After events of June 5, all parties consider we are now deeply involved and look for us to take positive position in New York. It is common belief our policy on Cyprus has changed, but SC will be regarded as acid test of this belief.
/2/Telegram 1346 from Nicosia, June 10, reported the observations of the Syrian Ambassador on the U.S. position following President Johnson's actions to prevent an invasion of Cyprus. (Ibid.)
Reading the political temper in Cyprus, we believe either emergency or scheduled SC meeting may prove major watershed in Greek Cypriot attitudes. As we have reported with increasing frequency, Communists have been going all out to enmesh Greek Cypriots by espousing principles of freedom and democracy, offering assistance and promising support. Having a favorably conditioned audience, the Communists have up to this point made extensive progress with most elements of Greek Cypriot society. Their accomplishments have been impressive and give cause for serious concern, but thus far we estimate them to be generally shallow in nature. The fickle, politically immature Greek Cypriots could quickly change their view of their "real friends", if given the occasion.
The show down which now appears to be at hand, would threaten to give Communist accomplishments in Cyprus a deeper, more lasting character where permanent damage might be done to the orientation of the Greek Cypriot leadership as well as many other elements of the society.
Given this ticklish situation, the problem for the US will be how to handle itself on policy without alienating the Greek Cypriots and giving the Soviets the opening for which they hope. In this circumstance perhaps it would be best to let troop contributing countries carry the ball on sensitive terms of reference issue (assuming discussion this issue cannot be avoided) where US involvement in substance would probably range us among opponents of GOC.
There is, however, one point where US might be able to make major productive contribution to work of SC, a contribution which relates to principal concern of Greek Cypriots about threat of Turkish military intervention. If US could produce as its contribution a Turkish commitment not to intervene in Cyprus for the duration of UN involvement, this would be major accomplishment which should go far toward re-establishing our damaged position here.
Belcher
62. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 11, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Memcons Other Than Visits. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Talbot and Komer and approved in the White House on June 15.
SUBJECT
President's Meeting with Greek Ambassador Matsas
PARTICIPANTS
The President
His Excellency Alexander Matsas, Ambassador of Greece
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Robert W. Komer, The White House
After the President greeted Ambassador Matsas cordially, the Ambassador said he understood that the President had already taken action on the letter now being formally delivered. However, Matsas had no report as yet on the Ball conversation in Athens./2/ The President then carefully read Prime Minister Papandreou's letter./3/
/2/See Document 64.
/3/Document 60.
The President made clear our position on the Cyprus crisis. Outside powers could not solve it. The Greeks and Turks must settle it themselves. He believed the Prime Minister of Greece should get together with Prime Minister Inonu, or have some representative talk with the Turks. We had told Turkey that there could not be war but we didn't know how long this would stick. Moreover, we were "disappointed" that the Greek Government had not taken the initiative to meet and talk with the Turks. It was much more dangerous not to get together than to get together. As we saw it, there were two requirements for a solution: (a) whatever was done must be permanent; (b) the solution could not be humiliating to either side. It was much more dangerous not to have a solution. War could help nobody. Therefore, the President continued, he had told Ball to urge Papandreou to take the initiative in getting together somehow with the Turks. The US people were becoming quite worried over the Cyprus problem; they couldn't understand why "two of our close allies were growling at each other." As for Makarios, he didn't seem to care. He thought he had the Greeks supporting him. Meanwhile, the Soviets were meddling and fully expected to win in the end. So we thought the Greeks must show some statesmanship and get moving toward agreement.
The President returned to the theme of American public attitudes. Some Americans were already wondering if they should go to Europe and to the Eastern Mediterranean now. There was no reason why Turkey and Greece couldn't agree to talk about their problem. It would be dangerous if they did not. To repeat, this solution should be permanent and not humiliating to either side. We had gone to the aid of Greece and Turkey in the Truman Doctrine. We had helped through the years, and wanted to help now. But Greece and Turkey must grasp the problem. We had stopped the Turks from moving, but we couldn't drop the matter there. We wanted to see them at the conference table. Greece should take the initiative.
The Ambassador asked what response his government had given to Ball. The President replied that they seemed to be considering our d?marche. But he urged a Greek initiative. Action was what was needed.
Matsas explained that the chief need as his government saw it was to stop the constant threats of invasion. The President interrupted him, saying we had stopped it already but couldn't stop it always. We had acted vigorously when trouble was imminent, but we might not be able to stop the Turks again.
Ambassador Matsas agreed there were still dangers ahead. His government had disturbing reports in the last day or so, including reported overflights of Rhodes. The President replied, "If I can't get you to talk, I can't keep the Turks from moving."
Matsas again sought to explain the Greek position. He reported that the whole trouble lay in the continuing Turkish threat to invade Cyprus. The President interjected: "Or in your support of what Makarios is doing--or in arms imports." The Ambassador replied that otherwise Makarios would have felt isolated. There were two dangers: The Greek-Turkish tensions and the risk of Makarios drifting to "the other side." Both are the consequence of the Turkish threats. If only the US could secure Turkish agreement not to invade, then tensions would be reduced and there would be no need for arms imports to Cyprus, etc. etc. The President emphasized that we could not get the threat called off until the Greeks had agreed to talk. This called for statesmanship. Papandreou was a statesman. Matsas should tell his Prime Minister to call Inonu today and arrange a meeting. We had done everything we could. Our troubles around the world these days were not our own; our troubles turned out to be mostly disputes between our allies. Certainly Greece and Turkey would not be justified in destroying NATO over this issue.
Matsas asked if the President thought it impossible to get the Turks not to invade. The President said: "Nothing is impossible if people will act." But Papandreou must act in this case if we were to have peace and not war. Matsas tried to point out again that Turkish agreement not to invade was the key to the situation. The President said bluntly that we could not get the Turks to turn off until there was some basis on which to argue with them. He noted that the Greek Government was apparently willing to have secret talks (this surprised Matsas who was obviously unaware of this. So Mr. Komer confirmed that the Foreign Minister had said secret talks were possible). Matsas then asked whether any US proposals had been mentioned by Ball. The President said that we were not going to make proposals ourselves at this point. Any US proposals would be seized upon by one side or the other and used to blame us. We want the Greeks and Turks to start making proposals to each other. This should be a matter between the two of them. Matsas added: "And the Cypriots." Matsas said that "talks are difficult under the threat of invasion." The President immediately came back: "Of course they're difficult. But it's more difficult to talk after an invasion. Get together and work something out. If not, all NATO will become involved."
The Ambassador contended that the Greeks from the beginning had sought to keep the dispute damped down and avoid actions which increased the threat of hostilities. He gave examples of proposals advanced to the British, cooperating with the UN, etc. In contrast, he said, the Turks have done everything to spread the dispute, as by their treatment of the Greeks in Istanbul. The President said he thought Papandreou should appoint someone and talk with Inonu immediately. Talk was far better than the way of the jungle. Matsas attempted to return to the theme of calling the Turks off. The President interrupted him again saying: "I have only a temporary hold-off. What we want is for your Prime Minister to sit down with the Turkish Prime Minister and work out an agreement. Our people are getting terribly worried." Matsas said that temporary cessation of the invasion threat won't solve the problem: it won't keep Makarios from building up arms supplies. The President responded that nothing would. The President said: "The Turks are the only ones I have gotten to do anything till now. All I want is for the Greek Prime Minister to sit down and talk. This is not so difficult." He pointed out that by just this means he had gotten the railroad strike settled in ten days. But Greece always wants Turkey to do something to ease tensions and Turkey always wants Greece to do something. What was the Greek program for settling the crisis?
Matsas described the desire for a fully independent state with self-determination and guarantees of minority rights. He noted this was a "compromise" position (i.e. not enosis). He asked what the President thought of this approach. The President said that we couldn't negotiate for the Turks. All we wanted was for Greece to get together with them. It wasn't up to us to say what agreement should be reached. "We stopped an invasion the other night. Now we want a conference. Let's start discussing this thing." He again mentioned the problem of American tourists going to the threatened area. It was easier to talk than to fight. The President told the Ambassador: "You will only be admired for saying 'let's talk'." It was a matter of the Biblical injunction, "Come let us reason together." Matsas said he would so report to his government.
The President then changed tactics and pointed out the strong American affection for Greece. The President himself would like to travel there again soon with his family. But there could not be a war. We had turned off the Turks. Now we want talks. As Speaker Rayburn had said, "It's always better to talk than fight." Matsas tried once more to press the theme that the US or the UN Security Council should get the Turks to call off their invasion threats. The President said, "Let's see what you can do for us and we will see what we can do for you." Matsas sought to inquire whether this meant the President would get Turkey to agree permanently not to invade. The President carefully avoided any such commitment. He said: "I made a positive request of the Turks and they said that even though they didn't agree they would comply. I now make a positive request to you to talk. If you comply, we will then make some suggestions to the Turks. That's better than fighting." The President did not tell him what these suggestions would be, but promised that if Papandreou would try to bring Greece and Turkey together, we would help all we could to move things along to an agreement. Otherwise we'd have a disaster.
The President asked Matsas to tell his Prime Minister of the President's deep sense of friendship for him and for Greece. The President was counting heavily on Papandreou. We did not want the US people to get the idea that Makarios was "using" the Greeks. "Greece must avoid at all costs humiliating its ally Turkey. Even in the Cuban missile crisis, we always left the enemy a way out. With an ally it was even more important to leave a way out."
The President observed that negotiating with Makarios was impossible. Makarios wasn't interested in the security of the West. But Greece, Turkey, and the US were. Matsas interjected that Greece could not negotiate without Makarios. The President indicated understanding that the Cypriots would have to be consulted at some point but the important thing was Greek-Turkish agreement. Greece talked about its responsibil-ities to the Greek Cypriots. Didn't the Greeks see that the fate of 100,000 Turkish Cypriots was a matter of honor for Inonu too?
Ambassador Matsas assured the President that he would promptly inform his Government.
63. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/
New York, June 11, 1964, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Nicosia, London, Athens, Ankara, and Paris for USRO.
4455. SC--Cyprus. Cypriot FonMin Kyprianou called with PermRep Rossides on Stevenson June 11. Fol are highlights:
1. Kyprianou stressed that principal reason he decided for time being not call urgent SC mtg was his awareness Pres Johnson's efforts with GOT which he did not wish upset as he hopeful it would produce something. Stevenson emphasized seriousness present situation stressing GOT concern with Cypriot arms imports, conscription, disappearance hostages, ties with SovBloc. Situation deteriorating and there need work actively for solution agreeable to all parties before situation deteriorates further. Said he hoped GOC had given thought to this as obvious that in any solution no party will get everything it wants.
2. Kyprianou responding to Stevenson mention of GOC moves cited provocative GOT acts (including use UK soldiers for smuggling) leading to GOC arms and conscription decisions and defended these as right and duty of GOC. Stevenson said situation difficult to control. Was worse than in March and GOC had not exercised restraint he had hoped, or avoided provocations as he hoped. Kyprianou stressed GOC had avoided number of moves and Rossides provided chapter and verse on Turk contingent, "rebels" at Hilarion, obstruction on Kyrenia Road.
3. Yost stressed need create feeling of confidence among Turk Cypriots. Kyprianou replied " If GOT wants them have confidence they'll have it. Their unease ordered by Ankara. Everything calm where GOT not stirring them up." Turk Cypriot discontent is manufactured as result longstanding GOT partition plan of which GOC amassing more and more evidence. Denied arms imports and conscription designed have any effect on Turk Cypriots stating they reaction to: (1) invasion threats; (2) need to discipline Greek Cypriot forces. In response Stevenson question, Kyprianou said regular GOC army would disarm irregular Greek Cypriots.
4. Stevenson again stressed seriousness of situation mentioning GOT fear of new "Cuba." Kyprianou said this new idea but Rossides emphasized Greek Cypriot Communists few and without arms and nationalists in control. Nationalists got main outside support from SovBloc as result Western lack of sympathy.
5. Stevenson asked Kyprianou state of negots with Sovs and Czechs on arms. Kyprianou, hesitating somewhat, denied there were such negots. Rossides noted GOC would abandon arms acquisition if SC guaranteed territorial integrity. Kyprianou defended acquisition of arms "from US or anywhere," not necessarily from Sovs and Czechs.
6. In reply Stevenson query on SC, Kyprianou said 1) not abandon idea urgent mtg; 2) planned in regular mtg raise question Turk threat, exit of Turk contingent along with Greek.
7. Yost stressed GOT feeling that they have been pushed back steadily from Zurich agreements and cannot tolerate this, particularly in view of method by which this done. Kyprianou noted initial method was negots.
8. Stevenson emphasized US effectiveness in restraining GOT diminishing because of GOC moves, urged Kyprianou "bend over backwards avoid provocations", saying would be wise not take any actions which would exacerbate Turk feelings and plan quiet SC mtg instead to extend UNFICYP on basis SYG report and then might be possible move forward toward solution. Kyprianou countered asking how fact recent GOT preparations can be hidden and mentioned expanding SC mandate to include UN guarantee against attack. Stevenson remarked this unlikely.
9. Referring ideas in press for population exchange, Kyprianou stressed Turk Cypriots wanted return to villages but cannot because of Turk Cypriot terrorists' threats. With choice, only 20 per cent would leave Cyprus, he said. Yost suggested offering reassurances in SC to Turk Cypriots to improve atmosphere but Kyprianou responded that this would be admitting GOT threats justified.
10. Referring again GOT threats, Kyprianou said "We not importing planes and tanks to fight Turk Cypriots." Went on describe Mansoura as center smuggling of Turk arms and men which GOC cannot and UN does not stop, implying this would be exposed in SC and would have been publicly described previously except for bearing it has on trial UK airman.
11. Rossides called for "bold move"--dismantling all fortifications by both sides leaving security to UNFICYP.
12. On problem hostages, Kyprianou said there had been regrettable incidents but not as many as charged. Claimed many on Turk list solely in Ankara or hidden in villages. Claimed Kutchuk had not deplored hostage taking as Makarios had and had no accounting for 39 Greek hostages.
13. Stevenson suggested further talk prior SC mtg. Again stressed US efforts with GOT. Urged avoiding clamorous SC mtg in order move on to next step.
Comment: Fol mtg, MisOff encountered Asiroglu (Turkey), informed him that Kyprianou testing idea of calling for withdrawal Turk contingent, SC guarantee for Cyprus but that Stevenson had argued strongly against it. Expressed hope Kyprianou would find similar discouragement elsewhere. Asiroglu stated he confident in Norway, UK, perhaps France. MisOff suggested he talk to others particularly Bernardes, prior his departure for consultation. MisOff stressed Stevenson urging non-polemic mtg. Asiroglu had earlier told MisOff GOT not now planning bring Turk Cypriot leaders to New York but would do so if solution warranted it.
Barring new developments, present expectation SC finish apartheid June 17 and take up Cyprus June 17 or 18 on basis SYG report. SYG had not yet called for mtg on financial contributions presumably because Comptroller still having difficulties figuring up estimates for present and future periods as UK and Swedish bills coming in and being argued./2/
/2/In telegram 4470 from USUN, June 12, the Mission added that Kyprianou also argued that enosis would provide Turkey with the best guarantee about future Cypriot political orientation to the West. (Ibid.)
Stevenson
64. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 11, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 7. Secret.
SUBJECT
The Cyprus Problem
My conversations in Athens and Ankara/2/ have led me to reappraise the play of forces in the Cyprus problem and to modify my thinking as to where we should go from here.
/2/Ball visited Athens and Ankara June 10-11. Documentation on the visits is in Department of State, Central File POL 23-8 CYP. Ball's account of the trip is in The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 352-355.
Athens
The significant impressions I gained in Athens are the following:
1. For the first time the Greek Government is scared--scared at the reality of the danger of a Greek-Turkish war and at the progressive extension of Communist control in Cyprus.
2. The GOG is fed up with Makarios. Papandreou wants to deal him out of any settlement talks. (This is a marked change from a few months ago when the GOG was insisting that Cyprus could not be discussed without Makarios participating.)
3. The GOG is now pleading for a strong American intervention in the search for a settlement. (This again contrasts sharply with its earlier attitude when it supported Makarios' efforts to exclude us from a serious role in the Cyprus situation.)
There were strong indications that Papandreou would like to have the USG force a settlement on the GOG that it could accept only with the excuse of outside pressure.
Ankara
On the Turkish side, Inonu is doing everything possible to maneuver us into taking responsibility for bringing about a settlement. The Turks are clearly frightened of the Cyprus situation. They are perplexed and sad. They also want us to force a settlement on them--provided adequate face-saving aspects can be devised.
Washington
Under these circumstances we are now in position for the first time to bring the Cyprus matter to a conclusion if we are prepared to invest time, energy and prestige. The alternatives are dismal.
The UN is totally unable to make even a beginning on a solution. Tuomioja has flopped around for three months and has achieved nothing whatever except to discredit himself with the Greek and Turkish Governments. This is not altogether his fault since the UN holds no cards in this game. Moreover, it is under the disability of having to genuflect to the Makarios Government. But Tuomioja quite clearly has operated on the wrong assumption--that the Cyprus problem was an affair between the two communities on the Island and not an argument between Greece and Turkey. His efforts to work out a solution from the vantage point of Nicosia were doomed to failure. It would have made quite as much sense for a mediator to try to solve the Kashmir problem by sitting for three months in Kashmir.
U Thant knows that the UN cannot succeed in settling this question. Tuomioja is sick of it and wants out. I think it altogether likely that we could get their tacit acquiescence to a vigorous USG initiative.
Quite obviously Papandreou needs a far greater shock than I was able to give him Wednesday night but I made a start. We need to lay on a crash effort to bring the GOG up short. But the GOG is a hard nut to crack and we are far from being home with this one.
Even so there are indications that Papandreou is ready to start low-level conversations with the GOT. Certainly the GOT is dying for a chance to start talking with the Greeks. But it won't occur without us. Both Papandreou and Inonu indicated quite clearly to me that they envisaged a successful negotiation only under active USG tutelage. I am convinced that a meeting between representatives of the two Governments, without the active presence of the USG, would be likely to lead only to a deepening crystallization of positions. Certainly this was the result when Sandys tried it out in London last January.
Recommendation
I think therefore, that the central thrust of our effort should be directed at bringing representatives of the two Governments together with a strong USG representative as a catalyst--under quiet conditions. The pattern, in other words, would not be unlike that which we followed successfully in disposing of the West New Guinea problem./3/
/3/Reference is to Ellsworth Bunker's role in the 1962 Netherlands-Indonesian talks regarding West New Guinea.
I doubt that the United States should try to put forward any plan for settlement. Certainly it should not do so at the outset of negotiations. The Greek and Turkish Governments are now latched on to enosis and double enosis respectively. There should be room for bargaining under these circumstances. In fact, Erkin made it clear that there was--so far as the GOT was concerned.
I would suggest, as one possibility, that we think of trying to arrange a meeting at some quiet, neutral spot such as the Villa Bellagio on Lake Como where representatives of the two Governments--perhaps at the Ambassadorial level--would be brought together with a respected but hard-boiled American, such as Dean Acheson, who knows the score and is not afraid to use American pressure.
Every effort should be made to keep this meeting secret, although we should quietly tell the British and perhaps U Thant what we were doing. Given the present state of Greek feelings, I think it possible that Papandreou could be persuaded to arrange this without letting the word pass to Makarios.
As a condition to our undertaking this, we should exact from the two Governments a firm commitment to try to hold still the two communities on the Island pending the outcome.
I think we must put this show on the road right away. Time is definitely not running on our side. We can get Turkish approval when Inonu comes to Washington. Meanwhile we should give thought to whether Papandreou might not be invited to pay us a visit./4/
/4/In telegram 1513 to Athens, June 13, the Department of State instructed Labouisse to sound out Papandreou about a visit to Washington. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GREECE) A letter of invitation was transmitted in telegram 1513 to Athens, June 13. (Ibid.) The letter was delivered on June 14.
George W. Ball
65. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 12, 1964, 11:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis; TUG. Drafted by Jernegan.
SUBJECT
US-UK Approach to UN Secretary General Regarding Cyprus
PARTICIPANTS
His Excellency the Right Honorable The Lord Harlech, British Embassy
Mr. Patrick R.H. Wright, First Secretary, British Embassy
Under Secretary George W. Ball
Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland (IO)
Mr. George Springsteen (U)
Deputy Assistant Secretary John D. Jernegan (NEA)
Mr. Ball explained to the Ambassador our revised view on double enosis, saying that we now thought it should be put forward to the Greeks and Turks as a serious basis for discussion (rather than dismissing it too quickly from consideration, as had been implied during the discussions in London June 8)./2/ He also explained that he did not think it would be well to have the mediator make the proposals of enosis and double enosis to the parties.
/2/Rusk's conclusion that "hard bargaining" might result in "enosis plus territorial and other compensation to Turkey," was reported in Unsec 32 to Geneva, June 9. (Ibid.)
We were giving serious thought to doing some "arm twisting" with the Greeks and Turks to induce them to negotiate realistically for a settlement. Prime Minister Inonu was probably coming to Washington and we planned to invite Prime Minister Papandreou as well. The President would bear down on both of them. Our tentative plan of action after that would be to get Greek and Turkish representatives together with an American representative as a third party. This meeting, which should be kept absolutely secret, would have as its object to hammer out an agreement which the mediator could then pick up and work on. We thought this plan had a chance of success because Mr. Ball had found during his most recent visit to Athens and Ankara that both Papandreou and Inonu had a changed attitude and wanted the United States to take an active direct role in bringing about a settlement.
We and the British should, therefore, tell U Thant and the mediator that we were going to make a real effort to get the problem settled, as it must be, between Athens and Ankara. We would not ask U Thant and the mediator to propose any bases for solutions to the Greeks and Turks (as had been contemplated in the papers worked out in London). We would just let Tuomioja keep on doing what he is doing now, for the time being.
Lord Harlech said he would tell London we thought it would not be helpful for the mediator to take any initiative.
It was agreed that the Department would prepare a new draft of proposed instructions to Ambassadors Stevenson and Dean in New York, and send a copy urgently to Lord Harlech for transmission to London./3/
/3/The instructions embodying Ball's comments were sent to the Embassy in London in telegram 8231, June 12. (Ibid.) Telegram 8250 to London, June 12, reported that Lord Harlech had informed the Department of State that the British Government could not take immediate action on the U.S. proposals because many senior Cabinet officials were away from London. (Ibid.)
66. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, June 12, 1964, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris, USUN, OSD, CIA, JCS, and the White House.
1357. Athens 1845 to Dept./2/ We assume comments desired are our views on feasibility of new approach to Cyprus problem in form of secret bilateral negotiations between Greece and Turkey with objective of agreement on union of Cyprus with Greece compensated by some mix of following elements: minor Greek territorial concession to Turkey, emigration of Greek minority from Turkey (with assisted voluntary emigration of Turkish Cypriots to Turkey?), transfer of Patriarchate from Istanbul, and Turkish military base on Cyprus.
/2/Telegram 1845, June 8, reported that Greece remained firm on its ultimate objective of enosis but recognized the need for some limited concessions to Turkey and counted on the United States to achieve a mediated settlement. (Ibid.)
We not only concur that it would be useful explore this possibility but also believe satisfactory settlement can only be achieved along these lines.
At same time we wish point out that, while Turkish Cypriots have no alternative to accepting whatever deal Turkey may make, Greek Cypriots have greater independence from Greece. Despite their protestations about Panhellenism, it might take considerable persuasion to win Greek Cypriot acceptance of some elements of deal along lines suggested above.
While there has been marked intensification of enosis agitation in recent months, two very significant elements of Greek Cypriot community are at best lukewarm and at worst hostile toward it. Makarios and GOC officials obviously have vested interest of being large fish in small puddle. A strong and apparently growing Communist movement would obviously resist submersion and probable suppression in Greece. Coalition of these two elements would be quite likely insist in first instance on "full sovereignty", "self determination", "neutrality rather than NATO" as dodges for avoiding enosis. For this reason we believe that, if enosis is agreed on as basis for solution, every effort must be made bring it about as integral part of immediate settlement rather than agreeing on "full independence" or "self-determination" on understanding Cyprus state will wither away and enosis will inevitably occur.
We would not anticipate any serious Greek Cypriot opposition (though there would probably be a lot of noisy protest) about Greek territorial cessions elsewhere or about population movements. Greek Cypriot attitude is wholly self-centered. On other hand, we would expect strong resistance to Turkish base on island, in part as desecration of "holy soil" but even more out of fear it would be used as center for agitation among remaining Turkish community. Limited Turkish military presence might eventually be palatable if it were on NATO base within what is now British sovereign base area.
Another area in which Greek Cypriots might demonstrate independence of Greece, as recent history makes only too clear, is by reneging on agreement once made in order attempt eliminate any special concessions to Turkey or Turkish Cypriots on island. Fact Greek Cypriots cannot be trusted makes it all the more important enosis be part immediate settlement and not as goal to which settlement might eventually open way. Considering Cypriot temperament, strong Communist influences, resentments arising from current strife, and widespread holding of arms, we have every reason to expect Cyprus to be source of difficulties for years to come. It is certainly far preferable this be internal Greek problem rather than international problem of type now facing us.
Belcher
67. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, June 13, 1964, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to London, Ankara, Istanbul, Nicosia, and USDOCOSouth (Naples) for Burris.
1891. Embassy notes with interest Istanbul's 72/2/ quoting Turk Press Attach? Athens Karaoglou to effect that Turkish invasion Cyprus would result in "immediate fall" Papandreou government and his substitution by military junta. If this belief also held by important GOT officials, Embassy believes it important clear up what appears to us to be misreading of situation. Our reading is that in event Turkish invasion Cyprus and subsequent Papandreou military response, government would have full backing of Greek nation. In our judgment only if government were to fail to take some action satisfactory to injured Greek pride would there be threat to Papandreou's continuance in office. It should be noted that there is no important element in Greek political life calling for more "moderate" approach to Cyprus problem; on contrary, Papandreou being attacked by both right and extreme left for not pushing Greek and Greek Cypriot cause more vigorously. Opposition (ERE) press, for example, accuses Papandreou of "retreating" in face of US pressure to seek quick solution Cyprus question.
/2/Dated June 6. (Ibid.)
In any case, it important that senior GOT officials not labor under mistaken belief that Papandreou ahead of press and public in following "hard" line vis-?-vis Cyprus question. On contrary, in view inflamed public opinion here, great test for PriMin will come if and when he agrees to compromise settlement on Cyprus which falls short Greek demands. It conceivable that if he agreed to what public opinion considered "sell-out" on Cyprus, his many enemies within and without party might combine to bring him down. In that event, successor would almost certainly be figure with more intransigent view Cyprus settlement. In sense, Papandreou now paying for fact that during last two electoral campaigns he tried win votes by riding Cypriot tiger and attacking Caramanlis administration for "sell-out" of London and Zurich Agreements. Although he avoided stating exactly what final solution he expected to achieve, public led to believe that Papandreou victory would result in Cypriot independence and enosis, if not immediately at least eventually. Thus, when and if Papandreou sits down to serious negotiations public opinion will expect him to deliver on at least part of his promises, explicit or implied.
To reiterate: in our view Papandreou would have full support of nation in military response to Turkish invasion. (Although once heat of battle passed there might be second thoughts about how Greece was maneuvered into such position.) Only if he failed to take some dramatic action would his position be jeopardized. In such case his successor would undoubtedly be advocate of harder line. However, in view Papandreou's character--as well as his stated commitments to respond to Turk "attack"--it highly unlikely that he would follow passive course under such circumstances.
Labouisse
68. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, June 14, 1964, 11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to London, USUN, Nicosia, and Ankara and passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, and CIA.
1898. I saw Papandreou this morning accompanied by Brewster. After preliminaries, I handed over President's letter./2/ Papandreou read it carefully and said he would be glad to accept, and that June 24 and 25 would be satisfactory provided Inonu had then left. He stressed that it would be most embarrassing if they were both there at same time and made this point a flat condition. He feels it would be most awkward if both were there at same time and they did not see one another, and he does not consider it politically feasible to have a meeting with Inonu at this time.
/2/See footnote 4, Document 64.
I believe that Papandreou is sincere in his belief that an over-lapping with Inonu would cause real difficulties, and I strongly recommend that the President set the date for Papandreou's arrival and meeting with him so as to avoid possible over-lapping.
Papandreou then went on to say that, as practical politicians, President Johnson and he would not want to have a meeting which failed. He said that he had tried to make the Greek position clear to me in previous conversations and to Mr. Ball last week. He hoped the President would understand that the Greek position had been formulated "objectively" and on the basis of principles of justice. I responded that it was not my understanding that President Johnson had in mind reaching a definite solution of the Cyprus problem during the proposed discussions. He was not attempting to short-circuit the UN. The purpose of the talks was to exchange views on ways to move toward a solution. He replied that he was not posing this as a condition to a meeting but he thought the President would want to know his views. He said he would put these in a letter which he would deliver to me this evening.
The PriMin then proceeded to outline his position, very much in the same way he has done on previous occasions and with Mr. Ball. There was nothing new in his presentation, except for his emphasis on fact that entry of Soviets in picture had made Cyprus issue a great deal more far-reaching than simply a Greek-Turkish problem. From the "security" point of view, the only hope was "Natofication," including a NATO base which could have Turkish NATO personnel. From "moral" viewpoint there should be self-determination. The present limited independence should be lifted and self-determination exercised in the form of a plebiscite (resulting in union with Greece) to take place before the UN forces leave the island; i.e., within three months. He stressed that an independent Cyprus would mean a Cuba and a partitioned Cyprus would lead inevitably to conflict between the 400,000 Greeks and the 100,000 Turks which would only continue the crisis situation.
He asked what I thought about this. Reverting to his security argument, I suggested that Turks might well think double enosis would best serve purpose. He replied that even if he should order partition the population of the island would not accept it and civil war and chaos would ensue. In both cases the Communists would be the winners. Only by a close link with the West could this be averted.
I observed that even though his arguments might sound "objective" to many, there was still an important psychological factor and political realities which Inonu had to face. I suggested that if Menderes had been able to negotiate a deal which disallowed enosis, it would be expecting a lot for Inonu to accept it. I repeated the question I had often posed to him--what could be done to meet Inonu half way? He came to his "security" argument, repeating that the new factor since 1959 was that Sov Union was on scene and would be muddying waters. He felt that the US should stress heavily to Inonu that Natofication would achieve the security of the island within the NATO framework and Turkey would not have a Cuba off its southern shore. This solution could also get Makarios out of the way which should be helpful to the Turkish Govt with its problem of face. Also, compensation could be provided for the Turk Cypriots who wanted to move to the mainland, and further economic aid from the West might be promised. He underlined (more for US benefit, I think, than for the Turks) that this solution would be a lasting one and arrived at within framework of democratic principles.
I pressed him on score as to whether compensation he was offering would be adequate to meet the Turkish political and psychological problem facing Inonu. He had nothing to add to above. When I touched briefly on question of possible territorial exchanges based on news reports he took standard Greek line that giving up islands such as Chios, Mytilini or Samos would be inconceivable. It would lead to revolution in Greece.
Our talk, which was highly informal (no other Greeks present) and friendly throughout, did not touch on displacement of Istanbul population and Patriarchate./3/
/3/In telegram 1899 from Athens, June 14, Labouisse reported that he had also told Papandreou that sending Grivas to Cyprus at this point could have deleterious effects. Papandreou had agreed with this analysis. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
As to publicity concerning the visit, he stated that until he had sent a formal reply of acceptance and had received further word from us, he would not make any statement. He would parry questions with formula "I have received no formal invitation." Publicity from US side should be held up also, pending consideration of content of formal letter, which will be cabled as soon as received. Meanwhile, I shall appreciate comments re date of meeting in light paras 1 and 2 above./4/
/4/In telegram 1516 to Athens, June 15, the Department of State informed the Embassy that June 24-25 was satisfactory for a Papandreou visit and that it would arrange for Inonu's departure prior to Papandreou's arrival. (Ibid., POL 7 GREECE)
Labouisse
69. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, June 18, 1964, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USUN, and Paris for USRO.
1377. Deptel 951./2/ Regret Deptel 942/3/ not received (although serviced) when I called on Makarios this afternoon. Came in while at palace. With regard SC proceedings,/4/ he said Kyprianou will go along with resolution merely extending term of UNFICYP. Said he realizes both sides want changes in terms of reference and would like see resolution continuing some condemnation, either direct of indirect, of other side, but it highly unlikely be possible obtain such res and therefore GOC will not attempt it. I said this would assist in avoiding probable acrimonious debate if other procedure followed. Said my govt would be pleased to hear that this was GOC plan. Makarios went on to say, however, that GOC presentation would have to refer to Turkish invasion threats and to most recent events in Mansoura-Kokkina area where for to him inexplicable reasons Turks have picked this time to create new and dangerous situation. I urged him to try keep Kyprianou speech in as low key as possible.
/2/Telegram 951, June 17, outlined U.S. strategy for the U.N. Security Council meeting on Cyprus. (Ibid.)
/3/Telegram 942, June 14, outlined U.S. strategy for establishing the proper atmosphere for talks in Washington with Inonu and Papandreou. (Ibid., POL 7 TUR)
/4/Reference is to the upcoming Security Council debate on the extension of UNFICYP for a further 3 months.
While Deptel 942 not available and hence I unable act on specific suggestions, most of them covered indirectly. Items covered were Inonu visit; my frequent consultations his Ministers and himself; support for UN effort; gave credit several recent moves including offer Green Line pull-back; urged him make some unilateral gesture even in face Turkish actions in Mansoura area in effort improve Greek Cypriot image abroad and this particularly in his interest at this moment of SC meeting.
With regard Mansoura and events of last two days,/5/ Makarios in most apparent show of anger I have yet seen said he would not permit Turks to take over small Greek villages in area. Said he had reports that UN had urged villagers at Mosphili to evacuate, but when they had inquired whether they should do so, he had refused allow them. Said he will move to protect Greeks if UN cannot do so and if Turks did nothing.
/5/On June 16, the heaviest fighting since April broke out in Nicosia and Tyllonia. At the same time Turkish Cypriot spokesmen began charging that the United Nations and its representatives were not conducting themselves in an impartial manner.
In this regard, he expressed oft-repeated Greek Cypriot position that UN not forceful enough in preventing such incidents and in particular in this northwest area they apparently unable control smuggling of arms and people by Turks. He said if present situation continues much longer or if today's incident becomes more serious, he will move to isolate area from rest of island. In this connection said he had told Plaza (Embtel 1356)/6/ that he could not wait "long" for UN to open Kyrenia and Xeropolis Roads. When he said he would close all roads to Turks if these two roads not opened, I said I was sure he had estimated far better than I what probable reaction of Turks might be to such action. Said he had and (contrary to what he told Plaza) he expected they would react violently, but he was prepared to take consequences since present situation intolerable.
/6/Telegram 1356, June 12, reported on Galo Plaza's discussions with Makarios. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
When he went on to say he was more pessimistic now than he had been in some months, I said this distressed me since he was usually optimistic. I asked him what he thought probable GOT reaction might be to any such action on his part, particularly in view of present delicate situation in which GOT leadership found itself. At this point he asked me whether USG really thought that Turks had intended invade two weeks ago. I said that this was matter of conjecture for some, but that we were satisfied they had intended do so and it was only with greatest possible pressure that we had dissuaded them. Expressed hope that we would not have to try again.
I said might be useful for me see Kutchuk and urge him use restraint to avoid new crisis. Archbishop told me feel free give "Vice President" full account his statements to me. Am seeing Gyani and Plaza tonight and will concert with them before seeing Kutchuk./7/
/7/Belcher reported on these talks in telegrams 1381, June 19, and 1395, June 23. (Ibid.)
We ended conversation by agreeing that at his usual Thursday evening press conference, he would say that I had called on him to inquire about GOC plans with regard to resolution and to express USG's support for three-month extension of UNFICYP and our willingness to provide another $2 million for expenses.
Belcher
70. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, June 21, 1964, 5:52 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TUG. Drafted by Bracken, Jernegan, and Talbot; cleared by Ball; and approved by Talbot.
8463. For Bruce. We see coming week as crucial in long-smoldering Cyprus crisis. If Inonu and Papandreou talks should fail to yield constructive results, critical new situation might confront us as early as next week. Even while Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers here, impact of Grivas' presence on Cyprus or of communal clashes on island could add complications./2/ Role played by British will have great significance during these days. We sense UKG would prefer avoid facing hard contingencies that may lie ahead, and we look to you to help strengthen their realism and readiness to take any difficult actions that may become necessary.
/2/Grivas returned to Cyprus on June 17. The Greek Government announced his return on June 21.
On June 20, Under Sec Ball called in British Ambassador to explain how we view upcoming talks with Inonu and Papandreou./3/ Ball said our objective is to get Greeks and Turks into serious high-level discussions in presence distinguished American. Dean Acheson has agreed to undertake this task. We estimate Turks will agree, but Papandreou will be more difficult. We expect tell Papandreou close vote of confidence in Ankara/4/ ominous sign that Turks deeply frustrated. If no movement on Cyprus, Inonu could fall. We should be under no illusions that Turks might then move militarily, whatever we said to them. If Turks moved there would be no question of stopping them with Sixth Fleet or other military means, because we would not fight our allies.
/3/A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP.
/4/The Inonu government survived a vote of confidence on June 19 by a vote of 199 to 195.
Object in taking this line will be to demonstrate to Papandreou what dangers Greece, Turkey and Western world could face on very short notice unless Greece and Turkey able to compromise their positions. Assuming Inonu will by then have agreed to talks, Papandreou will be told flatly that he will be risking security of his country and of Alliance unless he also agrees to substantive talks.
Harlech agreed Greeks must face up to dangers. US should "make their flesh creep" by spelling out prospects and making them understand US would not stop Turkish intervention if it were started contrary to American advice.
Ball raised question of British plans for such contingency. He returned to discussions of last February when London had agreed to consider possible tripartite intervention should Turks move. Harlech drew back fast from that particular suggestion. He left impression British would want no part of fresh military intervention in Cyprus. He did not think HMG had ever agreed to intervention though there had been talk of trying to get Turks and Greeks to limit their advances should they land on island.
On June 21 Ball met with General Taylor and Sec McNamara to review contingencies on which State-Defense planning should focus in immediate future./5/
/5/No record of this conversation has been found.
Our contingency problem is what US and UK could do if Inonu and Papandreou talks should result in impasse and if Inonu's moderation was then eclipsed by more activist Turkish forces, leading to Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. This could now occur without our getting much advance warning. In any case we not at all certain we could turn Turks off again even if we had notice.
This would obviously be war nobody could win. We do not see how Greeks could stop Turkish landing or put effective Greek forces on Cyprus. Nonetheless, Greek and Greek Cypriots could harass Turkish action, delay actual landing of total Turkish force and plunge island into bloodbath. If Greeks widened attack to mainland areas, consequences could be disastrous. Meanwhile UNSC activity would be intense. Western security interests could only be seriously jeopardized and none but Soviets could gain, whether or not they threatened to intervene militarily in Turkey or Cyprus.
Turks, if they moved, would hold they acting legally under Article IV of Treaty after failure of Guarantor Powers to take effective joint action to restore constitutional position. Greeks of course would take opposite stand. In this situation posture and actions of UK could have determining effect. We believe plan proposed by Ball in February still has merit, but will be glad to hear any alternatives British may wish to put forward. In any case, we hope British studying this contingency carefully, for if Turks move it is clear US and UK will need to set their courses fast and to lead their public attitudes appropriately. US and UK must obviously stay in close consultation.
We are also looking urgently at possible Soviet actions in event of military operations over Cyprus, and hope British are doing same. Role of UN also needs study.
More immediate question is impact of return of Grivas to island. We assume British will be extremely agitated; British EmbOff suggested today UK might even withdraw contingent from UNFICYP. We appreciate Grivas' presence reopens old wounds and we know how sensitive British public is to his earlier role. However, relationships have changed and it is conceivable Grivas could impose more discipline on Greek Cypriot irregulars, correct slide toward Soviets, extend hand of friendship to Turks and protect them from Greek Cypriot extremists, and actually contribute to solution of British difficulties on island. However this may be, it is going to be hard enough--yet essential--to calm down Turkish fears of Grivas and to forestall any rash Turkish reaction. It is equally essential that British not let appearance of Grivas upset our careful preparations to bring Inonu and Papandreou to effective substantive talks. Do try to persuade them of this.
Rusk
71. Editorial Note
Prime Minister Inonu and Prime Minister Papandreou visited Washington June 22-23 and June 24-25, 1964, respectively, for talks with U.S. officials. Prime Minister Inonu arrived in the United States on June 21 and spent the evening at Williamsburg, Virginia. He met with President Johnson at 10:30 a.m. on June 22 and held subsequent discussions with U.S. officials before departing for New York and meetings at the United Nations on the evening of June 23. For text of statements by President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book II, pages 798-801.
Prime Minister Papandreou arrived in Washington on June 24, following an overnight stay at Williamsburg, for a meeting with the President. He held talks with other U.S. officials June 24-25, prior to departing for New York for discussions at the United Nations. For text of statements by President Johnson and the Greek Prime Minister, see ibid., pages 811-812, 814-816, and 818-819.
Andreas Papandreou, the Prime Minister's son and Alternate Minister for Coordination, discussed the talks in Washington and New York in Democracy at Gunpoint, pages 133-136. Ball's recollection of the meeting is in The Past Has Another Pattern, page 355. Documentation is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, County Files, Cyprus, Vol. 8; ibid., Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cyprus; Department of State, Central File POL 23-8 CYP; ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2415-2417; and ibid., Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Papandreou and Inonu Visits.
72. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 22, 1964, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2415. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Greene and approved in U on July 24 and in the White House on July 28. The meeting was held at the White House.
SUBJECT
Cyprus Situation and Greek-Turkish Relations
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
Under Secretary of State Ball
Ambassador Raymond A. Hare
Semih Ustun?interpreter
Turkey
Prime Minister Inonu
Foreign Minister Erkin
Ambassador Menemencioglu
The President welcomed Prime Minister Inonu and thanked him for coming to Washington to discuss Cyprus and the Greek-Turkish dispute. The President said these questions have been of great concern to the United States and although the United States does not have ready answers for the many problems of the world, it is the responsibility of statesmen to meet and seek ways to find solutions.
As for Cyprus, the President said we do not have a magic formula to offer, but we are prepared to assist Greece and Turkey in finding a solution. He emphasized it would be unwise to engage in hostilities before making every effort to settle the dispute peacefully. He said that with this in mind, we are ready to make available the services of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to sit down with Greek and Turkish representatives for quiet and frank talks at Camp David. The President was hopeful that such talks could narrow the gap between the two countries.
Prime Minister Inonu replied that these talks could make possible an exchange of opinions and that in principle he had no objections to the President's kind offer.
Under Secretary Ball said the talks would be most effective if each country sent a highly responsible official short of the most senior ranks, but still a man holding the complete confidence of his Prime Minister. He said that the participation of responsible and trusted officials below the Foreign Minister level and the use of the special facilities afforded by Camp David would make it much easier to keep the talks completely secret. Foreign Minister Erkin and Mr. Ball agreed that the two Foreign Ministers might join the talks at a later date.
The Prime Minister asked when the talks could begin, and the President replied the sooner the better, perhaps within one week. Prime Minister Inonu and Mr. Ball each expressed some optimism that the talks might quickly help clear the air.
Prime Minister Inonu again expressed his thanks for the President's help, but added that every time during recent months when there had seemed to be hope for a peaceful settlement, something had developed to block it. He said the President should know that he may have to overcome resistance on the Greek side to the proposed talks. He agreed with the President that there are no gainers in war, but pointed out that Greece appears to be acting under the impression that it can win an easy victory on Cyprus. The Prime Minister said if there is to be a solution satisfactory to both sides, Prime Minister Papandreou must decide that he wants one.
The President commented he had no illusions that his talks with the Greeks would be easy, but he would do his best.
Foreign Minister Erkin raised the subject of the Turkish-Cypriot refugees, now homeless and unable to return to their old villages. He suggested settling the refugees in new homes where they are now. Under Secretary Ball said the Greeks might interpret such a move as de facto partition, thus making the situation more difficult. He pointed out that the International Red Cross could help in the immediate problems of the refugees, and said the United States would view such assistance with sympathy.
Mr. Ball said we may have a new asset on Cyprus in the person of General Thimayya, the new commander of the United Nations force on the island./2/ The Prime Minister said similar sentiments had been expressed when General Gyani was appointed to the same position.
/2/On June 20, Secretary-General Thant announced that Thimayya would replace Gyani as commander of UNFICYP. Thimayya assumed command on July 8.
Foreign Minister Erkin said the Cyprus situation would become serious indeed should the Turkish army contingent on the island be attacked. The President assured the Turkish officials he would do his utmost to persuade the Greek Prime Minister that the issues must be settled peacefully and that Mr. Papandreou should use his influence to maintain tranquility on the island.
The President concluded by saying that Mr. Acheson would be present at Mr. Ball's luncheon the following day and that further details on the proposed talks could be discussed then.
73. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 23, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2415. Secret; Exdis-TUG. Drafted by Jernegan and approved in U on July 13. The meeting was held during a luncheon aboard the Presidential yacht S.S. Sequoia on the Potomac River.
SUBJECT
Cyprus
PARTICIPANTS
(See attached list on page 4)/2/
/2/Not printed. Prime Minister Inonu, Foreign Minister Erkin, and Ambassador Menemencioglu were accompanied by five Turkish officials. Under Secretary of State Ball and former Secretary of State Acheson were accompanied by Talbot, Jernegan, and Springsteen.
Mr. Ball opened the main conversation by saying that the United States did not want to put forward a formal solution for the Cyprus problem but to start by identifying the elements of a possible solution. The Turks, he said think that double enosis would be the best answer whereas the Greeks think that enosis is the solution. For the United States to say now that either of these or certain modifications of either was to be preferred would not be useful. He hoped that Mr. Acheson could push matters forward during the anticipated detailed discussions to come later and that at some time in the future we might then decide to propose something specific to the parties.
Mr. Acheson said he did not consider that these discussions should be regarded as a "lawyer's dispute". There was no sense in simply trying to score points on each other. This was not the way to make progress. Rather, it would be wiser to explore separately the vital elements which each country had at stake in this issue. For example, Turkey seemed to have three major concerns:
1) Turkey's national dignity and prestige;
2) Turkey's physical security, the question of the degree to which Cyprus in unfriendly hands would be a menace to Turkey;
3) The welfare of the Turkish Cypriots, the security of their lives and property. (He remarked that when the crisis arose this last concern had seemed to be Turkey's principal worry, but he thought now it had receded into third place.)
Similarly, Mr. Acheson would propose to ask the Greeks to consider what was vital to their national interests, not merely what they would like to have. After doing this with both parties, he would propose that they try to develop a solution from these bases, instead of starting with broad concepts like enosis and double enosis. After these first steps, Mr. Acheson suggested all concerned must decide how to handle Archbishop Makarios and the Cypriots, who were somewhat less than responsible.
Dr. Erim/3/ commented that Mr. Acheson's proposed method was a rational approach to a final solution but that the question remained how to preserve security on the Island until a solution could be reached. Mr. Ball replied that a condition to the talks must be that both Ankara and Athens would exert every effort to keep things quiet on the Island. Mr. Acheson added that he hoped the discussions would be very short and the security problem would not be with us for long. Dr. Erim said we could not count on a quick solution, to which Mr. Ball replied that we must not start with the expectation that the talks would be protracted, the situation was too urgent. Mr. Ball foresaw three problems during the talks:
/3/Dr. Nihat Erim, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Turkish National Assembly.
1) Maintenance of security on the Island;
2) Possible disruptive activities by Makarios;
3) Possible Communist activity.
Therefore, we must hurry things along. Mr. Acheson concurred heartily, stressing that the present state of affairs would not permit long negotiations of the type which eventually resulted in the Austrian State Treaty; the situation was too explosive. Foreign Minister Erkin interjected that even next week we might have a moral collapse of Turkish Cypriots.
Mr. Ball said that we would like to have the talks begin right after July 4th. There was no dissent. He also suggested that Camp David would be the best site for the talks. Again there was no dissent.
Erkin urged that we try to make sure the Greeks don't leak news of our plan to Makarios. Mr. Ball said we would do our best but could not guarantee anything.
At various times during the conversation, Turkish representatives voiced special concern not only about the general prospect for security on the Island but also about the situation of the displaced Turkish Cypriots who had left their homes. They asserted that relief for these people had been inadequate and that they were living in a state of dire need. Further, the British relief agencies would be withdrawing from the picture at the end of this month. The American side expressed belief that the International Red Cross would carry forward. The Turks expressed doubts on this and pointed out that the IRC can work only through the local government; if the local government were not willing to cooperate, nothing would be done. The American side gave general assurances of support for the relief effort.
The Turks further asserted that the Greek-Cypriot authorities were threatening to prevent the resupplying of the Turkish Army contingents on Cyprus and that this unit would soon exhaust its present stocks. They asked for American help on this problem, which was promised.
Most of the balance of the discussion was concerned with the wording of the joint communiqu?. The text of the final draft as issued is attached./4/
/4/Not printed. For text of the joint communiqu? issued on June 23, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 582.
At one point Mr. Ball asked how the Turks interpreted the return of General Grivas to Cyprus. Erkin commented that it was not a good sign from a Turkish point of view, and others made similar remarks, but there was no noticeable excitement or special disturbance on the part of the Turks.
Summary: The conversation confirmed agreement on the following points:
1) Provided the Greek Government also agreed, Turkey would participate in secret talks with the Greeks and Mr. Acheson directed toward agreement on a final and permanent solution of the Cyprus dispute.
2) These talks should begin at Camp David promptly after July 4th.
3) The Turkish representative would be Dr. Nihat Erim. (Dr. Erim remarked that he was scheduled to come to the United States later this summer on a leader grant and that this could be given as the reason for his return here when he came for the talks.)
4) In the meantime, the United States would do its best to assist in assuring the welfare of the Turkish-Cypriot refugees.
74. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 24, 1964, 10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Papandreou and Inonu Visits. Secret; Exdis-TUG. Drafted by Labouisse and approved in U on July 29 and in the White House on July 30. The meeting was held in the President's office.
SUBJECT
Cyprus Problem
PARTICIPANTS
The U.S Side
The President
The Under Secretary
Ambassador Labouisse
The Greek Side
Prime Minister Papandreou
Foreign Minister Costopoulos
Alternate Minister of Coordination Andreas Papandreou
Ambassador Matsas
The President welcomed the Prime Minister for a discussion of a matter which he knew was of deep concern to both of them. The President stated that he had no desire to impose our will on anyone; we have no formula. However, he is worried that our friends differ among themselves, and he hopes very much that, rather than fighting, they can get together for talks which will lead to a solution.
The President referred to the recent threatened move by Turkey and the action he had taken in an effort to forestall it, saying that he was following the teaching of Isaiah: "Come let us reason together". The President had asked the Turks not to act without talking with us and with Greece. After an exchange of communications, Prime Minister Inonu had agreed to come to Washington for talks.
The President then went on to say that he had not presented to Inonu any formula or recommendation re a particular solution but that he had urged as strongly as possible that the Turks sit down and reason with the people of Greece. The President stressed that statesmen should get together and reason. He had told Inonu that if the Turks would agree to talk with the Greeks, the United States would provide the arrangements and facilities, including an outstanding American citizen, Mr. Dean Acheson, to assist.
The President said that he knew that Prime Minister Papandreou felt very strongly in the matter of Cyprus--that he knew the Prime Minister's viewpoint, and that Papandreou felt justified in it. The President added, however, that he hoped very much that Mr. Papandreou would agree that discussions be held with the Turks. He specified that he was not proposing talks on the Prime Minister or even Foreign Minister levels, but rather between duly authorized representatives of the two countries. He felt that the meetings should be secret and should be held in the immediate future, and he suggested they be held with the assistance of Dean Acheson at Camp David. The Prime Minister indicated that he had a high regard for Mr. Acheson.
The President went on to say that the Secretary General of the UN wanted the United States to help, in fact, he was anxious for us to do it within the spirit of the UN. There was no proposal to go around the UN.
The President said to Papandreou that he had told Inonu that he wanted history to remember him as a statesman who would reason and not as a warrior. While Inonu had accepted this line of argument, the President did not know how long Inonu could keep his people behind him.
If the Prime Minister of Greece could designate someone who has his confidence who could meet with the Turkish representative and Mr. Acheson, President Johnson was sure that this could be arranged very quickly. There was everything to gain and nothing to lose by trying to reason. The alternative could be very bad and bloody, and we would want no part of it; we cannot be in a position of fighting our allies. The President went on to say that we have exercised our very best efforts to prevent a disaster. He pointed out that anyone can start a war, but confidence, patience and wisdom were needed to prevent one. He said, therefore, he wanted to have meetings started during the next week and he was sure that all people would welcome this. He emphasized that he was not asking that anyone yield any right, but only that they try to reason.
The President then referred to the vote which had just taken place on the foreign aid bill/2/ and said that he could lead the American people if the people think he is doing all possible to prevent bloodshed and work with the UN. But the people are worried about growing tensions between Greece and Turkey and they do not want this to continue. He was sure that if we three try to reason this matter out, it will help a great deal.
/2/On June 10, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 11380, the 1965 Foreign Aid Appropriations bill, by a vote of 230 to 175. The bill authorized a total of $2 billion in assistance.
He said to Papandreou that if the latter would cooperate and search for peace, he will have the approbation of the UN and of the people of this country; the alternative is too horrible to contemplate. If we cannot cooperate in this search for peace, the President will have to tell the American people what to expect, and he added again we cannot be in a position of fighting an ally. Under the circumstances, the President said what we want to ask is that talks be held in search of a solution and we do not think that this is an unreasonable request. He expressed the hope that before July 4 he could get Inonu to designate a representative and Papandreou to do likewise. They, with Mr. Acheson, could explore the roads to a solution.
The President continued that, with the help of Mr. Acheson, we can develop plans which will help both our allies down the years and he then referred to the need for economic development of both countries instead of wasting their resources. The President ended by saying that if the American representative recommends a plan for promoting peace and prosperity, he was sure the American people would follow along.
The Prime Minister then spoke. He said that we were before a very critical situation and we needed to avoid war. He wanted to explore what was the best procedure, for he thought that there was confusion between what we called absolute and relative questions.
He said that the two world wars could have been prevented if the leaders of those times had acted properly. He said that for this reason he expressed great appreciation for President Johnson's interest in the Cyprus matter.
On the question of procedure, Papandreou asserted that the procedure suggested by President Johnson would lead to war--"if an understanding does not come about through Mr. Acheson, war will result". He also asserted that we all have a common aim of avoiding war and this was why he could not accept the viewpoint put forward by Mr. Stikker that when an issue is between two members of NATO, NATO must be neutral. Since the arms of the NATO powers are for use against the enemy, is it possible that NATO would permit their use against an ally?
Papandreou stated that the Greeks have responsibility for bringing about peace on the island by influencing the Greek Cypriots; the Turks have a similar responsibility with respect to the Turkish Cypriots. This, he said, was his first point: differences should be settled only through peaceful means.
Papandreou went on to say that as the points of view between Turkey and Greece differed so widely, nothing could be expected from the meeting proposed by the President and consequently the extremists on both sides would contend that there was nothing to do but to fight. "When the presupposition is that no war will take place, we can then talk with safety."
Papandreou said that he was prepared to go personally to Cyprus to insure calm and then there would be no excuse for a Turkish landing.
The Prime Minister asserted that he was not thinking just as a leader of Greece but as a leader belonging to a country of the Free World. This led him to the discussion of intervention, saying there were two arguments to be discussed--one legal and one substantive. On the legal side, the right of intervention had been lost when Cyprus entered the UN--there was no longer any basis for intervention. On the substantive side, there was an argument that both the Turks and Greeks must be satisfied. This, he alleged, was false. "Turkey does not lose anything. A century ago it sold Cyprus, so what valid right does it have?" He argued that security was the only basis for negotiation and he agreed that Turkey must be offered security. This, he said, is why he had put forward "NATOfication" as the most desirable solution of the Cyprus problem.
He alluded to other possible solutions, saying that in the case of partition, the non-Turkish part of the island would become Communist.
Concerning the possibility of Greece giving up something to Turkey as part of a solution, Papandreou said that Greece wanted nothing in Cyprus--its position was "merely that through democratic principles the majority can rule and the minority can be protected." He put the question "if Greece does not take anything, why should Greece give?" He asserted that the question of enosis was a matter for the Cypriots; that self-determination would be good for Cyprus and for the Free World.
Returning to the proposal for a meeting, Papandreou said he was afraid that a confrontation of the two points of view at the present time would lead to war. Instead of this confrontation, talks should be carried on by the Mediator and, meanwhile, peace on the island should be maintained in order to avoid provocation.
Papandreou then repeated his argument that NATO should not permit NATO-furnished arms to be used by either Turkey or Greece to fight one another.
Papandreou concluded by expressing the view that if the meeting should be held with Mr. Acheson, the latter would have to report no agreement at the end of ten days.
President Johnson asked why Mr. Acheson would have to report no agreement if the two parties entered the discussions in good faith.
Mr. Ball interjected here to say that we cannot be sure that the Turks will not move. He suggested that we explore this whole matter further at luncheon.
75. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 24, 1964, 12:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Greene and approved in U on August 10. The meeting was held aboard the Presidential yacht S.S. Sequoia on the Potomac River.
SUBJECT
Cyprus Situation and Greek-Turkish Relations
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Under Secretary
Dean Acheson, Former Secretary of State
Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Maxwell Taylor, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Ambassador Henry Labouisse
John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
George S. Springsteen, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary
Greece
Prime Minister Papandreou
Foreign Minister Costopoulos
Andreas Papandreou, Minister Alternate of Economic Coordination
Ambassador Alexander A. Matsas
Under Secretary Ball referred to President Johnson's proposal of that morning that Greek and Turkish representatives meet quietly with Dean Acheson to try to arrive at some agreement on the main issues in the Cyprus crisis./2/ In making this suggestion, the President did not intend that the U.S. replace the UN mediator. Rather, the mediator himself had realized he had come to an impasse and asked us to use our good offices. The U.S. agrees with the Prime Minister's remark that a breakdown of these proposed talks would lead to a dangerous situation, but we are also convinced that serious danger exists now, and so negotiations are essential.
/2/See Document 74.
Mr. Ball continued that there are two elements in the problem: (1) to negotiate a just solution and (2) to do so in a way which will prevent irresponsible forces from taking over Cyprus. He said Greece and Turkey are thinking along the same lines; and so now is the time to talk about procedures which serve everyone's interests. Mr. Ball added that the day before the Americans had taken a strong line with Turkish Prime Minister Inonu. Turkey now recognizes that a new basis for Cyprus must be negotiated.
The Prime Minister commented that the first requirement is security on Cyprus. Greece is trying to establish security; Turkey must try also. He said the Cypriots must then have an opportunity to exercise self-determination. Under any final arrangements, there would of course be guarantees for the Turk-Cypriots.
The Prime Minister said NATO needs a new principle: no member has the right to begin war against another. He continued that Turkey's former right of intervention is not valid now that Cyprus is covered by the UN Charter. If there is no danger to the Turk-Cypriot community, then Turkey's argument on the need to intervene collapses. As for solutions, Turkey suggests partition or federation, neither of which is anyone's interest, including Turkey's. The Prime Minister said partition would lead the non-Turkish part of the island into becoming another Cuba, and thus a grave danger to Turkey's security. The other proposal, federation, would lead to civil war. The Prime Minister concluded that the only possible solution is unrestricted independence. This would be followed by a plebiscite and enosis, a solution which is certainly in the free world's interests. Turkey would lose nothing and would in fact gain security. The Turkish-Cypriots would be protected just as are the Thracian Turks now. Prime Minister Papandreou said Greece would also be willing to offer international guarantees for the Turkish minority. The Cyprus crisis had now moved into the context of East-West rivalries, and the Prime Minister said he could not always exclude contacts by Makarios with the USSR.
Mr. Ball replied that he must question the Prime Minister's statement that NATO should oppose war between two members. He said he was certain that no NATO country would oppose Turkey if it tried to enforce its treaty rights on Cyprus. As for the United States, the President had said in the morning we would not fight an ally in a situation as complicated as this. The Under Secretary said we will not interpose the Sixth Fleet. The U.S. would certainly attempt to dissuade Turkey, but not by the use of force. With this background, he concluded, it is obvious that the talks as suggested by President Johnson are essential to avert danger and permit the mediator to get on with his work.
Prime Minister Papandreou said that this line of thinking leaves no conclusion but war. In a conflict between the old agreements and unrestricted independence, there is no bridge. Sooner or later Turkey will go to war, although he said he would be happy if his pessimism were shown to be unfounded. Turkey is too weak now to bridge this gap, and so there is no need for the Prime Minister to meet with Inonu. Rather the better approach would be to wait for the mediator's report. Perhaps by the process of elimination and with the passage of time, we may find a way. For the moment, the Prime Minister said he thought Greece and Turkey should undertake a reconnaissance to see whether future negotiations are possible; if so, then the real talks might begin.
The Under Secretary said it would be a mistake to limit action to keeping the peace on Cyprus while awaiting the mediator's report. We would only be deceiving ourselves, because if there is no progress, we could not expect the GOT to restrain the activist forces in Turkey.
Mr. Ball continued that what the Prime Minister suggests is an exploration--that is, a Greek representative, Professor Erim of Turkey, and Mr. Acheson would meet to explore quietly the possibilities of some kind of action and to narrow the differences between the two sides. During that interval, Turkey would attempt to keep the Turk-Cypriots quiet. We would certainly fear the consequences should we have to tell Prime Minister Inonu that, despite his desisting from military action, we had been unable to arrange any useful alternative.
Prime Minister Papandreou repeated that the GOG would be willing to begin exploratory talks with Turkey. If there appeared to be room for talks he would then appoint someone for real negotiations, but given the present positions of the two Governments, there is little point at present of undertaking actual negotiations. Even though Greece and Turkey may be close now, there must first be cautious preliminary contact.
On Mr. Ball's invitation Mr. Acheson commented that in insisting that there be peace on Cyprus before serious negotiations, the Prime Minister was raising the old chicken-egg question. He asked whether any pacification is possible until the views of Turkey and Greece are closer than they are now. Mr Acheson said no solution can fully satisfy both parties, but what is important is maintaining peace. He said the Prime Minister speaks of principles and theory, but as Mr. Acheson grows older, he believes more and more that general principles do not decide specific cases. The Prime Minister's suggestion would place the talks in too narrow a framework. There must be more room for flexibility.
The Prime Minister replied that in this case the principle comes from a concrete case on which he had generalized. The point is, he said, that if the impression is given that negotiations are underway and they then fail, there would certainly be trouble. So there must be a reconnaissance first. He said he defended the principle of self-determination. If he did not, the Greek-Cypriots would follow their own way, and he could not influence them. If the United States thinks negotiations are possible, does it have an opinion about a final solution?
The Under Secretary replied that Prime Minister Inonu had asked a similar question and Mr. Ball's answer now would be the same: any USG-sponsored solution would be condemned to failure. But in the course of Mr. Acheson's talks he could evoke certain points of view, and he might then be able to say that A is better than B. Mr. Ball turned to self-determination, saying that the USG had long advanced such an approach to international problems, but, in looking at Cyprus, there are a number of elements of which self-determination is only one. He said Mr. Acheson would try to identify all of the elements on each side. If we do not do something, America's influence over the GOT would rapidly dissipate, and the consequences could be terrifying. Mr. McNamara and General Taylor are here to discuss these possible consequences.
The Prime Minister said the GOG has great esteem for Mr. Acheson and accepts in principle his offer to make contacts on both sides. If, after these contacts, Mr. Acheson thinks actual negotiations would be useful, then the Prime Minister would appoint a representative.
Mr. Acheson said there are several elements immediately obvious. One is that of prestige and dignity. No solution can humiliate either side; nor can it be a complete victory for either side. Secondly, is the question of security, which concerns Turkey more than Greece. Therefore, the GOG should be sympathetic on this issue. Next come the people of Cyprus. The Prime Minister has said this element is more important to Greece, but actually it is also important to Turkey.
Prime Minister Papandreou said he was glad Mr. Acheson had included the Cypriot people in his listing. The greatest weight must be given to that element--its rights to a majority decision and its right to appeal to the UN. He said he also agreed that the security element is more significant for Turkey. He continued, however, that Mr. Acheson must be aware that the Greek starting position for any negotiations is unrestricted independence for Cyprus.
Mr. Ball commented that this would be a negotiation beginning with the conclusion and, therefore, would not be a negotiation at all.
Mr. Acheson said the purpose of two-party negotiations is not to take an unchangeable stand, but rather to see what can be accomplished. If the GOG sticks to its position, the GOT will not change its views about the binding validity of the present treaties and Turkey's resulting right of intervention.
Prime Minister Papandreou insisted that there is no alternative to unrestricted independence. Mr. Ball replied that he agrees the present system on Cyprus has not worked. We must search for others. There are dangerous forces at work, and we must be practical; as the President said during the morning meeting, the USG cannot make moral judgements on this crisis. We are in a grey area in which neither Cypriot community has met 20th Century moral standards. The only choice is a compromise solution.
The Prime Minister concluded that he had expressed his views and heard those of the Americans. He would give his reply to their proposals before leaving Washington./3/
/3/For text of the joint communiqu? issued on June 25 by President Johnson and Prime Minister Papandreou, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 582-583.
76. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
New York, June 26, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Memcons Other Than Visits. Secret; Exdis-TUG. Drafted by Cleveland and Yost and approved in U on June 29.
SUBJECT
Cyprus
PARTICIPANTS
U Thant, Secretary General of the UN
Mr. Tuomioja, UN Mediator
George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State
Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the UN
Charles W. Yost, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs
Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
I.
In morning session with the UN Mediator Tuomioja, Under Secretary Ball and Ambassador Stevenson (with Ambassador Yost, Assistant Secretary Talbot and Assistant Secretary Cleveland) outlined upshot of Washington conversations with Prime Minister Inonu and Papandreou, and asked whether Mr. Tuomioja would be prepared to ask Greek and Turkish Governments to appoint representatives to assist him, ask the United States to provide someone to help, and arrange private Greek-Turkish talks as part of the UN mediation framework.
Mr. Tuomioja said he personally considered this "a practical approach", but as "UN man", he had to consider following angles and discuss them with the Secretary General:
(a) He saw no difficulty in his asking Greek and Turkish Governments provide representatives to assist him in finding a permanent solution.
(b) He thought something would have to be done to cut the Cypriots in. He was clear they should not be in the Greek-Turkish meetings as such, but should perhaps be available somewhere nearby so that Mr. Tuomioja could keep in consultation with the Government of Cyprus. Mr. Tuomioja made clear he regarded this as window dressing at this stage.
(c) He did not like Camp David as a site, preferring somewhere in Switzerland. Recognizing that Geneva is quite accessible to daily contact with the press, he mentioned Lausanne or Evian as possibilities.
(d) He found most difficulty with his designating an American to help him or asking the United States Government to do so. He clearly thought this would produce considerable political heat from the Russians, Cypriots and others, and wanted to consider with the Secretary General how much of this kind of heat the United Nations could properly take.
On the substance of the solution, he said in his opinion "only basis is enosis", with whatever compensation is necessary to make it palatable to the Turks. But he also commented that the "Makarios solution", which he defined as unrestricted independence leading rapidly to enosis, would not be so bad.
He was not surprised to learn that the Turks were relatively easy to deal with in Washington, while the Greeks were making difficulties. The Turks are in "very weak" position, unless they play their ultimate card. The Greeks naturally believe that the United States will prevent the Turks playing that card; counting on the United States, therefore the Greeks feel that they "have it their own way."
II.
A meeting of the same Americans with the Secretary General (also Bunche and Rolz-Bennett) followed:
The Under Secretary opened with a summary of the events since February as the United States sees them, stressing the Turkish threats, and Turkish "bitterness and frustration" when dissuaded from action by the United States. The United States had decided we could help best by having the Greeks and Turks get together with Mr. Dean Acheson at a private retreat such as Camp David.
The Turks had agreed, but the Greeks evidently found difficulties with this proposition. Papandreou had made strong domestic commitments that he would not talk with the Turks under US pressure; and the Greeks anyway think time is on their side. Mr. Ball said the United States had made clear we would not fight an ally ("You couldn't sink Turkish ships," commented U Thant); the Under Secretary added that our influence in Ankara might prove a wasting asset.
At the end of the Papandreou discussions in Washington, Mr. Ball said, the Greeks agreed that they would do anything the Mediator asks them to do, including designating representatives or even meeting jointly with Mr. Acheson if the Mediator requests it. Mr. Ball then reported on our conversation with Tuomioja. The Secretary General said Tuomioja had also meanwhile reported to him.
The points the Secretary General made in reply were these:
(a) The UN Mediator is competent to adopt whatever procedures he wishes, but asked the Secretary General for political advice on US suggestions.
(b) The Secretary General and Tuomioja have agreed that it would be useful to ask Greek and Turkish Governments to provide representatives to assist in finding a permanent solution.
(c) The resulting discussions should probably be in Geneva rather than in the United States.
(d) The Secretary General thought that any formula for designating Mr. Acheson as counsel to the UN Mediator would create difficulties under the Security Council Resolution of March 4th.
(e) The Secretary General's counterproposal was that Tuomioja would invite the Turks and the Greeks to designate representatives to meet with him in or near Geneva, on the understanding that Tuomioja was also free to consult with a representative of the United States (Dean Acheson). Mr. Acheson could be close by and in frequent touch with the Mediator as conversations proceeded.
The Under Secretary said in his judgment the contribution of the United States would not be worth anything on this basis, and a lengthy discussion followed.
The Secretary General made clear that he did believe "the United States is in the best position to contribute to a peaceful solution of this problem" and that it would be useful for the United States to be constructively related to the mediation process. But he was sure that if the United Nations served as cover for United States participation, it would make great difficulties for the Secretary General under the Security Council Resolution. His point was that the Security Council Resolution provides for appointment of a Mediator with the consent of all four governments concerned (Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and Cyprus). If Cyprus, or any of the others decided that the Mediator was operating in an unsatisfactory manner, and so declared to the Secretary General, U Thant said he would have no alternative but to terminate Tuomioja's services and get another mediator.
The Secretary General also argued that the presence of Acheson as a UN representative would increase likelihood Cypriots would want to be represented too and he predicted the Soviets would ask for a Security Council meeting to complain of manner in which the Secretary General was discharging his responsibility under March 4 Resolution. Some political risk was acceptable, but as Ralph Bunche put it, the risk was too high if the Mediator provided cover for a US operation. "Perhaps the mediator is expendable but the Secretary General is not."
In the course of this discussion, the Secretary General and Mr. Bunche came around to a somewhat more flexible proposal, under which Mr. Acheson, operating not as UN counsel but as a representative of the United States Government, would meet not only with Tuomioja but also with the Greeks and Turks, together or separately as seemed most useful. But such meetings would have to be worked out on spot with the Greeks and the Turks rather than taking place under the UN Mediator's direct sponsorship.
The Secretary General seemed not to share fully our sense of urgency in a quick solution, though Ralph Bunche commented at one point that the United Nations Force in Cyprus is in an increasingly untenable position, with the continuing inflow of arms and growing bitterness between the two ethnic groups.
In the course of discussions, the Under Secretary mentioned that the Mediator had made known to the Turks his personal view that a likely permanent solution was enosis with Greece. This was clearly news to both the Secretary General and Bunche, who said this had not been included in any report by the Mediator; they could fully understand the dangerous effect of such comments by a UN Mediator on sensitive Turkish nerves. The Under Secretary made clear that the United States has no position on an ultimate solution, but doubted that any straight enosis recommendation by the Mediator was a useful starting-point for the substantive discussions.
III.
After luncheon for Prime Minister Papandreou, the Secretary General informed Ambassador Yost of the substance of his conversation with the Prime Minister before lunch, as follows:
Papandreou had said he is entirely willing, if the UN Mediator so requests, to designate a Representative to meet with a Turkish Representative and with Tuomioja at any time. If meeting is to take place in New York, the Prime Minister would designate the Greek Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Bitsios. The Secretary General replied that Tuomioja would be making his headquarters for the time being in Geneva and the meetings could be held there.
When the Secretary General raised question of the presence of a United States Representative at these meetings, Prime Minister Papandreou replied he would not wish a US Representative to be formally designated by Mr. Tuomioja as advisor or counsel or to take part in meetings of Greeks and Turks chaired by Mr. Tuomioja. When the Secretary General proposed, however, that Mr. Dean Acheson as US Representative might be available in Geneva, "even in next room or in next building", to meet separately with mediator, and with Greek and Turkish Representatives, in order assist in search for settlement, Prime Minister Papandreou replied that this would be entirely agreeable to him.
The Secretary General commented that this seemed to him a reasonable arrangement which should take account of our views and needs without risking the kinds of difficulties which he had outlined to us this morning. He added that Prime Minister Papandreou and Mr. Tuomioja were at that moment discussing details of the proposed arrangement.
Subsequently, Ambassador Yost called Mr. Tuomioja who said he had reached agreement with Prime Minister Papandreou along the lines the Secretary General had described, and would be addressing to the United States about July 6 an invitation to send a representative to Geneva to be available for consultation. He has in mind himself proceeding to Geneva from Cyprus July 4, and opening the meeting with Greeks and Turks early the following week. He would keep closely in touch with Mr. Acheson, and believed the Greeks and the Turks would do likewise.
He said he plans to hold conversations with the Greeks and the Turks at UN headquarters in Geneva (the Palais des Nations) but that meetings with Mr. Acheson might take place wherever convenient to all concerned. He was confident of his ability to carry on negotiations without undue press interference and did not contemplate any announcement to the press of the proposed Greek-Turkish talks until they actually begin. He did not intend before July 6 to address formal invitation to Greeks and Turks to meet with him.
Ambassador Yost emphasized the importance of extending an invitation to the Turks promptly so that they would know that the desired negotiations are about to commence and would hence be more likely to refrain from any hazardous action. Mr. Tuomioja saw the point and said that, after consultation with his UN colleagues, he would either address formal invitations to the Greeks and the Turks right away, or else would issue statement to the press announcing that he intends to extend such an invitation.
Comment: It is clear that the Secretary General cannot be pushed to provide United Nations sponsorship for mediation between the Greeks and the Turks essentially conducted by the United States. However, we must apply a sufficient proportion of US persuasion to a mediation process set up by the UN Mediator. Sine qua non is therefore that we make sure that all parties concerned at this stage (Greeks, Turks, SYG and Tuomioja) understand need for, and welcome, day-to-day discussions with US representative at or near the scene of mediation talks.
77. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
New York, June 26, 1964, 6:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 74 D 272, CF 2417. Secret; Exdis-TUG. Drafted by Talbot and approved in U on July 11. The meeting was held at the Plaza Hotel.
SUBJECT
Cyprus
PARTICIPANTS
Greek
His Excellency George Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece
His Excellency Andreas Papandreou, Minister-alternate for Economic Coordination
His Excellency Alexander A. Matsas, Ambassador of Greece
Mr. John Sossides, Chef de Cabinet of the Prime Minister
United States
The Honorable George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State
The Honorable Henry R. Labouisse, American Ambassador to Greece
The Honorable Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
The Honorable Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Mr. Ball called on Prime Minister Papandreou to confirm and pull together the results of several discussions earlier in the day that had involved the Greek Prime Minister's party, the Secretary General of the United Nations, the United Nations Mediator, and Mr. Ball and his colleagues. The Prime Minister was extremely tired. Three hours earlier he had cancelled a talk at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was cheerful, however. He felt he had reached a "perfect understanding" with the mediator, and could leave the United States having overcome the "mood of dispute" that characterized his Washington talks. Nevertheless, when pressed on details of the proposed arrangements, he continued to resist firmly all suggestions that the Greek and United States Governments could, if necessary, agree together to involve an American representative in the Cyprus discussions.
Observing that the Prime Minister had had a busy day in New York, Mr. Ball asked how he now saw the situation. The Prime Minister replied that happily he and the mediator, Ambassador Tuomioja, had reached total agreement. The mediator would be in Geneva and Mr. Papandreou would name a representative to meet with him. After that the mediator would have the total initiative; whatever he asked, Mr. Papandreou would accept. The meeting with the Secretary General, on the other hand, had been rather more difficult. In passing, U Thant had said that all people were speaking to him today about Dean Acheson. The Secretary General believed an impression of conspiracy would develop if Mr. Acheson were brought directly into the negotiations.
Mr. Ball said that in considering possible arrangements we had been sensitive to the political problems of the Prime Minister. We wanted to see a satisfactory solution. As he understood the agreed plan, the mediator would invite Mr. Acheson to Geneva and suggest to the Greek and Turkish representatives who would be there that there be some talks with Mr. Acheson as well. The Prime Minister said the mediator had not told him Mr. Acheson would see the representatives independently of himself. Mr. Cleveland noted that we had understood from Ambassador Tuomioja that he would prefer not to have four-way meetings. The mediator would meet with representatives of Greece and Turkey, and he expected that Mr. Acheson would do so also. The Prime Minister said he had understood the essence of the mediator's position to be that at the first stage any meetings with Mr. Acheson should be bilateral and not with the Greeks and Turks present together. The Greek and Turkish representatives would not meet together unless their Governments specifically agreed on that. However, he respected totally the initiative of Mr. Tuomioja.
Mr. Ball said we probably had the basis for the beginning of some talks. Success would depend on the will of the parties. Knowing it would not be easy, we were prepared to be helpful in any way we could. The Prime Minister expressed pleasure that we were now in agreement. He was also grateful for the initiative that had been taken by President Johnson. Greece needs peace, and for this it needs a final objective solution of the Cyprus dispute.
Mr. Ball commented that meanwhile we had received disturbing reports about conditions on the island itself. The Prime Minister replied that on those matters he would use all of his influence. We could count on that. He had told Mr. Tuomioja that as soon as the mediator's request arrived he would send a representative immediately to Geneva. The Prime Minister added that he was happy that we could meet today to show a change in the atmosphere to one of friendship and understanding rather than dispute.
The Prime Minister reiterated that so long as the mediator suggested a meeting between the Greek representative and Mr. Acheson it would be done. Mr. Ball concluded that this formula should help move things along if the parties so desired. Mr Talbot asked hypothetically what would be the situation if the mediator invited Mr. Acheson to Geneva but for one reason or another was shy about specifically asking the Greek and Turkish representatives to meet with him. There would be a general invitation but from what the Secretary General had said in the morning it was conceivable that the mediator would hesitate to make a formal request of the parties to meet with Mr. Acheson. Mr. Talbot said that if something like this should happen he assumed our two governments could work things out together. The Prime Minister replied that this would change the basic situation. It was essential that the mediator take the initiative. He could send a general invitation to all the parties. Just four men would be involved so there should be no mystery. It would need to be at the mediator's initiative, however.
Mr. Ball said that we understood the Prime Minister's approach. In a situation like this, of course, people must proceed pragmatically. We would have preferred a simpler situation, but we will work within the practical framework. As the President had said to the Prime Minister, we had been disappointed that we could not work out a more straightforward arrangement. Faced with the dangerous situation in Cyprus, however, we must do all we can. He could assure the Prime Minister that the United States would do everything possible to cooperate. As the Prime Minister had observed, Ambassador Labouisse was greatly trusted by the Secretary of State and the President and he could speak with an authoritative voice in discussing these matters with the Prime Minister. We would do what we could to get us all out of a very dangerous situation.
The Prime Minister once again thanked Mr. Ball, expressing his appreciation for the reception that had been given him in Washington, and confirmed that Ambassador Labouisse's many qualities made him a valuable cooperator in Athens. The discussion was left at that point.
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